ML19319C848
| ML19319C848 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee, Crystal River, Zion  |
| Issue date: | 04/20/1971 |
| From: | Kleinman M, Oller R, Vetter W US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19319C775 | List: |
| References | |
| B&W-71-01, B&W-71-1, NUDOCS 8003040808 | |
| Download: ML19319C848 (19) | |
Text
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U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION REGION III DIVISION OF-COMPLIANCE Vendor Inspection Report PWR Vessels Vendor:
Babcock & Wilcox Company Mt. Vernon,' Indiana Report No..:
Babcock & Wilcox 71/1 Components Inspected For:
Florida Power Corporation Crystal River 3 (50-302)
Duke Power Company Oconee 3 (50-287)
Commonwealth Edison Company Zion 1 (50-295)
Dates of Inspection:
March 30 to April 2, 1971 G)
- / 2ZZw Inspector:
R. E. Oller-4-20-71 Metallurgical Engineer Licensee Representatives:
M. H. Kleinman - Florida Power Corp.
C. A. Robinson - Duke Power Co.
S. G. Woodard - Westinghouse for Commonwealth Edison Co.
d-Reviewed By:
W. E. Vetter 4-20-71 Sr. Reactor Inspector 1
1 Proprietary Information:
None - See the Summary, Management Interviews and Section II.A of this report.
Licensee Application Both Crystal River 3 and Oconee 3 Requirements :
PSAR's, Tables 4-9, lis t code and classification for the reactor vessel as ASME Section III t
8003040 h N
' b SCOPE An announced vendor inspection was made at the Babcock & Wilcox plant, Mt. Vernon, Indiana, on March 30 to April 2,1971, by R. E. Oller, Metallurgical Engineer, Region III.
The purpose of the inspection was to: (1) perform an inspection of documentation and work on the reactor pressure vessels (RPV's) for the Crystal River 3 and the Oconee 3 nuclear facilities; and (2) to complete the record review of the repaired weld defects in the Zion 1 RPV.
The inspections of the three RPV's were performed on separate days.
SUMMARY
1.
Ihe representatives of Babcock & Wilcox (B&W), Florida Power Corporation (FPC), and Duke Power Company (DPC) were told by the inspector to identify ali inspection items which they considered proprietary.
Mr. Buskey told the inspector he, Buskey, was not clear on which items would be defined as proprietary. During the inspection, no specific items were identified to the inspector as being proprietary.
(Section II.A)
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The fabrication of the Crystal River 3 (CR-3) reactor pressure vessel
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(RPV) is. complete.. Hydrostatic testing is scheduled to occur on April 5, 19 71.
(Section II.B.1) 3.
A review of material test reports (MTR's) for the CR-3 pressure boundary materials disclosed no cases of nonconformance with the ASME code.
The total accumulated hours of stress relief for the RPV revealed the time at temperature was within the qualification time for the base material and welding procedures.
(Section II.B.2) 4.
The internal B&W process records for CR-3 contained sketches of all major weld repairs to base material and welds.
This record would serve to meet the requirements of the proposed ASME Code,Section XI, In-service Inspection Code Case, published in the February 1971 edition of the Mechanical Engineering Magazine. The case will require in-service inspection of all known major repairs.
The B&W process records relative to work for selected components in the CR-3 RPV, further established that the welding, intermediate radiography, grinding, weld repair, and final radiography sequence steps were performed and signed off by responsible persons. The number of contract variations and major repairs for the total RPV fabrication were few in number.
(Section II.B.3)
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A review of the hydrostatic test and post hydro NDT procedure to be used for the CR-3 RPV established that they were in accordance with ASME Code,Section III.
(Section II.B.4) 6.
The RT films for the circle weld seam joining the closure head dome and flange of the CR-3 RPV were reviewed and found to be free of unacceptable defects.and in accordance with ASME code require-ments.
This weld was radiographed using a cobalt 60 source.
(Section II.B.S.)
7.
Shop inspection of Oconee 3 (0-3) reactor pressure vessel (RPV) revealed that the vessel was complete except for final stress relieving, hydrostatic testing, and post hydro NDT.
