ML19323G462
| ML19323G462 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/30/1977 |
| From: | Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| To: | Gossick L NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19323G457 | List: |
| References | |
| SECY-78-142, NUDOCS 8006020530 | |
| Download: ML19323G462 (88) | |
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ENCLOSURE 3 EACX3RCUND r
EAC:GRCUND INFC??A7?CN u. o-a, n *6 :. 6:.tO-. e
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AcM T 23,1976 - SECY 75-iE3A. De C:missicn es infomed cf an im-
- enetng eeting(of =e physical ?-
- :acti n Subgreuc of de Nucisir.
Supplier Grcup NSG) of the IAEA t c:nsider physicai pre: action cMtar's fer nuclear matarial at fixed sitas and in-transit.
June 1975. De NSG ad:ptad f:r a::itcation O ex:crt shi=ents, the
- nys cai ;r
- : action cMtaria rec:= ended by its subgreuc and suggestad tne cMtaria as minimum recuirec'en s f:r te ;hysical security f:r 11-tarnal c:erations wi'hin nuclear facilities of member natiens Of de J. Sc.
July 1975. In a let ar :: de Chaiman, Assistant Secretary :f Stata I,rnng ::= ended tna NSG eri. aria as a basis for de revisi:n of NRC physicai ;rctacticn recuiremena.
.r braary li.1977 - SECY 77-79. Bis ;acer analy ad de issue cf whe=er e
on-scing NRC actions to u: grace :hysicai protacticn recuirecents shcuid meet rec = mended intarnaticnal standards and if so, t: wna extant the recxcendatiens of the IAEA and/cr de NSG should Se adccted as a Sasis f r requia= ry change. Ti;c relevan; rec:=ancatiens of SECY 77-79 :ali for (a) adcction of the NSG catagcri:1:icn of catarial; and (h) ade:tien of general per#:rmance recuiremen.s f:r Catascry II and I: materiai : hat wcuid at vide...cretac,ticn ecuivalen :: the measures rec:= ended by de
".h.,,A-4en....1%.-r%,1;e.
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ba June !I-77 INFCIRC/ESE was ccdified :: change the physical :re: action a:ascries of nuclear materials to be in acreeman: wid 2csa rsextended by the NSG.
June 20,1977 7he Cc.missicn ;uclished SECY 77-793 in wnich 1: a=reved me general a:creach rec:menced by de staff in SECY 77-79 and direc:ad te s.aff :s deveico a pre:csec raie, sucject to rasciutien of de felicwing mat:ars:
a.
An analyst: Of the tacnnicai 'ustificatien fer de physi:21
- r
- tactice Of Ca:ageries II and III ma:arials.
3.
C s esti=atas f:r :reccsec c:ia 1:ciecenta:icn and ai.anative ar angacents f:r abscr:ing ::s s f:r tha ;re:csad ecuf.ee
- r
- :acticn.
Enci:sure 3 r
Encicsure 3 (::ntinued) ;
c.
ERDA's (CC5) ;csitten and plans :: pretact icw-enriched uranium.
d.
Affir.atien :f whed.er NRC rec.uireents.: :retac: 55NI4 wnile in-transit art :ceratienally equivalan:.:.Secticn 5.1 f
INFCIRC/225 in regard : Ca:ageries I-I!!.
Juiv 5.1977. A pr cesed raie to uegrade the physicai retacticn of fer:ula cuantities of stratagic special nuclear matarf al was issued by NRC and :ublished. in the :edeni Recister. A cng cthe? -hings, this precosed rule includes recuirrents wnica satisfy INFCIR0/225 rec:menda-tiens fer the pretac. fen Of Catagery I material 1: fixed sitas and in-
- ansit.
e 4 e
c:
G
0 I
l ENCLOSURE a
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TECHNICAL A55555 PENT Intrcduction.
This enciesure discusses 5.e technical basis f:r physical pr:tacticn of Catascry II ind !!! ma arials by assassing ' heir utilt:y, rela:1ve
- s Catascry I utarials, as the nuclear c:=penents Of crude nuclear exclosive daytcas.
In making this assessment, it is useful t: se:arata :he ma:ariais wi-hin Catagories II and I!! fnto three classes. The first class c:nsts:s of small quantities (1ess than the five.'<flegram f:rmia axunt) of strategi:
special nuclear matariai (uranium-233, :lu :nfum, and uranfum enriched
- 20: cr more in the U-225 f sc:::e). The sec:nd class ::nsts:s cf 1:w anriched ursntum (uranfum anriched :: less than 2C% fn the U-225 f set:ce).
Finaily, the third class ::nsts:s f frradia ad ma: arf ais (s:ecial nuclear matarfai which is not reaciiy sa:arahis fr:m c:her ridicactive matarial and which has a :::al external cese ra:: fn excass of 1CO rues ;er hcur at a distanca cf 3 feet fr:m any ac:assf 5ie surfica without fatarvening shfelefng). These classes Of ma:artals wili #:rm the basis cf the discussi:n of :he westens : fit:y cf Cata; cry :: and II: matarials.
The utility of a specific type and quanti:y of special nuclear matarial in fabrica: Tag crude nuclear devicasde;er.ds u;cn a aumber of fact:rs which cannct be preciseTy as:assed for requiatory ;ur;csas. These fact:r:
include the-phytical and :temicai fccm of the s:ecial nuclear matariai, the s:ectffe detafts :f the design f the in:enced nuclear ex:lestve cevfca, anc the :achnical skfils anc c:mpe:anca cf :he gr:u: a::anp ing
- ::nstruct the device.
icerer:ra, rather than addressing these c:nsid-era:fons in de:afi f:r all ;cssible c:mhtna iens Of Ca:agery II and II:
ma:arfals, this discussten is erf antad :: ward Istn:statng the dagree Of safeguards conservatism ex:ressed in the C erating Assum:tfon Ccvering the Relative Ease of abricating Cland;stine Ffssfen Ex:10stves (attachec).
SFALL CUANTITIES CF S~ ATEGIC SPECIAL NUCLUR.VATERIALS i
The Catescry II matariais in : hts class are unf eradf a:ad ;1u::ntum er uranfum - 232 cr uranf an 225 (:entained in uranfum anriched :: 20 percan:
Or mort in the U-235 f so:::e) er any c:mbina:1:n of :hese ma:arials in a cuan: tty of less than ECCO grams when c:meuted by the f:r:uia, grams =
(;rzzs ::ntained U-225) ' 2.5 (grtzs U-232 + grams ;Iu :nfum), bu whfch is in a cuan.it/ Of i C0 grams :r mere when ::meutad by O.e f:ntula, grs=s = (;rtms c:n.sined U-225) - 2 (grams U-223 e grams piu::nfum). D.e Enci:strt 4 r
.. Category III materials in this class are unirradiated plut:nium or uranium - 233 Or uranfum - 235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isot:ce) or any ccmbination of these materials in a cuantity of less than 1000 grams when c:meuted by the plutonium} rams = (grams contained U-235) + 2 (grams U~-233 ' grams formula, -
, but more than 15 grams when c = outed by tha fomula, grams
= grams plut:nf um + grams U-233 + grams U-235.
Based upcn infomation suppifed by CCE and tne weapons laboratories, a single theft of the quantities of the type of strategic scecial nuclear material specified in either Categcry II or Category III would not provide suff fctent special nuclear material to construct a crude nuclear devi:e.
Therefore, the safeguards concern with this class of materials is the possibt1f ty of undetected multiple thefts.
LOW ENRICHED MATERIALS The Category II materials which are in tnis class are 10,000 grams or more of unieradfated uranium-235 (centained in uranium enriched to 10 percent or more but less than 20 ;ercent in the U-235 isatece). The Category III materials which are in this class are less than 10,0C0 grams but more than 1000 grams of uranium-235 ' contained in uranium enriched to 10 percent or more but ess than 20 per:ent in the U-235 isotope) or i
more than 10,000 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uraniu. enriched above l
natural but less than 10 percent in the U-235 isotepe).
1 Based upcn information supplied by CCE and the weapons laborat: ries, none of the icw enriched materials in Categories II or III can be directly used in a practical low technology nuclear explosive device.
Before those materials could practically be used in such a device, they would either have to be enriched in the isotope uranium-235 or used to fuel a reacter, pr:ducing plutonium which could then be reprocessed fr:m the irrsdiated fuel.
Either of these processes is considered to be beyond the capability of a sub-national -level group at this time.
When safecuards are considered for these Icw enriched materials, it is
~
important to reali:e that bcth covert enrichment of uranium and covert use of urantum in a react:r can begin with natural uranium.
Enrichment of natural uranium to greater than 20 percent in the isotcpe uranium-235 requires almost twice as much secarative work as dces the further enrich-ment of 3 ;ercent enriched uranium Oc the same isotocic percentage in uraniun-235, licwever, this difference in the required level cf effort.
is sifcht in cemoartsen to the total eff:rt currently required to design, c:nstr5ct, and ::erate an enrichment facility. Likewise, the conversion
- f natural urantum inte plutonium recuires a specially designed reactor Enclosure a e
o.
. (for examole, a CANDU or graphita moderated reactor). Nevertheless, the design and construction of sucn reactors are not inherently more difficul than :P design and construction of reactors using enriched uranium fuels.
- 1. arefore, the technical basis for establishing safe-guards for natural uranium is c:moaracle to that for estaolishing safeguards for icw enriched uranium.
The primary safeguards requirements for icw enriched uranium would be tne timelv da*=---
~~
e -he diversion of accunts of material which n
mignt be used outside~the U.S. in a reactor to arccuce 31u: nf um or in an enrichment facility to crocuce Mtu. uncertain:y accut :ossible acvances in enricament tecnnology (for examole laser enrichment) which, mignt eventually make it possioie for a sub-national _grcun 'n envar*1y 3h[.
enrien uranium, may suWeTt that it wTufd% prudent to. safeguard..this ma eria l a: an a:propriate levei. Therefore, al though *ka -a f a j u tti-fication. for__ protection of these materiais is :o demonstrate U.S.
willingness to c:ccerate with Ine IJE( in support cf interna icnal sareguar s c5Tec:hes-there-itCJe icFe~ justificalion _for Sc:tecliM of these matsrfirs against possible future -dcmestic threatsm__
IRRADIATED MATERIALS Both Category II and Categcry III contain irradiated materials.
In order to use those materials in a crude nuclear explosive device it is necessary to separate the special nuclear material frem the fission product " poisons" and radioactive heat sources.
Such a secaration is a complex chemical process which is further ccmolicated by the radiation protection measures required.
Eased ucon information provided by COE the c0mbination of technical skills and physical plant re;utred to separate s:ecial nuclear material fr:m f eradiated materials is beycnd the capabfif ty of a sub-national grouo. Therefore, the primary safeguards requirements for irradfated materf als would be the timely detection of diversion of amounts which might be cr0 cessed outside the U.S. to pro-duce Category I quantities of plutonium. Such large quantities of frradiated strategic special nuclear materials are now protected under current NRC regulations. Safeguards measures do not appear warranted for small or moderate quantities of sucn materials fr:m either dcmestic or interna: Tonal standcofnts.
CCNCLUSIONS AND RECCMMENDATIONS The st=clest manner in which Category !! or III materials can be utilized in the c:nstruction of a crude nuclear explosive, c:nsidering only the problems of the design and facrfca:fon of the device, is to ac:umulate clutonium, uranium-233, or uranium-235 (enriched.:o greater than 20%) by mu!:t:le thefts until a Categcry I puantity is : stained.
!asec u:en inf:rmatien su: cited by OCE and the weacons latera::rf es, :nis is the enly way i which a sub-national gr u: could utili:e Oa:eg:ry II or III inc:csure a
-r.
materiais to construct a,aractical nuclear device.
This sets the base-line technical recuirements for the safeguarding of Category II and
~
III materials. Consistency with Our c:nservative c;erating assumatica (attacned) recuires. that safeguards deter and detect thefts of small
. and moderate cuantities of SS.'iM.
Additionally, safeguards shculd be based u:en the necessity for timely ((-pE detection of possible diversi:n of LEU.
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Theref:re, NRC reif er ucen :.CA f:r tacnnicai inf:rraticn reia:ad to this area. Sinca detailed tachnical infer =a:1cn specifically acclicable t: de des'gn and fabricati:n :f a ciandestine fissien
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..,.g....
3 6
.p.
I * *. g.. g......1 y
. 4
- 4.....
~
.o 2
wi-h the tachnicai ::=etanca cf a n neati:nal group.
Tne gr u:
wcuid have t: incluca ;ertens ca:ahie Of searching and under ancing de cad.nical Ti.ars urs in saversi fieId: and :f ac:= ifshing ne recaired :achnician-:yre. asks.
.4 grea: daai decends :n de :=:e-tanca of de greu:; if da is deficient, nc: :nly is de enanca :f
- reducing a
- :ai !141ure incrsasac, tu: -he enanca ta"Yzeter :f
'he greuc sight suffer sericus er ft:si itury wcuid 5e cuita reai.
In acditi n, the ;cssihiiity of rapid assebly aftar matarial ac:uist-tien decends s r:ngly :n the tachnical c:::e ance Of the-gr us.
Again, hcwever, due.: the disast us ::nsscuencas :f -he det:nati:n of a CFE,.'EC ;clicy shcuid give safeguar.s c :.Mi: f:r '.ne di'ff-cait/ cr any ax andad Iength Of ize invcived in casigning and f2bri-cating a CFE.
l 1
l l
9
1 ENCLOSURE 5 PROPOSED RULE r.
l
+-
ENCLOSURE 5 NUCLEAR REGULATCRY CCPNISSICN (10 CFR PART 73]
PHYSICAL PROTECTICN CF PLANTS AND MATER!ALS (10 CFR PART 150]
EXEMPTIONS AND CONTINUED REGULATORY AUTHORITY IN AGREEMENT STATES UNDER SECTICN 274 Safeguard Requirements fer Special Nuclear Paterial of Moderate and Low Stratagic Significance AGENCY:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission ACTION:
Proposed Rule SUPNARY:
The Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission is considering amend-ments to its regulations for physical protecticn of plants and materials, including nonpcwer reacters." These amendments would require physical pretaction measures against theft of special nuclear material of mcderate and low strategic significance.
The amencments are proposed in the interest of common defense and security.
