ML19320B002
| ML19320B002 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/30/1980 |
| From: | Ott W NRC OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19320B000 | List: |
| References | |
| NUREG-0685, NUREG-0685-DRFT, NUREG-685, NUREG-685-DRFT, SECY-80-275, NUDOCS 8007090017 | |
| Download: ML19320B002 (54) | |
Text
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[7590-01]
O NUREG-0685 1s
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Environmental Assessment for Effective Changes to 10 CFR Part 50 and Appendix E of 10 CFR Part 50; Er.argency Planning Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants W. R. Ott Office of Standards Development U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cc mission Enclosure "I" 8007090o q
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NUREG-0685 Environmental Assessment for Effective Changes to 10 CFR Part 50 and Appendix E of 10 CFR Part 50; Emergency Planning Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants Manuscript Completed:
, 1980 Data Published:
, 1980 W. R. Ott Division of Siting, Health and Safeguards Standards Office of Standards Development U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Enclosure "I"
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ABSTRACT The staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission h:s prepared an Environmental Assessment for changes to the regulations governing emergency planning requirements.
Based on this assessment the Director, Office of Standards Cavelopment determined that an Environmental Impact Statement would not be prepared for the rule changes and directed that a " Negative ' eclaration; Finding of No s
Significant Impact" be prepared and published in the Federal Reafster.
The Environmental Assessement is presented and the FRN is attached as Appendix II.
(Included in Appendix II is an analysis of comments received on an earlier draft version of this Assessment (45 FR 3513, January 21, 1980).) The effective rule changes are included as Appendix III for completeness.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1.
ItitroduAtion.........................
1 2.
Need for the Amendments; Rejection of the No Action Alternative......
1 3.
The Proposed Action.....................
2 4.
Impact of the Proposed Action................
4 5.
Summary...........................
10 d
Appendix I
- Replacement Power Costs of Shutting Down Operating Nuclear Power Plants,1981...
12 Appendix II - Negative Declaration; Finding of No Significant Impact for Effective Rule Changes...................
17 Apper. dix III - Emergency Planning Rule Changes.......
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l 1.
Introduction The Commission recently published in the Federal Register proposed amend-ments to 10 CFR Part 50, Sections 50.33, 50.47 and 50.54 and Appendix E (44 FR 75167, December 19,1979).
Since these amendments to the regulations governing the licensing of production and utilization facilities are substantive and may have a significant impact on the human environment, the Commission has directed that an environmental assessment should be prepared to determi.:e whether an environmental impact statement should be developed for the ruie changes.
A draft Environmental Assessment (DEA) was published in the Federal Register.as part of the " Draft Negative Declaration; Finding of No Significant Impact" for
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the proposed amendments (45 FR 3913, January 21, 1980).
Comment periods for both the proposed amendments and'the Oraft Environmental Assessment ended on February 18, 1980.
Comments were received which resulted in modifications of the amendments and the Environmental Assessment.
This document (NUREG-0685) contains the final text of the Environmental Assessment and has attached as Appendix II the Federal Register notice containing the " Negative Declaration; Finding of No Significant Impact" for the effective amendments and the analysis of the comments submitted on the DEA and as Appendix III the text of the effective amendments.
2.
Need for the Amendments; Rejection of the No Action Alternative Until now regulations concerning emergency planning required the applicant for a nuclear power plant operating license to be prepared to take protective measures within the site boundary in the event of an accident.
The applicant was also required to develop plans which among other things incorporate agree-ments and arrangements for the taking of protective measures by State and local government authorities when the consequence of an accident might extend beyond 1
Enclosure "I"
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the site boundary.
Offsite participation of State and local authorities was on a voluntary basis.
Several recent studies 1, 2, s, 4, s have criticized the state of prepared-i i
ness for radiale'3: cal emergencies in the vicinity of operating nuclear power i
plants.
The-events which occured at Three Mile Island confirmed some of the criticisms contained in these reports.
Due to the accident at Three Mile Island, j
the various reports, and its own assessment of tn'e health and safety significance of emergency planning, the Commission saw a need to act to upgrade those por-tions of its regulations concerning emergency planning and preparedness.
This decision to upgrade the regulations was a rejection of the alternatives of taking i
no action or of taking more drastic action which could have an immediate, detrimental impact on the nation's energy supply (i.e., immediate shut down).
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In order to rectify shortcomings in emergency preparedness the Commission decided that it was necessary to develop rule changes to the emergency planning requirements in 10 CFR Part 50.
3.
The Proposed Action In its deliberatien< 1eading to issuance of the effective Amendments, the Commission determined that emergency planning should not only be upgraded but that i
4 IEPA/NRC Task Force Report
" Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG-0396, December 1978) 2GAO Report
" Areas Around Nuclear Facilities lhould be Better Prepared for Radiological Emergencies: (EMO-78-110, March 30, 1979) 3" Report of the Siting Policy Task Force" - (N"*:G-0625. August 1979)
- Senate Bill S.562 - involves c:nr r-rea and adequacy of State and Local l
(See Congressional Record - Senate, Vol. 125, No. 95, July 16, 1979, pages 59461-59506.)
sConaressional Report
" Emergency Planning Around U.S. Nuclear Power Plants:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Oversight" (House Report 96-413, August 8, 1979).
1 r
2 Enclosure "I"
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adequate emergency planning should be made a condition of lictase issuance and of continuation of operation.
The changes make issuance of an operating ifcense for and the continuation of operation of a nuclear power plant dependent on an NRC finding of adec,uacy in State and local governmental emergency plans.
The changes also introduce into the regulations the use of " Emergency Planning Zones" (EPZs) as the area within which local and State authorities must have plans which the NRC has found to be adequate 8 The effective rule changes also require certain changes related to onsite emergency preparedness which are essentially an upgrade of existing onsite plans.
The effective rule includes special con-sideration of those plants already licensed for operation.
The content of the effective ruls is constrained by the need for prompt action and the determination that it is appropriate to allow a reasonable time for the preparatio, and imple-mentation of adequate emergency plans.
The effective rule identifies January 1,
- 1981, as the reasonable time period to allow plants now in operation to come into compliance.
An additional six months is allowed for installation of warning systems.
The licensability requirement is stated as a requirement for the NRC to determine that State and local emergency response plans are adequate or for a determination by the Commission that (1) the deticiencies in the plans are not
- Emergency Planning Zones (EPIs) are discussed in the EPA /NRC Task Force Report (see footnote 1).
In most cases they will be a circle of radius about ten
-miles for the plume inhalation exposure pathway and about fifty miles for the ingestion exposure pathway.
The exact size and configuration of the EPZs i
surrounding a particular nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relation to the emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such local conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and local jurisdictional boundaries.
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significant for the plant in question, (2) alternative compensating actions have been or will be taken promptly, or (1) that there are other compelling reasons for continued operation.
If the Commission makes a determination that I
the state of emergency preparedness at a site is inadequate, it then must decide whetherthehlantinquestionshouldbeshutdownorallowedtocontinueto operate.
The notice of proposed unfavorable finding will come with sufficient warning in either case to allow an applicant or licensee to seek relief under the criteria listed above.
The requirements for a favorable finding apply only to proposed emergency plans for governmental entities wholly or partially within the Emergency Planning Zones.
State and local authorities have, in common with the NRC, the responsibil-ity to protect public health and safety.
To that and the Commission is seeking the active cooperation of State and local governments in the develepment and implementation of upgraded plans for the protection of the public health and safety.
4.
Impact of the Procosed Action The effective rule changes state tha.
are identified ceficiencies persist, when the deficiencies in the pien are significant fe? the plant in question, when compensating actions have not or will not be taken, 'ot when there are no other compelling reasons for license issuance or continued operation, a new plant will not be allowed to begin operating or an operating plant will be required to shut down.