The inspector observed B&W personnel performing ultrasonic inspection of major welds as part of the fabrication work.
This UT was not baseline mapping.
The DPC plans for baseline UT mapping were not available.
(Section II.C.1) 8.
A review of MTR's for selected components in the 0-3 RPV revealed that several flange and shell forgings were purchased from European suppliers.
Errors and omissions were found in reports of specimen heat treatment data for forgings supplied by Klockner-Werke, AG.
/N The specimen heat treatment data reported by Rotterdam Dockyard
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-(RDM), for two-shell forgings was unclear and confusing with respect to precise code conformance. Moreover, indications were that the heat treatment data had not been reviewed by B&W Mt. Vernon personnel for either Klockner or RDM as require ! by ASME Code,Section III, Paragraph IX-226(a).
(Section II.A.2.)
9.
The B&W internal process records for the 0-3 RPV contained sketches of all major weld repairs to base metal and welds. A review of process records for selected components established that the welding, inter-mediate radiography, grinding, weld repair, and final radiography l
were performed and signed off by responsible persons.
The number of contract variations and major weld repairs for total RPV fabrication were few in number.
(Section II.C.3.)
1
- 10. A review of stress relief data for the 0-3 RPV closure head established that the total accumulated hours of stress relief were within the qualification time for the base material and weld procedures.
(Section II.C.4')
- 11. A review of the radiograph films of a weld joining an inlet recirculation nozzle to the shell for the 0-3 RPV revealed that the RT technique m \\
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s was in nonconformance with Paragraph IX-333(b), ASME Section III, due to placement of penetrameters across the weld instead of adjacent to the weld and the omission of extra penetrameters, or use of film side penetrameters, to_ compensate for significant variation of density across the width of the weld.
The density values varied from 2.0
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to 4.0.
A review of RT films for a weld joining a core flooding nozzle to the shell established that these films were made in accordance with code requirements.
(Section II.C.5.)
- 12. The estimated dates for hydrostatic testing and shipment of 0-3 RPV are June 1 and June 30, 1971, respectively.
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- 13. The review of the final Zion 1 RPV shop hydrostatic test data and post hydro NDT inspection data (following repair of the lower head circle
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l weld) established that the RPV was hydro tested in accordance with Article 7, ASME Section III, and that the weld repair was performed in accordance with Paragraph N-528.
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- 14. A discussion was held with Mr. Buskey with respect to the UT inspection of welds in other RPV's which were completed at Mt. Vernon, in-process l
or transferred from Mt. Vernon. The discussion (See Section II.E of this report) indicares that this subject must be pursued on an individual basis with B&W, Westinghouse, and General Electric.
There was' very little information available relative to the radiographing of welds in specific RPV's using a cobalt 60 source.
Nonconformance Items - The inspector identified two items of apparent nonconformance to the ASME Code,Section III requirements, with respect i
to the fabrication of Oconee 3 'RPV.
1.
Errors and omissions were found in reported specimen heat treatment data for the vessel and head flanges and lower torus ring forgings supplied by Kloci.r-Werke, AG.
In addition, the specimen heat treatment data reported by Rotterdam Dockyard (RDM) for two
.shell forgings was unclear and confusing with respect to precise code conformance. Moreover, indications were that the heat treatment data had not been reviewed by B&W Mt. Vernon personnel i
I for either Klockner or RDM as required by Paragraph IX-226(a),
'ASME Code,Section III.
2.
A review of radiograph films for a weld joining an inlet recirculation nozzle to' the shell of the:Oconee 3 RPV revealed that the RT technique Lwas-in nonconformance with Paragraph IX-333(b) due to the placement
' of penetrameters across instead of adjacent to the weld.
In addition,
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there was an omission of the use of additional penetrameters or use of film side penetrameters to compensate for significant variation of density 'across the width of the weld. The density values varied from 2.0 to 4.0.
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Management Interview - Crystal River 3 1.
A management interview was held with Messrs. Buskey, Walton, Coston, Thompson (all B&W), and Kleinman (FPC) ot... acch 31, 1971.
