ML19322C857
| ML19322C857 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/07/1979 |
| From: | Donna Anderson, Folsom F NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE, NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001280651 | |
| Download: ML19322C857 (82) | |
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- g g%e.%.. Difd..OINTERVIEW'OF DONALD GENE ANDERS q,
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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
X 3
In the Matter of:
4 THREE MILE ISLAND 5
SPECIAL INTERVIEWS 6
X I
7 i
8 f
9 6th Floor Maryland National Bank 10 Building 7735 Old Georgetown Road 11 Bethesda, Maryland t
Friday, September 7, 1979 1:10 p.m.
13 I
i I
14 BEFORE:
15 FRED FOLSOM FRED HEBDON 16 i
17 18 i
19 I.
20 i
21 i
22 i
1 23 24 Am.Few3 Roomrs, lm.
j 25 l
i t
2 CONTENTS 1
2 INTERVIEW OF:
EXAMINATION 3
Donald Gene Anderson 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
I 10 l
f 11 12 i
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9 14 I
15 16 i
17 18 i
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20 j
21 l
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24 pFaserei topormn. Inc.
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3 P_ R O_ C E_ E D_ I N_ G_ S,
- r. 6830
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Whereupon, DONALD GENE ANDERSON 3
was called as a witness and, having first been duly sworn, was a
examined and testified as follows:
5 EXAMINATION CXX 6
BY MR. HEBDON:
7 8
Q On the record.
Have you read and do you understand the letter that 9
10 Mr. Rogovin sent to you concerning this interview?
11 A
Yes.
12 Q
Do you have any questions or comments concerning that.
13 letter?
14 A
No.
15 Q
Will you please state your name?
16 A
Donald Gene Anderson.
17 Q
What is your current occupation?
18 A
I am a principal inspector with the Vendor Section 19 Branch, Project Evaluation Section.
20 Q
What was your position in early 1979?
21 A
The same.
22 O
How many people reported to you?
I 23 A
None.
24 Q
To whom do you report?
Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 A
Cliff Hale.
i 1
4 Q
What is his position?
1c-2 A
He's Chief, Program Evaluation Section.
2 3
Q All right.
Would you describe your employment history, including your positions held at the NRC?
4 5
A Do you want me to give you a resume or --
That would be fine, and then if you could just 6
Q briefly describe your employment, just to have it complete.
7 8
Q Okay.
You want AEC and NRC or just NRC?
I 9
A
- Both, 10 0
Okay.
1965-66, I was employed by the AEC as a
{
reactor inspector, Division of Compliance, Region II, Atlanta.
11 My inspection responsibilities were the research reactors in
?2 that region and also, BONUS, which is in Puerto Rico and 13 Carolina Tube Reactor, which is in South Carolina.
14 15 MR. HEBDON:
For the record, this document is a personal qualification of Donald Gene Anderson and I would like 16 to have it included in the record at this point.
17 18 MR. FOLSOM:
Insert 1.
(Professional qualifications for Donald Gene 2XX 19 Anderson was marked Insert No. 1 for Identification.)
20 21 1
22 23 24 Ace-Federet Reporters, Inc.
25 i
5 010-3 THE WITNESS:
Then, my present employment with NRC began when the NRC began in January of 1975.
And I was 2
riginally a reactor inspector.
I had responsibilities for 3
Arkan5as-1, ANO-1.
I was principal inspector on that plant.
4 I assisted in the other nuclear power plants in our region, 5
which are Fort Saint Brain, Cooper Plant in Fort Calhoun.
6 And I also was responsible for inspection of some research 7
reactors in Region IV.
8 okay.
Then, in 19 -- let me look at the book.
Let's' 9
In July of 1976, I transferred to the licensee contractor see.
10 I
vendor inspection program, which is now the Vendor Inspection 11 Branch, and was responsible for Westinghouse.
I was principal 12 i
inspector on Westinghouse, principal inspector on NABASCO.
j 13 And I assisted other inspectors on inspections of the other l
14 i
architect engineers and nuclear steam suppliers.
My 15 responsibility in this position is to evaluate the quality i
16 assurance programs of these architect engineering firms and 17 nuclear steam suppliers, in particular, their engineering 18 19 design activities.
BY MR. HEBDON:
20 21 0
All right.
First of all, I'd like to ask you some I
questions concerning an event that occurred at Davis-Besse in j
22 i
23 September, 1977.
I am particularly interested in any j
i 24 knowledge of this incident that you may have had prior to the I Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 accident at TMI, specifically, prior to March 29th, 1979.
What i
6 knowledge did you have concerning the incident that occurred 1c-4 3
2 at Davis-Besse on September 24th, 19777 3
A The only knowledge that I had of that was a meeting that I attended at Babcock & Wilcox because I'm now principal 4
5 inspector at Babcock & Wilcox.
I attended a meeting at Babcock 6
& Wilcox.
Let's see, February 14th, 1979, in which the 7
Davis-Besse transient was discussed.
8 Q
Now, is this the Davis-Besse transient that was 9
discussed at that meeting?
Do you recall specifically when 10 that transient occurred?
11 A
No.
12 0
Do you have any -- is there any possibility that 13 that was a different transient that was referred to at that 14 meeting and not the one that occurred in September of '77?
15 A
They discussed -- I am not sure of the date of the 16 transient that they were discussing.
l 17 Q
All right.
18 A
I know it had to do with -- it had to do with 19 pressurizer indicator loss at Davis-Besse, Toledo Edison plant. :
20 Q
There are two transients that occurred at Davis-i 21 Besse that are of interest to us.
One occurred on November 22 29th, 1977, and one occurred on September 24th, 1977.
And I 23 believe that the one that they were referring to at that meeting' 24 was the one that occurred on November 29th.
Ace Federet Reporters, Inc.
I 25 So, are you aware of other than the transient that
.~
7 elo-5 was discussed at that meeting?
Are you aware of any other j
transients that occurred at Davis-Besse?
2 A
No.
3 Q
All right.
Have you ever discussed concerns by 4
Mr. Kelly and a Mr. Dunn of B&W associated with that incident 5
in November of '77, or were there concerns about the adequacy of-6 pressurizer level of the indication or the adequacy of 7
instructions that would be given to operators concerning 8
pressurizer level indication?
9 A
I don't believe I know a Mr. Kelly or a Mr. Dunn at j
t 10 i
11 B&W.
It's possible that in my sections of B&W, that I have run across them, and obtained documentation as part of my 12 13 inspection routine.
But I see maybe 200 people there, and I don't remenber, you know -- the ones that I have interviewed.
14 15 0
Mr. Dunn, I believe, works with ECCS Analysis Group..
16 In fact, I believe he.is the head of that group.
A Okay.
We conducted a series of inspections in 17 1978 that had to do with computer programs for ECCS Analysis.
18 But -- and I was scheduled to go to B&W for that meeting, which 19 I think was in August of '78.
But, I had 20 so I was not able to attend.
And I would have 21 22 probably met Dunn at that time, if I had gone, because I'm sure l
if he's in charge of the ECCS Analysis Group, that they did 23 24 interview him.
I I
Ace Federd Reporters. Inc.
25 O
But, yeu have no knowledge of any concerns that were
8 ilc-6 raised by people at B&W concerning the instructions that they had been given to the operators about how to interpret 2
pressurizer level?
3 A
Not specifically.
The only knowledge that I have of 4
that is the meeting of February 14th.
They discussed this and 5
they discussed that the operators had manually run back tne 6
controllers on the -- during this loss of level transient.
They 7
had been manually running back the controllers on the charging 8
pumps for the primary reactor coolant system as part of a 9
method to raise level back in a pressurizer, after they had lost' 10 11 level due to a rapid cool-down.
i 12 0
We'll get into this a little bit later on.
I am a little confused.
Why were they running back the charging 13 14 pumps to regain level?
t 15 A
No.
No.
They were running back the controllers on 16 the charging pumps, I. guess, to increase the flow of the 17 charging pumps.
Maybe it's the other way around.
They were 13 ' increasing flow of the charging pumps to get more water into the I
19 primary coolant system to raise the level in the pressurizers.
And they were doing this manually.
20 j Q
Are these the make-up pumps for the high pressure 21 22 injection pumps?
23 A
They'd be the make-up pumps.
The charging pumps for l l
24 the system.
The high pressure safety injections are for action Ace Feder9 Reporters. Inc.
25 conditions.
These were just normal make-up that they were adding i
i
9 c10-7 1
to the system.
And they used these pumps to raise level in 2
the pressurizer.
3 Q
During transients?
4 A
Yes, sir.
During this rapid cool-down transient that 5
they had been experiencing in some of these B&W plants.
6 Q
okay.
You keep mentioning this meeting in B&W.
7 I'll get to that in a little more detail a little later.
But 8
I'd like to try and cover some preliminaries first.
9 Were you aware of an investigation of concerns 10 raised by a Mr. Creswell of I&E, Region III?
II A
Not until February 14th, 1979.
12 0
You had no knowledge of it prior to that time?
13 A
I didn't even know Creswell, no, 14 Q
Now, how did you become involved in the meeting in 15 February?
16 A
I was the principal inspector for Babcock & Wilcox.
17 We were notified by Region III that an inspection team was 18 coming in to meet B&W on the 14th to follow up on some 19 concerns I had had in Region III.
And so, my management felt 20 that it would be appropriate that since I had scheduled inspec-t 21 tion for that week, a regular inspection, that I take time off 22 from my regular inspection and sit in on the entrance meeting 23 and see what the purpose of that visit by the people of Region 2#
III was.
J Ace Feder;A Reporters. Inc.
oc Q
Okay.
Could you go ahead and describe your
~
l l
10 involvement at that particular meeting?
)lc-8 j
A Yes.
I attended the entrance meeting.
And I guess 2
there were -- there must have been five plants or somewhere --
3 five plants, I guess, that were generic to the Davis-Besse 4
plant that were experiencing some of these same problems that 5
the Davis-Besse plant had.
And,the Babcock & Wilcox people 6
were there to present a chart presentatinn of the transients 7
that had been experienced.
8 And utility representatives were there from I think 9
all but one of the plants that were involved.
And I attended 10 i
11 the meeting.
The meeting was also attended by a Mr. Foster l
l and a Mr. Kohler from Region III.
It was their responsibility 12 to be there for this particular meeting and follow up on what-13 ever concerns there was about the transients.
l 14 l
15 And so, Ihadalreadybeentherefromthedaybefore,l because I started my inspection on the 13th, February 13th.
16 And then, I just took time out from my inspection on the
)
17 morning -- I notified the people from Babcock & Wilcox that 18 when they were ready to have the entrance meeting, to notify me ;
19 i
and I would like to be present for that.
20 So, I guess it was about 10:00 o' clock in the morning; 21 I had already been working a couple of hours on my normal 22 inspection routine when I was notified that the meeting was 23 i
24 about ready to start.
So, I went down to the conference room f
Ace Federd Reporters, Inc.
25 where it was being held and sat in on the entrance part of the
11 meeting and some of the presentation that B&W, personnel were 3c-9 j
2 supplying to Kohler and Foster.
And also, to the utility 3
representatives that were there.
And I took some notes at the meeting.
This would not 4
be a part of my regular inspection report because Foster and 5
Kohler were responsible for the meeting and for the presentation 6
7 by B&W.
And I assumed that this information would be used in an 8
inspection report prepared out of Region III.
And my purpose in being there was just that I was 9
i the principal inspector at D&W and it was kind of a coordination!
10 i
11 thing for me to be there, to see, you know, what they were --
what sort of information they were looking for while they were 12 i
13 at B&W.
14 After the entrance meeting then, I -- it was noon or,
15 it was just before lunch.
So, Kohler and Foster and I went to 16 the cafeteria to eat together, and there was also a B&W t
17 representative that was there at the table with us.
But 18 O
Excuse me.
Do you recall who that person was?
19 !
A No.
I don't have any idea who he was.
Could have I
i 2C been Stan Klein.
I don't remember.
But then, I had known 21 Kohler previously in one of NRC's DWR training programs that we l
22 had had here, a two-week training program.
And that was back j
23 in '75 or '76 that I met him at one of those meetings.
And I 24 guess I'd seen him once after that, and I can't remember Ace Feder-J Repor+cr:,Inc.
l 25 where, but it seems like I remember seeing him somewhere.
Maybe l
l l
12 alc-10 he came to R; Ton IV for a meeting or something.
j I saw him there.
But, it will be probably three 2
years since I'd seen him.