While this is not a requirement on State and local l
governments, the States are concerned with meeting the energy needs of their resid6nts.
In the opinion of the NRC staff, in order to meet this need as well as that of protecting public health and safety, it is likely that the t
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4 Enclosure "I"
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States will cooperate to assure the continued safe operation or timely commence-ment of safe operation of nuclear generation capability within their jurisdic-tion.
The NRC's Office of State Programs recently published a staff study entitled "Beyond Defense in Depth:
Cost and Funding of State and Local Govern-ment Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Commercial Nuclear Power Stations," NUREG-0553, October 1979.7 This study sampled emergency plans and preparedness in several States which had been developed under existing regulations, some of which had NRC concurrence.
The study identified a range of costs per plant to State and local governments which the data indicate depends largely on the relative differences in popula-tion distribution and radiological transport characteri: tics of the plant locations.
Some important considerations that were found to affect cost include:
exercises, communications, radiation monitoring, warning systems, emergency planning tones and local technical directors.
Typical costs for State and local government programs to achieve adequacy in radiological emergency response plans for a ten mile Emergency Planning Zone are presented in Table 1.
For a Stata, the initial costs of planning, exere ses, training and resources (communication and radiation monitoring instrumentation) typically total about $240,000, with associated annual updating costs of about $44,000.
For local governments, the initial costs typically total about $120,000 (four jurisdictions) with annual updating costs of about
$30,000.
Thus the typical tota's costs to State and local governments to obtain 7This document has been issued by thi NRC's staff and is used here only as a source for technical data on costs.
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TABLE 1
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TYPICAL COSTS TO STATE AND LOCAL GO'/ERNMENTS TO DEVELOP EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAMS WITHIN A 10 MILE EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE *
(St.ite with one plant)
State Local Total
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(4 jurisdictions)
Plan Initial
$100,000
$40,000 ($10,000/yr)
$140,000 Update
$ 10,000/yr.
S 4,000/yr.
$ 14,000 Preparedness Exercises
$ 20,000/yr.
$20,000/yr.
$ 40,000/yr.
Training Initial
$ 20,000 None-
$ 20,000 Update
$ 4,000/yr.
None
$ 4,000/yr.
Resources Initial
$100,000 560s000 (comunications) $160,000 Update
$ 10,000/yr.
$ 6,000/yr.
5 16,000/yr.
Total Initial
$240,000
$120,000
$360,000 Update
$ 44,000/yr.
$ 30,000/yr.
$ 74,000/yr.
M nformation taken from NUREG-0533, "Beyond Defense-In-Depth," October 1979 i
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4 an NRC finding of adequacy in their emergency response plans would be about
$360,000 initial cost, plus $74,000 in annual updating costs.
NUREG-0553 did not contain estimates of the costs of installing warning systems which would have a capability of notifying within fifteen minutes everyone within ten miles thatasiteimergencywasinprogress.
Estimates provided by commenters on the Draft Environmental Assessment indicate an installed cost of around $500,000
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plus a nominal yearly maintenance cost.
This will bring typical costs to about
$1,000,000 per plant.
Costs incurred in regard to multiple unit plants will experience lower per unit costs.
Costs per unit in areas with more distinct governmental authorities involved and/or higher populations will be higher.
The upgraded onsite requirements are centered around the following improvements:
1.
More detailed plans and procedures' with a well defined staff and formal emergency organizttion.
2.
Improved communication capability with backup power sources.
3.
Standard emergency classification and notification schemes coupled with annual public information bulletins.
4.
Improved projection capability based on real time meterological
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information and ability to notify offsite officials within 15 minutes of an accident.
5.
Onsite technical support center with adequate emergency facilities ard equipment.
6.
Facilities for onsite treatment of contaminated injured; ability to control workers radiological exposure during accidents including 1
exposure during life saving actions by workers; and facilities for personnel decontamination.
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7.
Improved emergency preparedness training and formal drills, exercises, and audits to insure adequacy of the program.
The impact of these onsite improvements will vary with the existing state ofpreparednAssataspecificsiteandmayreadilybeconfusedwithoffsite
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costs already discussed.
Initial costs are expected to be, for intially, attaining an acceptable state of emergency preparedness onsite, about one quarter to one half of the costs projected for the same process offsite.
This will amount to a range of between $250,000 for a less complicated site to about
$750,000 for a complicated site in an area of high population density.
.f For sites in areas of high population density, additional costs may be associated with such items as dynamic evacuation analyses and shelter surveys, and communications and' warning systems.
Areas experiencing high population growth rates may also experience additional costs.
A likely cost to achieve a NRC b raWeid a g in radiological emergency response plans for a typical nuclear power plant is therefore around $1,250,000 and is unlikely to exceed $2,000,000 j
for sites with the highest population densities.
J These costs of implementation may be compared to other costs incurred in the construction of a t <nical 1000 MWe nuclear power plant or to the tax and i
fee burden usual for such an installation.
The capital investment in plant and equipment is on the order of $1 billion at the present time and the State and local tax and fee structure, although quite variable, amounts to an average
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1 of about two and one-half percent of that capital investment per year or about l
l a" Coal and Nuclear:
A Comoarison of the Cost of Generating Baseload Electricity by Region" - (NUREG-0480, December 1978).
8 Enclosure "I"
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$25 million per year for a $1 billion investment.s A particular exception would be publicly owned utilities such as TVA which make payments to State and local governments in lieu of taxes and also have a much lower rate structure.
When compared to these investment and tax burden figures, even for the case of publicly AA.
owned utilities, the costs of implementation of the requirement for NRC Fuoa.Aw f,.4,%
A N
Madd in4 State and local emergency plans within the EPZ 4e^not saem unreasonable.
An.other potential major impact is that associated with shutting down those plants for which NRC does not rn awe A pl%V32AALS f ed D eMG
'jn the $ tate and local governmental radiological emergency response plans.
An estimate for these costs is presented in Appendix I for plants which are forecast to be in opera-tion in 1981.
The estimate is based on the cost of replacement power for one month, taking into consideration the fuel mix associated with the replacement power for the State in which each plant is located.
For a typical 1000 MWe power plant, these costs range from $2.6 million/ month for replacement by all coal fired capacity (Prairie Island) to $27.9 million/ month for replacement by i
all oil fired capacity (San Oncfre).
It should be noted that effects of shut-downs could be magnified several time when multiple unit plants are involved or a single governmental authority has several plants within its jurisdiction.
While the variation in replacement power cost is significant, even those plants with low replacement power costs will exceed the projected costs for implementation of adequate emergency plans if a shutdown lasts beyond a month and that the utility management will have a strong incentive to expedite the
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emergency planning pr: cess with every available resource.
Also associated with replacement power generated by coal or oil burning power plants will be the health effects attributable to gaseous and particulate emissions from thase power plants.
While it is difficult to quantify these 9
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health effects due to variability in fuel composition, the variation in effi-ciency and pollution control equipment of the older units usually pressed into service for replacement power, and the lack of accurate epidemiological and other data connecting these emissions with health effects, there are definite indications that these emissions could have a significantly greater impact on public health than the emissions of the nuclear power plants which they would ba replacing.',10 It should be said, however, that the health effects from the coal or oil units represent a very small incremental risk to the average individual in the public.
Thus, even if extended periods of shutdown occurred, the impact would be small in an absolute sense.
But the proposed rule allows a reasonable opportunity to achieve compliance and the health impacts of these rule changes should therefore be insignificant.
It should be noted that the time periods ana deadlines quoted in the 4
effective rule, i.e.,180 days after publication of the final rule or January 1, 1981, whichever comes sooner and the six month extension for warning systems, have been chosen to allow reasonable time to achieve compliance or justify exemption.
As a result the Commission anticipates that shut downs will be few and of short duration.
5.