The inspector again requested all personnel present to identify any specific items considered to be proprietary.
Mr. Buskey stated he wasn't clear on which items would be defined as proprietary.
The other persons made no response.
2.
The inspector stated that the organization and traceability of records "was acceptable and reflected considerable improvement over prior inspections.
A low number of contract variations in conjunction with a reduced number of major weld repairs, the inspector said, also reflected improvement.
Mr. Buskey said that Mt. Vernon has an intensive program to reduce defects in both automatic submerged are and manual metal arc welding.
The B&W weld defect rating system, based on veld repairs resulting from all forms of nondestructive testing, had dropped from 3.7% at the start of 1970 to a current rate of 0.31%.
p) 3.
The inspector called both B&W and FPC attention to an implied need
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for manufacturing baseline sketches for vessel material weld repair records as discussed in a recent ASME Section XI Code Case (February 1971 Mechanical Engineering).
Both B&W and FPC representatives stated that they appreciated having the code case pointed out to them and that they would study its implications.
4.
The inspector told Kleinman that Compliance would review the detailed results of the April 5,1971, hydrostatic tests during a subsequent inspection.
5.
Relative to the inspector's review of RT films, made with a cobalt 60 source of the. closure head circle weld, the inspector asked Mr. Buskey if B&W was performing UT during fabrication on Crystal River 3.
The inspector explained that he had observed UT inspections of welds in other RPV's.
Mr. Buskey said that they, B&W, were negotiating with individual customers to provide either shop or field baseline UT mapping and would do whatever the customer requested.
Mr. Kleinman (FPC) said the Crystal River 3 RPV UT mapping had been contracted to Southwest Research Institute, v
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p Management Interview - Oceaee 3 1.
. A management interview was held with Messrs. Buskey, Walton, Coston, Thompson (all B&W), and Robinson (DPC) on April 1,1971.
The inspector again requested all personnel present to identify any specific items they considered to be proprietary.
No specific items were identified to the inspector during the inspection.
- 2. - The inspector discussed the errors and discrepancies (concerning hours at stress relief between the material test records and heat treatment records) with regard to the.Klockner-Werke head and shell flanges and ' lower ring forging. Also discussed was the unclear RDM heat treatment data.
B&W stated that they would check Klockner to determine if heat records applied to the specimens or the actual forgings.
3.
The apparent ASME code nonconformance to Paragraph IX-333 in placement of the penetrameters across the weld, instead of parallel to the weld (due to variation in density) during radiographing of the inlet nozzle welds to the shell was discussed in detail.
Mr. Buskey said that the geometry of the weld precluded parallel placement of penetrameters.
The inspector commented that Paragraph IX-333(b) permits the use of film side penetrameters in such cases.
4.
With regard to items 2 and 3, above, the inspector said the applicant would be contacted concerning corrective action.
5.
The inspector commented that the total hours of stress relief on the closure head based on the process sheet and other records reviewed, appeared to be conservative and that the number of major weld repairs and contract variations appeared low.
6.
The ASME Section XI Code Case, concerning sketches of major weld repairs and core belt repairs, was brought to Mr. Robinson's attention for DPC consideration.
DETAILS I.
Persons Contacted The following persons were contacted during this inspection:
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-97 Babcock & Wilcox Company (B&W), Mt. Vernon W. - C. Buskey - General QC Manager G. A. Walton - Manager of Commercial Nuclear Quality Control S. N. Coston - Project Engineer, Reactor Vessel Quality Control
-R. A. Fearing - Metallurgist, QC Engineering
. C. D. Thompson - Resident QA Representative, Lynchburg l
Florida Power Corporation (FPC)
M. H. Kleinman - Manager of Quality Programs Duke Power Company (DPC)
C. A. Robinson - QA Engineer, Charlotte, North Carolina Westinghouse Electric Corporation (WEC)
S. G. Woodard - QA Engineer, Pittsburgh II.
Results of Inspection A.
Proprietary Information v
During the inspection, the inspector asked representatives of B&W, FPC, and DPC to identify all items which were considered proprietary.
