ML19318B896

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Responds to IE Bulletin 80-12, Decay Heat Removal Sys Operability. Plant Design Does Not Provide for Automatic Actuation of ECCS Recirculation or Automatic Positioning of Containment Recirculation Sump Valves
ML19318B896
Person / Time
Site: Point Beach  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/05/1980
From: Fay C
WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
To: James Keppler
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
References
IEB-80-12, TAC-42114, TAC-42115, NUDOCS 8006300262
Download: ML19318B896 (2)


Text

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Wisconsin Electnc eomcoma 231 WEST MICHIGAN, MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN 53201 June 5, 1980 Mr. J.

G.

Keppler, Regional Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region III U.

S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301 RESPONSE TO IE BULLETIN NO. 80-12 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 This letter is in response to IE Bulletin No. 80-12 entitled " Decay Heat Removal System Operability".

The circum-stances and events surrounding the Davis-Besse Unit 1 loss-of-decay heat removal (DHR) capability incident have been appropriately reviewed.

This review included circulation of the Davis-Besse Sequence of Events among Operations Group supervisors.

Decay heat removal hardware capability and operating history for Point Beach Nuclear Plant and relative to the Davis-Besse incident were reviewed in accoraance with the bulletin.

The design of Point Beach Nuclear Plant does not provide for automatic actuation of ECCS recirculation or automatic posi-tioning of containment recirculation sump valves.

Present Point Beach operating procedure OP-3C requires automatic safety injection (except as actuated by High containment pressure) be manually blocked at a reactor coolant system pressure of 1765 psig during the approach to cold shut-down.

1 We are currently implementing a change to procedure PBNP 4.13, " Equipment Isolation Procedure" (Operating Point l

Beach Nuclear Plant Administrative Control Policies and Procedures Manual, Volume 1), to assure redundance and integrity of DHR capability.

The procedure change is as follows:

"2.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS To ensure the safety of the nuclear reactor and that of the general public, it is important to ensure that at least two trains of redundant methods of removing decay heat from the reactor are maintained at all times.

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Mr. J.

G.

Keppler June 5, 1980 This condition can be met by having two fully operable trains of residual heat removal or if one train is to be removed from operable status, then the redundancy for decay heat removal must be provided by an operable steam generator with reactor coolant system flow capability by either natural convection or forced circulation.

Any deviations from this requirement must be approved by the Manager's Supervisory Staff prior to tag series imple-mentation."

The safeguards against DHR degradation and their adequacy are described in the Point Beach Nuclear Plant Final Facility Description and Safety Pnalysis Report Sections 9.3

( Auxiliary and Emergency Systems), 6.2.2 (Engineered Safety Features), and 8.0 (Electrical Systems).

Reviews performed in accordance with IE Bulletin No. 80-12 did not identify any modifications to the residual heat removal system which would affect decay heat removal or safety function ability.

Thus, the residual heat removal system remains safe and adequate as described in the above-re"erenced FFDSAR sections.

Very truly yo,urs, Q

h6v!

C.

W.

Fay, Director i

Nuclear Power Department Subacribed and sworn to before me

'this'9th day of Ju 1980.

A.

iotdry Public, S te of Wisconsin My Commission e pires d/)L4/ /f t

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Copies to Director, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement Washington, D.

C.

20555 NRC Resident Inspector, Point Beach Nuclear Plant L

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