ML19323J105
| ML19323J105 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/27/1980 |
| From: | Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| FRN-43FR37399, RULE-PR-73 NUDOCS 8006170777 | |
| Download: ML19323J105 (46) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 73 Physical Protection of Irradiated Reactor Fuel in Transit AGENCY:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ACTION:
Effective amendments to interim final rule
SUMMARY
- The Ccmmission is amending its interim rule for the physical protection of irradiated reactor fuel (spent fuel) in transit which was issued on June 15, 1979.
The interim rule and a related guidance document designated HUREG-0561 were issued in effective fem without the benefit of public comrrent.
Public comments were, however, solicited on both the interim regulation and the guidance decurent.
This notice summarizes the comments, gives the Commission response to each, and sets forth the interim amended rule in final fem.
EFFECTIVE DATE:
July 3, 1980, fl0TE:
The Nuclear Regulatory Cncmission has submitted this rule to the Ccmotroller General for review under the Federal Reports Act', as amended, 44 U.S.C. 3512. The date on which the record keeping reouf rement of Secticn 73.37(b)(5) beceries effec-tive, unless advised to the contrary, will be 75 days 'ollowing oublication in the Federal Reef ster. This time period reflects inclusion of the 45 days which the General Accounting Office is allowed for its review (44 U.S.C. 3512(c)(2)).
FOR FURTHER INFCRMATION CONTACT:
fir. L. J. Evans, Jr., Chief, Regulator /
Improvements 3rsnch, Division of Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safaguares. The teleobone nucber is (201) 427 4151.
B006170797 '
.. SUPPLEMENTMY INFORMATION:
On June 15, 1979, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comissicn arrended 10 CFR 73 of its regulaticns to provide immediately effective interim requirements for the protection of spent fuel in transit.
Concurrently, the NRC issued a guidance, document (NUREG-0561) to assist licensees in carrying cut the requirements.
Both the amendment and the
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guidance document were published withcut benefit of pub 1ic conrent in the interest of the public health and safety.
At the time of publication, the public was invited to submit its views and ccaments.
After reviewing cerrrents received frem the public, and after taking into acccunt the experience gained during the several months that the arrendments have been effective, the Cemission he: decided to make a number of changes to the amendments and to NUREG-0561.
All references to specific sections of the regulatien refer to the June 15, 1979 version of the regulation, unless otherwise specified.
A.
Follcwing is a sumary of changes to the amendments.
These changes were, of course, acconpanied by appropriate changes to NUREG-0561.
(1)
Small cuantity shicments.
Some comments suggest that the secpe of the rule should be revised to specify for spent fuel a threshold quantity below which protection requirements wculd not apply.
The Comission agrees with this suggestion and has mcdified 573.l(b)(5) and 173.37(a) to set the threshold level at 100 grams in net weight of irradiated fuel (i.e.,
uranium, plutenium and associated fission products) exclusive of cladding or other structural or packaging material; thus shipments of spent fuel in quantities belcw 100 grams need not be protected.
It is believed that the 100 gram threshold is in the public interest inasmuch as it would simplify the transport of small cuantities, such as those made in ecnnection with 9
e e'
4 spent fuel research activities.
The calculated ave :ge radiological consequences of successful sabetage of a shipment of 100 grams of spent fuel even in a heavily populated envfronment are negifgible.
The language of 173.l(b)(5) and 573.37(a) has also been changed to clarify which shipments are covered by the amendments.
Shipments of material which are exempt from the requirements of 173.30 through 973.36 on the basis of the external radiation dose rate associated with such shipments, are now referred to in the regulations directly in terms of their dose rate, rather than in terns of their exemption frem another rule.
The guidance will i
clarify that the dese rate measurement in the case of smaller shipments, which may involve multiple packaging, shculd refer to the arrangement of shipment packages which results in the highest measurable external dose This should eliminate any ambiguity which may arise from the rate.
possibility that the highest measurable dose rate for a grouping of several different packages comprising a single shipment may depend on the particular arrangement and orientation of the packages within the transport vehicle.
(2) Transit thrcuch heavily coculated areas.
Some comments sugges:
that the NRC modify its current embargo of shipments thrcugh heavily populated areas.
These comments contend that truck shipments should not be required to depart frca interstate highways, even in heavily populated areas.
Some of these comments further contend that interstate highways are safer and faster than alternative routes, that police response time is faster along interstate than secondary rcutes, that hijacked shipments wculd be easier to locate en intersta:es, and that interstates offer saboceurs less advantage cf ; retracted cencealme-..
Ccctents noted nat prior to the issuance cf :ne re;ula:f en, routes ere being enesen to j
_4_
avoid heavily pcpulated areas and to minimize shipment time.
Scme ecmments contend that shipments protected by ar=ed escorts as cutlined in the guidance document shculd be permitted to transit heavily populated areas.
Other comments suggest that NRC continue to strengthen its current embargo on spent fuel transit through heavily populated areas.
They ask that the "vlhere practicable" exception in 10 CFR 73.37(a)(3) be eliminated.
They also ask that the guidance document be modified to eliminate extra driving time as a basis for exception, unless there are overriding safety and s deguards considerations.
Scme ccmments suggest that the NRC emphasize the use of routes through areas of Icw population density.
l The NRC censidered two alternative protection strategies.
Under the firs alternative, shipments would be planned to avoid heavily populated areas where practicable.
Preliminary analysis indicated that most spent fuel shipments would move by read and suggested tha avoidance of heavi~1y populated areas is generally practicable. This alternative became the basis for the rule issued on June 15, 1979. The chief benefit of this alternative is-that it takes advantage of the fact that sabotage of spent fuel must take placo in a heavily populated area if the sericus con-sequences discussed in a Sandia Report (SAND 77-1927) are to be obtained.
The necessary conditions for successful sabotage would thus entail the adversary gaining control over the chtsment, ccving it to a heavily popu-lated area, and then placing and detonating the necessary explosive charge.
It is believed that the measures set forth in the June 15, 1972 regulation are capable of interrupting this sequence of events.
The principal dis-advantage of this protection strategy s ems frem the fact that the highway system is designed to connect population centers, and therefore major highways :: ass near er thrcugh the pecu!nion centers.
Avoidance of heavily e
e r
' populated areas leads to the use of secondary reads.
Ccmpared with inter-state highways, these secondary roads are characterized by a higher likelf-hood of conventional traffic accident, by longer times in transit, by less frequent patrolling by the local law enforcement agency (LLEA), and by lengthened response times in the event that LLEA assistance is requested.
Under the second afternative, shipments would be permitted to transit heavily populated areas under armed escort.
The significant advantages and disadvantages of the first alternative are interchanged in the second alternative.
In the second alternative, highways are the best available, the likelihood of a conventional traffic accident is reduced, total travel time for the shipment is reduced, the roads are more frequently patrolled.
by the LLEA, and the LLEA response time in the event of a call for assistance is reduced.
On the other hand, spent fuel wculd be within heavily pcpulated areas on a planned basis some of the time, thus satisfying one of the necessary conditions for successful sabotage with potentially sericus consequences.
The Ccmmission has decided that there is no clear advantage of the one alternative strategy over the other.
Accordingly, the rule has been revised to allcw either protection strategy to be used:
The revised provisions make it clear that either (i) avoidance of heavily pcpulated areas, or'(ii) passage threugh heavily populated areas on approved rcutes employing additional protective measures, which are delineated in 173.37(c)(1), (d)(1), and (e)(1), are acceptaMe reuting alternatives.
The Ccmmission retains its earlier pcsition that interstate highways shculd be used whenever possible.
. (3) performance objectives.
Scme ccaments suggest that the NPC shculd provide criteria and guidelines for the use of force for the protection of spent fuel shipments.
Another ccmment suggests that the regulation and guidance be modified to clarify whether escorts have the duty to defend spent fuel shipments or merely to detect and report threats to the shipment.
The amendments have been modified to include a new section, new designated as 173.37(a), which provides performance objectives to be achieved by the physical protection system for spent fuel shipments.
These performance objectives do not specifically address the issue of the degree of_ force escorts are to use in protecting shipments, but incicate the general level of protection that is to be provided by the entire physical protection system.
