ML19323B722
| ML19323B722 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/03/1980 |
| From: | Bender M Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Tam P Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-1719, NUDOCS 8005140135 | |
| Download: ML19323B722 (18) | |
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P. Tam Staff Engineer CERTIFICATION OF THE MINtTTES OF THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETI!G
SUBJECT:
ON PLANT ARRANGEMENTS - WASHINGTON, DC - FEBRUARY 20 & 21, 1980 I hereby certify that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the minutes for the subject meeting, issued March 6, 1990, are an accurate record of the proceedirgs for that meeting.
O V
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Mi BeMer, Chairman Plant Arrangements Subcommittee
-fo (DATE 4
FOIA EXEMPTION (b) 5 MINUTES OF THE ACRS PLANT ARRANGEAENTS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING February 20-21, 1980 Washington, D.C. 20555 The ACRS Plant Arrangements Subcommittee met in open session on February 20-21, 1980 at 1717 H St., N.W. Washington, D.C.
The purpose 6f the meeting was:
To hear prosent-tions by the Staff and Sandia Laboratories on Phase 1 1.
of the Systems Interaction Methodology Applications Program, and to review the objective and goal of the program.
To review and recommend actions on the 13 generic items assigned to the 2.
Subcommittee.
(See below for listing).
Notice of the meeting was published in the Federal Register on february 5,1980..
Copies of the notice, meeting attendees list, and meeting schedule are included as Attachments 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
Documents received before and during the meeting are listed in Attachment 4, and one copy of each has been filed in the No written statement was submitted, and no request for oral state-ACRS office.
ments was made by members of the public.
Executive Session Mr. Bender, Subcomittee Chairman, convened the meeting at 11:30 A.M., introduced the ACRS members and consultants (Attachment 2) who were present, and indicated Mr.
that John C. McKinley was the Designated Federal Employee for the meeting.
Peter Tam of the ACRS Staff was also present.
He stated that the meeting was being conducted in accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act and the Government in the Sunshine Act. He further stated that portions of the meeting may be closed to discuss security matters (Note: the entire meeting was conducted inopensession).
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Mr. Bender briefly described the background of the Systems Interaction study:
Some time ago, the ACRS identified a need to better understand systems inter-actions, and as a result., the regulatory staff initiation work at Sandia The meeting would Laboratories to develop methodology for systems studies.
provide opportunity for the Subcommittee to review the work tha.t has been done.
Meeting with NRC Staff and Status of Task - J. Angelo Mr. Angelo described the historical background that led to the initiation of the Phase I of the Systems Interaction Methodology Applications Program Sandia work.
was performed in the latter part of 1978 and all of 1979, culminating in the The report will draft report (provided to the Subcommittee prior to the meeting).
Mr. Bender asked how the Sandia be published in fin'al form in March of this year.
technique differed from the fault tree technique in WASH-1400 (The "Rasmussen Report"), Mr. Angelo said that the latter is general and broad in scope but the Also, WASH-1400 former is a " narrow deep cut" into the systems interaction problem.
studied large accidents but the Sandia effort did not assume the occurrence of accidents - it assumed normal operating mode and searched for interactions that The Staff believes that the ACRS concern for the may lead to worse conditions.
systeins interaction issue was from a day-to-day operations perspective.
Management and Technical Overview - S. Hanauer Mr. Hanauer said that the Staff is not sure if it would actually draw fault trees To date, the Sandia study has pointed out about a dozen items which on each plant.
However, the show some potential for changes in the Standard Review Plan (SRP).
major result of the effort is a methodology of studying systems interaction in The scope of Phase I of the work has been limited by available funds.
general.
Furthermore, the Staff restricted its review.to available technology two. years ago (pre TMI-2 incident). As a result, issues such as human factors play only a
.
- minor role in Phase I of the program.
Mr. Hanauer requested Subcommittee comments on the Sandia work, but not an He indicated that the Staff will, in the near future, issue a ACRS letter.
report describing how it would use the methodology in the licensing process.