Summary The Commission has decided that a need exists for a change in the rules governing consideration of emergency planning in the licensing of nuclear power
"" Health Evaluation of Energy Generating Sources," AMA Council on Scientific Affair, Journal of the America Medical Association, November 10, 1978, Vol. 240, No. 20, 2193.
10" Health Effects Attributable to Coal and Nuclear Fuel Cycle Alternatives" -
(NUREG-0332, Septemoer 1977).
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plants.
The effective changes in 44 FR 75167 and described here meet the require-ments for the upgrading of emergency planning with respect to siting and design features as determinants of license issuance or continuation.
The impacts (costs) of compliance are within a reasonable range when compared to capital investment costs and the State and local tax and fee burdens associated with the construction and operation of nuclear power plants.
It is expected that nuclear power plant shut downs under this rule wil1 be infrequent and of short duration and that the impacts on the human environment of the proposed rule will be insignificant.
It is therefore unnecessary to prepars an environmental impact statement for the proposed rule changes.
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APPENDIX I REPLACEMENT POWER COSTS OF SHUTTING 00WN OPERATING NUCLEsR POWER PLANTS,1981 If a nuclear plant is ordered shut down, the power which would have been generated by the plant will be generated by another plant, if capacity is avail-able.
A cost estimate was prepared and is shown in the acccmpanying Table for replacement power for one month.
The list of operating plants for 1981 was taken from the forecast in NUREG-0380 Oct. 19, 1979, excluding Indian Point 1 and TMI #2.
It was assumed that each utility would replace the power with coal and oil fired capacity in the ratio which the state where the plant is located currently uses these fuels for steam-electric plants.
It was assumed that no I
replacement hydro generating capacity would be available because it would already be fully used.
In addition, the availability of hydro is highly weather dependent.
Supplies of coal and oil, particularly oil, are highly uncertain looking ahead to 1981, thus these fuel mixes may be altered considerably.
Likewise, coal supplies could be changed substantially by strikes and severe weather.
Coal and oil costs were based on January 1979 prices from DOE.
Coal costs for 1981 were increased by 15%.
Oil costs (residual) were doubled over January 1979 prices.
This estimate is conservative since the present price (January 1980) has already exceeded twice the January 1979 price.
Neither of these assumptions are likely to be near the prices actually prevailing in 1981.
Oil prices in particular are highly uncertain.
It does seem reasonable however, to assume that oil pricas in January 1581 will be no lower than current levels.
Also, if oil prices continue rising, past experience indicates that coal prices will follow.
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The weighted cost of fuel for each plant was adjusted downward by 6 mills /kWh which is the approximate savings of nuclear fuel costs by not operating the nuclear plant.
No adjustment for non-fuel operating and maintenance costs was made, although average O&M costs for nuclear plants are lower than these for fossil fuel plants, especially those which would be brought into operation to replace the nuclear capacity.
It was assumed that the nuclear plants operate at an annual average 65 percent capacity factor.
This will likely be higher in the early months of 1981 as utilities will be experiencing their winter paak demand for electricity.
The average capacity factor will likely be lower in the spring when nuclear plants are typically shut down for refueling.
The above patterns will be repeated for the summer and fall.
Given these uncertainties, especially in fuel prices, the monthly replace-ment costs shown in the Table should be taken only as indicators. What is clearly shown is that oil dependent areas are quite vulnerable to substantial cost increases.
These are California, the entire Northeast Power Coordinating Council plus New Jersey, Florida, and Arkansas.
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l SHORT TERM REPLACEMENT POWER COSTS FOR NUCLEAR UTILITIES Ratio of Coal Fuel Cost 3 Weighted 4 Net Fuel Replacement Power l
Rsliability HWe to 011 Use 4/108 8tu Ave. Fuel Cost Costs 5 Costs $ 1x108 l
Council Plant (GER)*
Coal Cil Coal Oil Mills /kWh Hills /kWh Per No.s l
NPCC N.Y.-Fitzpatrick 821 1
4 134 218 46.9 40.8 15.9 N.Y.-Ginna 470 1
4 134 218 46.8 40.8 9.1 245 60.4 54.4 14.9 Cenn.-Haddam Neck 575 oil N.Y.-Indian Point 2 873 1
4 134 218 46.8 40.8 16.9 N.Y.-Indian Point 3 965 1
4 134 218 46.8 40.8 18.7 oil 182 44.8 38.8 15.1 Maine-Maine Yankee 825 245 60.4 54.4 17.1 Conn.-Millstone 1 660 oil Conn.-Millstone 2 870 245 60.4 54.4 22.5 oil N.Y.-Nine Mile Point 1 620 1
4 134 218 46.8 40.8 12.0 Mass.-Pilgrim 1 655 oil 201 49.4 43.4 13.5 201 49.4 43.4 10.6 8
oil Vt.-Vermont Yankee 1 514 011 201 49.4 43.4 3.5 Mass.-Yankee-Rowe 175 N.Y.-Shoreham 854 1
4 134 218 46.8 40.8 19.8 N
i SERC 146 20.7 14.7 7.5 l
Ala.-Browns Ferry 1 1065 coal 20.7 14.7 7.5 Ala.-Browns Ferry 2 1065 coal 146 146 20.7 14.7 7.5 Ala.-Browns Ferry 3 1065 coal 20.3 14.3 5.6 N.C.-Brunswick 1 821 coal 143 143 20.3 14.3 5.6 N.C.-Brunswick 2 821 coal
!'i Fla.-Crystal River 3 825 1
3 132 336 66.7 60.7 23.8 Ala.-Farley 1 829 coal 146 20.7 14.7 5.9 Ga.-Hatch 1 786 coal 132 18.7 12.7 4.7 18.7 12.7 4.7 Ga.-Hatch 2 786 coal 132 Va.-North Anna 1 907 2
3 161 203 39.2 33.9 14.4
?