So, we just renewed acquaintances, 3
you know, and then I didn't attend any of the other parts of 4
the meeting during the day.
I went back to my inspection 3
activities, because I'm required to -- we follow an inspection 6
procedure in I&E, and I'm required to complete the requirements,
7 l
l 8
of that procedure.
1 i
9 So, I had my own work to do.
But, I did notify them ;
10 that when they had the exit meeting, that I would like to 11 attend the exit meeting to see if Kohler and Foster had findings 12 that they'd identified during this meeting or what kind of i
13 resolution or the concerns, you know, or what have you.
i 14 0
What transpired at the exit meeting?
l 15 A
I guess Kohler discussed what they had found at the 16 meeting and that they.would document their -- the information 17 that they had gained in an inspection report.
And that they 18 didn't have any findings, any items of noncompliance.
And that 1
f 19 it was a routine exit meeting.
There was, as far as I knew, 20 there were no real findings or real resolution that had been 21 obtained by this visit.
22 O
What was your understanding of the concerns that j
23 caused this particular meeting to be held?
l 24 A
The only thing I got from attending the meeting was Ace Federil Reporters, Inc.
25 that there had been some transients at Davis-Besse and these i
13 other plants, including Arkansas-1.
Some transients in which 310-11 relief valves had lifted and had failed to recede.
Some rapid 2
cool-down transients after turbine trip, loss of pressurizer 3
level, things that appeared to be generic to all of the five 4
plants that were carbon copies of each other.
5 0
How was that then translated into a concern?
What 6
was the content of the concern?
7 Well, after attending a morning meeting, I realized A
8 that it was pretty -- sort of just an informational meeting.
9 10 So, after lunch, I asked Kohler and Foster if they would just I
i move me into a private conference room so that I could discuss, 11 12 you know, what they were really there for.
Because it didn't l
l 13 appear to me that any -- that it was the sort of thing that l
That 14 you'd come all the way to Region III to follow up on.
i they had gotten the information at Davis-Besse and that the l
15 t
in things that B&W told them all have been supplied, you know, 16 17 a report or what have you.
Because it was all information that was presented on the part that I saw, was all information f
la i
19 > that was just presented on charts.
20 l
And I don't know what transpired in the afternoone I don't know whether Foster and Kohler went to look at the 21 calculations that suppor ed the analyses or what have you, 22 t
The exit meeting was at 3:00 o' clock, which surprised me, becatise 23 24 I' thought that, you know, it would require more time to really AceF o.c c.ooner.ene.
follow up on the things at B&W, the analyses that had taken 25 i
i l
i
14 010-12 place.
3 S
I got with Foster and Kohler andle went to a 2
3 private conference room.
And I said, Joel, you know, what are you really here for?
This doesn't seem like much of anything.
4 And they indicated at that time, that there was an inspector 5
in Region III named Creswell that had expressed some concerns 6
about this -- these cool-down transients and loss of pressurized 7
8 levels, and so forth.
And that they were there to follow up on his concerns.
9 i
10 Q
Did they explain or expand at all on this, on what i
i 11 the concerns were that Mr. Creswell wanted considered?
{
12 A
Nothing, except that they related to the rapid 13 cool-down transients.
14 Q
Did they give you any indication of whether the i
15 concern was associated with loss of pressurizer level indication 16 highs?
17 A
Yes.
Oh, no, I am sorry.
Go ahead and ask the la question.
19 Q
I believe you mentioned that they did indicate that l
l 20 the concerns were also associated with loss of pressurizer 21 level indication?
22 A
Yes, but it was at the low end.
It seems like it 23 was dropping out the bottom rather than going off scaled high.
I 24 Q
Did they expand on that at all and tell you why it
( Ace Federal Reporters. Inc.
25 was felt that that might be a concern?
i
15 01c-13 1
A Well, when you lose pressurizer level, I would think 2
that would be a concern as far as, you know, operating a 3
nuclear plant because you don't know what your inventory of 4
water in your primary coolant system is, at least I don't know 5
that after you lose pressurizer level.
6 Q
Was the concern with loss of pressurizer level 7
indication or with actual emptying of the pressurizer?
8 A
I think from what I've got at one time, it's actually 9
a physical emptying of the pressurizer.
Not all the way, but i
10 down to a level of -- let's see.
I've got 35 inches.
That's --
i 11 oh, one event at Toledo Davis-Besse three.
One event, there 12 was only forty-five inches left in the pressurizer.
AndIthinkl l
13 low or low, low level or something is like 125 inches or 80 l
l 14 inches or something like that.
15 So, that was way below the instrumentation that the i
16 pressurizer could sense.
j 17 Q
Did you consider that to be a problem?
la A
I am not that technically competent.
I don't inspect' l
19 I the plants any more, So, I didn't feel that it was really, you l I
20 know -- my judgment, they were following up on this thing and j
i 21 that was their responsibility.
My only responsibility in this 22 whole thing was just to see what they were there for and just to; 23 coordinate with them while they were and to ensure them, if 24 they needed any help, or if I could get anyone from B&W with
- Ace.Federet Reporters, Inc.
25 them, that, you know, I would be there to help them on that, as i
16 i
far as that la concerned.
cic-14 3
Q When you had this discussion with Mr. Kohler and 2
Mr. Foster, we've seen some references made to the possibility 3
that Mr. Kohler made a statement to the effect that Mr. Creswell 4
was a troublemaker and they were there to shut him up.
5 A
That is exactly right.
6 Q
Do you recall any other details about that or when it 7
occurred and in what context it was said?
8 A
It occurred in a meeting that we had privately between 9
10 Kohler and I and Foster.
And when I asked them what they were i
11 there for, they told me about Creswell.
And they said he had l
l 12 written several memos and had concerns and he had kept beating i
4 13 this thing to death and that there were some people, I guess 14 in Region III, that were -- that did not agree with him.
And j
15 that they had been sent to B&W to shut him up.
16 Exactly.
Those were the exact words Mr. Kohler i
17 used.
i 18 Q
Did they give you any indication of the context in 19 which that was meant?
l 20 A
When somebody says they are going to shut somebody l
21 up, it seems to me that instead of resolving a concern 22 objectively, that you are going there to just resolve a concern.
23 period.
Youknow,andit's--itleftsomeconcernwithmethat!
l 24 a region would send inspectors to follow up on concerns of Ace Federd Reporters, Inc.
25 another inspector, a fellow employee, you know, to shut him up.
i
17 And I felt that if I had been sent there to do that, J10-15 I would have gone in objectively and tried to see if I could 2
understand what the man's concerns were.
And then, after I had 3
accumulated enough information, you know, to make some sort of 4
judgment myself, then to determine at that point whether or not 5
6 the man had legitimate concerns or not.
7 Q
Other than the statement made by Mr. Kohler, was there any other indication that the -- Mr Kohler and Mr. Foster 8
were taking less than an objective observation of the concerns 9
10 that had been raised?
11 A
Well, when I had heard that they were coming on the I
12 14th and after the presentation in the morning, I felt that l
13 probably they'd be there two or three days following up on the 14 items that were discussed at the meeting.
Because on N triple I
15 S, when you have a problem and you bring it to their attention, '
i i
16 they are going to that meeting of that sort with charts, and so Ii They are going to try to impress you with the fact that 17 on.
18 they have analyzed this problem and that it is not a problem.
19 And that your concerns are not really justified.
20 It's -- these people are in competition with each j
i 21 other and --
l l
22 Q
Excuse me.
Which people?
23 A
N triple S.
i i
24 Q
In competition with whom?
Am FWw) Reporwes, IM.
25 A
Each other, combustion engineering, Westinghouse, I
i i
18 010-16 B&W, the ones that provide pressurized water reactors.
It's not to their advantage to have information in the PDR or in 2
the public that indicates that one of their plants is 3
operating any less safe than the other.
Because their sales depend on the safety of the operation of their plants.
5 It's like the Pintos with the gasoline tanks on the 6
back. That didn't help Fords salling Pintos any more.
And you 7
don't want that sort of thing if you are a nuclear steam 8
supplier in the public record.
Because it could hurt your 9
sales.
10 And my feeling is that the nuclcar steam suppliers 11 have a tendency to kind of whitewash most of the concerns that 12 the NRC or utilities or ar.'fone else has by presenting a dog and l 13 pony show, as some people call it, for the benefit of the 14 NRC or the public, to resolve a question.
And the only way 15 16 that you can really resolve it objectively, as an NRC l
i inspector, is once they presented the information to you, to go 17 i
18 deeper and look and see the analyses, the calculations that i
19 4 they have to support what they're telling you.
l l
20 And if you don't go that far, you're really just 21 getting a superficial view of the thing.
And it was surprising 22 to me that they could come in at 10:00 o' clock in the morning, j
i 23 spend the whole morning in a presentation, eat lunch and at l
24 3:00 o' clock, be completely finished with their -- with the l
Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 concerns such as have been indicated unless they had a lot of l
I
1 19 r
prior information that had already -- their judgment was already J10-17 j
made on what the problem was.
Because for something like this, 2
the only place that you can really go to see if there have been 3
design changes or reanalysis or anything of that sort to 4
establish the safety of a system, B&W is the only place that 5
y u can get that information.
Because they're the nuclear steam 6
supplier.
And they have the analysis groups that perform those 7
sorts of analyses.
8 They use computer codes, do hand calculations, all of; 9
10 the engineering techniques that are necessary to substantiate anyinformationthattheyhaveregardingtransientsorproblemsl 11 t
12 that they're having in a nuclear plant.
So, the main thing was l t
that the time that was spent there, I don't feel was enough to j
13 i
14 really objectively find out if there was substantive information!
I 15 that backed up the response that B&W gave them in the morning 16 session.
l 17 Q
Did Mr. Kohler or Mr. Foster give you any informa-I tion as to whether their concerns were principally associated is I.
f 19 with the technical content of the analyses or simply the --
l l
20 an attempt to identify what analysis had been done and when l
2i they had been done?
22 A
I am not aware of that.
I don't know -- Would you j
{
23 repeat that again?
I There's some indication from discussions with j
24 Q
Am.FWeril Reporters,1N.
l 25 Mr. Kohler and Mr. Foster that their principal concern was not
[
e u
o
,w-e
20 10-18 so much the technical content of what had been done because j
f their perception-that they had already been rather extensively 2
3 analyzed by NRR.
But, their concern was more on the issue of what had been done and whether a timely evaluation of these 4
issues had been done, rather than trying to get into actual 5
technical content of the analyses.
6 In fact, I think Mr. Kohler even admits that he's 7
not a thermodynamics expert and wouldn't have been qualified to g
assess the technical merit of the analyses in the first place.
9 10 A
So, they were just following up on the procedural 11 aspects of the thing?
12 Q
Correct.
13 A
Okay.
@d t-1 14 15 t
16 17 18 l
19 20 i
21 22 23 f
24 Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
i 25 I
21 30 02 01 kepPL i
O Now, if that were in f act the case, do you think 2
they could have accomplished that in the time that they were 3
there ?
4 A
Sure.
That's possible if they knew that NRR had 5
already Deen to Bid and had gone through the calculations 6
and analyses and had confirmed that they were correct.
7 Then, their meeting, coming in there later, would have ceen 8
just a procedural thing, but I don't know why they would 9
have even had to have gone in at all if NRR had already 10 confirmed that supporting celculations verified that the 11 probl em, you know -- that it wasn't a problem.
12 0
Well, in issues such as tais there's two possiole 13 questions tnat can be asked.
One is the question of whether 14 there is an unreviewed safety issue, whether or not there's 15 a technical content or a technical merit for determination lo that an issue is or is not an unreviewed saf ety issue.
l, Inere is also the question of whether or not tnat 13 determination, regardless of how it eventually comes out, 1/
was performed in a timely manner.
23 A
Rignt.
l 21 0
.b w, it is my understanding -- and please correct 22 me if you don't agree, out it was my understanding that 23 Mr. Xohler and Mr. Foster, their f eeling was that tney were 24 there primarily to determine if the analysis had oeen done 2a in a timely manner.
Taking as a given the f act tnet the P00R DillilR
22
$30 02 02 kepPL 1
results of the analysis which had been done confirmed by NRR 2
was that there was not, in f act, an unreviewed safety 3
issue.
So their principal concern was simply whether or not 4
that determination had been done in a timely m'anner.
5 A
Tnen why was the meeting in the morning technical 6
in na ture ?