Discussion With Sandia Laboratories _
Introduction - Mr. D. McCloskey to develop a methodology for conducting a The objectives of the program are:
disciplined and systematic review of nuclear power plant systems which will facilitate identification and evaluation of systems interactions which affect the likelihood of core damage, and to use the methodology to assess the SRP to
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determine its completeness in identifying and evaluating a limited range of systems interactions.
Overview of Study - J. Hickman Systems interaction is defined as an event or sequence of events causing two or more components to fail to perform their function, thus increasing the likelihood of an undesired event. The scope was limited to the study of normal conditions and incidents of moderate frequency. The methodology consists of three steps:
Identification of important systems using fault tree analysis.
1.
Identification of potential interactions by matching commonalities
- 2.
using the SETS computer code, and 3.
Evaluation of interaction by specific case review.
Mr. Bender asked how the methodology is different from the WASH-1400 methodology.
Mr. Hickman said that the Sandia methodology is more systematic.
- " Commonalities" is the term used to denote linking characteristics between components, e.g. physical proximity, shared motive power, control, actuation, cooling, lubri-cation.
)
Mr. Arnold asked if there is anyone in the Sandia group who is familiar with plant as-built conditions, and if experts of all disciplines are represented Mr. Hickman said that experts of all areas have been included in in the group.
As for obtaining plant as-built conditions, Sandia used the P& ids, the group.
visited the plant, and consulted with the utility on details of plant components.
Fault Tree Development - Mr. W. Cramond The three basic Fault trecs form the basis for the systems interaction ansiysis.
function fault trees describing conditions potentially leading to unacceptable failure to achieve or maintain reactor subcriticality, failure core damage are:
to remove decay heat, and failure of the reactor coolant system pressure boundary.
The purpose of the fault trees is to model the combinations of components which, if failed, would result in loss of any of the above three functions and by Each fault tree assumption result in the potential for unacceptable core damage.
is develope,d from the function at the top of the tree to specific components at the bottom of the tree that are directly applicable to the failure of that function. Only those parts of systems which affect the undesired top event are included. Not all systems are identified explicitli or modelled in their entirety.
The three basic function fault trees which would lead to unacceptable core damage through an "Or" gate is shown in pp. 16 of the Sandia handout.
Th2 necessary systems and success criteria for each basic function vary depending on the operational mode of the plant at the time of the occurrence which challenges Five of the six possible plant modes were studied.
the plant, system to shutdown.
Four occurrence categories are defined. This results in twenty potential combi-nations to be modelled and analyzed for each basic function. These are shown on P.13 of the Sandia handout.
These twenty combinations of modes and occurrences coupled with the three functions result in sixty potentially different fault trees.
Due to similarities between the sixty cases, only 20 distinct fault trees were needed. (These are listed on P.18ofthehandout.) These are the foundation for further analysis.
The most significant potential interacions are those that involve all the events of a cut set.* This would indicate that there exists a potential for a single failure which would compromise the performance of a given plant function. (The prevention of single failures is the philosophy that dominates the Standard Review Plan and its completeness in the evaluation of potential single failures is con-sidered of principal importance.)
Once the interactions had been grouped, questions used to evaluate the Standard Review Plan were formulated.
These questions (e.g., "Does the plan prevent the common location of train A of system Q, train B of system Q, and system R?") were then answered through de-tailed review of the Standard Review Plan. The first step involved review of the SRP section which addressed the specific systems. The second step was the review of S'./ sections dealing with support systems and general design. The review process on any given question was stopped when a specific statement dealing with an inter-action was found.
Theoutputofthistaskwasalistoftheimportantpotentiakinteractionsand their coverage in the Standard Review Plan and its supporting documents.
Specific statements which preclude certain interactions were documented.
If the only ref-erence to a potential interaction was in inference to a general statement, e.g.,
no single failure shall prevent operation of a system, it was documented as such.
- A cut-set is a combination of component events in the fault tree whose cccurrence would cause the top event.
-D-Finally, potential interactions not mentioned in any manner were pointed out.
The most significant potential interaction found at the exemplary facility in-These valves share a common volves the pressurizer power operated relief valves.
location with their isolation valves.