Within heavily populated areas, armed escorts are expected to carry cut their assigned duties, including implementation of emergency procedures in case of attack, under the same legal umbrella extended all other private guards (or law enforcement personnel, in the case LLEA personnel are employed as escorts).
(4) Clarification of certain terms.
Scme ccaments request that certain trcubleseme phrases in the regulation be clarified.
With respect to 573.37(a)(3), which requires that "the rcute is pl-anned to avoid, where practicable, heavily populated areas," comments request that the phrase "where practicable" be clarified.
In s73.37(d), which requires that
"...if it-is not possible to avoid heavily populated areas, the Ccemission may require, depending on individual circumstances of the shipment, additional protective measures," cecrents request tI1at the phrases "not possible* and
" additional prctective measures" be clarified.
The requirements have been revised and the treuolesome phrases nave been eliminated er clarified.
(5) Calls for assistance.
Some comments present the concern that the rule dees not require that escorts com.:unicate directly with the LLEA in the event that LLEA assistance is required.
The Comission agrees with this concern. The regulation has been modified to explicitly require that escorts communicate directly with the LLEA in the event LLEA assistance is required.
(6) Road shioments:
Imobili:ation.
Some cements are concerned with the safety consequences of immobilization and that inadvertent cperation of the imcbflization device could lead to a sericus accident.
Scme cements suggest that imobilization of both the tractor and the trailer (rather than the tractor or trailer) should be provided. - Some coments suggest, that the method of immobilization should be specified and approved by the NRC rather than allowing the method to be specified by the if censee.
Other comments suggest that NRC analysts consider strengthening the immobilization requirement while simultaneously reducing the number of escort personnel requi red.
Finally, one coment suggests that LLEA's along the route should l
be familiarized with the immobilization technique in the event that the need should arise to move a vehicle following activation of the immobilization device.
The NRC is concerned with the possible safety consequences of immobilization.
The teethod of immobilization proposed by the licensee was intended to be reviewed by the NRC for its safety implications.
The regulation has been modified to specifically require that the method of immobilization be approved by the NRC orf er to the making of shipments.
The intent of the regulation and the relatet guidance is to assure that, when coerated, the 1::nobilization dev :e wf P :elay movement cf the spent fuel shipment for at
a least one-half hour.
The immobilization provision is essentially a perfor-mance requirement that can be complied with by immobilizing the trafier or the tractor or both.
The guidance has been reviewed and appears to be clear on this point.
It is also intended that the licensee should have the opportunity to use his ingenuity and skill in determining how to best acccmplish the immobili-zation. Accordingly, the particular method of immobilization required has not been specified.
The staff recognizes that a licensee might develop al:ernative methods of irrnobilization.
The staff will evaluate arly proposed trethod of protection and will approve the proposal if it provides adequate protection against sabotage occurring in heavily pcpulated areas.
The staff believes that it would be self defeating to familiarize a large number of individuals with the immobilization technique, with a view tcward constructive use of this infomation in the event that the need sSculd arise to move a vehicle following immobilization. Instead, the guidance document has been revised to suggest that the possible need for traffic control folicwing cperation of the immobilization device should be considered l
l by the licensee when preparing the cperating procedures for the shipment.
(7) Road shiements:
Traininc.
Scme cerarents suggest a significant expansion of the driver and escort training program.
Scme of these coments suggest that the training curriculum shculd include training in anti-sabotage and in initial response to spills of radicactive material.
Scme ccm:ents l
suggest that clarification of the level of proficiency needed to satisfy the trair.*ng curriculum of Appendix D should be provided.
One ccmrent l
.. _ _ ~
J
.g.
contends that some of the topics in Appendix D are superfluous.
Another comment suggests that the training curriculum in Appendix D shculd apply to drivers as well as escorts. One comment suggests that the training program should emphasize safe driving techniques.
The driver and escort training requirements have been reviewed and the regulations and guidance have seen adjusted accordingly.
The revised amendments include specific requirements for familiarization of the driver and LLEA personnel with certain safeguards precedures, and inclusion of a weapons training and qualifications program for escer s who are armed.
The Ccmmission has decided that the training requirements, as revised, are consistent with the duties and responsibilities of the drivers and e:crts.
(8) Rail shicments: Route restrictions.
Some ecmments contend that rail transport is penalized, compared with truck transport, through the lack of realistic alternative rcutes.
The regulation has been modified to permit transport through heavily populated areas.
One effect of that change is to eliminate the need for alternative rail rcutes which avoid heavily populated areas.
(9) Rail shicments:
Stoos:
Scme comments ask that the regulation and guidance pertaining to planned rail steps be modified to allow for the crew changes that take place every 100 *200 miles.
The comments also point cut that rail shipment planners cannot meet the current step criteria, which wcuu permit steps only for refueling and provisions.
These suggestions were adepted and the regulation and guidance document have been modified
.accordingly.
'13)
Shi:ments by sea.
Scme ccements suggest that the rule be exsanded to 1 clude requirements for the protaction cf spent fuel aboard shi s anc
boats.
A review of the rule as published June 15, 1979, will show that 173.l(b)(5),173.37(a), and I?3.37(d) apply to shipments independent of the mode of transpcrt.
Hewever, in the interest of clarity, the rule has been revised to include a new section specifically addressing the protection of spent fuel shipments aboard vessels.
New guidance has been added to NUREG-0561, accordingly.
(11) Written log.
The original version of NUREG-0561 contained a chapter cescribing a written log to be kept by shipment escorts during the course of a spent fuel shipment.
The purpose of this log was to provide a durable record of the circumstances surrounding a given shipment, to support ' inspection and enforcement functions of the NRC, and form the basis for any further regulatory actions regarding s)ent fuel shipments, in general.
It was determined that this guidance needed to be given a firm regulatory basis by specifically requiring the mainten.nce of a written log in the regulations, These requirements are ccmparable to the recordkeeping
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requirements of s73.70, which cover shipments of other types of special nuclear matarial.
(12)
Communications center.
The amendments published on June 15, 1979, included requirements for calls by escorts to a " designated location,"
for purposes of monitoring the spent fuel shipment.
Further details regarding the duties of personnel at this designated lccation were included in the guidance document, NUREG-0561.
It was determined that further detail regarding this safeguards function would be desirable so as to give the detailed guidance included in NUREG-0561 a firm regulatory basis.
The facility at the designated locatien has been termed the "ccanunications center," and.is new described in the regulation.
9
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. B.
In some instances, the comments showed a need for modification of the guidance document alone.
Folicwing is a summary of those changes:
(1)
Definition of heavily coeulated areas.
A number of cements suggest that the definition of a heavily populated area be modified in various ways to permit more areas to qualify.
Some point out that the present definition causes certain cities to be excluded from the list of heavily populated areas provided in the guidance document even though they have populations or population densities greater than seme of those which
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were included. These ancmalies were explained to arise from failures to take into account the combined populations of contiguous cities in the same urbanized area and the total populations of urbanized areas.
Other comments suggested that areas with large temporary populations such as colleges be included although their permanent populations would not otherwise qualify the areas as heavily populated areas.
Scme ccaments suggested that specific cities be added to the list of heavily populated areas.
Reconsideration of the bases for defining heavily populated areas has led to a broader definition which is included in the revised guidance document.
Accordingly, the number of urbanized areas listed as heavily populated areas is increased to approximately 180.
The NRC would like to take temporary population centers into account in determining whether an area qualifies as a heavily populated area.
- However, there are no readily available census figures upon which the NRC presently can base such deterninattent.
Therefore, the NRC invites officials of temocrary population centers to submit, to the NRC, information in support of including that area in the list of heavily populated areas.
P
[
. This same mechanism will be used to assist in the continuous updating of the list relative to those areas meeting the. population criteria.
(2) Road shipments: Criteria for selection of hichways.
Some comments suggest that NRC guidance should include a prioritizing or ordering cf the various highway types (interstate, 4 lane, 2 lane marked, 2 lane unmarked, etc.) to aid ifcensees in the selection of alternative routes.
