ML19318A785
| ML19318A785 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/03/1979 |
| From: | Leach T METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19318A760 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8006240150 | |
| Download: ML19318A785 (46) | |
Text
r' i
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of:
l 2'
IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 3
of Mr. Thomas John Leach Radiation Chemistry Technician Junior 4
5 6
7 8
Trailer #203 9
NRC Investigation Sita TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10 Middletown, Pennsylvania 11 May 3, 1979 12 (Date of Interview) 13 June 22, 1979 (Date Transcript Typed) 14 107, 108 ISt (Tape Numodr(s))
16l 17!
18 19 20' 21 NRC PERSONNEL:
22 Mr. Gregory P. Yuhas 23 Mr. Mark E. Resner 24 25 8 0 0 624 0 \\$PD i
t
t e
I 1
RESNER:
The following interview is being conducted of Mr. Thomas John Leach.
Mr. Leach was employed by the Metropolitan Edison Company as a 2
3 Radiation Chemistry Technician Junior.
Mr. Leach is no longer employed 4
by that Company.
Mr. Leach worked at the Three Mile Island Nuclear 5
Facility.
The present time is 12:20 p.m. eastern daylight time and the date is May 3, 1979.
The place of this interview is Room 240 of 6
the Red Roof Inn.
The Red T,oof Inn is located on Highway 283.
The 7
individuals present for this interview are Mr. Gregory P. Yuhas.
8 Mr. Yuhas is a Radiation Specialist with Region I of the U.S. Nuclear g
Regulatory Commission.
The moderator of this interview is Mark E.
0 Resner.
I am employed with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, an Investigator with the Office of Inspector and Auditor.
Prior to taping this interview Mr. Leach was given a two page document which explained the purpose, scope and the authority to conduct this investi-gation.
On the second page of this document, Mr. Leach has answered three questions which were asked of him.
He has also signed the sheet and dated it indicating he has read both pages.
The three questions which Mr. Leach answered were:
Do you understand the above, he has checked that he has understood what he has read.
Is that correct 19 1
Mr. Leach?
20 21 LEACH:
Yes.
22 23 RESNER:
Do we have your permission to t<pe this interview? He has 24 indicated yes to this answer, is that correct Mr. Leach?
25 j
l 2
1 LEACH:
That's correct.
2 3
RESNER:
Do you want a copy of the tape? Mr. Leach has checked yes 4
indicating that he does want a copy.
Is that correct Mr. Leach.
5 LEACH:
Yes.
I would like a copy of the tape.
6 7
RESNER:
8 All right, we will see that you receive a copy of the tape.
At this point, I'd like to ask Mr. Leach to state briefly his background g
in the nuclear industry for the benefit of those who might be listening 10 to this tape in the future.
Mr. Leach, would you please?
12 LEACH:
I have no background in the nuclear industry prior to my g
employment at Metropolitan Edison in 1974.
I had worked for a surgical supply company who sold medical instruments and I had worked in several hospital laboratories as a chemist and a blood analyst.
Originally I was hired at Met Ed as a water analyst.
Through the years that I 17 worked there I became more and more involved with the radiation and 18 health physics aspects of the job.
So actually, before I worked for 19 Met Ed I had no previous experience in the nuclear field.
21 YUHAS:
We are going to go over some of your experience right now.
22 Are you a high school graduate?
23 24 25 O
e 3
LEACH:
Yes.
1 2
YUHAS:
Did you take college preparatory courses in high school?
3 4
LEACH:
Yes.
5 6
YUHAS:
So you've taken basic sciences possibly physics?
7 8
LEACH:
Yes, I started off majoring in biology in college'and wound up g
with a psychology degree, eventually.
But I had quite a few chemistry s
g courses in college.
12' YUHAS:
So you have a bachelor of psychology.
14 LEACH:
Psychology, yes.
i 16' YUHAS:
From what school.
17 18 LEACH:
From Lebanon Valley College in Annville, Pennsylvania.
19 20 YUHAS: What year did you graduate?
21 22 LEACH:
'72.
23 24 25 a
l f
9 4
YUHAS:
And you had about how many units in pure sciences?
1 2
LEA' I say 12 or 16.
Including chemistry and physics.
3 4
YUHAS:
When you joined the Metropolitan Edison Company in 1974 as a 5
water analyst, can you briefly describe the training that Met Ed gave 6
you when you assumed that position?
7 8
LEACH:
We had instructions from representatives of Babcock and Wilcox, g
representatives from the Alliance Laboratory in Ohio and the Lynchburg facility in Virginia, I believe it is.
Most of the instructions were given by people from Metropolitan Edison.
Do you want me to name names of the people?
14 YUHAS:
Sure.
15, I
16' LEACH:
Richard Zechman, Gary Reed, Ken Frederick, and most of the 17 other bosses were at some time involved in our training, somehow.
18 19 YUHAS:
How long were you a water analyst?
20 21 LEACH:
At Met Ed? The whole time that I was there.
It's a dual 22 function job, I'm sure you're aware of this by now down there, but 23 half of the time you work in health physics, radiation detection, and 24 half of the time you would work in the water analysis side of it.
25
5 They were intermixed because, I guess because of the feeling that y
health physics had so much to do with the radiochemical aspect of the 2
j b.
3 4
YUHAS:
All of the training that you alluded to so far, is chemistry 5
training.
How about training in health physics?
6 7
LEACH: We did have training in health physics also, mostly confined 8
to reviewing procedures for the plant specific procedures.
For opera-g tion of equipment, procedures of things to do in case of certain events, what kind of instruments would be used for specific applica-tions and things like that.
13 YUHAS: Would you describe this training as classroom instruction 14 followed by written or oral examination or was it on-the-job training?
16 LEACH:
I'd say it was a combination of both.
Moce on-the-job training 17 than classroom instruction.
We reviewed tapes, instruction tapes, and 18 did take a few quizzes that were graded.