If a pressurizer relief valve were to fail open and also leak (spray), it could potentially fail its own isolation valve.
The reactor protection system did not appear to be subject to interactions within the scope of the program. The system is highly redundant.
Results - J. Hickman be modified to accommodate peer review comments, but th re The draft report will will be no changes in the analysis itself. Also, lessons learned from the TMI-2 Dr. Mark asked if Sandia had incident may have some input into the final report.
' c.teracti on. Mr. Hickman identified, using the methodology, new areas of systems said that the work was a qualitative study, and gave no specific answer.
Mr. Angelo added that Phase 2 may start next month (March), but may be delayed by other things such as the TMI implementation plan.
Executive Session Mr. Epler pointed out that the exemplary plant, Watts Bar, is not an operating Thus, Sandia would have necessarily done more of its work from drawings plant.
than from as-built handware conditions. Mr. Bender said he felt the same.
Mr. Bender said that in general, the nuclear industry is too dependent on the regulators telling it what to do, rather than taking its own initiative.
Mr. Epler said that from experience (such as the Brown Ferry fire, TMI-2 incident etc.), testing activities are hazardous in that they have caused a number of l
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undesirable events. The Sandia work does not account for such. He indicated i
that he did not believe this methodology would tell much more than is already known because of such limitetions.
Mr. Moeller and Mr. Ray added that they agreed with Mr. Epler, and that they doubted if the methodology would even reveal known systems interactions.
Furthermore, Sandia may have been using the same methodology as was used in the past to evaluate the exemplary facility against systems interactions; Mr. Moeller did not see the present Sandia approach as being innovative.
Mr. Zudans said that the methodology amounted to " summarize everything that you already know and see what else that suggests." The system inte,'cRas are fed in to the methodology i.e. they are defined a priori as input.
Mr. Bender said that the scope of the program was too constrained to start with (the program was limited to the study of normal operations), and Sandia has He is not enthusiastic about Phase 2 accepted all design objectives as being true.
- Namely, of the program until Sandia can produce something more useful in Phase I.
the study should show that there are lines of defense; in the absence of such, there is little or no value.
Mr. Lawroski said that the work should involve more people with actual plant ex-perience than it does now.
Mr. Hanauer indicated that he was disappointed the program has not done more, but that the Sandia work was just to supply a " matrix for a number of studies", while the IREP (Integrated Reliability Evaluation Program) would supply the event-tree type of matrix. Neither of these matrices by itself is an analysis - they are just methods.
Mr. Bender summed up saying that despite the large number of negative criticisms, the Subcommittee did not say that the Sandia work is not usable.
Sandia needs When asked to demonstrate Phase I more before proceeding further in the program.
by Mr. Bender for votes, no member or consultant suggested that the work should be discontinued. Mr. Moeller stated that many believe that accidents in the future will probably occur as the result of unexpected events. Since systems interactions may be a major source of unexpected events, the Sandia work is important in this sense.
(The meeting was recessed at 5:40 P.M., to be reconvened the following day.)
Discussion With NRC Staff on 13 Generic Items (The ACRS has assigned 13 generic items to this Subcommittee for review.
A copy of the generic items letter No. 7 is filed with these minutes.
The numbers of the items below refer to numbers in the letter.)
6.
Fuel Storage Pool Design Basis 8.
Protection Against Industrial Sabotage 70.
Design Features to Control Sabotage Mr. Durst of the Research Staff reported that a major project at Sandia covers all three items. The heart of the project is to extend the SETS code to permit vital area identification. The SNUPP plants are being used for this study and findings have actually caused design changes at SNUPPS (no specific example given). Mr. Durst indicated that he will have Sandia and the Staff brief appropriate ACRS groups on the results of this project.
Mr. Lawroski mentioned that Mr. Michelson (ACRS consulttnt) wrote a report indicating that badly vulnerable plants might be sabotaged. Mr. Durst said that points raised by Mr. Michelson will be addressed by the Sandia group.
No further details were discussed.
