ML19323E705
| ML19323E705 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/24/1975 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19323E675 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-EM-801-4, TASK-OS NUREG-75-087, NUREG-75-087-05.4.7, NUREG-75-87, NUREG-75-87-5.4.7, SRP-05.04.07, SRP-5.04.07, NUDOCS 8005270145 | |
| Download: ML19323E705 (8) | |
Text
- "N" ENCLOSURE d - Current " ?sion
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3 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION a
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STANDARD REVDEW PLAN
\\.'.'..N.o OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULAT!ON
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s SECTION 5.4.7 RESIOUAL HEAT REM 0'.'AL (RNR) SYSTEM REVIEW RESPO*:SIBILITIES Primary - Reactor System Branch (RSB)
Secondary - Auxiliary and Pcwer Conversion Systems Branch (AFCSB)
Containment Systems Branch (CSB) l Core Performance Branch (CPB)
Electrical. Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch (EICSB)
Materials Enginsering Branch (MTEB)
Mechanical Engineering Branch (ME3)
I.
AREAS OF REVIEW The residual heat removal (RRR) system is used in conjunction.with the main steam and feed-water systems (main condenser), or the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC). system in a boil *..g water reactor (B*"#). or auxiliary feedwater system in a pressurized water reactor (PWR) to cool down the reactor coolant system follcwing shutdown. Parts of the RHR system also act to provide low pressure emergency core cooling and are reviewed as described in Standard Review Plan (SRP) 6.3.
Scme parts of the RHR system also provide containment heat removal capability and are reviewed as described in SRP 6.2.2.
Both PWR's and BWR's have RHR systems which provide long term c0 cling once the initial decay
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heat load is removed by the main condenser. RCIC, or auxiliary fee @ater systems. In both types of plants. the RHR is a icw pressure system which ' takes over the shutdcun cooling func-tien when the reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature is reduced to about 3CO'F. Althcugh the RHR system function is similar for the two ty;es of plants'. the system designs are different.
The RHR system in PWR's is ccmposed of 71 ping, pumps. valves. heat exchangers. monitors, and controls which take water frem the RC: hot legs, cool it. and pump it back to the cold legs or core flooding tank nozzles. The suctd and discharge lines for the RHR pumps have appropriate valving to assure that the low pressure RHR, system is always isolated frem the RCS when the re etcr coolant pressure is greater than the RHR design pressure. The heat removed in the heat exchangers is transported to the ultimate heat sink by the component cooling water or service water system. In PWR's. the RHR system is also used to fille drain.
and remove heat frem the refueling car.al during refueling cperations; to provide an auxiliary pressurizer spray; and to circulate coolant through the core during plant startup prior to RCS pump operation.
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removai[ ans $os pr sure emergency core cooling subsystems.*S discuss;d in SRP 6.2.2 and 6.3.
The shutds dholin2 and steam condensing (via RCIC)" asystems are covered by this plan. These subsystems make use of the same hardware, consisting cf pumps, piping, h at cx-changers, valves, conitors, and controls. In the shutdcwn cooling code, the BUR PJfR system can also be used to supplement spent fuel pool cooling. As in the PWR, the low pressure RHR piping is protected from high RCS pressure by isolation valves.
i The steam condensing mede of RCIC operation in BWR's (when included in the plant design) provides an alternative to the main condenser or normal RCIC mcde of operation during the initial cooldown. Steam from the reactor' is transferred to the FJiR heat exchangers where it is condensed. The condensate is piped to the suction side of the RCIC pu=p.
The RCIC pump returns the condensate to the reactor vessal via the feedwater line. The heat removed in the heat exchangers is transported to the ultimata heat sink by the service water system.
The RS3 reviews the design and operating characteristics of the PJiR system with respect to its shutdown and long term cooling functicn. Where the RHR system interfaces with other systems (e.g., RCIC system, cceponent ecoling water system) the effect of these systems on the RHR system is reviewed. Overpressure protection provided by the valving between the RCS and RHR system is also reviewed.
The proposed preeperational and initial startup test programs are reviewed and the preposed technical specificatiens are evaluated in regard to limiting conditions of operation and pericdic surveillance testing.
The RHR system is reviewed to ' assure that it has the proper seismic and quality group class-(
i fications.
This aspect of the review is perforced as a portion of the effort described in SRP 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.
The RHR system is to be enclosed in a structure having the pro;er sels-mic classificaticn. The review is d:ne as a part of the effort described in SRP 3.2.2.