S.C.-Oconee 1 887 4
1 147 186 25.8 19.8 8.4
,i S.C.-Oconee 2 887 4
1 147 186 25.8 19.8 8.4 S.C.-Oconee 3 887 4
1 147 186 25.8 19.8 8.4
- g S.C.-Robinson 2 700 4
1 147 186 25.8 19.8 6.6 y;
}
Fla.-St. Lucie 1 802 1
3 132 336 66.7 60.7 23.1 j),,
Va.-Surry 1 822 2
3 161 203 39.2 33.2 12.9 c3
=
Va.-Surry 2 822 2
3 161 203 39.2 33.2 12.9
'u Fla.-Turkey Point 3 693 1
3 132 336 66.7 60.7 20.0 F a.-Turkey Point 4 693 1
3 132 336 66.7 vu 7 20.0 Ala.-Farley 2 829 coal 146 20.7 V.7 5.9
Sil0RT TERM REPLACEMENT POWER COSTS FOR NUCLEAR UTILITIES (Continued)
Ratio of Coal fuel Costa Weighted 4 Net Fuel Replacement Power Reliability MWe to 011 Use
(/10s Blu Ave. Fuel Cost Costs 5 Costs $ 1x108 Council Plant fDER)*
Coal Oil Coal Oil Mills /kWh Mills /kWh Per No.s N.C.-McGuire 1 1180 coal 143 20.3 14.3 7.8 Tenn.-Sequoyah 1 1140 coal 20.7 14 7 8.0 147 Va.-North Anna 2,
907 2
3 161 203 39.2 33.2 14.3 S.C.-Summer 1 900 4
1 147 186 25.8 19.8 8.5 1
ECAR 2
852 coal 137 19.5 13.5 5.5 Pann.-Beaver Valley Mich.-Big Rock Point 72 4
1 130 258 27.4 21.4
.7 i
Mich.-Cook 1 1054 4
1 130 258 27.4 21.4 10.8 Mich.-Cook 2 1100 4
1 130 258 27.4 21.4 11.2 Ohio-Davis-Besse 1 906 coal 137 19.5 13.5 5.8 Mich.-Palisades 805 4
1 130 258 27.4 21.4 8.2 MAAC i
Md.-Calvert Cliffs 1 845 1
1 150' 225 38.4 32.4 13.0 5
Md.-Calvert Cliffs 2 845 1
1 150 225 38.4 32.4 13.0 N.J.-Syster Creek 650 1
3 163 255 52.9 46.9 14.4 Prnn.-Peach Bottom 2 1065 5
1 118 247 24.1 18.1 9.2
,i Penn.-Peach Bottom 3 1065 5
1 118 247 24.1 18.1 9.2 l
N.J.-Salem 1 1090 1
3 163 255 52.9 46.9 24.3 i
Penn.-Three Mile Island 1 819 5
1 118 247 24.1 18.1 7.0 Pcnn.-Susquehanna 1 1052 5
1 118 247 24.1 18.1 9.1 N.J.-Salem 2 1115 1
5 163 255 52.9 46.9 24.8 MAIN Ill.-Dresden 1 200 8
1 124 335 24.8 18.8 7.1 Ill.-Dresden 2 794 8
1 124 335 24.8 18.8 7.1 III.-Dresden 3 794 8
1 124 335 24.8 18.8 7.1 15.7 9.7 2.4 Wisc.-Kewaunee 535 coal 111 c,
111 15.7 9.7 2.2 ui Wisc.- Point Beach 1 497 coal 111 15.7 9.7 2.2 E$
Wisc.-Point Beach 2 497 coal Ill.-Quad Cities 1 789 8
1 124 335 24.8 18.8 7.0
=
c3 i
Ill.-Quad Cities 2 789 8
1 124 335 24.8 18.8
- 7. 0 C3
=
Ill.-Zion 1 1040 8
1 124 335 24.8 18.8 9.3 Ill.-Zion 2 1040 8
1 124 335 24.8 18.8 9.3
Sil0RT TERM REPLACEMENT POWER COSTS FOR NUCLEAR UTILITIES (Centinued)
Ratio of Coal Fuel Cost 8 Weighted 4 Net Fuel Replacement Power R211 ability MWe to 011 Use 4/10' 8tu Ave. Fuel Cost costs 5 -
Costs $ 1x108 Council Plant (DER)*
Coal Oil Coal Oil Mills /kWh Mills /kWh Por No.*
MARCA i
N:b.-Cooper Station 778 coal 100 14.1 8.,1 3.0 Iowa-Duane Arnold 538 coal 109 15.4 9.4 2.5 14.1 8.1 1.6 N:b.-Fort Calhoun 457 coal 100 111 15.7 9.7
.2 Wisc. Lacrosse 50 coal Minn.-Monticello 545 coal 80 11.3 5.3 1.4 80 11.3 5.3 1.4 Minn.-Prairie Island 1 530 coal 11.3 5.3 1.4 Minn.-Prairie Island 2 530 coal 80 SWPP Ark.-Arkansas 1 850 1
5 112 202 44.1 38.1 15.2 Ark.-Arkansas 2 912 1
5 112 202 44.1 38.1 16.2 WSSC 9.8 3.8
.5 Colo.-Fort St. Vrain 330 coal 69
=o 9
Calif.-Ilumbolt Bay 65 oil 263 64.7 58.7 1.7 oil 263 64.7 58.7 25.6 Calif.-Rancho Seco 918 Calf.-San Onofre 1 436 oil 263 64.7 58.7 12.2 Ore.-Trojan
- 1130 oil 263 64.7 58.7 31.5 263 64.7 58.7 30.4 Calif-Diablo Canyon 1 1084 oil Calif.-San Onofre 2 1140 oil 263 64.7 58.7 31.8 3 Assumed 100% oil because intertied with all oil utilities i
2Used Ohio fuel and prices as plant is in ECAR ni
((
afrom U.S. 00E/EIA-0075/1-(79), Monthly Report, Cost and Quality of Fuels for Electric utility Plants, Data gg for January 1979, Tables 2 and 5 c3 q
- Prices escalated to January 1981, coal increased by 15%, fuel doubled from January 1979, net plant y; i j hest rate 11,000 Btu /kWh c) m
(=
5 Fossil fuel prices less nuclear fuel price of 6 mills /kWh-53 e65% plant capacity factor a->
=
- 0esign Electrical Rating
[7590-01]
APPENDIX II NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 50 EMERGENCY PLANNING:
NEGATIVE DECLARATION; FINDING OF NO
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SIGNIFICANT IMPACT FOR EFFECTIVE RULE CHANGES AGENCY:
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ACTION:
Final Negative Declaration; Finding of No Significant Impact
SUMMARY
On January 21, 1980 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published a
" Draft Negative Declaration; Finding of No Significant Impact" (45 FR 3913, January 21, 1980) for proposed changes to 10 CFR Part 50 5950.33, 50.47, 50.54 and Appendix E which deal with emergency planning requirements for nuclear power plants (44 FR 75167, December 19, 1979).
A Draft Environmental Assess-ment accompanied the Draft Negative Declaration.
The ccmment period ended on February 18, 1980.
Sixteen sets of comments were submitted and have been analyzed (see Supplementary Information).
Although all sixteen commenters felt that the Draft Environmental Assessment was inadequate to support the Finding of No Significant Impact, the staff analysis does not support this view.
The commenters suggested that some points in the Draft Environmental Assessment were in error, some l
required'much more detailed discussion, and some points had been ignored.
The errors have been corrected and do not significantly affect the earlier conclusion.
l The levels of detail and the omissions are generally related to the penalties l
associated with noncompliance with the rule.
The staff originally judged that 17 Enclosure "I"
[7590-01]
invocations of the noncon.pliance penalties (i.e., nuclear power plant s.. idown) would be infrequent and of short duration and the associated impacts would thus be insignificant.
Commenters asserted that frequent and long-term shutdowns 4
would have severe impacts, which would require detailed consiaeration in an Environmental Impact Statement.
The staff analysis has supported the judgment of infrequent, short-term shutdowns and thus concludes that no additional detailed studies are necessary.
The environmental assessment has received minor revision but its conclu-sions have not been altered.
Based on this assessment, a final determination has been made by the Director, Office of Standards Development, that the pro-posed rule changes will not have a significant impact on the human environment l
and that, therefore, an environmental impact statement will not be prepared l
for these rule changes.
OATES:
The rule changes for emergency planning (FR citation) will become effective (thirty days after the publication in the Federal Register of this Finding of No Significant Impact)
ADDRESSES:
Copies of the Final Environmental Assessment, NUREG-0685, and the comments received by the Commission may be examined in the Commission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, N. W, Washington, O. C. and at local Public Document Rooms., Single copies of the Final Environmental Assessment may be obtained on request from at a nominal cost to cover printing.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Michael T. Jamgochian, Office of Standards Development, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555 Telephone:
(301) 443-5966.
1C Enclosure "I"
[7590-01]
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION:
Sixteen sets of comments on the " Draft Negative Declaration; Finding of No Significant Impact" and supporting draft Environmental Assessment (DEA) for the proposed rule changes on emergency planning (10 CFR Part 50 5650.33, 50.47, and 50.54 and Appendix E) were received.
The groups which submitted comments are identified on the Table together with their principal comments.
No comments were received from State or local governments, other Federal agencies, or public interest groups.
The main point of each set of comments was that an Environmental Impact Statement should be prepared for the rule changes and that the Environmental Assessment "... inadequately addresses the environmental impact of the Emer-gency Planning Proposed Rule and the economic and social impacts on U. S.
industry of long-term or permanent premature shutdowns of nuclear plants" (AEP).
The comments have been reconstructed into fourteen general criticisms, which have been analyzed for their relevance to the validity of the conclusions in the " Draft No.gative Declaration; Finding of No Significant Impact."