The Subcommittee discussed the merits of building spent fuel storage pools underground but did not go into details nor come to any conclusion.
Mr. Durst said The Subconanittee is concerned about sabotage of the pool.
will address concerns that two Sandia reports, to be published in April covered by items 6, 8, and 70.
Currently, items 6 and 8 are classified as " resolved" on the basis of Reg.
Guides 1.13 " Spent Fuel Storage Pool Design Basis", and 1.17, " Protection of N-Plants Against Industrial Sabotage".
Item 70 is classified as "reso-Mr. Lawroski indicated that it is implementation of Reg.
lution pending".
Guide pasitions that always causes problems. He suggested that items 6 and 8 be.left in their current classification unless the Sandia reports The Subcommittee and Mr. Bender did not object to this say otherwise.
suggestion.
Mr. Bender pointed out that the fact that item 70 remains on the "reso-Mr.
tion pending" list seems to contradict the classification of item 8.
Ray said that maybe item 8 should be reclassified as unresolved on such Mr. Allen of the Staff reported that since publication of contradictions.
10 CFR 73.55, Reg. Guide 1.17 was no longer used for licensing reviews.
At the disclosure of this information, Mr. Bender said that the basis on which this item is considered resolved is no longer valid.
(The Subcommittee, howev'er, did not make any statement at this point to reclassify any of items 6,8and70).
- 30. ECCS Capability of Current and Older Plants _
- 62. ECCS Capability of Future Plants No discussion.
Items transferred to ECCS Subcommittee.
- 52. Safety Related Interfaces Between Reactor Island and Balance-of-Plant Questions have been raised concerning both standardized balance-of-plant and NSSS on the one hand and custom-designed structures and components on the other. The Staff, in its report NUREG-0102 (Interfaces for Standard Design), has identified the safety related interfaces of licensing concern.
Reconnendations of this report have been incorporated into the SRP (Reg.
Guide 1.70).
The Subcommittee agreed to, on the basis of the SRP, to leave this item in its current status, " resolved".
58.
Non-Random Multiple Fai16res The Subcommittee realized that this item ties in to other generic items such as anticipated transients without scram (ATWS), reliability of AC and DC power sources. As a result, the Subcommittee decided to leave this item in its current status, " resolution pending".
23.
Quality Group Classification for Pressure Retaining Components Reg. Guide 1.26 covers this item but the incident at TMI-2 prompted the Staff to reconsider the classification system. The Subcommittee con-cluded that even though this item is considered " resolved", it may have to be reclassified if the Staff initiated new actions.
Currently, there is no Staff activity in this area except thoughts.
22.
Seismic Design of Steamlines New Reg. Guide 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification", covers this item.
plants do not have problems meeting the requirements in this guide but older plants have not been designed accordingly. On the basis of this Reg. Guide, the Subcommittee decided that this item should retain its current status, " resolved."~
- 28. Protection Against Pipe Whip Reg. Guid? 1.46, SRP 3.61, and 3.62 address this item.
Plants built prior
- 11 to issuance of these documents may not have met these requirements and the Staff expects the Systematic Evaluation Program would show For how closely these older plants conform and what fixes are needed.
these older plants, the issue of pipe restraint is probably one that is The methods that might have to be
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going to be difficult to deal with.
used are likely to be less conservative than instantaneous pipe break.
Seismic Category 1 Requirements for Auxiliary Systems _
41.
The Subcommittee recognized that this is covered by Reg. Gu 1.29, and did not see any need to change its present status, " r Vessel Support Structures _
73.
A possible consequence of the instantaneous double-ended pi M
t ic postulated to occur in certain large pipes of PWRs is the asymme r The magnitude loading of the reactor pressure vessel support structures.
er i
d to and effects of such loads on the pressure vessel should be determ ne urs -
f a LOCA.
t]vi; establish if such loads adversely affect the predicted course o ur If analysis indicates that the results are unacceptable, appropriate M
A potential effect is pressure vessel mer rective action should be taken.
9 trans-movement due to blowdown jet forces at the location of the rupture,
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res ient differential pressure in the annular region between the ves barrel the shield, and transient differential pressures across the core within the reactor vessel.
