ML19320D485

Forwards IE Circular 80-13, Grid Strap Damage in Westinghouse Fuel Assemblies. No Written Response Required

ML19320D485
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	05/28/1980
From:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	Mcdonald R ALABAMA POWER CO.
References
NUDOCS 8007210419
Download: ML19320D485 (1)

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o

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REGION 11 b[

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ATLANTA. GEORGIA 30303 In Reply Refer To:

MAY 281980 RII:JPO Alabama Power Company Attn:

R. P. Mcdonald Vice President-Nuclear Generation Post Office Box 2641 Birmingham, Alabama 35291 Gentlemen:

The enclosed Circular No. 80-13, is forwarded to you for information.

If there are any questions related to your understanding of the suggested actions, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

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James P. O'Reilly Director

Enclosures:

1.

IE Circular No. 80-13 2.

List of Recently Issued IE Circulars s.

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8007210;e.%ffy

MAY 261980 Alabama Power Company cc w/ enc 1:

A. R. Barton Executive Vice President Post Office Box 2641 Birmingham, Alabama 35291 F. L. Clayton, Jr.

Senior Vice President Post Office Box 2641 Birmingham, Alabama 35291 J. W. McGowan Manager-Operations Quality Assurance Post Office Box 2641 Birminghao, Alabama 35291

0. D. Kingsley, Jr.

Manager, Nuclear Engineering and j

Technical Services i

Post Office Box 2641 Birmingnasi, Alabama 35291 H. O. Thrash Manager, Nuclear Gcneration Post Office Box 2641 Birmingham, Alabama 35291 W. C. Petty Manager-Quality-Design Assurance (Design and Construction)

Post Office Box 2641 Birmingham, Alabama 35291 W. G. Esirston, III Plant Manager Drawer 470 Ashford, Alabama 36312

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"yi R. E. Hollands, Jr.

QA Supervisor Post Office Bcx U Ashford, Alabama 36312 1

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i SSINS No.: 6830 Accessions No.:

UNITED STATES 7910250495 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 May 28, 1980 IE Circular No. 80-13 GRID STRAP DAMAGE IN WESTINGHOUSE FUEL ASSEMBLIES Description of Circumstances:

During the refueling operation at Salem Unit 1, it was noted by the licensee that some of the assemblics that were removed had suffered grid strap mechanical damage. This was reported to the NRC in LER 79-44.

Subsequent to this discovery all fi al ossembli,es were removed from the core for examination.

The degree of the damage to the grid straps was classified in three cate, gories: small pieces missing (15 assemblies), grid material ripped and laid over (5 assemblies), larger sections missing and fuel pins exposed (11 assemb-lies). No damage to the fuel pins was observed. A total of 31 assemblies suffered some grid damage.

The damage appeared to be the resuit of corner to corner interaction of the grid straps of diagonally adjacent fuel assemblies during the vertical loading

-and unloading movements. No correlation of the damage to core location, grid strap elevation, or manufacturing and shipping batches has been identified.

The licensee and the fuel manufacturer established the following guidelines for reloading damaged assemblies: (1) those assemblies with full width pieces missing will not be reloaded for cycle 2, (2) those assemblies with deformed edges and those with small pieces missing will be reloaded with special pro-cedures to prevent further damage.

Salem Unit 1 is fueled with 17X17 Westinghouse assemblies. Similar grid problems have occurred at other facilities fueled with 14X14 and 15X15 Westinghouse assemblies; however, fewer assemblias were damaged in those instances.

Recommended Actions:

All licensees using 14X14, 15X15, or 17X17 Westinghouse assemblies are advised to:

(1) Visually inspect grid straps of those fuel assemblies which are discharged from the' core as well as those assemblies which are moved to 5

the spent fuel pool for control rod replacement and are subsequently returned to the core.

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i IE Circular No. 80-13 May 28, 1980 Page 2 of 2 (2) Review the fuel handling precautions recommended by Westinghouse at a meeting on May 25, 1979, with NRC and the licensee for Salem (Attachment 1).

Adopt those recommendations which are pertinent.

No written response to this Circular is required.

If you require additional information regarding these matters, contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

Attachment:

Summary of Meeting Notice dated 5/30/79 V

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F I FACILITY: SALEM UNIT NO. 1 1.

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Su m ARY OF MEETING HELD ON MAY 25. 1979. TO DISCUSS Vap W M'.f!Abt DAMAGE OBSERVED TO FUEL GRID ASSEMBLIES DURING THE

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we met with repr'esentatives of Public Service Electric &

On May 25, 1979, Gas Company (PSE&G) and Westinghouse to discuss the cause and extent of i

damage observed to the Salem Unit No.1 fuel grid assemb,1ies during the current refueling outage for cycle 2.

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A list of attendees is enclosed.

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Significant discussions are sumarized below.

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' damage observed to the salem fuel grid assemblies during the The licensee and Westinghouse provided a detailed discussion of the

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refueling outage which comenced i'- April 1979. Due to the indications

. ' observed during the initial stages of the outage. the decision was ende Of the fuel assemblies to unload all fuel assemblies from the core.

(193) inspected, 28 assemblies were detemined to have varying degrees 3. ',

d.b,"2 of damage to one or more of the eight grid assemblies per fuel assembly.

The grid asse-blies provide lateral support to the fuel rods.

