ML19319C036
| ML19319C036 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 11/05/1976 |
| From: | Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Roe L TOLEDO EDISON CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8001300766 | |
| Download: ML19319C036 (15) | |
Text
5
/~~
Distrit' lon
~
e
~
~
Docket F1 NRC PDR-Local PDR NOV 6 1976 LWR 1 File L. Engle D. B. Vassalo F. J. Williams E. Hylton Docket ilo.60-346 ACRS (16)
ELD IE (3)
Toledo Edison Company H. Smith
~
ATT1: Mr. Lowell E. Roe Vice President, Facilities bec:
J. R. Buchanan, NSIC Development T. B. Abernathy, TIC Edison Plaza 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, Ohio 43652 Gentlemen:
MEETING SU:iMARIES OF ELECTRICAL CRAWI:4G REVIEWS FOR DAVIS BESSE, Ul LIT 1 At our site visit to Davis Besse, Unit 1 (DB-1) on October 6,1976, you requested :nat copies of the meeting sumaries regarding electrical drawing reviews for Davis Besse, I; nit 1 be sent to you by letter.
This letter is in response to your request. As you know, you had previously received informal copics of the meeting sumaries prior to our site visit.
Our discussion with you at the site visit regarding these matters are sumarized below. -
The meeting held in Bethesda, Maryland on April 14-15, 1976, with the NRC staff, Toledo Edison Company and the Bachtel Corporation was for the purpose of conducting an electrical drawing review of the Auxiliary Feedwater System and the main steam line isolation,and feedwater line ruotura control systcm.
The purpose of the April 14-15, 1976 meeting was to assure that the DB-1 design has been adequately implemented to satisfy the rec,uirenents of the applicable standards and criteria. During the course of the meeting you were requested to demonstrate how the design met the cri-teria for channel separation. Selected input parameters to the Auxil-f ary Feedwater System were traced from the sensor to the logic cabinets located in the control room and from tha logic cc' ?aets to the actuated equipment (i.e., valves, pumps, etc.). You identified the location of wireways and sensor mountings between redundant channels in order to verify that safety related channels were adequately separated.
~ :J
,)
Ob
/
orries >
summans
- oave >
Forum AEC.)15 (Rev. 9-55) AECM 0240
. # u. es eovannassar pasavene opricas n,ra.sas-see gons 300 7R
a c,
NOV 5 1976 Toledo Edison Company 2-
- Enclosure 1 to this letter surnarizes the items discussed at the April 14-15, 1976 meeting.
The meeting held in Bethesda, Maryland on July 13-15, 1976, with the NP,C staff, Toledo Edison Company and Bechtel Corporation was for the purpose of conducting an electrical drawing review of the reactor protection system and the engineered safety features actuation system.
The purpose of the July 13-15, 1976 meeting was to assure that the 08-1 design has been implemented to satisfy the requirements of the acolicable standards and criteria. During the course of the meeting you were requested to demonstrate how the design met the criteria for channel separation.
Selected input parameters to the P,eactors Protection System and to the Engineered Safety Features System were traced from and including the sensor to the logic cabinets located in the control room and from the logic cabi-nets to and including the actuated equipment (i.e., valves, pumos, etc.).
You identified the location of wireways and sensor mountings between redun-dant channels in order to verify that safety related channels were ade-quately separated. to this letter sunnarizes the items discussed at the July 13-15, 1976 meeting.
You are hereby advised that a meeting summary of our site visit to Davis Gesse, Unit 1 on October G, 7 and 8,1976 will be transmitted to you in t.ie ucek of November 8 12, 1976.
Sincerely,'
- Original Signed bg' John F. Stolaj' John F. Stolz, Chief Light Water Reactors Branch Ho.1 Division of Project Management
Enclosures:
1.
April 14-15,1976 Neting Sumary 2.
July 13-15,1976 Meeting Summary cc: See page 3 i
orrice >
LWM,
JStol
. k...
suaae.wa >
11/5/76 _
11/ _/76 i
Form ABC-313 (Rev. 9 53) AECM 0240 1lT u. se sovmanessm? Pausvues arricas sove.sas.see
.. ~ ^
NOV 6 1976 3-Toledo. Edison Company cc: Mr. Donald H. Hauser, Esq.
