ML19317G988
| ML19317G988 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 02/17/1978 |
| From: | Mattimoe J SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT |
| To: | Reid R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8004020648 | |
| Download: ML19317G988 (24) | |
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REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
DISIRIEUTION FOR INCOMINii MATERIA!_
50-312
+.E C. FEID R H DRO: MATTIMOE J J DOCD4TE: 02/17/79 Npr 5ACRAMENTO MUi4 UTII Irr DIslRIC DATE RCVD. 03/02./78 BC C T t F.. LETTER NOTARI7ED. NO COPIES RECEIVED Ih JECT LTR 1 ENCL 40 cc:4APr,IHi, RF:PnN:F TO ITEM ? OF HRC"S LTR DTD 01/19/78 RE REQUEST r r,a I t,=0, Lii FFNING lHF DISTRICT"? FIEE HA7ARD ANAltSIS PEPT.
FLANT NAME. RANCHO SECO (? MUD)
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SMUD SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT O 6201 S Street, Box 15830, Sacramento, California 95813; (916) 452-3211 f
i February 17, 1978 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. Robert W. Reid, Chief Operating Reactors, Branch 4 i ' li'..
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission v. s.,,.. -
m.t Washington, D. C.
20555 ci-(gl s,.
.y;~ n
~9 '.r7.- -'M'Y Docket No. 50-312 Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 1
Dear Mr. Reid:
Please refer to your letter of January 18, 1978 wherein you requested infonnation regarding the District's Fire Hazard Analysis Report.
In our February 1,1978 transmittal we provided our response to all be' Item 12 of your lette'r.
Enclosed are forty (40) copies of the add
.onal information required in this item.
Sincerely yours,
.V. Yk V1 u
' J. J. Mattimoe Assistant General Manager and Chief Engineer Enclosures
[s@0 t3
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_ L.,....
AN ELECTRIC SYSTEM S E RVIN G MORE THAN 600,000 IN THE HEART OF C ALIF0 R N I A
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Item 12 Related to Section III.B.2 of the Fire Hazards Analysis, on what basis was the determination made that " sufficient spatial separation exists" to prevent fire spread within a fire area, and thus permit division of the area into zones.
(Fire Area 68 and Response to NRC Question 25)? Has division of the Reactor Building into " Zones" considered both horizontal and vertical extension of fire damage between zones due to heat and radiant energy?
Response
In Section III.B.2 of the Fire Hazard Analysis Report the following state-ment was made:
" Fire Areas may be subdivided into zones for purposes of the analysis when sufficient spatial separation exists to preclude the possibility of multiple fires resulting from any initiating fire within the zone."
This " zone" concept has been applied for the analysis of the Reactor Building.
The District has taken this approach for the following reasons:
1.
The Reactor Building is essentially one large open space which is subdivided by radiation shield walls, missile barriers and heavy structural walls.
2.
The largest single zone fire loading is 73,700 BTU /SF. A standard fire potential classification system (NFPA Handbook,14th Edition, Section G, Chapter 8) classifies any fire loading of less than 100,000 BTU /SF as low.
All of the fire zones in this building have fire loading of substantiallyv less.
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than 100,000 BTU /SF.
Table 6-8C of the NFPA Handbook identifies power plants as having a " slight fire severity" which corresponds to a low fire loading having an average of 100,000 BTU /SF of net floor area.
3.
Since entrance to the Reactor Building is under strict administra-tive and health physics controls, transient fire loadings are not considered to be probable.
4.
The District has proposed to install fire barriers (fire stops) in all cable trays which cross zone boundaries.
5.
The fire zone boundaries were selected so that only one cable tray which carries cables required for safe shutdown or cooldown crosses any zone boundaries.
6.
There is only a single cable tray (Channel A) which carries cables required for safe shutdown and cooldown located in the Reactor Building. All other cables (Channels B, C, & D) are routed in conduit.
7.
The only exposure fires to cable trays and conduits in the Reactor Building are lube oil in zones 1, 2,'and 11 and activated charcoal in zones 9 and 10. See the Fire Hazard Analysis Report,Section IV.B.2, Fire Area 68, Zones 1, 2, 9,10 and 11 for further detail.
8.
With the exception of exposure fires, all of the other fires which are postulated in the Reactor Building are electrically initiated, which is considered to be a low probability event with little probability of becoming a Design Basis Fire.
9.