Mr. Buskey told the inspector that he, Buskey, was not clear on which items would be defined as proprietary.
Mr. Buskey failed to elaborate further and, during the course of the inspection, no specific items were called to the attention of the inspector as being proprietary.
i B.
Crystal River Unit 3 - Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) 1.
Status of Fabrication The Crystal River 3 RPV was found to be completely fabricated and awaiting hydrostatic testing.
The vessel was positioned in the hydrostatic testing pit, the nozzle hydro plugs were installed, and the flange opening was covered with a p,lastic sheet.
The completed closure head was positioned on the shop floor, in an inverted position, and was covered with a plastic sheet.
Mr. Kleinman (FPC) told the inspector that the hydrostatic test was scheduled for April 5,1971, pending receipt of the closure studs.
The inspector told Kleinman that Compliance would review the shop hydrostatic test results and the shop post hydro NDT results -
during a subsequent inspection.
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In response to questioning, Kleinman told the inspector that the ASME code applicable to Crystal River 3 RPV was Section III-1965, plus the addenda through the summer 1967.
2.
Material Certification The inspector reviewed the material test reports (MIR's) for eleven selected pressure boundary components in the Crystal River 3 RPV. The MTR's were found to be complete and certified to the applicable ASME and ASTM specifications.
The test data indicated that the properties for physical, chemical, and. Charpy V impact tests meet specifications.
In addition, the MIR's indicated the materials were found to be free of unacceptable defects by ultrasonic and magnetic j
particle inspection. Also, the specimen heat treatment cycle,
j representative of the component, was acceptable.
The forgings were certified to SA-508, Class 2, and the plates were certified to SA-533, Grade B, Class 1, specifications.
The following tabulation is representative of the component 1
MTR's reviewed:
Specimen i
C Stress Relief I' tem Hours at 1100 - 1150F Mk 24 - Closure Head Dome 40 (6-5/8" plate)
Mk Closure Head Flange 40 (forging)
Mk Core Flooding Nozzle (forging) 40 Mk Reairculation Outlet Nozzle 40 (forging)
Mk Recirculation Inlet Nozzle 40 (forging)
Mk-86 & 87 - Shell* Forgings (upper 60 half and lower half)
Mk-A2 - 3 hell Course (One of two 8-7/16" 40 plates)
Mk-A2 Shell (One of two 8-7/16" plates) 40' j'~'
Mk Lower Head Torus Ring (forging) 60 V
Mk Bottom Head Dome (5" place) 60
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O U.
In conjunction with-the material specimen qualification time at stress relief, the inspector inquired into the actual accumulated time at stress relief for the various RPV components and the weld procedure-time at stress relief qualification.
According to Mr. Coston, both pieces of the closure head each received 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br />,' 26 minutes stress relief. With respect to the vessel shell, none of the components received over 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> total stress relief.
At the inspector's request, Mr. Coston checked typical weld procedures used. and determined that the procedures were qualified for 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br /> of stress relief.
3.
Major Repairs and Contract Variations The inspector called B&W's and FPC's attention to a l
tentative code case published in the February 1971 edition of the Mechanical Engineering Magazine, entitled, "In-Service Inspection,1970, Table IS-251, revised Category A - Areas Subject to Examination." In essence, the case implied the need for-baseline weld repair sketches for in-service examination of vessel major repair areas
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and reactor core belt repair areas, in that, if the
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repair area locations were not accurately known, then the individual plate, forging, or shell course, known to contain the repair, would be required to be examined in entirety.
During the inspector's review of process records regarding major repairs, the inspector determined that B&W did maintain sketches of all major weld repairs on all RPV pressure boundary materials.
The inspector reviewed the Process Traveler Sheets for a Mk-18 inlet nozzle in CR-3 and determined that completion of welding was signed off by the welding foreman. The RT was deferred to accommodate simultaneous radiographing of all eight nozzles and two circle seams. Review of work sequence-No. 490 on a subsequent process sheet revealed that two Mk.-18 inlet nozzles and the circle seam joining the vessel flange to the first shell course were ' cleared on 'the first RT inspection.