)
The Staff informed the Subcommittee that Brookhaven Nationa publish a report in April on the study of combination of dynamic loads.
Plants under construction are being designed and constructed against asyninetric load.
The Subcommittee reconnended that this item retain its present status,
" resolution pending".
Mr. Bender then asked the consultants to submit any further comments in writing and adjourned the meeting at 5:30 P.M.
1 A complete transcript of the meeting is on file at the NRC Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20555 or can be obtained from International Verbatim Reporters, Inc., Suite 107, 449 South Capitol Street, S.W.
Washington, D. C. 20002 (202-484-3550.)
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Federal Register / Vcl. 45, Ns. 25 / Tuesd:y. February 5.1980 / N:tices
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L. 92443). that, should such sessions be Iges 1. Bradford, NW Washington.D.C.20550,ar lephone required.1tla scessary to close theseAssociate AdminiscotorforE.nforcement-e sessions to protect proprietary
' (202) 632-7880.
AD interested agencies, organizations information. See 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(4).
pm on.e sm rmed u.am ans M o' atroons desiring io submit comments Further information regarding topics amassa anos answwr sr suggestions for consideration durirlf to be discussed, whether the meeting
'h2 preparation of the draft EIS should has been cancelled or reacheduled, the DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY cont:ct Mr. Randall by March 31.1980-Chainoan's ruhng on requests for the For the National Sdence Foundation.
opportunity to present oral statementa Omco of the,Secrery prends s.lebanoa, and the time aUottad therefor can be
-7 Assistant Directorfor Astrononucol.
obtained by a prepaid talephone call to goept. carsdar Puhac o.et L so)
Atmosphene. Earth, and Ocean Sciences.
the cognaant Designated Federal jaosary so.1sso.
Employee,Mr. ohn C. McKinley Treasury Bonds of 2005-20kO; Auction an om. an.ause md w.am ees.g (telephone 202 634-3265) between 8:15 am.ama cosa tees es-as a.m. ad 5 00 p.m. EST.
january 31.teso.
1.lavitation for Tanders I'""
NUCLE M GULATORY C.
1.1.,%e Secretary of the Treasury.
COMMISSION '.
d @'m under the authority of the Second Liberty Bond Act, as amended, invite's
- Pn n.c.so a ama s4.annes I tenders for approximately $2,000,000.000 Advisory Committee on Resctor aswmo caos mwus
_ of United States securities, designated Saf: guards; Subcommittee on Plant Arrangements; Meeting Treasury Bonds of 2005-2010 (CUSIP No.
912810 CM 8).The securities wfH be sold De ACRS Subcommittee on Plant POSTAL RATE COMutSSION at auction with bidding on the basis of Arr ngements will hold a meeting yield. Payment will be required at the February 20-21,1980 in Room 1046,1717 Briefing the Govemors on Structure prf:e equivalent of the bid yield of each H St., NW, Washington, DC 20555.
and Functions of the Commission accepted tender. The interest rate on the Notice of this meeting was published securities and the price equivalent of February 1.1980.
J nuary 22,1980-in accordance with the procedures Notice is hereby given that the Postal each accepted bid will be determined in cutlined in the Federal Register on Rate Commission will brief the the manner described below. Additional October 1.1979. (44 FR 56408) oral orgovernors of the U.S. Postal Service on amounts of these securities may be written statements may be presented by the structure and functions of the issued to Government accounts and members of the public, recordings will Commission. The briefing will be at 6:00 Federal Reserve Banks for their own account in exchange for maturing be permitted only during those portions P.m., on Tuesday. February 5,1980, in cf the meeting when a transcript is being the Commission's Hearing Room,2000 L. Treasury securities. Additionalamounts kept, and questions may be asked caly Street NW., Room 500, Washington, D.C.
of the new securities may also be issued at the average price to Federal Reserve by members of the Subcommittee,it David F. Hanis.