The cable which the District has installed has fire resistance characteristics as indicated.in the District's response to NRC Question No.11 located in the Fire Hazard Analysis Report.
O The fire hazard analysis of the eleven zones which comprise the Reactor Building considered both the radiant and convective heating effects of the postulated fires. The heat transfer mechanism of the postulated fires was assumed to be convection and radiation, with radiation accounting for no more than 30 percent of the total heat flux.
This assumption is based upon tests conducted at Sandia Laboratories as reported in " Cable Tray Firs Tests" by L.J. Klamerus & R.H. Nilson, Dated July 1977, Report No.
SAND 77-1125C.
The attached table lists the horizontal and vertical openings in the zone boundaries and includes all openings, gratings and hatches.
This table also identifies the separation distance from the fire zone boundary or opening to the nearest component in the adjoining fire zone which is required to safely shutdown or cooldown the plant.
Figure No.1 sh'ows graphically the existing comunication between the eleven fire zones of the Reactor Building.
Based upon the attached table and Figure No.1, a detailed evaluation of the thermal effects of the Design Basis Fire on the adjoining zones has been perfonned for each zone in the Reactor Building.
These detailed evaluations show clearly that the thennal effects of a design basis fire in one zone will not compromise the safe shutdown or cooldown capability.
3.
r )-
A Evaluation of the Thennal Effects of a Design Basis Fire on Adjoining Zones Fire Area 68/ Zone 1
Design Basis Fire 54.000 BTU /SF Combustibles e
electrical cable e
oil Adjoining Zone Shutdown /Cooldown Type of (Beside or Above)
Components in Adjoining Zone Heat Transfer 68/3 yes*
. Due to stack effect in zone 68/1 air flow will be into 68/1
. Shielded openings protect components from radiant heat-ing 68/4 Yes*
Same as above.
68/11 None Convection / Radiation
- l.
See Fire Hazard Analysis for identification of Safe Shutdown and cooldown components.
2.
See enclosed Table and drawings SK 6292-E-54-SH2, SK 6292-E-55-SH2, and SK 6292-E-56-SH2 in Appendix of Fire Hazard Analysis for exact location of components.
Evaluation Due to the stack effect in this zone, the majority of the heat from a Design Basis Fire will be directed to Zone 11 where there are no components required for safe shutdown or cooldown.
In addition, the air flow will be into this zone from the adjoining zones 3 and 4.
There will be no damage to components in zones 3 and 4 due to radiant heating since the openings into these zones are protected by Labyrinth shield walls.
In addition, the nearest components in zones 3 and 4 are 17'-0" and 16'-0" away respectively.from the openings. The conclusion that there will be no damage to these components can be further justified for the following reasons:
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/
Fire Area 68/ Zone 1 Evaluation continued 8
Electrical cable used is s'gnificantly flame resistant, as indicated in the District's response to NRC Question No.11 located in the Fire Hazard Analysis Report.
8 The spatial separation significantly exceeds the require-ments of Regulatory Guide 1.75.
8 Test conducted at Sandia (SAND 77-1125C and 1713C) demonstrated a'" margin of safety" in the-Regulatory Guide 1.75 spacing requirements.
~~
L
tm Evaluation of the Thermal Effects of a Design Basis Fire on Adjoining Zones Fire Area 68/ Zone 2
Design Basis Fire 51.400 BTU /SF Combustibles e
electrical cable e
oil Adjoining Zone Shutdown /Cooldown Type of (Beside or Above)
Components in Adjoining Zone Heat Transfer 68/3 Yes*
. Due to stack effect in zone 68/2 air flow will be into 68/2
. Shielded openinge protect components 1
from radiant heat-l ing.
68/4 Yes*
Same as above.
68/11 None Convection / Radiation
- 1.
See Fire Hazard Analysis for identification of safe shutdown and cooldown components.
2.
See enclosed Table and drawings SK6292-E-54-SH2, SK 6292-E-55-SH2, and SK 6292-E-56-SH2 in Appendix of Fire Hazard Analysis for exact location of components.
Evaluation Due to the stack effect in this zone, the majority of heat from a Design Basis Fire will be directed to Zone 11, where there are no components required for safe shutdown or cooldown.
In addition, the air flow will be into this zone from the adjoining zones 3 and 4.
There will be no damage to components in zones 3 and 4 due to radiant heating, since the openings into these zones are protected by Labyrinth shield wall.