.The Cleveland Electric 111uciinating Company P. O. Box 5000 Cleveland, Ohio 44101 Gerald Charnoff, Esq.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge 1300 M Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
20036 Leslie Henry, Esq.
Fuller, Seney, Henry and Hodge 3J0 Madison Avenue Toledo, Ohid 43C04 I
l 1
l orrics >
avamaas s >
oats >
Foran ANC.318 (Rev. 9 53) AECM 0240 W u. s. sovsamusm? raswrime orrics: tota.sas. nee j
_.,_ - _ _.c n
ENCLCSURE 1 DAVIS BESdc, UN.?T.1 DRAWING REVIEW -(APRIL 14-!5, 1975 TCLE00 EDIS0N COMPANY 1.
The over211 Au'xiliary Feedwater, Main Steam Line Isolation and Feedwater Line Rupture Control Systems were discussed in detail.
l-
-(The applicant calls _this systen the Steam, Feedwater Line Ruptere Ce. rol System - SFRCS). The staff indicated that the system, cs presently designed, does not fully nee: the requirement Of IEEE Std 279-1971 and is not acceptabic.
Antic *patory inputs to the reactor protecti:n system are derived frc systems ths; are net Class IE (e.g., inputs frei the Integrated Cent:01 Syster) and l -
as such do not satisfy the Cc mission's equirements.
The staff l
recuired'that-these input systems ce designed to IEEE Std 279-1971 l
if they retain'as reacter protection systen inputs or remove them ii thev. are not required for saferv..
The acclicant acreed to these
=
requirements and cc mit:cd to submit a modified design.
i 2.
The staff identified valves HV10,6, H7106A, HV107 and HV107A (stea:
-inle; valves to the auniliary feedwater pump turbine) which incorpora::
an override interlock to shut these valves and inhibit the valves fr : cpening) whenever the containment pressure exceeds 38.5 psla.
It is.the staff's c:ncern_tha: the interlock will negete the operatico of :he auxiliary feedwater systen auteratically and manually. The I
i applicant was' requested to verify that, for conditions when cor: inmen I
pressure ren:hes 35.5 psia,_ the auxilicry feedweter syster w ul! no:
be-required.
In addf. tion, tha applicant was recuested to dece rate f at adequate targinsis-providad in the se:pnints so that p;cper
.:7aratien of the ' Anniliary Fee.' vater System will not be ne;2:ed.:hcr
- Fis system is requirec.
4
~, -*
3 Discrepancies found in the final design drawings for these systers 4.
- wcre discussed. The applicant'ectritted to revise the drawings and include the necessary legends, cross references, clearly identify the parameters being actuated and menitored, and to =odify the functional logics to represent the as-built design.(i.e., =cdify the design to confer: with Ite: 1 of this report, correc: the drawings for
=ain stea: isoaltion valve actuation to represent the as built design, e:C.).
5.
The actuated ecuiptent associated with the subj ect system was reviewed.
The staff identified varicus centrol scheres that intercennect redundant channels (i.e., channel I with channel 3, and channel 2 with channel 4).
Based on the information presented, it was not apparent how adequate isolatien was previded to assure that a single failure would not degrade the functional operability cf channels. 3echtel ec::itted to review this concern and resolve the staff's concerns.
- 6. For the subject.systers, selected senser cable reutings were traced frc= the sensors field installed physical location through to the actuatien icgic cabinets to verify that the design hac been i=plefiented is accordance with the channel separation criteria as defined in the FSAR Channel I and Channel 3 are run independently in separate metal cenduits for *.he major portion ef each ones run, however, they both
-converge frc: cpposite Sirectien 'into a ec= en t ay (labled ICFL).
Since Channel 1 and Channel 3 a:e associated with train I and Channel 2 and Channel 4 are associated wi;h train II and there was ec::entlity
?
4 identified between redundant trains, the staff concluded that the ce==onality identified above is acceptable for this system. However, the' staff cautioned that such ce=:enality could effect other systets such as the RPS and ESFAS and degrade those systems belcw an acceptable level. We intend to review these other systens at a ~
1ater date.