One ccament suggests that routes used in the past for spent fuel shipments, including routes used for military spent fuel' shipments, should be approved auto-matically.
The suggestion to prioritize route highway-types was~ adopted and the guidance in NUREG-0561 has been amended to include suitable criteria.
Routes used for spent fuel shipments prior to the issuance of the interim rule, however, will not be automatically approved inasmuch as those routes, itke all other proposed routes, must meet current criteria before approval.
(3) Road shipments: Criteria for detours.
Scme comments express concerns about detours from pre-planned routes.
Some of these cocments ask that the guidance document be mcdified to provide better criteria for detennining when detours are appropriate.
These comments also suggest that the NRC, rather than the licensae, should produce the guidelines.
Some canments are concerned that once a shipment is en route, implementation of the deteur procedures set forth in the guidance document might not be possible. Some comments suggest that LLEA's should be notified at the outset of each unplanned detour.
In response to these suggestions, the guidance document has been modified to set forth some new guidelines to be followed in deteur situattens.
Hcwever, except for the obvicus instance of
..m.
. )
where a shipment is being escorted by LLEA personnel, it is believed that the LLEA need not be notified of each detour inasmuch as the agency is not expected to do anything differently as a result of a detour.
(4) Rail shiccents:
Advance notification.
Ceccents indicate that not all of the required advance notification dats can be provided in advance of a rail shipment; among these data are routing, specification of stops, and cask serial numbers.
Some ccmments contend that scme of the information specified in the guidance document may be irrelevant to rail
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shipments.
These suggestions were generally adopted.
The guidance document has been modified to clarify advance notification requirements for rail shipments.
(5) Rail shicments: Unanticicated route chances.
Scme comments suggest that the rule and the guidance should be modified to allow for the unanticipated rcute changes that semetimes cccur in rail transport.
This suggestion was adopted by modifying the guidance document.
C.
The Commission also received a number of cccments and suggestions which were considered but which did not lead to changes to the amendments or to NUREG-0561.
Following is a discussion of those comments:
(1) Justification for the rule.
Some ccmments contend that the NRC has not provided proper or sufficient basis for the new regulation.
(a) Scme comments ask that the fiRC not modify its regulations on the basis of unproven information in draft form, such as the Sandia report.
The Ccmmission has decided that there is an adequate basis for interim requirteents for the protection of spent fuel shipments.
The NRC continually P
I l
r
. reexamines the adequacy of its regulations for the protection of the public health and safety against deliberate acts.
Part of this reexamination consists of studies and research projects.
One of these studies, conducted by Sandia Laboratories and published in draft form in May 1978 as SMD-77-1927, concluded that sericus public health consequences could result in the event of successful sabotage of a spent fuel shipment in a heavily populated area.
Although a later draft Sandia report predicts less serious consequences, a -significant degree of uncertainty remains that can only be resolved by further study.
The Commission is currenty pursuing a research effort to resolve these issues.
While awaiting the results of this research the Ccemission believes that it is prudent to retain these requirements on an interim basis.
When the final research results are analyzed the NRC will either modify, continue, or rescind 10 CFR 73.57, whichever is apprcpriate, based on those results.
(b) Other comments point cut that the NRC should regulate on the basis of risk, a concept wherein risk equals the product of the consequences of an
)
event, such as' sabotage, and the probability of the event.
Inasmuch as the NRC has no basis to specify an identifiable threat, some cenments conclude that the probability of sabotage is insufficient to justify a legitimate concern.
NRC has not pursued quantitative risk studies for safeguards because of extreme difficulty in adequately quantifying the varicus factors centributing to risk.
This view was expressed in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH 1400) and sustained by the Lewis panel's peer review of that docurrent.
The Lewis Panel Reporc (NUREG/CP.-
i 0400) states:
"The risk from sabotage was not calculated in the Reactor Safety Study.
The onnission was deliberate, and preper, because it was reccgnized that the probability of sabetage Of a nuclear pcwer slant cannot ::e ehtimated with'any'conficence." Similarly, estimates of the probability of successful sabetage of spent fuel s5.1: cents canns be made ui-h any confidence.
m
l In their report (fiUREG/CR-0400) the Lewis panel points out that, even with
" realistic" risk estimates, further conservatisms must be incorporated in the regulatory process.
In the absence of " realistic" risk estimates, it is even more important to incorporate conservatiscs in regulatory decision making.
This is the approach taken in safeguards.
We know of no attempts to sabotage spent fuel shipments in a manner leading to a significant radiological release.
But we have conservatively assumed that such a sabotage act might be attempted.
Furthermore, we have tried to determine, logically and systematically, the characteristics of persons j
who might attempt to perpetrate such crimes.
The results of-c;r threat characterization work have been published as flUREG-0459, Generic Adversary Characteristics Summary F p,c,r_t.
3 Another factor in making a detennination concerning the. probability of
-successful sabotage is the reaction of spent fuel to sabotage.
It is generally agreed among analysts that the serious consequences discussed in the Sandia report could result only if sabotage is carried out in or near a heavily populated area and only if some of the normally solid spent fuel contained in a massive, durable cask is somehow released as respirable particles.
It is further agreed among analysts that the only credible way to carry out such sabotage is through the skillful use of explosives. The reaction of spent fuel and spent fuel casks to explosive sabotage is subject to large uncertainty.
A research program is being carried out to improve our understanding, but the program will likely not yield useful results for approximately one year.
The Commission frequently uses the concept of risk in its deliberations
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cencerning the need for new regulations and did so in this case.
The i
. Commission found that the ifkelihood of successful sabotage is uncertain inasmuch as the existence of a credible adversary organization cannot be ruled out and the response of spent fuel and spent fuel casks to credible explosive sabotage is subject to large uncertainty.
With respect to consequences, it appears that the release of a small fraction of the inventory of a spent fuel casks as respirable particles could produce serious consequences in a heavily populated area.
On this basis the Commission has decided to generally let stand these requirements designed to protect spent fuel shipments against sabotage in heavily populated areas on an interim basis. The need for permanent requirements will be reconsidered when the results of the research program beccme avaf f able.
(c) With respect to the Sandia report, the staff notes that the latest draft of the report projects sabotage consequences less sericus than are set forth in the May 1978 draft, and cited by the NRC as the basis for the rule.
Another ccmment points out that even the consequences set forth in the May 1978 Sandia draft, are not that much more serious than those of a severe accider.t the risk of which the NRC appears to be wfiling to accept.
As mentioned above, a later draft of the Sandia report issued during September 1979, estimates less sericus consequences than the May 1978 version, partly because the May version assumed larger accunts of material released as a result of sabotage.
In view of the continuf ng uncertainties concerning the release fraction, the Commission has decided it is prudent to, in the interim, protect spent fuel in-transit.
(d) Other ccmments coint cut tha: Cepart. Tent of Energy (DCE)
The analysts have concluded that the rule is premature and inappropriate.
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. comments also point out that 00E does not require protection of spent fuel shipments for which it is responsible.
The Commission notes that the DOE and the NRC have access to the same infor-mation and that DOE has decided not to require protection for the spent fuel shipments for which it is responsible.
Despite the policy of NRC and 00E l
to have ccmparable requirements for the protection of nuclear materials, the Commission accepts the fact that frem time to time reasonable administratcrs will differ temporarily on the difficult question of what constitutes ddequate safeguards.
Both agencies are developing additional inf0rmation on the issues and are coordinating with one another.
It is believed that the differences in positions of the two agencies are temporary and will be resolved as new information, such as that frem the research program discussed above, becemes available.
(a) Other connents argue that adequate protection is provided by the durable containers in which spent fuel shipments are made.
The Ccomission agrees that the massive, durable casks in which spent fuel shipments are made provide a high degree of protection against many kinds of sabotage, including explosive sabotage.
Mcwever, in view of the uncertain-ties in predicting the response of spent fuel and spent fuel casks to explosives, the Commission believes that it is no longer prudent to uepend upon cask design alone to protect against sabotage in heavily populated a reas. Accordingly, until acditional information can be developed to resolve some of the present uncertainties concerning the respense of spent fuel to explesives, the Ccmmission has decided that spent fuel shipments should be prctected as specified in 10 CFR 73.37, as modified.
t l
i l
.. (f)
Some ecmments question the need for significant, costly protection measures for rail casks.
