ML19325D332
| ML19325D332 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 09/20/1989 |
| From: | Eckert E, Green W, Grim B GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19325D328 | List: |
| References | |
| EDE-32-0989, EDE-32-989, NUDOCS 8910230105 | |
| Download: ML19325D332 (75) | |
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' 1; CEHERAL EllCTRIC REPORT : )
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, ,LASALLE UNIT 2 1 j .
i SPURIOUS SCRAM l
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.oGE EDE-4344' SAN JOSE TEL.No. 498 935 4344 Sep 28 89 Staa P 03 TAhl.E OF QQNTEN1q Eh1EI 2A3 ract, rege 1 Trensatttet Letter 2 General Discussion 3 GE View of the conclusions $
AWS Determination 8 Cantactor Freventive Maintenance 9 Contactor Service Life 10 t
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,GE EDE-4344 SAN JOSE 408 925 4344 Sep.28,69 0:22 P.05 TEL.No. __
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t ammaut. niscussion l
on August 26, 1989, LaSalle Unit 2 was being shut down in order to perform i
- corrective maintenance. During the plant shutdown seguence, after the main l generator was separated froma the grid and with reactor power steady at 81 and !
the reacter mode switch in run', testing was being performed to check the leak tightness of the main turbine step valves and control valves. Con.
i current with, but not necessarily related to, the testing, a reactor scran j occurred. i
' t amou - a af tv nta At 0413 29, the reacter scras occurred. One second later the operator !
'beerved a rod drift alars and the A2/A3 acran 116ht8 11L' At 0413 41, the operator initiated a manual scram. At that time, the 8 backup scram channel actuated, i i
At 0414 an automatically generated computer printout of rod positions showed ,
- all rods moving or inserted.
b kalavant _b_ata en Plant canittiana From the plant computers, recorders and indicators, the following was firmly ;
established:
f No plant variables initially were beyond their required scram setpoints i except that the turbine stop valves were closed as a result of testing, but !
this scram trip was bypassed by turbine first stage low pressure (below 25 to 30 percent equivalent resetor power).
Control rods in groups 1 and 4 scrammed automatically. Scram group lights f 21, 162, 83, 84, Al and A4 were extinguished, i
The 'A' and *&* RPS 1/2 scrams. wore s 40 msee apart.
Backup scram A initiated. automatically.
Backup scram 8 did not initiate until the manual scram initiation.
The manual scram (A2/B2) de ener5 1 sed the K140 contactor, which de energized the remaining rod scram group li&hts. !
The recirculation pump RPT logie was not initiated. (The pumps had already been transferred to their low frequency M/0 set supply.)
Event Analvaia '
CECO analyzed the event and all available plant infora;ation in order to I determine: ,
1 l 1. Wat caused the screa and Wy was it initially a partial scram 2.
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T.EL No.. 408 925 4344 Sep.2.8.89 8:22 P.05
. GE EDE-4344 SAN JOSE i,i I :.
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tutensive data review and testing revealed no clear cause of the scram. The !
, initiator of the scras was a very short transient which was not sensed by the l readout equipment which was in service at the time, but the initiation pulso l, was sensed by a portion of the seran logic. The Rp$ logic has a specified I responu time of 50 milliseconds. The initiator was not a valid initiation signal, and the event was shorter than 50 millteocends; however, a scram was (
initiated even though there was no need to scras. I i
E M lar Event Bennaria I i
on september 8,1989 at shortly af ter 4 AN, a similar event occurred. It was i a half scras during testing of the IRNa while the reactor was shut down. !
' This time one contactor (Klap) of the 32 legte did not de energiE*. Data from l the sequence of events recorder showed that the IRN spike lasted fGr 28 !
l a1111 seconds.
l This event confirms the tapact of a short transient. Again, the contactors l l (
i do not do. energise at the same time, but they do de. energize within the l l system timing requirements.
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cE Analvala '
The initially partiel seras appears to be the result of a hardware anomaly.
The contactors are known to have similar but not identical response times. ,
This has been verified' by testing, and it may be all or part of the reason for the partial scram action. We reset function has some commonality j betwun the scram groups. We impact of a salfunction of the reset in ceaj'metion with a very short transient has bun reviewed, and testing has l been performed to assure that the reset was working properly. With a short ;
trans19nt scram signal l and ' failure of the - scram reset switch in a reset i position, the reset could be in effect, preventing seal in of the scram i contactors in two serne groups (1 and 4 er 2 and 3). If this signal was !
sustained for 50 milliseconds or longer, the reset would have been removed by !
redundant autoutic means since reset is prevented after a full scram for 10 ,
seconds (to allow full control rod insertion). i The testing of the reset switch showed that it worked properly, so it is 1 l
believed that the reset circuitry was in the proper configuration (no reset) j when the events occurred, i The sections that follow document GE Nuclear Energy's review of the event l j
analysis and conclusions drawn and give additional information on the scram 1 contactors and late developing issues. CENE believes that the total effort, including the CECO analysis, GE review and INpo independent analysis, establiches that the event was spurious. The acceptability of contactor performance appears good. The reset circuitry nuds more review and/or testing.
CE Nuclear Energy was informed, by CEC 0, of the event on August 26 and has i
vorked with them to determine its cause(s). This has included experienced i systems and hardware enginurs at the site and San Jose.
problem reviews were held in San Jose. Several reviews were Two full scale also supported l
at the plant, I i
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! TEL No. 400 935 43ad Sep,28,89 8:33 P.07 ]
GE EDE-4344 SAN JOSE j:- . j l.- )
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- . On september 6, 1989, a noeting was held at the GE offices in San Jose, l California, to review the information that was available for the event that t i occurred at the LaSalle Unit 2 Power Plant on August 26, 1989. ;
C1$0 Coisiusions and San Jana Itaview blacunniens ;
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- 1. Sea.e disturbance, not inticative of an actual plant condition, caused a !
- spurious actuation of part of the RPS logic. !
i l Discussion: GE agrees with this conclusion.
i 2. The source of the disturbance cannot be determined conclusively. ,
i Discussion: 08 agrees with this conclusion.
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- 3. One RFs contactor (E or G) did not trip from the disturbance. The other t contactor in the associated contactor pair did trip, indicating a . aster i
- time response. !
) Discussion: KPs contactor K14E and/or K140. did not respond to the f l disturbanco. Since contactors K14A and K14E '(also K14C and K14G) are in i parallel, both would be expected to do. energise at appreximately the ,
I same time. The lights for scram groups A2 and . A3. remained lit, which ;
confirms that contactor K14E and/or K140 did 'not do. energise for the same disturbance for which K14A and/or K140 de energised, i 4 The response tisie testing results . of the contactora has failed to i demonstrate any significant timing discrepancies between contactors during dropout testing. Because of this, the postulated cause of the ;
observed response is an intermittent physical binding of K14E or K140, i or minor variances in the trip / reset characteristics of K14 relay pairs :
A and E or C nd C. All of the *A' RPs contactors were inspected with a i boroscopo on August 28, 1989. No problems were seen, although very '
little of the contactor is observable by this method. !
r Discussion: subsequent momentary de energisation testing of the con. i tectors in place duplicated the behavior that was observed during tho l disturbance. A 4 millisecond band of time was identified where the C i contactor and another unassigned contactor would drop out but the E contactor would not. Because of this, the postulated cause of the l
observed response is a small variance in the -trip / seal in character. i istics between the A and E contactors and/or the C and G contactors but l 1s most likely the E contactor only, which was slower but still within l specifications. ;
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- 5. A scram signal that would have lasted long enough to have challenged the reactor or primary pressure boundary .would have do. energized the 1 contactors and scrammed all the control rods by normal automatic means and confirmatorily scrammed by backup scram, with the present contactors !
performing as they existed at the time of the event. !
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- TEL. fo.. ,,. 408 935 4344.Sep.88.09 8
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, Discussien: A valid scras signal that would have lasted long enough to !
have challenged the reactor or primary pressure boundary would have !
de.energised the contactors and scrammed all the control rods by normal i automatic means. This is substantiated by the fact that the RPS issued !
a full scran comund as expected when the manoel scram buttons for RPS !
logic channels A2 and 82 were neusted, and the manual scram signal is :
I one of the inputs to each of the automatic scram channels. In eddition. l the last surveillance test, which s!aulated a valid scras input signal, i successfully demonstrated the pre event contacter functionality, t i 6. The event ru ulted from a short spike in some set (less than all) of the ;
Rps channels. This spike did not constitute a valid scram signal since l the spike was not detected by.indleating equipment. In addition to the '
! spike, it appears that one scram contactor did not respond to the event
- because it ceted more slowly than the others.
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Discussion: The one scras contactor (E) that did not respond to the !
, disturbance me.y have failed to do so because it6 trip / seal.in response !
i time is slightly longer than its paired contoctor (A). A small l l time frame may exist such that, for very abort momentary signals, both ;
contactors would not respond equally as fast. - - !
l 7. Slow ruponse of a contactor would. likely be a mechanical problem due to j binding or sticking. The only other possibility is failure of the noin I suppression varistor across the contactor coil. Contactors and varistor should be inspected / tested to determine if these devices are in proper j operation. :
i Discussion: Inspection and testing of the contact'oro in the panels (in $
situ) and in the laboratory have shown them to be free of mater!als or nchenisms which could'have contributed to sticking or binding. Degrada. )
tion of the noise supprusion verister acrou the contactor coil could
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cause a very slight increase in contactor drop.out time. However, since the coils of both centactors and their associated noisa suppression i varistors are all in parallel (until at least one contactor has dropped '
out), any degradation would be expected to affect both contactors equally.
- 8. This event, does not constitute an AWS. An AWS is based on a fatture to sersa due to a common cause failure. It also means that a valid scram cause has occurred.
Discussion: GE discussion of AWS is given in a later section of this j report.
l 9. A comon cause failure did not occur. It appears that a single random I i failure occurred on one scram contactor. (Further, it appears that no l i failure would have occurred if the scram signal was sustained.) l Discussion: ct discussion of AWS is given in a later section of this a report. !
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GE E9E-4366 SAN JOSE TEL No.., 408925434aSeph889 8:24 P.09 j i >
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, j AC110NS TO &E TAKEN TO PREVENT REClit1ENCE ,
i The event was anomalous and was enseerbated by differences in trip / seal in [
characteristics. A program of periodic mechanical inspections may be con. I
' sidered.
- he event recording equipment should be .iviproved to allow better screa !
analysis, i I
ne IM testing procedures should be modified to assure the half scram is not !
reset until testing is completed, j 4 !
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408 925 4344.Sep 28 89 8:24 P.10 CE EDE-434.1 SAN JOSE TEL No. .
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he event which occurred at Lasalle 2 en August 26, 1989 should not be l l equated to an ATVS event. This determination is bued on two considerations.
First, an Anticipated Transient Without Stras (ATUS) La en event in which a condition requiring scras occurs followed by failure of the Reacter Protection l l System (RPS) to shut down the reacter. From the evidence which is avails' ale, l
no operational transient requiring scram occurred. With the STARTR50 ;
recorder sampling data en a period of 20 milliseconds, no change was seen l which would have indicated that a process variable chs. aged such that a seras j
, value was reached. It should be noted that, any variable change which might 6 tend to signal for a screa, would cause other varteblos to change on a slower l time basis. Fat instance, had Neutron Plux (power) stven a .brief ourse, this l would have had an influence en primary systes pressure as additional stens J
was generated. No such secondary variebte activity to shown. There is no (
evidence that any process , variable was altered sufficiently to approach a r screa setpoint, thus there to no' evidence of an event for which scraa should i have occurred. ;
For the second consideration, the evidence shows that if a scran signal had !
been sustained, a scram would have occurred. It appears that the cause of '
the trip was so somentary that it did not reach,the disconnect threshold of some of the trip devices. Scram contactors 14(#) and 14(0) of seras group, 2 ,
and 3 did not de energito. The contactor 14(E) may have a slightly slower '
response than the other contactor 14(A) for the sano logic signal. Thus, for a somenta7y signal the 14(A) contactor responded but the 14(E) contaccor did ,
net. There probably was no response from 14(G) contactor again because the disturbance was so short that this device did not reach the dropout threshold or because no signal was received in that channel. In either case, no contactor failure took place. Contactor 14(G) probably did not receive a <
signal at all. Had a valid signal occurred, scram would have been complete.
This is evidenced by the fact that, when a valid scraa si 5nal did occur (aanuel scram buttons for RPS logic channels A2 and 82 actuated) the 14(G) ;
contactor dropped out, and the remaining rods scrammed.
Since there was no Anticipated Transient and there was no fatture to scram, an AWS did not occur. Further, had an Anticipated Transient occurred, it is :
expected that a proper scree would have taken place, i i
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. GE EDE-4344 SAN JOSE TEL No., 408 925 4344 Sep 28 89 8:25 P.11 ;
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- , f coNTacTom rasVRuftvg MAINianucg l i I
. EtCaentunaT10p FOR PERVENTIVE h1NTENANCE OF }
l p S ACRAM 00NTACTQtA IN THE CQNTEDL RDON f i
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&ACK0ROUNDl , f i
- These devices are in a clean, moisture and corrosion free environment. The j levels of dust are limited by Control Roon NVAC, the control panel (without .
deers) and sentactor enclosure. Woro is ne source of. oil and grease in the i area. We contactors are energised and de energised more frequently than '
Constects are not accessible without disassembly. Disassembly
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l ence a y6ar. !
et contactors without reason to believe that a. probles exists is not l recommended. , . ,
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OE recommnds that the following be performed on one' ccntactor each refueling !
outage' !
. i MAINTENANCEt , l
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- 1. Check tightness of terminals.
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- 2. Inspect the armature / coil anting surfaces for Nreign. substances. !
Notes: 1) Do not oil or grease the magnet nating;purfaces. [
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- 2) If a problem is belf oved to exist. , disassembly of contactor !
should be performed to CEH 2416B teatruction book, which was !
supplied with the contactor, ,.
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- 3) Preventive maintenance recommendations are extracted from NEMA Standard ICS 2.3 " Instructions for.the Handling, Installation, [
Operation and Maintenance of Motor Control Centers', which ;
addresses contactors, f
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TEL No. 606935434ISep28,89 8:25 P.13 j 4
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l The service life of the contactors in the scran circuit is the same as the f
< mechanical life and is $0,000 operations. This should be in excess of 40 l yests and exceeds the calculated coil life (based on years of operation et i service conditions) and demonstrated contact life (20.000 operations). !
