ML19322A634

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Forwards Insp Rept 50-269/71-04 on 710406-09.Noncompliance Noted Re Overfilled Electrical Cable Trays & Failure of Three Molded Connectors on Control Rod Drive Position Indicator Cable
ML19322A634
Person / Time
Site: Oconee 
Issue date: 05/17/1971
From: Seidle W
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To: James O'Reilly
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
Shared Package
ML19322A635 List:
References
NUDOCS 7911210703
Download: ML19322A634 (3)


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UNITED STATES

[ay ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

l le DIVISION OF COMPLIANCE i

REGION fl - SulTE 818 230 Pt;ACHTREc STREET, NORTHWEST Tusnoose $264537 AT LANT A. GEORGI A 30303 May 17, 1971 J. P. O'Reilly, Chief, Eeaccer Testing and Operations Branch (2)

Division of Compliance, Headquarters DUKE POWER COMPANY (OCONEE 1), LICENSE NO. CPPR-33, DOCKET No. 50-269 The attached report of an inspection of the subject facility by our inspectors en April 6-9, 1971, is forwarded for infor=ation. Five items of ncnconformance were detected during the inspection.

The items involve overfilling of cable trays, discrepancies in data packages for the main coolant pumps, failure to properly identify a damaged d.c. breaker cabinet associated with the control rod drive controls, inadequate control of stainless steel velding rods, and a fuel element storage location record A CDN covering these items was issued to the licensee en April 14.

error.

Please note that we consider the licensee's response to the March 8, 1971, 7

i CDN relating to the polyethylene in the core to be unsatisfactory.

Our position en this matter was referred to Headquarters by memorandum on April 27 The licensee has experienced additional failures of the ITE time delay relays spoken to in C0 Report No. 50-269/71-1.

'Ihe transmittal memorandum for this report identified these failures as possibly being of a generic type and recommended t~4at the matter be referred to our Technical Support Eranch for evaluation.

Two more electrical-type problems that may be generic in nature have been reported to our inspector.

One involves four lev voltage pover-type Viking centainment penetrations that were found to have internal grounds.

The licensee has postulated that the short circuits could have been caused by metal shavings falling into an a es between two seals. The penetrations have been returned to the factory for repair. We have requested that the licensee advise us when the cause of the short circuits has been determined.

If the ground problem turns out to be a generic type, then we vill advise you accordingly.

The other electrical problem involves the failure of thr-e molded connectors on the control rod drive position indicator cable. Prel.minary information indicates that the failures are attributed to improper curing of the poly-urethane ecmpound in the connectors.

In that these failures could also be 7 0 7 Hi s194 !

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J. P. O'Reilly 2-May 17, 1971 E

generic in nature, our inspector vill attempt to get more information relating to the problem during the next inspection.

We vill keep you advised.

In discussing preoperational testing with the licensee, our inspector was informed. that Duke dees not presently plan to conduct the following tests which are required by PI 6000:

1.

Safety injection systems tests at design conditions.

2.

Vibration tests on pressure vessel internals after core loading.

3.

Pressurizer effectiveness tests.

h.

Pressure reactivity coefficient measurements.

5 Shutdown from outside the control room at 100% power.

6.

Loss of offsite power at 100% reactor power.

7 Loss of coolant flow at 50 and 100% reactor power.

8.

Generator trip at 50 and 100% reactor power.

9 Dropped red test at power.

10.

Ejected rod test (withdrawal of one red at approximately 75% power).

We h' ave urged the licensee to reconsider his position on these tests.

If, at the time of our next inspection, we find the licensee's position on these tests unchanged, then we vill forward this matter to Headquarters for evaluation.

Duke is staying with their July 1971 fuel loading date.

We still feel September 1971 is a more realistic date.

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% M W. C. Seidle CO:II:WCS Senior Reactor Inspector

Enclosure:

C0 Rpt. No. 50-269/71 h (Murphy) l l

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