19 20 YUHAS:
Now I'd like you to go through the scenario of your involvement 21 from the night of March 28, 1979:
how you came to work, what your 2?
actions were, and after you've gone through this in you own terms, 23 then we'll probably go back over and I'll ask you some more specific 24 questions as to exactly what you did or what type of equipment used, i
25 f
l 6
1 that sort of. thing.
So, if you like to pick it up past how you got involved in the incident at Three Mile Island?
2 3
LEACH:
The first time that I realized that there was a problem was on 4
5 the way to work heading down Route 283 I saw there was no steam coming from the towers and I knew that there was something wrong.
I arrived 6
just in back of my health physics boss, Pete Velez, I drove into the 7
gate just behind him and we stopped at the gate and got out and talked 8
to the security guard', who informed us, who informed Mr. Velez that g
there was a radiation emergency in Unit 2 and that all non-essential 0
personnel were being kept off the Island.
Well, we were regarded as essential personnel so they let us in.
I got into the health physics laboratory at about ten after seven, I'd say, at which time I would say about a dozen people in the lab.
There were a couple of bosses 14l 15l there, people like I'd say, came in right ahead of me.
Joe Deman was l
there.
I asked him what was happening, and he told me that they had blown Unit 2.
That's all he would say to me.
Which, I guess--no one really knew any more than that.
A minute or so later, Pete Velez asked me to get a high range radiation dosimeter, a self reader, and 20 run through the Aux. Building and make sure that there were no personnel still left in the Aux. Building.
I questioned this and I asked him if 21 we had a radiation instrument that I could take with me, a high-range 22 radiation instrument and he said that they were all out--that they had 23 been used and that there were none in the lab at the time.
So I 24 obtained a high range self reader dosimeter and started into the Aux.
25
I l
7 1
Building.
As I got to the doors of the Auxiliary Building, I saw two l
2 technicians coming out, the people that I work with in the same job capacity except that they are Senior Technicians, Mike Janouski and 3
Pat Donnachie.
They had just completed a tour of the Auxiliary Building 4
Si dressed in full PC and had a high range radiation instrument with them, a teletector, I believe.
I asked them if there was anybody in 6
the Auxiliary Building, and they replied that there was not and that 7
they had not seen anyone.
They had masks on and rubber suits and were 8
completely covered, so I went back to the health physics laboratory, g
told Pete Velez what I just related to you, about the people already 10 going through there, and he said, okay, don't bother to do that, to go through the Auxiliary Building, and he turned away.
The next person that I talked to and this was only a couple minutes later was Cary Harner, our chemistry supervisor or chemistry foreman for Unit 2, and he told me to go into the primary sampling lab and obtain two samples, one each of the steam generators from Unit 2.
I walked into the primary laboratory.
I had found a radiation instrument in the laundry room, Eberline E520 model.
I walked into the primary sampling lab, and my first instinct was to check the dose rate on the Unit 2 letdown 19 cooler, I took the E520 over to the cooler and about three feet the 20 instrument pegged off its high scale, which is 2R.
I judged that the 21 cooler was probably reading from the way the instrument pegged, which 22 is not a very good way to determine dose rate, that the dose on the 23 cooler was somewhere in the range between 10 and 20R.
The instrument 24 would peg at about three feet away.
So, I think the dose rate in the 25
8 1
room itself where I would be taking the Unit 2 steam generators samples 2
was around 75 mR, a 100 mR, somewhere in that area.
I turned on the 3
samples for the Unit 2 steam generator and I got a sample from the B generator, labelled it, dated it, and put it on the shelf in the 4
primary sampling lab, and could get no flow from the A steam generator.
5 This was not unusual and I thought that there must be either something 6
wrong with the generator or that as usual, when you can't get a flow 7
ut of a sample point, that a valve was closed downstream of that 8
sample point and this is what I assumed was the problem.
Later I g
found out that the generator was in a broken condition.
I don't believe that I would have been able to get a sample out of it anyway.
I got that sample, went back outside the primary lab to the health physics lab, once again ard at this time I'd say it was about 7:30 or 25 to 8.
The foreman, Pete Velez was trying to 'rganize offsite radiation monitoring teams, and trying to determine wiM direction and other factors involved in setting up these radiation monitoring teams.
He told me, Pete Velez told me, to get a radiation monitoring kit and take an operator, as a second person, one of the operators present, and go to Goldsboro by vehicle and record the dose rates in that area, 19 Goldsboro, at one of the points on the map that we have in the radiation 20 kits.
I took the operator, Jim Randeze, who had worked all night that 21 night and we went to Goldsboro.
Drove there in my vehicle, my car, 22 and I think we got to Goldsboro at about 8:45. We took readings at 23 the Goldsboro environmental air station tisat Met Ed maintains.
Tried 24 l
to set up our SAM 2 Unit, which is a portable multichannel analyzer.
25
l 9
We could not get that unit to function, but we did have a Pick 6 y
Geiger counter with us and we got no readings at that time when we 2
were in Goldsboro from the Pick 6.
I realize that this is a very low 3
efficiency type instrument and should only be used for specific applica-4 tions, but we were doing the best we could.
We had a couple self-5 reader dosimeters with us and a high range dosimeter that I'd gotten 6
earlier that morning and none of those instruments were recording any 7
dosage. We took dose rates in that area and then thought that we g
might be able to get our multichannel analyser to work if we could g
find a line power source.
So, we stopped a State policeman and enlisted his aid in asking the marina owner at the Goldsboro Marina if we could use one of his power sources and he said yes.
We told the man that we would be doing routine radiation survey and he knew that something was going on caused he had heard it on the radio, but he said, " Fine", and 14 l
we set up the instrument with the line power directly across from the 15'!
plant.
The plume was going over our heads, I would say about a quarter 16i mile downriver of where we were.
The SAM 2 still did not work.
Even 17{
with line power we couldn't get any, we couldn't f.et any results from 18l that instrument.