The meas-i ures procosed are cesigned to provide a level of protection equivalen:'
)
to that recommended in Information Circular /225 (INFCIRC/225) publishec by tne International Atemic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The amenc=ent wouic l
specify protection requirements for nuclear materials used at fixed
'Cansiceratice is also eing given to the cevelecment cf accitional and sucplemental safeguard recuirements designed s:ecifically for nor:cwer i
reactors.
These procesed recuirements will :e puo'.'snec at 1 iater cate for pucife ccmment.
I 1
Edcies.re 5 e
D sites, including nonpower reactors, and for nuclear materials in transit.
Physical protection requirements for independent scent fuel storage installations and nuclear pcwer reactors are presently covered under 10 CFR $ 73.40, 3 73.50 and i 73.55 and therefore are not included in these amendments.
DATES:
Ccmments must be received on or before 1973.
(date 30 days after publication in FR)
ADDRESSES:
Comments or suggestions for censideration in cenrection with the proposed amendments should be sent to the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission, Wasaington, D.C.
20555, Attention: Occketing and Service Branen.
C: pies of ccmments received may be examined at the Ccmmission's Public Occument Rocm at 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATICN CONTACT:
Mr. R. J. Jones, Chief, Material Protection Standards Branch, Office of Standards Development, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, O. C. 20555 (301) 443-5973 or Mr. C. X. Nuisen, Requirements Analysis Branch, Division of Safe-guards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and SafeT:ards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission, Wasnington, D.C. 20555 (301) 427-a043.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATICN:
The Nuclear Regulatcry Ccmmission is censidering amencments to its regulattens in 10 CFR 73, Physical 2rctaction of Plants anc Materiais." These amencments.culd recuire 2
5cciosure-5' t
physical protaction measures against theft of special nuclear material of moderate and 10w stratagic significanca.
The preposed amendments are designed to protact against the theft of special nuclear material of a type and quantity that is not directly useacle in :ne manufacture of a nuclear weacon but which nevertheless could be of substantial assistance in sucn a project.
The preposed amendcents would provide a level of protection equivalent to that recccmended for Categories II and III matarial in Information Circular 225 bulletin puclished by the IAEA as snewn in Tacle 1.
Physical protection f unieractatad SNM in Catagerias II and III is justifiec en tne basis of enhancing ecmestic pretac:icn of such materials by providing theft detection and detarrence capabilities and demonscrating U.S. willingness to accept international physical security standards.
The publication of recommenced physical security measures for materials of nederate and low strategic importance by the IAEA, in Information Circular /225 (INFCIRC/225), was acccmpanied by assess-ments of dcmestic safeguards needs relative tc :ncsa matarials.
It is the staff's judgment that the proposed requirements are technically justified and are necassary, even without taking into account tha general desirability of Unitac States acceptanca of internationally recommenced standards developed and premulgated with full United Statas participation.
In the absence of protaction measures, an acversary coult cctain a formula quantity or more of plutenium, U-233 or HEU :nrcugn nuiticle thefts of quantities of matarials Of 3
Snclosure 5 t
t.
Table 1 IAEA CATEGORIZATION OF NUCLEAR MA7ERIAL" 1
I Category l
Matarial Form I
II III i
1.
Plutonium **#
Unirradiated 2 kg or Less than 2 kg 500 g D
more but more than or less' 500 g i
2.
Uranium-235" Unirradiatac i
U t
uranium enriched 5 kg or Less than 5 kg 1 kg or 235 c
to 20%
"U or more more but more than less i
1 kg
- uranium enriched 10 kg or more Less 235 to 10%
~U but enan.
less than 20%
10 kg'
- uranium enriched 10 kg er above natural, but more less than 10% 235U 3.
Uranium-233 Unirradiated 2 kg or Less than 2 kg 500 g more but more than er less' 500 g aAll plutonium except that with isotcpic c:ncentration exceeding 30% in plutonium-238.
Material not irradiatad in a reactor or material irradiated in a reactor but with a radiation level equal to or less than 100 rads / hour at one meter unshielded.
C Less than a radiologically significant quantity should be exemsted.
UNatural uranium, cepleted uranium and theritm and quantities of uranium enriched to less than 10% not falling in Categorj III shculd be protectac in accordance with prudent menagement practice.
' Irradiated fuel should be protected as Category I, II or III nuclear material depending on the category of the fresh fuel. However, fuel which by virtue of its original fissfie material content is included as Category I or II befera irradiation shculd only be reduced one Category level, while the radiation level frem the fuel exceecs 100 rads /h at one metar unsnielded.
The ' State's ccmcetent authcrity shculd datarmine if there -is a credible threat to disperse plutonium malevolently. -The State should enen a;:cly chysical pro-i taction requirements for catacory I, II cr III 2f nuclear matarial, as it deems accrecriata and withcut regarc to the plutoniaa quantity specified uncer eaca category herein, to the plutenium isct:ces in tacse quanti:iss and forms ce:ar-airec by the 5 ata to fail within tne sc ce Of tne credible discersal enreat.
A c
~
moderata or low strategic significance.
In addition, quantities of uranium enricted to less than 20% U-235 :ould te diverted, witnout timely detection, to other countries for additional enrichment or for plutonium prcduction.
The crocosed amendments differ in substance frem the IAEA categorization in that:
1.
a icwer limit of 15 grams for plutonium, high enriched uranium-235, or uranium-233 is set for special nuclear material of low strategic significance (Category !!I),
2.
a lower limit of 1000 grams for uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 10 :ercent or.nore but less than 20 percent in the U-235 isotope) is set for spscial nuclear material 'of low strategic significance (Category III),
3.
physical protection is also expifcitly required for the comoination of plutonium, nign enriched uranium, or uranium-233 for special nuclear material of mocerate strategic significance (Category II) and icw strategic significance (Category III), and 4
indecendent spent fuel storage installat ons are presently.
i covered under 10 CFR 5 73.40 and 73.50 and therefore are not included in these amencments.
-l Basically the proposed pnysical protection measures for special nuclear matarial of acderate strategic significance require:
using and storing the material in a controlled ac:ess
- area, 3
Enciosure 5 e,
o 2.
limiting access to the material only to authori:ed indi-viduals whose trustworthiness has previcusly been determined, 3.
continuously monitoring the area to cetect unauthorized activities, and 4
transporting the material under : ntrolled anc planned conditions.
The proposed physical protection measures for special nuclear material of icw strategic significance basically require:
1.
using and 5 cring the material in a controlled access
- area, 2.
continucusly monitoring the controlled access area to detect unauthori:ed activities, and 3.
transporting the material under controlled and planned conditions.
The pr posed amendments would apply to licensees authorized to possess, use, transfer, import, and export cartain quantities of special nuclear material.
Licensees possessing special nuclear material of Icw strategic significance who are licensed under the agreement states requirements of part 150 of this chapter will be required to meet the requirements of these proposed amendments pursuant to section 27am of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
Pursuant to the Atemic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorgani:ation Act of 1974, as amended, and sectir.1 553 of title 5 of the Unitec States Code, notica is hereby given that 5
Enc 1csure 5 e
4 aception of the folicwing amendments to Ti-le 10, Chacter I, Code of Feceral Regulations, Part 73 is contemplated.
1.
Paragraph 70.22(g) of 10 CFR Part 70 is revised as follcws:
n n
x.
n e
(g) Each application for a license whicn would authorize the transport, export or delivery to a carrier for transport of special nuclear material in an amount specified in 3 73.1(b)(2) of this chacter sna11 incluce a cescripcicn-of-ine** plan for the physical protection of special nuclear material in transit in accordance with $s 73.30 througn 73.36, 73.27(a) and(e), 73.47(c) for 10 Xq or more of scecial nuclear material of Icw strategic significance.
and 73.70(g) of this chapter including a plan for the selection, cualification and training of armeo escorts, or the specification and design of a scecially designed truck or trailer as accrcpriate.
2.
Paragraph 70.22(h) of 10 CFR Part 70 is revisec as folicws:
n n
n (h)
Each application for a license to possess or use at any site or contiguous sites sucject to centrol by the licensee uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriened to 20 percent or more in tne uranium-235 iset:pe), uranium-233, or plutonium alone cc in any ccmcinaticn in a quantity of 5,000 grams or more c mputed by the formula, grams = (; rams
.t ;4 Cce:arati se tax: to tae existing requiations.
Ce etians are ifnec tarcugn ano accitions are unce sc: rec.
l 7
ncICsur? 3
~
l e
o-contained in U-235) - 2.5 (grams U-233 + grams plutonium), otner than a license for possession or use of such matarial in the cperation of a nuclear reactor licensed pursuant to ? art 50 of this chapter, shall include a physical security plan, consisting of two parts.
Part I snall address vital equipment, vital areas, and isolation tones, tnd shall demonstrata how the applicant plans to meet the requirements of i3 73.10. 73.50, 73.60, 73.70, and 73.71 (Part-75]
of this chapter in the conduct of the activity to be licensed.
Part II shall list tests, inspections, and other means to demonstrata comoliance with such requirements.
3.
A new paragraph 70.22(j) is added to 10 CFR Part 70.22:
a a
a s
a (j) Each acolication for a license to cessess or use at any site or conti;ucus sites subject to centrol by the licensee soecial nuclear material of acderate stratecic significance or 10 (q or more of scecial nuclear material of Icw strategic significance as defined under 14 73.2(z) and (aa) of this chacter, j
other than a license for cossession or use of <nc* material in the i
eceration of a nuclear cower reactor lice.ised cursuant to Part 50 of tnis chaoter, shall incluce a chysical security clan which shall cemenstrate how the acolf canc olans to meet tne aecuirements of Para-I crachs 73.17(c) and (c) of 3 art 73 of this chacter.
3 Ecclosure 5 e
4.
Paragraph 73.l(b) of 10 CFR Part 73 is revisec to read as falicws:
$ 7
3.1 Purpose and Scope
A M
M A
M
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(b) Sccce (1) This part prescribes requirements for (i) the physical pro-taction of production and utili:ation facilities licensed cursuant to Part 50 of this enanter; (ii) the pnysical protection of piants in wnich activities licensed pursuant to Part ~0 of tnis chapter are conducted, and (iii) the physical protection of special nuclear material, by any person who pursuant to the regulations in Part 70 of this enapter possesses or uses at any site or contiguous sites subject to the control by the license, formula cuantities of stratecic scecial nuclear material
- cr scecial nuclear material of moderate stratecic sicnificance or s ecial nuclear material of low stratecic sicnificance
rani =m-235(centained-in-=rtni:m-enriched-t:-i9 percent :r mere-in-the 0-255-isetepe)- :reniem-253--er pi= :ni:m-siene-er-in-any-::mbinati:n in s quantity-f-5666 grams er-mere eem;=ted-by-tne-fermeis-grams-
(grims-::ntained-in-S-235)-+-2-5-(grass-d-253-- gesms pi=teni:m3. *
(2) This part prescribes requirements for the physical pre-tection of special nuclear material in transcor:stien by any persen no is licensed pursuant to the regulati:ns in Part 70 of this u
chapter who imports, exports, transports, delivers to a carrier for traasport in a single shipment, or takes delivery of a single shipment free on beart enere it is deliverec :: a carrier, f:rauia 9
e
1 l
ouantities of strateofc scecial nuclear mater:al' or scecial nuclear J
mater al of mocerate strategic sicniffeance er s:ecisi nuclear matarial d
of low strategic sicnificance eitner crsnium-255--centsinee-in :rsni:s
)
entie ed-to-f 3 percent-er-mers-in-the-e-iiS-isetepe37 ersni:m-DSS; l
cr pisteni =; or-sny-::mcinati:n ef-these-materisis;-wnien-- -5609 grtms-er-tere ::mpete -:y-the-fermeis; gtsms-=-fgrams-::ntainec 9-2353-+2:5-fgrass-6-233-+ grass pi=teni:m):
5.
Sec-f on 73.2 of 10 CFR Part 73 is amended by adding new para-graphs (:) and (aa) to reac as follows:
i 73.2 Definitions s
x a
x n
(:) "special ' nuclear material of moderata strategic significance" means:
(1) less than formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material, but in a quantity of more than 1000 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope) or more taan 500 grams of uranium-233 or plutonium or in a ecmoined quantity of more than 1000 grams wnen c:mouted by the equation,.
grams = (grams cantained U-235) + 2 (grams U-233 grams plutonium), or R
As cefined in Section 73.2(t) and (u) of the orecosed rule :colisned in 42 FR 34310 cated July 5, 1977.
- 0 Erclosure 5 e.
(2) 10,000 grams or more of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 10 percent cr more but less than 20 :ercent in the U-235 isotope).
(aa) "special nuclear material of 10w strategic significance" means:
(1) less than an amou.at sf strategic special nuclear material of mcderate strategic significance, as defined in Paragraph 73.2(z)(1) of this Part, but more than 15 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enricned to 20 percent or scre in the U-235 iset:pe) Or 15 grams of ur=nf um-233 or 15 grams of plutonium er the c:mcination of 15 grams wnen ecmputed by the equa. ion, grams = grams centained U-235 + grams plutonium + grams U-233, or (2) less than 10,000 grams but more than 1000 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 10 percent or more but less than 20 percent in tne U-235 isotope), or (3) 10,000 grams or iore of uranium-235 contained in uranium enriched above natural but less than 10 percent in the U-235 isote:e.
6.
A new section 73.47 is added to 10 CFR Part 73 to read as folicws:
$ 73.47 LICENSEE FIXED SITE AND IN TRANSIT REQUIRE.MENTS FOR THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL OF MODERATE AND LCW STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE.
(a) General Performance Cbjectives (1) Eaca licensee wnc possesses, usas or transcorts strategic nuclear matarial of icw cr accerata strategic significance snall 11 Enc 1:sure 5 t
estaclish and maintain a ::nysical protectf on system that will acnieve the folicwing cbjectives:
(i) Minimi:e the pcssib. lities for unauthori:ed removal of i
special nuclear matarial censistent with the potantial consequences of sucn actions; and (ii) Facilitata :ne location and recovery of missing special nuclear material.
(2) To achieve these cojectives, :ne pnysical protection system T.M)'V shall:
' \\
(i) {g Detect and assess unauthori:ed access anc materials intr 0cuc-tien into, or unautnori:ed activities sitnin the vicinity of scecial nuclear mater (ii) tact and assess unauthor::ed removal of scecial nuclear A
material; (iii) Assure proper placement and transfer of custacy of special nuclear material; and (iv) Respond to indications of unauthorized removal of special nuclear material and ecmmunicata to appropriata respcnse forces in order to facilitata its recovery.