They point out that rail casks are more substantial than truck casks and that according to Sandia, successful sabotage entails even more explosives and skill than fcr truck casks.
The cor=ents further :oint out that there is no record of hijacking trains, and therefore the movemer., of a hijacked train from a icw population area to a high population area seems quite remote.
Comments also point out that protection measures for rail shipments in heavily populated areas already include frequent surveillance by, railroad police and are therefore adequate.
The referenced Sandia Report indicates that *,imilar uncertainties apply to l
possible explosives attacks on both road and rail shipments.
Even though rail shipments would most likely require a higher level of adversary resources for successful sabotage, such sabotage is considered possible for both road and rail modes.
The Sandia P,eport states in particular that attacks on rail casks using shaped charges is possible since the requisite materials can be carried by men on foot. Moreover, the likelihood that available ro routes would include passages through heavily populated areas diminishes the importance of the consideration that it would be more difficult for an adversary to illicitly move a hijacked train from a less densely populated area to a heavily populated area.
protection for rail shipments, therefore, is still required.
(2) Adecuacy of protection recuirements.
Scme corrents state that protection of spent fuel shipments under the interim rule is not adequate against terrorist action.
These coarnents argue that protection equivalent to that already given strategic special nuclear materials is needed.
Soce cone.ents cuggest that NRC should require licensees to ja:tify ?.11 spent fuei shipeents ty considering all possible alternatives to :.e = ding of shipments.
..~.. -
.. One of the most frequent comments favored an embargo of spent fuel shipments until a permanent storage facility is established.
Thereafter, spent fuel shipments would be permitted only to that facility.
Scme concents contend that the additional measures required for movements through heavily populated areas are too weak to deter or to provide protec-tion against successful sabotage; these comments ask that the regulation be modified to indicate additional safeguards and list them in detail One comment suggests that for any given heavily populated area the protec-tion measures required should be similar for all shipments, rather than allowing varicus options for each shipment.
The Ccamission considered a number of sets of measures for the protection of spent fuel shipments.
One of these sets of measures wculd have provided that spent fuel shipments would be protected equivalently to shipments of formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material (SSNM),
which must also be protected against theft.
However,10 CFR 173.6 of the Commis'sion's physical protection rules for SSNM specifically exempts spent fuel which is not readily separable and which has a total external dose rate in excess of ICO rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet from any accessible surface without intervening shieldin; Such m.aterials possess intrinsic protection against theft and are not readily usable to fabricate nuclear explosives.
Nevertheless, the Ccmmission considers it prudent to require some additional measures to protect spent fuel against radio-logical sabotage.
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Shi;;ers of spent fuel must submit rcute information and security plans e
a ne "R for autnart:stion to c rry cut the shipment.
The NF.: :nus
. has the opportunity to review the shipper's plan for the shipment and to assure that he has considered alternatives to the making of the shipment.
The Corr.ission reaffirms its judgment that spent fuel can be shipped safely without constituting unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public.
Accordingly, the Comission does not believe that it is necessary to prohibit sp'ent fuel shipments until a permanent storage facility is established.
Some requirements of the regulation, particelarly regarding transiting urbanized areas, have been changed considerably in this later version.
Given these changes, the Comission has decided that the protection level required reasonably protects the public against risk frcm sabotage of spent fuel shipments.
The escort force has the capability to call for assistance and in a heavily populated area, local law enforcement authorities could be on the scene within minutes. Within a heavily populated area, the escort force is armed and therefore has the potential to prevent sabotage until local authorities arrive.
The Comission is seeking adequate protection for shipments which must pass through heavily populated areas.
In the Comission's view, an adequate level of protection can be provided by either private guards or law enforcement personnel.
(3)
Liability limits.
One ccament suggests that no shipments of spent
. fuel should be permitted unless the shipper carries private liability insurance without limit.
Other coc=ents favor informing the public of the 1iability limits currently in force for shipr.ents.
The C: mission has not at the cressat time extended indemnity esverage te
_ spent 'uel sniements on a generic basis.]'cuever, spent fuel snirents 2 e
Indemnified while in the course of transportation to or from an indemnified facility (principally nuclear reactors).
Indemnity coverage for snent fuel shioments to or from reactors terminates at the point at which transcortation ends.
The provisions of Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as acended, recuire production and utilization facility licensees, i.e., reactors and reprocessing plants to have and maintain financial protection (e.g., nuclear liability insurance) to cover. pubite liability claims resulting frem a nuclear incident. The Cornission is also directed to enter into protection and indemnify the licensee for up to $500 million in excess of that financial protection.
The indemnity protection afforded the cublic for accidents arising during trans-portation is derived from the coverage provided under the insurance policies maintained by licensees of reactors and reprocessing plants and in the indemnity agreements executed by these licensees with the Commission.
The coverace under the policies and indemnity agreements incorporate the so-called " omnibus" pro-visions of the Price-Anderson Act. Under the " omnibus" coverage liability protection extends not only to the liability of the licensee, but also to any other person who may be liable, such as a transporter. However, there would be no Price-Anderson Act protection (or limit on liability) under facility ifcensees' insurance policies and indemnity agreements once a shipment were highjacked and placed beyond the control cf the transporter.
Extension of the Price-Anderson Act protection to cover incidents occurring after h shinment has been hichjacked is beyond the scope of this rulemaking.
(4) ALARA imifcations. One comment suggests that the implications of the rule with respect to the Commission policy of maintaining radiation excesure levels as 1cw as reasonably achievable (ALARA) shculd ce examined.
The Ccenission has not at the present time extended idemnity coverace to s;eet 'Jei sniements on a generic basis.
However, 3:ent fuel shicments are
~
. accidents involving radicactive material shipments are sufficiently small te allcu centinued shipments by all modes.
Because transper:ation conducted under present reculatiens provides adequate safety to the public, the staff concludes that no immediate changes to the regula:icns are needed at this time.
This determination is partly based on the conclusien in t:UREC-0170 that the averace radiation dose to the peculation at risk from ncrmal transpcr:ation is a small fraction of the limits recommended fcr members of the general public from all sources of radiation other than natural and medical scurces and is a small m
fracticn of natural backgrend dose.
The staff has examined the ALARA implicaticns of the rule for the specific case of spent fuel shipments by truck.
Calculations indicate that reutine expcsure frcm shipments routed around cities uculd likely be about 30% higher than the small but calculable rcutine exposure for similar shipments routed thecush cities.
The Ccamission considers that this difference in such small rcutine exposures is not a significant health factor and therefere not to be considered a significant factor in the choice of rcuting.
(5)
Transecr:ation mode.
Scmc comments suggest that the scope of the rule should be expanded to require licensees to examine alternative transper-taticn ecdes fer shipments.
l The Ccomission agrecs that alternative medes cf transper:atien should be considered during the development of a program for the protection of spent fuel shipments against sabetace.
The characteristics of alternative.;cdes have been censidered in the revised rule and suitable reasures have bcon developed for read, rail and water transport. Acccrdingly, a licensee r..ay chcesc the mecc Of transper:ation for his shipment en the basis of censider-j
- i ations c:he-thin safegu3rds.
. 1
.. (6) High level waste.
Some comments suggest that the scope of the rule should provide requirements for the protection of high level waste shipments.
o licensed shipments.cf high level vaste are presently being made.
Only a feu facilities currently possess high level waste.
Shiements of the waste from a facility at which it now resides to another facility would involve the amendment of one or more licenses.
At that time, appropriate require-cents would be issued.
(7)
Test reactor fuel shicments.
Ccanents suggest that the staff censider relaxing protection requirements for test reacter spent fuel in recognitien of the fact that it contains no free radioactive gases.
The revised rule has not been modified to reduce the protection requirements for test reactor spent fuel.
Fission gases vould account for only a tiny fraction of the calculated health effects.
Solid, respirable material would acccunt for most of the health effects.
(3) Cistinction between guidance dccuments and reculations.