Banks, as agents for foreign and consultanta and Sta!L Persons desiring Secnfory.
international monetary authorities. to to make oral statements should notify the Designated Federal Employee as far yt o.awa:n ma w-am o.s !
the extent that the aggregate amount of onwuo come mwwr tenders for such accounts exceeds the in advance as practicable so that aggregate amount of maturing securities
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eppropriate arrangementa can be made
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held by them.
to allow the necessary time during the meetingfor such statements.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION The agenda for sub[ect meeting shall be as foUows: Wednesday. February 20.
National Higtmay Traffic Safety 2.1 The securities willbe dated 19s0-112 o.m. until the conclusion ofAdministratic a February 15,1980, and will bear interest from that date, payable on a semiannual business. De Subcommittee will Midas Series 2000 Motorhomes; Public basis on August 15.1980, and each discuss with the NRC Staff and their l
recently completed "Rnal Report (Draft) ' Meeting Cancelled subsequent 6 months on February 15 contractor. Sandia Laboratories, the l
A public proceeding scheduled for 10 and August 15, until the principal I
becomes payable.They wiu mature on Phase I of Generic Task No. A-17, m.m February 5,1980,in Room 2230, Systems Interaction in Nuclear Power Department of Transportation Building.
February 15,2010, but may be redeemed l
Plants." Thursday, Febntory 21.1960.-
400 Seventh Street,S.W Washington.
at the option of the Uritted States on and C30 a.m. untilthe conclusion of D.C. 20590, with respect to an initial after February 15,2005, in whole or in I
bysiness.The Subcommittee wiU determination of noncompliance with part, at par and accrued interest on any discuss the status of various generic Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards interest payment date or dates,on 4 Items contained in the ACRS March 21.
Nos. 207. 206, and 210 in Series 2000 months' notice of call given in such 1979 report.*' Status of Generic Items Motorhomes manufactured by Midas-manner as the Secretary of the Treasury Relating to Light. Water Reactors: Report International Corp. is canceUed. The abaU prescribe. In case of partial call, company has announced its intent to file the securities to be redeemed w in addition,it may be necessary for a Noncompliance Report pursuant to 49 determined by such method as may be No. 7.*
the Subcommittee to hold one or more CFR Part 573 not later than February 8 prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, Interest on the secudties closed sessions for the purpose of 1980-called for redemption shall cease on the exploring matters involving proprietary (Sec.152. Pub.1. sNe:, as Stat.1470 (15 date of redemption specifiedin the information. I have determined,in U.S.C.1412). delegation of authority at 4e notice of call.
accordance with Subsection 10(d) of the Cm t.51 and 4e CFR 5o1.6)
Fedetal Advisory Committee Act (Pub.
(l mMendhh
- ~,,,., - - - -..
ATTACHMENT 2 PROPOSED
SUMMARY
ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON PLANT ARRANGEMENTS WASHINGTON, DC FEBRUARY 20 & 21, 1980 l
t ATTENDEES:
N_RC STAFF j
ACRS J. Durst M. Bender, Chairman G','Zech J. Ebersole R. Bosnak S. Lawroski R. Mattu J. Mark S. Hou D. Moeller W. Lanning J. Ray T. Allen H. Etherington E. Quinn J. Arnold, ACRS Consultant A. Sinisgalli E. Epler, ACRS Consultant T. Michaels S. Saunders, ACRS Consultant J. Norberg E. Rodabaugh, ACRS Consultant (21st only)
T. Scarbrough Z. Zudans, ACRS Consultant D. Fischer J. McKinley, Designated Federal Employee J. Angelo P. Tam, ACRS Staff S. Hanauer J. Zwolinski SANDIA LABORATORIES DUKE POWER COMPANY S. Hatch W. Cramond S. Rose G. Boyd D. McCloskey TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY D. Simpson BECHTEL CORPORATION BABCOCK & WILCOX R. Borsum l
IVRI REPORTERS _
S. Corsanico E. Aguirre B. Nunevar
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j
'ITNTATIVE DETAILED SCHEDULE ACRS PIAVT ARRANGEME!frS SUBCCNMITTEE 1
ROCM 1046,1717 H St., NW l
WASHINGTON, DC FEBRUARY 20 & 21, 1980 APPROXIMATE TIME 11:00 a.m.