7 During the review the staff ider.tified areas where redundant channel wiring rcuted in separate and independent =etal conduits, were rcuted in close proximity to each other withcut provisiens for barriers other than the cenduit itself. Althcugh the staff recogni:es that metal cenduits may be a valid barrier for certain types of failures, the staff does not consider.th2: conduits alone are adequate barriers for all types of failires. The applicant was requested to review these installations. Where external scurces (such as heat er mittiles) cay effect the redundant circuits in these conduits, the applicant was requesned to provide barriers to assure the integrity of these circuits or jdstify their design en some other defined basis.
Incidents such as a fire in an open tray crossing under redundant conduits vas cited as an exa ple that =sy effect the cables inside the conduit!and degrade the systes circuits below an 2cceptable leve'..
The a.ru. licant com=itted to evaluate their criteria and will advise the starr as to the resciution or t..aas concern.
.3.
The Ar.nilian Feedwater Isciation valves circuitry was reviewed (HV603 and H7 599). We concluded tha: the circuitry for these v117es did no: fully meet the requirement ef the staff!s position as stated in
.__E._ _.
2 _
3 Y
. ~
Question P7.1.1 (10/4/74) and was unacceptable. We requested that the applicant uodify the design to confor: with our recuirements.
(i.e., wh'en'the single failure criterien is satisfied by removal of electric power f cc these valves, these valves should have-reduncant position indication in the =ain centrol rec = and the position indication systen should itself meet the single failure criterion). The applicant-com:itted to codifiy their design to =eet our requirements.
~
)
4 t
[. -
i o
I.
0 1
u-
~
u- - -. -
re
--w, n
.u--.-.
.. ~...-
,~.
i o
MEETING ATTENCEES F. Eltawila NRC*
V. W. Howard Bechtel D. W. Douds 3echtel D. V. Fichett NRC
- 3. F. Novich Bechtel G. A. Stashik Bechtel E. J. Ray Bechtel*
R. W. Ja:ksen Bechtel*
J. E. Reilly Sechtel*
J. K. Weed TECo S. N. Saba Sechtel*
C. F. Mi'ler NRC
- F. R. Miller TECo L. Engle NRC*
5:ukiewic:
NRC
.s.
- l. Can cr 5echtel*
-Part Tire
p t 3-m c
m;
.w
.u _-
. =. -.
.- +
1
-s -
-ENCLOSURE 2
^
DAVIS BE.
f, UMT 1 DRAWING -REVIEW (JULY 115, 1976)
TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
'1.. Qhalification of ESFAS isolation devices was discussed. The system design.utill:es digital isolation- (i.e., relays for ESFAS outpdt isciatien and opto-isolators for ESFAS interchannel isolation) and analog isolation devices (i.e., current to current isola:ica devices
- .nput sensors)..Censolidated Controls Corporation's for.'vsolation o:
representative described the test methods.and procedures used to qualify the isolation devices. In general, the relays were qualified to 450 VAC the opto-isolators were qualified to 1000 VAC, and the analog isolators were qualffied to 600 VAC. Testing was perfor ed
- .ch on component and system level. Noise tests using Mil-Spec 19900 were conducted to de:crmine noise susceptability of the safety channels.
The-applicant ec =itted to amend the FSAR and describe the adequacy of these isolat'an devices in a subsequent revision.
2.
ESFAS channel independence was reviewed in detail. Althcugh non-Class lE wiring is separated from Class 1E wiring outside the E5FAS logic cabinets, the system-design ali ws non-Class 1E wiring to be bundled with Class 15 wiring inside the ESFAS logic cabinets. Tnerefore,
it-is not apparent that independence between redundant Class 15-cir:uits would not be--cc promised in the event of a single - failure imposed en the non-safety circuits associated with -he safety circuits.
It is the staff's concern that a fault (i.e., grounding shorting, applica ica cf high voltage er noise) i= posed on the non-Class !E circuits associated with safety grade equipment could degrade the functional integrity of the safety channels below an acceptable level. Tne appli-cant was requested to demonstrate by tes that the syst m as installed would :sintain their functional integrity when subjected to these faults.
The applicant identified that caly the non-safety circuits assoc.ared with the safety channels that could be of concern are circuits associated wit's alarn incuts and cc= cuter inouts, and agreed to eve'.ua:e cur concerns. Suitable test methods were discuss.-d.
t I
i i
W:
,1 j
a_a___.___..
-_.2
__[
.E
.c q
2
. The. applicant will advise-the staff as to the satisfactory resolution
- of this concern.