The RPR system is to be housed in a structure that provides adequate protection against wind, tornadoes, floods, and missiles (as appr:priate). The review of the adequacy'of this en-closure is performed as described in other standard review plans.
~he ApCSS reviews the ccepenent cooling er service water systems as described in SRP 9.2.1 r
and 9.2.2.
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The CSB, as descnbed in SRP 6.2.4, reviews the design of the RHR system to see that it is coroatible with the function of the contairment and that adequate isolation capabilities are provided.
The EICf3, as described in SAP 7.4, revie.s ; otor-c;erated valve controls, interlecks, sen-sors for interlocks, positicn indicatces, and power sources. EICSS ceter=ines that the inter-Iccks en motor-operated valves used as barriers between the high and 1cw pressure RHR piping are suitable independent and diverse and tnat trip signals close the valves when the pressure is too high.
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- The MIB, as /.....ibed in SKP 3.9.3, reviewt the design " instalTation of @ie WM syi84W W---
s'ee that appi. 3 1e coda requirements are cat.
The MTE3 reviews the caterials and inservice inspection progrem for the RHR system, as des-cribed in SRP 6.1.1 and 6.6.
The CPB reviews the core decay energy cutput on which the design is based to see that it is applicable and suitably conservative.
The MEB and APCSS review the effects of pipe breaks both in and cutside containment on reactor shutdown systems. This review includes the effects of pipe whip, jet impingement forces, and any environmental conditions created. The effect of missiles on the RHR system is also reviewed by these branches.
!!..ACCEp7'hCE CRITERIA Thi general objective of the reviilw is to determine that the RHR system meets the requirecents of General Design Criterion (GDC) 34 (Ref. 4) concerning shutdewn and long term cooling and GOC 61 (Ref.11) concerning cooling during refueling. The RHR system cust be capable of removing decay and residual heat frem the core after the initial phase of cooldown so as to preclude fuel damage.
The integrated design of the RHR system including pumps, heat exchangers, valves, tanks, piping, and system enclosure must be in accordance with GDC 2 (Ref.1) and GCC 4 (Ref. 2),
and should confonn to the reccomendations of Regulatory Guide 1.29 (Ref.12), Regulatcry Guide 1,46 (Ref.13), and the staff positions on protectico against piping failures cutside k
containment (Ref.15). The RHR system should meet the single " failure criterion.
Interfaces between the RHR system and RCIC'and ccmponent ce service water systems should be i
designed so that operation of one does not iriterfere with, and provides proper support (where required) for the other. In relaticn to tne:? and other shared systems (e.g., emer-j gency core ecoling and containment heat recoval systems), the RHR system r:ust conform to GCC 5 (Ref. 3). Coc.pccant ecoling and service water systems removing heat from the RHR heat exchangers cust conform to GDC 44, 45, and 46 (Refs. 5, 6, and 7). Containment isolation 4
provisions for the RRR system must conform to GCC 55, 55, and 57 (Refs. 8, 9, and 10).
It must be shown that adequate equipment, control, and sensing information is available to allcw the operator to properly execute any re;uirra reanual cperations during operation er test.
The preoperational and initial startup test progracs shculd meet the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.58 (Ref.14).
All connections between ths RCS and R;:R systems should be biccked by two independent and redundant borriers whenever the T.CS pressure is above the R3R design pressure. The acceptance criteria cencerning this feat:.re are as follcws:
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1.
At Irm atwo valvIs in series sh:11 b2 providef Risolata the RHR system wh:never tha
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primary system pressure is abova the pr:ssura raing of the RHR system.
t 2.
For systems where both valves are motor operated, the valves should have independent and diverse interlocks to prevent the valves from being accidentally opened unless the pritrary system pressure is below the. RHR system design pressure. The valves should also receive a signal to close automatically whenever the primary system pressure ex-ceeds the RHR system design pressure.
3.
For those systems where one check valve and one motor-operated valve are provided, the motor-operated valve should be interlocked to prevent valve opening whenever the prMry pressure is above the RHR system design pressure, and to close automatically whenever the primary system pressure exceeds the RHR system design pressure.
4.
For those systems where two check valves are provided, continuous or frequent periodic (e.g., annual) checking should be done to assure that neither check valve allows back-flow leakage.
5.
Suitable valve position indication should be provided for the above valves in the control room.
In addition to the above criteria, the acceptability of'the RHR system may be based on the degree of design similarity with previously approved plants.
III.
REVIEW PROCEDURES i
The procedures below are used during the construction permit (Cp) review to asst.re that
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the design criteria and bases and the preliminary design as set forth in the preifminary j
safety analysis report meet the acceptance criteria given in Section II of this plan.
