ML19318C284
| ML19318C284 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07000824 |
| Issue date: | 05/19/1980 |
| From: | Kahle J, Kenna W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19318C276 | List: |
| References | |
| 70-0824-80-01, 70-824-80-1, NUDOCS 8007010301 | |
| Download: ML19318C284 (7) | |
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 MAY 211980 Report No. 7C-824/80-1 Licensee:
Babcock and Wilcox Company Lynchburg Research Center Lynchburg, VA 24505 Facility Name: Lynchburg Research Center Docket No.70-824 License No. SNM-778 Inspection at Lynchbur Virginia Inspector:
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B' ate Yigned Approved by:
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SUMMARY
Inspection on April 29 through May 2, 1980 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 24 inspector-hours on-site in the areas of 10 CFR Part 21, facility changes and modifications, internal review and audits, safety committees, operations review, nuclear criticality safety, followup on unresolved items, followup on items of noncompliance, followup on notices and circulars and independent effort.
Results Of the ten areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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4 DETAILS
-1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- T. Engelder, Laboratory Director
- A. Olsen, License Administrator K. Long, Accountability Specialist F. Welfare, Research Specialist C. Burnham, Building A Custodian R. Beauregard, Hot Cell Supervisor S. Pennington, Health Physics Engineer J. Hammonds, Maintenance Supervisor
- P. Doran, Accounting and Administrative Services Manager
- C. Bell, Facilities Manager Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included six technicians.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 2, 1980 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The inspector emphasized the need to notify NRC Region II when committed scheduled dates for final corrective actions to items of noncompliance were going to be delayed. Management acknowledged the concern and stated that emphasis would be placed on meeting -
scheduled dates, and if additional time was needed, an alternate commitment would be discussed with Ragion II. Refer to the open items in paragraph 3.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (79-08-03): Determination that the inner containers for the Certificate of Compliance No. 6058 packaging meets specifications equivalent to DOT Specification 17H drums. On February 4,1980 the Certifi-cate of Complisace No. 6058 was revised (Revision 6) to eliminate the authorization to use equivalent inner containers which meet DOT Specifi-cation 17H drums.
A licensee representative stated that currently the waste burial sites are not authorized to accept this type waste (plutonium) and if radioactive material is shipped in the packaging, a DOT Specification 17H drum will be used.
(0 pen) Noncompliance (79-08-01): Transfer of byproduct material in excess of the receiver's license limit.
In the licensee's response to items of noncompliance identified in Inspection Report Number 70-824/79-8, the corrective active was scheduled for completion on February 28, 1980. The final revision of the " Radioactive Shipment Check List" form to include a i
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space for entering the receiver's license limits and a space for'the signa-tures of the person completing the form and that of the reviewer's has not-been completed. The form is currently at an outside printer's shop for printing. A licensee representative stated that the shipping documentation reviews are being performed. The inspector discussed the need to notify the Region II inspector when committed scheduled dates were not going to be met or submit a supplemental response. A licensee representative stated that the final corrective actions would be completed by June 1,1980.
i (0 pen) Noncompliance (79-08-02): Hazardous material (radioactive) incorrectly described on shipping papers. The requirements of 49 CFR as they pertain to shipping documents have been reviewed. A set'of check-off forms are 3-being typed. The final revision of the shipping documents and instructions has not been completed. A licensee representative stated that a person other than the individual completing the forms to assure full compliance with the regulations is being performed. Again, as in the previous para-graph, the revision to the forms and instructions were not completed by February 28, 1980, as scheduled.
A licensee representative stated that final revision to the forms and instructions would be completed by June 1, 1980.
4.
10 CFR 21 a.
Posting Observations were made that the licensee's bulletin boards were posted with Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 and notices l
which described the 10 CFR 21 regulations, the adopted procedures and where copies were maintained.
b.
Procedures and Procurement Documents i
A licensee stated that there have been no revisions to the implementing procedures or procurement documents pertaining to 10 CFR 21.
These were discussed in inspection reports 70-824/79-5 and 70-824/79-1.
c.
Evaluations Two evaluations of deviations were made by the licensee since the inspection of 10 CFR 21 on January 31 through February 2, 1979 (Report i
No. 70-824/79-1).