(b) A licensee is exempt frem the requirements of this section to the extent that he possesses, uses, or transports special nuclear matarial which is not readily separable from etner radicactive material and wnich has a total extarnal radiation dose rate in excess of 100 rems per hcur at a distance of 3 feet frem any accessi:le surf a:e withcut intarvening shiel:ing.
12 Ecc'.:sure 5 t-
(c) Each licensee wno possesses, uses, or transports special nuclear material of mcderate strategic significance or 10 Kg or more of special nuclear material of icw strategic significance shall submit by [date E0 days from cublication in effective form in FR] a security plan or an amended security plan cescricing now the licensee will comply with all the receirements of Sections 73.47(c), (d), (e),
and (f), including schedules of imolementation.
(d) FIXED SITE REQUIREMENTS FOR 3PECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL CF MCCERATE STRATEGIC 5:GNIFICANCE - Each licensee ano possesses, st:res, or uses quantities and types of special nuclear material of moderate stratagic significance at fixed sites, excect tacse wne are licensed to ocerate a nuclear pcwer reactor pursuant to Part 5C, shall:
(i) store or use such material only within a c:ntrolled access area which is illuminatec sufficient to allow detection and surveil-lance of unauthorf:ed penetration or activities, (2) store such material within a vault, vault-type rcom, or G5A accreved security cabinet, (3) continuously monitor with an intrusion alarm er other devices or procedures tne controlled access area to detect unautho-ri:ed penetration or activities, (4) conduct preempicyment screening to detarmine the trust-warthiness of emoioyees having access to the material, (5) develop and maintain a centrolled cadging and lock system to icentify and limit access to tne controlled ac:ess area to autho-ri:ec incividuals,
- 3 Enciosure 5
)
i f-
(6) limit access to tne controlled area to authorized individuals who require such access in order to perform their duties, (7) assure that all visitors to tne c:ntrolled access area are under tne c nstant escort Of an individual,ho has been autnorized unescortec access :: the area, (8) establisn a security organization consisting of at least one watchman per shift able to assess and rescend to any security incidents in the c:ntrolled access area, (9) provide a communication capacility between :ne security organi:ation and appropriata respcase force, (10) search on a randem bas *s senicles and packages entering or leaving the controllac access area, and (11) establish. and maintain centingency plans for dealing with threats of tnefts or thefts of sucn matarial.
(e) IN TRANSIT REQUIREMENT 3 FOR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL GF MCOERATE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE -
(1) Each licensee who transpor:s, excorts or who delivers to a carrier for transport s;ecial nuclear saterial of mocerate strategic significance shall:
(i) provide advance notift:ation to the receiver of any planned shipments specifying the mode of transcort, estimated time of arrival, lccation of the nuclear material transfer, name of carrier and flignt numcer, if applicaole, (ii) receive ::nfirmation fr:m the receiver prior :: :ne ccm-mencement Of the planned sni: ment tnat tae. receiver will be reacy to 14 Encicsure 5 j
'l
accept the shipment at the planned time and location and ackncwlecges tne scecified mcde of transport, (iii) transport the material in a lecked er sealed container, and (iv) cneck the integrity of the containers, 1ccks, and seals prior to shipment.
(2) Each licensee wno receives special nuclear material of acderate strategic significance shall:
(i) cneck the integrity of the containers, locks, and seals upon receipt of tne snipment, and (ii) notify the shipoer of receict of tne material as recuired in Section 70.54 of Part 70 of this chapter.
(3) Each licensee who arranges for the physical protection of special nuclear material of mcderate s,trategic significanca while in transit or who takes delive y of such material free on beard (f.o.b.)
the point at which it is de:ivered to a carrier for transport snall:
(i) arrange for a telephone or radio communications capability between tne carrier of the caterial and the shipper or receiver, (ii) minimi:e the time that the material is in transit by reducing the numcer and duration of nuclear material transfers and by reuting the material in the most safe anc direct manner, (iii) conduct preempicyment screening, of all licensee emoicyees involved in tre transportation of tne material to cetermine the trust-worthiness Of the individual entrustad wita transportation duties, (iv) establish anc maintain contingency :lans for dealing ita threats of nefts or thefts cf suca material,
- 5 Enc!csere 5 e
(v) make arrangements to be notified immediately of the arrival of the snipment at it: destination,' or of any such shipment that is lost or unaccounted for after the estimated time of arrival at its destination, and (vi) c:ncuct immediately a trace investigation of any snigment that is lost or unaccountec for after the estimated arrival time and recort to the Nuclear Regulatory Comission as specified in j 73.71 and to tne shipper or receiver as appropriate.
The licensee wne mace the pnysical protection arrangements shall also immeciately notify the Director of the apprcpriate Nuclear Regulatory C0mmissicn Inspec-tion anc Enforcement Regi nal Offica listec in Appendix A Of tne action being taken to trace the shipment.
(?) Each licensee who exurts scecial nuclear material of moderate strategic significance shall c mply with the requirements specified in paragrapns 73.47(c) and (e)(1) and (3) up to the first point where the shipment is offloadec cutsice the (Jnited States, (5) Eaca licensee wno imports special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance shall, (i) comply with the requirements specified in paragrapns 73.47(c) and (e)(2) and (3) from the first point where the shipment is picked up inside tne United States, and (ii) notify the exporter who celivered the material to a carrier for transport of the arrival of sucn material.
(f) FIXED 5ITE REQUIREMENTS FCR 57ECIAL NUCLEAR.97ERIAL CF LCW STRATEGI !!3N!?!CANCE - Each licensee ano possesses, er uses special 15 Enc!:sure 5 e
O c
nuclear material of Ic
<trategic significance at fixed sitas except those wno are licensed to coerste a nuclear ;cwer reactor pursuant to Part 50, shall:
(1) store or use sucn material only within a controlled access
- area, (2) continucusly monitor with an intrusion ali.ra or other devices or precedures the controlled access area to detect unauthori:ed penetrations or activities, (3) assure tnat a guard, atenman, or offsite res,ense force will rescond to all unauthorized penetrations or activities, and (4) establisa and maintain contingency clans for dealing witn threats of thefts or thefts of such material.
(g)
IN TRANSIT REQUIREMENT 5.:0R SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL OF LCW STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE -
(1) Eacn licensee *nc transports er *no celivers to a carrier for transport special nuclear material of Icw strategic significance shall:
(i) provide ad.vance notification to the receiver of any planned shipments specifying the mcde of transpcrt, estimated time of arrival, location of the nuclear material transfer, name of carrier and flignt numcer, if applicable, (ii) receive confirmation frem the receiver prior to c:mmencement of the planned shi; ment taat tne receiver *fil be ready to accact tne shipment at the siannec time and location and ackncwledges t.,e s:ecified node of transport, 17 Encl 0sure 5 r
(iii) transport the material in locked or sealed containers, and (iv) eneck the integrity of the containers, lecks, and seals prior to shipment.
(2) Each licensee wne receives quantities anc types of soecial luclear material of low strategic significance snall:
(i) check the integrity of tne containers, locks, and seals upon receipt of the shipment and (ii) notify the shipeer of receipt of tne material as required in section 70.54 of Part 70 of this enapter.
(3) Eacn licensee wno arranges for tne chysical protection of special nuclear materia' af low strategic significance wnfle in transit or who takes delivery of such material free on board (f.o.o.)
the point at which it is delivered to a carrier for transport shall:
(i) establisn and maintain contingency plans for dealing witn threats of thefts or thef ts of such material, (ii) make arrangements to be notified immediately of the arrival of the shipment at its cestination, or of any such shipment that is lost or unaccounted for after the estimated time of arrival at its cestination, and (iii) conduct immediately a trace investigation of any shipment tnat is lost or unaccounted for after the estimated arrival time and l
l report to the Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission as specified in i 73.71 anc to the shicper or receiver as apprcpriate.
The licensee wne mace the
- nysical ;rctaction arrangements shall
- !?o immeciately notify tne Of recter of tee acoccaria:e Nuclear Regulatory Ccamission Inspection l
13 Encl:sure 5
and Enforcement Regional Office listed in Appencix A of the action being taken to trace the shipment.
(4) Each licensee wna exports scecial nuclear material of Icw strategic significance shall comply with the appropriata requirements specified in paragrapns 73.47(c) and (g)(1) anc (3) up to the first coint i
where the shipment is offloaded outside the United States.
(5) Each licensee who imports special nuclear material of icw strategic significance sna11:
(i) comply witn the requirements scecified in paragraph 73.17(c) and (g)(2) anc (3) frem the first point where the shipment is picked up inside the United States, and (ii) notify the person who delivered the material to a carrier f ar transport of the arrival'of such material.
7.
Section 73.71(a) of 10 CFR Part 73 is changea as folicws:
$ 73.71 Recorts of unaccounted for snigments, suspected theft, unlawful diversion, or industrial sacotage.
(a) Each licensee who conducts a trace investigation of a lost or unaccountad for shi: ment pursuant to s 73.36(f), i 73.47(e)(3)(vi),
or i 73.47(c)(3)(iii) shall immediately report to the appropriate NRC Regional Office listed in Appendix A of this part tne cetails and results of his trace investigation and shall file within a period of fifteen (15) days a written report to the acprcorsite NRC Regional Office setting for:n tre details and results of the trace investigati:n.
A cecy of such written rescr: srail :e sent t: the 3f rector of
- 3 e
Inspection and Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccemission, Wasningt:n, D.C.
20555.
M M
M M
M 3.
Section 73 72 of 10 CFR Par: 73 is amended as follcws:
,2
$ 73.72 Requirement for advance notice of shipment of special nuclear material.
Eacn licensee who plans to im ort, exacrt, transport, deliver to a carrier for transport in a single shipment, or take delivery at the point wnere it is delivered to a carrier, fermula cuantities of stratacic scecial nuclear material (ceantities-ef s:ecis -neciest materisi-ss-seecified-in-i S-ifb3ff33 shall notify the Direc:ce of the appreoriate Nuclear Regulatory Ccomission Inscection and Enforcement Regional Office listad in Acpendix A by U.5. Mail, post-marked at least seven days in advance of the shipping cate.
The folicwing information shall =e furnished in the advance notice:
shipper, receiver, carrier (s), estimated data and time of departure J
l and. arrival, transfer point (s), and mode (s) of shipment.
The Director of the acpropriate Nuclear Regula:Ory Commission Inscection and Enforce-ment Regional Office shall also be notified by telephone seven days in acvance of the shipping ca:e that an advance shipping cctice has been 1
sent by mail, and of any enanges to tne shipment itim.erary prior to One shipment date.
Road shipmen:s or transfers witn one way transit times of One hcur er less in curation between instaliations of a licensee are exemot face the requirements of tais section.
20 Encicsure 5 1
9
9.
A new Section 150.14 of 10 CFR Part 150 is added to read as follows:
3 150.14 Commission Regulatory Authority for Physical Protection Persens in Agreement States ecssessing. usinc cr transcorting scecial nuclear material of icw stratacic sienificance, that is, in cuantities creater than 15 grams of clutenium or uranium-233 or uranium-235 (enriched to 20% or more in tne U-235 isotooe) er any ccmcination creater than 15 grams when cemeuted bv tne ecuation crams = grams slutenium - crams uranium-233 - c*ams uranium-235 fenriened to 20%
or greater in the U-235 isotece), shall meet the enysical :retection recuirements of i 73.47 of 10 CFR Part 73.
Dated at Wasnington, D.C. this d.1y of l
1978.
For the Nuclear Regulat:ry C:cmission.
Samuel J. Chii<
5ecretary of the C:mmission 21 Saciosare 5 t
E.'ICLOSURE 6 VAL'JE/ IMPACT ASSESSMENT CONTAINING A Re.:CR.
m..e.?..:r,e,n-
,4 iw m4ALYSIS e
i
_Js C. r..e r : n e, un.
VALUE/ IMPACT ASSE55 MENT CONTAINING A RE?CRT JU$TIFI:ATION aNALYSI5 FHYSICAL ;9CTECTION CF ?LANT5 AND wATERIALS DOPT!CNS AND CCNTINUED REGULATCRY AUTMCRITY s ;u-.:_:vr..y i.c..,s :a.r C.:R.:.:-....y.;,2 n
..oa u
Procesed Amendments to 170.22(g), (n) and (f);
373.(b)(1) and (2); 173.2(2) and (ta);
373.a(a)(b),(c), (d), (e) and (f)-
573.71(a); 373.72 anc il50.a I.
The ;reccsec Action A.
Descriptica Prepcsad amencments to 10 CFR Par: 73 wculc require that varicus Part 50, Par: 70 anc stata/ licensees including mest ncn ;cwer reac: Ors, various fuel cycle f acilities and many research and teaching institutions ;cssessing, using, or transecr ing non self protecting SNM of:
less than 5000 gm fccmula quantities of Pu, U-233 anc U-235 enriched to 2C% or more; or more than i.<g of U-235 as uranium enriched to IC% tu less than 2C%; Or cre than 10 Xg of U-235 as icw-enriched uranium, implement nev provisions f:r pnysical security.
These ;rovisions are equivalan :: these standards sat cut in the International At:mic Energy Agency (IAEA) circular INFIRC/225.
5.
Neec for the Preccsad Action The ;uclication of recommenced ;nysical security requirements for materials of accerata and icw strategic imccr:anca by the IAEA, INFCIRC/225, anc the participation by the Uni ad Sta as in :neir devele; ment, was ac::mpanied by anc c:ntinues to be accom:aniec by assessmenta of dcmestic safeguards neecs related to thnse
. materials.
It is the staff jucgmen tha the pre;csac require-ments are achnically justified as a necessary safeguards u: grad-ing acticn ::mmensurate with internati:nally rec:gni:ed require-ments, caveicced anc ;r:mulga:ac with full Unitec Statas
- articipation.
Eccles;re 5 e
C.
Value/Im:act of the Procesed Action 1.
NRC C erations The precosed recuirements wculd deter theft of materials of ccerate and i w strategic significance and would assure timely detection of thef.s cc a tem:ted thefts.
- . r eaca Of the pec-
- csed requiremen s, One Office Of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, the Cffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulatien, and ne Office of Stancarcs Oeve!cpment woule prepare ac
- ectance criteria in sufficient detail to enable an evaluator to determine whetner a given device or precedure would satisfy the requirements.
This work would require F.c additional sicffing for these Offices.
