ML19323G456
| ML19323G456 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/09/1978 |
| From: | Casey Smith NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19323G457 | List: |
| References | |
| SECY-78-142, NUDOCS 8006020523 | |
| Download: ML19323G456 (14) | |
Text
.
t.
5 e
" '.3 9.., g/
_p
/
v p;n 9, jg73 UNITto STAf ts a
NUCt. EAR REcULA7:RY CoMMI:3*CN
~~
~
CONSENT CALEND AR ITEM Fer:
The C enissicners
- - m:
Cliff:rc V.
Soft.9, Jr., Cirector Cffice of Nuclear Ma:arfai 5afety arc Safaguarcs
.,s, C4 21 h Thru:
Lae '/. Gossick, I.xecuti se Cirect:r f:r Oceratiens
'l suofect:
PHYSICAL FROTECTION OF CATEGORY II AND III MATERIAL Surecse:
Tc Octain tne C mmi531:n's accrev11 Of a ;re:csed amendment :: 10 CFR ? art. 73.
Cataccry:
This ;a:er ::sers a.3ajor ;ci'ay ues:4:n.
Issues:
a.
Are chysical prc: action reasures rec:mmenced in
- ne IAEA ;uclication (INFCIRC/225) f:r Categories Q and III matarial justifisc?
b.
Should NRC fssue f:r :ublic c:mment :reces.ad new rules f:r protac-f en of Ca:escries II and III matarial?
Ciscussien:
Cn February 11, 1977, the Office of Nuc!aar Ma: arf ai Safety and Safeguarcs su:mi :ac SECY 77-73.
That acer analy:ed -he issue Of whe ner on ;cing NRC acticas. o u: grace pnysical Or action recuiremen 3 saculd meet rec: cenced intarna:icnal stancards and if 50, na. a. cant sneule.ne rec:ccercatfens of tre i
I-EA and/cr ne Nuciaar Sce: Tier Grouc (NSG) :s ace; tac an a basis for regula Ory enange.
Tne raieiant recem-rendaticas of SEC'r 77-79 ere:
a.
Adepti:n of r.e NSG ca ageri:ati:n Of sa:arial
.hicn sucsequen:ly as acceptac 11mest it its entirety :y ne IAEA" anc puolisnec in INFC!RC/225, June 1977.
The puolfsned.421e is inclosur*. T.
.The only ex:a:-f on for unieradinac na arf ai is Onat INFCIRC/225 ci: act sa: 1:.es l'ai:3 f:r Ca:egcry I~I mata*ial.
The NSG I:.er ifni s ece asec in : e :re:cse: amencments :: !C CFR Par: 73 at.:acrec :: :afs :a:er as
-nciosure :..
l C:nta:::
)
C. <. Nu: sin, vs3 127-:012 b.b:N,"I2 THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS P00R QUAUTY PAGES, a..
1roo (eo AoSAS
4 The Commissioners b.
Accotton of general performance requirements for Categories II and III material that would provide protection acuf valent to the measures recccmenced in INFCIRC/225.
On June 30, 1977, the Commission issued its response to SECY 77-79 (Enclosure 2) in wnf cn it approved the general acproacn reccmended by the staff and directad the staff to develop a proposed rule, subject to resolution of the fo11cwing questions:
1.
What is ERDA's (CCE) ;:ositfen and plans with rescect to recuiring protecti:n of LEU?
2.
Are current NRC requirements fer protaction of SNM in transit cceratienally equivalent to those reccmmended in INFCIRC/225?
Other background informatien is provided in Enclosure 3.
Question 1:
What is COE's position and plans with respact to requiring protection of LEU?
00E plans to issue an Intarim Management Directive 1
(IMO 6103, the COE equivalent of NRC regulatiens) to require protection measures for Category II ar.d III (wnich includes LEU) materials nat closely follow reccmendations in INFCIRC/225.
The directive is cut for field review.
Question 2:
Are current NRC recuirements to protect SNM wnile in transit operationally equivalent to those reccmmended in INFCIRC/225?
For the protection of Category I material in-transit, the NRC provisions equal or exceed tne INFCIRC/225 recc meccations, with the following exceptions.*
INFCIRC/225 reccmendaticas call for a deter-mination of trustwortniness fcr those persons involved in the transcortation of Category I-naterial.
Currently, tne natter of trustwortni-ness is accressed in the licensee's transporta-ti:n security plan.
