ML19322A615
| ML19322A615 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 02/03/1971 |
| From: | Cubitt R, Murphy C, Seidle W US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19322A609 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-71-01, 50-269-71-1, NUDOCS 7911210689 | |
| Download: ML19322A615 (14) | |
Text
1 U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY CO:CilSSION REGION II DIVISION OF COMPLIA'!CE Report of Inspection C0 Report No. 50-269/71-1 Licensee Duke Power Company Oconee 1 License No. CPPR-33 Category B Dates of Inspection:
January 5-8, 1971 Date of Previous Inspection:
December 1-4, 1970
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Inspected By:
C. E. Mulph[, Rp/ctor Inspector (Da tl '
(In Charge)
/
l N
R. L. C b'itt, Re r Inspector
' bate Reviewed By:
7/
W. C. Seidle, SMicr Reactor Inspector
'Da t'e Proprietary Information:
None 1
SCOPE A routine, announced inspection was cade of the 2,568 :ht(t) pressurized water reactor under construction near Seneca, South Carolina, known as Oconee Station No. 1.
Purposes of the inspection were:
1.
To determine the construction status and significant changes to the schedule dates;
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2.
To review the outstanding items remaining to be completed at the l
facility; 1
I 7911210.hf
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im 00 Rpt. No. 50-269/71-1 3.
To review the electrical installation; and 4.
To review the test program.
SUSDfARY Safety Items - None Nonconformance Items - None Unusual Occurrences - None Status of Previous 1v Reoorted Items -
1.
The licensee has determined that the steam generator skirt indications are not significant.
(See Section C.)
2.
The polar crane load test has been completed.
(See Section F.)
3.
The four stainless steel sections cf reactor coolant pipe which had been furnace sensitized have been clad on the inside with stainless steel.
(See Section C.)
4.
In response to the inspector's questions, Aycock stated that the in-house report on what appears to gy a generic-type failure of the ITE relay coils had not been issued.-
(See Exhibit A, Item 50.)
Outstanding Items - See Exhibit A.
Maragement Interview - The management interview was held on January 8,1971, and was attended by Dick, Bean, Wells, Smith, Hampton, Aycock and Hunnicutt.
1.
The inspector reviewed the results of the cable and cable tray instal-lation inspection in detail. He stated that he had reviewed typical examples of installation deficiencies with Wylie, Hall, and Aycock and that it was his understanding that corrections would be made as follows:
a.
Additional. trays and cable troughs would be installed to l
support and protect the cables.
l b.
Where practical, cables that had been improperly color coded would be dyed the correct colors.
c.
A letter would be written supplementing the licensse's original response to the Construction Deficiency Notice relating to the cable installation.
1/C0 Report No. 50-269/70-12.
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C0 Rpt. No. 50-269/71-1 d.
Design (Wylie and Hall) stated that a review had been made of the instances where cables of different color codes were routed in the same conduit or tray. This review indicated that in no case was the criterion for separation of redundant circuits comp romised.
In response to the inspector's question, Aycock stated that it was also his understanding that the installation would be corrected as stated above.
(See Section F.)
2.
The inspector advised Wells that he had discussed the electrical QC records with Wylie, Hall and Aycock. Most of the records which engineering had previously considered as complete had been returned to Charlotte for rework.1/ Wylie had also stated that consideration was being given to developing a method which would indicate when a QC data package had been completed. Wells stated that he felt that if a nethod is developed, that it should be used for all data packages, not just the electrical. The inspector concurred in.nis view.
(See Section F.)
3.
The inspector stated that he had reviewed the installation of the switchgear associated with the Keowee emergency feeder including that at the Keowee hydroplant. No deficiencies had been noted.
(See Section F.)
4.
The inspector acknowledged receipt of a revised procedure for the.
cleaning of the reactor coolant system. This procedure appeared to-be adaquate except for the cleaning of the steam generators. The inspector advised Smith that the procedure for cleaning the steam generator tubes should require sufficient cleaning and testing to assure that no harmful particles would remain af ter the cleaning operations are completed. The procedure should also require the-protection of cleaned areas from recontamination. Smith stated that the section relating to the steam generator would be reviewed and that the inspector's comments would be considered.
(See Section H.)
5.
The inspector stated that he had reviewed a Duke in-house report on hydros tatic test pressures and that he considered this item resolved.
(See Section H.)
1/C0 Report No. 50-269/70-12.
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C0 Rpt. No. 50-269/71-1 DETAILS A.
