ML19319C042
| ML19319C042 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point, Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 05/13/1975 |
| From: | Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Roe L TOLEDO EDISON CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8001300773 | |
| Download: ML19319C042 (5) | |
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DISTRIBUTION:
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Docket File LWR 2-3 Rdg Docket No.: 50-346 LWR ads FSchroeder AKenneke LWR TCs ELD The Toledo Edison Company IE (3)
AITN:
Mr. Lowell E. Roe LEngle Vice President, Facilities EGoulbourne Development TR BCs 300 Edison Plaza LWR BCs Toledo, Ohio 43652 ACRS (16)
Gentlemen:
We are presently conducting a review of the effects of secondary system fluid flow instability in FWR's.
Events, such as the damage to the feed-water system piping that occured at the Indian Point 2 facility on Nova.mber 13, 1973, could originate as a result of the uncovering of the feedwater sparger in the steam generator or the uncovering of the steam generator feedwater inlet noz=les. Subsequent events may in turn lead to the generation of a pressure wave that is propagated through the pipes.
Therefore, we request that you provide the information contained in the enclosure. This information vill enable us to determine whether these effects have been considered in the Davis-Eesse Nuclear ?ower Station, Unit 1 plant design.
Please inform us within seven (7) days af ter receipt of this letter of your schedule for providing this information. Please contact us if you have any questions regarding the information requested.
Sincerely.
C@tJ sign.J ty A. Schwencer, Chief Light Water Reactors Branch 2-3 Division of Reactor Licensing
Enclosure:
Request for Additional Information ecs: See next page
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Washington, D. C.
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- -. E CENEP,.AL 'II:FOPM'sTION P.7.OCIRED
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She following is a general list of information required for our review of the ef fects of secondary systco fluid flow instability in P'.*R's, and for, ouE. review of any proposed " design chen;;cs that =ay be found necessary.
Since piping Icyouts and systen designs are substantially diffew.nt fres plant to plcat, you should deternine the applicability to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 design of each of ttia following items for inclusion in your response.
1.
Describe all potentici operating occurrences that cc;uld cause the level of the water / steam interface in the stec= generator to drop below cad uncover the feed; eater sparger (or inlet nozzles), and allou steen to enter the sparger and the fecducter piping.
Such uncovering could Iced to' " water harner" that could result in deletericus cbasequences for the sysrca piping (c.c., Indian Point 2 feedwater 1.ine failure, November 13, 1973).
2.
Describe ced show by isecetric diagrr.=s, the routing of the cada cr.d cu: ciliary fecducter piping fro: the stcca cencrators outuards throu;;h contcinzent up to clic outer isolation valve and restraint. Uhendescribinhthepipingrun,noteell* valves end reference centinually, the cicvation of Tac inlet noccles and/or spe.rger with respect to the piping run elevation.
3.
Describe all anclyses of the piping systcc in d ich dyncaic forcing I
functions vare assu=cd.
Also, provide the results of any test progrens that were carried out to verify that either uncovering of the feedwater lines could not occur at your facility, or if it did occur, the uctor h :=cr ef fect did not result.
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a. 11f f.orcing nctions ucre assumed in ~you-nah sis,.
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provide the technical b' asis that you used to assure
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that an apprcpriate choice seas bede, nnd that adaqu:tc i
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conservatis=s ucre included in the enclytical r.odel.
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i b.
If a test progrca ums folleted, provide the basis for i
assuring that the progran cdequetely tracked and predicted 7
i the flo.i instability event that occurred, and further, that the test results centained adequate conservatisns cnd an acceptt.ble facter of scfety, e.g., range of parc=cters l
cover ed all conceivcbic codes of operation.
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If neither a or b have'been perfor::cd, present your basis for i
j not requiring cither,and your future plans to investigate thir.
r potential, transient occurrence.
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In order to bound the consequences of this event, discuss the l
possibility of a sparger or no:-21e uncovering, and the consequent pressure uave effects that uculd occur in the piping follo.ing a
,i design basis accident.:ith concurrent turbine trip and Joss of a
off-site pc.cr.
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5.
If plant system design changes are to be cada to preclude the 4
occurrence of flo: instabilitics, describe these changes or codificatie:-
and discuss the reasons that :.ade this alternative superior to other alternatives that night have been applied.
Discuss the quality i
assurance progran th:t vill be folloucd to assure that the planned systen nodifications will have been correctly cecor.plished at the i
f acility.
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Discuss **the of _ cts of reduced #m :iliary fec ' atFs-flo.i as a.E possibic ccanc of reducing the cagnitude of induced pressure vaves includin;; positive ccans (e.g., inthricchs) to assure a
sufficient le.i flop rctes and still c6ct the mininua require tents for the systc= safety function.'
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