ML19319B527
| ML19319B527 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 06/12/1978 |
| From: | Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Jeffery Grant TOLEDO EDISON CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8001230641 | |
| Download: ML19319B527 (4) | |
Text
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799 ROOSEVELT RoAo JUN 12 1978 Docket No. 50-346 Toledo Edison Company 3
ATTN:
Mr. James S. Grant Vice President Energy Supply I
Edison Plaza 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, OH 43652 Gentlemen:
This refers to the telephone conversations between yourself and others of Toledo Edison Company and Mr. R. C. Knop and others of this office on June 9, 1978, regarding the program to assure that circuit problems such as the diesel generator automatic loading sequencer failure do not exist in other safety-related systems.
The following identified problems have been identified during the review of this event:
1.
Inadequate control of terminal slide links in the safety-related panels.
2.
Inadequate testing methods to demonstrate operability of control systems.
3.
Conflict between design drawings and the scheme and vendor as-built drawings.
4.
Compromise of safe':y systems design feature by authorized procedure operator actions.
Based on our conversation with you on June 9, 1978, we understand that you will implement the program detailed in Appendix A for electrical systems to assure yourself that other similar untested circuits do not exist.
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Toledo Edison Company JUN 12 1978 i.
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Please inform us immediately if your understanding of this progra::t is different from that stated above.
I Sincerely,
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James G. Keppler i
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Enclosure:
Appendix A l
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Station Superintendent
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U. Young Park, Power Siting Commission I
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4 APPENDIX A l
1.
Slide Links a.
Establish and implement a system to verify by visual examination that slide links are in the correct position and screws are tight I
in the following areas:
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- 1) Q relay cabinets.
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- 2) all safety-related cabinets SFAS, SFRCS, RPS
- 3) switchgear performing essential functions.
I b.
Slide Link Management Controls
- 1) Review slide link management controls for adequacy and revise as required.
- 2) Emphasize to Station personnel the importance of the management i
controls for slide links.
c.
Document the inspections and any incorrectly positioned links found. Resolve any discrepancies found by documented evaluation and/or testing.
2.
Technical Review of Test Procedures I
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Establish and implement a program including acceptance criteria that verifies adequacy of procedures used to determine equipment i
j operability.
j a.
From sample of systems
- determine by detailed comparison of i
design control features to applicable surveillance procedures that the surveillance test does verify system operability in accordance with design. Design features that are not tested will be documented and justification for not testing will be provi;ied.
b.
Where design control changes have been made to any safety-related system after the applicable test procedure was written, ensure that the change has been tested ** (intent of change) and ST's are revised to reflect the change required. This testing may be TP, ST, temporary mod to ST or specific procedure to test the new feature. If segmented tests are used, insure that proper overlap exists to completely test the change.
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APPENDIX A 1 3.
Review Safety System design drawings from a standpoint of logic diagrams (used as specification drawing) compared with scheme drawings or vendor drawings to ensure there is no conflict. Establish a priority of review.
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4.
If any significant deficiencies are uncovered as a result of these reviews and tests, the scope of the review shall be i
increased to other Safety Systems.
If any additional deficiencies are found in those other systems, the scope shall be increased to include all Technical Specifications systems.
5.
Retest SFAS and verify all design features work.
6.
Review all safety related plant procedures related to the onsite and offsite power systems and verify that design features are not inadvertently defeated or compromised by operator action.
7.
Establish additional administrative controls to insure that 4
changes or modifications to systems utilize drawings verified correct in accordance with 3. above.
8.
These items shall be completed according to the following schedule:
a.
Items 1, 2, 5 and 6 shall be completed prior to entering the mode in which the system is required by Technical Specifications.
b.
Item 3 shall be completed by September 15, 1978.
c.
Item 7 shall be implemented prior to going into mode 5.
9.
RIII shall be promptly informed of any significant discrepancies found during the course of the review.
The " sample" systems will be SFAS, containment spray, diesel generators, and RPS.
Testing will be done to the depth to deconstrate that any modified circuit has the proper redundancy, logic and other features of the individual channels.
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