The effor requirec to concuct review: cf tne security plans succitted by abcut 54 iicensees wn: ;cssess 5NM of accara a strategic significance is es-imated c :e 14 man :cc ns.
N accitional staffing in :ne Divisi n of Safeguarcs wcuid :e necessary ::
- mplete taese reviews or for routine maintenance.
The Office Of Inspection and Enforcemen: culd. ake ini-ial acecuacy determina-tiens at each of tne affectec facilities anc :nereafter wculd inspect facilities ;cssessing materiai Of macera a strategic significance at accr:criate intervals.
The Office of Inspection and Enforcement woul: require acditicnai personnel to carry cu-tnis pregram.
2.
Other Government Acencies i
0 ner government agencies shall minimally, if at all, be involvec in the develc; ment of the needed contingency plan information-frca a ifcensee.
The FBI, 00E and OCC may ce involvec in other c:ntingency plans develcped by the NRC.
Whciesale disposal cf ?u-Ee scurces, which may be stimulated by the creposed amencments f:r materials of Icw strategic significance, c:uid work legistical preolems ucen tne OCE's Mound La:cra: cries - the res;cnsible return cepc: for the leased 2ssPu.
3.
Industry Benefits to industry would te imcreved orc;ection of valuable catarials and facilities.
Muca cf the industry is already in subs antiai ::cf:rm-l ance with :ne Orcccred requirements, having res:enced Oc intarim guitance en such ma ers in tne case of mecita ;cwer ncn :cwer rea:::rs, l
anc eiscenere to ne general prucent ce: Icy 9en cf acca::et incustrial security practices.
?recuiga: fen of :ne :rc:csec re;uirements wcui:
. inc; sure 5 J
l l
e T l
I c:cify widely existent practice.
Ccepetition ancngst the commercially criented licensees wculd e annanced by subjecting everyone to uniform security costs.
The imcact u:en the licensees will be ces s asscciated witn ::mcitance wita :ne prec0 sed regulations.
- s:s and :enefits, of par:fcular safeguards items are ce:ailac in Annex 1 to this inclosure 5.
The affectac industry anc :ne ceveic; ment of incustry wide c st incacts are cascribed in further detail in Annex 2 to this inciosure 5.
Protection requirements for material of moderate strategic signifi-cance would a: ply at accut 5a facilities.
The maximum capital cost per affected facility would te 511,C00, and wculc acoly only if the facility aad t: install a c:melete new security system inclucing an intrusien a: arm system, 1:cks, lign s, badge systems and an around-ne-cicck security force.
Annual c:s:s subsequent :s the first year wculc te abcut 5a5,000, almes; entirely f:r guard f:rce salaries anc evernead ex:enses.
Since all affected facilities alreacy nave watca-man ::verage and are attended by respcasible ccerating staff curing worxing hours, it is estimated na: ncne will actually recuire addi-ticnai security forces.
Cep10yment of u:gradec ;nysical security systems are ex:ected Oc be sucn that the 54 impac ec facilities will incur fixed site incremental capital costs Of accc: 5330,000 and incremental annual cperating costs of about 533,CCO.
Incremental costs for trans;cr:ation are' estimated to : tal accut 5125,000 caci'tal and 51a,000 annual ccerating.
Cetails are given in Tables I:I -hrough V! cf Annex 2 to this inclosure 5.
Prc:ecticn recuirements for material of icw strategic significance would a: ply at almost 500 licensees--the overehelming majority of wnich are universities each possessing from 15 to 50 grams cf piu-tenium as 1 :: 5 curie Pu-5e neutron scurces.
The maximum capital cost per securec location is es-imatec to be aceut 33,500, wnich includes 5550 for an alarm system.
Annual costs are es-imated as about 5500.
It is estimated :na: ne affected industry will incur incremen ai fixed site capital c:s:s of about 5900,C00 anc incremental annual c:sts of 5250,000 and incremental ca: ital anc annual costs fer trans:cr:atica of accut $120,000 anc 512,000, rescectively.
Cetails are given in Tacles VII tarcugh X cf Annex 2 to nis inclosure 5.
Many f :ne affected universi:fes received their small inven:Orfes of iut:nitm as gifts of 1 t: 5 curfe Fu-Be neutron scurces fr m indus-rfai users wnen the ia:ter swf ched :: Ac0 -5e anc 2 3PsC4-5e neutren sources.
These ?u-5e scurces can :e reciaced witn AmCa-Be' r 2:37204-Be
~
s:urces at ; rices c:cpara:1e c : cse estimated for ef fecti. g One
. 5 cics re 5 r
prcpesed physical sacurity requirements fer materiaic of 10w stratagic significanca, i.e., 51,400 to 31,3C0 fer i to 5 Ci 2389uC -Be or 2
31,600 to 32,900 for 1 to 5 Ci Am0 -Se scarces.
Seme' users may elect 2
that alternative.
Others may simply dispose of their sources and amend or terminate their licenses.
4 Puclic No impact on tne puclic can be foreseen.
The pucifc will cenefit in that a more rigorous approach to physical security has taken place leading to a higher level of assurance that extensive thefts or attempted tr. efts of nuclear materials of stra agic significance are unlikely and are likely to be detacted in a timely manner.
- Further, the preposed amencments support international safeguards anc rcn*
proliferation ecjectives.
II.
Tecnnical Accreach A.
Tecnnical Al ernatives 1.
Other technical means of acccmplisning the required pnysical security upgrading.
2.
Replacement cf strategically si nifi cant materials, i.e., ou 2383u0.
in Pu-Se sources with Am02 or 2
3.
" Exaction of small quantities of Pu cr U-235 in sealed scurces frem requirement for alarmed use and storage areas.
3.
Value/Imcact of Tecnnical Alternatives 1.
A great many technical alternatives are possible for upgrad-ing physical security to achieve protaction equivalent c the IAEA standards in INFCIRC/225 and to those of.the preccsad requiremen s.
Mcwever, these that are cecidedly different than those cf INFCIRC/225, aitacugn tney would acccmplish the necessary uegrading for d mestic safeguards, would not further international safeguards to the s, tant that being in literal conformanca with INFCIRC/225 -culd through tangible demonstration of U.S. willingness to enccese the IAEA standards.
All such technical alterna-tves are tnerecy rejected for further censideraticn.
2.
A tecnnical alternative whien may accly to scme exten as an unavoicacle ec:ncaic consequence of ne ;reccsec requia-f:cs is the reciacemen of tr.e entire D M inventories Of s ne ACC 4
4-Encicsk*e i t
e
. licensees possessing material of 1 w strategic significance, c:nsisting almcs: exclusively of i to 5 curie Fu-Ee neutron scurces, with sources c:ntaining ne materials of strategic significance.
Pu-Se neutron sources have alreacy :een largely replaced in tne c:mmercial sector ty AmC -Be er 2
- ss?uC -Se scurces.
Re:lacement with sucn sources cult, in 2
scme cases, be less ex:ensive than accuisiticn Of -Me pnysical security requisite :: c:ntinued possessien of Pu-Ee neutren sources.
C:mmercially sutplied "Stancard :AEA Capsule" neutron sources of 1 to 5 curies cost frcm 51,cCO to 51,900 for 23sPu-Se and from 51,600 to 32,900 for Am0 -Se This alternative may be elected by many affected li!anse. es.
Cthers.nay simply elect disposal of the sources and license terminations.
Eitner alternative will inv01/e crecessing of license 2.mendments by M C anc/or varicus state licensing authorities and repossessica of the leased 23S?u by the CE at its Mcund La:ces:Orfes.
3.
The :AEA recogniced in :NFCIRC/225 :ne pcssibili y tha-
"researen type facili.ies cutsice tne nuclear fuel cycle and c:rres;cnding shipments may not be acle to mee. the recem-mendations.
In suca cases tne states' physical Orotection system may make.stecific exceptions on a case-ty-case basis."
The over@elming majority of licensees affected :y tne preposed regulations are "research type facili-fes cutside the nuclear fuel cycle" and are, in fact, mostly universt-ties.
The larger university facilities possess research reactors and related facilities and the smaller enes ;cssess one or more Pu-se neutron scurces.
The ec:ncmic im acts of the procosed regulations could be substantially recuced by exempting seme or all research type facilities.
- Mcwever, ncn pcwer reactor facilities are, for the mcst part, already pretacted to levels c:mmensurate with tne preposec requia-tions and suca protection is largely regardec as Only prudent and necessary for incustrial security and for protection fece sacotage and thef t of valuable equi; ment, etc., other-taan SNM.
l Small inventeries of SNM consisting only of one er a few sealed Pu-Se scurces and, perhaps, an even smaller quantity of Fu or U-235 in sealed fissica fcils er neutr:n cetect:rs i
I cnaracteri:e almes 300 licensees.
Those are ty:ically universities.nich may be ill ecui;ced to bear ne ex:ense Of accuiring alarmed int usien cetecti:n systems :ut wcc generally alreacy c:ntrei access to thcsc 3a arials ita 1:c<ec 3:crer:cas anc cc iccXed neute:n ir acia rs.
An Enc!:su e C i
ti
l l
1 l
excecti:n : the recuirement f:r alarmed s:Orage and/:r use areas for those :atarials oculd re'ieve incivicual licensees of at leas: 5700 new ca ital experciture and 5375 per year ccerating c:sts eacn and the affected education incustry :y a: cut $210,CCC capital c:sts anc a cut 5113,000 annual costs.
Thefts or otner icsses of suca :atarials are alreacy required :s :e'recertec anc any attamc: : ga:ner greatar than formula cuantities by a series Of thefts sncuid :e detectac cef:re it c:ulc ce successful.
Sucn an except;cn is judgec :: act drastically cecoremise either the furtner-ance of cur international safeguards objectives or effective dcmestic safeguarcs.
III. E"0Cedur11 1 cr0aen A.
- recedural A1
- arnatives Ucgraced pnysicai securf:y for use and trrns:cetati:n of
- atarials of ::cerate er icw stra:agic significance c:uic be effectad several ays.
Sete of nese are:
1.
Issue guides wi:n detailed criteria and implement en a case-by-case basis. 'This has been the practice with many medium ;cwer nca power reac: Ors except that tne guides -ere not formally precuigated.
2.
Issue guices witn detailed criteria and revise regulaticas to incer; crate physical security performanca criteria.
3.
Issue guices with detailec criteria anc revise regulations
- include physical security criteria equivalen
- o those of INFCIRC/225.
4 Revise regulaticns to include all necessary informa:1cn anc catailed criteria to meet physical security requirements.
3.
Value/!acact of 3recedural Alternatives All of the precedural alternatives c uid effect the recuired co-grading.
Mcwever. Only alternative (3) provides a high visibil'ty encersament of I.2EA and wouic te the cs: effective in furthering international safsguarcs.
Alterna:f ve (1) suffers frca having less nan :ne ac:earance of law ar.c.cuic require extansive negotiations wita affected if:ersees.
Alternative (2) wcuic recuire c:nc:citar.t deveiec ent of Oc:a :erf:raance criteria an::
requit:Ory gui:es arc.ct'c celay ::n :::estic upgrading anc
- Enci
- sure 5 t-e.
o furttering ur intarnational ::jectives.
Alternative (4) would put an unseemly ascun: of detail into the regulations.
C.
Cecisien on Precedural Accreach Alternative (3) is jucged t :e the mest desiracle of the alterna-tive precedural 1:proacnes anc shcule be pursuad.
IV.
Recer: Justifica:icn Analysis The preposed amendments are in the interest of national security to assure protection of public health and safety and are for the curpose of pectaction against tnef: of s:ecial nuclear material of mcderate and icw strategi: significance.
A.
Security plans 1.
10 CFR Part 70, i70.22(g) will require each a:clication for a license which would authcri:a the trans:crt, ex:cr: or elivery to a carrier fer trans:ce: cf mcdera a strategic significant IhM 10 Xg cr acre of material of icw stra:agic significanca (low enri:ned uranium) to previce a plan for pnysical prc: action of in transit material including as accropriata, the selection, qualification and training of armed escorts, or the specification and design of specially designed truck er trailer.
2.
10 CFR Part 70 $70.22(j) will require eacn appifca:icn for a ifcenses to passess or use at any site or contiguous sites sucject to control by if:ensee cuantities and types of acderate stratagic significant SNM cr 10 Xg er scre of icw stratagic significance (lcw enriched uranium) other than a license for possession er use of sucn material in ne operation of a nuclear pcwer reacter, to incluce a physical security plan which will demonstrate hcw the a:piicant plans to meet general perf:rmanca cojectives to minimi:e the possibilities for unautacri:ec removal of ShM consistant with pctantial consequencas of such action; and facilitate the location and recovery of missing SNM.
3.
10 CFR Part 73, 573.47Cs) will require a 11:ensas wne pcssesses, usas, er trans:cris acderata stra agi: signif -
1:ance SNM or 10 Xg er more of material of low stratagic significanca (Icw enricted uranium) te submi 50 days
(:wo men:ns) after ;'.cifcatien in effe::ive f:rm a security pian :r an amendec_ security plan, inclucing sc. eculas f:r fx:lementation.
Tne sicurity clan er tne amancac sa:urity plan is ta cescrf:e Pew :na if:ansas wiii ::m:iy wita:
1 1 En :sats 5 r}
I I
F.
[
=
a.
Fixec Site Requirements of:
(1) using SNM cnly within a ::ntreiled ac:ess area wnica is illuminated suf#icient to allow cetection and surveillance of unautacr':ed penetrati n or activi ti es,
(2) st: ring SNM witnin a c:ntrciled a :ess area in a vault, vault-type reen, Or G5A accreved securf:y
- cabinet, (3) continucusly menitor with an intrusien alarm er other devices or precedures :ne c:nte lled at:ess area to detect unautheri:ec penetrati:n er activi ti es,
(a) cercucting preem:1cyment screenic; to determine the trustworthiness of em:icyees naving a::ess ::
the material, (5) deveiccing and maintaining a 'acging system ::
c identify and limit access to :ne c:ntrolled access area to authori:ed indivicuals, (5) limiting ac:ess to the c:ntrolled area to auther-i:ed individuals who require sucn a :ess to perform their cuties, (7) assuring that all visitors to tne centro 11ed ac:ess area are under tne c:nstant escer: of an incividual who has :een authori:ed access to tne
- area, (3) _esta:11sning an ensite security crgani:ation of a:
leas :nr (1) guard or watenman per shift ::
sssess and respend te any security incidents in the centrolled access area, (9) providing a communication ca:acility between the ensi e security organi:ation and an offsi e respcnse f:rce, (10) searching en a rancem : asis, senicles anc :a:kages entering : e cente lied ac:ess area f:r items wnt:n ::alc :e usec for tieft ;ur:cses, and Erc :sure 5 e
(11) estabitshing and maintaining centingency :lans fcr cealing witn tnreats of trefts or neft rela ac ::
- ne use cr s:crage of sucn material.
a.