One matter warrants additional mention here.
An assumption was made in preparation of the DEA that shutdowns of nuclear power plants as a result of actions taken under these rule changes would be infrequent and of short duration.
This assumption is critical to the dccision that an Environmental Impact Statement should not be prepared.
The basis for this assumption was that, since State and local authorities have the responsibility, in common with the NRC, to protect public health and safety and are concerned with meeting the energy needs of their citizens, it is likely that they will cooperate to ensure the continued safe operation or timely commencement of safe operation of nuclear generation capability within their jurisdiction.
The only significant adversa reaction by the State and local governments that must bear this burden has been 19 Enclosure "I"
a Patrix Olsplay of Comenters and w jor Cements a
Ccmentersl 3
3 C
A E
w o
z h
3 8
=
d
=
W G
j t
g i
d Major Cnents I
1.
Alternatives inadequately x
x addressed
~
2.
Impacts of shutdowns I
x 0
0 X
X X
X underestimated (costs) 4 3.
liealth effects of fossil x
x 5
x substitutten undarestimated i
1 w-w 4 Challenge assumption of I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I infrecuent, short-duration shutdowns 5.
Judgemant on Stata x
x x
I X
cooperation unsubstantial 6.
Long-tars irpacts not I
X X
X addressed j
T.
Psychoicgical and physical risks of false alams not I
X X
X X
evaluated 8.
Use of fuel-eix im!. roper, variation in cost of X
X X
X X
replacement o..er 9.
Significant impacts due to linkage between approval X
X X
X X
ud continued operation
- 10. Proposed rule prior to X
- 11. Cos'ts two 1cw (15 minute I
I I
I X
X X
warnirg system not included)
- 12. Cecisions granting exemptions or resueption of operation I
should be classified as cateacrical exclusions under Cemission's NEPA regulations X
X
- 13. No consideration of costs to utilities X
14 lfo consideration of plants under construction
' Xey to Cementers PAS:lY - Fewer Authority of the State Alf - Atenic Industrist Forum Yank. At. - Yankte Atomic Electric Co.
of llew York Cem. Ed. - C =onwealth Edisca2 335E Saltieore Gas and Electric Con. Ed. - Consolidated Ediscn Cc:pany 0 i L - Ce?cvois i Liberran (for of.:cw York. Inc.
threeutilities)
' AEP -..erican Electric ?cuer Service Cuke - CA4 Fewar Cc: ;any 5?P5T - Shaw Pitt; an. Fotts 1 Corporation eel - Edisen Electric Instituta Tr::.trid;e (for cight LLUi - Le3ceuf. Larb, t.eihy 1 PacRae utilicies) s (for five utilities)
GCE - U. 5. "c;ar'aent of Encrgy's.
C:Uli - Lcuenstein. *:e.: in. *el
- 'J
- ortheast Utilities A2alred 1 !all (f;r two utilities) s Two letters Enclosure "I"
(7590-01]
that complications in funding of State programs and lead time for equipment acquisition might make it difficult to completely satisfy all of the planning and preparedness requirements by the date set forth in the proposed rule changes. As a direct result of this, the deadline for having warning systems
~
in place has been extended for months. 6 This extension should be sufficient in most cases.
It should also be noted that the Commission has chosen the alternative that requires Commission action to initiate a shutdown.
Conditions are speci-fied that the Commission will use in each case to determine whether an exemption is warranted. When arrayed together, the lack of any significant adverse comment from State and local governments, the necessity for Commission action before a plant will be shutdown, and the conditions for granting an exemption all argue convincingly that the assumption that shutdowns will be infrequent and of short duration is sound. Thus, the assumption is retained in the final Environmental Assessment (NUREG-0685) and the impacts of extended shutdowns are not considered valid impacts of these rule changes.
The fourteen reconstructed general comments and a discussion of each follows:
1.
Three commenters (see Table
) contend that alternatives to the crocosed rule chances are inadequately addressed.
They specifically mention alternative ways of achievino the same end such as oroposing legislation.
In view of the existing safety record of the nuclear industry and the lack of effective preparation for the TMI accident, the Commission had three ' avenues along which it could proceed.
A.
The Commission could take no immediate action itself while encouraging the parties, i.e., the Congress, other Federal Agencies, the States, and the utilities themselves to take effective action.
This "no action" alternative would be counter to the Commission's legislative mandate to protect public health 20 Enclosure "I"
[7590-01]
and safety.
Indeed, the TMI accident was a clear indication that this " urging without requiring" emergency preparedness.had proved to be ineffective.
This alternative clearly could not stand in the face of the Commission's responsibility -
in this area.
2 8.
The Commission is a regulatory agency and has as one of its chief tools the authority to issue regulations that bind those parties that it regulates.
If an effective method for achieving protection of public hea7th and safety is available through promulgation of regulations with specific requirements and penalties and conditions governing exemptions to those requirements and. penalties, this should be the proper way for the Commission to proceed.
C.
If the Commission judged that danger to public health and safety was significant and imminent because of continued operation of existing plants while i
effective regulations are developed, it had the authority to impose immediate shutdowis until a solution could be found.
The safety record of nuclear power, including the TMI accident, does not support an industry-wide judgment of imminent, significant danger. Potential does exist for significant harm to the public in the event of a severe accident exists and the events at TMI suggest that plans must be made to account for this potential problem.
Immediate industry-wide shutdown and the attendent severe long-term impacts are not warranted.
i Alternatives A and C are clearly unacceptable.
The discussion of alternatives in the Final Environmental Assessment has not been changed from that in the Draft Environmental Assessment.
2.
Six commenters (see Table
) assert that the imoacts of shutdowns are underestimated and that shutdowns of multiole unit olants or several in the same State were not considered.
The DEA was prepared with the understanding that ever increasing fuel prices make it difficult to make stable predictions of the costs of replacement 21 Enclosure "I"
'~T 7
-f w
T N
w w'
[7590-01]
power. While individual values of replacement costs may be in error, the upper end of the range of costs of replacement power, which is compared in the Environ-mental Assessment to the costs of compliance, is only changed by about 36% when the heat rate is ch:.7ged as suggested.
The response to comment eleven indicates that the cost's of compliance were also underestimated.
The relative comparison of these two costs was used to demonstrate the strong economic incentive that exists for all parties to strive for effective emergency planning and prepared-ness. The staff agrees that the net plant heat rate assumed in the OEA is low and therefore changed the assumed heat rate from 9400 Stu/kWh to 11,000 Stu/kWh.
Accordingly, the cost figures have been modified in the Final Environmental Assessment, but these modifications do not alter the conclusions of the Environmental Assessment.
The question of multiple plant shutdowns because of a common failure, i.e.,
unacceptable State plan or multiple units on a site where the local plan is
?
unacceptable, is a more difficult problem.
The State plans are only a part of the overall Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) program to enhance the ability of State governments to handle emergencies.
The economic incentive for the utilities to help the States in every way possible will result in the preparation of plans and equipment for a nuclear plant emergency that will be a sound, :fgnificant contribution to the overall capability of a State to handle many different kinds of emergencies.
The provision of conditions that permit exemptions, the 6-month extension of the deadline for warning systems to be in place, and the record of cooperation from the States up to the present time make it unlikely that any State's program will be so deficient that shutd n 1
of all plants in the State will be required.
The potential that an, unsatisfactory local plan might result in the shutdown of all units on a specific site appears l
to be significantly greater.
Depending on the size and number of the units 22 Enclosure "I" i.
[7590-01]
involved, the incentive of the utility for aiding the local governments is also greater. The potential magnitude of the impact of shutdown in these cases is two to three times greater than for the single unit case, and this determin-ation has been added to the Environmental Assessment. In any case, it would appear that Whether these impacts, if severe enough, constitute "other compelling reasons" to permit continued operation will be determined in the individual decisions on adequacy of emergency plans and preparedness.