- 3. : Testability of ESFAS channels was reviewed in detail. It was deter-ninJ4 that non-Class lE' equipment associated with the ESFAS test modult s was utilized for periodic veri.fication of ESFAS channels.
. The ap,licant was advised that the staff requires that the reliability of the test system be equivalent to that of the ESFaa in which it is located,. and therefore this design feature of using non-Class IE equipment for ESFAS testing is not acceptable. The applicant was requested to modify -he design by providing a fully Class 15 test s cheme. The applicant committed to review this design and conform with the staff's requirements.
2 Channel identification of safe y related cables in conduits was dis cus sed. It was determined that identifica:icn of safety related conduits was only implemented 2: ea:h end of the "run" and as such sr.fety related conduit runs could not be readily identifiable along their entire length. The applicant was advised that channel identi-fication for safety related cendui: " raceways" does not conform to the requirements of IEEE S:1 279-1971, Section 4.22, and is unacceptable.
?ie require that conduit raceways be uniquely identified at discrete points along the entire length in order to visually verify that these " raceways" were installed. in accordance with the required criteria. Color coding or alphanumeric channel designation is considered an acceptable identifier. The applican; agreed to evaluate the staff's requirements and provide unique identification for conduit " raceways."
5.
55 ?3 internal cabine: wiring was reviewed. Eoch ESFAS channel catinet is physically separated frc= its r'edundant countereart, all input and cutputs. enter and exit frem the bottom of the cabincts, all entrances and exits are sealed with flame retardant material.
~
Interchannel wiring is uniquely identified and routed in designated ra:eways -.:a confern to the separatica criteria for redundcnt Class 1E raceways E (i.e'., ' channel 12 which interconnects channel 1 and 2 are separated fron raceways designated for channel 1 or channel 2).
Interchannel-wiring is isolatea fro: ::3 originating source via
L. _ 2 m. 2.
4
...u-q 3
3 s
optical isolators. The ' applicant agreed to amend the FSAR and describe in detail the separation criteria for inte channel wiring. Subject to sa-isfactory documentation we. conclude that the design for interchannel wiring is acceptable.
-6.
Curing our review the applicant was requested to demonstrate how the separation criteria described in the FSAR.for the ESFAS was implemented.
~
Separation and independence for the following sensor inputs frot their field'installe'd location to the protection channel was traced and verified.
2.
Redundant containment radiation sensors (RIS 2004 and RIS 2003) b.
Redundant Reactor Coolant Pressure (RC2B4 and RC2AJ) c.
Redundan: Containment Vessel Pressure (PT2000 and PT 2001) d.
Redundant Borated Storage Tank Level (LT 1323A and LT 13233) in addition, separation criteria was verified from the protection systen. to the following actuated devices.
a.
.Redundan: High Pressure. injection pumps and valves, b.
Redundan: Low Pressure injection pumps and valves, and c.
Redundant Containment Spray pumps and valves.
Also the power supply to thd sensors and actuated devices was verified to be separate and independent..
The following 3ech:41 cable raceway drawings were used for verification L
of :he cable separation for the above parameters.
E 319, Revision 3 E 414, Revision 13
.E 333, Revision 17 E 363, Revision 9 E 336,. Revision 14 E 319, Revision S
~ E 347, Revision 13.
E 330, Revision 6 5 313, Revision 13 5 331, Revision 3 5 329, Shee: 1, Revision 13 5 332, Revisien 17 E 330,-Revision 16 E 334, Revision 2 E 336, Sheet 1 E 333,. Revision 1~
E 363, Revision 4 5 336, Revision 14 E'366, Revision 12-2 337, Revision 7 E 3c9,fRevision 13 E 333, Revision 19
.W:
g i -
. 1.3 s
4
~
E 347,.Revisien 13' E 350, Reivision 16 E-348, Revision 12-E 356, Sheet 1, Revisiot 9 E 349,,Shee: 2, Revision 1 E 356, Sheet 12, Revision 1 E 349,. Sheet 1, Revision 13 E 412, Revision 14 Based on the review of the ESFAS systen and the above referenced drawings we conclude that the design as implemented provide a satis-fastery degree of separation.and independence and is acceptable L(except as noted in i cms 2, 3, 2nd 4) subject to the veri-t
.fication of this design during our site visit.