Because the B&W presentations had to do with why
/
the problem was occurring, what action B&W was taking, 3
design action they were taking to correct the proolem.
Why 9
it wa s not generic to all plants and, you know, if it were IJ only reporting that, we're talking aoout -- it seems like 11 the meeting got a little too technical for that part of it.
12 a
dell, again, I don't want to attempt to overwnelm 13 you with my understanding of what's going on.
O bvio usly, 14 the purpose of this is to get your perceptions of what's 13 going on.
But, as I understand it, there was some confusion lo on B&W's part and Mr. Kohler and Mr. Foster's part aoout 14 exactly what that meeting was all aoout.
15 dow, did you perceive any conf usion such as tnet?
19 A
Yes.
I perceived that from the beginning cecause 23 wnen Kohler and Foster and I arrivea f or the meeting, there 21 was considersole animosity oy the utility people that were 22 there.
Because -- let's see, the utilities wanted to knat 1
23 why degion 3 had not.gone tarough all of the other regions 24 in notifying the utiliti,es, why Region 3 had called 31.. and 25 asked B&W to notify tne utilities.
Because the utility P00RBRIGlHR
23 J30 02 03 people that were there felt like -- that the NRC format for koppL 1
2 this sort of thing would be to notify regions in which --
3 like Arkansas-1, notify Region 4 which in turn -- the 4
principal inspector at Arkansas-1 the n -- or ye s --
6 Arkansas-1, would notify the people at Arkansas-1 that tnere 6
was going to be a meeting at B&W.
I And that was the concern of the utilities, that 8
the notification of the utilities had not been 7 roper.
9 0
Wnat -- excuse me, go ahead.
10 A
And it just seemed as if there was a lot of 11 nostility at the oeginnning of the meeting.
And the fact is 12 Foster said, I'm sorry if we stepped on anyoody's toes.
And 13 to kind of culet the utility people down because there was a 14 lot of animosity and discussion, and so on, in the la oeginning.
16 0
In your understanding, wno requested that the li utilities ce there?
IS A
I think later on, I saw - the fact is after I 19 gave deposition to the Three Mile Island Commission, they 23 sent my deposition oack to me with the attachments tnat we 21 had kind of breezed through when I was at the Commission.
22 And one of them was a letter, I believe, from Foster to 23 somecody at Bin telling them that tney were coming in for 24 this meeting.
2a And I guess once that happened, then, the people P00R70RIGINAL
24 130 02 04 kepPL 1
at B&W notified the utilities that the NRC was coming in for 2
this meeting and maybe the utilities felt like, that the NRC 3
was trying to sneak in and find out more about their particular plants from B&W without first notifying the 4
5 utilities that they were going to be there.
6 You know, there's quite a bit of interplay oetween 7
utilities and NRC and NSSS as their architect-engineers and 8
there's certain formalities that everyone tries to coserve 9
as far as setting up meetings and making sure the right 10 people are there for the meeting and seeing if the utilities 11 would like to send a representative, and so on.
12 0
Well, is there any current practice that would 13 imply that an NRC inspector in a region can't go to 31/. to 14 discuss a generic concern or can't go to any vendor to la discu ss a generic concern without naving representatives of 15 all of the plants that are involved with that vendor 1e present?
id A
I think first, he has to notify tne utility that lv s's going to do that.
I don't think he would go to 31,4 23 witn a concern without first notifying the utility 21 repre sentatives tnat, I am going to S&vi to f ollow up on 22 this.
23 0
Well then, how do you do your inspections?
Do you 24 have to notify all five or six BL utilities every time 23 you're going to go to an inspection at 5sW?
l P00R DRGINAL
25 130 02 05 kappL i
A l'm not a reactor inspector.
I inspect B&W.
So, 2
I don't have to notify the utilities.
My responsiollity is 3
to Bid.
That's my inspection responsibility.
4 0
But you inspect B&W7 6
A Ye s.
5 0
If you inspect B&W, that would seem to be of interest to people who own B&W plants.
e 8
A We don't have to notify them.
9 0
What's the diff erence between you going to inspect 10 the B&W and address concerns and a regional inspecto2 from Region 3 coming in to inspect Bid with unaddressed concerns?
11
!!y concern is 12 A
Well, that's a concern that I nave.
i 13 that I am a principal inspector at B&W.
And as far as I'm 14 c onc e rned, that's my plant.
And the way the ilRC operates is la they can send inspectors, regional inspectors, into 55 4 or 15 NRR can send inspectors into B&W without my even knowing 1/
about it.
I can ce at Westinghouse and somecody will as2 IS me, Did you know that there are five guys here f rom.iRR tae 19 are also inspecting?
2J Bu t, we wouldnt' dare go into a nuclear plant in a 21 region.
I woulon't dare go to Rancho Seco to do a quality 22 assurance inspection there without first clearing it thrauon 23 the regions 1 office and through the inspector who's the 24 principal for this plant.
23 But, I think that's a proolem witnin the.IRC that P00R ORIGINAL
26 030 02 06 kepPL i
needs to be resolved.
2 BY MR. FOLSOM:
3 0
dould you notify B&W if you were going to Rancho 4
Seco to make an inspection of some aspect of B&W plant 5
performance there?
5 A
I am the principal inspector at Bad.
t 0
I understand that.
8 A
Ol ay.
I inspect the engineering activities of all plants that are under construction right now cy Bid.
If I 9
h) am looking at Bellafonte, I don't notify TVA that I'm 11 in
. ting at Bsw at Bellafonte.
Inst's my inspection 12 resonsioliity.
Now --
13 0
Does Bd.l know that you're coing to Bellefonte?
14 A
I look at Bellafonte test enoineering activities la at 314.
I con't go to any of tne plants.
16 0
I see.
li A
But, a regional inspector who is a princioal 13 inspe ctor at Davi s-Be sse, for instance, can come into 32,.
19 with my -- with no knowledge on my part.
2) 0 And it's your understanding that he has to notify 21 3dd or the utility that he's cooing there?
22 A
I was inspector at Arkansas-1.
I wouldn't have to Baocock & Wilcox to follow uo on a concern that i 23 gone 24 nad a t Arkansas unless the people at Ar%ansas knew I had --
26 I was going there.
P00R ORIBMAL
27 D30 02 07 kcpPL 1
0 Was urat your personal rule ?
2 A
Tnat was a regional rule.
3 0
A regional rule?
4 A
Yes, sir.
5 0
Was that an NRC rule?
6 A
If it's a regional rule it's an NRC rule, e
Q Within certain limitations, yes.
8 A
Tne regions promulgate activities of I&E, NRC, and whatever rules they have for inspection of the plants are 10 NRC rules.
They're made in the regions.
Do you know whether that rule is pervasive of all 11 0
12 regions?
13 A
Before an inspector can follow up in an activity, 14 an AE or N3S5 for a utility that he's p.incipal of, that he la notifies the utility?
16 0
Yes.
II A
I don't know.
I <now Recion 4 has that 13 res tr iction.
19 Bf MR. HE3 DON:
fnat's not quite the case we nave here.
fney 2) a 21 weren't really going to spe:ifically address Davis-desse.
24 They were going to address a generic concern that applied to 23 all d&n con: erns.
24 A
do, five plants.
Only five.
26 0
Tnere's only six S&W plants, aren't there?
All P00R DREINAL
28 D30 02 08 kepPL I
nut one.
In f act -- well, for the -- it's not really I asked particularly important but for the sake of argument, 2
And as I understand 3
to get information from all B&W plants.
it, there were two that had. never hed that type of 4
5 transient, one or two that never had that type of 6
And so, they didn't provide anyone and that's I
the reason it wasn't ever ybody.
9 So, Kohler and Foster first of all, Kohler is not 9
a principal inspector on any B&W plant.
He is not a B17.'
10 inspector on a plant.
He wasn't at the time.
11 A
Kohler?
12 O
Kohler.
13 A
Okay.
I didn't know that.
14 0
Foster is an investigations specialist.
He's not la an inspector at all.
I still don't understand how tne Konler 16 system can function if these are the ground rules.
1, and.oster told E&W they were coming down tnere to discuss IS some generic concerns associated with Bia plants.
B17 said, 19 Hell, we have to notif y all of the utilities.
That's fine.
23 That is B&W's proolem.
21 But, why would the utilities ce distressed because 22 of tne fact that they weren't notified through the IAE regional -- each through their own I&E regional office tnat 23 24 this meeting was going to oe held, tney were told it was
)
2a going to be held?
What dif f erence did it make to tnem now l
29 D30 02 09 kcpPL I
they were told?
2 A
You'll have to ask the utilities.
3 0
Didn't that strike you as an unbelievably 4
cumbe rsome way to try and hold a meeting?
5 A
If that's the the utilities f eel it works, I guess If they 6
you'll have to resolve that with the utilities.
7 have concerns aoout people coming to B&W to look at 8
engineering activities on their plants, well, I guess we either have to tell them it's none of your business and go 9
in any time we want to, or else try to coordinate activities 10 11 through them.
12 O
But you go in any time you want to and look at l3 B&ti?
14 A
No, I don't.
I send -- I notif y tnem by phone.
I f ollow it up with a letter saying tnat I'm coming, wnen I'm 15 to coming.
Tnan, wnen I'll be there.
Then, I come regularly Ie on a four time a year basis.
IS Bf MR. FOLSDM:
19 0
Do they always know what you're coming for?
23 A
Inen I always 100.< at engineering activities.
I 21 looK at the design activities of Ba..
If I bring someoody 22 along with me that's going to look at procurements or 23 audits, I notify them that I have somebody coming along that 24 will be looxing at prn;urements or audits.
So that at tne 20 entrance me? ting, they can have the proper people
30 230 02 10 kepPL I
represented there, so inpection can get off in a hurry and 2
we can get to work right away.
3 Because too many times, you arrive.
People are on 4
vacation.
You don't get to see the right people.
And 5
that's why we notify them.
6 0
You don't have any unannounced inspections?
4 A
We don't have any unannounced inspections, no.
5 And there's really no reason for it, because when you say 9
you're going to look at design, you're talking about a
lJ million documents.
And there's no way that they can clean 11 up the wnole design area in a two-week period of time oef ore 12 you get there.
13 O
Now, let's say you wanted to go down and look at 14 one of the plants that is actually under construction oy 15 B&W.
That's still in tne design pnase, early in 16 construction.
Il A
Yes.
IS O
First of all, have you ever done that?
IV A
do.
We're not allowed to do that in our group.
2J inat is --
2i O
If you were looking into the design of a 22 particular system and for wnatever reasons you wanted to go 23 see how it actually looked --
24 A
I f e l t l i'< e -- tha t I needed to go in?
2a O
You felt like you needed to actually go see wnst i
31 D30 02 11 keppL i
this thing looked like.
Are you telling me that you would 2
be prohibited from doing that?
3 A
I am not saying I would be prohibited from doing 4
that.
I am saying we have not done that.
What you would 5
have to do is, you have a construction inspector in the 5
construction group, in the regional office.
They have i
construction inspectors.
Tne inspectors, construction 6
inspectors, are the principal inspec t s at those 9
construction site 3.
And some of them now are regional 10 inspectors.
11 Now, if you wanted to f ollow up on a proolem that 12 you had identified -- if I wanted to say that I had 13 identified at B&W, at South Texas projects, for instance, 14 well, that would De Westinghouse -- then, I would have to la notify my management that I would like to go in there.
,ie 10 would hi e to coordinate it through the principal inspector 17 and his chief in whatever region we wanted to go into, to go is to the plant to do whatever we wanted to do.
19 But, it's never been done yet.
2J Q
ebuld you have to tell BLv?
2i A
l'm sure -- I don' t know i f I' d hav e to, ou t I' m 24 sure that I would tell them.
I woulo tell them at an exit 23 meeting that I've identified a problem.
It's going to i
24 require that I go to Arkansas-l.
Inat I'm going to nave to 23 coordinate it through my local -- my Region 4 managa nent.
l
32 D30 02 12 kepPL i
And the way that would work is that I would 2
request that in my regional o ffice to the Operations Chie f.
3 And then, he would coordinate it through his resident 4
inspector at AND-l.
And then I would go to Arkansas-l.
But there's more than just me leaving B&d and not 6
telling them anything and taking the next plane out and o
landing at Little Rock and dr Eving up to ANO-1 and walking e
8 into the plant and saying, I' m he re to look at follow-up on 9
some information.
It just doesn't work that way.
10 0
All right.