In both instances the analyses showed that the effect of the deviations did not create a substantial safety hazard.
(1) An error in the KEN 04 and KEN 04/ LCM codes The licensee's evaluation analysis showed that the code had been changed by the licensee to prevent an error stop in a specialized geometry criticality calculation by allowing an overlap in the.
dimensional test. When the altered code was used at a later date for a generalized geometry criticality calculation, inconsistent results in the multiplication factor were observed. The licensee 4
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. o s changed the code back to the original dimensional test form and notified users of the changed version of the code that errors may-exist in their results if used for a generalized geometry calcula-tion.
(2) NAC-1 Cask-Drop Evaluation On February 11, 1980, Wiley and Wilson, licensee consultants, notified the licensee that a design change in the impact limiter axi the NAC-1 Spent Fuel Cask altered the cask impact limiter crush strength values. The crush strength values had been used in the licensee's cask drop safety analysis evaluation for lowering the NAC-1 cask into the pool in the Hot Cell Cask Handling Area.
The 10 CFR 21 evaluation showed that the integrity of the bottom of the pool could not be assured wit.h the changed impact limiter crush strength values. However, the evaluation showed that the effect would not rt. ult in a significant safety hazard. Conse-quently, the licensee has submitted a license amendment request to NMSS to authorize modifications to the pool and the methodology for performance of a safety analysis evaluation for any cask the licensee desired to lower into the pool as opposed to just the NAC-1 Spent Fuel Cask. The safety analysis evaluation shall show that the integrity of the bottom of the pool is maintained in the event a cask is dropped.
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The inspector had no further questions or comments.
5.
Circulars and Notices 1
The inspector verified that the licensee had received IE Notices 80-14, 80-11 and 79-12A and Circular 79-08. Verification was made that the Notices and Circular had been assigned to responsible individuals for action. The inspector had no further questions or comments.
6.
Facility Changes and Modifications a.
Building C - General Access Area A modification was made in Building C to increase the general cecess area (uncontrolled - noncontaminated) to the uranium process areas. A corridor was cut through the conference room and the " Uranium Fuel Synthesis" area (Room 16) plus adding the corridor adjacent to the
" Uranium" Fuel Synthesis" area.
This allows visitors to view the uranium processes without going through the change room and donning protective clothing. The entrance to the storage vault is now from what was formally the back wall of the vault.
The old shipping and receiving vault is being used to store special nuclear material until the final modifications of the vault are completed. The x-ray emission and diffraction equipment has 1
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' been moved from Room 20 to Room 19.
Verification was made that the modification was reviewed by the Safety Review Committee. The inspector had no further questions or comments.
b.
Plutonium Glove Boxes All but approximately nine plutonium glove boxes have been packaged for vaste burial. The remaining boxes have been moved to a walled off portion of Room 17 in Building C.
A licensee representative stated that the new ventilation ducts for the boxes were fabricated of metal as opposed to PVC. Also, that the movement of air was designed to flow from the uranium areas and the old plutonium areas to the new walled off area in Rcom 17. Nine large metal containers containing the packaged plutonium glove boxes are currently stored in Room 20, Building C.
Two are stored in the Building B high bay shop area. A licensee representative stated that plans are to ship and store the containers at the Babcock and Wilcox Parks Township Facility at Leechburg, PA.
They will be stored in the decommissioned Type II Facility until a place is found for disposal of plutonium wastes. The inspector had no further questions or comments.
7.
Safety Review Committee The Safety Review Committee membership is composed of a retired licensee employee (Chairman), two university professors, a B&W-NNFD chemist, a licensee research scientist, the laboratory health physicist, and the j
license administrator.
The membership meets the license requirements.
The minutes of meetings were examined for February 8, April 6, April 14, September 19, November 21 and November 30, 1979, and February 7 and April 9, 1980. Topics discussed were review of area operating procedures, health physics procedures, emergency procedures, license renewal, NRC inspection reports, Safety Audit Subcommittee results, disposal of glove boxes from Building C, facility modifications, analyses of TMI samples, safety review committee charter, and significant health physics items.