These clans are evaluatec by the NRC staff in acccedanca vita arf ttan cricaria as fcilews:
"The (licansa) acc!! cant xs nave a "Tresa except cns were also noted in IECY 77-79.
e
D The Ccomissioners program for screening and selection of individuals wno will protect SNM shicments.
A candidate must have a satisfactory previous empicyment history.
A background check of each candidate should be conducted."
The current practice for trustworthiness determi-nations *culd be strengthened and clearly meet the INFCIRC/225 recommendations if the Commission approves and publishes the proposed rule on security clearances tna; *as issued for public comment on March 17, 1977.
INFCIRC/225 recommendations call for road ship-ments by exclusive use venicles and for a cetailed searen of all shipping venicles (truck, aircraft, or snip) prior to loacing.
Current NRC require-ments only call for road sni;ments to be made withcut intermediate stccs, cut in practica all sniements are made in an exclusive use truck.
Detailed vehicle searches are not currently required, but would be required for trucks and aircraft uncer the upgrade requirements issued by the Commission for public comment on July 5, 1977.
For both Category II and III material, the INFCIRC/225 recommendations call for minimi:ing the time the shipment is in-transit, minimizing the number and duration of transfers, avo~iding regular movement senecules, predetermination of trustwortniness of all indivicuals involved in the transportation of snip-ments, advance notification to the receiver, provision of locks and seals, search of the load venicle, and certain measures to be carried out ey the receiver upon receipt of a shipment or ucon non-arrival of the shipment.
In addition, the INFCIRC/225 recommendations for Category II material call for special attentien to be given to selection of trans:ortation anc routing, issuance of written instructions to transportation authorities and frequent telegnene communication between the shipment vehicle and a control coint.
Currently, the NRC has ac etuirements for the arctac-tion of Category II and III saf:ments but does recuire that licensees report any act.ai or attemotac thef t or sanctage.
The recufrements ;rocesec in this paper
?
The Commissioners would be equivalent to the INFCIRC/225 rec ccendati:ns for Category II and III matarial.
Issue a:
Justification for protaction of Category II anc III materials.
Protection of plutonium, U-233 and high enriched uranium can be justified on tne grounds that a formula quantity" could be obtained through multiple thefts of Category II and III materials.
Protection of uranium enriched to less than 20% (!.EU) may have technical justificatien based en the chance that without safeguards, it signt te ;cssible to divert such materials out of tne U.S. for accitional entienment or for production of clutenium without detection.
Regardless of the tecnnical justification, i
the results of a ifmitac survey of affected f acilities l inoicatas that almost all of tnem already hava security (i measures in place whi:n would satisfy the requirements I
of INFCIRC/225.
Therefers, the cost of nese require-ments is not a major concern.
Altncugn nuclear matarials night be involved in a threat to the public threugn a discersion scanario, such as sacotage, SECY 77-79 states the risk from cispersion of small or mcderata quantitias of nuclear materials (including irradiatec materials) dces not accear to pose a risk to the public sufficient to justify specific protaction measures for these materials at this time. provides a discussion of the possible use of Category II and III materials in the construction of a nuclear weapon.
In conclusion, the staff :elieves that physical protac-tien of unfrradiated SNM in Catagories II and III is justified en the basis of ennancing cemestic protection of suen iatarials by providing detection and deterrence capaoilities and demonstrating U.S. willingness to ceccerata with the Internaticnal At mic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Issuance of specific :rotaction requirementa f:r protaction of _ small or accerata quantities of 5
1
'Femula ;uantity sears stratagic special nuciaar natarial ir any 1
- ac!nati:n in 1 cuantity Of 5,000 grams or icce ::mcutac :y the ':mui1,.
- rams = (; rams
- entainec J-235) + 2.5 (grus U-223 --grams tiu :nt.m).
f!
The Ccmmissioners f eraciated nuclear materials is not considered necessar/ at this time.
Insofar as the staff believes that the timely detac-tion of tre theft or civersion of 5NM in Categories II and III is in ne pubife interest and the additional costs are not excessive, the cost of tnis protection should be borne by the licensees.
Accordingly, alterna-tive arrangements for absorcing costs were not analy:ed.
Issue 5:
Descriotion of the procosed rule for protec-t:en of Categories II and III material.
The proposed rule (Enclosure 5) ould apply to Category II and III materfil at non power reactors licensed uncer 10 CFR Part 50 and at facilities and in shipments licensed under 10 CTR Part 70.