But your statement of what there's 11 more of all relates to within the NRC and has nothing to do 12 with whether you tell R&d.
You have to get clearances 13 through your own line management and then wnatever crosscut 14 problems witnin the agency might ce involved?
15 A
Yes.
16 0
But that has nothing to do with notifying 3&W that 1/
y3u're going to do it, does it?
IS A
dell, if all of tnis that you're saying is true,
19 then why was there antagonism between the utility owners 2J that were present, and why did Mr. Foster say I'm sorry i f 21 we stepped on your toes?
I mean, if he felt li%e he had 2e dona this in all good faith, why did he say that?
I 23 wouldn't have said that.
24 I would have said, It's none of your damn 2;
ousiness.
We'll come up here any time we want to.
That's
33
)30 02 13 kepPL i
exactly what I would have told them.
And we don't operate 2
like that.
3 BY MR. HEBDON:
4 0
dell, first of all, Mr. Kohler was, as I 5
understand it, unaware that the utility representatives were 6
going to even be there.
It's his perception that he never
/
asked that they be there.
He was simply trying to get some 8
information and nad never had any intention that they would 9
oe there, and in f act, was quite surprised when he walked in 10 the room and saw them there.
II A
I know that.
12 0
So, could that be a plausicle explanation of wnat 13 he was apologizing for?
That he was apologizing for the 14 fact that tney were there because he had not -- he nad not 15 requested tneir presence and that he was a little oit taken la acack to find all the time and money and travel time ano 1e airline tickets and everything else that had been spent to when he 13 get these people here from all over the country, 19 really had no desire that they be tnere?
23 A
Inat's not a judgment I can make.
I don't know 21 what was in his mind.
I am not Mr. Kohler.
22 J
dell, my question was, why was he apologizing, ana 23 what I'm wondering --
24 A
Foster is the one who was apologizing.
2a a
Foster or Kohler.
Is that a plausicle explanation S
w
34 D30 02 14 kepPL 1
for what he was apologizing fori 2
A No.
I don't have any idea.
But, the fact that he 3
said, I'm sorry, we stepped on your toes, to me appears that 4
somehow, he felt that he had done something that was 5
inappropriate and wnen they raised oojections to it, 6
previously, maybe he realized that maybe he hadn't really this
/
gone througn it, taken the proper action to arrange 8
meeting.
I don't know.
9 O
Well, anyway, that's neither here nor there.
10 dnen you do your inspections, do you actually 11 review the content of the design and analyses or do you 12 review niore the procedures oy which the design and analyses 13 are cone?
14 A
for the last year and a nalf, I have oeen '
lo reviawing tne actual design.
I've oeen looking at the 16 actual calculations, the actual computer codes, the output le of computer codes.
I've been paying very little attention 18 to quality assursnce, produrual requirements to doing it.
1v Sometime s it -- sometimes I identify deviations 23 that fall out in the process of dcing tnis, out I am more 21 literested in the technical details of their design.
I do 22 cesign verification, is exactly what I do now.
23 0
You mentioned that you've never been to any of tne 24 32A plants as part of your inspection program.
22 A
BAW, yes.
Arkansas-l, I was principal insoector
35 D30 02 15 LcpPL l
there.
2 0
I mean, since you've been part of the vendor 3
inspection program, you have not been to any B&W plants?
4 A
No.
5 0
Do you find it at all difficult to inspect or to assess design and analysis work on systems that you haven't 6
/
physically seen?
3 A
It is a problem, ye s.
Wnat I'm looking for is mainly, Does a single calculation which provides input to a 9
IJ 1arger design analysis, is that calculation correct?
11 Because sooner or later, NRR will get the design analysis.
14 They'll get the final numoers.
13 dnat I am really interested in is the calculations 14 that are performed oy hand, by an engineer, checked oy is another engineer and verified by a'other one, are the 15 technical contents of that calculation correct?
3ecause if Ie the input is incorrect, then the output is no good.
Inout il in is only as good -- the output is only as good as the 1/
input.
23 So, I look at individual calculations and design, 21 verify those, follow up on :he verifyer.
22 0
Do you look at those calculations on an audit 23 casis, or do you attempt to review all of tne calculations?
24 A
Just on a sampling basis.
That's all we can do.
20 There are tnousands of calculations.
It would ce imoossial?
I i
I l
36
-)30 02 16 kapPL I
to do it in a lifetime, one person.
2 0
So then, your purpose is to basically serve as a 3
quality assurance check on a sampling basis?
4 A
Not quality assurance.
Quality assurance means 6
that you're assuring that the procedural requirements have 5
oeen met, and so on.
I'm doing a technical audit, i s wha t I e
am doing.
I am looking at the references that are used in a a
calculation, the equations that have been used, assure that 9
the numoers go into the equations correctly to provide tne 10 input that goes into the computer codes, that provides the 11 design analysis.
12 0
How f requently do you find errors?
13 A
We've been finding errors quite frequently.
Even 14 though a calculation is prepared by en individual, checked 16 by an individual and verified by another one we still find to errors in the calculations.
li Q
Suostantive errors?
IS A
Some of them have been, I felt, yes.
Just 19 recently in an inspection at Browning Route, I had nad some 20 response spectra that had been used, response spectre that 21 was in a report that generated information f or the ?S AR, was 22 different tnan tne response spectra that was in the report.
23 And the fact is, it was less conservative.
So I had a 24 concern, then, aoout whether or not this less conservetive 26 response spectra had been used in the procurement of
37 130 02 17 kepPL I
equipment, because all the specifications, design 2-specifications, have to identify the response spectra that 3
that pump or valve or whatever must ce subjected to.
- Also, 4
the construction of the containment, the containment base 5
mat, for instance, has response spectra that it is designed 6
to.
And this response spectra was less conservative.
s 6
I did not f eel that I was technically qualified to re ally do this sort of an analysis.
So I. requested from NRR a 10
-specialist in this area.
And a Dr. Raf an went down to 11 Browning Rou...e with me, and at that point, he didn't feel 12 that he was really qualified at that time, to do it.
13 So, he took about six calculations back with him 14 to Bethesda that had been a system that had been designed 15 using less conservative response spectra.
And it had been la re-analyzed to assure that the incorrect response spectra 11 had not underdesigned the system that was being faoricated 13 down there.
And in particular, it was the shield door on 19 the reactor containment ouilding.
23 And on my last inspection of Browning Route I 21 received, finally received a letter f rom Dr. Rafan in which 22 he had performed the analysi:3 -- a verification of these six 23 calculations.
And he f elt that each -- that the 24 calculations and the design of that structure were 25 conservative.
l
38
)
p30 02 01 Yep PL i
So then, I was able to close the item.
And I 2
f eel like these sorts of things are definitely substantive 3
technical design information.
4 0
If you're identifying these substantive problems, 5
are you taking any general actions to improve or to minimize 6
the possibility of these kinds of errors being made ?
e A
Yes.
One of the things tnat they have to do in 8
their corrective action is to identif y generically any other systems that may have been purchased, may have been 10 facricated that were based on this report that had 11 non-c onserva tive response spectra.
And that's one of the 12 things that the architect-engineer is required -- we require 13 of him in his response to us.
14 And he then looked at all specifications relating 13 to South Texas project, to assure tnat the correct response 16 spectra thac was in the FSAR, was identified in each of 1/
these design specifications.
13 And they f ound -- that's how they identified the li one for the shield door.
And also, there was part of the 2s reactor f an cooler system that was purchased to less 21 conservative response spectra.
They re-analyzed those two 22 systems and found that in neither case was the system 23 underdesigned.
24 Inere's a lot of -- in the design of nuclear 26 plants, there's a lot of conservatism tnat's put into tne
39 D30 02 02
~
kop PL 1
design by AEs and NSSSs.
Just about every time they turn acorner, they a dd 2
3 more conservatism.
They're lucky because when they find one 4
of these things in error on design, if there's not a way 5
they can go back and take some of the conservatism out and 6
re-analyze the thing, they would be tearing cut systems or I
redesigning and rebuilding systems to meet the design 3
c rite ria.
0 I think we've gotten a little f ar afield.
Let's 10 see if we can get back to specific concerns of Mr. Creswell, 11 lostar and Kohler.
12 anat was your opinion of ine general competence 13 and maturity of Mr. Kohler?
14 (93-15 1/
15 19 2J 21 22 23 24 2a l
40 D30 03 01 pv PL i
A Oh, I think he's an excellent reactor inspector.
2 He was.
And he did very well in those courses that the 3
Inspe ction & Enforcement, you know, provides, the PdR 4
cot; se, the one I was in with him.
His questions in class 5
were very clear.
He's a very technically competent person.
6 There's no doubt in my mind that he's not.
And I tnink ne's e
from the nuclear navy.
I think he's got that background 3
experience.
I think he has an engineering degree.
Inere's no question in my mind that Kohler is not
/
13 very competent.
He's probaoly one of the top, or was one of 11 the top, reactor inspectors that we nave.
I don't know what 12 he's doing now, out --
13 3
Do you f eel that ne would oe involved witn an 14 e f f o r t to -- and mayoe this is a oit of an overstatement la whitewash tne concerns of a f ellow inspector?
la A
Taat's a nard question.
That's a moral question 1,
that an individual must address himself to.
I am not sure is that if my management didn't put pressure on me to whitewesa 19 concerns of another inspector, you know, that I mignt not ce 23 f orced into a oox to do that.
I don' t know.
21 Inst's a moral question tnat sometimes you can ce 22 intimidated into whitewashing another individual.
If ther' 23 are enough people around that say, "He doesn't know what 2i ne's talking scout," and you feel li%e you nave to acree 2;
with the majority, even though you may feel thet mayce tne P00R BRIGINAL
41
-)30 03 02 pv PL guy does have legitimate questions.
So, I don't really 2
know.
I don't know how to answer that.
3 That'a a moral question that I wouldn't know how 4
to answer.
I don't know how I would react under a similar 5
situation where I am put under pressure by management to go out and intentionally find a way to discredit somebody.
I o
/
don't know.
And I don't know if that's what happened in 3
this case.
)
3 okay.
IJ A
All I know is I just have some gut feelings aoout li what did happen, and that's all I can say.
12 0
One of the things that I celieve came out in the 13 course of this mee ting was a discussion about an earlier 14 incident that had occurred at Arkansas 1.
Do you recall a 15 discussion of that particular incident?
la A
Yes.
There were two events reported on Novemoer ie i 1, 1974, an d.'.i ay 9, 1975, that were of 20- to 30-secono li duration.
And it had to do with steem relief valves not 19 receding or something, saf etys sticking, or I am not sure 2]
exactly what that was.
But this was a presentation, part of 2
tne 33% presentation, to Konler and ?oster.
22 J
.hre you involved with Ar<ansas Nuclear as an 23 inspec 'r Wnen taese events occurred?
24 A
Yas.
Jo you rec 611 the event at all, separate f rom the 2;
s P00RORIBINAL
42
)30 03 03 pv PL i
discussion at this meeting?
2 A
The one on November 11, '74, I was not the 3
inspector at that time.
The one on May 9, 1975, I nad just taken over responsioility for Arkansas in April, the month 4
5 cefore.
And 1 guess, aDout -- that would have been my second inspection there, sometime aoout that time period.
o And it seems like, in my memory, we got a letter e
8 f rom some formal naval officer who had a home on Lake 9
Darnell, and they had been lif ting saf etys on Arkansas 1 1) pretty regularly.
And he wanted to know about the because qualification of the people that operated that plant 11 was concerned that they must not know what they were 12 ne 13 really doing, because if they had to lif t the saf etys all 14 the time -- and that's the only thing in my mindi tnat is a la recollection of wnat anything that nad to do with anything la like that.
l/
And I d'n't even know if I reviewed a licensee report related to safetys or something like that.
lo event 19 It's been a long time.
2J 0
Jo you recall any discussion at tnat time of any 21
- on: erns oy anyone that pressurizer level indication ned 22 ceen lost during those transients?
23 A
.4 0.
I don't rememoer that at all.
And ossides 24 taat, I w?i so immature in my judoment at tnat time, I 23 procaoly would not have known wnat they were talking acout
43 h30 03 04 pv PL 1
in the first place, because I had only been with the NRC for 2
-- le t's see --- f our months t and my previous experience with 3
-- in the nuclear industry, had been the operation of 4
research reactors.
6 And so -- and I was in the process of being 6
trained at that tiae in I&E, PWR schools.
So, I can't s
answer that question.