1 (Actual coil and contact condition can be determined by test or inspection, !
and replacement at the calculated / demonstrated life may be shown to be :
unnecessary.) coil and contact life is not critical' to the scram contactor i safe operation. i i
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~ DEVIAT!W INVElfleAtle REPtaf TEXT OmfilalATim Pero how 2.0 PAHE MR C-FACitlTT nRpt St@$11TIAL REVl51CBI STA Lal1T YEAR lasant itsett 01 1 01 1 81 0 - 01310 - 01 0 2 0F 013
' dalle e- ^y
. Stattaa unit 2 __
TEXT Energ industry identification System (Ell 5) codes are identified in the test as (XX)
- 8. DESCRIPfl0N OF IVliff (Continued) l 2C11A 41003C and 2C71Ade030, will hypass a Turtine Centrol Valve /Turtine Step valve closure' These pressure switches will also bypass a
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the reactor is operating at less than 305 themel power.
downshift signal to the teacter Recirculation (IR, 033) (AD) pumps (500-41PT) when the reacte operating at less than 30E themel power and the W.in Turbine Step or Centrol Valves close. i t
The 2C11A4203A and 2C11A-410038 (channels A and 8) pressure switches were verlflod to b within a11ewa61e lletts. ,
unit 1 was not affected by this event.
C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT ,
Appropriate ad,)ustments were made to The apparent cause of this event was due to instrument drift.
satisfactorily bring the pressure switch's setpoints back within allowable lletts as specified in the procedure. This is true for both the 2C11A-N003C and 2C71A-4f0030 pressure switches.
D. SAFETY AnALT515 0F EVENT 5 The "As Found" setpoints of the 2C71A41003C and 2C71A-4f0030 pressure switches had very little lap '
the design requirements of the Reactor Protection system. Pressure switch 2C71Aas003C was found to Pressure actuate at 153.8 psig which exceeds the Technical Specifications required 151.8 psig by 2 psl.
switch 2C71A-N0030 was found to actuate at 154.5 psig which escoeds the required 15,1.8 psig These "As Found" values correspond to less than the 30E themal power requirement during nomal operation of the turbine.
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l In addition, in the event the Turbine Stop Valves or the Turbine Control Valves closed with the 2C71A-40003C and 2C71A-N0030 in their "As Found" condition, the other redundant 2C71A41003A and i 2C71A-H0038 pressure switches would not have bypassed the scrm signa) at less than the Technica Specifications specified tertine first stage pressure of 140 psig and the required auto-scram wo occurred as designed. In addition, per station procedure, the Reacter Recirculation pumps would already have been downshifted and the downshift signal generated by the Turbine Valve closure would have ha effect on the plant or the reactor at reactor powers slightly greater than the 30E thermal power limit ,
for 80C-JIPT.
Based on the above, the safety significance of the event is considered minimal and no adverse consequences resulted from this event. ,
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LP""*" 6 i L _i(taalTfRYimmiM= Tim n.ee Cil LAR _ ~ ~ (6)
WCKET safeta (2) !
I FACILITY N W (1) Year y Sequential /p nevisten oI1i1 - oI o of 5 . oF of s !
i i =11e e-w statlan mit i oI5ieieIo 1 21 11 4. e i e -
i itsi Energy ladustry leontificatten System (8115) oedes are identified in the tent as (KK) l
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C. AppAAtWT CA ME OF EvtWT (Continued) f 6
- 5) Varlster current check
- 6) Col) shorted turns test f
- 7) Temperature rise test I
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Early evaluations indicate that the pulse which initiated the trip s ?
' logic pair.
i Latensive testing was done by Systm Operational Analysis Department (5040), with vender and NRCA I
absorvers to look for abaenasiltles la the removed Klet and K148 contacters and in a new contacter.N l i
This testing has found no identifiable pmbism with the Kidt or Elet contactor, i demonstrated a repeatable condition where narrow pulse actuations (between 4 and 12 ellitseco !
occasionally result in one contacter in the pair dropping out and the other remaining energized. !
it has been concluded that based on the available data that the RPS actuation However, was are the enact details due to a spurj i
signal and was not due to any real change in a plant process variable. ;
- not discoverable. I The manual scram was a valid scrm signal and perfonned as espected and designed.
O. SAFETY ANALYS15 0F EVENT i Initiation of the event was not due to an actual transient on a parameter which is monitored to protect the reactor. All systems, when required to operate, functioned as designed.
The delay in the operation of these cantacters caused the insertion delay of two groups of reds.
insertion of two rod groups is sufficient to ensure the reactor is subcritical in het shutdown.
Reviews of the camputer scan of rod positions which was requested at the time of the scram indicated >
This shows that the actuations of the.'A" backup scram channel was that all rods were being inserted. valves of the last two sufficient to cause the scram air header to blood down enough to open the scre) groups of 'eds and cause them to begin moving before the Operator manually scranmod the reactor This event is not espected to have been worse at higher power levels since no actual plant transie occurred during the event.
Due to the redundancy of the Reactor Protection System components and the satisfactory response o; required support systems, the safety consequences of this event are minlasl.
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Lttsanff EVENT REPERT (LIR) TEHT -miitialA11tm h (M LER sB9AER (el _
PACILITY siffE (1) DOCKET im8SER (2)
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, TERT Energy Industry Identification System (Ell 5) codes are identified in D l'
E. CORRECTIVE ACil0N5 Ihe Operating Deperteent generatod procedure putdance to prevont the deactivetion o!
devices while major evolutions are in progress and delay the start of enje l
recording devices were operable. l l
I has been revised with the following guldence:
l 1)
The SER alam typer will not be turned off during evolutions that have a high potential for ja uneapocted transient. l l
- 2) Provide options which can be used to deal with nuisance alems. l l
In addition, the leportance of the SER in post event evolutions has been included in Opera!
l Options for leproving the availability of the SER v111 be pursued tracked by Action item Al l
! 374-200-4g-03701.
f Response time tests were conducted on these scram contactors in an attenyt to identify fau !
- During the test equipment hookup to the A1 I
' and/or quantify the magnitude of their response times.
subchannel, the partiet scram condition appeared to ta repeated only once in many attemp' !
and A3 Ilghts did not doenergise as quickly as did the Al and A4 lights. This trip signal wa while setting up the santtoring instraents and, though it was observed by personnel in the Cont i hoon, was not recorded.
Subsequent attempts to repeat the event at varying tlass failed to repeat the locause of this second '
unusual dropout behavior of the suspected 'E' contactor or identify its cause, observation of steller behavior as the Inillal scram and the repeated successful tests on I conttctor, the 'E' contactor was considered to be suspect.The two renoved contactors have been KleG contactors have been replaced. l System Operational Analysis Department (50A0) to be analyzed for potential failure nochan These were: l The 50A0 testing and inspection of the removed contactors consisted of 4 phases. !
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- 1. Detailed inspection of "as found" conditions prior to removal. !
- 2. Preliminary non-destructive response time characteristics testing of the contactor and assoc ;
varistor (voltage spike suppressor).
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- 3. Olsassembly and inspection with vendor and teRC observation.
- 4. Reassembly and testing of response times under varied trip demand conditions. ;
t Phase 1 discovered the presence of fire retardant cable packing which had vibrated out of the f This was not considered to be related to the problem undwr entering the top of the contactor housing. !
evaluation. !
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Fem Rev 2.0-LLcsansr ivaNT aEPoRT (LER)un TET wilsalATtes Paes (3) l I
assunta (61 j coCEET safeER (2) //
g,novisten 8ACILITY a mt (1) Tear / 5eemential'
//f -e j l 18 r yrt oiti1 oI o el 1 oF OL1 cI5loIoIo 1 31 71 4 8Ie latalte lfER1 county statten unit IEnergy Industry leentification System (El!$) codes are identified in th!
l E. 00RRECityt AC110N5 (Continued) f; Phase 2 demonstrated that it was possible to doenergise a single contactor in a pale if
'pu1Se* is short enough, between 8 and 12 milliseconds.
All sovable Phase 3 discovered no unusual conditions inside the contactor moving asseely or contacts. i surfaces were free of foreign asterial which could cause binding or stleking, and no p The above mentioned packing asterial was present inside the contactor body, Ii Cf any parts was found.small guantitles. This dry, soft asterial was not seen to potentially inte ,
movement, les contact welding was indicated. )
Dropout tests of the parette) contactors
- Phase 4 involved detailed simulation of the plant logic chain. (Phase 1 tests had used a solid was perfomed using the same relay contact configuration as the plant.la this way, rendem portionl ,
state switching device to drop out the contactors.)
would simulated.
be interrupted by the driving relay contacts, and the pos !
power to scram contactor for intervals of 8 to l$ ellliseconds would result in a singlei dropping out apprealmstely once in 10 to to demands.
observed infomation to date.
on Septeeer 8,1989 t'ollowing the performance of LaSalle Instrument Surveillance Lil-NR-402,
'Intemediate Range Monitor Rod Stock and Reactor $ cram Functional Test' on the 0 Intemodi p Monitor (IMR) (10), the 0 IM function swltch was moved from OPERATE Thisto was TRIP TEST and ba done to l uith the IMOP 1NMilli button depressed. (This bypasses During thisthe Inoperative action scram signal.)
the RPS subchannel was i
verify proper operations but was not part of L15-NR-402.When the mode suitet eas moved from 1 RIP 1EST l reset (which is not the case during the norest Lis). RPS rod groups 52 and 83 were dropped but SI ,
OPE 4Af t, a Hi-H1 signal was generated for a short period. Investigations did not and b4 did not trip. '
During the investigation it was learned that the channel C and 0 Turbine This First did $tage Pres ,
were found to be out of tolerance in the non-conservative direction due to instrument del not affect the sequence of events. Deviation report (1-2-99-039) and they have since been recalibrated.
AIR 314-200-09-03702 will be issued to track a A continuing investigation is ongoing into this event.
supplement to this report with the conclusions of the investigation.
- f. PREVIOUS EVENT 5 None.
l G. COMPONENT FA1 LURE DATA I
Model Nunteer MFC Part Nunteer Manufacturer Nomenclature CR-105 CRl05002 General Electric Scram Contactor CR105X100E
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Par. Ass 2.0 l L: e*=35 EVENT L ai (Lati TEMT u i'*"'* TIM As G) l l Las r_- ^ 16) ,
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TEXT Energy ladustry identification Systa (E115) codes are teentified in the test as (XX] i E. CORRECTIVE ACTION 5 l Tuttine First Stage Pressure Switch 2C714 41003C and 2C71A 40030 were lamediately adjusted within the required ranges at the time of the surveillance.
A review of the last five calibration receres shows only one aL4)tional case where the switch had exceeded its Techalcal specification setpoint of 151.8 psig. Fram this it is. concluded that the i setpoints and calibration frequency ere appropriate. Action its Record 374-200 4 9 4 3901 has been generated to track results os the nest perfomance of LIP-TG401 auf LIP-TS-501 (Unit 1) to con; conclusion.
F. PREVIOUS EVENTS OVR Number Title 1-143470 Reactor Scrm on Main Turbine M5V/CV Closure Scran Signal G. .Cof90NENT FAILURE DATA Namenc14ture Model thseer MFG Ftrt Number i Manufacturer 82T-#Il255-GE N/A l Barksdale Control Pressure Switch ,
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APPENDIX B CECO ENGINEERING REPORT COffTACMR TEST PLAN AND RESULTS 9
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9/27/69 ;
i TEST CONCLUSIONS FOR THE LASALLE UNIT 2 RPS CONTACTORS K14E AND.K44G L
On September 6, 1989, System Operational Analysis Department under the direction of the Nuclear Engineering Department, began testing on the LaSalle Unit 2 RPS Scram contactors K14E and K14G. In aCdition, a'new spare contactor, GE type CR 205D122, was also tested'to provide benchmark data.
This testing was performed at the laboratory facilities of the System Operational Analysis Department, Maywood, Illinois. The puspose 'of the tests was to determine the operating characteristics of the contactors and-the response of the.contactors when subjected to a short interruption of its source voltage. The testing was conducted in accordance.with a Test Plan and '
a' Test Plan Supplement developed by the Nuclear Engineering Department. Both the Test Plan and the Test Plan Supplement are attached and are part of this l report.
All testing performed on contactors K14E and K14G result in the '
conclusion that these contactors were and are in good operating order. The
- mechanical and electrical tests along with'the non-destructive disassembty of the two contactors did not reveal any deficiencies with either K14E or KitG. ,
The following conclusions and observations are drawn from the data gathered during the tests.
P 1 Small amounts of Thermo Fiber found in the contactors would not have impeded the movement of the armature and thus did not impair their operation.
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- 2. When K14E and K14G are connected in parallel and are energized, one of the two contactors m.cy de-energize when an 8-12 millisecond interruption in the power to their coils occurs. Interruptions greater than 12 milliseconds will result in both contactors de-erergizing. An interruption less than 8 milliseconds will result in both contactors' remaining energized. This occurred after approximately 1000 test initiations of power interruption to the coils. There were 11 occurrences where one of the two contactors de-energized. The approx imate 1000 test initiations include test configurations with K14E and K14G being connected in parallel with each other, and with either one in parallel with the new CR205 contactor. It cannot be concluded that every time an 8-12 millisecond interruption'in the power to the coils occurs one of two contactors will de-energize. What can be concluded is'that for an 8-12 millisecond interruption in the power to the parallel connected contactors, it is P.LaE4hin to de-energize one of two parallel connected contactors.
The testing does indicate that, for interruptions to the contactors greatnr than 12 milliseconds, both devices will de-energize. Therefore, initiation from the manual scram button will result in a unit scram.
(:) s'~' (
Prepared by: '
0 bC' t-r'.s R.E. Grams 'Y'Y# 7 Nuclear Engineering Dept.
i Approved by:
/ j ('- /p/ and 'b /w A.) Jaras G.P. Wagner System Operat.ional Analysis Dept. Nuclear Engineering Dept.
Manager Manager 1042E i REG /psb l
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5 b t September /,1989 f er e LaSalle County Station Unit 2 .
Test Plant Operability of RPS Contactors K14E and K140, G.E. Contactor Type CR105D102 .
