ML19323J338
| ML19323J338 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 05/28/1980 |
| From: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Counsil W NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8006200037 | |
| Download: ML19323J338 (1) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES aeo2 9[')g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y
O REGl*N I rs j
$31 PARK AVENUE KING OF PRUSSI A, PENNSYt.VANI A 19408 Docket Nos. 50-336 May 28, 1980 50-423 Northeast Nuclear Energy Company ATTN: Mr. W. G. Counsil Vice President - Nuclear j
Engineering and Operations 1
P. O. Box 270 l
Hartford, Connecticut 06101 1
Gentlemen:
The enclosed IE Circular No. 80-13, " Grid Strap Damage in Westinghouse Fuel Assemblies," is forwarded to you for information.
No written response is required.
If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.
Sincerely, j
?!%
i Boyce H. Grier Director
Enclosures:
1.
IE Circular No. 80-13 with Attachment 2.
List of Recently Issued IE Circulars
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CONTACT:
D. L. Caphton (215-337-5262) cc w/encls:
J. F. Opeka, Station Superintendent D. G. Diedrick, Manager of Quality Assurance J. R. Himelwright, Licensing. Safeguards Engineer K. W, Gray, Supervisor of Construction Quality Assuranca H. R. Nims, Director of Nuclear Projects
-THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS POOR QUAUTY PAGES 8006200037
ENCLOSURE 1 SSINS No.: 6830 Accessions No.:
UNITED STATES 7910250495 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION Wn j
OFFICEOFINSPECTIONANDENFORCEMENThgi1
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 y
IE Circular No. 80-13 Date: May 28, 1980 Page 1 of 2 GRID STRAP DAMAGE IN WESTINGHOUSE FUEL ASSEMBLIES Description of Circumstances:
During the refueling operation at Salem Unit 1, it was noted by the licensee that some of the assemblies that were removed had suffered grid strap mechanical damage.
This was reported to the NRC in LER 79-44.
Subsequent to this discovery all fuel assemblies were removed from the core for examination.
The degree of the dauage to the grid straps was classified in three categories: small pieces missing (15 assemblies), grid material ripped and laid over (5 assemblies),
larger sections missing and fuel pins exposed (11 assetblies).
No damage to the fuel pins was observed.
A total of 31 assemblies suffered some grid damage.
The damage appeared to be the result of corner to corner interaction of the grid straps of diagonally adjacent fuel assemblies during the vertical loading and unloading movements.
No correlation of the damage to core location, grid strap elevation, or manufacturing and shipping batches has been identified.
The licensee and the fuel manufacturer established the following guidelines for reloading damaged assemblies: (1) those assemblies with full width pieces missing will not be re.oaded for cycle 2, (2) those assemblies with deformed edges and those with small pieces missing will be roloaded with special pro-cedures to prevent further damage.
Salem Unit 1 is fueled with 17X17 Westinghouse assemblies.
Similar grid problems have occurred at other facilities fueled with 14X14 and 15X15 Westing-house assemblies; however, fewer assemblies were damaged in those instances.
Recommended Actions:
All licensees using 14X14, 15X15, or 17X17 Westinghouse assemblies are advised l
.to:
l (1) Visually inspect grid straps of those fuel asser.blies which are discharged from the core as well as those assemblies which are moved to the spent fuel pool for control rod replacement and are subsequently returned to the core.
IE Circular No. 80-13 Date:
May 28, 1980 Page 2 of 2 (2) Review the fuel handling precautions recommended by Westinghouse at a meeting on May 25, 1979, with NRC and the licensee for Salem (Attachment 1).
Adopt those recommendations which are pertinent.
No written response to this Circular is required.
If you required additional information regardin NRC Regional Office.g these matters, contact the Director of the appropriate
Attachment:
Summary of Meeting Notice dated 5/30/79 j
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Attachment to IE Circular No. 80-13 d
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UNITED STATES 8
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION r.
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e Ome Docket No. 50-272 LICENSEE:
PUELIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY (PSE&G)
FACILITY:
SALEM UNIT NO. 1
SUBJECT:
SUWARY OF MEETING HELD ON MAY 25, 1979. TO DISCUSS DAMAGE OBSERVED TO FUEL GRID ASSEMBLIES DURING THE SALEM UNIT NO. i REFUELING OUTAGE OnNay25,1979, we met with represeritatives of Public Service Electric &
Gas Company (PSE&G) and Westinghouse to discuss the cause and extent of dacage observed to the Salem Unit No.1 fuel grid assemblies during the current refueling outage for cycle 2.
A list of attendees is enclosed.
Significant discussions are sucrnarized below.
Th licenses and Westinghouse provided a detailed discussion of the da:. age observed to the Salem fuel grid assemblies during the cycle 2 refueling cutage which co:rrnenced in April 1979.
Due to the indications
. observed during the initial stages of the outage, the decision was made to unload all fuel assemblies from the core.
Of the fuel assemblies (193) inspected, 28 assemblies were determined to have varying degrees of danage to one or more of the eight grid. assemblies per fuel assembly.
The grid asse.. bites provide lateral support to the fuel rods.
In no cas,e was dacage observed to the fuel rods themselves.