The balance of six nozzle welds and one circle seam weld contained defects which were repaired by grinding out defects shown by RT, performing MT, weld repairing, and final RT acceptance.
The defect areas on the RT films were noted on the inspection tickets and the defect removal cavity sketches were maintained in a folder along with process sheets and contract variations.
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The inspector reviewed the contract variations (CV) written on the CR-3 RPV and noted that most of them involved minor dimensional corrections.
Only one CV, concerning a core flooding nozzle, required code stress calculations.
All nine CV's were approved at Barberton or Lynchburg and none required the applicant's approval.
4.
Hydro Procedure and Process Sheet Steps In response to questioning, Mr. Kleinman u. 'd the inspector
.that the. hydrostatic test was scheduled for April 5,1971.
He said that one of his men would witness the test.
The procedure would consist of the B&W Hydrostatic Test Procedure S-178, Revision 3, in conjunction with prepe. red instruction forms..."Part 1 - first and second pass stud tensioning and Part 2 - stud unloading date."
The inspecto; reviewed the stud tensioning and unloading procedure and the hydro sequence steps in the process sheets and determined that the sequence steps included:
a.
Stud tensioning.
['"'N b.
Hydro test in accordance with an approved procedure with a
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special notation that the Hartford inspector was to witness the test.
c.
Inspection duping hydro test and recording of test results.
d.
Opening and disassembly of the vessel.
e.
Inspection cleaning.
f.
MT af ter hydro of all accessible carbon steel.
g.
PT of all of the instrumentation nozzles, flow vanes, guide lugs, and safe ends to in-core instrumentation nozzle welds.
The inspector was told that sequence steps for MT and PT of the closure head,were identical to those for the vessel, but on a separate process sheet.
The inspector commented that all instructions and forms comprising the hydro test procedure, incluaing the official vessel
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In response to questioning, the inspector was told that the official vessel metal temperature and test pressure were 1000F and 3125 psig, respectively.
The inspector asked whether or not the ultrasonic testing of the vessel welds would be performed at the shop by B&W.
Mr. Buskey said that they (B&W) are negotiating with the various utilities with respect to shop or field baseline UT mapping and would do as the customer -asked.
Kleinman stated that the Crystal River UT mapping had been contracted to Southwest Research Institute, San Antonio.
The mapping will be performed using permanently mounted UT crystal appcratus.
5.
Radiograph Review
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The 41 RT films of the circle weld joining the closure head dome to the flange were reviewed by the inspector since this weld was radiographed (as in the case of the unsuccessful
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radiography on the Zion RPV) using cobalt 60 on a panoramic exposure.
The weld' joint design was similar to the Zion 1 lower head circle weld.
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The density, contrast, and sensitivity of both the No. 80 penetrameters and the weld image were determined to be in accordance with AS12 Code,Section III.
No unacceptable weld ' defects were observed.
C.
Oconee Unit 3 - Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) 1.
Status of Fabrication I
The Oconee 3 RPV was found to be in an advanced stage of completion.
Remaining items were final stress relieving, cleanup, hydrostatic testing and post hydro NDT inspection.
The remaining work to be done on the closure head was installation of the CRD mechanism housing tubes...all stress relieving and NDT inspections were complete.
During the examination of the vessel, the inspector observed that B&W was performing weld UT using both straight wave and 450 shear wave ultrasonic inspection from the vessel interior as part of the fabrication process.
Ihe inspector observed the calibration of ultrasonic.
inspection instruments on block standards which were of the same thicknesses as the vessel welds.
The technique was in
/ 'i accordance with ASME Code,Section III requirements.
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- 1 2.
Material Certifications The inspector reviewed material test reports (MTR's)' for i
14 selected pressure boundary components in the Oconee 3 RPV. The MTR's revealed several significant items of 4
information.
The shell and closure head flanges, lower head torus ring, and two recirculation outlet nozzle forgings were purchased from Klockner-Werke, AG.