S 0
All right.
You mentioned, I believe, earlier, 9
something to the eff ect of one of the topics that was being 10 discussed at the meeting was a questi if safety valves 11 lif ting and receding?
12 A
Ye s.
13 0
Wcs that primary safety valves, or secondary 1 -1 safety valves?
15 A
I'm sorry, I can't answer that.
I oelieve it was la steam relief valves, because that's what I nave got here.
I got " steam reliefs did not recede." and then I've got 1e nave 13 "safetys sticking."
And this was at Three Mile Island, 19 Units 1 and 2.
And there were two events of 30 seconds 2J apart.
2i J
Jo you nave a date on that?
24 A
datification to tne NRC was 11/15/ 78.
23 J
All right.
By the way, I think you've been 24 quoting-here off ano on f rom some notes you took during tne 25 m ee t i ng.
Would it ce possiole to get a copy of those notes?
44 930 03 05 pv pt 1
A Yes.
And you can get them from Mallory.
He says 2
he has an extra copy.
At the Three Mile Island deposition, 3
they made copies of this, and he has an extra copy.
So, he 4
said he'd be happy to provide you all with that, if you 5
requested it.
6 0
All right.
Fine.
We'll get that f rom him.
4
.Mr. Mallory, from the general counsel's office?
8 A
Yes.
9 0
Did you have any subsequent discussions with 10 Mr. Kohler or Mr. Foster after their visit to B&W?
11 A
On, boy.
Let's see.
I think I called Joel Kohler 12 and told nim that I was -- that I had been asked to come to 13 the Three Mile Island Commission to give a deposition.
And 14 I think I told him' exactly what I was going to have to say.
la I think I did tnat the week that I wen to the deposition 15 for Three Mile Island.
Il G
Wnat did you tell him you were going to have to 13 s av ?
19 A
The business about " shut nim up.
2J J
All right.
Do you recall either at the oriefing 21 that you participated in or at the exit interview, axit l
22 meeting, did Mr. Kohler or Mr. Fcster give any indication of
)
i the results of their investigation was going to be?
23 wnst l
24 A
Tne only thing I can remember is it was something 25 to the effect that we've gotten the information we came i
j
45
-330 03 06 pv PL i
for.
And we are satisfied, you know.
And that's aoout all 2
of the information I remember them giving me at the exit 3
meeting.
4 0
Did they indicate that they were satisfied with 5
the information they had received or they were satisfied 6
that they had resolved the concerns that were raised?
I A
No.
They didn't say that.
I think they were 8
satis fied with the information they had received.
And they 9
wanted to tnank B&W for giving them the information and 10 going to the troucle of preparing it, and so on.
11 But they did not indicate what the final 12 resolution of the thing would be.
They indicated that there 13 would be an inspection report which would document the 14 m ee t i ng.
15 3
Did you receive a copy of that inspection report?
15 A
do.
First time I saw it was Tnree Mile Isla,d I,
depos ition.
They snowed me a copy of it.
ld J
Did you find it unusual tnat you cidn't receive a 19 copy of it?
23 A
It's the way the sy.e. tem works.
I would think it 21 would be -- it would have been nice if Mr. Konler nad sent 22 me a copy of tne inspection report so I could have found out 2J what the resolution of the whole proolem was, since I, you 24
.<now, was initiated to the problem somewnat that day.
22 J
Mare you at all curious aoout how it came out?
9
$9
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IMAGE EVALUATION N
TEST TARGET (MT-3) 1.0 Igm iL2a 5 m gn ru m
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
- ll//4
+ 4%
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u :a
46 130 03 07 pv PL 1
A No, because I have got my own work to do, and 2
following up on someone else's concerns had already been 3
their responsibility.
And I go out on inspection every 4
other week, and I come in and write an inspection report on 5
the week I'm there, and I just don't have time to f ollow up 6
on anything else like that.
I don't think that they had any responsibility to s
8 sena me an inspection report.
0 Way not?
10 A
Because it was a Davis-Besse inspection report, 11 and I suspec t B&W --
12 0
- 3re these to be associated with an issue that 13 might have been generic to S&d plants?
14 A
Yes.
15 0
Mouldn't you have any involvement with tnet?
16 A
Well, it would be nice if we could go in and il follow p on things 1ike that as part of our normal 13 inspection routine, but we don't do it that way.
Ae've got 19 inspection procedures that we inspect to, and there are 2J certain requirements in those inspection procedures tnet you 21 nave to meet during the time that you're there.
And you 22 nave got 20 percent of your time can be spent in individual 23 inspection afforts, and that sort of thing, I f eel li ke i s 24 tne sort of thing tna t would probaoly take you at least a 23 w ee.: to follow up on, to look at the calculations tnat l
l l
47
- 01) 03 08 pv PL 1
support the information, to verify those calculations, to 2
assure yourself that the design input that had to be changed 3
or whatever in the redesign of the systems or reanalysis of 4
the systems was correct.
6 0
I guess I find it a little difficult to understand 6
how here two inspectors from Region 3 have come to B&W, for
/
whom you're the principal inspector, and they've raised a 8
concern that possibiy B&W has failed to perform a timely 9
analysis of a generic concern, and they've neld meetings 10 there, they've taken the time and effort to come down there, il so they obviously f eel it's at least to some extent a 12 significant concern.
And then they go of f and they leave as the principal 13 and they go back to Region 3 and you, 14 inspector, are first of all procedurally not provided with la the results of that analysis, nor are you -- nor do you feel la in your mandate or your charter of what you're supposed to Ie be do ing the r e, any need to find out how that whole matter 13 came out.
Now -
19 A
Stranger things have happened in the NRC.
I don't 23 thin % there's a lot of coordination cetween different 21 regions, oetween headquarters, on tnings like tnis.
I taint i
22 there -- somehow there's a flaw in the system that maybe 23 It's administrative or something.
24 But I know that I inspected, as part of my duties.
22 in the authorized inspection agency activities, I went to l
48
-D30 03 09 pv PL i
the State of Oregon to inspect their authorized inspection 2
agency, and I came back and I wrote a report on that 3
inspection, and I attached a memorandum to that inspection, 4
which raised some concerns that I had and some f eelings that 5
I had about the authorized inspection agencies.
Our director was interviewed and they asked him 6
loaded questions about what he thought about the I
some S
authorized inspection agencies.
And he gave them an 9
opinion --
10 0
Excuse me.
Interviewed oy whom?
11 A
See, I guess -- was it a newspaper ?
12 J
0, ay.
13 A
Okay.
14 3
Go ahead.
la A
And they had a ccay of my memo, and tnen they la said, ".N e l l, how is it that you're the director of that 1,
regional office, and here's a copy of a memo where one of 16 your inspectors, who is actually done tne inspection, has an 19 entirely different opinion of the system than you do?"
And 23 somehow, tact memo had gotten out of our of fice without our 21 regional director even knowing it existed.
22 It came to Wayne Reinmuth, in headquarters, and, 23 f or some reason, the regional director didn't even '<now of 24 its existence.
23 So, things like tnat, I am sure, I feel like i
49
-330 03 l0 pv PL I
happen all the time, that the people who actually are 2
involved and have the responsibility for a particular 3
inspection or activity, sometimes the inf ormation in an inspection report is not enough to get strong concerns in 4
those things identified to the proper people, because not a
everybody reads all the inspection reports, except maybe a o
/
chief reads it for technical content and corrects the errors 3
in the report, and then it may go -- af ter that, it may go 9
into the pDR without the regional director, you know, or ID anyone else seeing the thing.
11 And I guess this memo that I am talking aoout 12 probably was the same sort of thing, and if he had known 13 aoout the memo, he may have had a better f eeling for the 14 system.
I don't know.
15 Md. FOLSOM:
Can we take a break?
13 Md. HE3DO:48 Yes.
Let's go off tne record and 1/
taka a crea.<.
13 (3rief recess.)
19 1R. HEBD03:
Go back on tne rec ord.
23 3( MR. HESDO:J:
21 0
Naat was your opinion concerning the significance 22 of tne issues that Mr. Creswell raised?
23 A
dot being able to really technically evaluate what 24 his concerns were, it appeared to me as if they were related 25 to fnree Mile Island, that the concerns that he had -- and
50
-330 03 11 pv PL 1
then af ter Three 'lile Island, that there was some 2
relationship oetween the two.
3 0
In what way?
4 A
Oh, I guess, pressurizer level, for one, because 5
that was a problem at Three Mile Island.
Le t's s ee.
And, I 6
guess, the relief valve or safetys, or whatever, not 7
receding, was probaoly associated.
3 0
Let me explore those a little bit, if we could.
9 In what way did you see -- do you see a 10 relationship between Mr. Creswell's concern about low 11 pressurizer level during a coo -down transient and the 12 accident at TMI?
13 A
The accident at TMI also nad a rapid cool-down, I 14 understand, after they got -- finally aux f eedwater going.
16 They had depressurized below the point at wnich they got 15 saf ety injec tion.
They had a sling in the primary coolant 1,
system.
Some of these same things, I gue ss, we re wha t I 13 inferred from the Davis-Besse incidents.
11 If you have to maqually operate a motor controller 23 on a valve for a system which supplies water to your primary 21 coolant system, it appears tnat mayce at Three '. tile Island, 22 if they nad done something of tnis sort, maybe they could 23 have gotten some water back into the system.
24 0
Could ce sometning of waat sort?
2; A
z!.anually operating the valve controllers on the
51 330 03 12 pv PL 1
makeup pumps, the charging pumps to the system that could 2
have gotten some water back into the system this way.
They 3
turned off saf ety injection, which cut down -- cut off a 4
source of supply to the primary coolant system.
5 0
I'm sorry, I guess I still dont> understand what 6
motor controllers they'd be operating to do what.
7 A
dell, there must be valves on the charging S
system --
9 0
Yes.
10 A
-- That can be opened up to allow the charging 11 pumps to force water into the primary coolant system.
12 0
Wnat would have caused them to do that?
They had 13 already snut off the high pressure injection pumps.
14 A
I guess they had to turn them back on to do that.
13 They had shut off the high-pressure injec tion because they la turned on safety injection an --
14 2
Isn't tnat the same thing?
13 A
Tne plants that we learneo about were Westinghouse 1/
plants.
23 0
Okay.
21 A
And BC'i plants are somewnst different.
So, 22 sometimes I get tne two confused.
23 0
Well, isn't the saf ety injection system on a 2i
.sestingnouse plant and the nigh pressure injection system on 2;
a as.i plant essentially the same system?
P00RMER
52 3-30 03 13 pv PL i
A On a Westinghouse plant, the safety injection 2
system, high pressure safety injection, is your charging 3
pumps.
And in one mode, it f orces borated water from the 4
bit into the reactor coolant systemt and the other mode is to just provide makeup for the primary coolant system.
a 6
0 You also mentioned that you felt that the safety velve issue had some relevance to the TMI.
In what way?
3 A
dell, they -- the PERC on the pressurizer lifted 9
and -- or PORV on the pre ssurizer lif ted, and it didn't 13 recede.
So, they lost coolant into the relief tank.
And 11 they finally blew the rupture disk.
And so it was a case of le relief valve not receding and leaking.
And I am not sure 13 whetner what they were talking aoout at B&W was your steam 14 safetys leaking er whether it was tne PORVs on the 13 pressurizer.
I did7't pick that up in the period of time 15 that I was, you know, listening to tne discussions.
li J
All rignt.
13 A
3esides tnat, I am sure somebody nas analyzed lv Creswell's concerns and have seen if they do relate to tne 2J T..il.
I navan't had the time or I haven't had the technical 21 info.mation available to do that myself.
22 0
Certainly.
That was just en attempt to get your 2a perspec ti ve, not an a ttempt to get any detailed anelysis.
24 A
If I had the technical inf ormation to 100% at, 2;
cased on -- I have never even seen any of Creswell's i
i P00R ORIGINAL l
i 1
53 830 03 14 pv PL I
reports, you know.
The only thing that I've seen is a memo 2
that Creswell wrote.
That's attached to my Three Mile 3
Island deposition.
And it doesn't really give a lot of the 4
details of his concerns.
5 It's a poor Xerox, in the first place.
You can 6
hardly read it.
/
And the other thing is it doesn't identify his 3
concerns at all.
It doesn't give the detail of them.
So, 9
it would be impossiole for me to analyze what his real IJ concerns are and how they relate to Three Mile Island, 11 unless I have availaoility to that information.