The meeting frequency, quorum and review topics met the license requirements.
The inspector had no further questions or comments.
8.
Internal Audits The inspector verified that monthly audits were performed by the Health Physicist and the Nuclear Safety Officer. The Safety Audit Subcommittee made three audits during 1979. An examination of the records showed that all areas were audited and that followup corrective actions were taken for identified discrepancies and safety concerns. Audit results were reported to the Laboratory Director as required by the licensee. However, on occasions the audit results were reported to the Director quarterly. The inspector questioned quarterly reporting to the Director for monthly audits.
A licensee representative stated that monthly reports are issued to Super-visors with a copy to the License Administrator when items that need corrective action are identified.
The quarterly report to the Director include the corrective actions. The inspector had no further questions or comments.
9.
Operations Review a.
Procedures The inspector examined the operating procedures manuals for Buildings B and C.
Verification was made that the procedures are available to operating personnel.
The procedures pertaining to the handling, movement and transfer of licensed material in Building A have not been completed.
A licensee representative stated that these would be completed by September 1, 1980.
The inspector had no further questions or comments.
b.
Logs and Records Verification was made that the Hot Cell Handling Area crane and sling inspections were performed in accordance with the requirements of the license.
The Hot Cell pool alarms were tested as required by the license. The inspector verified that the emergency generator units were tested weekly in accordance with the licensee's procedures.
Verification was made that the liquid waste retention tanks were inspected after each voiding for sludge accumulation and the fissile content in the tanks did not exceed 0.01 grams per liter. An examina-tion of the Hot Cell log book showed that the accumulation of zircaloy and plutonium fines in the hot cells did not exceed 8 grams of zircaloy and one curie of plutonium. The inspector had no further questions or Co!MDents.
c.
Housekeeping The general housekeeping conditions were good. There were no apparent fire or safety hazards.
10.
Nuclear Criticality Safety a.
Records Verification was made that the Accountability Specialist maintained records showing the balance of special nuclear material in each building.
The inspector verified that records were maintained of the number of criticality units authorized and present in Building A.
The inspector had no further questions or comments.
b.
Postings During tours of the laboratory areas, the inspector verified that authorized to contain special nuclear material were properly areas posted. An inspection of the shipping and receiving vault in Building C showed that each storage bin was properly posted. The inspector had no further questions or comments.
. c.
Storage During tours of the laboratory process areas and the shipping and receiving vault in Building C, the inspector verified that special nuclear material was stored in accordance with the approved procedures and within the storage conditions and limits. The inspector had no further questions or comments.
d.
Criticality Alarms The inspector discussed the source check and calibration procedures with licensee representatives. Selected detector units are used for source checking the alarm system weekly. Detector calibrations are performed annually. Some calibration procedures were in handwritten form and some were typed, but not in the licensee's technical procedure format. A licensee representative stated that the calibration proce-dures would be formalized into the technical procedure system as are the Health Physics procedures. June 30, 1980 was established for the completion date.
A review of the records showed that the weekly source check and annual calibrations had been performed. The inspector had no further questions or comments.
11.
Sludge - Building A Retention Tank An examination of the uranium analysis of the sludge from the Building A liquid waste retention tank showed that the total uranium content in the sludge was less than one gram. The inspector had no further questions or comments.
12.
Nonroutine Event On April 29, 1980, a licensee representative informed the inspector of a liquid waste spill in the Cask Handling Area (CHA) of the Hot Cells on March 19, 1980.
Radioactivity contaminated phosphoric acid contained in two 55-gallon drums leaked onto the CHA floor with a portion of the acid leaking under the large, roll up door. The acid leaked across a portion of the asphalt drive immediately in front of the door and flowed into a run 1
off ditch. The solution was confined before it reached the storm sewer.
The licensee representative showed the inspector the affected area and furnished him with a detailed investigative report. The report outlined the cause and the immediate corrective actions for neutralizing the acid, removing the contaminated materials (earth, asphalt) and solidifying the waste with cement.
The report contained corrective measures (change in procedures and review) for assuring that a similar recurrence will be prohibited. The inspector had no further questions or comments.
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