3.
Three aroups comment that health effects of fossil substitution are underestimated in the Draft Environmental Assessment and that other effects are ignored.
l The' critical assumption in the Draft and Final Environmental Assessment is that shutdowns will be infrequent and of short duration.
In such a case, the fossil generating capacity is simply that which is available for normal replacement power during refueling and maintenance outages and would probably be used in periods of peak demand until the utility phases it out of the generating system completely.
The impacts are thus ones that occur anyway, but at a different time.
Short, infrequent shutdowns will only change the time period for suffering an impact that will most likely be felt eventually anyway.
For such short-term replacement, no new plants will be built, no more coal will be mined or transported over the cumulative life of the fossil plant.
While the draft and final Environmental Assessment accepts these impacts as a con-
~.
sequence of infrequent.and brief shutdowns, a more accurate analysis might conclude that there is zero cumulative impact because the useful life of the i
replacement capability is unaltered.
The discussions in the Final Environmental Assessment are unaltered on this subject.
l l
23 Enclosure "I"
[7590-01]
4.
Ten commenters challenced the assumption that shutdowns would be infrecuent and of short duration and ouestioned the lack of treatment of the availability of replacement capacity.
The assumption that shutdowns will be infrequent and of short duration is
~
critical to the validity of the Environmental Assessment.
At the time when the Draft Environmental Assessment was prepared, this assumption rested on the assertion that State and local governments (having in common with NRC the respon-sibility to protect public health and safety) will cooperate to provide fully for protection of the public.
Since that time, the Commission, in cooperation with FEMA, has been working diligently to help State and local governments develop satisfactory emergency plans and programs.
The response of the State i
and local governments has confirmed the validity of the earlier assumption.
In addition, no State or local government provided any ccmment on the Draft Environmental Assessment, thus indicating at lea'st tacit agreement with the basis for the assumption.
Since the basis for the assumption of infrequent shutdowns has not received substantive challenge from the parties directly involved, but there has instead been activity whicn tends to confirm the assumption, it will remain as a fundamental assumption of the final Environ-mental Assessment. The availability of replacement capacity also hinges on this assumption. Part of the purpose of reserve capacity is replacement during plant outages.
As long as shutriowns are infrequent and of short duration, they should i
fit into this normal pattern of utilization of replacement capacity.
No addi-l tional discussions of this topic have been prepared for the final Environmental i
Assessment.
t 24 Enclosure "I"
[7590-01]
5.
Five commenters contend the judgment that "... it is likely that the States will cooperate to assure the continued safe oceration or timely commencement of safe operation of nuclear ceneration cacability within their furisdiction" is unsubstantiated.
4 While this assumption was made in the absence of first-hand information, the experience of the Commission since December 1979, in attempting to work t
l with State and local government officials, has confirmed the accuracy of this 1
assumption.
6.
Four commenters assert that imoacts of long-term shutdowns are not 1
addressed.
The assumption that shutdowns will be infrequent and of short duration i
defines the scope of this Environmental Assessment.
If the trust of this rule were to shut down significant portions of the nuclear industry for extended periods of time, an Environmental Impact Statement would be necessary and a much wider range of impacts would have to receive detailed consideration.
Long-term shutdowns are not the expected result of these rule cnanges.
The goal of these rule changes is timely implementation of adequate emergency plans and programs.
The draft and final Environmental Assessment address the impacts of this action based on the expected consequences and practical considerations of implementation of the provisions of the proposed rule changes.
No analysis of the effects of long-term shutdowns has been added to the final Environmental Assessment.
7.
Five commenters contend that osychological and ohysical risks to the public of false alarms are not evaluated.
The Emergency Action Level Guidelines (NUREG-0610) recommend notification of the public when a " Site Emergency" has been declared. The expected frequency of an event of this type is predicted to be 1 in 100 to 1 in 5,000 per reactor 25 Enclosure "I"
[7590-01]
per year.
The high end of this range indicates that two such warnings might occur over the effective life (40 years) for every five units.
The low end indicates one ev?nt over the life of one hundred and twenty-five units.
Far from causing excessive psycholgical and physical risks, this kind of behavior
~
should lead to <1 more accurate public perception of the true incidence of risk from nuclear power facilities and a more practical and considered response to an emergency when one occurs. No change has been made in the final Environmental Assessment.
a 8.
Five commenters assert that the use of the mix of fuels already in use in the state is a poor predicter of what would be the fuel replacement caoacity for a specific plant shutdown.
A generic assessment must make some averaging assumptions or become hopelessly lost in detail.
In this case, the commenters are correct that this is a gross assumption.
It is, however, sufficient to establish the range of costs for replacement power, which is the way the detailed information was used.
No change has been made in the mix of fuels used to generically assess the range of costs of replacement power.
9.
Five commenters soserve that. all of the significant impacts are due to linkage between approval of emergency plans and continued plant operation.
These commenters agree that the impacts of compliance are insignificant and that if there were no penalty associated with inadequate emergency prepared-ness then an Environmental Assessment or no Environmental Assessment would be appropriate.
The thrust of the rule is to protect the public through adequate emergency planning.
The thrust of the shutdown provision is to protect the public in the event that adequate provision has not been and is not being made to provide adequate emergency planning and preparedness.
The decision of how the public should be protected has been made, i.e., either emergency planning 26 Enclos re "I"
[7590-01]
and preparedness is adequate or a plant must be placed in a condition of safe shutdown.
The State and local authorities have the responsibility to determine which option is in the best interest of their citizens.
The linkage remains in the effective rule changes. No additional discussion has been provided in the final Environmental Assessment.
10., One commenter observed that the proposed rule was issued orior to the expanded role of FEMA in emergency olanning for nuclear oower olants.
The NRC and FEMA are working closely to establish and carry out their respective roles in emergency planning for nuclear power plants.
The effective rule has been changed to reflect this change in relationship between the two agencies.
However, the substantive provisions of the rule have not changed, only the parties responsible for specific actions.
Minor changes have been made in the final Environmental Assessment, but the conclusions are unaffected.
11.
Seven commenters assert that the costs of imolementation aretoo low and that there may not ba enough t'.me allowed to achieve adecuacy in all areas of emercency planning and preparedness.
The draft Environmental Assessment based its estimates of cost of imple-mentation on infonnation contained in "Beyond Defense in Depth: Cost and Funding of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Prepared-ness in Support of Commercial Nuclear Power Stations," NUREG-0553, October 1979.
This report'did not consider the costs of a warning system that will effectively
~
warn everyone within la miles within 15 minutes of the time when the decision to warn the public is made.
The cost estimatos in the Draft Environmental Assessment thus do not include the costs of 15-minute notification.
The estimates provided by the commenters have been used to revise the cost estimate in the final Environmental Assessment.
It should be noted that all cost figures are approximate and are only intended to give a feel for the normal magnitude of 27 En:losure "I" i.
[7590-01]
costs and fees associated with building and operating a nuclear power plant.
These changes do not affect the earlier conclusions of the draft Environmental Assessment.
In response to comments thai core time might be needed, the time for installa-tion of warning systems has been extended for six months to allow for procurement problems.
Appropriate changes have been made in the Environmental Assessment but the earlier conclusions remain unaffet' ad.
12.
One commenter succested that decisions on the cranting of exemptions or on the resumption of cperation after a shutdown should be listed in 10 CFR Part 51 l
as a acategorical exclusion.
The categorical exclusions in Part 51 are those Commission actions which have been judged as a class not to have any environmental impact and thus have been excluded from further considerations under those portions of the Commission's regulations which implement the Natural Environmental Policy Act of 1969.
The Commission will consider adding this class of actions to the list of categorical exclusions.
13.
Two commenters noted that no consideration was given to the costs to the utilities of those portions of the rule changes which upgrade crevious ensite requirements.
