ML19320C729

Forwards IE Circular 80-14, Radioactive Contamination of Plant Demineralized Water Sys & Resultant Internal Contamination of Personnel. No Written Response Required

ML19320C729
Person / Time
Site:	Ohio State University
Issue date:	06/24/1980
From:	James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Redmond R OHIO STATE UNIV., COLUMBUS, OH
References
NUDOCS 8007170636
Download: ML19320C729 (1)

Text

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UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o

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REGION 111

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799 ROOSEVELT ROAD GLEN EtLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

'JUN 2 41980 Docket No. 50-150 Ohio State University ATTN:

Dr. Robert F. Redmond Director Engineering Experiment Station 161 Hitchcock Hall 2070 Neal Avenue Columbus, OH 43210 Gentlemen:

The enclosed IE Circular No. 80-14 is forwarded to you for information.

If there are any questions related to your understanding of the suggested actions, please contact this office.

Sincerely, C%

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hamesG.KeppTe$

Director

Enclosure:

IE Circular No. 60-14 cc w/ encl:

Central Files Di rector, NRR/DPM Director, NRR/ DOR PDR NSIC TIC 800717Od84 h

s SSINS.: 6830 UNITED STATES Accession No.:

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8005050074 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D. C.

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,mJ IE Circular No. 80-14 RADI0 ACTIVE CONTAMINATION OF PLANT DEMINERALIZED WATER SYSTEM AND RESULTANT INTERNAL CONTAMINATION OF PERSONNEL This circular describes an event which occurred at a nuclear power facility; however, the generic implications may be applicable to research reactors, and fuel cycle facilities.

On March 17, 1980, a licensee informed the NRC resident inspector that portions of the plant demineralized water (DW) system were found to be radioactively contaminated.

A temporary hose used to add demineralized water to the spent fuel pool was the pathway for the cross-contamination.

After this fuel pool makeup was completed on March 14, the temporary DW line (still connected to the DW header) was inadvertently left submerged in the fuel pool.

Since the DW header pressure at the point of supply was relatively low (a DW booster pump had been secured), a siphoning action occurred, resulting in radioactive contamination of portions of the DW header.

On March 17, 1980, while performing routine secondaay system cnemical analyses, thelicenseediscoveredthatthedemineralizedwatertapin_ghechemistrylab contained high levels of boron and had activity of 1.5 x 10 uCi/ml (mainly Cs-134, Cs-137, Co-58, Co-60 and Mn-54).

It was subsequently discovered that demineralized water from the chemistry laboratory supply tap had been used to make five (5) pots of coffee.

The remaining coffee was confiscated and the twenty-three (23) individuals who had consumed this coffee were whole-body counted All involved individuals shewed no intake great <

than an equivalent 0.01 MPC-HRS. Analysis performed by the licensee's radiat t.onsultant, based on the maximum concentration of radioactivity found in the coffee, indicated that the resultant 50 year dose commitment to an individual drinking eight ounces of this coffee would be less than 1 millirem.

Further licensee investigation revealed that the non-radiological chemistry DW supply tap was the only DW supply point outside the Auxiliary Building controlled area.

This DW supply tap w"s tagged prohibiting human consumption to prevent a sinilar event in the future.

It is recommended that you review your facilities use of demineralized water (DW) via temporary connections and give attention to the following:

1.

Provisions should be made to assure that radioactive materia?

are no'.

inadvertently introduced into your facility's DW system via the improper use of temporary connections.

A terrporary cross connection between contaminated systems and the DW system without adequate physical controls to prevent cross-contamination should be prahibited.

IE Circular No. 80-14 June 24, 1980 Page 2 of 2 2.

In addition to some physical means of preventing backflow into the DW system, appropriate administrative controls should be established to ensure that the DW supply valve is secured and temporary hosing is disconnected from the DW supply header after use.

3.

Use of plant-supplied DW for human consumption should be prohibited.

The potable water system should be the only authorized source of water for human consumption.

4.

Examine potable and demineralized water systems to determine if pathways exist allowing or having the potential to allow contamination of these systems including temporary connections whereby siphons could cause situations described above.

No written response to this Circular is required.

Your review of this matter to determine its applicability to your facility and any corrective and preven-tive actions taken or planned, as appropriate, will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspection.

If you desire additional information regarding this matter, contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

I

IE Circular No. 80-14 Enclosure June 24, 1980 RECENTLY ISSUED IE CIRCULARS Circular Subject Date of Issued to No.

Issue 80-13 Grid Strap Damage in 5/18/80 All holders of Reactor Westinghouse Fuel Assemblies OLs and cps 80-12 Valve-Shaft-To-Actuator Key 5/14/80 All holders of Reactor May Fall Out of Place When OLs and cps Mounted Below Horizontal Axis 80-11 Emergency Diesel Generator 5/13/80 All holders of a power Lube Oil Cooler Failures reactor OL or CF 80-10 Failure to Maintain 4/29/80 All holders of Reactor Environmental Qualification OLs and cps of Equipment 80-09 Problems With Plant Internal 4/28/80 All holders of a power Communications Systems reactor OL or CP 80-08 BWR Technical Specification 4/18/80 All General Electric Inconsistency - RPS Response BWR's holding a power Time reactor C'.

80-07 Problems with HPCI Turbine 4/3/80 All holders of a power Oil System reactor OL or CP 80-06 Control and Accountability 4/14/80 Medical licensees in Systems for Implant Therapy Categories G and G1 Sources

^0-05 Emergency Diesel-Generator 4/1/80 All holders of a power Lubricating Oil Addition and reactor OL or CP Onsite Supply 80-04 Securing of Threaded Locking 3/14/80 All holders of a power Devices on Safety-Related reactor OL or CP Equipment 80-03 Protection from Toxic Gas 3/6/80 All holders of a Hazards power reactor OL 80-02 Nuclear Power Plant Staff 2/1/80 All holders of Reactor Work Hours OLs, including research and test reactors, and cps b

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