Testing wi31 be conducted at tha CECO Technical Center facility in Haywood, IL by the Electronics Relay Section of System Operational Analysis Dept. under the direction of the Nuclear Engineering Dept.
Purpose Conduct non destructive electrical and mechanical tests of the CR105D102 contactors to determine if the contactors have failed or are degraded.
References:
- 2) LST-89-096 Unit '2' Scram Relay Inspection and Functional Test gg v.a . .. . vo . .ag s
- e r**>s - or.~.. . c. Aor ? V r.. r .* ~k a jfu o Prerequisitest ))IMI*"[oa$*'of'testpikshallbemadebytheNuclear pp v Engineering Department
- 2) Document all test equipment numbers and latest calibration.
- 5) G !. <<<< c A hs.,c Arvlery h<r..r. 6ff 1w 124 '*Ar I fu I y ,, , , ,, to.'
s.) 62 unria zu fr.s r.o e er so.r m ,.a:. c*.*r sa - 62 W 2 v// d -
- 1) c.n./ae/usD/)*so Des l***nna . G t. Teted.1 6 c-,ru.w (rye cws) 61 M 2 UAi9Yo At*' k l l
Test Approval: 8 7I/Fr
- l K.M. Uhlir M
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I R.E. Grams 9/(p Electrical /It.C De' sign /PgC Superintendent Nuclear Engineering Dept.
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I. Removal of Contactors K14E and K140 ,
A. Take photographs of contactor installation and surroundings.
B. With K14E and K14G both in the energized state, measure and record r temperature inside the contactor housing C. Prior to the removal of the contactors, perform a inspection of the conta: tor surroundings. Inspect for the following:
- 1) Varnish deposits inside contactor housing.
- 2) Any foreign materini inside contactor housing. t
- 3) Any physical presence that could inhibit armature movement. \
D. Place a piece of plastic underneath the contactors prior to removal in order to collect any material or deposits that might fall loose from the contactor. Any material collected will be saved for possible ;
further analysis. (Analysis may be performed by System Materials Analysis Dept.) i After removal, conduct inspection of contactor without disassembling [
E.
the contactor. Inspect for the following:
- 1) Any deposits or material on the esternals of the, contactor.
- 2) Verify all movable elements including the. armature and auxiliary contacts are not restricted. Inspect for mechanical interference, '
deterioration, corrosion, etc.
- 3) Correct assembly of the contactor. Inspect for missing elements or incorrect assembly.
F. Record the dimensions of the contactor housing.
Note: The remainder of the test plan will be conducted at Tech Center r
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II. Mechanical Tests
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A. Conduct armature push tests to verify correct spring :eturn action at ambient and elevated temperatures.
3, verify main contact synchronisation by manual actuation of the
C. Verify aur. contact synchronisation by manual actuation of the contactor.
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I III. Electrir a1 Tests - Contactors K14E and K14G
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, A. With the contactor coil de-energized and at ambient temperature measure and record coil resistance and aus. "B" contacts. Megger between all terminals, coil and case. Compare measured resistance
- j. . value to the resistance determined in LST-89-096.
t B. Energize the coil of the contactors with 120 V.A.C. and verify the. I following:
- 1) Temperature rise of the coils are within acceptable limits. F . * * . ,
&ne .
- 2) No mechanica1' interference between elements occur while at the normal t- elevated temperature rise.
- 3) Measure and record the main "A" contacts h / re v i
- resistance. Compare measured resistance values to the contact i resistances determined in LST-89-096.
l C. Determine the drop out voltage of the contactor. Measure the time response of the contactor to de-energise (drop out). Verify main l contact and aus. contact s'ynchronisation. , l D. Verify excitation current is within acceptable limits. Vary' current and observe changes in armature movement. Measure contactor coil current on energisation and upon de-energisation.
l E. Determine the voltage pick up of the contactors. Nessure time l response of the contactor to energise. VW'6 ** 2 (so r . P u =' l l'" I er .,, go m - .fy oo. a o .a . . . u .
F. Use variable pulse widths to determine drop out of the contactors.
Determine minimum pulse width to drop out contactor. !
l G. Repeat steps C thru F with the associated varister connected in parallel with the contactor coll.
H. Conduct a shorted turns tests to verify that no short turns exist !
within the coll. j i .
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. 1 IV. Electrical Tests - Varistor R14E, R14G and R14A . l G.E. Type V130LA20A '
)
1 A. Measure and record resistance of the varistors. Compare measured !
resistance valur,s to the resistances determined in LST-89-096.
- a. Measure and record current of the varistors at 120 VAC Cu l
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V. Electrical Tests - Contactors and Varistors I In order to simulate normal contactor operation the following test will be conducted with the K14E (K14G) contactors electrically connected in .
parallel with a spare contactor type CR105D102, CR205D or CR305D. In addition, the varistors R14E (R14G) and R14A will be electrically connected in parallel with the contactors.
A. . Measure the time response of the contactors to de-energise.
l B. Determine the drop out voltage of the contactors.
C.- Determine the pick up voltage of the contactors. ,
D.. Measure time response of the contactor to energise. I E. Use variable pulse widths to determine drop out of the contactor. l Determine minimum pulse width required to drop out only one. contactor and both contactors.
F. Using a humidity and temperature controlled device vkry the temperature and humidity o~f the parallel contactor arrangement (within acceptable operating range) and per2ona steps A thru E. >
G. Hi-pot between all terminals, coil and case.
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VI. Detailed Visual Inspection (nondestructive disassembly) i A. Inspect for pole face polishing B. Verify thet the roundness of the contacts have not become flat. Both [
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l main and aus contacts shall be inspected.
l l C. Inspect the main and aus contact surface, for any pitting, film, l corrosion, etc.
D. Inspect all movable elements for mechanical interference, ,
deterioration, corrosion, etc.
E. Verify correct assembly of the contactor. Inspect for missing l elements or incorrect elements.
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Test Equipment Checklist ,
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i LaSalle County Station Unit 2 l f Test Plan Supplement: Operability of RPS Contactors K14E and K14G '
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G.E. Contactor type CR105D102 l
Testing will be conducted at the Ceco Technical Center facility in i Maywood, IL by,the Electronics Relay Section of System Operational Analysis I Dept. under the direction of the Nuclear Engineering Dept.
t Purpose . Conduct electrical tests on the RPS Contactors K14E and K14G using HFA Type 12HFA151A9F relay and IRM relays GE 3 SAT 6004R1 and Potter >
Brumfield KH4690 to simulate the RPS relay logic in order to l determine pulse width range required to drop out only one RPS contactor.
References:
- 1) 1E-2-4215 AC - Reactor Protection System l
I 2) GEK-45484 - Mul'ti-Contact Ausiliary. Relay Type RFA 151
- 3) LEP-GM-163 - Inspection, Maintenance and Replacement of HFA and HMA Relay
- 4) Test Plan References l
l Prerequisitest 1) Approval of test plan shall be made by the Nuclear Engineering Dept.
- 2) Document all test equipment serial numbers
- and latest calibration '
l Test Approvedt ,
A N7 K.W. Uhlir l
. . wy R.E. Grams Electrical /I&C Design Superintendent Nuclear Engineering Dept.
1036E KWU/psb 4
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< i I. Electrical Tests - HTA Type 12HTA151A9F, GE 12VDC Relay 3 SAT 6004R1 and i Potter Brumfield 24VDC Relays KH4690 (IRM Relays)
A. Verify proper functional operation of HTA relay type 12HTA151A9F, GE ,
relay 3 SAT 6004R1 and Potter Brumfield relays KH4690 by performing the ,
following: }
DC coil resistance of HTA relay i 1.
- 2. Measure contact resistances of HrA relay
- 3. Determine the drop out voltage of the HTA relay. Measure the -
ti.me response of the relay to de-energize.
- 4. Determine the Pick up voltage of the HFA relay. Measure the time response of the relay to energise.
- 5. Measure pick up and crop out time response of GE relay 3 SAT 6004R1 and Potter Brumfield relays KH4690. ,
II. Electrical Tests - HrA Type 12HFA151A9F, Contactors K14E and K14G i and IRM relays A. With HFA relay contacts 1-2 in series with contactor K14E and K14G
- coils, determine minimum pulse width on the HFA coil required to drop out only one contactor and both contactors.
B. With HFA relay contacts 1-2 and 3-4 in series with contactor K14E and K140 coils d?termine minimum pulse width on the HTA coil required to drop out only one contactor and both contactors. Use the GE relay 3 SAT 6004R1 (K33) to drive the HFA coil. Also include the Potter Brumfleid KH4690 relays por the attached schematic.
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- Tite OF DAY CH+ 1 CH+ 2 CH+ 48 CHo 68 CH* 129 CH+ 145 CH* 51 CH+ 52 CH* 139 CHO 148 RSCM BSCM- SV2 APRtm 2A28T CFCVP CVDt9 BVDtB RPSF8 BPSF8 VOLTS VOLTS PCT PCT VOLTS PCT PCT PCT PCT PCT 4:13:33:168 18.972 11.177 88.984 18.836 .888 24.274 .856 32.858 98.764 74.385 4:13:33:188 18.986 11.286 88.848 9.282 .883 24.155 .!!2 32.858 98.764 74.413 4:13:33:208 18. % 5 11.177 88.848 8.646 .888 23.164 .224 32.858 98.789 74.245 4:13:33:228 18.958 11.177 88.984 9.282 .818 23.894 .856 32.978 98.764 74.878 4:13:33:248 18.986 11.177 08.984 18.835 .823 24.135 .224 32.853 98.736 74.133 4:13:33:268 18.986 11.184 88.848 18.175 .883 24.274 .168 32.914 98.764 74.381 4:13:33:288 18.972 11.184 88.848 9.863 .800 24.135 .168 32.978 98.789 74.413 4:13:33:388 18.965 11.177 88.848 8.646 .880 23.233 .112 32.978 S'.736 d 74.245 4:13:33:328 18.958 11.192 88.640 9.132 .818 23.382 .112 32.978 98.764 74.878 4:13:33:348 18.965 11.192 88.848 18.836 .813 24.274 .I12 32.97d 98.792 74.161 4:13:33:368 18. % 5 11.286 88.848 18.175 .880 24.274 .168 32.698 98.764 74.385
'4:13:33:308 10.986 11.177 88.848 9.341 .883 24.866 .112 32.914 98.764 74.413 4:13:33:488 18.965 11.177 88.848 8.785 .813 23.164 .160 32.858 98.789 74.245 4:13:33:428 18.958 11.177 88.848 9.282 .818 23.441 .856 33.082 98.764 74.186 4:13:33:448 18.972 11.177 88.848 18.836 .883 24.866 .112 32.978 98.736 74.133 4:13:33:468 18.979 11.192 88.848 18.175 .888 24.285 .168 32.984 98.792 74.381 4:13:33:488 18.972 11.lG4 88.984 9.488 .880 24.866 *