Persons Contacted
)
R. L. Dick - Manager of Construction, Duke Power Company (Duke)
D. G. Beam - Assistant Project Engineer, Oconee J. R. Wells - Principal Field Engineer G. L. Hunnicutt - Senior Field Engineer C. B. Aycock - Field Engineer, Electrical J. E. Smith - Plant Superintendent J. W. Hampton - Assistant Superintendent C. W. Wylie - Electrical Engineering Supervisor, Duke R. C. Hall - Electrical Design Engineer B.
Administration and Organization There have been no significant changes in the licensee 's staff since the previous inspection.
C.
Quality Ass urance 1.
Wells advised the inspector that B&W had reviewed the extent of the laminations in the steam generator skirt adapter. B&W's analysis indicated that the laminations were not significant.
The inspector plans no further action on this item at this time.
2.
In response to the inspector's question, Wells stated that all four of the sensitized stainless steel safe ends had been manually backclad on the interior surface with stainless steel.
The inspector does not plan any further action en this item at this time.
I 3.
The inspector reviewed the Deficiency Work Sheets maintained by Aycock and the Variation Notice File maintained by Wells. No items of significance were noted.
D.
Construction Progress 1.
The four reactor coolant pump motors have been installed.
- 2..All main coolant pipe welds have been made. Backcladding of the sensitized stainless steel nozzles has also been completed.
Cleaning of the loop piping is_ underway.
-3.
Fifty-five of the. sixty-nine control rod drive pressure thimbles have been-installed on the reactor vessel head.
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Work on the health physics facilities are underway.
E.
Construction Schedule 1.
The erection of the turbine generator is now scheduled for com-pletion by mid-February 1971.
2.
The startup of the Keowee hydro station is scheduled for the last of February.
3.
The reactor vessel internals were to be moved to the transfer canal by January 11, 1971, and installed in the vessel the las week in January.
4.
The hydrostatic test of reactor coolant loop is now scheduled for mid-February and the containment testing in March. Core loading is now scheduled for late May 1971.
F.
Electrical and Instrumentation 1.
Routing and Identification of Safety-Related Cable (5205.06)
During a prc.-ious inspection, the inspector had advised the licensee that the cable installation appeared to be contrary to the require-rants of the.FSAR in that numerous safety-related cables were not properly color coded and were not properly supported and protected.1/
The licensee had been further advised that a Construction Deficiency Notice (CDN) would be issued. The licensee's initial response to this CDN was not considered adequate by Region II and the matter was discussed with Dick on January 5,1971. Dick requested that the Compliance inspector review the installation with Wylie and this was done on January 6, 1971. The following examples of installation discrepancies were pointed cut to Wylie, Power panel boards IDID and IKVID had safety-related cables a.
approaching them that were color coded with tape and were strapped to the outside of the tray with plastic ties.
b.
Nucerous. green cables to the emergency power switching logic panel EPSLP2 were routed outside of the cable trays and were not physically protected.
Cable troughs were pointed 'out in the cable spreading room c.
i and the electrical equipment room that had sharp metal edges which were cutting into the ' cable jackets.
1/ C0 Report No. 50-269/70-11.
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C0 Rpt. No. 50-269/71-1 i d.
A yellow-jacketed cable in vertical trough IT44 was not supported.
e.
The 500 MCM battery cables were not color coded.
f.
Cables entering the 4 Kv switchgear from overhead cable tray were not adequately supported or protected.
g.
Orange power cable IEX9 ' required additional support.
h.
Numerous safety-related cables in the No.1 cable shaf t were not properly supported or separated f 4 'm redundant cables,
- i. Cable IEXS14 was not properly protected along beam and not supported or protected near its termination at a transformer.
k.
Two 19 conductor gray control cables to the chemical addition control panel were routad on top of a ventilation duct rather than in tray.
1.
Cable IEML479 lacked support at the valve end.
A 90* bend section of cable tray above emergency power m.
switching logic nanel EPSLPl required additional support.
Gray cables. routed through sleeve No. 6 in cable spreading n.
room required support.
The inspector advised Wylie that the above items should be considered as examples.of the types of discrepancies that were referred to in the CDN. The inspector stated.that many of the discrepancies that had been brought.to the attention of Hall and Aycock during pre-vious inspections had been corrected. Since the number of cables presently. installed. represented only a small percent of the cables to be installed, the inspector expressed concern about the adequacy of the design reviews. Wylie said that all the designs were independently. reviewed but because of mistakes and changes some errors would be expected to reach the field. Wylie agreed with the deficiencies pointed out by the inspector and stated they would be. corrected. In addition, he stated that the installation would be reviewed. and any other deficiencies found would also be corrected. Wylie also stated that the licensee would take steps to prevent such deficiencies from recurring. He said that a letter supplementing Duke's previous response to the CDN would be written to confirm these corrections.