Nctifications and Trace Investigations (1) A licensee anc transports, expcets er deifvers c a carrier for trans ce mcderate strategic signif-icance SNM shall:
(a) provide advance notification to the receiver of any planned shipments specifying the acce of transcort, estimated time cf arrival, location of :ne nuclear materiai transfer, name of carrier and, if a: plica:le, fli;nt nuccer, and (c) receive confirma:ica frem t.'e receiver ;rier
- the commer.cacent of the planned shipment that.the receiver will be reacy ;0 acce: the snipment at the pianned time and locati:n and acknculedges One specified :cde f transport.
(2)
Receiving licensee Of mcderate stratagic signif-icance SNM shall actify the shipper of receipt of One material.
(3) A licensee ho arranges for the physical cretec-tion of accerate stra egic significance ShM while in transit or who akes delivery of material f.o.b. point of delivery := a carriar for trans-port shall conduct immediately a trace inves-iga-tien of any shipment lost or unacccunted f:r af a-the estimated arrival time and recort to -ha Nuclear Regula:Ory 00mmission (NRC) anc : :ne snipper cr receiver as appropriate.
(4) A licensee wr:e execr:s mcderate strategic signif-icance ShM snali:
(a) ccmcly with 2.a. anc c. abeve, u: :
.he first point wnere tne snisment is taken off the vehicle Ou site ne Unitec 5 a:es, (b) naxe arrangemen s sit. tne c:rsignee :: be noti f f ec '.=:edi a ely :f :..e arrh a! :f. e E.c::sare 5 tl
shipment at its destination, Or Of any such shipment tnat 'is los: or unac::unted for after the estimated time of arrival at its destination, and (c) c:ncuct immediately a trace inves f ga f on of any sni; ent that is lost er unac: ented for after ne estina:ec arrival time anc reper o ne NRC.
(5)
Each licensee who imports moderate strategic significance SNM shall:
(a) c ecly wita 2.b. anc :. above, fec the first point wnere the shipment is pickac c: fr a the veni:la insice the Unitec States, anc (b) notify One ax:orter wnc delivered the materiai to a carrier for transcer cf the arrival of ne material.
In the even; a shi: ment fails to arrive at its destination at the estimated time, the consignee, shall recer: tc'the NRC and the shipeer of the licensee who made the physical protection arrangements anc f amediately notify the Direc cr of the a:crepriate NRC Inspection anc Enforcement Regional Office of the ac:fon being taken to trace tne shipment.
b.
Trsca Investication Reccr s 10 CFR 73.71, 373.71(a) will require a written re;crt fifteen (15) cays after the trace investiga:ica :: t.,e appropriate NRC Regional Offf:e setting forth the details and results of the investigation.
A c oy of the report is to :s sent to the Direc :c, Offi:e of Inspection and Enf:rcement.
V.
Statuterv Considerations A.
NRC :uthority 5ecti:n 2Cl(b)(1) cf the Energy Recrganitatien Ac Of 1974, a11 cts to the NRC the A::mi: Energy Act authorf y f:r tne
- '
- r: vision _and main:enance af safeguarcs against :nreats, tref s, anc sa:c: age of... iicensac f a:fii-f es, and ca: arf ais."
The A::mic Energy Act Of 1954 as 1:enced pr: vices 1:;ie a'.:ncrf y f:r
.0 -
In:i:3.~e i e
l
tne Ccamissien Oc require licensees te whatever measures fer pnysical security fer materials cf mcderate anc Icw strategic significance ceemed necessary to cretect the ;ublic health and safety and tne common cefense and security.
3.
Need fer NE?a Assassment The preccsad amencments have an insignificant environmental impact and pursuant to 10 CFR 51(2)(3) recuire neitner an environmental impact statement nor a negative ceclara:icn.
VI.
Rela:fenshic to Other Existin; cc Preccsed Reculatiens er ?clicies There are no accarent potential conflicts er everlaps with cther agencies.
Cecrdinatien wita c:her Federal agencies 4111 de Ocne by the NRC.
VII. Summary and Cerclusiens The procesec regulaticas will ec:h furtner cur interna:f cnal safe-guarcs cojectives and effect necessary uegracing of cc=estic safe-guarcs without working undue hardsaf;s en either the licensees or tne NRC staff.
Mcwever, scme.small nonfuel-cycle research facilities may elect to discontinue er carkedly amend taeir operations ratner tnan incur :he ecsts for upgrading.
. Enc!csure 5 t
AttflE( 1 r.v. i ::?Le-t.. m 6' t t e. t. e n..e ae
....e.e.0 I.....e
,. e.,...-..
PMUrv 0
/J.*/ ur IV
~4 PsMi /4 To estimate -he ::st :: ne it:ensee using :r s:: ring special nuclear material of moderate or icw strategic significance, several c:nservative assumotions were made.
It was assumed that:
1.
the licensee wcuid be using :he ma:erial in a c:en 50 3: W x 1C0 ft L - 20 ft H.
This reem wculd have 3 d:crs entering i:.
Two of these deces wculd :e # ire / ext: y;e ::crs wnile the third decr would be used for ncr:ai ;ersenne; entrance.
2.
One licensee aculd wan to have a minimum of a 30 fco:-candie light level a: the work area.
This was based en.egulatory Guide 5.11. "'lisual Surveillance of Individuals in Material Ac:ess Areas." Mcwever, :ne pr::csed amen: men s require rc minimum lign:-level in this area and therefore wculd cc nave to be me.
3.
One licensee wculd net already have ensite a ni;nt wa::hman ce guard ani:n :: aid res;cac : security incicents.
Annex i :f En: :sure 5
-r
4.
it would take the If:ensee te: ween 2 week: anc One enth (depending en the level of securi / requirec) :: ;re;are the security plan and one week :: prepare One c:ntingency plan, e.n:c.* eaa s
.w3..<_.
.ui. yr,.s.a.wi.y s.
=.... s.,n.4.aisy o..
.....a..
aw.
reduced.
Tables 1, 3, 5, and 7 shew the :apital ::s-f:r implementing the pr:Scsed amendment.
Tables 2, 4, 5, and 3 give the estima ed recurring annual ::s:s Once the security systaa has been implemented.
Tables 3, IC;,
11, and 12 give the teneft:s f e each of :he speciff: recuirements cf the propcsea amendment.
2
- nnea : :f En:::sure 5-w T
r o
Table i Cacital Cests fer Security at Facilities Having Special Nuclear Ma:erial of 'dederata Stratagic Significanca Ccs: :c.:acili:y Requirement per ! 73.47 1.
Coce Lecks S
940 2.
mpreved Lignting S 3237 a.
30 ft. Candle Level 3.
GSA Security Cabinet S
410 4
Interice Intrusicn Alarm a.
Monitcred Cnsite 5 1195 5.
Freempicyment Screening a.
NAC S
90 5.
3adging System S
1C0 7.
Card Key System 5
575 8.
Security ?lan.:re:aratien 5 3350 9.
Centingency Plan Preparatien S
770 3
E r.n e.( l ;[ 5.*0l!!ure 3 II
L::lanation of Table 1 I:em 1.
L:cks - :: was assurec -ha: :he ::n r:iled ac:ess area will icve 3 d:crs at its perimeter.
Twc deces wcuid be emergency type decrs requiring emergency breaker strikes costing a: proxima:ely 5250 each.
The third d:cr wculd te the main entrance and would be equi;;ec wi-h a ::::inatica Or ele ric ty;e leck. The c:s: f:r a 3-:csitten ::: ina fen ty;e icek is 3170.
Installa-i:n fre f:r the 31:cks wculd be aper:ximately 2 hcurs c:s-ing steu: 5270.00.
Total : s:
therefore will be a: proxima:ely 2 x 5250
- 5170 - SE70 = 5940.
2.
Improved Lighting - Althougn tners are no cint:Em lighting level requirements in i 73.a7, for cos-ing ;ur;cse we assurec an illuminati:n level cf 20 feo:-candles througncut the area cased on Requistory Guide 5.14, "Yisual Surveillance of Indivicuals In Ma arial Ac: ass Areas." The si:e of :he centre 11ed ac:ess area was assumed :: be 50' x 100' x 20'.
The walls and ceiling were assumed Oc be painted in a lign: color with the flece a : ark celcr. ? esc: estica:ad a minimum of 30 40-wa:: flucrescen-la:cs wculc be needed :: cc ain a 30 f:c:-candle level.
Annex 1 :f E.:T: sera i e
Fiucrescen: lames c:s: a:pr:ximately $1.50 eacn.
A 2' x 4' fixture wnica contains a lamps was assumed :: be used.
Thesa fixtures cost a;;roxima:aly 575 each.
Installatt0n 00s:3, including ne wiring for 22 fix ures needed := cbtain a 30 f:c -candle lign: level, wculd be abcu: 51252.
(NOTE:
.lucrescent lames were chosen since 1: was assured ecs: facilities were alreacy equi:;ed with them. Mcwever, High Pressure Scdium Va;ce lamps migh: : rove cre cos: effective in :ne long run.)
-.a] e.:s.. (< cjs<.:4.:. U, j. (-.j*r- :3as.j,.c4 :.;
t s
,.e.- - - /. a. c 6w.
c.
w w
3.
G5A Securi y Cabinet - I: was ass. rec -ha seme f acili-ies wcule have only small quantities Of :cderata er icw stra agic ta a-rial wnich c:uld :he.f be s:: rec in 3SA securi y ca:ine s.
The chea:es class ar.d the ene used by NRO for Orc: acting classified dec; ents is a GSA class 95 security :abinet.
The ;ri:e of a 2-drawer legal si:e versi:n is about 5410 and a 4-drawer legal si:e version is accu: 5550.
(Nc:e: GSA a:prevec se urity ca inets are enea:er :han ncn-a:: coved cabinets because :f :ne large num:er purchased by ne ;;vernment thus reducing :neir unit c:st.)
4 Intarier In rusi:n Alarm - I was assurec tha: 3 balancac magne-ic swi-nas and 1 vcluce r1c uitras:nic detactor wit.14 slave uni:a :ule te neeced :: :revice pr::ac:icn : :ne 50' x 1:0' x 20' ::n rc;lec a::sss area.
The :nsite sacuri y :rgani:1-
- 10: was ass:. 4c !*
ave a Juar: s:4;i0n weers :ne alarn sys*am 3
AnreX l *? I.*:1:s;re 5 l
f
would be enitored.
I: was also assumed a simale D.C. iine supervisory system wcuid be needed to meni cr the area. Costs of purenasing, and installing the equipment for One year are as folicws:
1.
Ultrasenic cactector 5140 2.
A slave units
$120 3.
3 Eaiancec Magne-ic Sui cnes 5125 J.
0.C. line sucervisory 5450 5.
Ins tall a-ica 5260
.e,1 : =
i,s., i 4
eree cicymen,e.cr:ening - Two :ypes of screen <ing services were u
inves;igated. The first is a National Agency Check (NAC) which costs s-. /;ersen..-ssuming e. peepie wil. require sucn. a eneck, i:
1 this wculd ccst the licensee 5g0.
The seccnd ty;e of check wcule
~
be a cre it-empicyrent check.
The c:mmercial credi: investiga.
tive service we checked with charges 575 per year plus 52.25/
\\
- ersen for a credit eneck, plus >-<.
- /persca fer an employcent check going back 2 years. Assuming 5 pecple require such a check, the licensee wcule ;ay 75 - (5)(2.25 - 7.35)
- 5135 a year.
Sf ace the NAC : heck was isss ex;ensive, it was chcsen.
)
- ,s-4...e,.c - ~. e n.. e$c...,.
...a.
.-._.- s. e.
-,....a..n,,.. a. s.. -,:-,. =.2
.i2 I
2-x.
..m i 1, 4. w2, e.e.. -.....
4 2.
.2.._,r..~..;
.4..-
.- e - 4. :. a. s.
.s 5
'nnex 1 Of 5nci:sure 5 1
e!
1 l
a n. d
..a e..= ',v.=.. r.....= r. *. = 1 '. 4. -....
. n'- s.d e s '. 3 n = n d p r....'...g. #. - ". "
d
. v badges c:s:s aper:ximately 570.00.
The cost of taking a pr.c: -
grach of eaca :ersen and placing it in the badge cests a:pecxi-ma:ely 55 each.
Therefore, -he firs year the licensee should expect :: pay accreximate.iy sia - (:)( :/ = 21u0.
7.
Card Key Sys e= - A simple magnetic card key systa=, in wnich the
.= "... c r d..- = ^.
'n.m".'i i d ".a 'i
'..= r..= s.=.. =.. *.. '..- k e y..a.- '. a 2 l a..
2.
r
- ne decr :: unicck the doce, is assumed as prcbably tne ecs:
efficien way of limi-ing access : au:ncrized emelcyees.
Ccs: cf such a system is:
1.
Card.Re~ader
$214 2.
Electric Strike S200
.0 irans Ormer 1
Installa icn C st (533/heur)
S200
(:.
.. stic Laminate Cards ria 9 51.25 each 5
7.50
.:/].:0 = <.-<.:
S.
Security Pian Freparation - It is assumed apprcxima:aly (1) ran-ecn-h wit 1 be required :: prepare the security plan.
Eased en er.e man-year c:s ing :.., e.L.0, One man cn-h wi.. :: s :, a,,.C 0 +.. =....,sca:v.
-a,
.4
- =
1.,<-
9
O.
Contingency Plan Preparation - :: is assumed accr0xima aiy 1 man-week will be recuired c prepare the ::n-ingency plan.
Sasad en a r.an-year c: sting 520,0C0, cr.e man-week will c:s :
540,000 + :.2 = s.. 0.
=
ie e
e.it.A. g A.
A. W
.4...(.*@.g W
4 8
e
Tacie 2 Annual Recurring Costs fcr Physical Security at. acili:ies Having Special Nuclear Material of Mcderate Strategic Significance Annual Ccst Requirement c.:acility 1.
Lecks 5
9a 2.
Lighting 5
173.50 3.
