ML19323H480

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Safety Evaluation Supporting Design Aspects of Containment Purge Valve Isolation Override & Other Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Signals Except Radiation Monitors Which Initiate Containment Purge Isolation
ML19323H480
Person / Time
Site: Point Beach  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 05/22/1980
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML19323H479 List:
References
NUDOCS 8006130039
Download: ML19323H480 (1)


Text

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SAFETY EVALUATION POINT BEACH NUCLEAR STATION UNITS 1 & 2

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OVERRIDE OF CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION AND OTHER ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SIGNALS 1

INTRODUCTION As a result of Abnormal Occurrence #78-5, the NRC issued a generic i

letter requesting each licensee to take certain actions. Our review of the licensee's actions included a visit to the plant site.

EVALUATION The enclosed report was prepared for us by Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLL) and EG&G, San Ramon, as part of our technical assistance program.

This report provides a technical evaluation of the electrical instru-mentation and control design aspects of the override of containment purge valves isolation and other engineered safety feature actuation signals and is based upon review of these design aspects against the six staff review criteria provided for the review. The containment purge valves at Point Beach Units 1 and 2 are currently tagged shut and are not being used for purging or venting. All venting and purging is being performed through a two-inch pipe with continuous computer monitoring.

The isolation valves for this two-inch pipe also satisfy the staff review criteria cited above. The technical evaluation concludes that with one exception, the modifications made by the licensee at the plant have brought the designs into conformance with our review c:*iteria. The one exception is that the radiation monitors which initiate containment purge isolation are not safety grade.

CONCLUSION Based upon our review of the consultant's technical evaluation, we conclude that the electrical, instrumentation and control design aspects of the override of containment purge valves isolation and other engi-neered safety feature actuation signals are acceptable with the exception of the radiation monitors used to initiate containment purge isolation. The licensee should be required to provide radiation monitors that are safety grade and satisfy the requirements of IEEE Std. 279-1971. This requirement has been incorporated into Regulatory Guide 1.141, Revision 1, " Containment Isolation Provisions for Fluid Systems," with a proposed implementation schedule of January 1,1981.

This revision has been endorsed by ACRS and will be required after final staff approval.

Enclosure:

Technical Evaluation by EG&G, San Ramon 8 0061300% f