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' C0 Rp t. No. 50-269/71-1 2.
Electrical and Instrumentation OC Records (5105.05)
In response to Wylie's questions, the inspector reviewed the discrepancies which.had been noted in the electrical and instru-mentation records during the previous inspection.1/ The inspector stated that it appeared -that the records had not received an adequate review as to accuracy or completion. He pointed out that Duke did not have a procedure for documenting that a data package had been. reviewed and determined to be complete. This could lead to the type of discrepancies which had been noted.
W lie agreed and stated that. consideration would be given to y
establishing such a system. He further stated that the licensee had recalled most of the electrical and instrumentation data packages from the construction site in order to bring them up-to date. He also stated that the data would be reviewed for accuracy.
3.
Keowee-Oconee Emergency Feeder (5105.06)
The inspector reviewed the physical installation of the switch-gear, bus and transformer associated with the Keowee-Oconee emergency feeder. No discrepancies were noted. The inspector plans no further action on this item at this time.
4.
Polar Crane Load Test Aycock advised the inspector that the redundant overspeed switch had been installed on the polar crane and that the crane had been tested. The crane held 160 tons with one set of brakes released. In addition, it was confirmed that the crane did not have excessive overtravel on loss of power. The inspector plans no further action on this item at this time.
G.
Pressurizer Safety Valves (4905.05.a.2, 4905.06.b.1 and b.2)
The pressurizer safety valves are stored in a heated warehouse which is reserved for nuclear steam supply system. components. The valves are stored in their original shipping crates. One of the crates was opened and the inspector observed that _ the valve had blind flanges installed on..the ports and that the valve was ' sealed -
in plastic..The' licensee has provision for segregated storage for nonconfo rming. components. The receiving inspection report indicated that the valves'were received in good condition, however, and were not required to be quarantined. The inspector plans no~further action on these valves at this time.
El/00 Report No. 50-269/70-12.
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CO Rpt. No. 50-269/71-1 H.
Test and Operations (5400) l.
Hydrostatic Test Pressures During a previous inspection, the inspector had questioned the method used by the licensee to determine hydrostatic test pressure.1/ The licensee in the FSAR had stated that these systems would be tested in accordance with USAS Code B31.7.
This code provides that the test pressure shall be 1.25 times the design pressure multiplied by the lowest ratio of the allowable stress intensity valve-for the test temperature to the allowable stress intensity value for the design temperature.
The code further states that if the test pressure as defined above is exceeded by more than 6%, the upper limit shall be established by the design engineer using an analysis which includes all loadings that may exist during the test.
The licensee in his test procedures had specified a hydrostatic test of 1.5 times the design pressure. In some cases, this test exceeded that specified by B31.7.
The licensee has reviewed these tests and has issued an in-house report that the allowable stresses are not exceeded by the specified hydrostatic test press ure. The inspector does not plan any further action on this item at this time.
2.
Outstanding Items List The Outstanding Ite=s List was reviewed with Smith and Hampton.
Smith. stated that the only items which presented problems were as follows:
a.
Item 6.d, Core Bypass Flow - Smith stated that they were not certain how the measurement of core bypass flow could be made with the degree of accuracy that night be desired. The inspectors advised Smith that he might want to consider making physical measurements of the internals to confirm assumed tolerances. The bypass flow might also be determined from the measurements of total vessel flow, core tempera-ture rise and vessel temperature rise. Hamp ton s tated that these methods would be considered.
b.
Item 42, Cleaning Reactor Coolant System Piping and Equipment -
The inspectors were given a copy of a revised cleaning pro-cedure. This procedure gave detailed steps for cleaning, inspection, and testing which appeared. adequate for all areas 1/C0 Report No. 50-269/70-10.
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except.for the steam generators. The procedure for ' cleaning the steam generator specified that only 8 of over 15,500 tubes be cleaned. The inspectors advised Hampton that the method and extent.of cleaning.the steam generator should take into account the difficulty of verifying the cleanliness of the tubes and the size of particles that could be tolerated.
Hampton stated that this would be considered.
c.
Item.41, Reactor Coolant Pump Performance - In response to Smith's question, the inspector stated that the pump per-formance should be verified both. hot and cold. Data should include capacity, developed head, pump and cooling water temperatures, coastdown characteristics, motor currents, voltage and power, and direction of rotation. Data should be taken for single and multiple pump operation.
d.
Item 45, Safety Injection System Flow Balances - In response to Hampton's questions, the inspectors stated that test data should include the total flow rates provided by various pump-combinations, and the flows rates in each header and branch for the various pump combinations.
e.