For operating license (OL) reviews, the procedures are utilized to verify that the initial design criteria and bases have been appropriately implemented in the final design as set forth in the final safety analysis report. The OL review also includes the proposed tech-nical specifications, to ' assure that they are adequate in regard to limiting conditions of operation and periodic surveillance testing.
The following steps are taken by the reviewer to determine 'that the acceptance criteria of Section II have been met. These steps should be adapted to Cp or CL reviews as appropriate.
Using the d'escription given in Section 5.4.7 of the applicant's safety analysis report 1.
(SAR), including component lists and performance specifications, the reviewer deter-mines that the RHR system piping and instrumentaticn are such as to allow the system to cperate as intended, with or without offsite power and given any single active ccm-ponent failure. This is accomplished by reviewing the piping and instrumentation diagrams (pID's) to confirm that piping arrangcTants permit the required flow paths to be achieved and that sufficient process sensors are available to ceasure and transmit required information. A failure modes and effects analysis (or similar system safety analysis) provided in the SAR is used to determine conf]rmance to the single failure criterien.
5.4.7-4 11n:/75
2.
Using theMarison tables of SAR Section 1.3, the. o system is c, p: red to disigns
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and capacitics of such systems in similar plants to see that there are no unexplained I
departures frca previously reviewed plants. '4here possible, comparisons should ba made with actual performance data frcm similar systems in ccerating plants.
t 3.
Using the system process diagrams, PID's, failure modes and effects analysis, and component performance specifications, the reviewer determines that the RHR system has the capacity to remove the core decay heat load folicwing the initial ccoldown phase, given a single active ecmponent failure and with either onsite er offsite electric pcwer available. The reviewer censults with the CPB to confirm that the proper core decay energy cutput was assumed for the analysis.
4.
The reviewer checks the PID's to see that essential RHR system components are desig-nated seismic Category I and Safety Class II (the cooling water side of heat exchangers can be Safety Class III). Based on statements made in SAR Section 5.4.7 or on the reviews made by other branches the RSB reviewer ccnfirms that the RHR system meets the, requirements of GCC 2 and 4, and conforms to the recemendations of Guides 1.29 and 1.46 and the staff positions on piping failures outside contain. ent.
S.
By reviewing the piping arrangement and system cescription of the RHR system, the reviewer confirms that the RHR system meets the requirements of GDC S concerning shared systems.
6.
The RSS reviewer contacts the APCSS reviewer in conjunction with his review of the RHR
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system heat sink and refueling system interaction to 'nterchange information and assure that the reviews are consistent in regard to the interfacing paramirters. For example.
the ApCSB review determines the maximum service or c:mpenent cooling water temperature.
The RSB reviewer then' reviews the RHR system description to ddtermine that this maximum temperature has been allcwed for in the RHR system design.
7.
From the system description and PID's, the reviewer determines that the overpressure protection provided for the RHR system ceets the acceptance criteria as to valve placement, function, and testing. The review must also show that adequate overpressure protection (e.g., relief valves) is afferded so that any single misoperation (e.g.,
inadvertent startup of a makeup pump) or failure will no't over;ressuri:e the RHR system. EICS3 is contacted to ecnfirm that independent and diverse interlocks and trips are provided on any motor-c;erated valve used for overpressure protecticn and that valve position indication is adeq'. ate.
8.
The RSB reviewer contacts his countarpart in the SICSS to cbtain any needed information frcm their review. Specifically, EICS3 confirms that autcmatic actuation and remote-manual valve controls are capable of performing the functions required, and that sensor and monitoring provistens are adequate. The instru entation and controls of the RHR system are to have sufficient redundancy to satisfy the single failure criterion.
9.
The RSS engineer contacts his counterpart in CS3 so that the information needed con-l cerning their reviews will be intercharged.
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10; Th3 appficant's proposed pr: operational and initial startup test programs ara reviewed to detemina that they ar2 consistent with the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.63. At a
the Ct. stage, the reviewer assures that sufficient information is provided by the ap-
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plicant to identify the test objectives, r:ethods of testing, and test acceptance criteria (see par. C.2.b of Regulatory Guide 1.63).
s The reviewer evaluates the proposed test programs to determine if they provide reasen-able assurance"that the RHR system will perform its safety function. As an alternative to this detailed evaluation, the reviewar may compare the RHR system design to that of previously reviewed plants. If the design is essentially identical and if the proposed test progra.as are essentially the same, the reviewer may conclude that the proposed test programs are adequate for the RHR system. If the RHR system differs significantly from that of previously reviewed designs, the irpact of the proposed changes on the required.preoperational and initial startup testing programs are reviewed at the Cp stage. This effort should particularly evaluate the need for any special, design features required to perform acceptable test programs.