So we took readings with the Pick 6, checked our 19 dosimeters again and rendezvoused with the Bravo, the B radiation 20 monitoring team at point Northwest 21, I believe, to pick up some more 21 air filters and to use their instrument to count some of the samples 22 that we had taken.
They had to come over and assist us because of our 23 multichannel analyzer not working right.
After we did that, we were 24 in Goldsboro at the marina for quite a while, on the radio, radioing 25
i 1
10 back the results that we were getting from our dosimeters and our y
Pick 6 and at around noon we headed back to TMI.
They told us to come 2
back, either because they thought they were finished with us or because 3
our instruments weren't working correctly.
We got back to Three Mile 4
Island at somewhere, after noon, I think about 12:30 or 1:00.
The rest of that day for me was hanging around the observation center, checking people for contamination at the 500 KEV substation, and 7
basically just waiting in the observation center until 7:00 when they 8
sent us home.
The next day, I arrived at work at 7:00 and the first thing we were told to do, the first thing that I was told to do was take the shuttle bus into the security console at the site protection building out in front of the service building and clean respirators and try to assist people in anyway that I could in getting into the contaminated areas and getting into the building to do the work that 14 15l1 they had to do.
We stayed in the site building there until, I think, l
about noon or 1:00 and during that time I went down to get a sample.
16' During the morning, twice I went down to get samples from the industrial 17 waste treatment facility.
I got two samples from there at two different 18 times in the morning.
'The afternoon I was relieved for lunch, as I 19 say about 12:30 or 1:00 and relieved by Mike Gabner I belive, went 20 back over to the observation center and from there to the 500 KEV 21 substation, where I got something to eat.
We were checking contaminated 22 personnel at the 500 KEV substation most of the afternoon and the rest 23 of my afternoon was spent at the observation center.
That's about it.
24 25
1 11 YUHAS:
This was the day of the 29th?
1 2
LEACH:
Yes.
3 4
YUh?.5:
5 What time did you leave the observation center that afternoon?
6 LEACH:
7:00.
7 8
YUHAS:
That evening, 7 p.m.
g 10 LEACH:
Yes.
12 YUHAS:
Did you come to work the following day, which would have been Friday?
15j l
LEACH:
No.
I did not.
17 YUHAS:
Was that a scheduled day off for you?
18 19 LEACH:
No, it wasn't.
I had decided the evening of the 29th that I 20 was going to terminate with the Company and then on Friday morning we 21 heard the civil defense sirens in Harrisburg go off and there was all 22 kinds of talk of evacuation.
I had already made my decision that I 23 wasn't going to return to work, so I got a couple of my friends and we 24 left the area.
Not so much for fear of the effects of radiation or 25
I 12 1
anything like that, it was more in fear of the results of a general 2
panic, which I thought there was going to be in the area.
3 YUHAS:
Why or what was the basis for your decision? Apparently 4
sometime before 7 p.m. on the 29th to terminate your employment with 5
Metropolitan Edison?
6 7
LEACH:
Well, I had been planning on quitting for quite some time, 8
anyway.
I'm going to be moving out to the West coast, and when I saw g
the kinds of exposures that the people I was working with were receiving, 10 I decided I would terminate immediately to avoid any chance of getting into a position where 1 would either receive that exposure or be 1
expected to receive that exposure and have to say, "no",
to it.
14, l
YUHAS:
Can you be more specific in terms of you said the kind of exposure that your fellow workers were receiving.
Can you give us some names and some exposures that caused you to have this concern?
18 LEACH:
Well, I had talked to people during the two days after the 19 accident, talked to my fellow workers and there was one, two attempts 20 I believe to draw letdown samples made by individuals.
One was Tom 21 Thompson who just let the line flow for a couple of seconds and got a 22 sample that read I think 200 mR.
The other one was Ed Houser, chemistry 23 foreman, who went in to draw a primary letdown sample later that day.
24 Thursday, I believe he did this in the afternoon.
I had heard that 25 l
1 13 1
the sample, a one mi sample was reading 4 R with a, I presume, a 2
teletector and that a hundred mi sample of the letdown was reading 1000 R.
When I hear 1000 R, I presume that the machine had pegged.
3 4
1000 R is the top range of that instrument and I assume that a 1000 R S
w uld be a peg and that you wouldn't really have any idea what the exp sure or what the field actually was.
6 7
YUHAS:
Are you aware of the dosage that either Mr. Thompson or Mr. Houser 8
received in taking these samples?
g 10 LEACH:
I'm not aware of the exact numbers.
I heard that Mr. Houser had received 4 R, somewhere in the vicinity of 4 R, from taking that letdown sample.
Mr. Thompson, I'm not sure how much he received in that initial sample that he tried to take but it was probably just a wa'ter that was left in the lines before the sample, before he drew it.
16 YUHAS:
Is there anything else that contributed to your decision?
18 LEACH:
There were other instances of people being asked to do things 19 that I thought were dangerous and per' haps needless.
I heard during 20 the day that one of the maintenance men, his name was Ron Natale, and 21 a crew of two other maintenance men, an HP named Dave Ethridge and a 22 foreman, had been assigned the duty to go and change the makeup filters 23 in Unit 2.
Now I had done that job before and the filter that we had 24 changed the one time that I had done before, was a 70 R filter, was 25 i
l 14 1
reading 70 R on contact.
These filters are enclosed in a concrete r
m.
The wa'1s are about 2 feet thick and there's a hole about 8 2
3 feet in which you can insert a radiation instrument into.
The technician 4
that was with the workers when they did the job, got into the area and 5
said he put his high range radiation instrument up against the wall, 6
up against the hole in the wall and it read a 1000 R and pegged. and he said it pegged hard.
The foreman that was on the job, I believe, 7
still wanted to go ahead and do the job.
And reasoning like this is 8
one of the main reasons that I quit.
g 10 YUHAS:
Did Mr. Ethridge stop them from performing the job?
12 LEACH:
Yes, he did.