In addition, the nearest components in zones 3 and 4 are 10'-0" and 11'-8" away, respectively, from the openings.
The conclusion that there will be en damage to these components can be further justified for the following reasm s:
A
n Fire Area 68/ Zone 2 Evaluation continued Electrical cable used is significantly flame resistant, as indicated in the District's response to NRC Question No.11 located in the Fire Hazard Analysis Report.
8 The spatial separation significantly exceeds the require-ments of Regulatory Guide 1.75.
8 Tests conducted by Sandia (SAND 77-ll25C and 1713C) demonstrated a " margin of safety" in the Regulatory Guide 1.75 spacing requirements.
%d 7-
n Evaluation of the Thermal Effects of a Design Basis Fire on Adjoining Zones Fire Area 68/ Zone 3
Design Basis Fire 26,210 BTU /SF Combustibles e
electrical cable Adjoining Zone Shutdown /Cooldown Type of (Beside or Above)
Components in Adjoining Zone Heat Transfer 68/1 Yes*
. Convection-shielded openings protect components from radiant heating 68/2 yes*
. Convection-shielded openings protect components from radiant heating.
68/4 Yes*
. Convection-shielded openings protect components from radiant heating 68/5 Yes*
. Convection /Radia-tion.
- l.
See Fire Hazard Analysis for identification of safe shutdown and cooldown components.
2.
See enclosed Table and drawings SK 6292-E-54-SH2, SK 6292-E-55-SH2, and SK 6292-E-56-Sh2 in Appendix of Fire Hazard Analysis for Exact location of components.
Evaluation The shielded Labyrintii openings from this zone to zones 1 & 2 provide protection from radiant heating effects.
There are no components required for safe shutdown or cooldown in zones 1 & 2 which are near these openings.
There are three conduits which cross the southern zone bound:ry between this zone and zone 4.
As discussed ir. the Fire Hazard Analysis Report, the loss of these conduits is not considered to be a realistic consequence of the fire.
Since the core flood tank B motor operated isolation valve HV26514 6nd its associated conduit M27121-1" are.a minimum of 21'-0" from the zone boundary
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Fire Area 68/ Zone 3 Evaluation continued and are protected by shielding walls at the zone boundary, it is not considered realistic to assume any damage as a-result of the consequence of a fire.
All of the Channel A conduits in zone 5 enter zone 3 and, as such, the thermal effects in zone 5 of a fire in zone 3 will be no worse than the direct effects of a fire on these same canduits in zone 3.
Reactor Coolant system pressure transmitter PT-21043 and its associated conduit is located, in zone 5,15'-0" from the zone boundary. Since there are only limited combustibles in zone 3 in the area beneath this pressure transmitter, the loss of the pressure transmitter due to the thermal effects of a fire is considered improbable.
For further discussion of this pressure transmitter, see the Fire Hazard Analysis Report.
s.
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-y Evaluation of the Thermal Effects of a Design Basis Fire on Adjoining Zones Fire Area 68/ Zone 4
Design Basis Fire 6,300 BTU /SF Combustibles e
electrical cable Adjoining Zone Shutdown /Cooldown Type of (Beside or Above)
Components in Adjoining Zone Heat Transfer 68/l Yes*
. Convection-Shielded openings protect components from radiant heating.
68/2 Yes*
. Convection-Shielded openings protect components from radiant heating.
68/3 Yes*
. Convection-Shielded openings protect components from radiant heating.
~
68/5 Yes*
Convection / Radiation 68/6' Yes*
Convection / Radiation
- l.
See Fire Hazard Analysis for identification of safe shutdown and cooldown components.
2.
See enclosed Table and drawings SK 6292-E-54-SH2, SK 6292-E-55-SH2, and SK 6292-E-56-SH2 in Appendix of Fire Hazard Analysis for exact location of components.
Evaluation The Design Basis Fire in this zone is not a significant heat source and it
(
is not probable that the thermal effects will cause damage in the adjoining zones.
The shielded Labyrinth openings from this zone to zones 1 & 2 provide protec-tion from radiant heating effects.
There are no components required for J.
D Fire Area 68/ Zone 4 Evaluation continued safe shutdown or cooldown in Zones 1 & 2 which are located near these openings.
As discussed in Zone 3, there are three conduits which cross the zone
~
boundary between this zone and Zone 3.