The grid assembly dar. age observed, which was generally located at the corners of the grid assemblies, was categorized as follows:
Cateaory Tyca of Damace No. of Grid Asse:nblies 1
small pieces missing 15 2
grid material ripped 4
and laid over 3
1arger sections missing and g
fuel pins exposed e
e
Attachment to IE Circular No. 80-13 s __.
Meeting.Sunmary for SaTem Unit 1 Of the above, fuel assemblies with categories 1 and 2 damage were detennined by the licensee to be acceptable-for use and will be reloaded for cycle 2i as a precautionary measure assemblies with category 3 damage will not be reloaded. The basis for this detemination was that assemblies with category 1 and 2 damage can be used without any loss of function of the damaged grids.
Fuel assemblies With category 3 damage, however, no longer fully restrain all fuel rods in the manner provided for in the l
design. Their reuse should be based on further analysis.
Of the data collected and the reload films reviewed, no pattern has been established for the observed damage.
Also, it has not been detemined whether the damage occurred during fuel insertion for cycle 1, or during rernval or readjustments for cycle 2, or both.
It is believed that corner-to-corner interaction may have occurred between grid assemblies of adjacent fuel asse=blies especially when diagonal fuel assecblies have been removed and some degree of lateral movement is possible.
Under these conditions the grid assemblies may have been aligned such that the corners interacted during vertical movement.
Of the pieces missing (about 61), a total area of about 25in2 is involved.
These pieces range from about.31n2 up to about 5.5in2 Approximately 12in2 of material has been recovered from' the core or the fuel assemblies during the unloading of the core.
In addition, the core was inspected with a TV camera.
With regard to the potential for flow blockage from the missing material, Westinghouse indicated that if all the peices originally missing were to be located such as to partially block the inlet nozzle area of the ene fuel assembl, analyses similar to that described in Section 3.4 of the Salem FSAR indicate that no problem would exist.
The smaller pieces still missing are expected to easily pass up through the-fuel assemblies during operation and not present any problems to the control rod drive machanisms.
The largest that any of the missing pieces could be, based on the base areas on grid assemblies, is slightly greater th:n 2in2 Westinghouse has recocnended additicnal fuel assembly handling precautions
-to minimize the potential for corner-to-corner interaction between grid assemblies.
Included among these recomendations are,1) a revised Icading sequence which would load fuel assemblies from the sides of the core toward the center, 2) a slight offset in position as corner feel assemblies are lowered into the core until they are about 10" above the base plate and then making a lateral adjustment into finul position,
- 3) the conditionally acc y ted assemblies in categories 1 and 2 would be leaded in a special sequence to minimize relative motion with adjacent assemblies, 4) those assemblies in category 2 would be loaded against the core baffle, where possible and 5) re.ised load cell limits on the mani-pulator crane in an attemp to more easily detect increased loads
-during fuel handling.
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Attachment to I'E Circular No. 80-13 Meeting Sumary for Salem Unit 1.
Westinghouse acknowledged and sumarized similar grid assembly problems that have occurred at other facilities.
Although these other oc.currences did not involve as many fuel assemblies as in this Salem situation, similar damage has been observed to 14x14,15x15 and 17x17 fuel assemblies.
In some instances the fuel was removed, and in others, the fuel was re-loaded with no known adverse effects.
With regard to the Salem Unit 1 refueling analysis, the licensee indicated praliminarily, that the core parameters are expected to be essentially unchanged due to the revised core loading that will result.
The licensee agreed to address the potential effects that the unaccounted for pieces of grid material might have on the core thermal hydraulic analysis and on control rod operation.
This information will be included prior to restart of Salem 1 in a supplement to the licensee's reload application for cycle 2.
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Gary G. Zech, project Manager Operating Reactors Branch #1 Division of Operating Reactors
Enclosure:
List of Attendees cc: w/ enclosure
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See next page
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ENCLOSURE 2 IE Circular No. 80-13 Date:
May 28, 1980 Page 1 of 1 RECENTLY ISSUED IE CIRCULARS Circular Subject First Date Issued To No.
of Issue 80-03 Protection from Toxic 3/6/80 All Power Reactor Facil-Gas Hazards ities with an (Operating License (OL) 80-04 Securing Threaded Lack-3/14/80 All Power Reactor Facil-ing Devices on Safety-ities with an OL or CP Related Equipment 80-05 Emergency Diesel Gen-4/1/80 All Power Reactor Facil-erator Lubricating Oil ities with an OL or CP Addition and Onsite Supply 80-06 Control and Account-4/14/80 Medical Licensees in ability Systems for Categories G and G1 Implant Therapy Sources 80-07 Problems with HPCI 4/3/80 All Power Reactor Facil-Turbine Oil System ities with an OL or CP 80-08 BWR Technical Speci-4/18/80 All General Electric fication Inconsis-BWRs holding a power tency - RPS Response reactor OL Time 80-09 Problems with Plant 4/28'/80 All holders of Internal Communi-a reactor OL cations Systems or CP 80-10 Failure to Maintain 4/29/80 All Power Reactor Environmental Facilities with an Qualificationof OL or CP Equipment 80-11 Emergency Diesel 5/13/80 All Power Reactor Generator Lube Oil Facilities with ar Cooler Failures OL or CP 80-12 Valve-Shaft-To-Actu-5/14/80 All Power Reactor Faci-ator Key May Fall Out of lities with an OL or CP Place When Mounted Below Horizontal Axis