.112 32.978 98.681 74.413 4:13:33:588 18.965 11.177 88.848 8.785 .880 23.164 .112 32.978 98.789 74.381 4:13:33:528 18.965 11.177 88.792 9.282 .8?G 23.588 .112 32.978 38.792 74.133 4: 13:33:548 18.972 11.177 88.792 18.836 . 818 23.858 .112 32.978 98.789 74.189 4: 13:33:568 18.966 11.184 88.792 18.244 .888 24.274 .856 32.914 98.764 74.381 4:13:33:588 18.965 11.199 60.792 9.4PB .880 23.927 .112 32.858 98.764 74.413 4:13:33:688 18.351 11.177 88.736 8.854 .882 23.825 .168 32.978 98.789 74.245 4:13:33:628 18.958 11.177 88.736 9.132 .818 23.511 .112 32.978 98.764 74.161 4:13:33:648 18.972 11.177 88.736 9.966 .818 23.858 .224 32.978 98.789 74.189 4:13:33:668 18.972 11.184 PC.736 18.175 .868 24.274 .224 32.858 98.792 74.381 g 4:13:33:688 18.979 11.184 88.736 9.488 .800 23.858 .112 32.858 98.789 74.413 4:13:33:788 18.972 11.177 88.848 8.993 .888 23.164 .112 32.914 98.789 74.245 4:13:33:728 18.958 11.177 88.736 9.282 .818 23.372 .856 32.914 98.789 74.161 4:13:33:748 18.972 11.177 88.736 9.966 .813 23.858 .112 32.914 98.764 74.161 4:13:33:768 18.906 11.184 88.736 18.314 .888 24.413 .112 32.978 98.764 74.329 4:13:33:788 10.972 11.177 88.736 9.619 .888 23.996 .168 32.978 98.764 74.381 4:13:33:088 18.972 11.177 88.736 8.854 .888 23.825 .224 32.858 98.764 74.245 4:13:33:828 18.950 11.163 88.736 9.863 .880 23.382 .I12 32. B.58 98.764 74.161 4:13:33:048 18.972 11.177 88.736 9.897 .888 24.135 .888 32.858 98.736 74.189 4:13:33:868 18.986 11.184 88.736 18.314 .882 24.285 .224 32.858 98.764 74.329 4:13:33:888 18.972 11.184 88.736 9.688 .813 24.274 .224 32.978 98.764 74.357 4: 13:33:988 18. % 5 11.184 88.736 9.863 .888 23.825 .112 32.858 98.789 74.189 4:13:33:928 18.958 11.177 88.688 9.863 .818 23.164 .112 32.858 98.653 74.186 4:13:33:948 18.972 11.177 88.736 9.897 .813 24.135 .112 32.858 98.764 74.189 4:13:33:S68 18.972 11.184 88.688 18.314 .888 24.135 .224 32.858 98.764 74.381 4:13:33:988 18.852 -2.546 88.688 9.688 .888 24.135 .112 32.850 98.764 74.357 "6" %.$ u m+1
-DATA FROM OFF-LINE PRINT PROGRAM. TEST *: 99 DATE: 8:11:09 ROH+: 1 SUBRUH+: 11 TEST ENGINEER:WJN U HIT 2 SEHTIHEL --U .F. el 7 PSIG= 999 X PLR= 99 % FL8U= 99 T.C.*=
CH* 129 CH+ 145 CH* 51 CH* 52 CH* 139 CHe 148 CH+ CH+ 2 CHe 48 CH+ 68 Tite OF DAY 1 SV2 APRtM 2A28T CFCVP CVDtB BVPff APSFB 8 PSF 8 ASctf BSCH V8LTS V8LTS PCT PCT V8LTS PCT PCT
.112 PCT 32.858 PCT 98.764 PCT 74.189 N
- h, N' "
.166 .884 88.736 8.924 .818 23.233 4:13:34: 8 9.863 .818 23.894 .856 32.978 98.764 74.133 4:13:34: 20 .883 .818 88.688 98.789 74.245 i 88.736 9.897 .888 24.135 .168 32.914 4:13:34: 48 .018 .817 .168 32.858 98.764 74.357
.818 .817 88.688 18.314 .888 24.413 4:13:34: 68 88.688 9.897 .800 23.927 .112 32.858 98.764 74.357 4:13:34: 88 .818 .812 32.858 98.789 74.189
.883 88.688 8.993 .888 23.382 .112 4:13:34:180 .818 23.825- .112 32.746 98.789 74.878
.883 .818 88.680 8.924 .818 4:13:34:128 9.688 .882 23.996 .224 32.858 98.764 74.189 4:13:34:148 .883 .803 88.624 74.357 80.624 9.897 .818 24.413 .112 32.858 98.764 4:13:34:168 .883 .818 32.914 98.764 74.357
.813 88.512 9.418 .882 23.996 .112 4:13:34:188 818 .112 32.914 98.789 74.161
.828 .818 80.512 8.368 .818 23.382 4:13:34:208 8.229 .818 23.372 .112 32.914 98.764 74.858 4:13:34:228 .883 .883 88.688 74.878 88.688 8.924 .818 24.135 .112 32.914 98.764 4:13:34:248 .018 .003 32.698 98.764 74.329
.832 88.624 9.282 .888 24.482 .168 4:13:34:268 .883 *
.112 32.858 98.764 74.357
.817 .818 88.624 8.646 .888 23.858 4:13:34:288 7.673 .888 23.511 .112 32.858 98.789 74.189 4:13:34:300 .818 .817 88.688 74.878 88.624 '7.395 .818 23.233 .112 32.858 98.736 4:13:34:328 .818 .883 32.858 98.736 74.161
.817 88.624 8.898 .888 23.719 .168 4:13:34:348 .884 .112 32.858 98.764 74.357
.818 .003 80.488 8.646 .882 24.482 4:13:34:368 .888 24.285 .224 32.858 98.764 74.357 4:13:34:388 .818 .818 88.624 8.229 7.256 .888 23.164 .112 33.826 98.789 74.189 4:13:34:488 .824- .818 88.624 74.878 88.688 6.978 .800 23.441 .112 32.978 98.789 4: 13:34:428 .883 .883 32.978 98.789 74.133
.883 -88.512 7.742 .818 23.649 .112 4:13:34:448 .818 .112 32.914 98.789 74.357
.818 .818 88.512 8.298 .882 24.482 4:13:34:468 7.951 .883 23.858 .224 32.914 98.764 74.413 4: 13:34 483 .818 818 88.624 74.245
.883 88.680 6.988 .888 23.164 .112 32.914 98.789 4:13:34:588 .818 .112 32.914 98.764 74.878 4:13:34:528 .804 .818 88.568 6.839 .818 23.382 88.624 7.534 .818 23.441 .112 32.746 98.789 74.133 4:13:34:540 .817 .817 74.329
.817 80.5C8 8.229 .888 24.482 .112 32.858 96.764 4:13:34:568 .818 .112 33.826 98.736 74.357
.817 .818 88.512 7.812 .880 23.649 4:13:34:588 .888 23.441 .112 32.858 98.789 74.245 4:13:34:680 .818 .818 88.512 6.988 4
88.512 6.638 .818 23.382 .112 32.882 98.789 74.878 1 4:13:34:628 .883 .883 32.978 98.789 74.133
.818 .883 88.512 7.256 .888 23.858 .112 4:13:34:648 .823 24.552 .112 32.858 98.789 74.245 4
4:13:34:668 .818 .818 88.512 8.229 88.568 7.742 .818 .24.135 .224 32.858 98.736 74.357 4:13:34:688 .818 .818 74.245
.818 88.456 6.788 .888 23.588 .112 32.858 98.789 4:13:34:788 .818 32.858 98.828 74.133
.004 .818 88.512 6.422 .818 23.441 .112 4:13:34:728 24.135 .112 32.858 98.653 74.133 4:13:34:748 .003 .883 88.512 6.978 .813
.818 .883 88.512 7.812 .888 24.968 .112 32.858 98.764 74.381
! 4:13:34:768 .112 32.858 98.789 74.357 4:13:34:708 .818 .817 88.512 7.534 .888 24.135
.818 .810 88.512 6.561 .818 23.858 .224 32.858 98.789 74.245
- 4: 13:34:888 32.882 98.764 ,74.133 4:13:34:828 .003 .803 88.512 6.213 .028 23.927 .224 i
- . ..w DATR FRON OFF-LINE PRINT PROGRAt1.
DATE: 8:11:09 RUHe: 1 SUBRUHe: 11 TEST *: 99 U HIT 2 SENTlHEl. -u .F. el TEST ENGINEER:WJM x PLR= 99 x FLOU= 99 T.C.*= 7 PSIG= 999 Titt OF DAY CH+ 1 CH+ 2 CHe 48 CHe 68 CH+ 129 CH+ 145 CH* 51 CH+ 52 CH+ 139 CHO 148 ASCM BSCM SV2 APRIS 2R28T OFCVP CVBtB 8VDtt APSF8 SPSF8
. VOLTS VOLTS PCT PCT VOLTS PCT PCT PCT PCT PCT 4:13:34:840 .003 .003 88.456 6.839 .818 24.482 .856 32.858 98.789 74.878 4:13:34:860 .010 .018 88.512 7.534 .888 24.829 .112 32.858 98.828 74.245 '
4: 13:34:800 .010 .083 88.512 7.325 .888 24.621 .112 32.858 98.764 74.381 4:13:34:900 .010 .818 88.488 6.561 .888 24.135 .112 32.858 98.789 74.245 4:13:34:920 .011 .003 80.512 5.866 .818 24.135 .112 32.858 98.764' 74.133 4: 13:34:940 .003 .819 88.512 6.422 .818 24.968 .112 32.914 98.764 74.189 4:13:34:968 .610 .825 88.456 7.117 .888 24.968 .856 32.858 98.764 74.273 -
4:13:34:900 .003 .812 88.512 6.978 .883 24.968 .112 32.858 98.764 74.381 j 4:13:35: 8 .010 .818 80.456 6.885 .813 23.996 .856 32.978 98.789 74.273 ;
4:13:35: 20 .003 .018 88.512 5.449 .818 24.285 .856 32.858 98.764 74.186 4:13:35: 40 .010 .003 80.456 6.805 .880 24.698 .288 32.858 98.789 74.245 4:13:35: 60 .010 .018 88.624 6.788 .882 25.837 .168 32.858 98.736 74.381 4:13:35: 80 .818 .810 88.488 6.561 .883 25.187 .112 32.858 98.764 74.357 t 4:13:35:100 .024 .818 80.512 5.588 .888 24.135 .I12 32.858 98.789 74.161 4:13:35:120 .003 .003 80.512 4.962 .818 24.135 .112 32.858 98.736 74.186 !
4:13:35:140 .003 .010 80.400 5.379 .000 24.968 * . 856 33.826 98.764 74.161 4: 13:35:160 .010 .010 88.488 6.144 .888 25.384 .I68 32.858 98.792 74.381 4.13:35:188 .018 .018 88.344 S.866 .888 24.899 .112 32.914 98.681 74.273 4:13:35:200 .017 .017 80.400 4.%2 .000 24.135 .I12 32.858 98.789 74.I89 '
4:13:35:220 .003 .003 80.400 4.406 .818 24.285 .112 32.!!58 98.764 74.878 4: 13:35:240 .017 .003 80.400 4.754 .808 24.829 .112 32.858 98.764 74.!61 l 4: 13:35:260 .824 .018. 80.408 5.518 .880 25.246 .168 32.858 98.764 74.381
- 4: 13:35:200 .024 .032 80.480 5.449 .808 24.768 .856 32.858 98.764 74.381 4:13:35:300 .810 .018 80.288 4.615 .888 24.274 .112 32.858 98.789 74.189 4: 13:35:320 .003 .883 80.512 3.642 .818 24.866 .112 32.858 98.681 74.133 '
4:13:35:348 .003 .003 88.488 4.128 .888 24.698 .112 32.858 98.764 74.189 4:13:35:360 .003 .817 80.288 4.893 .888 25.523 .224 32.858 98.764 74.357 .
4:13:35:380 .818 .883 88.488 4.893 .888 24.698 .112 32.858 98.789 74.357 l
, 4:13:35:480 .018 .025 88.488 4.859 .818 24.135 .112 32.746 98.789 74.189 '
4:13:35:420 .810 .018 88.344 3.294 .818 24.413 .168 32.882 98.789 74.858 4:13:35:440 .811 .317 88.344 3.642 .888 25.837 .168 32.858 98.736 74.878 i
- 4
- 13:35:460 .018 .883 88.288 4.198 .883 25.24R .112 32.746 98.736 74.381 4:13:35:480 .810 .010 88.288 4.476 .882 25.246 .888 32.746. 98.792 74.357
.i 4:13:35:500 .018 .818 88.488 3.583 .888 24.866 .112 32.634 98.736 74.189 4:13:35i520 .010 .003 88.488 2.738 .818 23.996 .112 32.698 98.764 74.133 '
j~ 4:13:35:548 .003 .083 88.200 3.816 . 818 25.176 .112 32.858 98.789 74.858 4:13:35:560 .003 .018 88.288 3.642 .818 25.837 .112 32.634 98.789 74.245 4:13:35:588 .818 .018 80.288 3.858 .818 24.968 .112 32.698 98.789 74.381 4: 13:35:600 .818 .018 88.288 2.947 .888 24.135 .168 32.634 98.764 74.161- i
.832 88.288 2.468 .818 24.135 .112 32.523 98.828 74.822 4: 13:35:620 .818 32.579 98.792 74.822 4:13:35:640 .003 .003 88.288 2.538 .888 24.968 .112
.112 32.634 98.764 74,245 4:13:35:660 .010 .003 80.288 3.294 .880 25.187 1
- ,, ,....n .- . . _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - -
DATA FROM OFF-LlHE PRINT PROGRAM.
DATE: 8:11:89 RUH*: 1 SUBRUH*: 11 TEST *: 99 TEST ENGlHEER:WJM U HIT 2 SENTlHEL --U .F. *I x PLR= 99 x FLOU= '99 T.C.*= 7 PSIG= 999 ,
CH+ 129 CH+ 145 CH* 51 CH+ 52 CH+ 139 CH* 148 Tite OF DAY CHe 1 CH+ 2 CH+ 48 CH* 68 CVDtB 8VDtB APSF8 8 PSF 8 RSCM OSCM SV2 APRtm 2A28T CFCVP PCT PCT PCT PCT PCT i VOLTS VOLTS PCT PCT V8LTS '
3.583 .880 24.968 .112 32.523 98.764 74.273 4:13:35:688 .884 .884 88.288 32.467 98.789 74.161
.883 88.288 2.538 .888 24.285 .112 4:13:35:788 .818 .224 32.467 98.764 74.822
.818 .818 88.288 1.835 .818 24.866 4:13:35:728 1.974 .818 25.246 .168 32.523 98.789 73.966 4:13:35:748 .817 .883 88.280 32.411 98.764 74.161
.818 88.864 2.738 .888 24.968 .112 4:13:35:768 .818 .112 32.411 98.789 74.273
.818 .818 80.232 3.886 .888 24.698 4:13:35:788 .888 24.274 .I12 32.355 98.681 74.133 4: 13:35:888 .818 .8I8 88.232 2.252 1.348 .818 24.285 .856 32.299 98.764 74.822 4:13:35:828 .883 .818 88.288 98.764 74.858
.825 88.232 1.487 .888 24.698 .112 32.299 4:13:35:848 .883 .224 32.243 98.764 74.189
.884 .812 88.232 2.252 .888 25.315 4:13:35:868 2.599 .818 24.413 .224 32.355 98.789 74.273 4:13:35:888 .818 .818 88.232 32.876 98.789 74.189
.818 88.288 1.835 .888 24.413 .224 4:13:35:988 .818 .856 32.187 98.789 74.822
.818 .818 88.176 1.881 .828 24.274 4:13:35:928 .888 24.768- .168 32.131 98.792 74.878 4:13:35:948 .883 .818 88.232 1.148 1.984 .800 25.246 -
.168 32.876 98.828 74.381 4:13:35: % 8 .824 .883 88.232 32.876 98.764 74.161
.818 88.176 2.I13 .888 24.698 .168 4:13:35:988 .818 24.135 .112 31.964 98.789 74.161 i
.883 .817 88.232 1.557 .888 4:13:36: 8
.792 .818 24.482 .112 31.852 98.792 73.994 i 4:13:36: 28 .883 .818 88.232 98.764 74.133 88.864 .653 .813 24.768 .168 31.852 4:13:36: 48 .883 .883 31.852 98.828 74.189
.883 88.176 1.557 .888 25.593 .112 4: 13:36: 68 .818 24.621 .112 31.852 98.764 74.273
.884 .818 88.176 1.974 .888 4:13:36: 88 1.348 .888 23.927 .112 31.796 98.789 74.186 ,
-4:13:36:188 .818 .825 88.176 98.764 74.822 88.176 .445 .818 24.413 .I12 31.796 4:13:36:128 818 .817 31.748 98.764. 74.858
.884 68.176 .514 .813 25.187 .112 N 4:13:36:148 .883 25.187 .168 31.572 98.764 74.245
.884 .825 88.176 1.279 .888 4:13:36:168 1.696 .818 24.552 .168 31.516 98.736 74.217 4:13:36:188 .817 .818 88.176 31.628 98.792 74.878 88.176 1.289 .888 24.274 .856 4:13:36:288 .818 .818 .168 31.349 98.764 73.994
.818 88.176 .386 .882 24.135
! 4:13:36:228 .818 .112 31.516 98.653 74.878
.818 .883 88.864 445- .888 24.968 ~
- 4
- 13:36:248 .888 25.176 .112 31.349 98.764 74.161 -
.883 .883 88.176 1.878 74.189 4:13:36:268 1.557 .888 24.698 .112 31.349 98.764 88.128 2
4:13:36:288 818 .832 .112 31.293 98.681 74.878
.832 88.176 1.878 .818 24.274 4:13:36:308 .817 .818 23.858 .112 31.293 98.764 73.994
.818 .883 88.128 .167 74.822 4:13:36:328 .167 .888 25.523 .112 31.125 98.764 j 4:13:36:348 .818 .884 88.128 31.869 98.792 74.189 88.864 .862 .883 24.968 .168 4: 13:36:360 .818 .818 .224 31.869 98.764 74.161 l
.818 88.864 1.418 .880 24.552
- 4:13:36:388 .818 24.482 .112 31.813 98.789 74.878
.818 .817 88.888 .862 .888 l 4:13:36:488 .888 .24.135 . 112 38.982 98.792 73.855
.818 .883 88.864 .828 74.858 i 4:13:36:428 .997 .888 25.837 .112 38.982 98.792 4:13:36.:448 .883 .883 88.176 38.846 98.792 74.245 88.864 .723 .888 24.968 .168 i 4:13:36:468 .883 .883 38.734 98.792 74.381 88.128 1.348 .800 24.698 .112 4:13:36:488 .818 .883 .112 38.622 98.789 74.878
.810 .818 88.864 .723 .888 24.274 4:13:36:588
_ _ . . .. ~ _ _ _ _ _
'v~
.=
F 3 C41155 NOTM F277 COND EMERG MAKEUP M3/H -e.837
. C41294 NORM B729 FEEDAUM9 3 DISCH FL Me/H -8.88 (
g 041214 LRL B729 FEEDPUMP 3 DISCH FL MS/H L
, 041225 NORM T358 EXT STM 23 1ST STG INWC -2 T ;
l STOP 'MSDN i
' Oe
- e412 4 ALW B337 M &MespV4* prpeeS 4 " * --
Mo ((< On,'f .1.