Public ccccents en both the amencments published in the federal P.egister and the suppcrting guidance dccument (UUREG-0561) were received.
Scme cor.=ents apparently mistake the guidance dccument-for a regulation and therefere conclude that the supposed regulation is too loosely worded.
Other comments i
apparently reflect only the regulatory amendments and suggest that the amendments alone are worded too lcosely to be effective.
l l
Following is a discussion of the distincticn between regulations and suicance decu.icn t s.
Regulattens set forth legal requirements tiat licensees must f 11cu.
The.:D.g is empeuered to inspect against and enf:rce the previsiens cf its l
i
-Me
.4 p -
24 regulations.
- Regulations without exception carr/ the approval of the Cc::cissicn.
Guidance documents, on the other hand, can be prepared and issued by the staff.
The documents are not legally binding upon licensees.
The primary purposes of the cuidance docuients are:
(1) te describe and make available to the public tne intent and scope of application of the regulator / provisions, (2) in scme cases, to provide alternative metheds that are normally acceptcole to the NRC staff for implementing specific parts of the Cormissien's regulations, (3) in sore cases, to delineate techniques used by the staff in evaluating specific problems, and (a) to provide guidance to appif cants concerning certain infermatien
~
needed by the staff in its review cf applications for permits and licenses.
Guidanace documents are not intended as substitutes for regulations and, therefore, ccepliance with guidance documents is not required.
(9)
Licensee costs.
Scme coments centend that the cost esti: nates develop.
ed by the staff are too low.
One cement suggests that the cost for truck transportation would be at least dcuble that estimated by the NRC staff and probably much higher.
Another comment states that truck transportation cost is
,approximately double that estimated by the staff even befcre the cost of safe-Sucrds required by the nJle are added in.
One cor=cnt places cost in the rance cf twenty million dollars per year by assuming ten thcusand shipments per year circa 1955.
Cccents argue that staff estimates of rail costs are in even creater error than staff estimates of truck costs; these cer=ents conclude that rail shipments r.ust be made in special trains in order to satisfy the rule and that, therefcre, the cost of each rail shiptent will be in the range of twenty to forty thcusand dollars.
- ith respect to truck snipments, cur latest information indicates that as many as CCO shipments might cccur during calendar year 1950.
The number of ;cssibic snitrents is currently lir..ited by ?e nu:ccr of shiprent casks availaric.
Even r
. if new casks were quickly manufactured, allowing the number of shipments to double, the Ccntissicn notes that the interin. rule is designed to te in effect only until about mid CY31, and therefore, believes that the bish ccst esticates stwa..ing free protection of large numbers of spent fuel shipments circa 1925 are nct apprcpriato or relevant.
With respect to rail shipment costs, the Ccmmissien disacrees with the contention that special trains are needed to meet the require-monts for rail shipeents, and therefore, rejects'the high cost estimates which are based en the use of special trains.
(10)
Cost-bonefit study.
Some cernments suggest that the NRC should provide a cost benefit analysis in support of the regulation.
Ccoments also suggest that the requirements of the rule should be clearly defined and shculd be ecst effective.
They argue that regulations must be cost effective in order te be ceaningful and must avoid being arbitrary or capricicus or an abuse of discretien.
Scme cecrents suggest that the rule is not cost effective in its present form.
This interim rule is expected to be in effect for a year er tuo.
Recent figures indicate that if the maximum number of potential shipments occur, the require may result in a cost of about five hundred thousand dollars per year, distributed over a number of licensees.
The additica of protection measurcs for spent fuel shipments dees not have a significant effect on the environment.
After taking into acccunt the cost. the duration, arid the absence of significant impact on the environment, the Ccemission has decided that a detailed cest-bencfit study is not needed for this interim rule.
Although a detailed cost-benefit study was net perfermed, the ceneral costs and benefits resulting fecm this rule have been revieued, as have tne' petantial consequences cf sacetate of spent fuel shipments to the public health anc safoty.
A decision has :ecn made that the benefits frc:.:
reducing the pr:rability cf cecurrence and,ctential c:nsequences of spent l
Nes te.ms*-
=eA s
-h-
,.96 m >
ep-=
ager Mene m,.gm
+p.
- e. 4.
. fuel shipment sabotage justify the cost of the requirements.
A detailed cost-beneift study will be prepared in support of any permanent rule that is issued.
(11) Preemetten.
Some comments urge that the NRC preecpt state and lccal restrictions en spent fuel shipments.
Some comments seek to preempt those state and local ordinances which would ban or otherwise restrict shipments or which would require rerouting of shipments over secondary reads, with an attendant increase in safety hazard.
Sene comments argue that orcemption wculd lead to a more responsible national policy concerning uniformity of spent fuel transport regulations.
Scme cc=ments favoring preemptien suggest thct tne NRC shculd take into acccunt state and local cencerns when drafting federa' regulations.
One ccament suggests that HRC eliminate from its rule references to lccal ordinances as a basis for rercuting shipments; this comment concludes that a local community should not be able to prevent the use of a route accepta31e to the NRC.
One cc=n;ent suggests that the regulations make clear that local ordinances in conflict with the NRC rule would be preempted.
Cther comments took the opposite view of preengtion.
These cor. rents declare that local cccmunities have the right to be more restrictive than the CRC in the regulaticn of spent fuel shipments which they perceive as threatening their safety.
To date, the-.':RC has centested a local crdinance that regulates the transpcr of nuclear materials only once (United States v..'!ew York City (S.D.M.V.
Ho. 7G Civ. 273)).
In this case NRC, ~ ERDA (neu DCE) and CCT scught a judgement declaring a few York !!calth Coce provisien Oc be incensistent with the Federal Statutory seneme for transportatic., of nuclear ma:eria'.
On January 3i.',
- IC76, a Unitac :a:es request for a preliminary injur.c:icn !arring enforcament of the 1:c31 crcirance.aas denied.
On August 17, 1978, the Matertals Transportation Bureau of the COT published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (43 F.R. 36492) dealing with the subject of highway routing of radicactive materials.
On October 26, 1978, the 00T published a notice (43 F.R. 50C06) of its intention to hold a public hearing on this subject in ',!ashington, D.C., on November 29, 1978.
On January 31, 1920 the DOT published for public comment a proposed rule dealing with the highway transportaticn (including Federal routing require-ments) of radioactive material. The DOT has expressed its intention to publish a final rule on this subject by the end of 1980.
Where state law is consistent with new Federal regulations preculgated under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA) or where the state in a legitimate exercise of its police power imposes general, non-radiological constraints (e.g., speed limits, load limits) on all truck transportation, the Ccamission does not presently contemplate actions to preempt the enforcement of these laws.
Hcwever, the Ccamissicn reserves judgement on whether it may beccce necessary to seek such preemptive action in a limited way (e.g., where specific route considerations are at issue) prior to the time the 00T regula-tions beccme effective. Once the 00T regulattens on this subject beccme effec-tive, there appears a strong possibility that inconsistent state and lccal rules may be preempted on a broader basis.
(12)
Information on routes and schedules.
Sema ccmments ruggest that the NRC adopt a liberal policy concerning the information on rcutes and schedules that would be made public.
These ccaments suggest that rcute information should be published in the Federal Register; subsequently the
- nC shcuid hold public hearings (cr previde some other means for public input) en routes.
These ecmments furtner suggest that NRC shculd contact state and lccal authcrities before granting a rcute approval.
Scme cermer s
- conclude that a local population has better knowledge of routes than could be developed by NRC surveillance teams, thereby allowing the defects and advantages of alternate routes to be more adequately considered.
Comments suggest that the stato and local authorities should be notified of details of routes.
Ccmments also suggest that state and local authorities should be notified in advance of the schedule of each shipment.
Scme comments suggest that state and local authcrities should take steps to have emergency response and law enforcement organizations alerted and on duty at the time spent fuel shipments are made.
Other ccmments suggest that the NRC should adept a conservative policy with respect to information on routes and schedules.
These ccoments suggest that NRC withhold information on routes and schedules, pointing out that information certified by the NRC would be valuable to potential saboteurs.