Security Cabinets 5
al 4
Intericr Intrusicn Alarms 5
250 5.
Badging Systaa 5
10 5.
Card Xey System 5
67.50 7.
FreechicymentScreening a.
NAC 5
20 3.
Security Organi:ation a.
Watchman 543,300 9.
Security Plan Revisicas 5
335
- 10. Contingency Plan Revisiens 5
77 i
. b..kN e e o
?
5 Exclana ien of Tacle 2 1.
Based en a draft - sy of a MITRE recort, MTR-5541, prepared fer the NRC entitled "An Evaluatien of Ces: Estima:es cf physical Securi:y Systems for Recycled Nuclear Fuei," an annuai ain:enance and servica ces: cf 10" of initial hardware ecs: was used te determine the annual recurring ccs:s for the felicwing 1:ams:
A.
Lecks 10% x 5940 = 592 B.
Lignting 10% x 51755 = 5178.50 C.
Security Cabice:s 10% x 5 10 = 311 0.
Card.<ey System 10% x 3675 = 367.50 2.
A cc=mercial central alarm service wcuid cs: a;;roxima:ely 5260 for annual maintenance and service.
u 3.
?ce the Badging System and the Freemcicyment Screening it was assumed tna: the f acility wculc have an average of 33% turn-cver este per year in perscr.nei cr 2 new individuais car year.
Therefcre, recurring ccsts are basec en this figure.
A.
Eadsfr.g Sys:em (2) x 55/incividual = 510 5.
Freercicymen-Screening 1.
haC 2 x Si5ipersen = 550 1:
Annex ' :f Encies.re i r
- 3. ' Tc crovide a 2a-hcur ccmmercial armec guard service at the facili y ecs:s acproximately 35.50/ hour wnien incluces :ne uniform anc service revolver. To previde a 24-hcur watchman, or unarmed guard, service at a facili:y ces:s apcroximately 35.CO/heur.
Therefcre, a year's guard service will ecst apercximately 24 x 255 x 55.50 = 5:3,150 er a year's watchman service will ccst apcroximately 24 x 365 x 5 = 542,5CO.
Since only a watchman is required, the icwer figure was chosen.
4 I: was assumec that IC". cf the initial precara-icn ecs: of the Securi y and Centingency ?!an wcuid be spen: each year in revisien precara-icn.
eecur;ty Plan nevisien 10, x 222:..,.0 = c....
n.
aa:
- a.. ucnt,ingency.-ian xevisicn 10,.. x 2/70 = -<,<
i 1
(
4 o
l 0
44
- r.
a Table 3 Ca i ai Ces s for I:alemen-ing 173.27 Security Requirements for Trans;cr:ati:n Of Special Nuclear Ma erial of Mcdera e Strategic Significance Requiremen:
C:s:
1.
Lecks for Centainers 52C00 2.
Telechene 3.
Security Plan Preparatien 31520 4
Contingency Plan Precaraticn 5 770 5.
Freempicyten: Screening 5 90
.c...
.e--C0
-xplanatten.cr ia:le.,-
1.
It was assumed that 20 lccks c: sting appr ximately 51CO sach wcuid be required.
The number of iccks required is a c:nservative estimate since most licensees affer:ed by the prcposed amendmen: have very few sni; cents annually.
20 x 5;CO = 32CCO 2.
A eispnene could be used to provide frecuent c:mmunicaticn with the licenses.
This re: resents no significant addi:fcnal c:st.
I 1
r.
- d..e a s.i a '..=.
...2
.=.' c u".^ a.q -w a.a. ' - w '. 't 's
'. - =.
-a.e, '.' d. - e. d.
r*.e*
... =.... <~.,
y..i.
.a
...z.
.2.
3
.-v,.
e,
.22.s.
. p.
...,....,...ya.,.
a..-x==<2
.... =....
3 4 ] x, = ? ! O -'..
W"-
- s! i,3=(c,V,f 4 2 4 '.
l 1
p gx 4.
Ag l
i 1
Tacle 3 (C n-inued) 4 It was assumed appr0ximately 1 Tan-week will be recuired to prepare the c:ncingency plan.
5ased cn One. Tan-year :: sting 540,CCO, One Tan-week will cos 520 0C0 + 52 = 5770.
5.
Sinca an.'IAC check is less expensive than a commercial credi -smpicyment check, it was chosen.
Again. as'in fixec si es, 5 men are asscred :
recuire such a check, each c: sting ST:-
- r. ~=.r e...+ r =...e
.$ '4 wo.e '. = : x ': - a:G,
s i
i e
d' j
1 I
t 1
i i
4 4
- 8 e
e I
i
, i I
L
I i
Tacle 1 Annual s,ecurring :.ecur,. y s,csts
- r Trans:cr:ation cf S;:ecial.'tuclear.",nC.,
a aria' 0 :. vccer..
e.....,4...
.e 4. a.n 4 2..
4...
Requirement Annual Ccs:
1.
Lecks.:Or Centainers 5200 2.
Freemoloymen: Screening 5 30
.ecurity r.ian a.evis1:n 21 :.,
2.
Con-inc.ency ?lan x,evision
/i
. :a.
- .ci ic i
W
- X - 1...a *.
- r #. r.- =.a...i. n f r.-
....a c a.
. s.a-
.=r =.... a s.=.... e.= 2-
- . cl...d
- . w r i
. r i
3
-XplanatiOG CT.. le 2.
ta0
=
4 0
$. 4
.j.o..p g As
...$.4.,*...e
.A g.
+
M
~
Table 5 i
Capital Costs for Security a: Facilities Having Special Nuclear Material of Low Strategic Significanca Cos to Facility Recuirement per i 73.47 1.
Cecr Lccks 3;40 2.
Interice In:rusicn Alar:
a.
Monitored Cffsita 5560 3.
Card Key Systam 5675 4
Security Plan Preparaticn 53350 5.
Continger.cy Plan Preparation 5770 io cc. i W
- IB ed 60 4 1
I I
Explanaticn of Table 5 1.
Door Lecks - The same assuccticns as to reca si:e and numcer of decrs used fer estimating c:sts cf pnysical security f:r scecial nuclear ma:arial cf mcdera:a stra:agic significance was used here.
See Explanatien of Tacle 1.
2.
Interior Intrusion Alara - It was assumed in :nis case that a c:aner-cial offsi.ta central alarm service wcuid be usec.
Ccscs f:r a,iarm,.ng a :0, x. 0, x cs. recm are as fo,ii:ws:
c
.v Ecuip.
Install.
Ces:
Ces:
1.
(1) Master Ultrascnic Ce:ac cr 1a0 30 2.
(a) Slave Ultrasenic Cetec crs 115 50 3.
(3) 5alanced Magnetic Swi hes 125 120 380 280 Tc:al Initial Ca: ital Equipment Ces:
5380 + 5280 = 5660
'5 SnneX l cf IOC1 sur? 5 e
/
3.
Gard Xey System - It was assumec that the same type Of ac:ess c:ntr0:
system as used. in Table 1 would be used for SNM cf icw stra:e-gic significance.
See 5xplanation of Tacle 1.
2 A security plan is required fcr facilities having cre :han 10 kg of special nuclear material of icw strategic significance.
It is estimated that 1 man-menth will be recuired o prepare the security plan.
Assuming 1 man-year c sts 520,0Cd", one man-men-h will ces: 520,C00 + 12 5 53350.
5.
C:ntingency Plan ?reparaticn - It was assumed 1 man-week wculd be recuired to prepare the c:ntingency plans.
Assuming 1 man-year ces:s 520,0C0,1 man-week will cost 540,C00 + 52 5 5770.
6 i
i i
i 1
1 I
i a
e e
ri i
Table 5 Annual Recurring Ccs:s for Physical Security at Facilities Having Special Nuclear 'daterial of Lcw Stra:egic Significance Annual Ccs:
Requiremen s to Facility l.
Occr Lecks 5 ga 2.
Interice In:rusten Alarm 5275 2.
Offsita Guard Res;cnse 5240 J.
Card Key Systaa 5 68 5.
Security Flan Revisien 5225 5.
Contingency Plan Revisien 5 77 Tctal 51189
.5 4
e w
e e w
i i
I I
l l
9
Ex lana:icn of Table 5 1.
Per Mitre reper: number MTR-3541 entitled "An Evaluaticn of Ccs Estimates of Physical Security Systems f:r Recycled Nuclear Fuel" decr locks, securi:y cabinets, and card key sysceas are estima::d t: have a 10 percanc cf initial cost as recurring main enance and service ecst.
2.
A ccmcercial central alarm service wcuid cost apprcximately 5375 for annual mair enance acc serv 1ce ;.us,isasing costs or..:ne c.eie:nene line.
3.
A c:mmercial offsite guard respcnse, if tiad into a ccamercial central alarm service, c s s abcut 5210/ year.
4 It was assumed that 10% of the initiai preparation cost of the Security Plan wcula be spent each year in revisien preparatien.
5.
Approxt:ately 1/2 man-day annually wculd be required : revise the c:nt,.ngency plan er 1,,,5 or.
..,0
=
s...e/.
se<
i e
1.:
Annex ! Of Enc :sure i 4
i rl
Tacle 7 Cacital C:sts for Implementing i 73.27 Security Recuirements for Transporta-icn of Special Nuclear Material of Lew Strategic Significance Requirement C:s:
1.
Lecks Fcr Ccntainers
$2CCO 2.
Security Plan ?repara:ica 51520 3.
Ccntingency Plan Prepara:icn 5 770 Tc:ai 52310 1.
Locks - It was assumed 20 lccks at 5100 each wculd be required.
7he nuccer of 1ccks requires is a cense'rvative estimate since rest licensees affected by the prcposed unendment have very few shi;ments annually.
20
.v. 5100 = 52000 2.
Security Plan Preparatien - It was estimat.ad 2 tan-weeks wculd be required.
It was assumed 1 man-year costs 510,C00.
Therefore, 2 man-weeks = (5 0,CCO'+ 52] x 2 5 51540.
3.
Ccatingency :lan Fre; ara:icn - It was assumed i man-week woulc be required.
It was als: assumed i man-year ccs:s $20,C00.
Theref:re i man-week = SlC,CCO + 52 I 5770.
I
.nned nc csCIe J
l 1
?
i l
i l
Table 3 Annual Recurring Securi y Ccs s for Transpor:a:icn cf Sceciai.'uclear Material of Lew Stratagic Significance Requirement Annual Ccs:
- i. Locks SECO security.-lan xevision si:,
3.
Contingency Plan Revisien 5 77
.c:a.
.t i
i at Explanation for ces:s.cf Table 5 are the same as fcund for ex;iana-
-icn cf Table 2.
f i
l
+
e a
e 6
- r I
Table 9
- 7. e.m. a. :. 4...
.a
- n. :..T.e.C wa. s.s aA. :.e 4
. c..J e. t../. :mr..sC.9t.4.:.e i i..
.. a v i n c,
.( c e. i..= i.
'I".
'. =. = r.v.a *.= r..= 't
'. '.'.C-=..-=..=
W d-d s,.a
,e. t. C.e 1,71 a. t. n.,..C.a
.ReCuirscent anc Cas:
Eenefi:
1.
OCor LeCks Alicws for ;csitive Centrol c' (5920)
- erso,as.el aC
- ess int:
nn
-he C:n-
.-.'it.
.a re..,., y. t. '!,. a.. i }. a..n..t.
w.
y i..
. < n e, =.e..a - e.n..., a.x.. :-......a.
17 1 t.
s.
.m}gg
.s } *...g $
E. * -.'. 4. :.a.t.. '4.* g e.*J e J. a.,./
9 a g7 s i1g t.
g w-. t..,. 2.. e.
a.e t.
ca.
- t...
4
. :s.
T.....e. y a.n.
- t. 3 p. t.n. g s
A 'a. w-'n <.
T 4
=
V..Ugi 1 1
.t..n g:.
.i 2
( ~2-1)'
.. C.,,2..],
- s. C.
an.a-2
- ..:e..;nq...
se...
.e s a #=..'<..= =. e '. 7 c v' #.-".i.
..s=..=r..='..
d n
a.
G a,n, eCur1 y.abtne-
.st,:Cws 7:r tne sar.e s:: cage Cr i
(5410) small quan-ities of SNM during periods of time unen such mate-r 4.= 1 i s...-. 'e d... C. u.e =. d..
d a.
'..q..=. 4. w r i..n. u s '..a n.A 'i =...a t v s..=...
e' '& l ns
- . r 'i.....a d. 'i = -..= "=...=..*..n
( 511 c. :. ')
c#. a.n '.....' d.= - =... -..=. '.. -
- r
.C v '.., =
.#1.a' 4an
.a C. G. e.. T. 'i a. s.
.s.e a..s t
w w
J r..e. n;
..n C C.-n-t. a.e. p a F. m Cs.~
-2...e
.c c
..a..s.
e.
.t w
.s s a
.e., n C a C3n.e s.....Ca.s.
t.1
.t o.
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- P 2.C' c. e,. s. s re. e C..
- s..
a 3....
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'l. /...s. r... eC. c.a..n. j g
.4..ja.s w.... e sr t v* ys.e.
.s
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2...
s.
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- ". =.. =... i. a. who w 1.
.1 a..=.-. = r.- #.
s.
. : i.e working wi a :.te ma:er,. a,i.
s 1
.a Cc. i nC. S.vstaa nilCws releicw a :::. vees :: Cuickos.v i
e.
e c.
=
(.g't.0
.s s w.s r. s t..e. a nc.' 1 s
.e. a.n.
p ra.k.C.et.
c.p a
u l
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.s. a..s..... a t
3 a
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..s;*:,.. 1.:.1.s a
a
.j
.o
. t i
.-ay1MC OCecla. luClear Ma:ar,iat 0
,,.Ccara a a.
..., ae n 2 4.n 1 :.1 C., n C.a
( Co, n. a.u, a.). \\
n wee
)
.O. S o f.f i. w. C.F...O.M. *w
.q and Ccs:
Eenefi unsita auard servica ni s cws
- r a :e.-hcur immecia a 4
/
(*4*','CO)'
W a..."...a.r..-a..e -. s s e...= = r.".. d../-
J - e 4 A n..n. =.
J. '. 4.-
4**
i Ilb 4.
=
,M p o.e._.m...s.e
- M,..
s a
\\
e r. n.u a..., i t.;...ee.g
.ae..<.ze.se, : w..e.
e 4 -
./. s 1.. r<.,
s. a. '. ~.1 a.
