ML19322C131

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RO-287/76-07 on 760526,Keowee Hydro Station Unit Isolated from Underground Feeder Circuit.Caused by Personnel Communications Breakdown.Keowee Hydro Emergency Startup Test Procedure Revised to Delineate Steps for Unit Removal
ML19322C131
Person / Time
Site: Oconee 
Issue date: 06/08/1976
From:
DUKE POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19322C128 List:
References
NUDOCS 8001090549
Download: ML19322C131 (2)
v • d • e


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Duks Power Comp:ny Oconee Unit 3 Report No.:

R0-287/76-7 Report Date:

June 8, 1976 Occurrence Date: May 26, 1976 Facility: Oconee Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina Identification of Occurrence:

Isolation of Keowee Hydro Station unit from underground feeder circuit Conditions prior to Occurrence: Unit at 100% full power Description of Occurrence:

On May 26, 1976, during the performance of the emergency startup testing for Keowee Hydro Station, Keowee Unit 1 was removed from service before connecting Keowee Unit 2 to the underground feeder circuit. This was contrary to Oconee Technical Specification 3.7.2 which requires that during power operation, one Keowee hydro unit may be inoperable for periods up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> provided that the other Keowee hydro unit is connected to the underground feeder circuit.

This condition existed for approximately three minutes until electrical-breaker ACB-4 was closed, tying Keowee Unit 2 to the underground feeder circuit.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

This occurrence resulted from a breakdown in communication between personnel involved. When informed by the test coordinator that his next~ action would be to disable Keowee Unit 2, the Keowco operator misinterpreted the instruction and immediately removed Unit 2 from ser# ice before the Oconee Control Room operator had closed the electrical breaker connecting Keowee Unit-1 to the underground fersr circuit.

Analysis'of Occurrence:

As a result of thisincident, Keowee U it 2 was not available to supply power n

automatically to Oconee via the underground feeder circuit forlapproximately three minutes. However, if an emergency start had been. initiated,-the' unit would have been available to' supply power through.the 230 kV switchyard..

Other sources of power available to Oconee at the time of the incident, include the 230.kV and 500 kV networks and the 100 kV transmission system.: It is concluded therefore, that this incident did not endanger the health and safety-of the public.

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Corrective Action:

Procedure PT/0/A/620/15, Keowee Hydro Emergency Startup Test, has been revised to more clearly delineate the steps necessary to remove one unit from service and connect the other unit to the underground feeder circuit. Also, a " warning" has been added to the appropriate section of the procedure requiring that prior to inhibiting either Keowee unit, it must be verified that the other unit is connected to the underground feed circuit.

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- s Dam POWER COMPANY STEA31 PRODUCTION DEPr.

GENEILtL OFFICES TEL t* M O N E4 AREA 704 P. O. SCX 317e 422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET 373 4ot t CILARLOTTE. N. C. 2S242 M2l'0 k t i - - O 5. f '

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Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 1217 230 Peach:ree Street, Northwest Atlanta, Georgia 30303 RE: Oconee Unit 2 Docket No. 50-269, -270, and -287

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report R0-269/73-6.

Very truly yours,

.A_L-m O. P

'Jilliam O. Parker, Jr.

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Director, Of fice of Management Inforsation and Program &.rol 1

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t 2 21 l At 1750 on February 22, 1978, during nor=al operation, Oconee attempted to start Keowee Hydro Unit 2 which is a source of auxiliary pcwer for the Oconee

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The unit failed to start due to an inoperable field flashing, breaker.

The unit was started without incident after an investigation had been

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Keowee Unit I and other sources of auxiliary power for the station g,,,,

were available if needed so that no loss of energency pcwer was experienced.

Thus, public health and safety were not endangered.

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'he field flashine breaker has failed on 3 previous occasions.

There has been.

,,,y ; no determination of cause, as yet.

Until the cause has been pinpointed, the

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y DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE UNIT 2 Report Number:

RO-269/78-6 Report Date:

April 7, l978 Occurrence Date:

March lo, 1978 Facility:

Oconee Nuclear Station, Seneca, South Carolina Identification of Occurrence:

Keowee Unit 2, Field Flashing 3reaker Inoperable Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Unit i 100% FP Unit 2 100: FP Unit 3 100% FP Description of Occurrence:

At 0701 on March 10, 1978 when an attempt was made to start Keovee Hydro Unit 2, the unit's field flashing breaker failed to close.

The unit was thereby sade inoperable, contrary to the requirements of Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications 3.7.1.

Keowee Unit I was verified operable at 0713. Unit 2 was returned to service at 1534 af ter a ecmplete investigation of the breaker abno rmality. The unit was lef t inoperable for slightly longer than normal to leave it in its failed mode during investigation by a Westinghouse representa-tive.

This type of incident has occurred on three previous occasions, which were reported in Reportable Occurrence Reports R0-269/77-29, R0-269/73-1 and R0-269/78-3, transmitted by my letters of January 18, February 3, and March 23, l978, respectively.

Apparent cause of Occurrence:

A breaker =aintenance crew and a Westinghouse representative checked the field flashing, field and supply breakers as well as associated relays without noting any abnormalities.

Control and closing circuits were also checked without any resulting failures.

Therefore, the exact cause of the breaker zalfunctions are s till unknown.

Further investigation is proceeding to identify a possible cause.

l Analysis of Occurrence:

1 The failure of the breaker to close caused Keovee Unit 2 to become temporarily inoperable. Throughout this period, the second Keovee Hydro unit was fully operable and available to supply emergency power to the station if required.

The health and safety of the public were not endangered.

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Corrective Action:

A determination of preper corrective action will be made when the cause is i

established.

Until that time, extensive investigation and monitoring will continue.

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