The ccaments also point cut that it is a principle of security that sensitive information shculd be restricted to the minimum number of people. These ccmments conclude that the NRC should restrict dissemination of route and schedule information to a limited number of elected and appointed state and local officials who shculd be requested or required to avoid making the information public.
Current staff policy concerning information on routes and schedules is to generaly withhold this information frem public disclosure.
However, in one recent specific instance, the Ccamission decided that information on staff-approved routes should not be withheld.
It noted, however, that the decision was case-specific and should not be considered a precedent.
(13)
Consolidated notice.
Scme cen:ents ncte the proli'eration cf lccal orcinances requiring advance notice and ask that tne f;;.C estatiish -
1
. l in its rule such that only the NRC need be notified.
The NRC could then notify state and local agencies as it deems necessary.
Adoption of this suggestion would imply that the NRC rule preempts local ordinances calling for advance notification of shipments.
As was noted earlier, the NRC has not yet contested local ordinances tndt regulate the transportation of spent fuel.
Although this suggestion will not be adepted at this time, it will be re-evaluated when 00T routing rules go into effect.
l (14) Need for ccmcrehensive study.
One comment suggests that a i
ecmprehensive study of ports of entry for import of spent fuel shipments and subsequent routes is needed; the proposed principal criteria for selection of a port or route would be to affect the least population in event of sabotage.
In consideration of the Commission's revised position relative to avoidance of heavily populated areas; f.e., that passage through a heavily populated area, en approved routes, when supported by additional measures such as armed escorts, is acceptable, the Ccmmissica does not regard ports-of-entry as a particular problem area with respect to ecuting.
Ports that are also listed as heavily populated areas will require the additional protection.
' (15) Excansion of resconse cacabilities.
Sece cctments prepose a significant expansion of capabilities for responding to accidents or l
sabotage.
These ccaments suggest that all emergency response units in all communities alcng the rcute submit response plans to the NRC for accreval.
Scme ecmments suggest that all emergency response units in ali ecmmunities l
along the rcute subntt res:ense plans to the NRC for a:creval.
Scme cctments j
a
' suggest that these response units should be required to conduct drills.
Other coments propose that LLEA perscnnel along the route be trained to deal with radiological releases.
Scme cements suggest that the shipper should provide an escort capable of handling all emergency situations.
Some cements also suggest that the NRC should help to develop these various emergency response units.
Scme ccaments suggest that the shipper should be responsible for the preparation of emergency plans, while others suggest that the NRC should be responsible.
Some comments ask that provisions be made for local governments to approve licensee emergency response procedures and emergency plans.
These suggestions appear to be prempted, at least in part, by the provisions of 10 CFR 73.37(a)(6) which require a licensee to develop procedures for coping with threats and safeguards emergencies. As is noted in NUREG-0561, the purpose of this requirement is to provide for the development of a p1an to be used by drivers, escorts, licensee personnel and other individuals involved in a shipment in case of threats, attempted sabotage, or other events that jeopardize the security of a shipment.
The larger question of emergency plans, emergency preparedness, emergency response and the like
.are judged to be beyond the scope of these interim safeguards requirements.
Recent staff views on these questions are available in NUREG-0535 - Review and Assessment of Package Reouirements (Yellcw Cake) and Emercency Resconse to Transoortation Accidents.
(15) Arrangcaents with LLEA:
Clarity and feasibility.
Scme comments request that the NRC clarify its description of what constitutes acceptable e
arrangements, who must be contacted, and whether the arrangement or contact
~.. -.. _
. with the LLEA must be documented.
One comment suggests that the licensee's responsibility with respect to this requirement be limited to maintaining an up-to-date list of telephone numbers and contacts in LLEAs.
One ccmment points cut that in the case of transcontinental shipment, a very large number of LLEAs would have jurisdiction along the route and that contacting all of them would not be feasible.
Under current practice, the NRC staff makes the initial contacts and arrangements with LLEAs as part of the approval process.
Accordingly, the concerns set forth in the comment do not appear to be justified since the relevant burdens have been assumed by the NRC staff.
(17) Arrancements with LLEA:
Information security concerns.
Some ccmments suggest that coordination with LLEAs along the rcute would be tantamcunt to announcing the route and would therefore be contrary to goed information security practice.
During the coordination process, the NRC staff informs LLEAs of the importance of protection of spent fuel and asks that the agency not disclose sensitive information, such as rcutes, that would be helpful to a saboteur.
The agencies have generally been cooperative.
Accordingly, NRC practices were not changed as a result of the suggestion.
(ld) LLEA cacabilities.
One commenter notes his experience which suggests that LLEAs in heavily populated areas are unwilling or unable to crevide the additional protection suggested by the NRC for shipments j
througn heavily populated areas.
- 1 L-
.. NPC staff experience is at vartance with the experience of this commenter.
Staff experience is that LLEAs have been very cecperative in assisting in the protection of shipments of nuclear materials.
Also the rule allcws for pirvate armed escorts, instead of LLEA personnel, to be used to protect shipments.
For these reasons, no changes were made in the regulation or the guidance ~as a result of this comment.
(19)
Road shicments: Alternative routes.
Some ccmments suggest that j
NRC rcute approval policy should include approval of a reasonable number of j
alternative rcutes.
The comments suggest that the approvals remain valid indefinitely.
Current staff policy is to approve a number of alternative rcutes.
The actual number of routes that can be approved is, cf ccurse, limited.
Once a route is approved, the approval wculd remain valid until new information suggests that the approval should be withdrawn.
(20)'Readshicments:
Rush-hour _ concern.
One ccament suggests that in the event of reuting thrcugh a heavily populated area, the scheduling should be planned so as to avoid the local rush hour traffic.
The staff performs rcute surveys, including rcute surveys through heavily pcpulated areas, and makes arrangements with LLEAs along the route of the shipments for their response to an emergency cr a call for assistance.
Rush-hour concerns are taken into acccunt during this planning.
(21) Road shicments:
Reute olannina.
Sece ecmments contend that the informaticn given in the guidance dccument and in the related reference documents dces net crevice detail sufficient to distinguish and select highway rcutes.
. The staff agrees with the comment, but notes that the Census Bureau data
~
supplemented by local road maps jointly provide a sufficient basis for route selection.
Furthermore, the revised rule allcws greater use of interstate highways, which should make rcute selection easfer.
Accordingly, no changes were made in the regulation or guidance as a result of this con =ent.
(22) Road shipments: Orivers.
Scme ecmments suggest that the NRC should confer more closely with the 00T inasmuch as it appears that some driver requirements imposed by NRC are in conflict with DOT requirements.
One ecmment suggests that 10 CFR 73.37(b)(1) be modified to specify two trained drivers rather than one.
Ccmments suggest that in view of the potential consequences from accidents, drivers should operate spent fuel 4
shipment vehicles in the safest and most reassuring way in order to instill public confidence.
With respect to the coordination suggestion, the staff notes that in accordance with the terms of a Memorandum of Understanding, the latest version of which was pubitshed in the Federal Register on July 2,1979, the NRC and DOT have agreed to advise and censult with one another before either issues a new regulation. This precedure was follcwed before issuance of this regulation. The 007 review did not reveal any conflicts between DOT regulations and the NRC interim regulation.
The suggestion that the requirements of 10 CFR 73.37(b)(1) be modified to make explicit that two prcperly trained truck drivers satisfy the requirement 'was not adopted because the original phrasing already permits that cation.
The suggestien that two truck dr'ivers rather than ene should be reout rec was not adopted cecause there appears te be ac adequate safeguards jus:ificaticn.
The l
d
O
- 34 _
provision is allowed to stand because it allcws greater flexibility for the licensee in designing his security arrangements and it does not sacrifice the effectivents5 of protection arrangements.
The NRC agrees with the ccmme'nt tF t shipment vehicias should be cperated i
safely..However, the rule was not changed because the subject of safe driving is not within the scope of this physical protection rule change proceeding.
(23) Rcad shicments:
Escorts.
Some ccmments suggest that the regulation should be changed to always require an escort vehicle to accompany the shipment vehicle; other comments contend that an es ort vehicle is undesirable because it increases the likelihood of an accident.