?ower reactors having Category II and III natarials are covered by 73.55.
In acdition,10 CFR Part 150 woulc te modified to require the application of 10 CFR Part 73 protection requirements to those Agreement State licensees (approximately 5CO) wna possess Categor/ III material.
Licensees who possess Catagory II material and more than 10 kg of LEU would be required to submit for licensing review a physical security plan descricing the measures to be employed to c: moly with the new requirements. We believe that the new requirements for Category III materials otner than 10 kg or more of LEU can ce implemented effectively by licensees witncut NRC review of a physical security plan for each installation.
The procosed regulations introduce the term " material of moderate strategic significance" to correspond to the INFCIRC/225 term " Category II material" and :ne term " material of low stratagic significance" to correspond to the INFCIRC/225 term " Category III mate ri al. " The new terms are neeced since categories as cefined by INFCIRC/225 are not used in present NRC regulations.
The following is a summary of the pro-posed requirements.
Licensees who ::cssess material :f wcerate strategic significance at fixec sitas wcuid be requirec :::
store or t se One ma:arial only in a lign:ac c:ntroliac ac:ess area; acui: :Pe arta'witn an in:Tusi0n alarm;
The Ccmmissioners determine the trustworthiness of persons who have access to the material; develop and use a badging system and limit access to the controlled ac: ass area to persons wna require such access in their cuties; provide at least one around-the-clock unarmed watchman to respond to security incidents or emergencies; provide a communication cacacility (talechene acceptacle) between tne watenman and a res: case forca (police acceptacle); and search on a random easis vehicles and cacxages entering or leaving tne controlled access area.
Licensees wna ship material of moderate strategic significance would be recuired to:
. plan"and routa the shipment so as to minimize cpportunities for theft while enroute; c:ordinata shipment plans with the receiver; arrange for transport of the material in a lecked or sealed container; arrange for carrier emolcyees wno have custody of tne snipment to make seneduled telephone reports of shipment status to the snipcer (or receiver).
establish a contingency plan for dealing with thefts and threats; determine the trustwcethiness of all licensee emcicyees involved in the transcortation of the natarial; and carry cut various notification and tracing require-ients in tne event that a sni; ment becomes los er unac:cunted for.
Li:ansees no ;cssess material of 1:w strategi: signifi-arce at a fixec sita would te required. ::
I l
t
The Commissioners store er use material only within an area to whicn access is centrolled; continucusly monitor (such as with an intrusion alarm) the area to detect unauthori:ed activities:
arrange for a rescense to all unautnori:ed activi-ties witn watcr. men or offsite response force (police acceptacle).
Licensees wne ship material of Icw strategic signifi-cance would be recuired to follcw reputrements similar to those for snigments of material of mcderate strategic significance exceot that:
preplanning requirem.ents are less intense; c:mmunication capacility between carrier and shiccer is not recuirec.
Differences between INFCIRC/225 recemmendatiens and tne crocosea rule.
For material at fixed sites, the reccomendatiens of INFCIRC/225 would be met by the proposed rule.
For saterial in-transit, the significant cifferences between tne INFCIRC/225 reccomencations and the pro-posed rule are identified and evaluated as follows:
INFCIRC/225 calls for the search of the load vehicle for sabotage devices.
On the basis of the reasoning set forth in SECY 77-79, the NRC staff believes that protection measures directed solely agai.ist the dispersion (sabotage) of Categories II and III materiais are not required.
INFCIRC/225 calls for restraint in the'transmis-sion and handling of messages concerning ship-ments.
The staff believes that precedures similar to tnose usec fer " Confidential" information in the U.S..ould need to be imolemented to meet this reccmmendation.
Sucn a program cces not acpear to te justified for these kincs and qua tities of material.
i INFCIRC/225 : alls f:e a creceterminatien of the trustwortniness of all pers;ns involvec in the trans:crt of natariaII 7he procesed rule restricts
[
r
The Commissioners this predetermination to licensae empicyees. We do not believe sucn a requirement is necessary or can be cractically implementac for all persens involved in the transport of Category II and III matari al s.
INFCIRC/225 calls for the protaction of shipments of irradiated fuel.
Under the pr: posed rule, thase shipments would continue to te exempt from prctection requirements.
The massive container used in transport is believed to provide suffi-cient protection equivaient :: INFCIRC/225 rec:m-mencations.
International Imoacts United States acceptance of the INFCIRC/225 recem-mendations tnrougn issuance of tne precosed rule wculd likely be viewed favorably by other nations and possibly be an incentive for them to follew.
