ML19319C796

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Burnable Poison Rod Assembly Failures & Proposed Core for Remainder of Cycle 1 Per 780512,0602,06,08 & 0721 Submittals
ML19319C796
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/16/1978
From: Reid R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Stewart W
FLORIDA POWER CORP.
References
NUDOCS 8003040767
Download: ML19319C796 (4)


Text

a

._y y3. ~ ~qm ~m ~.,~=m7*:p - m.gwww7v e-~~pwr *-~ + 7..377 ~rpr " 7 umg>~g

-er ~~~~~y-*=.r y>g

_,... v.

2

.e v

./

.. -M s'

',.,a..

,-, ' ;;.; 7

-y a..

d

,fA.e

_. j i',,,,,, u ;

s :

-~ nf4 )

a;,.

, sG - l.,, f Q. f ~._,~a

  • 'O J.

.,. m.. up.

a y,

,.e e,,..

_1 c

w 9.*.

. DISTRIBUTION:

' x e

(-

~

7,.

~

~ QMEket a.'

~

NRC PDR g..

'~'

August 16, 1978' L PDR 4

~-

ORB #4 Reading w

VStello s

Docket No. 50-302' BGrimes/TCarter

~

OELD OI&E(3)

RWReid CNelson Florida Power Corporation RIngram i

ATTN: Mr. WJ P. Stewart-

~

.DEisenhut Director, Power Production

'TAbernathy

~

P. O. Box 14042. Mail Stop C-4 JBuchanan m.

St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 ACRS(16)

Gray file We have reviewed your submittals of tsay 12, June 2, 6, and 3, and July 21,1978, regarding the burnable poison rod assembly failures and the proposed core for the remainder of Cycle 1 and have determined that the additional information identified in the enclosure is necessary to continue sur review. You are requested to provide this infopistion as soon as possible.

Sincerely, i

Robert W. Reid, Chief Operating Peactors Branch #4 Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosure:

c Request for Additional Information cc w/ enclosure:

i See next page

~

.a

.w e.

up,. mm 4?-

~,

rc a. N;:. f.'h.*fn?'. '

y l

.< ? q

.x,q,..t.g s

w

- y se. ; : r.t c. n. J.,so,: g u.

m ~

.,~

.w

y 1 m

..< o r

.,m a

s

. ~.

e<

. ~ M c ' g,.;A '.

^ v J;.~

q' c

.;4...

y v,;g t;

.v e

, -p

.r t.

r;

[(

f h

s...

y.

W,,f

. Q,3;;~,q>

-..c w..

4

<,'5.

-v,

, s

3..

y-

,n.

99, :p 2

- x.

-s

.g s ~.

4)0R.

.E ::

ORBf4:00R] Cp@'dW g n

~

luff g,,,, j CNp%nC f a. _ pq

-. y

,s h'I 3

?A0 08 0 g.g.y...'

., SN '

, ~

9..,.. 8/f/7.83fs 8/ p 78 8

.~

.. ~,

L NRC.EURM.338.JNENBQA_me, h, 1,j,i,adie4 4,,$yg..-_ g uess!typeseggs e y pa 9 J,ogo; emmeng,%gf. j a j g fu g c g,; ; g 3,,,,g f,c (

1 e

a

-......... - ~. -. -

__. _ F~

~

~

.~

~-~

.9

. )

Florida Power Corporation cc: Mr. S. A. Brandimore Vice President and General Counsel P. O. Box 14042 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 Crystal River Public Library Crystal River, Florida 32629

)

I t

i t

4 e

O h

e e

~-

e m--

-r-e v-

G

")

1.

In your letter dated June 22, 1978 you stated that the dropped test weight came to rest against the APSR coupling device. Describe any inspections performed on the part length control rods, and any damage resulting from the dropped test weight. Should any damage have resulted, provide your basis for reuse of this component in the upcoming cycle.

2.

In your earlier response dated May 16, 1978 you indicated that 397'8" of the total 403'8" of BPR was recovered and that further search for debris was continuing. Please provide us with a final assessment of the total debris recovered. This assessment should include a complete listing of the composite parts and materials, and a listing of the amounts recovered. Should the location cf unrecovered parts and materials be known, but not accessible, include this information in your reply.

Also should missing parts and material exist in unknown locations, identify or estimate the quantity and location of the debris. Any new information on damage or residual effects uncovered as a result of your latest findings and evaluations should also be provided.

3.

Qualify your statement that the potential for propagation of fuel failures due to blockage is extremely remote. Also explain how the daily monitoring of the water chemistry provides a means of detecting fuel failures.

In this regard, specify the sensitivity of this method to detect fuel failures and any time lags involved between fuel failures and the detection of fuel failures.

4.

Describe any startup and operational tests and surveillance procedures planned to assure detection of degraded operations of the reactor coolant pumps, RCP seals, full length control rods, and part length control rods.

5.

In regard to your response on blockcge at the spacer grids, discuss the effects of your 5% reduction in DNBR and the potential for local per-foration of the fuel cladding. Also explain how the increased turbulence behind a blockage offsets the loss of flow to preclude local perforations or reductions in DNFR. Describe how the blockage is modeled in LYNX 1/

4 LYNX 2~ and what correlation with DNB and ~ blockage was used.

6.

In your reply you stated that there is a probability that small pieces might get into the guide tubes and cause some interaction with moving components. Provide your analysis of this condition and quantify the probability of this event.

i l

l l

l

.w.

m=.

w

~

O

")

e

~

i j 7.

During the previous cycle, two fuel assemblies operated for a signifi-cant period without burnable poison. Therefore, the exposure and isotopic inventories in these and adjacent assemblies will be different from that calculated using the exposure tallies derived from the incore detectors. Describe in detail how this discrepancy was accounted for in the calculations sumarized in Section 3, " Nuclear Design."

8.

The analyses in Section 3, " Nuclear Design," appear to be based upon octant symetry. Yet Location L12 and its octant analogues are only quarter-core symmetric. Moreover, one would expect the use of as-semblies from which the BPRA were ejected to introduce still more assymetry. Therefore, justify in detail the use of octant symetry in the nuclear calculations. In addition, explain quantitatively how the incore monitoring program (which apparently also assumes octant symetry) will account for any assymetry.

g, Describe the procedure to be followed in the event that the acceptance criteria of Section 7.2.3 are not met.

In particular, would Bank 4 be met. 1 red by deboration? If not, how would the 10'.' uncertainty in the shutdown margin calculations be justified?

10..

In the test of ejected rod worth (Section 7.2.4), will all four sym-metric rods be measured? If not, will any check on azimuthal tilt be made before power escalation?

11.

State your schedule for submittal of a startup report to the NRC.

12. Please provide a sumary of occupational exposures actually received during the OTSG repairs in the fom of Tables 2 and 3 of your May 12,1978 submittal.

Include in this sumary the number of workers who received the exposure.

i 9

e

=

.e-

_ _,