Item 6.o, Condenser Cooling Heater Crossover Header Valves -
The inspector advised Hampton that this item referred to the 18-inch manual valve upstream of the 30-inch condenser cooling water system crossover header. The valve must be locked open to prevent inadvertent closure and the resulting loss of all three reactor building coolers.
J f.
Item 46, Vibration Testing - Consideration should be given to checking the vibration of the major piping systems in the reactor building as well as the coolant pumps, core internals, 4
and steam generators.
Smith stated _ that the Technical Specifications had been revised to control the distribution of safety system bypass keys. The inspectors agreed that this item appeared to be resolved.
i Attachmen t :
Exhibit A Y
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LICENSEE Duke Power Company h,
FACILITY Oconee station No.1 DOCKFir 8: LICENSE NOS.
50-269, CPPR-33 REACTOR OUTSTANDING ITEMS IDENTIFIED ITEM CLOSED 1.
68-2, 3/5/68, Concrete test cylinder breaks below specs
.68-3, D.5.,
_NC 6/19/68 2.
68-3,6/19/68, Unautbrized revision to Cad reld specifications 68 h, Summary, NC 9/25/69 3
68-3,6/19/68, Failure to provide concrete inspector 68 h, Summary, NC 9/25/69 h.
68 h, 9/25/68 Failure to properly test Cadweld splices 69-1, Summary, NC 1/6/69 5
69-8,9/9/69, Failure to properly qualify veld procedures 69-9,G,11/3/69 E
6.
69-8,9/9/69, Failure to properly qualify veldors 69-9, G, 11/3/69 N,,C, 7
IEB,h/11/69 Procedure for repair of are strikes not available 70-5, Summary, I
h/27/70 8.
CDN,1/8/70 NDT of core flooding valves Memo, WCS to HQ, j
2/2/70 9
70-1,1/6/70, Welding and NDT deficiencies, CDN issued Memo, WCS to HQ, NC 3/26/70^
10.
Bingham 69-1, Main coolant pump discrepancies l
_ Memo. WCS to HQ, 12/9/69, E l
' h/21/70 11.
70 h, h/27/70, Low strength concrete Memo, WCS to HQ, E
i 8/7/70 i
Memo, WCS to HQ, 12.
IEB, 5/1/70 Precsure vessel safe ends 8/5/70 13.
70-6,5/25/70, Tendon stressing discrepancies Memo, WCS to HQ, E
8/T/TO 14.
70-8,8/3/70, Tendons end stress gages Memo, WCS to HQ, E
10/8/70 15 70-8,9/1/70,-
Fissures in primary coolant pipe cladding FSAR, Amend.24, E
12/17/70
- 16. IEB, 9/11/70,
a.
Determination of safety system response to axial E
power imbalances b.
Availability of in-core detectors
" - IDENTI/IED Column: 3 - safety item; HC - noncompliance or nonconformance item: UN - unresolveif item: IN - inquiry itom; IEB - Reactor Inspection and EnTerececnt Branch requeliT; ~ O, other ' source of idetM;/fwfication A (brief.Ly specify) 1 of 51 taan I
l i
LICENSEE Duke Power Company b
FACILI Oconee Station No. 1 DOCKET & LICENSE NOS. 50-269, CPPR-33 REACTOR OUTSTANDING ITEMS _
IDENTIFIED ITEM CLOSED c.
Measurements of flow and temperature during initial, operation d.
Verification of bypass flow
+
e.
Verification of axial peak effects on DNER f.
Data during startup for single loop, two pump operations g.
Inspection of reactor internals after completion of preoperational tests h.
Field test of steam generator
- i. Low strength concrete and omitted tendons Memo, WCS to HQ, 10/8/70 J.
Penetration room valves 70-12, Summary 12/1/70 k.
Strain gauge failures Memo, WCS to HQ, 10/8/70 1.
HP and LP injection system startup times m.
Core flooding tank MO valve
.n.
Reactor building spray pump performance o.
Condenser cooling water crossover header valve p.
Spent fuel accident filters q.
Administrative control of MCP startup Flow tests per 200/12 and 200/13 r.
s.
Flow distribution chart
~'76 IDENTIFIED Column: S - safety item; NC - noncompliance or nonconformance UN - unresolved item; IN - inquiry item; IEB - Reactor Inspection item; T6rcement Branch requesE; 'O - other source of identification and En
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(briefly specify) 2 of 5_
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LICENSEE Duke Power Company r,
s FACILITY Oconee Station No. 1 DOCKET & LICEUSE NOS. 50-269, CPPR-33 REACTOR OUTSTANDING ITEMS IDENTIFIED ITEM CLOSED 17 70-2,2/19/70, Vendor NI7f records for safeguards systems cables 70-11, F, 10/26/70 w
- 18. 70 h, 3/23/70, Verification of separation of transducer tubing E
I 19 70-8, 8/3/70, Control rod drive ~ guide bushings an'd torque tubes E
20.
