ML19323B953
| ML19323B953 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/15/1979 |
| From: | Fitzpatrick R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Lynd S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19323B948 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8005140452 | |
| Download: ML19323B953 (3) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES
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'j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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JUN 151979 NOTE TO: Sue Lynd, FMEA Study Coordinator FROM:
C. G. Fitzpatrick, Power Systems Sranch, DSS THRU:
Faust Rosa, Chief, Power Systems Branch, DSS
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SUBJECT:
FMEA INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE PRESIDENTS TMI COMMISSION PSB requirements for and use of FMEA'r are as follows. The responses are keyed to the unsigned June 15, 1979 note to the DSS Branches requesting this FMEA information:
1 R.G.1.70 requires an FMEA to be submitted in SAR's to demonstrate the single failure criterion has been met with the design of the onsite emergency power system.
Ot5er specific FMEA's are requested on a case by case basis, at the discretion of the reviewer, to facilitate the review of new or unique design features.
2.
An FMEA provides insight into a design and a measure of whether or not the design meets the design bases. The applicant is requested to per-fonn the FMEA, learn # rom it, and then submit it for our review.
t 3.
tie use applicant-supplied FMEA's to expedite our review of the SAR.
The conclusions drawn from the results of the FMEA contribute to the bases for acceptability of the design.
We do FMEA's (the degree of formality and depth varies widel 4.
only on a case by case but also reviewer by reviewer basis) y not when we independently review a design for meeting the single failure criterion.
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R. G.
itzpatrj l
Power Systems Branch Division of Systems Safety cc:
V. Moore R. Satterfield V. Benaroya l
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f1 R.E. Ino Revision 3 November 1978 8.3.1.2 Analysis. Provide analyses to demonstrate compliance with the Commission's General Design Criteria and to indicate the extent to which the recommendations of regulatory guides and other applicable cri-teria are followed.
Especially important are the analvses to demonstrate
_comoliance with GDC 17 and 18 and the discussion to indicate the extent ~
y3 to wnicn the recommendations of Reaulatorv Go ws 1. 6 and 1. 9 (Safety' TA Guides 6 and 9) and of Reculatory Guide 1.32 are fn110wed. The discussion should identify all aspects of *.ne onsite power system that do not conform to Regulatory Guides 1.6,1.9, and 1.32 and should explain why such devia-tions are not in conflict with applicable General Design Criteria.
Identify all safety related equipment that must operate in a hostile environment (e.g.,
radiatf or., temperature, pressure, humidity) during and/or subsequent to a postulated accident (e.g., loss-of-coolant accident, steam line break).
All the conditions under which the equipment must operate should be tabulated.
Provide bases, criteria, and analyses of the potential effects of (1) radiation (i.e., radiation due to accident conditions superimposed on that for long-term normal operation) on safety-related electric equipment throughout the plant and (2) loss-of-coolant accidents or steam line breaks on all safety-related electric equipment within primary reactor containment (e.g., motors, cables) that must operate during and/or subsequent to such an accident. The successful completion D
of any applicable qualification tests for the above cases should be docu-mented.
Where such tests have not been previously completed, plans and schedules of the qualification tests proposed should be documented. The FSAR should document the results of these tests.
8.3.1.3 Physical Identification of Safety-Related Equipment. Describe the means proposed to identify pnysically the onsite power system equipment as safety-related equipment in the plant to ensure appropriate treatment, particularly during maintenance and testing operations. The description i
should include the method used to readily (without the necessity for con-sulting reference material) distinguish between redundant Class 1E systems, associated circuits assigned to redundant Class IE divisions, and non-Class 1E systems.
8.3.1.4 Independence of Redundant Systems.
Present the criteria and their bases that establish the minimum requirements for preserving the independence of redundant Class IE electric systems
- through physi-cal arrangement and separation and for ensuring the minimum required equip-ment availability during any design basis event.* A discussion should be included of the administrative responsibility and control to be provided to ensure compliance with these criteria during the design and installation of these systems. The criteria and bases for the installation of electrical cable for these systems should, as a minimum, include a description of the extent to which the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.75, " Physical Independence of Electric Systems," are followed.
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Class 1E electric systems and design basis events are defined in IEEE Std 308-1971.
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8-6 k Q. l. 3)
Enhnes ZEEE WD 308 (AlfAcME b)
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IEEE Std 30S 1974 CLASS IE POWER SYSTEMS FOR standby power supply. The power supply that 4.4 Location of Indicators and Controls. The is selected to furnish electric energy when the design shall provide controls and indicators in
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preferred power supply is not available.
the control room and provision shall be made for control outside the control room for the unit. A nuclet.r steam supply system,its asso-I
.u nd engi; (I) r uit breakers required to swit4 the neered safet eatures.
Class IE buses between the preferr.
and standby power supply (2) standby power supply
- 4. Principal Design Criteria 4.5 Identification. Components of Class IE 4.1 General. The Class IE, power systems power systems, and their associated design.
shall be designed to assure that no design operating, and maintenance documents, shall basis event will cause:
be marked or labeled in a distinctive manner.
(1) A lost of electric power to a number of 4.6 Equipment Protection. Class IE power engineered safety features. surveillance de-equipment shall be physically separated from vices, or protection system devices sufficient its redundant counterpart or mechanically to jeopardize the safety of the station.
protected as required to prevent the occur-(2) A loss of electric power to equipment rence of common failure mode.
that could result in a reactor power transient capable of causing significant damage to the 4.7 Equipment Qualification. Each type of fuel or to the reactor coolant system.
Class IE power equipment shall be qualified Illustrative design basis events are given by analysis, successful use under similar con-in Table 1.
ditions, or by actual test to demonstrate its ability to perform its function under normal
_and design basis events.
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(j Illustrative Design Basis Events 4.8 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis. An analysic of the failure modes of Class IE pow-x.,.;.a r.n iouo.
rmn...no.,io.
er systems and the effect of these failures on I,"',.n.
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the electric power available to Class IE loads 7""*d*
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shall be performed to demonstrate that a ronWated.ccident em ironmer a t humid:ty. temperature. pres. ore. chem.as single Component failure does not prevent sat-nlg""'" "d '"'*"""
isfactory performance of the minimum Class
$','7,"'Ji U."J"!.',',,,,,
IE loads required for safe shutdown and NbEUb""M*"N r'.'$I."t8E*.'.".*rY,I.I.%Nr".'orp,y comeined.itn any or in.
L dent station security.
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Singse.quipment m.Junetion
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4.9 Connection of Non-C1 ass IE Equipment.
sinai..quiem.at m.,ieri.nc e.ut...
EmC E Md mtwM6hmwkdb maintain the sta, tion in a safe and orderly con-dition, may be supplied from Class IE power 4.2 Design Basis Event Effects. Design basis systems, provided that the Class IE systems events shall be established for each individual are maintained at an acceptable level with re-unit and the severity and magnitude of each spect to the requirements of this document.
event defined. The Class IE power systems shall be capable of performing their function when subjected to the effects of any design basis event.
- 5. Supplernentary Design Criter.ia 4.3 Power Quality. The variations of voltage and frequency in the Class IE power systems 5.1 Class IE Power Systems.
[~N during any design basis event shall not de-5.1.1 Description. The Class IE power sys-f j
grade the pe formance of any load to the ex-tems shall consist of an alternating-current
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tent of causing significant damage to the fuel power system, a direct-current power system.
or to the reactor coolant system.
and a vital instrumentation and control pow-(
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