He suggested that they don't stay in the area and suggested that the job not be done and the workers, I believe, the workers that were there finally decided for themselves that the job would not be done and refused to do it.
16 17 YUHAS:
But the foreman was still vehement about performing the tast?
19 LEACH:
I'm not sure if he was vehement, but from the feedback that I 20 got, he still wanted to go ahead and do the job regardless.
21 22 YUHAS:
Do you know of any other instances where you considered an 23 unnecessary amount of exposure would have been taken?
24 25
4 15 1
LEACH:
Well, I think the job that I was asked to do the morning that 2
I got there, which was run through the Auxiliary Building, would have 3
been a very dangerous thing to do.
From what I heard later that day, 4
they had pumped primary coolant onto the floor in the Auxiliary Building.
5 Now, how much fission products or anything like that was in that water I don't know, but I heard that the dose rates in the bas'ement were 10 6
R just from the gases being given off from that water.
I considered 7
that to be a needless rikk.
8 9
YUHAS:
Had you not met Janouski and Donnachie coming out of the 10 g
auxiliary building were you prepared to do as they had asked you to do at that time?
13 LEACH:
I had reservations about it, but I was going to try to go in 15ll there and run through there and make sure that there was no personnel in that building.
Yes.
17 YUHAS:
How were you dressed at that time?
19 LEACH:
I had my street clothes on.
The only kind of protection that I had was a dosimeter and a TLO.
21 22 YUHAS:
What are the license requirements for entering a High Radiation 23 Area?
24 25 U
i 16 1
LEACH:
We were not sure at the time that t % area was a High Radiation 2
Area.
As I said, the man that asked me to do it came in the door 3
right ahead of me and I don't think he really knew what the situation was either.
4 5
YUHAS:
In an emergency situation where you suspect that there might 6
7 be High Radiation Areas, you obviously because of your concern that y u put forth to Velez, you must have suspectM there must be high 8
radiation.
g 10 LEACH:
Yes.
I had heard in the HP lab that morning I heard people g
saying things like a 1000 R at HPR 227 and very high readings in Unit 2.
But we really didn't know that there was a problem in Unit 1 at that time.
15 YUHAS:
So this is the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building that you were going to go through?
18 LEACH:
Yes.
I'm not really sure.
He said, Velez said, grab a dosimeter and run through the Auxiliary Building and make sure no one is in there.
He did not specify which Unit.
21 22 YUHAS:
And what Unit were you headed toward?
23 24 25
17 1
LEACH:
I was heading to Unit 1 because that's where the HP lab is.
I 2
would have had to go through the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building first.
3 YUHAS:
We're going to flip the tape at this time, it is 12:50.
4 5
YUHAS:
This is a continuation of the interview with Mr. Thomas J.
6 Leac'h, the time is 12:52.
Okay, Tom we'd like to start going back now 7
ver the first period of concern.
One of the things that I wanted to 8
ask you about is, Cary Harner apparently told you to go and take a g
steam generator sample and this would be in the primary sample room 10 right?
12 LEACH:
That's correct.
14 YUHAS:
You said you did collect a B steam generator sample.
Did you take a dose rate on that sample?
17 LEACH:
No, I didn't.
I didn't even bother.
19 YUHAS:
Do you routinely sample
...?
20 21 LEACH:
I did have an instrument with me, though, and I think I would 22 have seen if that instrument would have been---if it would have been 23 gross radiation. I think I would have noticed on the instrument.
24 25
18 1
YUHAS:
Do you routinely take Unit 2 steam generator samples at that 2
point?
-3 LEACH:
No..It was something special, it was something that Cary ask 4
5 me to get because he believed that B&W would want to look at these samples after the event had happened.
6 7
YUHAS:
Are those sample vials labelled?
8 9
LEACH:
There numbered, but they are not labelled.
No, they are 10 labelled, they're labelled with marking labels.
12 YUHAS:
So when you say B steam generator, you're going by the basis of that was the tap that was labelled B steam generator?
15 LEACH:
Right.
17 YUHAS:
The reason we are bringing this out, apparently those were mislabelled.
It may not have been in fact the B steam generator.
20 LEACH:
This is a point of contention several times during the time 21 that I worked there, whether those sample points were labelled correctly
)
22 i
or not.
I remember, I can recall them having discussions about whether 23 they were labelled correctly or not, but we thought for the past year 24 or so we were sure they were labelled correctly.
25
19 YUHAS:
When you say they talked about whether... who specifically 1
-2 was they?
3 LEACH: Just, general hearsay.
I can't...
4 5
YUHAS: Who reassured you a year ago they were labelled correctly?
6 How did you come to the conclusion that they were labelled properly?
7 8
LEACH:
I think one of the shifts just passed it on.
We got the g
information.
I can't really remember specifically how we got the information that they were labelled correctly.
12 YUHAS:
Getting back to the request Mr. Velez gave you as far as touring the auxiliary building in search of personnel.
You said that a dose rate survey instrument wasn't available.
Could you elaborate on that?
16 17 LEACH: There were none available in the lab.
There were no. operating instruments that were available to the personnel.
All of them had 19 been checked out and were in use at the time.
20 21 YUHAS:
Was this a common occurrence to be short of instruments or not 22 having enough available to
..?
24 25 l
l
20 1
LEACH:
It was not a common occurrence not to be able to find any type 2
of dose rate instrument.
3 YUHAS:
When you left to become part of the environmental survey team, 4
5 what team was that?
6 LEACH: That was team Charley, C team.
7 8
YUHAS:
That was you and Mr. Randisi or C team? Did you pick up the g
survey kit yourself, the emergency kit?
10 11 LEACH:
Yes, I did.
13 YUHAS:
Did you check it out before you took it offsite?
15 LEACH:
No, I did not, I just took it and went.
I assumed that it would be in order.
17 18, YUHAS:
Have you been through emergency planning drills before?
20' LEACH:
I was through a couple when they first had them a few years ago.