l I. 041244 ALM D335 2B21MSBPV3 MSTM BYPASS 3 NCLS,
.[
g g l. e41244 ALM D365 2321CV3 MSTM TURB CONT CLSD
/ ret e gs (w/v" i
. 041244 ALM D363 2B21CV2 MSTM TURB CONT CLSD f' $41344 ALM D361 2381CVisNETN ft2R A, 4f , p[4
'941344 ALM D334 S E M 3 MTW .3 99 .
341344 ALM D33E W 14 39VS renire - -T-2 C IdM 041244 ALM D367 2B21CVC *1STM TURB CONT CLSD Ol 041245 NORM D337 2B21MSBPV4 MSTM BYPASS 4 CLSD
'l
+
l'i D
j
..i 08-26-89
(.j 841845 ALM D358 2B21MSV4 MSTM TURS STOS ',.
gn D356 2B21MSV3 MSTM TURSrSTOp k r' 841245 ALM l ni 041245 ALM D352 2B21MSV1 MSTh TURB STOP l g2 041245 NORM D334 2B21MSBPV3 MSTM BYPASS 3 NOPN j w 041246 NORM D335 2B21MSBPV3 MSTM BYPASS 3 CLSD 841247 NORM D332 2B21MSBPV2 MSTM BYPASS 2 NUsW
!q 941249 NORM B729 FEEDPUMP S DISCH FL MS/W"? . -9.88 $ ,.
O r) MG M ~ ~ **
vi 841255 LRL B729 FEEDAUMP B DISCH FL .
a 041255 NORM T350 EXT STM 2B 1ST STG INWC -0 i
CLSD g O =' T413e6 ALM D:57 2B21MSV3 MSTM TURB STOP 1041307 ALM D359 2B21MSV4 MSTM TURB STOP CLSD ) _
ALM D353 2B21MSV1 MSTM TURB STOP CLSD / 3
( 941388 041314 LRL F481 SRM CH B PERIOD SEC -1 O.fml SEC -238.0 841319 NORM F481 SRM CH B DERIOD C545 A" BACK-UP SCRAM TRI P)
(041329 ALM ON /
O' 0'41330 ALM C719 ROD DRIFT
= 041333 NORM D333 2B21MSBPV2 MSTM BYPASS 2 CLSD 2" 041334 NORM F259 CB PMPS DISCH HDR PSIG 709 O =3 041334 LRL F483 SRM CH D PERIOD SEC m 841334 NORM D339 kB21MSBPV1 MSTM BYPASS 1 NOPN 6 041335 LRL F480 SRM CH A PERIOD SEC O..n 041335 LRL F481 SRM CH B PERIOD SEC 041335 LRL F482 SRM CH C PERIOD SEC
'a 041340 LRL T358 EXT STM 2B iST STG INWC g C548 "B" 9ACK-UP SCRAM TRIP 7 Oh. - e41141 ALM
= 0413 NSS TVP UNIT 2 -10 QUT OF SERVICE O.= 041344 HRL F459 COND DEMIN 2B OLOW GPM 041344 ALM D950 REACTOR SYS MODE SW N-RN 9 841345 INVD C229 TOTAL CONDEN POLISH FLOW GPM 041349 HRL F461 COND DEMIN 2D FLOW GPM Q*iol ON DISPLAY 01 841349 DSUM B678 APRM B FLUX LEVEL
'*q 041351 DSUM W249 TUPBINE RPM ON DISPLAY 02 J
O p. 041352 ROD 20-47 UNKNOWN POS. =/60252651
~ 041353 DSUM B727 REACTOR WATER LEVEL ON DISPLAY 03 __
- - 0413S3
SUMMARY
COMPLETED 041355 NORM F349 LP STM FW PMP 2A K#/H 61.0 Q ,=.
INWC -3
- n 041355 NORM T358 EXT STM 2B iST STG ~ '
' ~
I 041:55 '_ L -T270 iST STAGE OPE 3 SUPE CSI3 6 , - - - - - - , . - - - .._,g_
MSAM 083* nCGICZYEv.3 man yp o . aana a Wc%0 MSTW BY 6 3 1 9
Y ,
N M 1 INW -
QmI I
1386 ALM D357 2B21MSV3 MSTM TURB STOP CLSD j S41387 ALM D359 2B21MSV4 MSTM TURB STOP CLSD / ' //,,
q h,,AJ,,,,
e .. '
1 TuAtegOP CLSD
>:: ' ' W, Q
" 9 ':
D 8ERI .. WC ' -238.e [b1 .3
841329 ALM C545 "A" BACK-UP SCRAM . _ . TRIP ,
- 41330 ALM C719 RCD DRIFT ON
- 'l = 041333 NORM D333 2B21MSBPV2 MSTM BYPASS 2 CLSD
% 334 43A3 Fase CB.PMPS DIsCH HDR PSIG 789 9
= 4 LAL,
BES g
= + 4' NOlWE D330 2B21MSBPV1 MSTM BYPASS 1 NDPN -
s 041335 LRL F480 SRM CH A PERIOD SEC . 041335 LRL F481 SRM CH B :ERICD SEC '
., 041335 LRL F482 SRM CH C PERIOD SEC W 841340 LRL T358 EXT STM 2B iST STG INWC e,l - 34134L ALM C548 "B" BACK-UP SCRAM TRIP 0413 .433 TV: UNI 1 -10 OUT OF 3ERVICE 04134* ciF L : 59 CNC DEvIN IB TLOW GPM
.ai 041344 QLM D?50 'dEACT.R Iv3 MC E SW N-RN
.1 941345 INVD C22'T TOTAL CCNDEN DOLISH FLOW GPM
, =l 041349 HRL F461 COND DEMIN 2D FLOW GPM el 841349 DSUM B678 APRM B FLUX LEVEL ON DISPLAY 81 L 041351 DSUM W249 TURBINE RAM ON DISPLAY 02
,s 041:51 ?!O lO-4" UtW' LOWN :CS. =/60;5;E!1 -
w 041353 DSUM B727 REO.CTCO WATEC LEVEL ON DISPLAY 03
= 041353
SUMMARY
COMPLETED
+ 041355 NORM F349 LP STM CW DMP 2A K#/H 61. 0 r 041355 NORM T358 EXT STM 2B iST STG INWC -3 ~~
041:55 _PL T270 197 3:E : t~- : I ' ~'- ~ :SI2
, 0e1756 COD !* 3- DS - 4 TO 0 2'_ ' ~55? ". : . - --: .- -i:: -": : :
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-y
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j '4' T3 : :-*3 2B21-'./: "3TM LP 'UR3 CL2D
) 041253 0.LM 0372 2B1101'/- "S*M L? R B NOON
, 3 4135.S_ Q.L
- D 371 2 B E 1 C 1 'i.2L.*_5~._5_L P ' ' ' B_ _ _ C L.5 D._ ._
? ' 2 5 3 0.L.*
. D370 2B11C1/1 MS'" ' ~' ' F B NC *1 Q % '. : 5 8 2' " D369 IB1101't M2TM L: TUAB CL2D 0 ; *. 5 3 CLM D3E B 2B11C11 METv _ ~' :B _ NCON .__
041359 NORM F480 SRM CH A DECICD SEC 1000.0 Qi. 041359 NORM F482 SRM CH C DE !OD SEC SEC -176.1
-97.8
~--' 041359 0 4 t e SNORM OvN "Lv-F48325*, SRM CH D :Eo!OD~~;0000000 00?- 000 P:001 70000000 3 04140' *:C:* ~61 ECM H E OEPICD SEC 57.5 O. .
O . 08-16-S?
. 1
$. 041409 NORM C459 COND :EMIN 2B OLCW GPM 3987 041409 NORM F461 CCND EMIN 1; c'_W GPM 3855
b
. h. 841CG4 NORM FC81 SEM CH B PERIOD SEC 57.0
? . L4/4
.:'I ua ;L ..
l
[mab TvM 3 p43
..I 08-26-89
.N C41489 NORM F459 COND DEMIN 29 FLOW GPM 3987 941499 NORM F461 COND DEMIN 2D FLOW GPM 3455
=> 041409 NORM C229 TOTAL CONDEN POLISH FLOW GPM 7842 bd 041410 HRL F480 SRM CH A PERIOD SEC
..I 041410 HRL F482 SRM CH C PERIOD SEC 841418 HRL F483 5RM CH D PERIOD WEC
, y 2
' 44 941418 NORM T355 MN STM-MSR 2A 2ND STG INWC a 941411 LRL F349 LP STM FW PMP 2A K8/H j
- 041413 DYN BLK ABT. 00034000 00000000 00035002 00000000
, 0 .* 041414 NORM T200 TG BRG OIL HDR PSIG 29
! = 041419 NORM F480 SRM CH A PERIOD SEC 14.0 m 841419 NORM F482 SRM CH C PERIOD SEC 13.1 0% 841419 NORM F483 SRM CH D PERIOD SEC 12.0 w $41429 RCD 11 38- 4 TO O
=' 041423 ROD 47 34-UNKNOWN POS. =/70252651 Ohd 041423 NORM C715 W/ DRAW PERMISSIVE ECHO ON
'J 041423 NORM C714 INSERT PERMISSIVE-ECHO ON v 841425 HRL F4SS SRM CH A PERIDD maw tal 041425 HRL F482 SRM CH C PERIOD SEC I 041425 HRL F483 SRM CH D PERIOD SEC
.4 041425 NORM C719 ROD DRIFT OFF gn 041426 LRL T358 EXT STM 2B iST STG INWC
..! 041436- ROD 42-19 UNVNOWN DCS. =/70252314 b 041439 NORM B729 FEEDEUMW B DISCH FL MS/H -0.88 t'd 041448 NORM T358 EXT STM 2B iST STG INWC -3
.a 041440 HRL F250 CB PMPS DISCH HDR PSIG ~
= 041440 LRL T355 MN STM -MSR 2A 2ND STG INWC g'M 041444 NORM F480 SRM CH A PERIOD SEC 13.2 J 041444 NORM F482 SRM CH C PERIOD SEC 12.4 _
j 041444 NORM F483 SRM CH D PERIOD SEC 12.5 Chi 041445 LRL B729 FEEDPUMP B DISCH FL M#/H
041449 NORM B729 FEEDPUMP B DISCH FL M#/H -0.88 ,
=== - 041454 ALM D255 2B21MSY2 MSTM TURB STOP CLSD tiu 041455 NORM T370 1ST STAGE PRESSURE PSIG -10
!= 041456 LRL T358 EXT STM 2B iST STG INWC h 041502 ALM D983 MAIN STEAM PRESS B1 LOW
% = 041504 ALM D985 MAIN STEAM PRESS B2 LOW d 041505 DAD B711 CRD DYSTEM FLOW M#/H 041505 ALM D894 MAIN STEAM PRESS Al LOW D 041506 ALM D904 MAIN STEAM PRESS A2 LOW 041506 ROD 42-19 NO DATA AT LEAST 1 NOTCH 041508 ROD 42-19 -5 TO O j) 041509 ROD 59 o){ -5 TO O 041509 ROD 59 42- -49 TO O 041509 ROD 59 38- -13 TO O
{} 041509 ROD 59 34- -49 TO O
, 041510 NORM T355 MN STM-MSR 2A 2ND STG INWC -1 f 041510 NORM T358 EXT STM 2B 1ST STG INWC -2
()in ' 041524 LRL B693 REACTOR PRESSURE PSIG 041533 ALM D097 MTR DRIVEN RX FEED PUMP OFF , _,
041541 LRL T355 MN STM-MSR 2A 2ND STG INWC 041541 tRt T358 EXT STM 2B iST STG INWC O'o' 041545 ROD 22-03 -49 TO O
'" 041549 ROD 18-03 -5 TO O
._ ___ ....." -2
~ ~ ~~ ~
59 72 53 40 S3 38 39
' 8 B3D INPUTS S2 d 'Y 1 C41342 NSS POST TMP LOG p%3 O 07:4 727 e735 0744 L: : e- 7e5
- e693 =70:
7:== 3077 Oc70 1.7 528.6
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,l 040904 e. 7 36.1 -0. G --
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]" 0 4 0 9 2 9 0. 7 36.5 -0.0 1. 7 528.4 i 040934 10.4 10.6 937.2 32.9
--h ' 528.4-14rfr---937. 0 3Gr9 0. 7 25. 5 -4r0 0':0929 10.4 1.7 528.4 10.4 10.6 937.2 32.9 0. 7 36.6 -0. 0
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1+ 529. 4 040054- ~ 103 4- 1er6- 937.-a- -0.0 1. 7 529.4 10.6 937.2 32.8 0. 7 36.9 040959 10.4
- 0. 7 37.0 -0.0 1.7 529.4 041004 10.4 10.6 937.2 33.0 528. 0 c 30.O er?--372 1 0. 0 - - - 1. 7 1909 10. 4 -- 104 6-937r2 0. 7 37.1 -0. 0 1.7 528.0 041014 10.4 10.7 937.2 32.9 1. 7 528.0 10.5 10.7 937.2 33.0 0. 7 37.2 -0. 0 s ' *n , e 041019 ~ ' ' ' *' ' ^^ ;
+ ter-7-- 9"
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% s, f% [y Q ffra i *"P }[ HW 0s-26-89
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- 1. 6 528.0' 10.7 937.2 33.2 0. 7 37.2 -0.0 041034 10.5
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-33.3 -0+ -37v3- -0. 0
- 1. 7 528c0-
-0+ 10 4 4 - 10.4 10.6 937.2 1. 7 529.0-33.3 0. 7 37.3 -0.0 041049 10.3 10.5 937.2
-0.0 1. 7 529.0' 10.6 937.2 33.3 0. 7 37.2 041054 10.4
- 9. 7 - ---37.- 3 -0. 0 --- 1. & - 528.0
-04+059- 10. 3 10.5- 937.2 - 33.2- 1. 8 528.0 10.5 937.3 33.3 0. 7 37.3 -0.0 041104 10.3
- 0. 7 37.2 -0.0 1. 9 529.0 041109 10.3 10.5 937.3 33.2 0 +- 3-7 c2 - -0. 0 - 1.7.- 528.O~
--444414- - 10.3 10.5- 937.4 -33.2 1. 7 528.0' 10.5 937.4 33.4 0. 7 37.2 -0.0 041119 10.3
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i DD-7. CONTROL RDD NOTCH AOSITIONS, NEW SCAN 84-26-89 9414 LAS M UNIT i THERE ARE NO CONTROL RODS AT DOSITION Sh.