It would demonstrate continuing United States sucport for international physica1' security rec:mmerdations wnica the United States nas helped to develop.
Value Imoact Protection requirements for material of mocerate strategic significance would apply at 54 facilities.
The maximum cacital cost per affected facility would be 511,000, wnica would apply enly if the facility had to install an intrusion alarm systam, locks, lights, badge systems and an around-the-c1:ck security force.
Maximum annual costs would be 345,000, almost entirely for guarc force salaries anc overhead ex:enses.
Since all affected facilities already have watchmen coverage at night and staff coverage during working hours, anc many have tne required security systems; it is estimated that the industry-wide capital anc annual costs will be icwer than those given above.
It is estimated that actual casital costs would be about $330,0C0 and actual annual cests would be accut $33,000 for the 54 facilities.
?rctaction requirements for materia of ::w strategic significanca wculc acply to aime t SCO If:ansees--tne overwneiming majority cf.nica s. a.nversities each possessing frca 15 to 30 grams :f statori'.m as i to 5-r
The Ccmmissioners curie Pu-Se neutron sources.
The maximum initial yearly cost ;er secured location is estimated to te acout $3,500, which includes 5660 for an alarm system.
Annual c:sts after the first year are astimated as 3850 whfen incluces a 32 0 fee for a c:mmerical response agency.
Industry wide incremental initial yearly costs of about $900,000 and annual incremental costs of 5250,000 are estimated.
The bases for taese estimates and other supporting data is given in.
Imcacts en NRC staff.
For each f the proposed requirements, tne Offica of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, the Office of Standards Deve1 cement and tne Offics of ?luclear Reacter Regulati:n would precare ac:ectance critaria in suffi-cient detail to enable NRC reviewers to determine
. nether a given device or precedure would satisfy the requirement.
This work wculd require no additional staffing for those offices.
The effort required to conduct joint reviews of the security plans submitted by the 54 moderate strategic material licensees is.,
estimated to be 44 man montns for NMSS, IE, & NRR.
No' acditional staffing would be necessary to complete these reviews or for routine maintanance.
Fo11cwing plan acproval by NMSS or NRR,.tne Office of Inspecti:n and Enforcement would make initial adequacy determina-tions at eacn of the affected f aciif ties and thereafter would inspect facilities at a:pecpriate intervals.
The Office of Inspection and Inforcament would require additional personnel to carry cut tnis program.
This increase will be reflected in the uccoming budget submittal.
Recommendation:
That the Ccmmissien:
1.
Accrove the proposed amendments set forth in for publication for c:mment in the Federal Register.
2.
Note:
a.
tnat tne -a:orecriate cengressionai ::mmit-tees will :e notified of tais acti:n, anc i
l l
t I
The~ Commissioners b.
that neither an environmental impact statement nor a negative declaratien need be prepared since the pecposed amendments are not signifi-cant frem the stancpoint of environmental impact.
c.
Approval by the General Accounting Office of the reporting recuirements in the preposed rule will be obtained prior to publication of the effective rule (Enclosure 6).
Coordination:
The Offices of Standards Development, International Programs, State Programs and Inspection and Enforce-ment, c:ncur in the recommendation of this paper.
The Office of the Executive Legal Oi ector has no legal objection.
The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation concurs in the reccmmendation of this paper out notes that they currently are drafting requirements that they believe should ce incer: orated into a separate section of Part 73 to provide acceotable levels of protection against theft of SNM and incustrial sabo-tage.at non power reactors.
These requirements would be equivalent to or would exceed those in the proposed 573.47 and INFCIRC/225.
These draft requirements will be provided for staff review during the comment period for the sucject regulation.
Scheduling.
This pacer is tentatively scheduled fer consideration at an ocan.reetina durina the week cf Acril 3. Ic73. dPleasa refer to the a:crcoria* Weekly Ccmuission e hedule hen pu'lisnec c
for a specifi a
.d Clif((d V. Smith, Jr., Direc or' Office of Nuclear Material C fety f
an'd Safeguards Encicsures:
See next page 9
O s
The Commissioners
Enclosures:
1.
Table:
Categori:ation of Nuclear Material 2.
Ccemission Response to 3ECY 77-798
===3.
Background===
4.
Technical Assessment 5.
Proposed Rule 6.