Scme comments are concerned that the duties assigned to drivers and escorts in the regulation and guidance would overwhelm the drivers and escorts for shipments longer than one day.
One ecmment proposes that the NRC should license escorts and test them annually.
Finally, some ccmments suggest that more than one escort might be needed for extended stopovers.
The Ccemission has decided that the current level of protection, which permits a single vehicle system to be used outside of heavily populated areas, is adequate.
In addition, a second escort or other added safeguards measures are required for transiting urban areas. The Ccmmission has also decided that the duties of the drivers.and escorts are straight-forward; that the training program as revised (Appendix 0 of 10 CFR Part 73) is adequate.
With respect to the size of the escort force, the regulation specifies the number, capabilities, and duties of personnel who are to be en duty at any one time; it is the obligation and resconsibility of the licensee to provide a force size sufficient to arovide for relief and rest periods.
(24)- Road shicments:
Call-in schedule.
Some comments contend that the two-hcur call-in schedule required by 10 CFR 73.37(b)(2) is not practicable; they argue that carrying out the requirements would violate 00T regulations by disturbing the co-driver's rest period on long trips.
The corrents suggest that an eight-hour call-in schedule would be more apprcpriate.
Comments also point out that the two-hour call-in schedule (if carried out) would require extra stops for telephone calls, thereby making the shipment vulnerable to sabotage.
The two-hcur call-in schedule has been reviewed with DOT.
Representatives of 00T found nothing in the requirement that was unsafe for a lone driver to carry out wht.le driving or that was in conflict with DOT regulations.
Accordingly, the two-hour call-in requirement is allowed to stand.
The Ccmmission reaffirms its judgment that the benefits frca two-hcur call-ins justify the additional risk of those instances where the vehicle must be stopped and the call-in done by conventional telephone.
(25) Road shicments:
Citizens band (CS) radio.
Some eccments suggest that there is no assurance that CB contacts can be made, and therefore the requirefrent for C3 radio in the shipment vehicle is superflucus.
Other ccmments note that the designated control location is not required to be equipped with a C3 radio and ask that the NRC reconsider whether a potential 4
saboteur could gain advantage frem this situation.
A requirecent for C3 radio is included in recognition of the fact that CS radio offers an inexpensive back-up to the crimary communication system.
It is true that there is no guarantee taat a C3 contact can be established in tre event that there is a need to call for assistance.
On the other hand,
.. the adversary is faced with a back-up communications system that he can neither ignore nor readily defeat.
Tne CB requirement is included because it, in some measure, reduces an adversary's Itkelihoed of success.
- Also, CS radio is useful for ccmunication among the escort vehicles and shipment s
l vehicle and can be used in most heavily populated areas to contact the LLEA.
However, because the transmission range of CB radio is short compared with the likely distance that shipments will be transported, there is no requirement for a CB radio to be installed in the control location, j
(26) Rail shioments:
Soecial trains.
Some comments urge the use of special trains to transport spent fuel rail casks.
These comments contend that special trains have the following advantages:
The requirements of 10 CFR 73.37(c) are difficult for regular trains but can be handled readily by special trains.
Special train speeds are lower and can be tailored to circumstances.
Special trains are shorter than regular trains with the advantage that " burying" the shipment car under other cars in the event of j
an accident is less ~likely; this feature, the coments argue, would be very significant in the event of a fire.
A special train offers better cbser-vation of the shipment car.
Most railroad accidents cecur in rail yards
{
and special trains spend less time in rail yards than do regular trains.
Special trains have priority in use of track over regular trains.
Regular trains could conceivably carry spent fuel together with other hazardous material, such as explosives or inflammables, in different cars of the same train; this situation would not occur with a special train.
Special routing is possible to avoid rafi yards and heavily populated i
areas. Finally, the probability of certain classes of train accidents, such as brake failure or railroad crossing accidents, is lower because special trains are sncrtar than regular trains.
. Other comments take the opposite view and suggest that the use of regular trains for spent fuel shipments is entirely satisfactory for the following reasons:
The likelihood of hijacking a regular train frem a low population to a high population area is remote in the extreme.
Special trains have no particular advantage in avoiding high population areas.
Special trains, as now pr'oposed, would be stopped to yield right-of-way to regular trains.
NRC approval of alternative routes would provide adequate response to the uncertainties of weather, rail damage, and other uncontrollable influences.
A regular train in a rail yard would be under surveillance by the escort and the railroad police.
Special trains have no advantage in ccanunicatiens; moreover, rail traffic controllers always know the approximate location of their trains.
Needed protection requirements for rail shipments can be met by regular trains. Accordingly, the suggestion that the regulations be modified to require the use of special trains was rejected.
(27) Rail shicments:
Arrangements with LLEA.
Some commcats suggest that arrangements with LLEAs are needed only when a shipment car is stopped in a rail yard.
This suggestion was not adopted because it would be inconsistent with the fundamental protection measure that an escort should always be present with a spent fuel shipment and that escort should be able to request and obtain assistance from the LLEA fr. dependent of the location of the shipment.
(28)
Rail shicments:
Escorts.
Scme ccaments contend that escorts are not needed when a train H ecving.
Other comments point out that more than
= ene escort will ::e needec to provide surveillance during extended st: cove s
~
~
. and that special lighting might be needed for effective surveillance.
One comment points out that no existing spent fuel rail cask car provides for an escort within the car, as is implied by the guidance document and the regulation.
Finally, some comments request that the NRC consider speed restrictions for spent fuel shipments and reconsider its decision not to require surveillance while the train is moving -- particularly while the train is moving very slowly.
One of the fundamental protection measures is that an escort should always
~
be present near the shipment, independent of the location of the train and independent of whether the train is moving. Accordingly, the suggestion j
that an escort is not needed while the train is moving was rejected.
One intent of the requirement is that a stopped shipment car always be under observation; it is the responsibility of the licensee to provide an escort force sufficiently large to meet that intent.
The object of the observation requirement is the early detection of circum-stances that-threaten deliberate damage to the shipment in a heavily populated area. Lighting in heavily populated areas is expected to be sufficient for this purpose.
With respect to the comment concerning the escort in the same rail car with the spent fuel cask, the guidance document was written so as not to preclude 2
the escort from riding in a rail car containing a spent fuel cask.
The staff had in mind a small cask in which.slightly greater than exempted quantities of spent fuel might be shipped rather than a typical rail cask centaining up to ten fuel assemblies.
l
.. ~
The Comission has recognized the need for surveillance capabilities while trains are moving, and has reflected this in the regulation.
(29) Rail shicments:
Strengthening of requirements crocosed.
One coment asserts that spent fuel shipments by road are inherently unsafe and that shipments should be made by rail. The coment contends that current capabilities fcr the safety and protection of rail shiplments are inadequate and identifies numerous areas where he believes improvements are needed.
~
The Comission disagrees with the view that spent fuel shipments by road are inherently unsafe.
The comment does not provide an adequate justifica-tion for the extreme measures proposed pertaining to rail shipments.
The Comission has no new infonnation to modify its current view that spent fuel shipments can be moved safely on the existing rail system. Accordingly, no changes were made to the regulation or the guidance as a result of this coment.
The following modifications to the rule have been coordinated with the l
Department of Transportation in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding l
l between NRC and DOT that was published in the Federal Register on July 2, l
1979.
The Department of Transportation has determined that the NRC rule is l
not in conflict with current 00T regulations.
l These amendments to the interim final rule are being published in effective form subject to codification.
In the Federal Register notice issuing the i
I interim final rule.(44 FR 34466), coments were esquested on the rule even though it was pus 11shed in effective form.
It is those comments received that have led to the amendments being made here.
It is as if corr:ents had
- een re:eived on a proposed rule.
Accordingly, the Cermission for goed ca:se ff.,ds t.Nat Nether notice and public prececure is unnecessary.
l
.. Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorgan-ization Act of 1974, as amended, and sections 552 and 553 of Title 5 of the United States Code, the following amendments to Title 10, Chapter 1, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 73, are published as a document subject to codification.
1.