THERE ARE NO CONTR'OL RODS AT A AOSITION GREATER THAN 02 :
UNKNOWN CONTROL RCD AOSITIONS 1139
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23 BAD 00 BAD 00 BAD 00 BAD 00 BAD 00 BAD 00 BAD 00 BAD 19 BAD BAD BAD BAD BAD BAD BAD BAD BAD BAD BAD BAD BAD BAD BAD 15 00 BAD 00 BAD 00 BAD 00 BAD 00 BAD 00 BAD 00
,11 BAD BAD BAD BAD BAD BAD 00 BAD BAD BAD BAD e7 6e BAD 98 BAD 90 BAD 08 BAD 00 C3 BAD BAD BAD BAD BAD BAD BAD _
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Q-26-89 OD-7. CONTROL ROD NOTCH POSITIONS, NEW SCAN 88-e6 -89 9415 LASALLE UNIT 2 ~
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.7 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 :
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39 Oe se e0 e6 OO 00 00 00 00 00 00 .0 e0 Se se j 3s ee se ee se se se ce ce e.e se te se 30 ee se ;
31 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 17 00 00 00 00 00 BAD 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 13 00 00 00 00 00 _00 00 00 00___00 _
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i APPENDIX D t ADDITIONAL REPORTS AND DOCUMENTATION i i
i
- 1. Letter dated September 27, 1989, J. P. Leider to D. P. Galle, " Safety !
Assessment Report on LaSalle County Unit 1 Event" - August 26, 1989.
- 2. Deviation Report 1-2-89-037, " Unit 2 Reactor Scram". ;
- 3. Deviation Report 1-2-89-039, " Turbine Pirst Stage Low Pressure Scram Bypass Switch". :
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ZCADTS Page 37 L i
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September 27, 1989 cdd/M !
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i Mr. 0.P. Galle
SUBJECT:
Safet) Assessment Report on LaSalle !
County Unit 2 Event - August.26, 1989 j
- i i
The final report of our review of the LaSalle Partial RPS Actuation j i
j Event is attached for your information and use. The conclusions from this .
- review are similar to the causes determined by the stations investigators - a i spurious signal of short duration resulted in partir.1 RPS actuation. Skfety Assessment was assisted by INPO in performing our review.
1 i The HPES process used and presented here appears to be a worthwhile [
t method for reviewing events of this complexity. The use of MORT /HPES should be considered for use early in event investigations. A difficultly during l this event was the lack of data due to the Hathaway event recorder being bypassed. LaSa11e's corrective actions are addressing the retention of data j from the Hathaway in the future. Although other station's do not use Hathaways, they could benefit from a general review to ensure that event data .
I or history would not be lost or bypassed. l l ;
- ? , 1 b' :.P., eider$ d b'4 ,
i Safety Assessment Manager !
JPL/rr/0823r {
1 cc: L.O. D*1 George lt1PP***
L. Lauterbach oECENED n
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Marshall cy p p,g e7,33 i
BY fb i 1
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September 26, 1989 i
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To: J.P. Leider
SUBJECT:
Independent Review of LaSalle Unit Two -
Partial RPS Actuation Event on 8/26/89 j l
l This review was undertaken to enhance and verify if possible !
conclusions of the Nuclear Operations Division / Station /G.E. joint i investigation into the LaSalle Unit Two partial RPS Actuation on 1 August 26, 1989. Our review was comprised of two elements. The first was an ;
independent assessment of the even' by Onsite Nuclear Safety personnel with !
participation by the Safety Assessa. sat Manager. The second element consisted crf an INPO Assist visit requested by senior CECO management to confirm t significant factors and/or causes that had not been overlooked. l The Safety Assessment /Onsite Nuclear Safety group participated i through attendance at several station review meetings, conducting NPRDS l searches to determine if similar failure.s were recorded in the data base, and -
independently evaluating available int iation to reach its own conclusion.
From the information thus gained Safvty Assessment /0NSG concurs with the !
station in its analysis of the root cause of this event. A spurious trip i signal of such short duration that it caused only partial actuation of RPS relays was identified as the likely root cause. Refer to the attached H. McLain to J.G. Marshall letter dated 9/13/89 for additional det&ils.
At the request of senior CECO management, INPO conducted an :'
Assistance Visit to LaSalle between August 31 and September 1,1989.
H. McLain of ONSG and J. Marshall of OPEX participated in this visit. The i plant provided all documentation concerning the scram generated by plant staff i and the General Electric representative. The GE representative was called to ;
the plant to assess the potential failure of the scram contactors that did not l l deenergize during the initial phase of the scram. -
The following root cause techniques were used during the assistance visit to aid in determining the cause of the scram.
O interviewing i o change analysis l 0 cause-and-effect analysis o event and causal factors charting technique l Based upon INPO's independent investigation, the cause(s) of the reactor scram was not determined. This was due mostly to the unavailability to information that would have been prihted by the sequence of events recorder i
a! arm typewriter. However, the alarm typer was off (deenergized) during the l same period of time the scram occurred.
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l The probable cause of the scram is an external spike of i indeterminate origin. The spike was of sufficient duration to deenergize not i less than three but not more than six of the eight scram solsnoid contactors l in the reactor protection system logic. This implies that the dropout time is !
slightly different for the eight contactors. Also, the presence of the spike i was not recorded by any process instrumentation. The complete INPO report ;
with events and causal factors chart is attached. Refer to it for additional i information. l As described above, the overall conclusion from the Safety f Assessment review of this event is consistent with that reached by the ,
station. The investigation did not discover any design deficiencies within the RPS system which could comprcmise safe operation of the plant. If you have any questions concerning this report, please let me know. ,
%% Mw- _(8 J. Marshall l Extension 7711 Operating Experience Assessment JM/rr/0822r Attachment ,
cc: D.P. Galle
- t. 0. De1 George ,
C. Reed G.J. Diederich H.R. Rolf J.G. Marshall ,
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reqtstered
- [ 1l M.CCLA!O on L C P
- P S 3 13 300 69 18 :51 J4 WO 5necdov
- AJ sep 89 Ad bitJJ Wednesday registered l
[ 1) H.MCLAIN on LCNPS2 Eubsects UNIT 2 StR6M INVE s t 'I u A I ION ,
1J September 1989 l J u b .i e c t s Unit 2 Scram Investication I F
J.u. Marshall i
19.
the taJa11e Onsite Nuclear Jarety Group participated an the review of the Auguet .b.1WH9 scram of Unit 2 as follows:
e
- 1) Attended Station revavw mvetAno on 8/49/89
.' s a t te ri d e d 4 t o L i o tt i vv tvw mvwta na on 4 / Jd id9 !
a t te tid e d S ta tion r eva vw mwe tt riQ on 6/J1/89 Js
- 4) P a t C t t. . p a t e d in INPO e ev i ew on d / Ji / d'A arid y /1/ 89 bl At.tenced INFO debriefino via W/1/69 .
Itom t.h e information oatnvd trum t.h e s e meetings and reviews. :
thw Loos 11v UNSG concurs with the s ta L L ori in their analysis et I the ioot cause of the Unit 4 s e t .im on nuoust 26.1969. i The statiori was conductino tests at about !#4 power for I
futbane stop/tontrol valve "ttchtness" Followingduringcucesstui the Unit 2testingshutdown of .
for 48 Hn pump seal replacement.
the futbatte Control Valves and during testand of the Turbine btop VJ1vws. the Unit 2 RPS was actuated. The "first hit" annunciator Atohts indicated this t the lurbine Stop Valves Not Full Open [
caused thi scrain even thouch that . cram is bypassed below 30%
Uut100 l.h o scram recovery.
uowwr and ,hould not have occurrwd. '
At was observed that 2 , cram channel lights. A4 and A3. had not e x t. i n o u s h a d .
A manual Scram was inttrated per LGP J-2 Scram l itecovery procvdure and the Itunts did extinaulsh. It was ob erv<d 1. h a t t.h v CRD. h .: d An,wrtwd but tt took about 3 minutes !
cv i scor d att rods at 00. It was determined thct at least 1 and telays I had not ,
pos.5bly J Scram contactor$ I 14 f N b w tu.ited.
,he plant was not in a condition which should have caused a
,osam. Ther e was no hard evidwnce bv any computer potnts or '
scarleec traces which show that any parameter exceeded a scram I
- v t.p o t ti t . Turbine First Stage Pre..ueo dad tio t show a tncrease i in value which would have unbypassed the Jet power trip for the [
totbane Stop Valve Closure scram und ihn pressut e switches were The tuc kPI logic did no t ac tua te w it .h s ti Calibratien 11mits. .; n i i v .- did not receive a trip
.. h e woram $14nal because the Reci.. .e lor the event was that ,
,sonal. The only possible explanal. :
.uium stynal". This could t.h v 1. F 3 S y s teit received "less t. h .s o
. ; t u ti that some of the RPS a- a dAuttaL siQnal of such short ..
sht JNPO A tive s t i qa l. i nq s JoyAnu did not havet t a stie to t o . p . . i .I '
i u f, already found by he Team did riot uncover any nvw evtJ v lo t: s o n .
I tiad not had the oporturAtv to investtuate or review 9 4 ') dui to c o m m i r. t m o n t s. ,
1oivim.itltcit l a um t.h w 'J n t t J , c i .s m oi ..
L to on the et<stion to c h .. ..OC R c; U - 1 revtew. Where och u .s on U / 10 i tt y . I was d e p t. i i. a j .,s .a. Iindtnu, of thw s t .w i
.Ca t t on . It oatmwd to me that the . t a l. t u n n.s Wdifound a conclusion t h o u t, any is..<mbAed f .s c t.S i.o r. o p p u s i *. h e fluil ou.
.i n d !
a rive f. t u a 1: t o n or review ot iniutmaLAon. I feiC che Stotion was t o q t i. ptvblom.
wiunu o .s I.h v t. s u r eout s.ause vow .5 A fn1 1 todependantiv came io the . a m er conclu4(ons as the ,
,i o t.a u n . I t. sovid h.sve uno ohv scal 6s . m u v ~ - t h t .* tot on attolon i
reorstered g
( 11 H.bCLO10on LLCP44 &J'aec dd te 5&i g wpenescov l
signal to reach a trip setpoint .4 n d return to normal values in !
euch a short time'so as to avo&d being seen by StarTrec. The i l
trip slonal had.to be a digitJ1 vvwnt u t vwry short duration cauoane the actuatAon of some NFS relavs, the appearance of {
tanding a cause then supportanQ evidwnee hJppens When Conclusive !
6 hard ev4dence le not present. ;
the LaSalle ONS$ August monthly contains a reference to the PSE j hepott of the event i SEL!!ON 111.0 ). l Harry McLain i s
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E AO institute or Nuclear Power l
g D) Operations (9[ ]
~ suneisoo a 11o0 Circle 7s l NYess moo" !
September 12, 1989 l
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i i Mr. Cordell Reed .
l Senior Vice President ,
i Commonwealth Edison Company !
72 West Adams !
Chicago, I 60690-0767 l
Dear Mr. R6ct:
- ?
This letter documents the results of INP0's special assistance visit
- conducted at LaSalle County Station on August 31 and September 1, 1989. Thg ,
purpose of the visit was to provide assistance with an investigation of an ,
event resulting in a reactor scram that occurred at LaSalle on August 26, 1989.
The results of the visit were discussed with appropriate members of the plant staff on September 1,1989, and a preliminary events and causal , i factors chart was addressed. In accordance with our policy, the team returned to INPO and discussed their thoughts with other experienced ,
personnel and department management before providing this report in writing, j Enclosed is a copy of our team's trip report. It is provided to you independent of INP0's evaluation program. !
Pleasedonothesitatetocontactmeat(404)953-7564 if you have any questions on this matter. j l -
Sincerely, i Donald L. G1111spie I
. Director i Engineering Division !
s i DLG/kah
Enclosure:
Trip Report i cc/w: MCWinston'C'Duka7
' Mr.. Gerald J. Diederich j i
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i in:titute of l Nucleer Power i Operations :
1 i
0" September 12, 198 Memorandum
, J. F. Groth . kM ;
% T. M. Muschar b .