The loss of these conduits is not considered to be a realistic consequence of a fire in this zone.
In the southeast quadrant of Zone 6, which is located above this zone, there are six Channel B conduits.
Two of these six conduits also route through this zone (4) and, as such, the thermal effects in Zone 6 of a fire in Zone 4 will be no worse than the direct effects of a fire on these same conduits in Zone 4.
Two of the remaining four conduits serve the Reactor coolant system pressure transmitters PT 21042 and PT 21099 which are redundant to the pressure transmitters in Zones 3 and 5.
(SeeFire Hazard Analysis Report, Fire Area 68, Zones 3 & 5 for further discussion).
The remaining two conduits serve instruments (Channel B) in Zone 2.
These two conduits are redundant to the Channel A conduits which are routed from Zone 1 through 5 and 3.
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Evaluation of the Thermal Effects of a Design Basis Fire on Adjoining Zones Fire Area 68/ Zone 5
Design Basis Fire 26,600 BTU /SF Combustibles e
electrical cable Adjoining Zone Shutdown /Cooldown Type of (Beside or Above)
Components in Adjoining Zone Heat Transfer 68/6 Yes*
Convection / Radiation 68/7 Yes*
Convection / Radiation 68/8 Yes*
Convection / Radiation
- l.
See Fire Hazard Analysis for identification of safe shutdown and cooldown components.
2.
See enclosed Table and drawings SK 6292-E-64-SH2,SK 6292-E-55-SH2, and SK 6292-E-56 SH2 in Appendix of Fire Hazard Analysis for exact location of components.
Evaluation Pressure ' transmitter PT 21043, located in this zone has its conduit routed through Zone 7 to a containment penetration located in Zone 8.
This pressure transmitter is redundant to pressure transmitters PT 21092 and PT 21042 which are located in Zones 3 & 6 respectively.
(For further discussion see the Fire Hazard Analysis Report, Fire Area 68, Zones 3 & 6).
Since this conduit originates in Zone 5, the thermal effects in Zones 7 & 8 will be no worse than the direct effects of a fire in this zone.
In Zone 6, there are six Channel B conduits and two pressure transmitters, PT 21099 and PT 21042,which a minimum of 25'-0" from the nearest Zone 5
~
boundary. When one considers the spatial separation and the excellent fire retardant characteristics of the cable as demonstrated by actual fire tests conducted, it must be considered improbable that these components will have a loss of function due to the thermal effects of a fire in this zone..
s 4
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Evaluation of the Thermal Effects of a Design Basis Fire on Adjoining Zones Fire Area 68/ Zone 6
Design Basis Fire 22,890 BTU /SF Combustibles e
electrical cable Adjoining Zone Shutdown /Cooldown Type of (Beside or Above)
Components in Adjoining Zone Heat Transfer 68/5 Yes*
Convection / Radiation
'68/7 Yes*
Convection / Radiation 68/8 Yes*
Convection / Radiation
- 1.
See Fire Hazard Analysis for identification of : safe shutdown and cooldown components.
2.
See enclosed Table and drawings SK 6292-E-54-SH2, SK 6292-E-55-SH2, and SK 6292-E-56-SH2 in Appendix of Fire Hazard Analysis for exact location of components.
Evaluation The Channel D conduit from TE 21029 (in Zone 1) is routed through Zone 7 to a containment penetration in Zone 8.
This conduit is routed through Zones 7 & 8 0 20'-0" above the zone boundary. to a penetration in Zone 8 which is 7'-9" above the zone boundary. This instrument is redundant to an instrument in Zone 2 which is routed in a conduit in other zones not effected by a fire in this zone.
l Two Channel A containment penetrations are located in the Southwest quadrant of Zone 5.
These penetrations are separated from the nearest Channel B com-ponents in this zone by 40'-G" horizontally. Since the cables in Zones 5 and 6, which are required for safe shutdown or cooldown,are routed in conduits and have substantial spatial separation, damage due to the thermal effect of a l
fire in Zone 6 on the conduits and penetrations in Zone 5 is not considered to be a realistic fire consequence.
I e _.
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Evaluation of the Thermal Effects of_ a Design Basis Fire on Adjoining Zones Fire Area 68/ Zone 7
Design Basis Fire 35,650 BTU /SF Combustibles electrical cable e
Adjoining Zone Shutdown /Cooldown Type of (Beside or Above)
Components in Adjoining Zone Heat Transfer 68/8 Yes*
Convection / Radiation 68/9 None Convection / Radiation
- 1.