EXEClfrIVE SESSION (OPEN)
Introductory Statement (M. Bender, Subcommittee Chairman)
Discussion of Agenda (Subcommittee and Consultants)
MEETING WITH NRC STAFF AND SANDIA IABORA1 DRIES TO DISCUSS PHASE I, SYSTEMS INTERACTION METHODOLOGY APPLICATIONS PROGRAM 11:05 a.m.
- Status of Task (J. Angelo) 11:20 a.m.
Management and Technical Overview (S. Hanauer) objectives scope 11:50 a.m.
- Introduction (Sandia Labs.)
definition of systems interactions systems interaction problem methodology 12:10 p.m.
Fault Tree Development (Sandia Labs.g) A, 1 c4
- LUNCH ******************
12:30 p.m. - 1:30 p.m.
1:30 p.m.
Fault Tree Analysis Techniques (Sandia Labs.)
%ffh 3
2:45 p.m.
Analysis Results (Sandia Labs.)
reactor coolant pressure boundary decay heat removal function I
reactor suberiticality function _)
3:15 p.m.
Results and Conclusions (Sandia Labs.)
General Discussion (NRC Staff and Sandia Labs.)
3:45 p.m.
future of program, follow-on work 5:15 p.m.
AIUOURINEMr.
l FEBRUARY 21, 1980 The Subconsnittee will discuss the status of various generic items contained in 21,1979, " Status of Generic Items Relating to Light-Water the Cortnittee's March Reactors: Repor t No. 7.
APPROXIfRTE TIME 1
8:30 a.m.
j PLA.JT ARRAEEMENTS/ SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY REIAED ITEMS
- 6.
Fuel Storage Pool Design Bases
- 8.
Protection Against Industrial Sabotage j
- 70.
Design Features to Control Sabotage l
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1(T:00 a.m. 7 PLARi ARRANGE *INTS/ECCS REIATED ITEMS
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ECCS Capability of Current and Older Plants
"+
- 30.
Wb BWR and PWR Primary Coolant Ptanp Overspeed During LOCA
- 60.
[,
- 62.
ECCS Capability for Future Plants i
11:00 a.m.
PLANT ARRA%EMENTS RELAED ITEMS
- 52.
Safety Related Interfaces Between Reactor Island and Balance-of-Plants
- 58.
Non-Random Multiple Failures
- 23.
Quality Group Classification for Pressure Retaining Components
- LUNCH ********************
12:00 noon - 1:00 p.m.
1:00 p.m.
CCMBINATION OF DYNAMIC LOADS REIA'ITD ITEMS
- 22.
Seismic Design of Steam Line t
f
- 28.
Protection Against Pipe Whip Seismic Category 1 Requirements for Auxiliary Systems
- 41.
- 73.
Vessel Support Structures 3:00 p.m.
AD300R mEvr
- Refers to item ntsnber in the Comittee's Generic Items Report No. 7.
F-1 ATTACHMENT 4 LIST OF DOCUMENTS RECEIVED
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1.
J. Angelo's view graphs on status of Task Action Plan A-17.
S. Hanauer's view graphs on " Reliability Engineering and Risk Assessment".
2.
Sandia Laboratories (D. McCloskey, J.
Hickman, W. Cramond, G. Boyd) view 3.
graphs on " Systems Interaction Methodology Applications Program".
4.
J. Durst's view graphs on "N-Power Plant Design Concepts for Sabotage Protection."
5.
J. Durst's handout, " Program Plan N-Power Plant Design Concepts for Sabotage Protection".
6.
ACRS letter, " Status of Generic Items Relating to Light-Water Reactors: Report No. 7".
Sandia Draft Report, " Phase I, Systems Interaction Methodology Applications 7.
Program".
8.
Memo,R. Major to M. Bender, background material for this meeting.
The above documents were " handouts" at the Feb. 20-21 meeting.
If you desire to obtain any of these documents, you may contact the ACRS office.
.