AS$!$TANCE V!$!T, LASALLE COUNTY UNIT 2 REACTOR SCRAM,
- . AUGUST 31 - SEPTEMBER 1, 1989 l t
-i I. Purnose t
During the period of August 31 to September 1, 1989, Russ Warren and myself assisted the LaSalle County, Unit 2 staff in an investigation of -
a reactor scram which occurred on August 26, 1989. l The nature of the event was a scram of the unit during a main turbine e control and stop valve leak tightness test. While the unit was at 10 - ,
percent power with three stop valves fully closed a scrae occurred even 4
though the unit did not experience an observable transient with first i stage turbine pressure that would have unbypassed the stop valve position scram input to the reactor protection system logic.
This assistance visit was requested by Commonwealth Edison Company i manageh.ent, j II. Discussion :
The two of us traveled to LaSalle on August 31, 1989. Upon arrival at [
the site Thursday, we were met by a training supervisor responsible for ;
our site familiarization training and access processing. Processing !
took approximately two hours. , !
I Late.r in the morning, we talked to Bill Huntington, Technical Superintendent for both units at LaSalle. He indicated that Commonwealth Edison had requested our assistance due to the concer :
thtt the cause of the scram on August 26th was eluding the f' investigation team. He introduced us to Jeff Miller, an assistant supervisor in the technical department responsible for the ;
investigation. Station individuals contacted during the course of the assistance visit are ideptified in Attachment A. l The plant provided all documentation concerning the scram generated by plant staff and the General Electric representative. The GE :
representative was called to the plant to assess the potential failure i of the scram contactors that did not deenergize during the initial l phase of the scram, i
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iI. Assista2ce Visit to 1.aSalle )
j Pags t Ia l i !
i l l The following root cause techniques were used during the assistance !
l visit to aid in determining the cause of the scram.
l l
0 interviewing o change analysis ,
i o cause and effect aatlysis
- o events and causal . actors charting technique Based upon our independent investigation, the cause(s) of the reactor f scram was not determined. This was due mostly to the unavailability to !
1 information that wc,vid have been printed by the sequence of events i recorder alarm typewriter. However, the alarm typer was off ,
(deenergized) during the same period of time the scram occurred. The ;
, reason the alarm typer was off is addressed in the events and causal k factors chart (Attachment C) and in the next section of this report. ,, l i
i On September 1, 1989, the results of the assistance visit were
- debriefed with the utility personnel '.dentified in Attachment B. The events and causal factors chart (Attachment C) developed by ta on the .
scram event was the focus of the debrief. >
III, senuance of Events On August 26, 1989, the plant reduced power to approximately 10 percent '
'n preparation for a main turbine control and stop valve leak tightness !
j 6est. The main generator output circuit breaker was tripped taking the ,
l unit off line, and the field breaker was tripped. Unexpectedly the ;
l main turbine tripped. The cause for this turnine trip had not yet been determined at the time of our visit. The main turbine was reset and ,
brought back up to rated speed. While recovering from the first turbine trip, a second turbine trip occurred due to exceeding the low I pressure turbinc exhwst hood torperature trip set oint. The procedure j being used for the test had a caution regarding ex aust hood i temperature. The main turbine was again reset and brought to rated i l speed, and the valve leak tightness test was started.
Earlier, during a previous shift, a reactor feedwater pump was taken {
i out of service allowing seal water injection pressure to decrease to
- the alarm setpoint for this parameter. The alarm came in and cleared ;
several . times a second. The alarm contacts were chattering and caused l I
the sequence of events' computer buffers to saturate. An otror message [
4 indicating this condition was printed repeatedly. The alarm typer ,
- (sequence of events recorder) that prints the alarms was physically :
4 close to the turbine control panel being used during the valve leak tightnes: test. Considering the naturated condition of the computer ,
- buffers and the noise it was making, the. alarm typer was turned off. !
t i The control valve portion of the test had been performe,i !
- satisfactorily. The stop valve portion of the test was started by ,
inserting a closing signal to No. 2 stop valve by installing a jumper i
a_ _..__________._,__,.___a
l <
'.. Assistance Visit to LaSalle Page 3 l
l in an electrohydraulic control (EHC) cabinet. As designed, when No. 2 was 90 percent open, No. 1,3, and 4 stop valves went fully closed in the fast mode. Approximately 20 seconds after the valves reached the full closed position, several annunciators alarmed (No. 2 stop valves
. The unit 2 nuclear station were operator still(NS0) soproximately saw the combination 75 percent open)l in lights, control rod of ful accumulator lights, and the rod sequence control system full core l display lights illuminate. He also noted that two of the eight scram J
- solenoid power indicating lights on the main control panel had not I doenergized. In response to the scram condition, the plant was ;
manually scrammed. The scram solenoid power indicating lights which .
were lit extinguished immediately. The 'first hit" annunciators indicated that the stop valve position scram had caused the scram. All t rods were subsequently verified to have fully inserted by obtaining a process computer printout. ,.
l IV. Conclusion -
i The probable cause of the scra's is an external spike of indeterminate i , l l origin. The spike was of sufficient duration to deenergize no less I than three but not more than six of the eight scram solenoid contactors in the reactor protection system logic. This implies that the dropout ;
time is slightly different for the eight contactors. Also, the presence of the spike was not recorded by any process Instrumentation. ,
TMM/kah l Attachments: A. Personnel Contacted l B. Personnel Present at Debrief '
C. Events and Causal Factors Chart cc/w: Presidents Office [
T. J. Sullivan ,
D. L. Gil11spie J. P. Forsyth L E. D. Hux !
R. D. Warren i
i l h g i i t I i 1
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Attachment A Page 1 of 1 2
PERSONNEL CONTACTED J
1 D. Crowl Station HPES Coordinator j J. Miller Assistant Technical Staff' Supervisor l J. Marshall Corporate 8WR Operating Experience Representative !
. i H. McClain Nuclear Safety Engineer !
B. Grim General Electric Technical Representative f i
- 8. Huntington Technical Superintendent i i
L. Melander Operations Auxiliary Foreman (SR0) !
, s l J. Stephens NuclearStationOperator(RO) l I
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Attachment B l
- Page 1 of I l PERSONNEL PRESENT AT DEBRIEF l l
i D. Galle Vice President, Nuclear Operations !
N. Xalivianakis General Manager, BWR Operations f J. Renwick Production Superintendent l
D. Crowl Station HPES Coordinator J. Miller Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor !
I J. Marshall Corporate BWR Operating Experience Representative [
L. Lauterbach Nuclear Safety Engineer f
- 8. Huntington Technical Superintendent l r
W. Morgan LaSalle Nuclear License Adminstrator i .
[
T. Hammerich Regulatory Assurance Supervisor , !
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e DEVIAtl0N REPORT i*
0V. . .
l-1 01 - W - M - M7 Fore Rev 2.0 STA talli YEAR MD.
- OCCURRED i 8/26/M_ 0413 I PART I _ l TITLE OF OEVIATim TIM RATE l Unit 2 ^^^ 1 r "cr= '
TESTIM l'
PLANT STATU5 AT TIM 0F EVENT 5757 J AFFECTED 10 mRK REqutST m. l L_l"5 l 1" Met i POeRm _
RPS I DESCRIPTION OF EVENT l i !
t As scram from furtifie Stop Valve not full open during perforinance of LD5-78-5A2, Tur61ms V:
LRP-3-2 was lausdiately l
Tightness Test. LGP-2-1 was in progress for planned maint. outage.
Group lights A2 and A3 did not initially doenerglas untti l
entered, upon receipt of auto ser m.
l annual scr e was inserted. f f
POTENTIALLT 510NiflCANT EVENT PER N50 OIRECTIVE yy gA 47 YE5
[ ]NO S/26/M 10CFR50.72 MRC REO PHONE l l1 HOUR John M. Damron 0515 NO
! 0 ATE ,
\ I _l d HOUR Tim ! RE5ru61SLE *C::"Is0R NOTIFICATION RADE PART2l OPERAT!W EWlWEER'S COMENTS DVR ull) be used 14 track completion of root cause. HPE5 wl11 be initiated for deterimination of any corrective actions, t
NOTIFICATION Lanksbury __ S/26/M REGION III DATE TIM 30 DAT REPORTABLE /10CFR50.73(a)(2)(lv) g, N50 DATE TIM -
5 OAT REPORT PER 10CFR21 l l AltfuAL/5PECIAL REPORT REQUIRE 0 CECO CORPORATE NOTIFICATION MADE l l 1F ABOVE NOTIFICAT10N 15 PER 10CFR21 A.I.R. # M UC'M oMol 03702. i QAT L TIME L.E.R.M- -eH@ CECO CORPORATE OFFICER PftELIRIMARY REPORT 8/26/M M. J. Hentschel / '
COMPLETED AND REVIEE 0 OPER&HW==R /// QATE i5 ON ./ lhfi YL A 9l2ffff E
f i
'b
- V N
RESOLUT10N APPROVED AIS AUTHOR 12E0 FOR O!STR19UT10N d "
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u-20-e5 E ""
c-5us (cor. is-s2-u ;
00CUMENT 10 0560p
1 l .
LICEN5EE EVENT (CPORT (LER) Pane (3)
Docket Numer (2) '
! Factitty Name (1) of $1 01 01 01 31 71 4 1 of!0 9_
f'dalleCountyStationunit2
' Title (4)
! I Other Facilities involved (s) l Saurious ReactorLEProtactlan " -- (63 Swatananaert Actuation Date (7) Due Day fear to maars Facility unknown ' Met thaber(s) Cause Event Data (5) Month '
Seguential' /,/J Revision Year'/f/
l Month Day Year W/
^ ^~-
U/ thauber 01 51 01 01 01 I i si e ol 51 of of of I i 019 21 5
~
I
~~
o1111 _0 1 0
. el e al 9 01 s 21 6 l
THIS REPORT ,r; of the !$ SURMITTED fo11awine) (11) PUR5uANT TO THE REQulREM
,_,13.71(b)
(t M one or 20.405(c) I__ 50.73(a)(2)(lv) 20.402(b) 73.71(c) 1 -
50.36(c)(1) ,,,,,
50.73(a)(2)(v) other (Specify 20.405(a)(1)(l) ,,,,,_
50.73(a)(2)(vil) ,,,,,,
POER ,,,,,
20.405(a)(1)(ll) 50.36(c)(2) __,,,
in Abstract 50.73(a)(2)(vill)(A)
LEVEL g i ,__
20.405(a)(1)(111) 50.73(a)(2)(1) ,,__
below and in (101 01 11 0 __ _
50.73(a)(2)(ll) ,_,,
50.73(a)(2)(vill)(8) Teat) 20.405(a)(1)(lv) ,_,,
50.73(a)(2)(x)
//g/f//f///jf//fj//f/f//j ff f
/
fjf ff ff 50.73(a)(2) W ) _
J NNN/NfbNfff'/fhfdb 20.405(a)(Wv) LICENSEE CONTACT T E LE"'*8 FOR THt5 LER (
HL"BER AREA CODE Name 8 l 1 15 31 51 71 l 61 71 61 1 IS REPORT (13)
& C. Klika. Assistant Tschalcal Staff Suoervisor.CopFONENT estension MANUFAC- 2513w,Fi.ETE REPORTABLE DE j _
CopFONENT MANUFAC- ' REPORTABLE' CAUSE SYSTEM TURER 70 tres CAUSE SYSTEM TURER TO NPRDS .
l l l l l l l Al Li Yi Gl 01 81 2 Y .
l i l l I l l I Jl C Expected ' Month l Oay 1 Yea r
I l l l I l I _
SUPPLEIENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) Sutumission 0 11 l015!910 l l N0 l lines) (16) x lyes (if ves, emplete EXPECTED SUBMI5510N OATE) ABSTRACT a controlled shutdown was in progress on Unit 2 . ed at 0414 hours0.00479 days <br />0.115 hours <br />6.845238e-4 weeks <br />1.57527e-4 months <br />. When On August 26, 1999, A remained energl2ed.
Valve Leak Tightness Survel11ance," a Aeactor Protection System (RPS) actuation occ the actuation signal was received, two of the four scr e group lights of appears Rod motion the RPS to Bus This prevented same of the rods from receiving the normaledautomatic at the smee time scrm later as actuat have initiated for these rods due to the Channe) A backup scram actuation which occur the initial event. The Control Room Operator manually initiated a nome) using the A2 and 82 scran pushbuttons.
that the scran had occurred. turned off due to Before the turbine valve test was started,Asthe Hathaway a result, Sequence the main sourcs of infomation of Events to be alam ty its constant printing caused by alam relay chattering.At the time of the trip, no plant parameters exceeded used in analyzing the reactor trip was not available.
their trip setpoints.
ilable infomation in an As a result of the missing information, several scenarios were developedbusing ce in avaAt t i
attempt to detemine the cause of the reactor trip.The investigations have con detemined.
the RPS system allowed scue of the scram contactors to trip, but was not present The source of this spurious signal is unknown.
the contactors tripped. f an Engineered Safety i
This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) due to the actuat o Feature System.
+ .
Fere ter 2.0 t?--"" LaT ._ _.i (LH) TEHY cMY***T te Paan (3)
L H U " (4)
PACILITY IIM (1) 00CEET IA53ER (2)
Year p/ 5eguential gm Revisten I
eie - o1111 - oI o el 2 or el e
- 11e cannt,statten unit i e15ieIeie1alfle
, TEXT Energy ladestry leentificatten Systa (Ell 5) codes are identified in the text as (11]
PLAlff A m 5YSTEM 10ElfflFICAfloll General Electric - Dolling lister Reactor i 1
, ]
l Energy Industry identification Systa (E!!$) codes a;e identified in the text as [T.X). I 1 !
i A. COWlfl0N PRIOR TO EVEtif !
i Event fles: 0414 Hamrs Event Date: t/5/99 _
Unit (s): 2 ,
4 Mode (s) leans: ,_3llL, Power Level (s): _j&,, ;
1 Acactor Mode (s): i 1
S. DESCRIPfl0N OF EVElff l
1 on August 26, 1909 a controlled shutdown was in progress on Unit 2 in properation for a maintenance '
) In accordance with the
)
outage to replace the seal on the At 290336Reactor Recirculation (IIR) [AD) i hours, LOS-TS-542, " Turbine Valve
- 1
$urvelliance,'hadjustbeencompletedsatisfactorily.
l Tightness Test," was begun.
l l After successful coupletion of the Turbine Control Valve leak tightness portion of LOS-TG-SA2 at f approalmstely 0412 hours0.00477 days <br />0.114 hours <br />6.812169e-4 weeks <br />1.56766e-4 months <br />, an Equipment Operator (EC) installed a juperThis oncauses the #2 Main ful 4
Valve (MSV 2) pre-any function board in the Electro-Hydraulle Control (EHC) [J0) cabinet. This ;
l the Main Turbine Stop Valves to go closed while maintaining the Turbine Control Valves open.
started the Turbine Stop Valve portion of the LOS-TG-5A2.
tihen M5V 2 reached 905 open After the jmper was installed, MSV 2 began to delft closed as expected. l position, MSV 1, 3 and 4 closed reaching full closed at 0413 hours0.00478 days <br />0.115 hours <br />6.828704e-4 weeks <br />1.571465e-4 months <br />. i i
Approalmstely 23 seconds after MSV 1, 3 and 4 reached full closed, at least one subchan Reactor Protection System (NPS) [JC] channels A and 8 tripped, with the respective channel tri At this time only the 'A" back-up scr e channel !
occurring within 40 ellliseconds of each other.
energized. (Refer to Attachment A.)