And I feel 12 like somecody else is responsible for that sort of thing at 13 the present time.
They're cound to oe.
14 2
All right.
la A
You know, that's another thing:
After Three '411e 16 Island, why didn't regional directors or somebody in 1,
reginnel offices call in all the inspectors and sit them 13 down and tell them exactly what had happened at Three '411e 1/
Island, the exact details of the thing?
2]
I went on an inspection to Westinghouse after that 21 had nappened.
And ?iestinghouse had had something like 500 22 of their engineering staff in a conference, in whic h th?
23 details of ihree '411e Island were descrioed in the meeting, 24 to apprise all of tne engineers there of what had actually 23 happened.
?or one thing, for puolic relations.
Because you P00R ORIGINAL
54
)30 03 I5 have people that are going out in the puolic and somebody pv pl I
2 says, " Hey, you work for the NRC.
What happened at Three 3
Mile Island?"
And if people cannot, you know -- if a guy 4
indicates that, you know, "I don't have any idea what 5
happe ned at Three Mile Island," they think, " And you work 6
for the NRC?"
You know.
7 But we didn't have any single inkling.
The fact is it was as if management was trying to keep the details of 8
/
the thing away from everyone.
IJ I think there is a -- there is a gap there.
I l'
think t' hat after an incident of this sort and this 12 ma gni tude, that everyone that inspec ts, whether they inspect 13 a nuclear plant or anything else, anyone that's in an inspection capacity and is interf acing with the puolic 14 15 should have some sort of training as to what happens in 16 these sorts of events.
We're not all stupid, and sometimes le thef treat us as if we were all -- you know -- don't have a 13 need to know.
That's exactly wnat it is.
1/
2
.4311, do you think that tnat particular incident 23 is somewnat symptomatic of the relationsnip of the various 21 units within NRC, tnat thers is very little 22 cross-fertilization of information?
23 A
I think so.
See, I was with the AEC oack in tne 24 time when there were 18 inspectors altoge ther.
It was a 2;
closa-knit group et that time, and when anything naopened, P00RDRIGiNAL
55 D30 03 16 pv PL i
everybody knew about it, because it wasn't that hard to 2
disse minate information.
But now, the thing is, the NRC has 3
grown to such a size that I guess it's hard to really get 4
the information cround to everyone.
5 But there should be an attempt to do this, I 5
f eel.
0 I would like to ask you some much more general 4
questions aoout tne way the NRC and the way I&E functions.
3 Some of these things, I think, we've already talked aoout to 10 some extent.
11 Wnat is your general perception of the 12 relationship oetween ISE headquarters and 115 regions?
13 A
That's -- I think there is some feeling of 14 suspicivn oatween tne two.
I think that the regional 13 offices nava a feeling of independence, and I&E heedquarters la proca oly f eel as if they promulgate the policy which they 11 do.
And than sometimes, the regional office s tend to drag 15 their feet a little. I thin <, aoout new policies tnac come 1/
through, because a lot of people don't like change.
They 2) get in a groove of doing things, and they don't like for new 21 things to come along that cause them to have to spend more 22 time to learn a new system.
23 And I think there is a sort of a feeling cetween 24 the regional offices and headquarters that headquarters just 22 is providing more work for the regional offices, or P00R ORIGINAL
56 D30 03 17 pv PL I
something of this sort.
2 It's a parochial sort of thing that always exists 3
in a situation like this, where you have the headquarters 4
offices located somewhere else and then regional offices out 5
in the field.
6 I see this with the authorized inspection 4
agencies.
For instance, Hartford Steam Boiler, they provide 8
the authorized nuclear inspectors et the nuclear plants now, 9
and they have seven regionat offices in the United 5tates, 13 and the headquarters office is in Hartford, and there is a 11 lot of ill f eeling oetween the regional offices and the 12 headquarters office because they f eel lite the headquarters 13 office is always f orcing undue requirements on them that add 14 to their time and just cause extra work and e ffort, you la
.: no w.
15 And I remember one time, we had an old friend of Ie mine that had been in, Region 2 that was now at he adquarters, 13 and ne came out to our regional office to explain le enforcement action.
That was his responsibility in 2J headquarters.
And they just berated him some thing 21 t e rr i bly.
fney really raked him over the coals.
2:
And I f eel like there should be more esprit de 23 corps between the people in the NRC, and not so much feeling 24 that here's a guy tnat's just coming out and he's trying to 22 add more work for our schedule and ne doesn't really know P00R;0RIGINAL
1 57 D30 03 of pv PL 1
what's going on.
And I think that's the regional offices' 2
f eeling about headquarters, that headquarters, ycu know, 3
those people there are way back in Bethesda, they sit in 4
rooms at desks and just sit there all day long and that the regional office is really the one that does all the work and 5
5 actually promulgates the activities of inspection and e
enforcement.
8 So, I think there is not a good feeling, as f ar as And I 9
I can see, cetween regional offices and headquarters.
13 don' t see tnat this has to be.
I tnink that there should be 11 more coordination and more f eeling of cooperation oetween 12 the two.
13 Tnat may not be a flaw in the system.
I don't 14 know.
But it procaoly doesn't help if~ people have f eelings 15 like that.
I'm sure it doesn't increase the frequency of C3 16 inspection effort.
11 13 19 20 21 22 23 l
24 2;
l
58 s
. 6380 Q
Have you ever been discouraged from using a strongly 4
worded statement to describe deficiencies that you found?
0-1 2
A No, I don't use strongly worded statements, anyway.
3 4
Q Have you ever had any perception that -- that the management of the I&E region were discouraging that sort of 5
6 usage?
A Only to the extent that -- where you might be 7
expressint; your own opinion.
I think -- I don't think opinions 8
i have any, you know -- you've got requirements.
If you've got a i 9
I 10 finding against a requirement, use that requirement in your 11 findings.
And you should not express personal observations or l
12 Opinions.
1 And I think there's been -- there's a policy about not f
13 14 expressing cpinions and findings.
But sticking to the facts 15 and addressing their requirements.
16 Q
How does one express opinions?
17 A
You don't really express opinions in inspection l
18 reports.
19,
O How do you express them at all?
i, l
20 A
Do you have an example in mind or --
21 Q
I think this particular utility is incompetentand i
22 shouldn't be allowed to operate a plant.
How would you express 23 that?
24 A
Well --
pce Feder:) Reporters. Inc.
25 Q
How would you bring that to the attention of your l
I t
l l
l 1
59 10-2 j
management?
A I guess you'd either go to your chief and tell them 2
I feel like this utility is incompetent and not capable of 3
operating.
But, I think the first thing you would be asked is',
4 you know, is that a personal opinion?
5 Do you have anything to indicate that that utility is not 6
7 competent?
8 Q
Let's say he's been inspecting that particular i
i facility for a year or so and he has a large number of documents',
9 10 in compliance in his inspection report, and that sort of I
11 conclusion has to be subjective.
Incompetence is a very j
12 subjective term.
How would an inspector go about expressing 13 that concern to his management?
Letmejustaddressnotutilitiesorplants,becausel 14 A
15 1 don't inspect those.
16 Q
Vendor.
17 A
Let me address in AE or N triple S.
If I had identified a large number of deviations and an architect-18 i engineer and really felt that they weren't responsive to my 19 20 concerns and my findings, and that their corrective action was i
21 not being completed, that they were identifying in their I
i l
22 letters of response that they were going t take whatever l
l corrective action and then I'd come back on another inspection 23
+
l 24 and they had not completed the corrective action, then, I Am FWerd Reporwrs, lx.
25 wouldn't have any feeling at all about now going to my i
60 management and telling them that this is the case.
This is
)12-3 3
the problem that I am having with these people.
And I am that 2
I would get complete cooperation from my management as far as 3
writing some sort of a letter to them telling them that in our 4
case, that we withdraw their letter of approval if -- approving 5
their quality assurance program if, you know, they didn't 6
start completing the corrective action that has been described, 7
and so on.
8 Probably, we would even have a management meeting.
My 9
chief would go along with me and explain to the people that 10 i
i 11 they were not performing the duties that they were inspected to j i
12 meet.
l i
13 Q
Could you put that formally in a memo to your e
l 14 branch chief?
l 15 A
Sure.
Yes.
I'd have no problem at all doing that.
16 0
All right.
What is your perception of the l
17 relationship between I&E and NRR?
18 A
There again, I think it is the same sort of thing l
19 that -- it is nbt really like we are all NRC.
It's more like i
20 all separate organizations and jockeying for positions.
I'm at 21 the very bottom.
So, I am giving you a bottom looking up to theI 22 top.
I don't know.
I don't have an overall management vicw of 23 the whole thing.
24 So, I don't know whether there is a lot of cooperation
' Ace Federal Reporters. Inc.
25 between NRR and I&E or whether, you know, there is sort of an f
I I
61 obstacle between the two organizations, even though they are all 010-4 j
within NRC.
2 3
Q Based on your perception, how effectively does the current I&E and NRR relationship facilitate the feedback 4
5 of Operational experience into a licensing process?
6 A
You mean identifying LER's at plants and then 7
following up on those and --
l 8
Q Well, in a general sense, how aware is the technical 9
reviewer in the Division of the Systems Safety, or how aware is 10 the technical reviewer in the Division of Operating Reactors i
11 to the concerns aul problems that you are seeing as a vendor f
12 inspector?
i 13 A
You know, we write inspection reports and the l
14 inspection reperts sometimes have pretty substantive problems
--l 15 identify pretty substantive problems.
16 0
Yes.
17 A
You really feel that once you've signed off on your i
18 inspection report and turned it into the papermill or whatever 19 and it Joes in the PDR, and so on, no one ever reads the thing
}
I 20 again.
21 BY MR. FOLSOM l
l l
22 Q
What's the PDR' l
l 23 A
Public Document Room.
i l
24 Q
- Okay, bee Feder:3 Reporters, Inc.
25 A
And I guess the mechanism that we have or, you know,
\\
l
62 01c-5 1
of identifying these things to licensing, is action items, action 2
item requests.
An inspector, if he really --
3 BY MR. HEBDON:
4 Q
Excuse me.
Is that the same as transfer of lead 5
responsibility?
6 A
I don't know about t' hat.
This is in the regional 7
office.
8 Q
All right.
9 A-What this is, it's an action item.that if an i
10 inspector has a problem that he feels should be addressed to II licensing, you know, NRR, then, he fills out a form that 12 identifies what the problem is, and I think it's in the -- it j
13 goes to the computer system.
And it's directed to I&E 14 Headquarters and then somebody takes responsibility for it here i 15 in Bethesda and sees that the proper organization in NRR gets f
16 this problem directed'towards them.
i 17 And mainly, these action items request some sort of action f
18 on the part of NRR.
And it takes them an inordinatt long l
19 ' period of time to get any sort of response back on these things.
20 I think that may be a problem with the system because after a 21 while, the inspectors get to the point where they feel like, 22 you know, I'm identifying this thing and maybe it's a year 23 before I hear anything about it.
And, you know, what's really 24 the necessity for continuing to write these action items when i
' Ace Federet Reporters, Inc.
25 I'm not really hearing, you know, what resolution is taking l
63 f
1 01c-6 j
place.
2 O
Is it your perception that most of these action items 1
eventually reach NRR or are most of them handled at the I&E 3
4 headquarters?
5 A
I think they do get to NRR.
6 Q
What is the basis of that perception?
7 A
Because sometimes, we get action back on them and it 8
comes from NRR.
And I don't guess I ever get telephone calls, 9
you know.
When I submit an action item, I don't finally get a e
10 telephone call from whoever has been given the responsibility in 11 NRR, asking me to expand on what, you know, the details of this i I
12 problem that I might have.
l And probioly, that would be a way that you would expect the l:
13 i
4 14 system to work, if it were working effectively, and there 15 would be -- when it finally got to the person that had the I
16 responsibility, that he would get back to the inspector that 17 identified his concern and that they would work together, you 18 know, trying to get the details worked out so that the person l
19 in NRR could actually perform an analysis or an evaluation of l
20 the problem.
21 Q
Okay.
Is there a difference in your inspection d
y 22 procedures in philosophy with respect to safety related I
23 systems as opposed to nonsafety related systems?
l l
l l
l 24 A
I pretty much stick to the safety related systems Am FWe9 Reorwrs, lm l
25 in our inspections because -- especially our technical i
I
64 21c-7 1
inspections, because only if you identify a problem with a 2
nonsafety related system, it tends to not become as much of a 3
concern as if you've identified a problem on a safety related j
4 system.