Both the uppar and lower halves of the nozzle shell course forgings were t
purchased from the Rotterdan Dockyard in Holland.
The other forgings were purchased from Ladish and Bethlehem Steel, and bo'th head dome plates were purchased from the Lukens Steel Company.
The review of the MTR's established that the forging materials were in accordance with SA-508, Class 2, and applicable code cases. The plate material was in accordance with SA-533, Grade B, Class 1.
No unacceptable defects were reported by ultrasonic and magnetic particle inspection. The Charpy-V notch impact test data indicated that the impact properties were in t
accordance with ASME Code,Section III, Article 3.
Specimen I
heat. treatment data revealed that the closure head components were qualified for a minimum of 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> at 1100 - 1150 F and 0
vessel shell forgings were qualified for a minimum of 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br />. With regard to the closure head flange forging supplied by Klockner, Ht. No. 417524/1, the inspector observed an MIR discrepancy in that, the specimen stress relief was reported at 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />, whereas on the backup heat chart, the time was reported as 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> at 10800F (The reported temperature was later determined to be a conversion error).
Mr.- Buskey was unable to tell the inspector whether the heat treatment chart represented the actual forging stress relief or the MTR specimen stress relief.
By examination of the chart on which the stress relief temperature was recorded at 6000C, it was determined that Klockner's conversion to Fearenheit was in error and that the actual stress relieving temperature was lil20F and not 10800, as reported.
The inspector also observed that, in the case of the specimen heat treatment described on.the two Rotterdam MTR's for two shell course forgings (Hk-86 and Mk-87)' the heating cycle information was poorly worded and difficult to' understand.
1 With regard to the two above items, the inspector commented that it appeared _that the review of the MTR's for the foreign N/
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purchased materials by B&W personnel was not timely and, therefore, in nonconformance with ASME Section III, Paragraph IX-226(a).
In response to questioning concerning B&W evaluation of foreign material suppliers, the inspector was shown an in-house B&W 1etter dated October 28, 1968, in reference to use of foreign materials in the Oconee Unit 3 contract.
The letter listed the components from the following suppliers :
RDM - nozzle shell forgings Mk-86 and 87 Klockner - lower head ring, vessel flange, head flange, four inlet nozzles (not used on Oconee 3), and two outlet nozzles English Steel - two upper and two lower tube sheets for steam generators The letter stated that B&W approved each of the vendor's procedures for heat treatment, Charpy-V impact tests,
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ultrasonic and magnetic particle tests.
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according to the letter, B&W had approved forging specimen test results, i.e., chemical and physical properties,
Charpy-V impacts, magnetic particle, ultrasonic,
. quenching and tempering, stress relief, Brinnell hardness,
and normalizing.
The inspector asked what assurance B&W had that foreign suppliers calibrated their Charpy testing equipment to U. S. standards such as Watertown Arsenal standards.
The
' inspector was shown a copy of a B&W trip report to RDM, dated August 29, 1966, by the Section Manager of B&W Purchasing Department, in which he confirmed that RDM had calibrated the Charpy V impact tests on August 29, 1966, and again in May 196 7.
Calibration of the Charpy specimens was in accordance with ASTM A-370 (Mechanical Testing of Steel Products), Figure 11, Type A (V-notch).
The testing and equipment were verified in accordance with E-4 and E-23.
No reference was made to use of Watertown Arsenal Standards.
With regard to the chemical test data and Charpy-V impact test data in the MTR's for the foreign supplied forgings, the inspector observed the following:
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v The Klockner ring forging specimens were analyzed for percent content of the following elements: carbon, silicon, manganese, phosphorus, sulfur, chromium, molybdenum, nickel, aluminum, and cobalt. The analysis for copper was not included.
Complete Charpy-V impact test curves were made for specimens from two points,1800 apart, on the ring.
Test values at + 100F were in accordance with ASME code requirements. In addition, drop weight tests were run to determine the nilductility transition temperatures.
The RDM forging specimens were analyzed for percentage content of carbon, manganese, silicon, phosphorus, sulfur, chromium, nickel, molybdenum, vanadium,.. and cobalt. The analysis for copper was not included.