I was the South gate monitor, and I was the liquid sample collector, at each of those times, and every year after that when it came time 23 for a radiation drill I was either not present, on vacation, or had a 24 day off, or I was in the chemistry deputment and was not involved in 25 l
21 1
the drill.
We received memos and orders on what to do if we were in 2
the drill. 'I was present in the HP lab several times during the 3
drills, without a function, just to watch what was going on.
4 YUHAS:
Had you ever been trained in the use of the SAM 2 instrument?
5 6
LEACH:
I have had the procedure read to me once about two years ago.
7 8
YUHAS:
Had you ever taken the instrument yourself and collected an g
air sample and counted it on the SAM 2 instrument?
10 11 LEACH:
No.
13 YUHAS:
You and Mr. Randisi drove over to Goldsboro.
Can you specifi-ally des ribe the problem you were having with getting the SAM 2 on 15g line and counting?
17 LEACH:
The machine would not re.9 ster any counts, that's all.
That 1
was the only thing that I could figure,out that was wrong with it.
20 YUHAS:
You also had no response?
22 LEACH:
No response.
23 24 25
22 1
YUHAS:
Was there any other survey instrument other than the Pick 6A?
2 LEACH:
That was all we had.
3 4
YUHAS:
Could you tell me a little about the Pick 6 and its limitations?
5 6
LEACH:
The Pick 6 is a two range instrument, the first range goes 7
from 1 mR to a 1000 mR and the second range goes from 1 R to 1000 R.
8 It's got a small Geiger Mueller tube in it and a small beta window on g
the bottom of it.
Its a beta gamma instrument and I would assume that 10 the beta efficiency is less than the gamma.
12 YUHAS:
Could you describe to me how to take a beta reading with that instrument?
14 15 LEACH:
You open the window.
First you take the reading of gamma, 16:;
determine what the gamma dose rate is, open the window and the difference is the beta dose rate.
18 19 YUHAS:
You said you contacted the other team which was team Bravo 20 right?
21 22 LEACH:
Yes.
23 24 25
23 1
YUHAS:
Did they come down to your location and try to get your SAM 2 2
working?-
3 4
LEACH: We met them about half way, as I said.
I believe the point 5
was Northwest 21 that we met them at.
I don't know why that sticks in 6
my mind, but I_think that was the point.
It was in a fa'rmer's field, 7
we met the team there, team Bravo.
We also met a helicopter there that was bringing supplies to us.
8 9
YUHAS:
Did they have there SAM 2 operating?
10 11 LEACH:
Yes, they did.
13 YUHAS: Who was on that team?
15 LEACH:
Ed Egenrider and Jim Dupes, I believe.
17 YUHAS:
Did Egenrider try to check out your instrument?
19 LEACH:
No, he didn't.
We just marked that up as a non-operating instrument.
21, 22 YUHAS:
Did Mr. Egenrider count any of your charcoal cartridges that 23 you had collected at that time?
24 25
24 LEACH:
No.
He didn't.
But he did take a sample in Goldsboro and 1
counted.
2 3
YUHAS:
Do you remember what he found?
4; 5
LEACH:
He found 5700 counts, which we thought was iodine from the 6
instrument.
But then I heard later that they were not sure that the 7
discriminators on those instruments were set correctly to discriminate 8
So, really it was a worthless reading if you don't know g
whether the discriminators were set right.
11 YUHAS:
Was Mr. Egenrider familiar with the setup of the instrument?
13 I
LEACH:
Yes, I would say that Mr. Egenrider was the most competent technician that we had at Three Mile Island.
I worked with him directly, 151 he was my senior technician.
16 17 YUHAS:
In the kits, was there a barium source provided to check the 18j window setting?
19 20 LEACH:
Yes.
21 22 YUHAS:
Did you, well you couldn't get any response on yours so there's 23 no point in trying to....
Did Egenrider have with him the barium 24 source?
25
25 1
LEACH: ' Yes, I believe there was one in every kit.
2 3
YUHAS:
On the sample you were talking about, Goldsboro,
...?
4 LEACH:
Except I am not sure it was a barium source.
I'm not sure 5
about that.
But there was a filter that had a...
6 7
YUHAS:
Pre-doped filter?
8 9
LEACH:
Right.
10 11 YUHAS:
Do you know what the background radiation levels were when you g
tried to count the sample in Goldsboro that you said was indicating g
fairly high? Was it 2 mR or 3 mr per hour?
g
\\
15 LEACH:
We were getting no indication on our beta gamma instruments 6
that measured in mR.
No.
None.
i
- 18 YUHAS:
Again, these were the Pick 6, both of you had Pick 6 and the minimum reading would have been 1 millirad per hour?
21 LEACH:
Right.
23 YUHAS:
Fine.
At any time during the morning that you were over there with team did you find any detectable radiation levels?
25 t
i i
26 1
LEACH:
Nothing detectable, no.
The only time that we saw any offsite 2
readings were when we were enroute back to Three Mile Island after our 3
G Idsboro monitoring we passed by the boat dock on 441, Steins Landing, 4
and there with the instrument in the car and the windows open we got 5
about 4 to 5 mR reading at Steins Landing.
6 YUHAS:
This was when you were returning to TMI?
7 8
LEACH:
Yes, the wind was shifting around all morning.
I presume that g
at that time it was blowing towards Stein's Landing.
10 11 YUHAS:
Can you describe the atmosphere when you returned to the observation center on the afternoon of the 28th? Where specifically g
did you go, did you go right to the 500 KEV station or did you go to I
the observation center..?
15j 16l LEACH:
I went to the cbservation center.
I 18-YUHAS:
What was going on at the observation center?
20 LEACH:
Some people were just trying to determine what they should do.
21 Everyone was confused.
Most of the people that I talked to didn't really have any conception of what was going on at all.
There wa e l
23 numerous reports of damage that ranged anywhere from slight cracks in 24 the cladding to a 100% fuel failure to 50% melt.
No one really had 25
27 1
any conception of what was happening inside.