After the autcastic IIPS actuation, the Control hoom Operator (if50, licensed teactor Operator) the survelliance noticed that the A2/A3 red scram preup lights were still energized which indicat; He directed another 1150 at the the A2 and A3 control rod scram solenolds were still energized.This 1850 armed and depressed?
foodmater pop panel to manually serm the reactor.This scram occurred approntaistely 12 seconds afte '
subchannel manual scr e pushbuttons.
actuation. This action successfully doenergized the A2 and A3 scrm solenolds (and rod scre group ;
lights) and caused the B channel of the back-up scram to energite (by doenergizingit the is "K14G" contactor),. All rods were verified to be fully inserted within a minute of the Initial signals, estimated that rod groups I and 4 were fully laserted 3 seconds after the initial actuation and all I
, _ _ _ __ . .-~~ - - _ . - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . - -- . . _ . - .
- . l I
te-~! EvtNT Mpet (taal TEHT caff f=Timi 7 ; ton g ;
' LAR r--- (4) AW FACILITT afgE (1) 00CEET IRpWER (t) i Year /u Sequential /H Aevisten Q
Q __
oi111 oI o el 3 or el e o I s i o I e i e i si 71 d eie - -
% 11e r_.av statlan unit 2 l J TERT Energy industry identification System (Ell 5) codes are identified in the tent as (KK) ;
l l
- g. DESCRIPflel 0F EVENT (Continued) based on available indications, l
control rods were fully inserted within 3 seconds of the manual scram, !
f lt was determined that all other espected avtsmatic actions occurred as espected and a valid process l
' This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFRt0.73(1)(2)(lv) due scram sigeal had not occurred. l I to the actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature System. !
f I
Prior te performing the furtine Valve fightness Test the tertine was tripped at 0306 and 0319 hours0.00369 days <br />0.0886 hours <br />5.274471e-4 weeks <br />1.213795e-4 months <br /> on i August N , 1999.
The reactor did not scr e during either of these events because the 305 Tertine First I l
! Stage Pressure Trip bypass was in effect at the ties.
l j i
From apprealmstely 2327 hours0.0269 days <br />0.646 hours <br />0.00385 weeks <br />8.854235e-4 months <br /> on August 25,1999 to 0316 hours0.00366 days <br />0.0878 hours <br />5.224868e-4 weeks <br />1.20238e-4 months <br /> on August N,1999, the seguential mome l
1 of the seguence of events recorder (SER) was being saturated (filled) due to cyc1tng inputs from the t 3 Turtine Driven Faed Water Pep Seal injection Pressure switch, and the Off-eas pro-Treatment Radiation j
Ronitor Law lanple Flow detector. Both of these alarms are " normal' for the shutdown condition, and ,
] were cyc11ag rapidly because the process signals were slowly passing through the alarm setpelats.
4 At about 0330 hours0.00382 days <br />0.0917 hours <br />5.456349e-4 weeks <br />1.25565e-4 months <br /> the Hathaway Sequential Events Recorder (SER) alare printer was turned off because l
i the typer was continuously printing messages caused by these nuisance alares. This printing was f distracting to the Operators who were performing the tuttine valve surveillance in the lamediate i I vicinity of the typer. This had no effect on the operation of the visual or audible alarus la the Control Asem. Authorlaation to bypass these alarus had been initiated prior to when the printer was ,
l j
turned off and had just been obtained just prior to the event, but the associated bypass jumpers had not 7
! been installed. 1 As a result of not having the SER alarm printer in operation at the time of the event, investigations l
into the cause of the event are very difficult. Therefore the primary sources of recorded data for this The event are the plant process computer (CE) (10), the Startrec computer and Control hoom charts.
l process computer prints out certain digital inputs if they change state for at least I second (its :
digital point scan rate), it also printed a "NS$$ post trip log" which prints a historical log of 10 l
5 analog secor readings (stored at 5 second intervals) retrieved from 5 minutes prior to its initiation.
j This log was initiated by the receipt of the 'A' backup scram signal which accespanled the Initial ;
j automatic scram. The Startrec recording was initiated directly by the RPS actuation and records i selected signals from .5 seconds before the trip to 1 minute after the trip. It has a scan rate of 20 milliseconds per scan.
l I l
l j C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT A
i To evaluate the cause of the scram, a list of possible scram signals was generated and evallable Information (including Control hoom chart recorder data) was used to eliminate any paraseters which it ['
l
' could be shown to have not onceeded their scram setpoints (L555 value) at any time. The results of this i I comparison concluded that there is no indication that any L555 parameter actually reached a required scram setpoint. Therefore, any RPS channels which received trip signals were receiving only false trip ,
J indication, not reflective of the true process conditions.
I i
i 1
6 i
)
, Rev 2.s Lle"""* 6 i - i (LH1 TEXT winammygg ^
= 00 LH Z--- (El ..
FACitlTY uffE (1) 00CKET tafGER (2) Revisten Year // 5equential f
l oi111 eI e el 4 or el e i o I s i o I o 1 o 121 Tl 4 eie - .
n2 911e - 1,statlan unit 2 j Taxi Energy industry leontificatten systa (5115) codes are teentified in the test as (xx) !
C. APPARENT Capt.t OF EVgNT (Continued)
The only significant infomstlen related to the cause of tatensive operator interviews were conducted.
the event was the Operator actlens to verify This alam thatisthe espected visualduringannunciator the asseclated systm test'first and est* light I; was the 'Tuttine Step Valves met F.4pon' alarm. This centributed to the Operators' ?
would not necessarily reflect the cause of the scre in this case. ;
belief that the scr e had been caused by a ceabinatlen of the step valve closure (due to the lt an uneapected less of the scre bypass function which operates off of the tuttine first stage pressure.{
Subsequent Indications of the tertine first stage pressure led to the conclusion that this was not j likely to be the cause of the scr e signal. I Further investigations indicate that the scr e signal could be due to a spurless pulse (not caused b r actual process variable transient) on one of the sensing lines which is shared by an 'A' and a *Sl subchannel.
All shared sensing lines were identifled using plant drawings.
Estensive tests of the RPS systs was undertaken in an attempt to detect eness11es in the followi i
j areas l
proper subchannel wiring (i.e., that the correct contactors respond to trip and reset 1) l actuations, ,
i 2) Inadvertent or failed rest / seal-in paths,
! 3) loose connections, !
J i
- 4) foreign materlats inside the contactors or housings, response timing between paired contactors and between contacts on the same contactor, l 5) f
- 6) logic inputs (station scram functional survelliances perfomed),
- 1) Radio - frequency interference. and i
- 8) mechanically induced trips due to striking comon sensing ilnes.
All cf these tests demonstrated proper operation in all "A" and 't* RPS channels.
The failure of the A2 and A3 Reactor Protection System channels to drop out Indicates that the K14E a K14G scram contacters did not trip. Scram cont,ectors Klat and K14G were removed from the plant to be tested. Prior to removal the following was performed: ,
- 1) Visual checks for discoloration
- 2) Drop out timing tests ;
- 3) Response times
- 4) Cell and contact resistance
. . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . - _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ ______._______m. . . -
I'O l
_ pese nos E.e ;
' LitsamEE EVENT MT psai runn suur"-"?tal Pine tll1 i Las '- '
to) _
PmCILITY uffE (1) e0CEET testte (t) arvislen Year Soementiat _ __
1 i
4 ei)i1 - ei o el e er el e l e i s i e i e i e 1 21 11 a e i e j - _
a-a-11e enunty stattaa mit t ,
- l ftst Energy industry leentification System (Elll) endes are teentiftee la the test as (u )
l ATTADeENT S i RPS LOGIC DMMPLE LaSalle
\,
E E .
SUBOUWOGEL n l tas une a n .Bunana.
Tum. Stop U19 Mot Open i e a = turb t** M
i
['='
a !
'm
' a s Cent Ulv Fast close s i
" StsPress
- s
' l t
) i soran et oh untwee Hi = =
\= = B/P au ** " "
iJ\ . gug MSIDs not Full Open s ~/t. d . i i !
i HI B/W Pressure e i
- i i HI Rx. Pressure a j
i
' i n i 14 Rx. Water Lvl s i i n MSL HI Red s i t
r HI Moutron Flux
( IIM/ RPRM -RUN) s..~..........,
H s. 3 Manua1 soran i '
K14C K140 ,
Contactor Kien l' 14E ,
'*1 i l g- : !
<xt4 ) 3 J b.) T'd b $J r-N b- N il
\
l
\
I f
T I X15 M19 l i
\ ET l c
l :
I I
i l '
SCRAM RESET LOGIC
- Roset Rosets B/U SW. :
Poeition Relav Contactor Lockout t Gi+G+
I' i
1 -
J M19D
~
a OEVIATION REPORT !
l OVR NO.
f 01 - 02 - 89 - 039 tallT YEAR NO. Fom Rev 2.0 STA OCCURREO t/M/09 2M5 PARTI l TITLE OF DEVIATimi TIM QATE Tuttina First Staan Law Pronpre Scram S_rs Switch '
TESTING SYSTEM AFFECTED PLANT STATU5 AT Tlft 0F EVENT W g- g PohER(5)_ 0 neRK REQUEST No. l_x lMS IEIDE_ 5/0 DE3CRiffl0N OF EVENT Ouring the performance of LIP-TG-401M, " Unit 2 Turbine First Stage Low Pressure Scram and E switch exceeded the Technical Specification ilmit of 151.8 psis. The typass," test, the 2C71400030 switch was calibrated and returned to service. ,
YES POTENTIALLY SIWilFICANT EVENT PER N50 DIRECTIVE A-07 g g lX lNo 10CFR50.72 NRC RED PHONE l ___.,l Li e 8/26/09 NOTIFICATION MADE l l Tim I*I RE5hidISLE SLF=ISOR QATE
_PA,RL2.,l R OPERATING ENGIIIEER'S CopWIENTS The turbine first stage press. bypass switch was found out of spec. during survelliance and was lamediately returned to specification.
NON RNW EVENT lXl If0TIFICAT10N NA OATE TIME REGION 11I 30 DAY REPORTABLE /10CFR g l 0 DATE TIME 5 OAY REFORT PER 10CFR21 g l IAL REM WM CECO CORPORATE NOTIFICATION MADE l l IF A80VE NOTIFICATION IS PER 10CFR21 A.L.R. 0_3H 2cc 99 0 W\
DATE TIME
- CECO CORPORATE OFFICER PRELIMINARY REPOILT COW LETED AND REVIEWED Mark w r 8/28/89 OATE ,
CMRATING .EldGlu8W/
f 10N V / 4 1[If C Y wna~ bX21Zwiss I RESOLUTION APPROVED AND Q l "l kW AUTHORIZE 0 FOR 015TR18UT10N **
es-Sin (Fo= is-52-u n-20-es W" ;
DOCUMENT ID 0558p
~, 1
, g OEYlA?l0N ENVESTIGATION REPORT (DIR)
PAGE Facility Nme 1 10Fl 0 1 3 sat =11e county Station unit 2 Title Turbine First 5*= Pressure i_r! Switch out of Tolerance OneREPORT to Setpoint DATE Delft EVnNT DATE DIR WLBRER NN I u REV!510N MODE talli YEAR
//
M SEQUENTIAL TJSER h NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR 4
MONTH QAY YEAR. STA POER N of on o of 9 11 9 el 9 of 2 el 9 - o 1 31 9 - oI o ol e 21 6 el 9 of 1 CONTACT FOR THIS DIR TELEPHONE NUPBER NAM AREA CODE 8l115 315lTI-l6lTl6l1 Kevin C. Dorwick. Technical Staff Eneinser. REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM estension COWONENT 2T05CUrFLET MANUFAC- REPORTASLE TO NPRDS SYSTER COM ONENT MANUFAC- TURER
~CAUSE TURER TO WPRD5 I I I I I I I x alC I l PI 5 s1 01 Tl o N l l I I I I I I I I I I "
SUPPLi=::TAL REPORT EXPECTED EXPECTED SUBMISSION l
~ - ll N0 l YES (if ves. w siete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)
TEXT Energy Industry identification System (E!!S) codes are identified in the text as (xx]
PLANT AND ST5 TEM 10ENTIFICAT10N i General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor Energy Industry identification System (E!!S) codes are identified in the text as (XX).
l
! A, CON 0! TION PRIOR TO EVENT Event Time: 2115 Hours Event Date: 8/26/89 I Unit (s): 2 Power Level (s): 05 4 Mode (s) Name: Cold Shutdown Reactor Mode (s):
B, DESCRIPTION OF EVENT l on August 26, 1989, at 2115 hours0.0245 days <br />0.588 hours <br />0.0035 weeks <br />8.047575e-4 months <br />, while Unit 2 was in Operational condition 4 (Culd shutdown) at power, Instrument Department Technicians determined that the Reactor Protection reactor auto-scram channel C and channel D turbine first stage pressure This switchesdiscovery had excee
- Technical Specification setpoint of 151.6 psig (140 psig + 11.8 psi head correction).
was made during the performance of LaSalle Instroent Calibration Procedures LIP-TG-601AB and LIP-TG-60188, " Unit 2 Turbine First Stage Pressure Scr m and E0C-RPT Bypass Channels A ,
Calibration in Shutdown Mode," and " Unit 2 Turbine First Stage Normally, Pressurethe Scram andswitches, pressure EOC-RPT Bypa Channels B and 0 Refuel Calibration in Shutdown Mode," respectively.
l
- _ _ . , _