5 BY MR. FOLSOM:
6 Q
Tell me as a layman, I'm the layman, the difference 7
betueen a technical inspection and any other kind of an 8
inspection.
9 A
Oh, okay.
Vendor Inspection Branch, which I'm in, 10, Program Evaluation Section, we're responsible for the il architect-engineers and nuclear suppliers.
And we don't have l
1 12 anything to do with pumps and valves A component branch.
l 13 That's also a Vendor Inspection Branch.
i 14 We have requirements in the manual ch.pter to inspect the 15 Quality Assurance Programs of these AE's and N triple S's.
The 16 Quality Assurance Prog' rams are usually developed in the top 17 Report, which is approved by a Quality Assurance Branch in NRR 18 and that describes their program for conducting their activities.
19 It is the 18 criterion in 10 CFR, Part 50 and Appendix B.
20 And, of course, you know that there is procurement and i
21 audits and things like that that are programatic.
Then, there t
22 are things like the activity that I am really interested in is l
l 23 design and control.
24 Q
Is that technical?
Ace Federet Rumrters, Inc.
25 A
That's technical.
i
65 010-8 1
Q And all of your work is technical then?
2 A
All of my work is technical, yes.
3 O
Okay.
4 A
In our group, we -- I guess up until about a year and a half ago, we inspected the programatic aspect of quality 3
And, at that time, we began to deviate from that.
6 assurance.
look And myself and another gentleman in our group, started te 7
more at the technical aspects of the Quality Assurance Program.
8 9
In other words, not just the quality assurance procedures and
.10 so on that they had for conducting the design activities.
But actually,weretheyconductingthedesignactivitiescorrectly?l 11 l
12 It was design verification, is what it was.
And after that time, I have nearly devoted all of my time strictly to that at 13 14 the AE's and N triple S's.
I've nearly entirely spent my time i
looking at design verification of calculations, computer codes, 15 input from the codes and output from the codes, things that NRR 16 17 does rot have an opportunity to see.
Because --
l 18 Q
Now, would you put your answer to me about the fact that all of their work is technical, together with Mr. Hebdon's 19 question about what is the difference in your inspection 20 procedures and philosophy for safety related versus nonsafety 21 22 related systems?
Your answer to him was that you spent -- that you tended to give a more technical inspection to safety related 23 i
i 24
- features, Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
i 25 A
Yes.
i l
66
)lc-9 Q
What kind of an inspection would you give to non-j safety related systems?
2 A
I don't really look at nonsafety related systems.
3 Q
That's what I'm driving at.
4 A
Yes.
The condensor turbine generator, electro-5 hydraulic control system, all of that, I don't -- I look 6
strictly at mainly the things that are in containment.
7 Q
Is that someone else's responsibility to look at 8
the nonsafety related items that you have just listed?
9 t
A I am not sure that we do look at nonsafety related j
10 ij systems at all.
The components that are supplied for nonsafety.
I related systems, I think are component suppliers who actually 12 13 1 ok at the qualifications of those.
14 But, as far as the design of the nonsafety related 15 systems, I don't think, since I've been with NRC, that I have 16 ever looked at a system like that.
i 17 0
okay.
18 BY MR. HEBDON:
19 Q
What is the basis for deciding that a system is l
20 safety related?
21 A
Well, I guess the design specification indicates 22 whether it is Safety Class 1.
I usually try to pick those 23 systems that are Safety Class 1 systems.
I can usually, you l
24 know, from the training programs that I've had in the NRC, I'm Am-FWwd Reorters, tm.
25 able to recognize, you know, by the title of a system, whether i
l
67 010-10 1
it's safety related or not safwty related.
2 And I try to stick with those that I am absolutely sure 3
are safety related.
This last inspection that I made at 4
Browning Route, I looked it the reactor head degassing system 5
because of Three Mile Island.
And I was interested in what 6
was the difference between how a westinghouse plant would handle 7
that sort of a problem, with a vapor in the head of the vessel 8
and that had the same problem.
Because there are no automatic 9
control valves in that system.
There's a spool piece that has tobeplacedinplacebeforewecandofuelhandlingoperations.f 10 11 And that's when they degassed that head.
I j
12 And so, they would have had the same problem.
But, I 13 selected that system because obviously, the safety related i
1 14 system and --
l i
15 Q
It is a safety related system?
l 16 A
It's a Safety Class 1 system.
17 Q
All right.
How is it classified as a safety system?
18 What's the basis for deciding that that system is a safety I9 related system?
t 20 A
Is this an examination?
21 Q
No, no, not at all.
This is information gathering.
22 A
Okay.
l 23 Q
Examination, you have to know the answer before you 24 ask he question.
Answer any part of the reactor coolant system I Ace-Feder;A Reporters, Inc.
25 that you could lose reactor coolant and radioactivity from the f
~
68 010-11 primary coolant system, I would think would be a Safety Class j
2 1 system.
3 Q
Do you know if the PORV on a B&W plant is a safety 4
related system?
A I don't know.
I've heard words that it's not.
And 5
I can't believe that it's not a safety related system because 6
it's a pressure foundry where the primary pressure reactor 7
8 system.
9 0
As I understand it, the valve itself is a pressure 10 boundary but the control to the pressure valve isn't.
Would l
t 11 that surprise you?
i 12 A
No.
In my inspections, I've seen a lot of systems j
i 13 that I thought, you know, in my own mind, appeared to me to be --
l 14 this appears to be a safety related system.
You know, and yet, f 15 it was classified as nonsafety related.
And I guess the j
i r
16 c.
- erion is like you said.
It's the pressure boundary to the 17 primary coolant system.
18 Q
Who makes the determination as to whether or not a i
19, system is safety related?
I 20 A
You know, that's a good question.
It seems to me to j 21 be that each AE and N triple S makes this judgment on his own.
22 And we've been trying -- I don't know whether we did it by 23 action item or anything of that sort.
But, we've been trying to l
24 find, you know, someone in NRR that would classify systems as Ace Federst Reporters, Inc.
25 safety related or nonsafety related and put out a list of safety!
I
69 c10-12 related and nonsafety related systems so that everybody in the j
industry would have the same guidelines.
2 3
But, there doesn't seem to be a single criterion that establishes which systems are which.
And today --
4 Q
Have you made that request formally?
5 Do you know if there is any documentation of that request?
6 A
I don't know if we have or not.
But we have 7
struggled with this for years.
8 Q
Would you, when you return to the region, attempt to 9
locate any formal requests or any document attempt to identify 10 or to resolve this issue of what systems-are safety related and l 11 l
i 12 what systems are not and f orward a copy to us, if you can find l t
I 13 it?
i 14 A
I'll be happy to.
l 15 Q
Okay.
You'll be getting a copy of the transcript, i
16 so there's no real need to make a note of that.
I i
i 17 A
Let me do it so that I can start action now.
f 18 MR. HEBDON:
Let's go off the record for a minute.
i 19 (Discussion off the record.)
I 20 BY MR. HEBDON:
l 21 Q
Back on the record.
22 Have you ever attempted to have a particular system 23 reclassified as safety related?
24 A
No.
Because there are enough systems that are Am. Feer;A Roorwrs, inc.
25 safety related that it keeps me busy just inspecting those.
I
71 would be easy to do if someone wanted to do it?
010-14 3
A I think NRR, if they made a list and said these 2
3 systems are classified and within these systems, these pumps are classified safety related, I think you'd need a listing like 4
5 that.
Somebody might need to do something like that in order for it to be effective.
6 7
Q And what I'm trying to get at is has any inspector that you know of, out in the field, ever identified a system that 8
I 9
they thought ought to be safety related that wasn't and made l
10 enY effort to have I&E headquarters or NRR reclassify that item 11 from nonsafety related to safety related?
12 A
Not to my knowledge.
13 Q
Is there any perception in your mind as to whether la or not it would be feasible to do?
Could an inspector do that 15 if he wanted to do it with some reasonable probability of 16 success?
i 17 A
I feel like it would be successful to do that.
I I
.l 18 don't think it would be an impossibility.
19 Q
Then, why hasn't anyone ever tried to do it?
20 A
I don't have an answer for that.
I know that I've l
21 heard other inspectors say that this system is not classified asi l
22 safety related, and I feel like it is safety related and yet, 23 it was dropped at that point.
I 24 Q
Okay.
. Ace-Faseret Reporters, Inc.
25 A
And I know I probably said the same thing myself in f
i k
I l
70 don't have any trouble finding a safety related system to 01c-13 1
2 perform my type of inspection on.
3 Q
Have you ever been concerned that a particular I system was not safety related that you felt should 'se?
c 5
A Yes.
The fact is, I can't remember, but it seems 6
like someplace I went, the aux feed system was not considered 7
to be a safety related system.
And in light of Three Mile Island, it appears to me that maybe it obviously should be a 8
9 safety related system.
I i
10 Q
Did you feel any responsibility to have the systems i
i 11 rcclassified as safety related?
j 12 A
I think all of us have, and I think all of the 13 inspectors have discussed it amongst ourselves, you know. -
14 Even those in reactor operations and so on.
And I don't know i
15 if there has ever been any formal request.
16 I think something, you know -- you've got the feeling that, i
17 from discussing it with other guys, that NRR had never -- that 18 somebody had asked NRR to do this, to classify safety versus 1
nonsafety related and that there had never been any sort of a 19 20 list that had ever come out that identified which systems were
}
21 and were not.
)
22 Q
Do you know of any cases where anyone has ever l
23 tried to get a system reclassified?
24 A
No.
Ace.Feder:1 Reporters, Inc.
25 Q
Was there any perception that such a thing is --
i n
72 1010-15 1
the discussions, had some concern about a syaiam that I felt 2
like should be classified safety related.
The fact is, on one 3
of my inspections, I identified -- let's see.
At United 4
Engineers, I identified that the condensate storage tank and demineralized water storage, which are the primary source of 5
6 supply for the aux' feed system, they were both classified as 7
nonsafety related.
They were not Safety Class 1 systems.
8 But, the problem was that they had taken the tanks from --
9 let's see.
They had moved the tanks outside the building and 10 in doing so, they had originally established the boundary of I
11 the auxiliary building as the limit for any Safety Class 1 l
j 12 systems.
l t
13 And then somehow, the -- in the design, the tanks were 14 moved to the outside of that and they didn't get reclassified 15 as Safety Class 1.
This is a deviation or an unresolved item f
16 that I have at United' Nuclear -- oh, United Engineers right i
17 now.
That I feel would require some NRR assistance.
18 Q
How long has that issue been unresolved?
A When did I go to United Engineers?
19 I
20 Q
Approximately.
j t
21 A
Let me see.
IT was sometime this year.
May 21st 22 through 25th, 1979.
l l
23 Q
Do you feel then that you are now going to request l
24 that NRR reclassify those two tanks as safety related?
i uAc.rww.i n.oen.n. ine.
i i
25 A
No.
The United Engineers have already taken the i
73 action to reclassify them when I identified that they were not.
clo-16 3
They reclassified them as Safety Class 1.
2 3
Q What plant would that be associated with?
4 A
I don't have my inspection report.
Let's see if I 5
can remember.
Just guessing, I would say WPPS-1 and 4.
6 Q
Could you double-check for sure when you get bach to the office and let us know for sure?
7 8
BY MR. FOLSOM:
9 O
Would you express that, WPPS?
10 A
Washington Public Power Supply Service or whatever, 11 WPPS.
l 12 BY MR. HEBDON:
I 13 Q
Washington Public Power System, W-P-P-S.
I 14 A
Do you want me to report back to you on that?
i i
15 Q
Yes, if you would.
16 A
Okay.
l 17 Q
Now, let's say that the architect-engineer in this i
18 particular case said no, we don't want to reclassify that as l
i
'7 l safety related.
What would you do?
20 A
I would then -- I'd have a problem with it, f
i l
21 Q
What would you do?
22 A
I would prepare an action item for -- to go through 23 the Office of Inspection Enforcement to NRR and appraise them.
24 The fact is, I'd probably call the WPPS project manager when I i
l Ace Fedwel Rgorwrs Inc.
got back to the office for NRR andtell him what I found and that' 25 l
l c
-..n.
74 I felt that those two tanks were -- should be classified safety 010-17 And that --
related and United Engineers disagreed with me.
2 that I would be concerned if they were constructed as nonsafety 3
related structures.
4 Q
Has that particular design been approved by NRR?