.s c. o..,
...n....-
4
= l a r,. e.v.-..=.., =.r. d.
.......u.nd w.2
=
4 sor...r../.
4.
- a..; 3.,.. a-
.,..a.,.2..-.-.-.4.,..2 res: case for:a.
3.
Card Kay System
'Magne:ic card keys wculd be issuec
(.:c-i :)
.a
.= u..'. a r..- =. =
- t w.'/ =. a. 2.
- 2. 2 c.5 d
s
.;..e
- u. a]. se.e <.. e.s., c.., s > so..u. a a
s..
centr 0iled area -hey wcuid have
- j n.e a r..... s.. -. q s,v,
.u. ~..e,- e. v. r. e.
e s
- csitive
- :n:rci aver perscnnel en ar-ing area.
- acuri y e,lan.,-repara-ica ints a,::cws t,... ::canscrs ::. ster-s (2 a:---.0) mine t.u.e a,.acuacy of tn.e ;nys1:ai s,.c.2r<..j....a..s... 1
- s. n...s,..,..e n.., s..
- 10. Ccntingency Plan prepara:icn Ailews : e iicansas c knew in (z. 0 advance wna-his eascensa shcuid be
.e<
.. ane,,, e ar..rd../- d.a. r. d. "..= a...
l t
i l
l 73
- 1...r. 2. A.
- :-.*..... h e.,2 t
1 9
Table 10 Senefits of Increased Security fer Transper:ation of Scecial Nuclear Material of Mccerate Strategic Significan,ce Require ent and Cos:
Senefit 1.
Lecks For Cen:ainers A11cws fcr scme ce:errence (52000) against unau:ncri:ed pene:ra-tien anc amcering while :ne ma:erial is in :ransit.
/
2.
Ccntingency Plan Precarttien A cws :he licensee to knew in (5770) advance wha: his respense should be :o any security incident.
S.
Freempicyment Screening.
Gives the emolcyer assurance cf (590) tne cnaracter of :he pecpie wnc will be working with the ma:erial.
4.
Security Plan Precaraticn This alicws NRC licensces :c (1340) determine the adequacy of the
~~~ physical security measures implemented.
Sa Anne.t i cf Encicsure S f,
l
o I
1 iable 1,:
3enefits cf :ncreased Securi y a Facilities Having Special Nuclear Material of '_:w Strategic Significance Requiremen:s anc Costs 5enefit 1.
Cecr Locks Allcws for positive cen:rci of (5940)
- ersonnel access in
- : the are=
wnile ::ili permitting emergency e.xit fr:m ne area.
Aisc ailcws cr nign lecx. :ene:ra,.cn security curing inactive time periods in dhe area.
2.
Interice :ntrusien Alarm System Allcws for immediate cetectica of
(:..0) an intrucer enter:ng er cving within cc
- ne c:ntr:lled area durir.g inactive time period so that assistance can be summened in time for adecuate respense.
3.
Offsi e Guard Response Alicws for It-hour guard cnft: ring (5210) and respense to alarms.
4.
Card-Xey 5/ stem Magratic card keys wcuid be issued (5575) t: autheri:ed empicyees.
Each time they cesired access :: the c:ntrclied area they wcuic have :: insert tne ar: key, thus giving ;csitive con-Orcl over persennel en:ering the area.
5.
Securi:y Fian Precara-icn This allcws NRC licensors :o deter-(53350) mine the adequacy of the.:hysical security measures im:lemen ed.
5.
Ccntingency ?lan ?recarati:n Ali:ws the licenses :: kn:w in (3770) acvance wna: his res:ense seculd be l
tc any security inciden:.
25
.a.ex i Of 5cci:sure i nr i
i O
I
Table 12 5enefits Of Increased Security for Transcer:stien of Special Nuclear Material Of L:w Stra:egic Significance Recuirements and C:s:
Eenefi:
1.
Lecks for Containers Alicws for scme deterrence (52CCO) agains; unautheri:ec ;ene: ration anc tampering wnfle :he ra:arial is in :ransit.
2.
Security Fian Prepration This alicws the NRC licens:rs ::
(51540) de: ermine :ne adecuacy of the physical security measures implemented.
3.
Contingency Plan Prepaca:icn-Alicws the licensee :: knew in (5770) advance what his respcase shculd be to any security incident.
l 4 ee e
e e e
i l
9 9
a ANNEX 2 The Affected Irdustry and Incustrvwice Costs The affected industry handling materials of mederata stratagic significance (Catagery II) censists of accut 54 iicansees, all excec-12 of wnica are primarily acn pcwer reac:ce ccaraters.
These 54 f acilities are cascricec furtner in Table I.
The incustry hancling materials of Icw stratagic significanca (Cagegory III) is much mere extensive.
It censists of a few fabricators of icw enriched uranium fuels, a faw icwer ;cwered acn acwer reac cr facilities, a few researca facilities using a 'aw hundrecs of grams of plutenium er U-235 in varicus enrichments and over a00 licansaes using platenium in cuantities rang!ng frcm accu: 100 grams dcwn to 15 grams as encacsulated Pu-5e neutrca scurces.
Further descri;; ion is given in Tacie II.
A survsy of ncn ocwer reac cr licansaes revealed that, cf 50 respendees, cnly 13 did not alreacy have intrusion aiarms.
In visw of internai intarim guicance fer security plans for medium ;cwer nca ecwer reac:ces which has been usac by ORR since 197a anc wnica calls for intru-sien alarms for sucn f acilities i-is felt na: aimes: all non ;cwer reac:ce facilities already have intrusion alarms anc acs: cf the other previsions for physical security which woulc be recuirec cy ne prc;csed regulations.
All licensaes possessing mataria.1 cf moderate strategic significance already have ensi a physical security forces.
Assessments of varicus elements of costs to the affected industry nandling ma arial of mccerate strata;ic significance are ca ailed in Tacles III
- necugn VI.
Overall costa imcacts of the preposac regula:icns are estimated at accut 5475,000 capital anc accut 545,000 annual ces:s.
Ocs:s elements for facilities ;cssessing materiais of Icw stratagic signifi-canca are assessac in Tables VII througn X.
Cvarall industry side cos s imcacts of the preccsad regulaticas for pnysical security of materiais of icw stra:agic signiflcanca are estimatad at about 31,050,000 cacital ces s anc accu: 5270,000 annually.
I
-I-1r e.: 2: Inc:: ;re i I
l
l l
Iable I Categor,y 11 1:acilities Possession Limit /
Mat erial in l'assession
.Itepot t ing l'ossession Italat eti as of.lusic 19// (ll'K =
licosiistolinn to Operation of a lotal laguivalent Kilo-Symlio l itrensee Name lleactor 1.icenses in fffcct grams,- c.f. 10 Cl11 70.4(t /Yi State University 36.0K 11 32.lK SilH-273, SNH-723, 1.01 kg Pu 0.012 Kg 11-23S as of New York at it-77,105 ) 20e%, 21.9 kg 0-235 as <10% lluf f aln YllC Natlonal llureau 17.0K SNH-362, SHll-405, 0.9S5 kg l'u, 0.6011 Kg 11-235 of Stanalartis 011-00566-05 as 20i%, 1.033 11-235 as 10% < 20%, 0.00S kg 11-233 IEK = 1.S69 Kg YCl llalicock & Wilcox 2S26.0K it i466.0K lt-47, SNH-7/fl, CX-10 YliG Naval Surface
- 1. 2K SNH-ll47, SilH-1251, Weapons Center LNH-14119 Iilu
. liniversiLy nf 0.69 Kg l'u, O.009 Kg 11-23S l'uerto Rico as 208%, 0.70 Kg ILK /Kil lowa State 7.2 Kg, /.0 Kg Silli- /4, 11-59, 0.096 l'y Pu, 4.63 Ku 11-235 liniversity of Silli-S91 as 20i%, 4.41 Kg lLK Science & let imolotly /XU li of Washintjton 11.1 Kg,11.1 Kg SilH-lull, lt-7.1, 0.104 Kg l'u, 4. 3 Kg 11-235 College of Wil-C001-Sill) as 20a%, 4.10 Ku ~IfK loginnering ^$
'latile I (Continuest) Possession Limit / Haterial in Passession liepart inu Possession llelateil as of. lune 1977 (IfK = Icutilicallun to Operation of a total Lquivalent Kilo- _ ' yu.ho l l icensco Name Iteactor Licenses in fftect grassis - c.f. 10 Clit 70.4QD /IV lowell 'leci.- 4.6K SNH-714, SNH 1220 0.19 Kg Pu, 4.2 Kg Il-23S nological as 20i%, 4.1 Kg ifK Instllule Int' HassacInisetts 159.4K 17.SK Snit-fil, SilH-il'1, 0.732 Kg Pu, 4.10 Kg (1-235 ITI' Instllute at SHH-171,It-37, as 20s%, 296.3 Kg (1-235 as I ce.hno logy SNH-9116, S110-60/ < 10%, 11. 63 Kg ll.'K XitX Intelcom 0.7K 2460-110 0.043 Kg l'u, 3.94 Kg (1-220 initustries, Inc. as 20s%, 0.0511 Kg 11-235 as <10%, 3./2 Kg II.K //C Worcester Poly-4.lK 11 4.lK lt-61 0.016 Kg Pu, 3.711 Kg Il-23S tecluilc Institute as 20e%, 3.55 Ku ll:K /!!Y Ohio St.ato fl. SK ll ll. lK 5r4-616, SHli-/32, 0.241 Ky Po, 3.S11 Kg 11-235 as finivers i t y SHH-917, lt-75, 20i%, 3.57 Kg ILK Sl10-It46, 34-00293 . /lill Hanhattan College, 3.SK R 3.3K SHil-fl27, R-94, 0.2311 Kg Pu, 3.105 Kg 11-235 Hech. Eng. Dept. 76-3 as 20e%, 314 Kg ifK /KK liniversity of 4.2K R 4.IK 11-73, SilH-36S 0.012 Kg Pu, 2. 77 Kg 11-235 14nsas as 20e%, 2.6 Kg IIK i
falile I (Continueel) Po:. session 1.imit / Haterial lei Possessinii lieport ing Possession Helateil as of lissie 191/ (ll K = lent i f ica t ion to Operatiosi of a f atal l'alisivalcist Kilo- _,' ya.i n l Iicensee Nai.ie Iteactor I icen:.es in fItect grams - c.f. 10 Cl H /0.4(L1) filS Pursline liniversity 0.296 Kg Pu, 2.-15 Kg 11-23S as 20s%, 225 Kg 11-235 as <10%, 10.04 Kl II.K i Yi i Davlil WiLlierspoon, 2.0K SHH-952, Sull-Sil/ 1.760 Kg 11-235 as 20s%, Inc. l.64 Kg 11K Contamisiateil f erroiss sci ap, exempt irom 73.40 /l li Co limiln ia 1.7K SilH-li/0, H-1211 0.22 Kg PH, 149 Kg 11-235 as thiivers i t y 20i%, 0.0/3 Kg 11-271, I. !>S Kg II.K /.lG lastman Kontak I.6K SNH-IS13, 799-02S3 1.511 kg 11-235 as 20i%, 1. 411 Kg ifK; A neutron multiplier /KO Inleilyne isotopes, I.uk SilH-107 0.001 kg Pu, 1.501 Kg 11-235 Inc. as 20i%, -1.006 ll-235 as 10 to < 20%, -0.055 Kg 11-23S as <10%, 0.001 Kg 11-233, 1. 50 K !! 'll K 1
O lable ! (Continucil) l'ossesslon 1.ituii/ HateriaI in Possesslost Reportinu Possession pelateil as or.inne 1977 (ifK = lent il ication to Operation of a Iotal Isinivalent Kilo- _ hynihol IIcensee Hanie Reactor 1.icenses in Ittect granis - c.f. 10 Crit 70.4(t}} Xt W liedents of II of 1.3K Stif t-1417 liet i real, 11.012 Kg l'n, 1. 21 Kg 11-235 California - 133tc42, R- ,50-433 as 20i%, 1.09 Kg it.K Saula liarhara XAt il5NHC-Region 111 0.964 Kg 11-235 as 20i%, 0.011/ Kg 11-23S as < l0%, 0.91 Kg II.K VA/ Nuclear l~nel Services - Wet.L Valley /.lR tiniversity at fl. lK R 5.6K SHH-235, Shit-il66, 0.154 Kg l'n, 6.197 Kg 11-235 lilinois, Dept. S011-520, $l111-S 71, as 10 to <20%,1.37 Kg ll:K of Physics 14-115, R il/ /HV Pennsylvania State 17.2K lt 12.6K SilH-95, Silil-123, 0.334 Kg Pn, 4.44 Kg 11-235 t.141 linivers i ty SilH-231, 14-2, 511 -428 as 208%, 4.52 (1-235 as 10 to <20%, 134 Kg 11-235 as <10%, 0.004 Kg 11-233 15.13 kg fl.K e e 1
lable 1 (Continue <!) . l'ossess ion t.imi t/ Naterial in l'ossession Nepotling I'ossession Relateil as of. lune 1977 (IfK " 1.:ot t i la at ion to Operation of a total listisivalesit Kilo- _ h eilio t Itrensee Name lleac tor Iicenses in Effect grams - c.f. 10 Cl'It 10.4{tj } /Cl tiniversity of
- 7. flK R 7.4K SNH-973, N-101,
- 0. 256 Kg l'u, 0.003 Kg 11-235 California, 1333-59, SilH-1471 as 208%, 4.29 Kg 11-23S as la llerl<e ley to <26%, 1.07 Ku llK YAl ll.S. Geological 4.2k R 4.0K SilH-lll, R-il3 0.17S Kg l'u, 0.001 Kg 11-235 Survey as 208%, 3.06 Kg 11-235 as i