We were sitting around 2
on the lawn.
It was a nice day.
They kept bringing food in to us, sandwiches and cokes.
I guess people were trying to contact other 3
4 plants and get some decent instruments into the place and some quantity f them.
Trying to set up for the Senators and the Congressman that 5
6 were going to be coming cown to the place.
And, just basically, trying to keep calm.
7 8
YUHAS:
Okay, you did that for most of the afternoon to after about 7 g
p.m. that night?
10 11 LEACH:
Yeah, I drifted back and forth between the observation center and the 500 KEV substation.
I was asked to go on a helicopter monitoring flight that someone else had already been asked to do.
I wound up not going on that, but I set up the instruments or got the instruments and 15j was going to go.
16 17 YUHAS:
What type of instruments were you going to take on the helicopter?
19 LEACH:
Ah, I'm not sure what they finally used.
I was going to take a E520.
21 22 YUHAS:.Okay.
23 24 25
28 1
YUHAS:
You said you had surveyed some people at the 500 KEV, were.
2 there numerous individuals coming out with contamination on their 3
clothes or bodies?
4 LEACH:
Yes, almost everyone.
Well, I would say without exception 5
6 every ne that was in the plant was contaminated when the'y came out to 7
some degree.
Most of them were 5 or 10,000 counts on their---most of it was on their trousers, around tiie knees.
There were some individuals 8
that were. contaminated all over.
g 10 YUHAS:
Did you note if this contamination was particularly present in g
those people who had double knit slacks on?
13 LEACH:
Yes, definitely.
That's seems that that polyester really, for some reason att.racts the particulates.
16 YUHAS:
Did that provide any information as the type of airborne problem you were seeing?
19 LEACH:
No, I have no idea what that would indicate.
20 21 YUHAS:
When you surveying personnel, what type of instrument were you using?
23 i
24 25
29 i
LEACH:
An RM 14.
It a..
1 2
YUHAS:
What type of probe?
3 ;
I 4
LEACH:
A HP 210 probe.
N r the most part, we did have some RM 14 5
down there that were being used with~a regular Geiger Mueller tube, a 6
hotdog type tube.
7 8
YUHAS:
Did you take any directly measurements personlel thyroid?
g 10 LEACH: No.
12 YUHAS:
Did you see anybody else during that?
14I i
LEACH:
No.
I wasn't aware that that should have been done?
15 16 YUHAS:
Ok.
When you left that night, what information, when you left the observation center, what did you know was going on the plant after being there all day.
Did you know the condition of the plant? Did you have an idea what the source term was? Were you apprehensive when i
20 you left that all hell was going to break loose.
When you left the 21 plant, basically what did you know about all that was going on?
22 23 LEACH:
The first day or the second day?
24 25
30 YUHAS:
The first day.
1 2
3 After the first day we really didn't know, as I just described LEACH:
a few minutes ago what the condition was inside the building, whether 4
r n t there was still fission going on, we just had no idea.
5 6
YUHAS:
Did you think it was a very serious problem at the end of the 7
Y 8
9 LEACH:
Oh, we knew that it was very serious.
It was something that 0
nobody down there expected.
It was beyond anything that had been indicated by the drills that we had had or the information that we had been given.
I asked several people if they ever seen---some of the more experience people that I worked with, Navy people that was in submarines and had worked at other plants if they had ever seen anything like this before, and they said, no.
And when we saw what the readings were, when I saw what the readings were during that day, I knew that there was.1 very serious problem.
I knew that it was on the verge of catastrophe.
19 20 YUHAS:
Okay.
So you went home that night, did you listen to any form 21 of media reports?
22
\\
23 LEACH:
I can't remember specifically listering then, to any news.
I 24 was pretty tired I think I went to bed about 9:00; went to bed about 2 25 l
l 31 1
1 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after I got home.
I was going to try to stay up and see the 2
news but I couldn't stay awake that long.
3 YUHAS:
Okay.
The next. day you said you came in about seven and you 4
5 w rked to noon setting up the process center?
6 LEACH:
Yes.
7 8
YUt!AS:
Okay what were the conditions when you came through the gate?
g Did you come through the north gate that morning?
10 11 LEACH:
Yes.
13 YUHAS:
What was going on at the north gate?
al LEACH:
There were two security guards there, and---I believe two or three security guards.
They were just checking the peoples' badges as they went through and calling on the radio to make sure the personnel that were entering were allowed to enter.
20 YUHAS:
Okay, when you get to the process center, what were the condi-21 tions in the process center?
22 23 LEACH:
There were respirators around in bags and lying on the floor.
24 There was nobody else in the place when we arrived, guard's coats e
32 around.
It was just deserted---the aftermath of contamination, used 1
2 coveralls, and paper coveralls and stuff and we set up a garbage, like 3
a plastic garbage pit, to throw all this stuff in on one side of the 4
room and starting setting-up and cleaning-up respirators on the other side.
5 6
YUHAS:
These respirators, were they canister type respirators?
7 8
LEACH:
Yes, they were.
We got most of the respirators that we used, g
I believe came from Berwick, out of their warehouse.
They looked---
they were brand new.
There were large purple iodine canisters; on the bottom, charcoal cartridges.
They seemed to be better than the respirators that we had at Three Mile Island.
13 14 YUHAS:
Okay.
The afternoon, you went back out to survey... well let I
me see, do you remember about what time you took the IWTS samples?
17 LEACH:
It was--- I can't remember, but I did mark it on the bottles 18' that were sent out.
19 20 YUHAS:
Did you take any direct radiation measurements on those bottles?
21 22 LEACH:
No, I didn't.
23 24 25 I
33 YUHAS: Where did you send the bottles to?
1 2
LEACH:
The bottles were picked up by Bob McCann, or someone that he 3
4 had sent to pick them up, he was the one who requested that I get those samples.
5 6
YUHAS: Okay.
Do you know where they were counted?
7 8
LEACH:
No.
Oh, yes I do.