11.
The proposed plant technical specifications are reviewed to:
a.
Confirm the suitability of the limiting conditions of operationi including the proposed time limits and reactor cperating restrictions for periods when system equipment is inoperable due to repairs and maintenance.
b.
Verify that the frequency and scope of periodic surveillance testing is adequate.-
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12.
The reviewer confirms that the RHR system is housed in a structure whose design and design criteria have been reviewed by other branches to assure that it provides ade-quate protection against wind, tornadoes, floods, and missiles, as appropriate.
13.
The RSS reviewer provides information to other branches in those areas where the RSS has a secondary review responsibility that is not explicitly covered in steps 1-11 above.
These additional areas of secondary review responsibility include:
a.
Identification of engineered safety features (ESF) and safe shutdown electrical
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loads, and verification that the minimum time intervals for the c0nnection of tha ESF to the standby power systems are satisfactory.
b.
Identification of vital auxiliary sys-3 associated with the RHR system and determination of ecoling load functional requirements and minir.um time intervals.
Identification of essential components associated with the main staam supply and c.
the auxiliary feedwater systa:n that are required to operate during and following shutdown.
!Y.
EVA!.UATION FINDINGS The reviewer veriffes that the SAR centains sufficient inforrati:n and his review supports the following kinds of stata: ents and conclusiens, which should be included in the staff's safety evaluation report:
5.4.7-6 11/24/75 n
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"The rssidual hiat removal (RHR) system includes the piping, valves, pumps, heat ex-I changers, instrumentation, and controls used to remcVe core decay heat and provide long term core cooling following the initial phase of reactor cooldcwn. The scope of review of the RHR system for the plant included piping and instrumentation diagrams, equipment layout drawings, failure modes and effects analysis, and design performance specifications for essential components. The review has included the applicant's pro-posed design criteria and design bases for the RHR system, his analysis of the ade-quacy of the criteria and bases, and the confomance of the design to these criteria and bases.
"The drawings, componer.t descriptions, design criteria, and supporting analyses associ-ated with the RHR system have been reviewed and have been found to conform to Co.aission The RHR regulations and to applicable regulatory guides and staff technical positions.
system has been found to conform to Generi Design Criteria 2, 4, 5, 34, 55, 56, 57 and to Regulatory Guides 1.29, 1.46, and 1.68. The system was found capable of perfoming its shutdown cooling functions with only ensite or offsite electrical power available, assuming the cost restrictive single active ccmponent failure. It was also found that two independer.t and redundant barriers are always in place betwaen the reactor coolant, systems (RCS) and RER sy; tem whenever the RCS pressure is 5.igha* than the RER design pressure.
"The sti.ff concludes that the design of the residual heat removal system conforms to all applicable regulations, guides, and staff positions, and is acceptable."
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V.
REFERENCES
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1.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 2. "Cesign Sases for Protection Against Natural Phencmena."
2.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 4. " Environmental and Missile Design Eases."
3.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, Jeneral Design Critarion 5, " Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components."
4 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterien 24, "Resideal Heat Removal."
5.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A General Cesign Criterien 44, "Ccoling 'Jater."
6.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A General Cesign Criterion 45, " Inspection of Ccoling Water System."
7.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A. General Design Criterion 45, " Testing of Coolin; Water System."
8.
13 CFR Part 50, 4;;endix A, General Cesiga Criterion 55. "Reactcr Cociant Pressure Scundary Penetrating Contain ent."
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5.4.7-7 11/24/75
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9.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Cesign Criterion 55, " Primary Containment Isolation."
10.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 57, "C1.ssed System Isolation Valves."
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11.
10 CFR Part 50. Appendix A, General Design Criterion 61, " Fuel Storage and Handling and Radioactivity Control."
12.
Regulatory Guide 1.29. " Seismic Design Classification," Revision 1.
13.
Regulatcry Guide 1.46, " Protection Against Pipe Whip Inside Containment."
14.
Regulatcry Guide 1.68, '/reoperational and Initial Startup Test Programs for Water-Cooled Power Reactors."
15.
Branch Technical Positions APCSB 3--1, " Protection A.* inst Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems Outside Containment," attached to !;? 3.6.1, and MES 3-1, " Postulated Break and Leakage Locations in Fluid System Piping Outside Containment," attached to SRP 3.6.2.
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