5 A
They haven't submitted an F5AR, I don't think.
6 7
0 Do they have a construction permit?
8 A
Yes.
9 0
Now, they have gone through the first preliminary l
t 10 design?
11 A
Yes.
In the course of that preliminary design, was there i
12 0
any indication that you've been able to identify, that the issue 13 of whether or not those two tanks were or were not safety i
14 15 related came up?
It was an oversight on the part of the United l
16 A
No.
17 Engineers.
I Was it equally an oversight on the part of NRR that 18 0
19 ' they didn't catch it, either?
20 A
No.
I think probably -- I don't know this for sure.
21 But, I can't remember.
I know I looked at the PSAR and I looked 1
22 to see where they were located in the PSAR.
And I think that i 23 the PSAR, it shows them located within a safety, you know, 24 Class 1 boundary.
~ Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 O
Which would have made them safety related?
t i
l 75 A
Yes, I am pretty sure.
And then, of course, when c1c-18 j
they looked at additional, you know, newer drawings where the 2
things had been moved, then I questioned the fact that they were 3
not classified as safety related.
Because the design 4
specification did not have them classified as safety related, 5
6 Class 1 systems.
And so then, when I addressed this problem, then United 7
Engineers followed up on it while I worked on the inspection to 8
find out how the oversight had occurred.
And the tanks were 9
10 moved and they had been reclassified.
And that was the 11 problem.
l l
l snd t-4 12 f
13 l
l 14 l
i 15 i
16 i
17 1
i 18 i
i 19 1
i 20 l
21 22 23 l
i 24 l
Am Fwee Roorurs, im.
l I
25 3
76 4
j Q
Okay.
Er. 6830
-5 10-1 2
A And before I left, they had done the design change 3
requests and all of that sort of thing to get those things 4
reclassified as safety related.
5 The next problem that I had was the specifications that were sent out to the supplier to fabricate the tanks, have them 6
7 identified as nonsafety related.
So, of course, that's another case in which I found that the Response spectra was incorrect.
8 And so, the tanks were being designed to a less conservative 9
10 Response spectra and were not classified safety related.
So, 11 I wanted them to verify the analysis performed by the supplier 12 to assure that the tanks were being fabricated, in fact, to the i
13 new Response spectra.
I 14 And so, of course, when I leave that, United Engineers l
15 is not my inspection of responsibility.
I was assisting on that I
16 inspection.
i 17 And so, I don't know what follow-up has occurred on that.
18 But I have a feeling that I will be required to go back on the i.
19 next time they go back on an inspection of United Engineers, to !
20 follow up on that particular item and hopefully, I can get 21 someone from NRR that's technically competent in that area to 22 go along with me and take a look at the reanalysis to assure I
23 they are, in fact, fabricated to the more stringent requirements.
24 Q
The fact that those tanks are not safety related, Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 have been affected in the FSAR?
l i
I
77 10-2 A
I'll bet they would have missed it all the way j
through.
2 Q
They still would have shown the tanks as being 3
inside the auxiliary building?
4 A
It would have probably shown them being outside the 5
auxiliary building, but it would have not addressed them as 6
safety related systems.
7 Q
D y u have any perception as to whether or not that 8
would have been identified by NRR as a problem?
9 A
I've never worked in NRR.
So, I don't really know.
10 I don't really know what details they really look at in an 11 12 FSAR.
There's so much information in those, 20, 25 volumes.
I I
i don't see how anyone could look at every page and evaluate j
13 i
14 every single system and find errors of that sort.
l i
l
.It seems to me that it would just be a monumental problem toi 15 16 do that.
It would take a tremendous amount of manpower to do l
77 that.
I don't know how they operate in NRR, but I am sure they assign certain sections of it to certain groups that have 18 i
19 competence in that particular area.
And one group was used L
over and over and over again with a certain system, rather than 20 21 the whole FSAR.
And maybe people, if they do that over and 22 over again, they'll pick up something like that quickly.
l 23 Q
Okay.
Do you know of any other precursory events 24 that are relevant to the accident at TMI?
' AeFWwd Reorwrs, lm.
25 A
Yes.
l t
78 i
l10-3 1
Q What?
2 A
I'm going into Westinghouse Monday on a Part 21 3
inspection that has to do with Beznau-l in Switzerland, which 4
is a foreign plant in which they had a transient that supposedly 5
is similar to Three Mile Island in 1974.
And the purpose of 6
Denny Ross and his group, are responsible for initiating 7
inspection.
And my responsibility is to go in and look to see if after Three Mile Island, did Westinghouse go back and look 8
9 at all transients at foreign and domestic plants that might 10 have been of the same sort of situation that happened at 11 Three Mile Island.
f 12 And under Part 21, if they did look at Beznau-l and since f
13 they had plants domestically, that was the same vintage as that l Id plant, did they, in fact, or why didn't they, in fact, report i
i 15 that as a Part 21 after Three Mile Island?
)
i 16 So, that's what I'm going in Monday to Westinghouse on.
17 Q
Okay.
f 18 BY MR. FOLSOM:
i I9 Q
May I ask a follow-up on that?
I was going to ask i
I 20 you anyway before you mentioned this.
Did you -- did you know 21 the content of the Westinghouse briefing about Three Mile 1
22 Island?
Were you there?
Do you --
f 23 A
No.
1 24 0
You learned about it --
l
, Aes Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 A
I learned about it from discussions with people that I
I
79 were there.
They said that -- you know, I said that I was 1c-4 just discussing with them, you know, what action has Westinghouse 2
How much taken, you know, with respect to Three Mile Island.
3 have you all gone back and really looked at Westinghouse plants 4
to see how closely related your systems are to their systems 5
and whether or not this could happen in a Westinghouse plant, 6
and so on.
7 And I understand that NRR had already sent, I guess, a 8
request to get information from all of them, from Combustion, 9
Westinghouse, and to really look into this and see if they had l
10 l
had similar problems or could have similar type problems.
l 11 What kind of an answer did you get from the people 12 O
that you made these inquiries of?
13 The first thing that -- right after Three Mile Island' 14 A
i that they had all of their engineering people responsible for i
15 i
design activities on Westinghouse plants into this big meeting 16 t
in which some people -- I guess after Three Mile Island, the l
17 the utility or somebody must have requested that Westinghou,se
- 8
- NRC, I
Combustion send some people to Three Mile Island for 19 20 assistance or something.
i And when the people came back from Three Mile Island that l
21 had been there, providing this assistance, of course, they were 22 the ones that were most familiar with what the activity and 23 24 the problem was there.
So, these guys debriefed everybody at
!Am Feder9 Reporters, Inc.
Because ;
25 Westinghouse in the design and the quality assurance.
i l
l l
80 I guess some of these guys from Quality Assurance were there c10-5 i
and told them, you know, just a complete description of what 2
3 had happened, how this was significant.
And then all of them, I guess, should take a look at Westinghouse systems and see if 4
5 this sort of thing could happen to us.
And I guess they were requested by NRR to do this, anyway.
6 7
O Did that debriefing surface the Beznau incident?
8 A
No, I don't think so.
I think the Beznau thing was identified by the Three Mile Island Commission or you all.
9 10 Was it your group that identified it?
11 MR. HEBDON:
Yes, it was.
12 THE WITNESS:
Okay.
13 BY MR. FOL90Mi 14 Q
Okay.
15 A
But that's right.
Sure.
One of the letters that I 16 had in the portfolio that Denny Ross sent me i8 a letter from your group that tells them about Beznau and wants to know if 17 i
18 this should not have been reported or something to that 19 effect.
I only had four hours to look at that package of j
20 information last week.
I came in.
I've been on an inspection 21 for four weeks in a row now.
Every week I've been on two 22 investigations for allegations.
I've been on an inspection.
I 23 came in this last week.
This was a short week anyway because 24 of the holiday -- you know, the holiday.
I had two inspection l
Am Fewel Ramners, Inc.
reports to get out this week, plus I had to review for -- I had,
25 I
l l
1 i
81 to get ready for this thing.
All this was was travel, of 01c-6 1
2 course.
I didn't even get to read my previous deposition which 3
- But, 4
I wanted to do.
And then Monday, I've got to go to Westinghouse and I've had four hours this week to look at that information.
5 And I probably have to dc a lot of the preparation at Westing-6 house, once I get there.
7 You wanted to clear the record for something.
8 Q
9 BY MR. HEBDON:
I I thought it would be fair so wa all know what they'r,e 10 0
i doing, to clear the record, the letter that you have from the 11 I
12 special inquiry group, I wrote that.
So, just to make sure t
13 that we all know who has done what to whom.
14 A
I remember that was in the package.
15 0
Yes.
16 A
And I looked at it briefly, just read it once and I l
17 didn't even notice your name being there.
18 0
I'm not evan su it's on it.
Just to keep the record straight so you don't feel we are trying to sandbag 19 '
20 you with anything --
21 A
No, f
22 O
Do you have any additional information that might be l
relevant to our inquiry into the events surrounding the accident 23 i
i 24 at TMI?
Ace FWet Reporters, Inc.
25 A
No.
I guess it's appalling to me that two valves i
82 could be closed and cost a utility $400 million.
If those two Glo-7
)
valves on the feed water system had been opened, this event 2
3 would never have happened.
It is just appalling to me that 4
that could happen.
5 Q
In what respect?
6 A
I guess not so much that people don't make human 7
errors and do that sort of thing, but to think that two valves 8
in a system like a nuclear plant that are on a feed water system, 9
that I really believe someplace is not even safe to relate it, 10 I may be wrong, could cost a utility $400 million, you know.
i 11 Maybe we missed something.
! don't know.
Maybe we should 12 have classified -- had some system for classifying systems, you 13 know.
I don't know that either.
It is all Monday morning 14 quarterbacking now.
Now, it's hard to tell.
t i
15 Q
Okay.
Have we failed ;o elicit any information that 16 you believe to be important?
l 17 MR. HEBDON:
Do you have any additional questions?
18 MR. FOLSOM:
I have no further questions, f
19 MR. HEBDON:
Do you have anything else to add?
l 20 THE WITNESS:
No.
1 21 MR. HEBDON:
Okay.
That complet9s the interview.
22 Thank you very much.
23 (The interview concluded at 3:30 p.m.)
jnd t-5 24 Am FWw3 Roorwrs, lm.
l 25 i
i
In Sert * /
p p9'J-?3 I'ROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR DONALD GENE ANDERSON Education University of Texas,1955, B.A. Physics / Math
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Southern Methodist University,1961, M.S. Nuclear Engineering University of Texas,1972, Ph.D. Nuclear Engineering
[
Certification w
Registered Professional Engineer (Nuclear) State of Texas, 1974 Experience From 1955 to 1961, I was e= ployed by General Dynamics / Fort Worth as a Nuclear Engineer in the Aircraf t Nuclear Program.
During that time ey assignments included:
Shielding Studies 2 years Reactor Operator 3 years Reactor Safety Engineer 1 year From 19f; to 1965, I was employed by the University of Texas, Austin, as a Reactor Supervisor.
During that time my assignments included :
Safety Analysis Report Review, Construction, Installation and Startup of 250 kw TRIGA REACTOR 1 year Supervisor - Senior Reactor Operator 3 years Reactor Safety Committee In 1965, I was employed by the USAEC as a Reactor Inspector, Division of Compliance, Region II Atlanta. My inspection
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responsibilitics were:
Uf11versity of Virginia Reactor Babcock & Wilcox Training Reactor and Pool Reactor
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University of Florida Reactor t1 4
North Carolina State Reactor Carolina Virginia Tube Reactor (Power) j BONUS (Power-Puerto Rico)
Lockheed Research Reactor
e o
D. G. ANDERSON From 1966 to 1973, I was employed by Texas A&M University, Fr Nuclear Science Center, College Station, Texas.
During the seven (7) years at the f acility, I held the following
}
positions:
p y
t Senior Reactor Operator
]
m6 Reactor Supervisor
!.i Manager of Reactor Operations j,.
Assistant to the Director, Nuclear Science Center I returned to the University of Texas, Austin, in 1973 in the following position:
Reactor Laboratory Supervisor In 1975, I was employed by the USNRC in the Of fice of Inspection and Enforcement, Region IV, Arlington, Texas.
During the past four and one-half years (4\\), I held the following positions:
Reactor Inspector Principal Inspector I am also an Associate Professor of Mechanical Engineering on the evening school faculty of the University of Texas at Arlington, where I teach courses in Nuclear Engineering.
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