10 to <20%, 0.09/ Kg IFK 1 YHI liniversity of
- 3. lK SNH-Il43, R-il6, 3.95 Kg 11-235 as la to California, 133ft-h9
<20%, 0.76 Kg itK Irivine /tM liniversity of Utali 4.3K R 0.7K SitH-663, SNH-1263, 0.103 Kg l'u, 3. 79 Kg U-23S 11 - 2 5 as 10 to <20%, 0.115 Kg II:K / fly Hichigan Stats 3.3K R 3.0K SNH-3'10, SNH-460, 0.279 Kg Pu, 3.30 Kg 11-235 as liniversity SNH-65ft, SNH-1014, 10 to <20%, 0.119 Kg 11K ll-114, 500-403 /Kl Kansas State 3.SK 11 3.4K 14-011, 3ft-C 011-01 0.00 Kg Pu, 0.001 Kg 11-235 as 20e%, 3.245 Kg 11-23S as 1 0 Les <20%, 0.673 Kg IIK YAl Armeal forces S.2K R S.0K SNH-706, SHll-670-6711, 0.1116 Ku Pu, 3.50 Kg 11-235 Ildeliobiology Res. R-114 as lit to <20%, 0.110 Kg ll K t n, t.. l
i l l l latile I (Contintical) Possession 1.imit/ Material in Possessioni l Hepurling Possession Relateal as at lune 1977 (ifK = l-lentilisatlon to Operatiosi of a Intal Calisivalerit Kilo- ' ya.lso l Iicensee_Name Iteactor Iicenses in frfcct grams - c.f. 10 Crit 70.4( Q) - /11', liniversity of S. flK H S.0K H-92 3.29 Ki(1-235 as 10 to t lexas, Nuclear <20%, 0.64 Kg ~lfK lie.u: Lor I.aboratory /AQ liniversity of 3.7K SNH-4 32, 11-52, 10-24 0.096 Kg Pu, 3.04 Kg 11-23S Arizona as 10 to <20%, 0.64 Kg lLK lilR liniversity of 2504.9K R 4.6K St#4-64, H-70, SillF630 0.143 Kg Pu, 0.002 Kg 11-235 Harylaiul HH-33-004-02, as 208%, 3.25 Kg 11-235 as H0-33-004-04, 10 to <20%, 0.79 Kg 11K /All Aerolest 5.0K R S.0K 11-911, CPRR-27, 0.016 Ku Pu, 2.77 Kg 11-23S Operations 2010-07 as 10 to (20%, 0.b!i Kg ifK Yi X llow Chemical 2.3K 11 2.3K It-100 Sill-527, 2.110 Kg 11-235 as 10 t o <20%. Company Sill-433, 21-0026S-07 0.555 Kg II.K / ',U Heest College 2.6K ORL-0010-3, H-112
- 0. 0110 KU Pu, 2.27 Kg 10 to
<20%, O.S3 Kg iiK /.lK liialin State 2.3K ll 0.7K SHH-1373, 11-110 0.0200 Kg Pu, 2.111/ Kg (1-23S liniversi ty as 10 to <20%, 0.45 Kg itK S-1 cl Pu-Ile sources 1510 g 11-235 fuel plates I y 11-235 iission cunnif er
~ latile I (Continucal) Pos:.ession I imit/ Material in Possession ite purt ing Possession Relateil as at lisna t]// (ll:K = sient s l ical lost to Operat. inn of a 'loLal fstisevalenit Kilo- .'Y"'3 'I.._.._ LI *!! see llame Reactor I.icenses in tfrect (jrams - c.f. 10 ClH 10.4(t.}} S Yll/ Veteran's Asimin-2.3K lt 2.3K H-57 2.02 Ku 11-23S as 10 to istration llospital <20%, 0.40 Kg Iti; /Al Atomics Inter-5613.3K R 193. 3 K. SHH-21 H-40, CX-17, 0.0111 Kg Pu, 2.2S8 Kt 11-235 i national Nuclear cal.ll-00lS-S9, N-Il8 as 20s%, 0.6S4 Ku IEK llevelopmes}t. fielal Ciarrently liaseil tipon less than laboratory Sulla tirams teamula qiiaintity at Pas site. Il Plarit. still Category 1. / ilk - Ilat telle Colinnhus 195.6K H 39.3 SHH-7, H-4, 3.709 Ki Pts. S953 Kit 11-23S as t laboratory 34-6flS4-US 20s%, 3.79 Kg ILK Currently on suuler 5000 gram formisla quanti ty liasis. b 4
V s Tacle II (cenc'd) Cataccr/ III Facilicies RIS L:w Enriched Uranium Most are fusi f acricacces. YLM Westinghcuse Electric Cc. - C01cacia YLJ General Electric Co. - Wilmingten YUD Exxon Nuclear YNJ Ea:c:ck & Wile:x - Lynchcurg ZQN Eacccck & Wilecx - Accile ZhQ Cembustien Engineering - Windsor ZEF Cemeustion. Engineering - Hemacita VAQ Chem - Nuclear Syscams, Inc. - Wasta Oispcsal YCE Eatc ek & Wile:x - Research & Ceveleccent ZQM NF5 - Erwin VAT NECO - Wasta Dispcsai VAY $ECQ-WastaDispcsal VAV NECO - Wasta Ofspesai VC:1 Scuthern Epaca - Wasta Gisposal Annex 2 cc Enclosurs 5 l l l i
Tacie II Cataccry III.:acilities RIS Plutenium 200-500 gm, auch as enca:sulated :u-Ee neutron scurtas and fission f:fis and chamcers. ZFS EG & G ZYK Westarn Michigan University ZYN Westingneusa Electric CO., Elect. Tu e Divisien ~ ZSF University of ?ittsburgn ZGF University of Florida ITP California Stata at San Ofego Z?Y North Carcifna State - Probacly irradiated eniy Z3Y Sceing YC3 Wrign: - Ps : arson AFB S0-200 gm, scst as encapsulated Pu-Be neutren scurcas anc fission foils and chammers. 40 facili:fes - mostly universities 15-30 ;m, assentially all as enca:sulatad Fu-Be als fac111 ties - al est ali universities Uranium Enriched 2C% cr More Abcut 40 ifcansees not alreacy ::un:ad elsewnere f:r c har ;cssassi:ns. Abcut 9 are research reac:ces. Uranium inr4cnac TO :: 2C% 12 faciif ties - III exca:: One are essaar:n react:rs. The ::. ar is NES ni:n nas al sa:y besn ::un:ac ncer plu nium, e nnam A I.I3
I ) i ll: 11 l 1 I O s t l i s eyo 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 t rC 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 5 1 1 at 2 2 1 7 0 5 5 9, 1 1 msl S 0 1 2 3 3 7 0 1 1 ua 2 2 3 7 4 0 i 1 tt t 1 3 i sni 3 EI p a s C tso C la t ipa C e t gp i S ir l i i e diu x enq i t e P ari t me e is 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 i l c t me 3 2 2 3 3 2 5 5 i sui t ENt s ic i l i l l t ic I l i s a e g f p l i la I c. ig i ta t sy_ S t e ot t l a iCi r e l i tl i aac 0 1 0 5 0 0 5 0 ? l n i i mt a 4 3 9 9 0 7 5 / s 1 M iif 9 2 4 1 1 i t i 6 3 7 l 3 1 3 ~0 f sao l o LCt l l a l-r e e e t t g n / a i n i H S i t n a t n e r e o e a n n r p ol c e i a n s e S r n i l i a sr m P a t C uo t m e l i rt n e t, n P n lg y ti e t a o t i t nn m s y yi l n s 1 i I o y y P t na e k r H o S m c d u r y y er l e n e c om p e i na t t r i v e m u K i np i i du o S ra 'l r ie i r r el n t r 3 l t a g a n p A A e l nP t i i i e n m S n r a i. e u l O I G I P f S C l l l 1 ! F$... n* l t
1 ~ l a tnems t s et ers l co anC 0 0 0 0 0 0 O 0 1 i( mi 2 2 2 0 0 5 s 3 1 1 1 1 1 i l 4 1 9 3 3 / 0 1 1 1 L ya 2 1 3 1 / 4 1 sra 1 3 u Et sss i uA 1 4n I i s tso l C a g i i t s ,N" i l s i a i r e u a r n n cf i e n oc s A c s i e rI i e l e e t is n l l me 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 3 3 1 i a 1 S eui 3 2 2 3 3 N 2 S S L Ht l i a i e m l x i i l L c I s a E f ecnac V i I f i e n l y g at t i i ui la S nl T ni c Ac i a g 0 l ) a I ( e e 5 i t t o a at 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 7 5 / ~3 1 r m 9 7 4 6 3 0 6 3 ~/ 6 1 t is 1 ? 3 i 1 1 f 'i tt 3 4 ss 4 4 e Eo } t C ar e tn aM fo e l t a g i S n p tr e e i e n n c e l L o e r p k i. e e n e ig H i nl r e l s a I l g oe c K i n b i r S y lp s i a so m a i t i t C ut t m e i l h ri n e r t ss I' 0 y t n e t u s a t 1 i no m s c y y l n s 1 i i H y y e S I' c e t r o S S n m c t e n s u. r :. y y e l e om p g i i e c g a t r v e i r m s t ( i n l o S ra i r i i i i a r r el u S u i l p s s o p A t A e r l l t I l l' lu. s C S C a r a e oi e i m s e h t O i l f l
yr t s st l ais iel o i C i t s aI m l a il t at 0 0 0 0 0 sti 0 2 1 0 3 f np 0 6 8 7 1 ea 0 1 0 2 5 mC 2 0 4 4 e 1 i s r o c n i t I a trop s nar I gns r rit o i ro ers f lmuC s ic t Nnl s I a o d t e C esn t re 0 3 3 0 aem 1 5 5 3 la mpepr t i i ti c p slin a I SI C f e o c V na e c s l i s f t i l a i is n eor 'l l t C e a. p l S nl p 0 0 0 0 0 a1 0 4 7 9 0 i ( 11 0 5 7 4 c t t st S, 2 1 4 1 [ ig e ar t Ce a i t r t S e t are l io s M re n f n o g o i i n a t i l t a n a n r e o a e ir C r n g e e c d r n S ta e P a M l l t c as Pn n i a o e t S yi m l s P ct y r e na o je s m o n y er l a f o t ga p np m r. e i l I s p r ie 1 8_ k e u t i P c nP e c l E o u e o r E S C P l l i ) 4 E# O " ? 2's b s 8 l 4
lalile VI Hah:rldlut Mailerate Strategic Sionificance Incremental kiisiisal Censts for Tiainspos tation 1:s tinia t eil I. Limatest Hiimlier I:s t imateil Annual Costs of Sliippers IncurrinD lucremental Inilustry ligpairement per Sliipper incremental Costs Annual Costs lads for Sealcal Containers i 200 10 2000 herurity Plan lipkeep 154 S3 7'JSO routindenty Plan lipkeep 30 53 15'10 Pre-i mployment Screenisig 77 30 2310 $ 4f>l 1 3115 0 Y s. J ? e 'N
la t i lipea tC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a s 0 5 0 0 0 0 5 m yt 0 6 0 5 5 0 5 rs 1 1 1 6 7 3 S 1 i 1 1 tt o 1 4 9 6 3 l 1 1 t ssC 3 9 1 1 E u lcn I 4 s tso C r la es b e i t mt g uin iu Nl i l l r l ii a e ecn 0 0 0 0 0 0 i e t t ag 0 3 0 0 1 0 i i a :1 e 2 3 1 5 S m H i f l t o ae s x E i F ec n I a I d V i f e e i g) n rs t g ae i la i 5 l i T S 0 ri 4 t t l c sy 3 ol teoL fi ig tCi r c e a 1 o 0 a ml 1 5f ta iac 0 5 0 5 0 0 0 9 r tt a 4 9 6 7 5 7 1 $[ 1 60 t si: 1 9 1 6 6 3 7 S ip 1 3 3 ([ S l ao w Ct o l fo s la no) ir i s e t e t al a rt H ai n: pl ol ei ie rc n isr m l' a a uo e e n 'l l rt e t t n l 1 ti t i s a1 o t nn i S y yi l I n s I o S S I' ct I 42 t H f na m, c r n y yu er f e u om O O e t o ga r K ir np i r l ra ra ie i J r el 9 o t A a l ul t r 8 e i r c( nlo' l e n n a e. R O C C I 'n? '$ ! M 'i. Bt I ! e d
lalile VIII Materials of low Strategic SI nificance I ixeil Site Anntial Costs D Estimatest Est.imatcal incremental Intiustry f:,timateil Annual ilumlier of f acilities' Isicremenit a l l{egui.rement Costs to facility Requiring Annual Custs Door Iocks 94 200 18000 Interior Intrusion Alarm H.in ii nrett: 9 e a. On Site 260 30 466S li. Off Site 3/b 300 112500 Of f Sit n (;uard Response 240 300 72000 Card Key System 68 100 6000 Security Plan tipkeep (Iarue iEU factIit.les) 335 10 3350 ConLin9ency P1an 77 500 30500
- a,-
PrepardLiHi n !? 499 or 6lS 2S9/S0 ($1134 tar large s. ILil f~acilities) i'. 'i no e
O lable IX Materials of Low Strategic Significance Capital Costs foi-1rainsportationi Ls timateal thimber of Estimatet! Estimate <l Capital Shippers Incurring incremental Irialaistry Respairement Costs Per Shipper incremental Costs Capital Costs locks for Sealcal Containers - 20 $ 2000 10 $ 20000 locks f or Sediest Containers - 1 100 100 10000 'ecnrity Plan Preparation 1540 10 1.,400 (Iarue ifu Shippers) ContingencyPlanPrep$ ration 770 100 71000 e C $ 2770 or 870 $122,400 ($2310 for lar0e IDIshippers) re N ? 9. b 2
- - j,
- A
'O e4 A GU Eo-6 % a. C - ~~ ~ w ~ C v O O v = 2 O C 4 N N W. N ~ ~ N N i Q h M % 1a aA = =s 7 A C, M', g.,.,, W a I ou b 0
- l o
1 %- A
- J b -e a% Af kb E: O Oi UQ
- =
W
- 2 1
.U A ei e a L C" A O "J U 11 C O O C U EOE O C L. % e a f'5 W.ll*. U WW = 2 += C X C e U O U = we ,J g a 2 U m % C c 6 L
- =
= %) ~= w ~ U. d = .I m = CJ cm
- ==
A = " O C v NN= en = U <A C A 5 .%
- wa N
N %, O 6 G U c O.' A f5
- J W
b EW ed =.a ob A W O 3 wu C O
- A G.
6 L ~J U =' 1 O 4 i E. "N O = 3
- O O
1 I Q t
- J m
L U A
- Q A
~3 .il 4 6 Q b
==
- l W
.D 4. Y. J W W
- g.,
W m T O 6 OO w .'.5 .=.=. 48
- y
-t A O L .4 4,.0 .4. 0 0 ._a.L. .Y Y y W M W 3i .= A r; 9 X ...h
- m. w i. 3 ".#Y.
o.. I}}