This oversight has been corrected.
While these costs addes a significant increment to the total cost of implementation, this total cost is still low compared to the reference costs of; (1) replacement power, (2) tax and fee burden,
~
and (3) capital investment.
While several of the cost figures in the final Environmental Assessment have been revised upward, the comparison of these costs has remained unchanged and the conclusions of the Environmental Assessment are unchanged.
l l
l 28 Enclosure "I"
[7590-01]
14.
One commenter observes that there is no consideration given to plants insder construction.
j The cost estimates were forecost for all plants scheduled to operating by the time the rule was to become effective.
To go beyond this period would
~~
only increase error and require complete projection of all cost analyses.
The purpose here was to present an approximation of the relative significance of the cost impacts to determine whether a more detailed analysis is necessary.
The relative magnitude of these costs is well established by the information i
at hand and these are clearly sufficient to support a decision without the i
preparation on environmental impact statement.
l 29 Enclosure "I"
1 NUREG-Staff evaluation of all public coments received - To be provided at a later date.
t
~
Enclosure "X"
S.
ANALYSIS OF ACRS COMMENTS (May 6,1980)
On April 22, 1980, the ACRS Subcommittee on Site Evaluation met with the staff and reviewed the proposed rule changes. On May 1,1980, the full ACRS met and discussed the proposed rule changes along with the staff's
~
proposed changes in the final rule. The ACRS comments resulting from these meetings are attached as Enclosure G.
The following is a listing of the ACRS comments along with a staff analysis.
ACRS Comment:
1.
The. Proposed Rule includes two alternative approaches for implementing the proposed changes. On the basis of clarifications provided by the NRC staff, the ACRS would endorse Alternative A.
In case of problems with State and local government emergency response plans, this Alternative would require action by the NRC to shut down a plant, instead of auto-matically requiring shutdown under the regulations.
State Analysis:
. The staff concurs with this comment and therefore has reflected the comment in the staff's proposed final rule changes.
ACRS Comment:
2.
The NRC Staff notes in the Proposed Rule that "while emergency planning is important for public health and safety, the increment of risk involve (d) in pemitting operation (of existing reactors) for a limited time in the absence of concurred-in plans may not be undue in every case." The Committee ENCLOSURE L
, agrees with this conclusion but qu,stions whether it is compatible with the ascertain that the Commission views " emergency planning as equivalent to, rather than as secondary to, siting and design in public protection..."
Safe day-to-day operation would be impossible without adequate siting and design and pr: ur operation of a safely designed and sited reactor would 1
probably not repressnt an unacceptable risk for several months and probably years.
A preferred statement would recognize that siting, design, and energency planning, as well as responsible operation, are separate but interrelated considerations that constitute the overall safety package.
It is not clear that the NRC policy of evaluating emergency planning to the same level as engineered safety features is wise or necessary. The role of emergency planning should be defined as supplemental to the decisions to allow operation of a plant.
Staff Analysis:-
The staff concurs with this comment. The staff's proposed final rule changes contain the following words " adequate onsite & offsite energency preparedness as well as proper siting & engineered design features are needed for the protection of the public health & safety."
ACRS Comment:
3.
In the Foreword to NUREG-0654 (See Reference 2) emphasis is placed on there being minimum acceptance criteria for energency preparedness and planning. ~There are also implications in this report and in the Proposed Rule that these criteria wil1 be made mandatory for licensees and for the acceptability of emergency plans developed by State and local
~
~..
, f agencies.
Insistence on strict compliance with detailed criteria could prevent proper coordination of nuclear power plant emergency planning with other emergency preparedness activities of State and local agencies, and could also delay the modification of specifications for key factors, such as evacuation times and distances, as better information is developed through ongoing emergency planning.
In addition, the Consnittee has noted an absence of technical justification for many of the requirements associated with the Proposed Rule and the criteria by which compliance will be judged.
If, in the final analysis, a decision is made to retain these criteria in the Rule, then, as a minimum, efforts should be made to test them on a range of nuclear and major non-nuclear accidents that have occurred in the past. Such tests would be particularly useful in showing how successful the specified actions would have been in alleviating the effects of the given events.
Staff Analysis:
The staff feels and the industry agreed at the May 1 ACRS meeting that placing the objectives from 0654 -- not the detailed acceptance criteria in the regulations -- is helpful and proper and significantly reduces ambiguity. The staff plans to use the detailed criteria as a reg guide is used as an acceptable way of meeting the objective.
ACRS Comment:
i 4
The Proposed Rule specifies that "the capability will be provided to essentially complete alerting of the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ within 15 minutes of_ the notification by the licensee of local and State o ffici al s." The ACRS agrees that providing such capability is desirable but
..\\
l believes that emergency plans should reflect the fact that there is less urgency for insnediate notification of people living at greater distances from the site and that, in the majority of cases, the promptness of 4
notification should have the important input of human evaluation and assessment. This might be accomplished through application of a graded scale of timing tied into distance, coupled with on-the-spot evaluations of local weather and other conditions. Supporting this approach are the j
results of recent research which indicate that prompt evacuation of people residing beyond five miles of a site may not be beneficial on a risk j
atsessment basis except under the most unusual circumstances. Furthennore, there is need to consider the possible risks associated with notification of the public prior to the police and other officials being ready and available to direct and control the responses of people residing near a power plant.
Staff Analysis The staff concurs with the overall thrust of this comment but notes that the regulation requires having a capability to notify the public, there is no requirement in the regulation how or when the State and local authorities must initiate this capability. Nonetheless, the supplemental information of the Federal Register Notice has been modified in order to expand and clarify the rationale for the 15 minute natification capability requirement and to make clear that stayed actuation of the system could be an acceptable option.
1 ACRS Comment:
5.
The Proposed Rule and accompanying proposed criteria request that l
applicants provide detailed information on evacuation, including "an analysis l
of the time required to evacuate various sectors and distances within the
. plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent populations." In no case, however, does the Proposed Rule provide information as to what times would be considered acceptable, even though, in the case of evacuation, the risks resultin" from transportation accidents are often related to the hastiness of the action. As written, the Rule also appears to allow no alternative to evacuation. This implies that the applicant is not itkely to be permitted to provide a better alternative, such as having the population remain indoors while the plume passes. This is a situation that reduces itself to the now familiar issue of specifying "how to" rather than providing the desired goal and allowing the licensee or State government to seek the best solution. In some locations, evacuation from the plume Emergency Planning Zone is obviously impractical. If evacuation is to be the favored emergency planning alternative, this choice and the requirements for it should be well-substantiated.
Staff Analysis:
The staff does not believe that it would be appropriate to place in the regulation " acceptable" times for evacuation. The reasoning for requiring an evacuation analysis is to provide the licensee, State and local authorities and NRC with important information as to the impediments and problem areas before an evacuation is necessary rather than these problems sufacing during an evacuation and to' better define the option available to decision makers during an emergency.
In all areas of the staff's proposed regulation the word " evacuation" is accompanied with "other protective measures" therefore the staff feels that the regulation has been modified to resolve the ACRS comment.
ACRS Comment:
6.
The Proposed Rule calls for "the yearly dissemination to the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ of basic emergency planning information such as the possibility of nuclear accidents, the potential human health effects of such accidents and their causes, methods of notification, and the protective actions planned if an accident occurs...."
Although the last two of these items appear reasonable, the ACRS suggests that the dissemination of information of the types described in the first two items cannot be expected to provide any improvements in emergency preparedness. The Committee therefore recommends that these two items be deleted.
Staff Analysis:
The staff concurs -- the staff's proposed final regulation now reads
" Provisions shall be described for the yearly disserination to the public, including the transien* population, within the plume exposure pathway EPZ of basic. emergency planning information, such as the methods and times required for (of) public notification, and the protective actions planned if an accident occurs, and basic information as to the nature and effects of radiation, as well as a listing of local broadcast stations that will be used for dissemination of information during an emergency.