Complete Charpy-V impact test curves from specimens at two points,
180 apart, on the ring were run.
Test values at + 100 F were in accordance with ASME code requirements.
In addition, drop weight tests were run to determine the nilductility transition temperatures.
3.
Maior Repairs and Contract Variations A
The inspector called Mr. Robinson's (DPC) attention to the - ASME,Section XI Code Case published in the February 1971 edition of Mechanical Engineering which, as previously noted in this report, may require baseline sketches of weld repairs in RPV's.
In response to questioning, Robinson was unable to say whether DPC was considering this code case as an in-service inspection requirement.
Major weld repairs made on nozzle welds and circle welds for Oconee 3 RPV were reviewed by the inspector through examination of process sheets. Sequence No. 490 indicated that the eight nozzles and two circle seams. (vessel flange to shell and courses Mk-86 to 87) were RT inspected 4
at one time. (The sequence step work was similar to that for the CR-3 RPV.)
Slag defects were found in five nozzle welds and the two circle seams as indicated on raject ticket No. 314736.
The repairs were made by two cycles of grinding and RT cavity inspection which was followed by MT inspection, more weld repair, subsequent RT inspection, another cycle of grinding, more cavity RT and MT inspection clearance, and final repair and RT clearance. Documentation review revealed the inspection sketches of all major cavities and repairs are retained in B&W process files.
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(\\a')* The 3. spector was told that only fenr contract variations (CV) had been written to date on the Oconee 3 RPV.
The inspector reviewed these CV's and found that all four represented minor dibensional variations.'.. correctable by rework and not requiring code stress calculations.
4.
Stress Relieving In response to questioning, the inspector was told that only the closure head had received final stress relief.
The inspector reviewed the total accumulated hours of stress relief for each component in the head and determined that the longest stress relief time was 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> and 33 minutes, which was well within the 30 hour3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> material qualification and 50 hour5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br /> weld procedure qualification.
5.
Radiograph Film Review i
Films for two large nozzle welds were reviewed by the inspector.
The films for the weld between the Mk-17 core flooding nozzle and the Mk-86 shell course were determined to be acceptable with regard to sensitivity, contrast,
'[h and density of the No. 120 penetrameter and weld image
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and were in accordance with ASME Section III requirements.
No unacceptable weld defects were observed.
The 22 films for the Mk-18 recirculation inlet nozzle weld to the shell course exhibited nonconformance with ASME Code,Section III, Paragraph IX-333(b)(3).
The nonconformity consisted of placing the penetrameters across the width of the weld instead of placement adjacent-to the weld.
Additional penetrameters were not used to compensate for the variation in density values (2.0 to 4.0) across the weld.
In addition B&W failed to use film side penetrameters as permitted for the difficult geometric weld configurations of the subject veld.
6.
Estimated Hydrostatic Test and NDT Inspection The inspector was told that the latest, estimated dates for the hydrostatic test and shipment of the Oconee 3 RPV were June 1 and June 30, 1971, respectively.
The inspector said that Compliance would review the results of the hydrostatic test and post hydro NDT inspection during a subsequent inspection.
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In response to questioning, Mr. Robinson (DPC) was unable to tell the inspector of any DPC plans for baseline UT mapping.
D.
Completion of Test and Inspection Records Subsequent to the inspection of Crystal River 3 and Oconee 3 RPV's, the inspector completed a review of hydrostatic testing and NDT inspection of the post weld repairs on the Z-1 RPV (see Inquiry Memoranda dated January 21 and February 17, 1971 from Vetter to Henderson).
Information is as follows:
A review was made of the B&W hydrostatic inspection report dated February 20, 1971, the Water Sampling Report, the Pressure Gages Calibration Report, and the B&W Specification F-301, " Calibration Procedures." The record established that the Zion 1 RPV was successfully tested at 3125 psig and inspected at 2550 psig in accordance with ASME Code,Section III, Article 7.
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A review of the post hydro nondestructive test inspection records established that the following NDT inspections were performed and was acceptable:
a.100% PT of the lower head interior cladding incluuing the in-core instrument tubes.
b.