Value/ Impact Assessment Containing a Report Justification Analysis NOTE: Ccmmissioner ccmments or censent shculd be given directly to the Office of :ne Secre ary by close of business Wecnesday, March 22. 1973.
Ccmmission staff office ccmments, if any, shculd be submitted cc the Ccomissioners NLT March 15,.1978, witn an informaticn cecy tc the Office of the Secretary.
If the paper is of such a nature that it recuires additicnal time for analytical review and ccanent, the Ccrnissicners and the Secretariat shculd be apprised of when ccaments may be expected.
DISTRIBUTICN Ccmnissicners Ccemissien Staff Offices Exec Dir for Operaticns Secretariat
3 -,
o ENCLOSURE I TABLE: CATEGORIZATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL I
c L
-~.
1 j
e l
t i
i J
23
)
i a
..a-1
.a
- u s
s 2
w s.:
- 2. a :
2 4
j "g
5
.2 A
i
.2
'?
12.,
2.*81
~
a
^
a s
=
=
2 L
=.
a s -. a, u
-, =,
=-
W a
m.
as, t
C 6 -
a g
t 7
a:
.a
- ..- e l
- x a
=
.s -
,4
.I 4 J, d.
W i -.
e e
.s g.
.=.-
6 i
- 4.
- w s
a i
a s
,s:
u o
o e
j
- d 1 -2
=
=
=
l g
- 2 ag.
n
$a
- 3 e:
d m
33
- f !.
i
?
=
m 4
=-
a 20-i m
3
=_
1 a.2 g
=
=
.s
=
63 1
2 a
a
=
a o
4 2:
"E m ul c
N w
- e
- 8. E
~'s
=- !
.x
=.m.
8
=
,= = :
J.
- 4. r,.
4 3.:
=e
=e--
.a
. c.*
3 : s
=
M
- =
.= a 1
i e*
.i d a,= ;
a l
.a
=
l a
at
=
- =!
g a
2,. 3 t,
f-i a
I *.,
2
.A m
a
=
!=
I.
l 2
e.
i :
o 2
.c
=.
=
s
=
=.
.s e
=
=
2
+
t i
s
.==
-.4 l
a.
f,f
. 2,*
2 m
u a
= :
a n
a a
4 1
M M
M t
1 3,d a
3 4,
-2.:
.,.F s:
4 J
s a,.,
3.
y8
=
l
.3 -
u-I s -
.a
- ..s 2.
s:
}
s
=
t s
5
, ~1 s:
=
2
- 3
,4 s -
I
~
~
s
- s 2
w a
.a g.
- i.,s.
-3 I
. 3 s
}
. ~.,.
i
.s
- 3
)
- J l
8 8
4 - 72 7'
al a
a l
f i-41; u,
a
=.
I
- =
i 5
d.2 i
=
c
- a. -
- s. 2a r
-w 3
3
{'
l.
- d.,,
.r 2a:
u w
3.:
- a aa
- : - 1 w<= ;. E =-..
a s
.=
2 l
l
.: g
.4 g 4
s s. :-. -a x.n f
=
=
=-
.f. 4.,..
v ~e a
l v
-,=
.a.
w-
- .,*.,:..,>a,.x
==
2 2
I.: 3a 3
a
=
=
i
-2
- a. 3 s
2 l
". J. 8 11 3
s.
=
=- =-
s
8 t
a
=
1 g
5 s e 2 'I,.,. s. e. I s 3
s a-
=
=
23 12 2
-. s 5
-2sm?,
- }
- .a * -3
.=.
J
. =. 1. J.
6 t
s
.a a s.
s 1 34,-
1 l
S = 2,s '3
=
i. =.. j -'2ss.
r l'
.3, J *,
- g 4
J 2
- 8
- e s.s
..s 2 4 4,.-
I
.e
.a..
.sj;- L ss..
.I
- m
'l E
2 4. J a s u.E 3 3 $.s I
Id
' =
=
E 9
l =
34 s.
.s
( = >
- , =-,
3.2
- s. *i,s. =2,.1 ** f *:
i 2
,' 2, s
1
- s i
b j - i
. % "I 2 3 s -
i
.1 I
i -
~sJ J* [j gja 1}J g
e-e
,I l
3 =..,,
g.-
.,a 4 3
.e
.==
l 4
4
-e
-.=-a.
e.:.
s
=
?..,.*.g....
.wew...
. e f
i+'-
ENCLOSURE 2 CCMMISSICN RESPCNSE TO SECY-77-793 l
1