- 7..All sensor inputs to the ESFAS and RPS logic cabinets are contin-uously monitored and indicated on the main control. board cr in the logic cabinets. located in the control room to facilitate verification of their operability. Sensers used for ESFAS are not shared with the RPS.
3.
The applicant was requested to'submi: the panel layout drawings series M-530 and series M-3812nd drawing E 353 as part of the final Ldrawing package of the FSAR.
3 Qualification of RFS isolation devices was discussed. Representatives
' fron Babcock and Wilcox Co. described general test methods and pro-cedures'used to qualify the isolation devices.
In general, two types of isolation devices are used in the RPS design, analog isolation devices (buffar 2:plifiers) and digital isolation devices (relays).
C: ponent tests were. conducted by subjecting the isolation devices ::
shorts, grounds, open circuits, and application of high vcltage and low. volta 3a Cup to 50 VAC) noise susceptibility.
Since the design of the RPS is functionally similar to the ESFAS design where ncn-Class 1E wiring is bundled together with Class 15 siring insice the RPS logi catinets, the applicant was also recuested to demonstra e by tes; tha the functienal integrity of the RPS would i.at be degraded-in the.even: of a single failure (see iter : of this
- repert).
The applicant vill sdvise-the itaff as to the satisfactory resol'ution-1:f::his concern.
[-..
i._.__._.____
F
^
S 10.
Separation and independence for the fol10 wing RPS sensor inputs from their field installed locatica to the protection channels was traced and verified:
Redundant Power Range (flux sensors ( (channel 1 and 3) a.
b.
Redundant Pump Speed sensors (channel 1 and 3) c.
Redundant Reactor Coolant Terpera ture sensors (channel 1 and 3)
In addition, the separation criteria was verified from the RPS channels to the undervoltage coils of the control rod drive pcwer supply breakers.
The following 3echtel cable raceway drawings were used for verificatien of the caole separatien for ::-a above parameters:
E 319, Revision 3 E 34~, Revision 14 E 330, Revisien 6 E 343, Revision 13 E 331, Revision 3 E 349, Shee: 2, Revision i E 332, Revision 17 E 349, Sheet 1, Revision 13 c -,,ev,sion 4
__0, Revision.,6
- aa
- a., n.
,evision i.
- ac o. S.neet,
.s c aas, s
2 335, Revision 13 E 336, Shee: 12, Revisica 1
--, evision *,
.e aae, nev4.s cn e coa n
,evision 9 6a.
n e aa3,,nevision,is
- a n
E-343, Revision 9 E 366, Revision 12 E 342, Revision 3 E 369, Ravision 13
,ev4sion a,
. 4.3 c
2-a, a
E 346, Revision 12 11.
The applicant was rec,uested to subait the final design drawing for the modified Reac:c Trip System, and amend the FSAR :: describe the as build design. The cdified design incorporates four react:r trip breakers (instead of two presently described in :he FSAE) and the trip legic 2: the -breakers is a 1-cut-of-2-taken-twi:e.
~,ie have
.2eiewed the preposed design and conclude tha: it is acceptable s ub iec: only to the satisfa:: cry decurentation of this desi;n in the rnq, n,.
W-
3
. +
m
>?-
. (-) -.
./m 6-t 4
' 12. The applicant was requested and agreed to submit the final schematic -
- diagran of the control rod drive power supply trip breakers as part of' the FSAR docke- (i.e., drawing 749-14-555-341).
- 13. We have. reviewed the inputs to the Integrated Control Systen that are derived fron..the RPS systen (i.e., average power signal, Reactor Coolant loop (A)3 flow, Reactor. coolant pressure).We con-
~ clude that subject to the satisfactory verification of the adequacy of the isolation devices used, this design for the Davis 3 esse i plan: is acceptable.
a t
I f
f e
'l 4
7 I '
Y T-4 i
e-AS-
., L Q
ifEETING ATTENDEES Toledo Edison Centany R. Sins A. S. Topor F. R. Miller Eechtel S. N. Saba S. M. Canter C. Schuker*
C. Stashte*
L. Wise
- J. Rerty*
D. Douds*
- 7. Howard' Consolidated Centrol Corr.
G. Schoonbaum Sabcock and Wilcox J. T. Fairburn*
J. E. A.derson*
L. M. Lesniak*
NRC R. Kendall A. J. S:ukiewic:
' Denotes p:.r: tine attendance
.