Dimensional inspection of the in-core instrument tubes by the " ball and rod method."
c.100% PT of the closure head flange sealing surfaces after the hydrostatic test.
d.100%..PT of all CRD mechanism housing tubes af ter hydro.
e.100% MI inspect $on of all accessible carbon steel surfaces (exterior) of the RPV.
- f. -UT remap of the entire repaired seam.
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.m O). (yJ The verification by the inspector of the above acceptable test results, in conjunction with evidence of acceptable weld repair and radiographic inspection reported in the Inquiry Memorands, dated. January 21 and February 17, 1971, ffom Vetter to Henderson, establishes that the repairs to the lower head circle weld were performed la accordance with the ASME,Section III, Paragraph N-528, " Repair of Weld Defects."
E.
Miscellaneous Information - Other RPV's In accordance with Item 7 of Inquiry Memorandus, dated January 29, 1971, from Henderson to Vetter, the inspector questioned Mr. Buskey concerning other reactor vessels containing welds radiographed with cobalt 60.
Mr. Buskey told the inspector char he did not think there was anything unacceptable with the use of' cobalt 60 in connection with the subject radiography and that the use of ultrasonic testing was " backup" for added assurance of quality.
Mr. Buskey then verbally provided the inspector with a list of ultrasonic inspection of pressure boundary welds on vessels started, completed, or in process at Mt. Vernon as follows :
Facility Status of Inspection by UT Mapping of Welds t
. Westinghouse RPV's
.N Ginna Performed in the field by B&W and Southwest Research Institute Point Beach 1 Performed by B&W in the shop from the core blocks to the flange.
Two lower circle welds not UT'd.
Turkey Point 3 Same as Point Beach 1.
Turkey Point 4 Same as Point Beach 1.
Point Beach 2 UT unknown; RPV sent to Combustion Engineering.
Kewaunee UT unknown; RPV sent to Combustion Engineering.
Prairie Island 1 UT unknown; RPV sent to Combustion Engineering Prairie Island 2 UT unknown; RPV sent to France.
O Beaver Valley 1 UT unknown; RPV sent to Combustion
(,/
Engineering.
. p, J. M. Farley UT unknown; Kr*! sent to Combustion Engineering.
Seabrook UT unknown, RPV sent to Combustion Engineering D. C. Cook 1 UT unknown; RPV sent to Combustion Engineering D. C. Cook 2 UT unknown; RPV sent to CB&I.
Zion 1 Welds 100% UT mapped at the B&W shop.
Zion 2 UT mapping under contract to B&W.
General Electric RPV's Dresden 2 No B&W shop or field UT map.
l Dresden 3 No B&W shop or field UT map.
Quad-Cities 1 No B&W shop or field UT map.
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Quad-Cities 2 No UT done by B&W.
Some UT done by RDM.
Browns Ferry 1 UT mapped in the field by Ssuthwest Research Institute.
Browns Ferry 2 Will be UT inspected by IH"..
Browns Ferry 3 Will be UT inspected by IH C.
Peach Bottom 2 UT unknown; RPV sent to CB&I.
Peach Bottom 3 UT u known; RPV sent to CL&I.
Babcock & Wilcox RPV's Oconee 1 UT mapped in field by B&W.
Oconee 2 B&W negotiating with DPC for UT mapping.
Oconee 3 B&W negotiating with DPC for UT mapping.
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Three Mile Island 1 UT mapped in field by Metro Ed of Pennsylvania.
I Three Mile Island 2 B&W negotiating with utility for UT nepping.
Crystal River 3 Will be UT mapped in the field by Southwest Research Institute.
i Russelville 1 B&W negotiating for UT mapping.
i Rancho Seco Same as for Russelville 1
. Midland 1 Same as for Russelville 1 Midland 2 RPV on hold.
i Davis bassie Too early.
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1hr. Buskey did not elaborate further on B&W's previously indicated plans to review all vessels in which some, or all, of tua pressure boundary welds may have been radiographed using cobalt 60.
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