ACRS Comment:
7.
The Proposed Rule specifies that exercises to test the adequacy of an emergency plan should be conducted at a frequency of once every three or five years. Because of the rapid turnover in staff personnel at all levels in all the organizations involved, the ACRS recommends that such exercises be
. conducted at three-year intervals. The Committ'ee also urges that the exercises be utilized for purposes of instruction as well as for evaluations of compliance.
Although the Proposed Rule calls for licensees to provide an independent review of their emergency preparedness program every twelve months, no mention is made of participation by State and local authorities. This omission should be corrected.
Staff Analysis:
i The staff's proposed final regulation has been modified to make clear that each site must conduct an annual exercise with at least local governmental o fficials.
The exercise with each site and the Federal, State and local governmental j
authorities has been specified as being required every 5 years. This will result in a frequent involvement of Federal resources.
For the second paragraph'in this comment -- the proposed final regulation does require that the State and local governments and the licensee review on an annual basis the Emergency Action Levels. Their emergency plans are also reviewed during the annual exercises.
~
ACRS Comment:
8.
One alternative in the Proposed Rule requires that corrective measures to prevent damage to onsite and offsite property be identified. The ACRS believes that protection of property is less important and less feasible than protection of health and safety and, in fact, may divert effort from
. the latter aspect. The Committee recommends therefore that this requirement be omitted from the Rule.
Staff Analy is:
The staff concurs - this is reflected in the staff's proposed final regulation.
ACRS Comment:
9.
As written, the Proposed Rule will require in-depth discussion and subsequent concurrence in the emergency preparedness program by the applicant and the NRC, as well as by 5 tate and local governmental authorities. The ACRS is concerned that this could constitute a third-party veto of the operation of a nuclear power plant based on considerations that may be unrelated to health and safety. The ACRS believes that such a requirement should not be included in the Rule without sone safeguards against such action by a third party. Furthermore, a de facto veto power on operation appears to exist with each local government entity within ten miles of a nuclear power plant if it chooses not to permit establishment of the warning facilities required to meet the criteria.
If the Proposed Rule poses such a possibility, it introduces complex societal issues. The ACRS recommends that the wording of the Rule be altered to pennit the NRC sufficient flexibility to cope with this situation and not mandate such power to local governmental entities in the absence of a Federal law addressing the matter.
Staff Analysis:
The staff recognizes this potential for a third party defacto veto power. The Commission is also aware of this.
,a-
_9 ACRS Comment:
The ACRS wo'ld also like to comment on the role of the Federal Emergency 10.
u Management Agency (FEMA) as related to the Proposed Rule. Although the NRC Staff stated that FEMA would simply notify them of their decision relative to the adequacy of a State and local emergency plan, a nonconcurrence on the' part of FEMA might also represent a " veto" action on a given application.
There are also questions as to the adequacy of the resources or the staffing of FEMA to assume these new responsibilities.
In addition, the ACRS sees a need for clarification of its fdture role relative to FEMA and to reviews of emergency preparedness planning for nuclear facilities.
Staff Analysis:
Under the proposed final rule NRC would retain this authority to make final licensing decisions after receiving the FEMA recommendation, the staff would expect, however to place significant weight on the FEMA finding.
The NRC has proposed legislative changes (ltr Ahearne to Simpson dated April 30,1980) which would give the offsite decision entirely to FEMA.
The ACRS role would decrease for offsite planning if the legislation is passed.
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Function Other (Fuels & Materials)
Comments P a r Reactors, Non-Power Reactors i
FV'80 FY'81 FY'82 FV'80 FY'81 FV'82 FY'80 FY'81 FT'82 0
4,. -
C.
Implementation and Testing Implementation 3
22(*8) 15 1
3 3
1 6
10 1.
Inspect Licensee Plan 15 0
0 0
1 2
5 2.
Prepare for and Evaluate Exercises 0(+2)
Indicated resources 3.
Support FLim in Providing should I,e capable of Field Assistance and supporting all three Training to State and areas.
Local Authorttles 0
1 1
l D.
Response to Emergencies 1.
Prompt Fleid Response and Exercises ***
~
2.
Operate and Maintain Indicated resources will hRC Operations Center 10 17 17 support all three areas.
Subtotal Subtotal 46(*14-1/2) 58(*13) 68(*2) 1(*1) 8(+3) 7(+3) 7 25 30 Includes llQ and Regional Office Centers and NQ-24 hour duty officers.
Total **** FV'80: 54(*15-!/2) 81: 91L*165 1
82: 105(+51
- Numbers in parenthesis indicates contractor assistance in addition to NRC resources.
- Iteens C.I and C.2 will be combined in FV'81 as evaluation teams do the first round of laplementation inspection at all operating power reacto
- Not specifically defined but it is estimated that approximately 15 man-years of effort will be expended annually in responding to in
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dictate the sianning or activation of the Operations Center in Headquarters or the Regions or in exercistag the NRC response capability.
i e
NRC UPGRADES REQUIREMENTS FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS e.
The Nuglear Regulatory Commission is amending its reg-ulations to upgrade its requirements for emergency planning e
around nuclear power reactor sites and other nuclear facilities.
The "upgradad" rule contains three major changes from past practices:
i 1)
In order for a licensee to continue operations or for an applicant to receive an operating license, the NRC must make a finding -- based on a review of an applicant or licensee's emergency plans, including State and local government emergency response plans -- that the state of onsite and offsite emergency preparedness provides rea-sonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can and will be taken in a radiological emergency.
2)
Emergency planning considerations are extended to-
" emergency planning zones" -- generally out to about 10
+
miles for the inhalation pathway and to 50 miles for the ingestion pathway.
3)
Detailed emergency planning implementing procedures for licensees and applicant's for operating license will have to be submitted for NRC review.
Enclosure N
~
2 The NRC's findings will be based on a review of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) findings and
-?
determinations as to whether State and local plans are adequate and capable of being implemented and on the NRC assessment as to whether an applicant or licensee's plans are adequate and capable of being implemented.
Within 60 days of the effective date of the rule, an nuclear power reactor licensee will have to submit the radiological emergency plans of State and local governments that are wholly or partially within the inhalation pathway I
emergency planning zone as well as all State government plans for the ingestion pathway emergency planning zone.
For operating power reactors, the licensee, State and local emergency plans -- with the exception of a 15-minute warning requirement -- must be implemented by January 1, 1981.
If, after that time, the NRC finds that the State of j
emergency preparedness does not provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency -- and the defi-ciencies are not corrected within four months of that determination -- the Commission will determine if the reactor should be shut down.
The reactor will not have to be shut down after the four month period if the licensee can demonstrate to.tte Commission's satisfaction that the defi-r ciencias are not significant for the plant in question, that Enclosure N
. alternative compensating actions have been or will be taken Promptly, or that there are other compelling reasons for continued operation.
Owners of research or test reactors with an authorized Power level of 500 kilowatts or more will have to submit emergency plans complying with the new rule within one year of its effective date.
Owners of such facilities with a power level of less than 500 kilowatts will have two years.
in addition, the rule sets forth 16 performance objec-tives which must be met by onsite and offsite emergency response plans.
It also provides that the emergency pre-paredness program be tested, at least once each year, by persons who have no direct responsibility for its implementation.
Federal emergency response agencies are to be involved once every five years.
The new rule, which becomes effective (75 days after o'
Federal Register publication), reflects comments on the proposed amendments which were issued in December last yea.-
The comments, and the staff's evaluation of them, have been compiled in a report identified as NUREG-0689.
Four Regional Workshops also were held to obtain additional comments.
The comments received from the workshops are contained in another report NUREG/CP-0011.
Both reports are available for purchase through the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia, 22161.