They took them to the guy in Harrisburg g
10 11 YUHAS:
State Bureau of Radiological Health.
13 LEACH:
Yeap.
15 YUHAS:
Janouski?
16 17 LEACH:
Janouski, right.
19 YUHAS:
Okay.
In the afternoon you went back out to the 500 KV?
20 21 LEACH:
Yes.
22 23 YUHAS:
Again, were you surveying personnel out there?
24 25
34 LEACH:
Yes, I was.
y 2
YUHAS:
And, what sort of things were you finding?
3 4
LEAC'H:
UM... pretty much the same type of thing.
Personnel were 5
c ntaminated on their clothes.
They were contaminated mostly on their 6
clothes.
4 or 5000 counts, usually around there, for the ones that 7
were Contaminated.
9 YUHAS:
Okay.
And you worked essentially doing that same thing til 7:00.
11 12 LEACH:
Yeah.
13 14, YUHAS:
Did you document the extent and location of contamination on 15!
l these people?
17 LEACH:
No, we were in a situation where we were just surveying the 18 personnel and trying to get them to wash, in a very small facility in 19l the 500 KEV substation.
All there was there was a sink and just 20 t.rying to make do with what we had and get the people through it as I
21 quickly as possible.
There were a lot of people coming through.
22 23 YUHAS:
Okay.
But no records were maintained of who you surveyed or 24 l
the extent of their contamination?
25
35 LEACH:
Not that I'm aware of.
1 2
YUHAS:
3 What was the cutoff point where you were allowing people to go home with their contaminated clothing?
4 5
A H:
A 1000 counts per, a 100 counts over background was usually 6
the point at which you would stop somebody from leaving.
7 8
YUHAS:
Okay.
Do you know that if every person coming out of the site g
proceeded to the 500 KEV to be surveyed?
11 LEACH:
They were supposed to.
13 YUHAS:
Was there any positive steps taken to assure that people, once I
they got to the Northgate, they just didn't take off?
16 LEACH:
No that I'm aware of.
The times that I came out, I was left 17 to my own free will.
Of course, you would want to go over and find 18 out if you were contaminated.
You would want to know.
19 20 YUHAS:
Did it seem like a real possibility to you the people came out 21 and, say, went directly to the observation center rather than going 22 down.to 500 KV and get surveyed?
23 24 25 l
l C
36 LEACH:
There may have been instances of that.
We also had monitoring 1
2 equipment at the observation center that could have done everything that the monitoring equipment at the 500 KEV substation would have 3
done.
4 5
YUHAS:
Okay. When did you finally make the decision that you would 6
n t return to TMI?
7 8
LEACH:
I think it was Thursday night.
g 10 YUHAS:
After you got home?
llli w
LEACH:
Yes.
I was considering it during the day on Thursday.
14 YUHAS:
Was the media's presentation of what was going on, did that have any bearing on your decision to terminate?
17 LEACH:
No, not really at all.
The media didn't have any thing to do 18 with it.
They were lost for the most part.
I didn't feel that the 19 media knew anywhere near as much as we did about what was going on, 20 which was very little anyway.
21 22 YUHAS:
When you made this decision did you' call Velez or McCann. or 23 any of your 24 25
s 37 1
LEACH:
No.
I didn't have the phone numbers or...
2 3
YUHAS:
How did you handle the termination, did they cal; you up the 4
next morning ind say where you're at or did you
..?
5 LEACH:
No. We left the area that morning, Friday morning, and I 6
7 stayed with some friends up in Northern Pennsylvania for almost a week.
I sent my letter of resignation down from there.
8 9
YUHAS:
Oh, I see.
Okay.
10 11.
LEACH:
And I didn't really inform anybody until I got back.
12 13 YUHAS:
Okay.
Has a representative of Metropolitan Edison contacted p
you since your resignation?
16 LEACH:
No.
But I talked to the Personnel Director.
18 i
YUHAS:
Did you initiate that communication?
20 LEACH:
Yes, I did.
22 YUHAS:
And what was the purpose of your discussion with the personnel department?
24 25
38 1
LEACH:
I wanted to call him up and confirm that I had terminated.
I 2
wasn't sure whether they had gotten my letter or not.
3 4
YUHAS:
And what was the Personnel Director response?
5 6
LEACH:
He was quite calm about it and seem to, he didn't seem angry 7
or anything.
He just was very businesslike about it and wanted to 8
wrap things up neatly, it seems.
9 YUHAS:
Okay.
Do you know what your accumulative whole-body exposure 10 is to date?
11 12 13 I'm not sure, I think its somewhere in the vicinity of 5 rem.
LEACH:
14 YUHAS:
And that would be about five years worth of work?
la-16 LEACH:
Yes, somewhere in that vicinity.
y7 18 YUHAS:
Okay.
Have you ever exceeded 1.25 rem per calendar quarter?
g 20 LEACH:
No, I don't think so.
22 YUHAS:
I'd like to talk just a few minutes about some basic percep-tions of the health physics department at TMI.
Was there a sufficient number of dose-rate type instruments available to personnel in the initial stages of the emergency?
39 LEACH:
No.
I don't think so, I couldn't find one when I got there 1
and I thought that I should have one.
2 3
YUHAS:
Okay.
Can you offer an explanation for where the instrumenta-4 tion was? Was it down for repairs from the Unit 1 outage, or you just 5
didn't have that big a bulk available or..?
6 7
LEACH:
There were quite a few instruments in the lab that were in 8
line for repairs.
There were quite a few instruments that were supposed g
to be repaired, but they weren't sure if they could do it or not and they were holding on to them to see if they could repair them.
I believe there was a lot of instruments in Unit 2 but the area was 12 inaccessible that morning.
We couldn't get to any of them.
14 YUHAS:
Are you familiar with any difficulties with maintaining the 15 operability of the teletector survey instruments?
16 17 LEACH:
The only difficulties that I ever had with that instrument 18-were getting readings sometimes when I pull out the extendable probe.