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case was damage observed to the fuel rods themselves. The grid assembly drange observed, which was generally located at the corners of the grid essemblies, wits categorized as follows:

i Ca egory Tyoe of Damage No. of Grid Assemblies

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1 small pieces missing 15 s

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grid material ripped 4

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1arger sections missing and fuel pins exposed

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determined ty the licensee to be ac.ceptable-for use and will be reloaded,.;

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for cycle 21 as a precautionary measure assemblies with category 3 damage will not be relotded. The basis for this determination was that assemblies l

with category 1 and 2 damage can be used witho'ut any loss of function of e

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longer fully restrain all fuel rous in the manner provided for in the 4

, design. Their rsese should be based on further analysis.

Of the data collected and the reload films reviewed, no pattern has been established for the observed damage. Also, it has not been determined whether the damage occurred during fuel insertion for cycle 1. or during removal or readjustments for cycle 2, or both.

It is believed that corner-to-corner interaction may have occurred between grid assemblies

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of adjacent fuel assemblies especially when diagonal fuel assemblies have been removed and some degree of lateral movement is possible. Under these conditions the k.-id assemblies may have been aligned such that the corners interacted during vertical movement.

Of the pieces missing (about 61), a total area of about 25in2 is involved.

These pieces range frem about.3tnz up to about 5.5fn2 Approximately j

.12 int f material has been recovered from' the core or the fuel assemblies duri., the unloading of the core.

In addition. the core was inspected with a 1Y camera. With regard to the potential for flow blockage from the missing material Westinghouse indicated that if all the peices originally missing were to be located such as to partially block the inlet nozzle area of the one fuel assembl, analyses similar to that described in Section 3.4 of the Salsa FSAR indicate that no problem would exist. The i

smaller pieces still missing are expected to easily pass up through the fuel assemblies during operation and not present any problems to the control rod drive mechanisms.

The largest that any of the missing pieces than ZinI. based on the base areas on grid assemblies, is ilightly greater could be 6

Westinghouse has reconnended additicnal fuel assembly handling precautions 1

to minimize the potential for cener-to-corner interaction between grid assemblies.

Included among these reconnendations are,1) a revised loading sequence which would load fuel assemblies from the sides of the core toward the center, 2) a slight offset in position as corner fuel assemblies are lowered into the core until they are about 10" above the base plate and then making a lateral adjustment into final position.

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3) the conditionally accepted assemblies in categories 1 and 2 would be loaded in a special sequence to minimize relative motion with adjacent assemblies, 4) those assemblies in category 2 would be loaded against the

-core baffle where possible and 5) revised load cell limits on the mani-pulator crane in an sttempt to more easily detect increased loads during fuel handling.

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Meeting Sumary for

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1. "'Westin'gMMGMTedgi(alid sumached similar grid'issed1['p'FobTiiid^^~' ' ~

bl that have occur:1sd at other facilities. Although these other occurrences

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.. C'?.. did not involve as' mary fuel assemblies as in this Sales situation, 4M'similar damage has been observed to 14x14,15x15 and 17x17 fuel assemblies.

In same instances the fuel was removed, and in others, the fuel was re-leaded with no known adverse effects.

With regard to the Salem Unit I refueling analysis. the licensee indicated preliminarily, that the core parameters are expected to be essentially e, unchanged due to the revised core loading that will result.

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The licensee agreed to address the potential effects that the unaccounted

.for pieces of grid material might have on the core thermal hydraulic i

analysis and on control rod operation.

This infonnation will be included

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prior to restart of Salen 1 in a supplement to the licensee's reload application for c;ycle 2.

gry p-Q bry ech Project Manager Operating Reactors Branch #1

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Division of Operating Reactors 1.,. <.

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List of Attendees cc: w/ enclosure i

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IE Circular.No. 80-13 Enclosure May 28, 1980 RECENTLY ISSUED 1

IE CIRCULARS l

Circular Subject Date of Issued to No.

Issue 80-13

. Grid Strap Damage in 5/28/80 All holders of Reactor Westinghouse Fuel Assemblies OL and Construction Permits for PWRs 80-12 Valve chaft-To-Actuator Key 5/14/80 All holders of Reactor May la On of Place When OLs and cps Mounteo

'M r Tontal Axis 80-11 Emergent, '

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Jenerator 5/13/80 All holders of a power Lube Oil Cooler Failures reactor OL or CP 80-10 Failure to Maintain 4/29/80 All holders of Reactor Environmental Qualification OLs and cps of Equipment 80-09 Problems With Plant Internal 4/28/80 All holders of a power Communications Systems reactor OL or CP 80-08 BWR Technical Specification 4/18/80 All General Electric Inconsistency - RPS Response BWR's holding a power Time reactor OL 80-07 Problems with HPCI Turbine 4/3/80 All holders of a power Oil System reactor OL or CP 80-06 Control and Accountability 4/14/80 Medical licensees in Systems for Implant Therapy Categories G and G1 Sources 80-05 Emergency Diesel-Generator 4/1/80 All holders of a power Lubricating Oil Addition and reactor OL or CP Onsite Supply 80-04 Securing of Threaded Locking 3/14/80 All holders of a power Devices on Safety-Related reactor OL or CP Equipment 80-03

. Protection from Toxic Gas 3/6/80 All holders of a Hazards power reactor OL 80-02 Nuclear Power Plant Staff 2/1/80 All holders of Reactor

-Work Hours OLs, including research and test reactors, and cps e