70-8, 8/3/70, Completion of HP facilities l
E i
21.
70-8,8/3/70, Completion of HP procedures U
22.
70-8,8/3/T0, Completion of HP personnel training 70-12, Summary E
i 12/1/70 71-1, 1/4/71 23 70-8,8/3/70, Crane load test E
24.
70-8, 8/3/70, Verify that test procedures are properly revised and approved when changes are required j W
25.
To-8, 8/3/70, Verify that analysis of containment is made FSAR, Amend. 24 E
26.
70-8,8/3/70, Approved fuel handling procedures l E
27 70-8,8/3/70, Main steam pipe hangers E
- 28. 70-9,9/1/70, steem c;enerator skirt adapter indice.tions E
70-11, C, 29 70-9,'9/1/70, HP injection pump QC records 10/26/70 w
30.
70-9,9/1/70, Basis for particle size in flushing procedures 70-11, G, 10/26/70 m
31.
70-9,-9/1/70, Protection of instrumentatica during hydro test E
I 32.
70-10, 9/28/70, Fuel transfer tube expansion joint; replacement 33 70-10,9/28/70, Routing of cables exterior to cable trays Memo, WCS to HQ l g
1/18/71 Tor IDENTIFIED Column: S - safety item; NC - noncompliance or nonconformance item; UN - unresolved item; IN - inquiry item; IEB - Reactor Inspection and Enforcement Breh.h requesE; ~O - other hource of identification g (briefly specify).
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e LICENSEE Duke Power Company r-FACILITY Oconee Station No. 1 DOCKET & LICENSE NOS.
50-269, CPPR-33 REACTOR OUTSTANDING ITEMS _
IDENTIFIED ITEM CI.OSED 3h. DRL Ept. No. 1, Installation of additional environmental monitoring T/2h/70,Ul equipment 35 DRL Rpt. No. 1, Vent valve replacement test T/24/70, E
- 36. DRL Rpt. No. 1, Strong motion accelerometer installation 7/24/70,UN 37 DRL Rpt. No.1, Penetration room flow indication and adjustment 7/24/70, E
- 38. DRL Rpt. No. 1, Instrumentation bypass keys Tech Specs Change 7/24/70, E 12/70 DRL Rp'. No. 3, Internals vibration test t
39 9/13/70, E h0.
DRL Ept. No. 3, Core flooding tank valves l
9/15/70, UN i
hl 70-10,9/28/70, Hydrostatic test pressures 71-1, 1/4/71 Ur i
h2.
70-11, 10/26/70, Cleaning reactor coolant system. piping and equipment h
b3 70-11, 10/26/70,3ensitized stainless steel in reactor coolant pump E
discharge piping i
71-1, 1/4/71 l
44.
IEB, 12/22/70 Reactor coolant pump tests 45.
IEB, 10/30/70 3afety injection system testing 46.
70-12, 12/1/70 Vibration testing - equipment and piping i
E i
- 47.
70-12, 12/1/70 Location of station batteries NC i
l 48.
70-12,12/1/70 Nuclear instrumentation vendor tests
- 69.
70-12, 12/1/70 Electrical QC data packages I
NC l
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!-. r IDENTI/IED Column: S - safety item; NC -inancompliance or nonconformance item: UN - unresolved itc=: IN - inquiry item; IED --Reactor Insnection andEnTorecmentBranchrequesT;~O-otherlsourceofidentification A
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(briefly speci.fy) l 4 of 5
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LICENSEE Duke Power Company FACILITY Oconee Station No.1
(
DOCKET E: LICEll3E NOS. 50-269, CPPR-33 REACTOR OUTSTAIIDING ITEMS _
IDEllTIFIED ITEM CI,0 SED 50.
70-12, 12/1/70 ITE relays
_UN
, 51.
70-12, 12/1/70 Heater and heat tracing tests I
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52.
70-12, 12/1/70 Control rod drive cooling system tests
_UN 53.
70-12, 12/1/70 Containment and auxiliary building vent system filters i
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IDEIITI/IED Column: S - safety item; NC - noncompliance or nonconformance item: Uti - unresolveE ltcm: IN - inquiry item; IED - Reactor Inspection and EnT6rcement Eranch requeliT; 0 - other isource of identification Exhibit A
~(briefly specify) l Page 5 of 5 l
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