19 Sometimes the needles would jump around a little bit.
And also in 20 very hot areas, sometimes w'e would have trouble with that instrument,
'21 which makes it virtually worthless inside a rmactor building type 22 l
situation because it usually about 150 in there anyway, between a 100 A'3 and a 150, and any type of instrument that is heat sensitive you 24 would have problems with.
I had heard of other people iving trouble 25 I
40 with them in hot areas, hot thermal areas and I never really had that y
much trouble with it.
I thought that the teletector was one of the 2
better instruments that we had.
3 h
4 YUHAS: Who is in positive control of the emergency teams? Who were 5
you taking your orders from?
7 LEACH:
The emergency control station and that's it.
I don't know who it was.
I believe it was John Banks who was working the emergency I
control station.
I thought I recognized his voice.
11 YUHAS:
Okay.
How are doing on time?
j 12 13 LEACH:
About two minutes at most.
14 i
15l YUHAS:
Okay.
Let me go ahead and break the tape now.
I don't want 16 to ask another question and get cut off in the middle.
The time is 17 1:22.
18' 19 YUHAS:
The time is 1:25 p.m., this is a continuation of the interview 20 with 21 Thomas J. Leach.
I'd like to give you.the opportunity now to express 22 any comments or criticisms about the program at TMI.
23 24 25 i
41 LEACH: Well, I would have like to have seen, during the most of the 1
2 time that I worked down there, I would have like to have seen better training for the people that worked there.
I thought that the personnel 3
4 that were employed, for the most part, were undertrained and many times put in charge of situations that I don't believe they had a full 5
knowledge of what was involved.
Workers were working in~ radiation 6
areas not knowing the differences between the types of radiation and 7
contamination that they could pick up, or in fact, the difference 8
between radiation and contamination.
I think that all of the peorle l
g that worked down there should be better educated.
11 YUHAS:
Let me interject there.
10 CFR Part 19 requires that workers be informed of radiation and its possible hazards, its presence and whereabouts, all this sort of thing. Wasn't that information being 14)
I conveyed to the workers?
15l I
l 16' LEACH:
I think they could have gotten a copy of the 10 CFR 19 somewhere at Three Mile Island, if they'd wanted to, but I don't ever remember 18 l
them, the management, making a poi.it of getting the workers to read 19 that document.
20 21 YUHAS:
No.
You're missing my point.
19 is the regulation that requires that they be trained.
It doesn't say what they have know.
23 It just says t e licensee is responsible for instructing t.Sem in the 24 hazards of radiation and there's five or six topics.
Are there instances 25
42 that you know of where workers were permitted to enter and work in 7
radiation areas and they had not been told of the relative hazards or 2
the difference between contamination and radiation and these sort of 3
things that your mentioning?
4 5
LEACH:
Well, I'm not sure.
I'm sure that they were trained, that 6
they were given the HP course that everyone down there has to undergo, 7
but it didn't seem that when the workers were working there, it didn't seem like they took the information seriously.
They just, a lot of them neem to feel that radiation was a myth almost something that just didn't exist.
They didn't worry about it.
And seems to be the same type of psychology as the coal miners have about working around coal dust, from what I've seen in interviews with them.
13 14 l
YUHAS:
Is there any specific instances come to mind where workers 15 were taking unnecessary exposure and you had to counsel them or ask 16 them to be more careful or to leave an area until they were to do the 17 job?
18{
19 LEACH:
Well, it was, that's what the health physicist was for in a 20 nuclear power plant, to tell people when their doing something wrong.
21 It was a matter of daily course to tell people to be more cereful with 22 radioactive materials or to whatever the situation would entail.
23 Asking people to leave an area because the dose rate was too high or 24 telling them to wash their hands when they're done working with some 25 piece of equipment.
Suggestions like that were made all the time.
43 YUHAS:
You appear to indicate that this was a chronic problem.
Didn't your supervision, or the licensee management---did you make them aware that you felt the people was not being responsive to the needs of radiation safety?
5 LEACH:
I never made any official type comment to any of the management about it, no.
8 YUHAS:
Did you document those instances of where you had to repeatedly counsel individuals as to not using good radiation safety practices or procedures?
11 12 LEACH:
No.
We had forms to be filled out in the event of a noncompliance 13 with the HP department, but they were very rarely used.
It was just a 14 slip of paper and you vould-- you didn't want to create any negative 15 feeling between yourself and the workers that worked there by doing 16' something like that, by reprimanding someone officially with a written 17 notice that they had done something wrong, if you could correct the 18 situation just by telling them about it.
19 20 YUHAS:
You give me the impression though, that these forms were 21 rarely used then, if though there were repeated instances of noncompliance 22 with Health Physics department instructions.
I', that true?
23 24 25
44 LEACH:
They were very rarely used, yes.
They were very rarely used.
y 2
YUHAS:
Were there repeated instances of noncompliance with health 3
physics department instructions?
4 5
LEACH:
I wouldn't say they were intentional, they were things that 6
people were doing that they weren't really aware of that they were 7
8 9
YUHAS:
Were there instances were licensed operators for instance entered lock High Radiation Areas, without first getting the permission of the HP supervisor as required by procedures?
13 LEACH:
I don't believe so.
I didn't---I wasn't aware of any instances 14 like that.
15 16 YUHAS:
Do you have any reason to believe that any individual or group 17 of individuals may have intentionally caused imp'oper valve lineup, or 18 improper maintenance, or securing of vital equipment connected with 19 this incident or any time previous to this incident?
20 21 LEACH:
I have no reason to believe it, no.
22 23 YUHAS:
Unless you have any thing else to say I think we've covered 24 it.
I certainly appreciate your cooperation in coming here today and 25
O O
\\
l 45 talking with us and I hope things work out for you in your new prospects 1
ahead.
2 3
ank you.
4 5
The time is 13:31 and this is concluding the interview with Mr. Thomas J.
6 Leach.
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25