Section 73.1 of 10 CFR Part 73 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(5) to read as follows:
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3.1 Purpose and Scope
(b) Scoce (5) This part also applies to the shipment of irradiated reactor fuel in quantities that in a single shipment both exceed 100 grams in net weight of irradiated fuel, exclusive of cladding or other structural or packaging material, and have a total radiation dose rate in excess of 100 rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet from any accessible surface without intervening shielding.
2.
Section 73.37 of 10 CFR Part 73 is revised to read as follows:
573.37 Requirements for physical protection of irradiated reactor fuel in transit.
(a) Performance objectives.
(1) Each licensee who transports, or delivers to a carrier for transport, in a single shipment, a cuantity of irradiated reactor fuel ia excess of 100 grams in net weight of irradiated fuel, exclusive of cladding or other structural or packaging material, which has a total external radiation dose rate in excess of 100 rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet frem any l
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. accessible surface without intervening shielding, shall establish and maintain, or make arrangements for, and assure the proper implementation of, a physical protection system for shipments of such material that will achieve the following objectives:
(i) Minimize the possibilities for radiological sabotage of spent fuel shipments; especially within heavily populated areas; and (ii) Facilitate the location and recovery of spent fuel shipments that may have come under the control of unauthorized persons.
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(2) To achieve these objectives, the physical protection system shall:
1 (i) Provide for early detection and assessment of attempts to gain unauthorized access to, or control over, spent fuel shipments; (ii) Provide for notification to the apprcoriate response forces of any spent fuel shipment sabotage attempts; and (iii)
Impede attempts at radiological sabotage of spent fuel shipments within heavily populated areas, or attempts to illicitly move such shipments into heavily populated areas, until response forces arrive.
(b) General recuirements. To achieve the perfonnance objectives of paragraph (a) of this section, a physical protection system established and maintained, or arranged for, by the ifcensee shall:
(1) Provide for notification of the Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission in advance of each shipment, in accordance with 173.72 of this part.
(2)
Include precedures for ccoing with circumstances that :.veaten delf terste camage to a spent fuel saf; cent and with cthe-safegua.s ete gencies.
(3)
Include instructions for each escort that, upon detection of the abnormal presence of unauthorized persons, vehicles or vessels in the vicinity of a spent fuel shipment, or upon detection of a deliberately induced situation that has the potential for damaging a spent fuel shipment, the escort will:
(i) Determine whether or not a threat exists; (ii) Assess the extent of the threat, if any; (iii)
Inform local law enforcement agencies of the threat and request assistance; and (iv)
Implement the procedures developed in accordance with paragraph
.(b)(2) of this section.
(?)
Include a communications center at a designated location, which will be staffed continuously by at least one individual who will monitor the progress of the spent fuel shipment and will notify the appreoriate agencies in the event a safeguards emergency should arise.
(5) Provide for maintenance of a written log by the escorts and cccmunications center personnel, for each spent fuel shipment, which will include information describing the shipment and significant events that occur during the shipment, and will be available for review by authorized NRC personnel for a period of at least 1 year follcwing completion of the shipment.
, 6) Provide that arrangements have been made with local law enforce-(
ment agencies along the routes of road and rail shipments, and at U.S.
ports where vessels carrying spent fuel shipments are docked, for their response to an emergency or a call for assistance.
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.. (7) Provide for advance approval by the HRC of the routes used for road and rail shipments of spent fuel, and of any U.S. ports where vessels carrying spent fuel shipments are scheduled to stop.
(8) Provide that shipments are planned so that scheduled intemediate stops are avoided to the extent practicable.
(9) Provide that at least one ascort maintains visual surveillance of the shipment during periods when the shipment vehicle is stopped, or the shipment vessel is docked.
(10) Provide tnat escorts (other than. enhers of local law enforcement agencies, or ship's officers serving as unamed escorts) have successfully completed the training required by Appendix D of this part.
(11) Provide that shipment escorts make calls to the communications center at least every 2 hcurs to advise of the status of-the shipment for road and rail shipments, and for sea shipments while shipment vessels are docked at U.S. ports.
(c) Shioments by road.
In addition to the provisions of paragraph (b),
the physical protection system for any portion of a spent fuel shipment that is by road shall provide that:
(1) A transport vehicle within a heavily populated area is:
(i) Occupied by at least two individuals, one of whom serves as escort, and escorted by an armed member of the local law enforcement agency in a mobile unit of such agency; or (11) Led by a separate vehicle occupied by at least ene amed escort, and trailed by a third vehicle occupied by at least one amed escort.
. (2) A transport vehicle not within any heavily populated area is:
(f) Occupied by at least one driver and one other individual who serves as escort; or
'(ii) Occupied by a driver and escorted by a separate vehicle occupied by at least two escorts; or (iii)
Escorted as set forth in paragraph (c)(1) above.
(3) Escorts have the capability of communicating with the ecmmunications center, local law enforcement agencies, and one another, through the use of:
(i) A citizens band (CS) radio available in the transport vehicle and in each escort vehicle; (11) A radiotelephone or other NRC-approved equivalent means of two-way voice communications-available in the transport vehicle or in an escort vehicle committed to travel the entire reate; and (iii) Citizens band (CB) radio and normal local law enforcement
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agency radio communications in any local law enforcement agency mobile units used for escort purposes.
(4) The transport f; equipped with NRC-approved features that permit immobilization of the cab or cargo-carrying portion of the vehicle.
(5) The transport vehicle driver has been familiarized with, and is capable of implementing, transport vehicle it. mobilization, ccmmunications, and other security procedures.
(d) Shipments by rail.
In addition to the provisions of paragraph (b),
l the physical protection system for any portion of a spent fuel shiprent l
j-that is by rail shall provide that:
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cm e-
, (1) A shipment car within a heavily populated area is acccmpanied by two armed escorts (who may be members of a local law enforcement agency), at least one of whom is stationed at a location on the train that will permit observation of the shipment car while in motion.
(2) A shipment car not within any heavily populated area is acccmpanied by at least one escort stationed at a location on the train that will pemit observation of the shipment car while in motion.
(3) Escorts have the capability of communicating with the ccmmunications center and local law enforcement agencies through the use of a radiotelephone, or other NRC-approved equivalent means of two-way voice communications, which shall be available on the train.
(e) Shioments by sea.
In addition to the provisions of paragraph (b), the physical protection system for any portion of a spent fuel shipment that is by sea shall provide that:
(1) A shipment vessel, while docked at a U.S. port within a heavily populated area, is protected by:
(i) Twn amed escorts stationed on board the shipment vessel, or stationed on the dock at a location that will permit observation of the shipment vessel; or (11) A member of a local law enforcement agency, equipped with normal LLEA radio ccmmunications, who is stationed on board the shipment vessel, or on the dock at a location that will permit observation of the shipment vessel.
(2) A shipment vessel, while within U.S. territorial waters, or
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while docked at a U.S. port not within a heavily populated area, is acccmpanied l
by an escort, who may be an officer of the shipeent vessel's crew, who will assure that the shipment is unicaced only as authorized by the licensee.
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(3) Escorts have the capability of ecmmuaicating with the communications center and local law enforcement agencies through the use of a radiotelephone, or other NRC-approved equivalent means of two-way voice communications.
3.
Apcendix D of 10 CFR Part 73 is amended by adding a paragraph at the end, as follows:
The licensee is also required to assure that armed individuals serving as shipmen't escorts, other than members of local law enforcement agencies, have completed a weapons training and qualifications
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program equivalent to that required of guards, as described in III and IV of Appendix B of this part, to assure that each such individual is fully qualified to use weapons assigned him. '
4.
The first sentence of 173.72 of is amended by adding the phrase "or spent fuel recuired to be protected under the provisions of 173.37," after the words "special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance".
(Secs. 53,161b,1611, Pub. L.83-703,'68 Stat. 930, 948, 949; Sec. 201, Pub. L.93-438, 88 Stat. -1242-1243 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2201, 5841).)
Dated at '4ashington, D.C. this 27th day of Mav, 1980 For the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission i
f e e n eh (L I su Q Y
Samuel J. ChilK Secretary of tl 'e Commission f.
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