See Fire Hazard Analysis for identification of safe shutdown and cooldown components.
2.
See enclosed Table and drawings SK 62.92-E-54-SH2, SK 6292-E-55-SH2, and SK 6292-E-56-SH2 in Appendix of Fire Hazard Analysis for exact location of components.
Evaluation There are no components which are required for safe shutdown or cooldown loca'ted in Zone 9.
A Channel C conduit from PT 21043 is routed from this zone to a containment penetration in Zone 8.
A Channel D conduit from TE 21029 is routed from this zone to its containnent penetration in Zone 8.
Both of these instruments have redundant counterparts located in other zones which are not effected by a fire in this zone.
The thermal effects in Zone 8 of a fire in this zone on the conduits will be no worse than the direct effects of the fire on these saue two conouits in
~
this zone.
n i
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Evaluation of the Thermal Effects of a Design Basis Fire on Adjoining Zones Fire Area 68/ Zone 8
Design Basis Fire 41.600 BTU /SF Combustibles e -
electrical cable Adjoining Zone Shutdown /Cooldown Type of (Beside or Above)
Components in Adjoining Zone Heat Transfer 68/7 Yes*
Convection / Radiation 68/10 None Convection / Radiation
- l.
See Fire Hazard Analysis for identification of safe shutdown and cooldown components.
2.
See enclosed Table and drawings SK 6292-E-54-SH2, SK 6292-E-55-SH2, and SK 6292-E-56-SH2 in Appendix of Fire Hazard Analysis for exact location of components.
Evaluation There are no components which are required for safe shutdown or cooldown located in Zone 10.
A Channel C conduit from the containment penetration in this zone is routed to PT 21043 through Zone 7.
A Channel D conduit from its containment penetration in this zone is routed to TE 21029 through Zone 7.
Both of these instruments have redundant components located in other zones which are not effected by a fire in this zone.
The thermal effects in Zone 7 of a fire in this zone on the conduits will be no worse than the direct effects of the fire on these same two conduits in this zone.
n
.i Evaluation of the Thermal Effects of a Design Basis Fire on Adjoining Zones Fire Area 68/ Zone 9
Design Basis Fire 73.700 BTU /SF Combustibles e
electrical cable e
charcnal Adjoining Zone Shutdown /Cooldown Type of (Beside or Above)
Components in Adjoining Zone
- Heat Transfer 68/10 None Convection / Radiation 68/11 None Convection / Radiation
- 1.
See Fire Hazard Analysis for identification of safe shutdown and cooldown components.
2.
See enclosed Table and drawings SK 6292-E-54-SH2, SK 6292-E-55-SH2, and SK 6292-E-56-SH2 in Appendix of Fire Hazard Analysis for exact location of components.
Evaluation There are no components which are required for safe shutdown or cooldown located in the adjoining Zones 10 & 11. Therefore, the thermal effects of a fire in this zone will have no effect on the safe shutdown capability of the adjoining zones.
m 9
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,i s
Evaluation of the Thermal Effects of a Design Basis Fire on Adjoining Zones Fire Area 68/ Zone 10 Design Basis Fire 73.700 BTU /SF Combustibles e
electrical cable e
charcoal Adjoining Zone Shutdown /Cooldown Type of (Beside or Above)
Components in Adjoining Zone
- Heat Transfer 68/9 None Convection / Radiation 68/11 None Convection / Radiation
- 1.
See Fire Hazard Analysis for identification of safe shutdown and cooldown components.
2.
See enclosed Table and drawings SK 6292-E-54-SH2, SK 6292-E-55-SH2, and
~
SK 6292-E-56-SH2 in Appendix of Fire ' Hazard Analysis for exact location of components.
Evaluation There are no components which are required for safe shutdown or cooldown located in the adjoining Zones 9 & 11. Therefore, the thermal effects of a fire in this zone will have no effect on the safe shutdown or cooldown capability of the adjoining zones.
D 6
O Evaluation of the Therml Effects 4
of a Design Basis Fire on Adjoining Zones Fire Area 68/ Zone 11 Design Basis Fire 745 BTU /SF Combustibles e
oil Adjoining Zone Shutdown /Cooldown Type of (Beside or Above)
Components in Adjoining Zone
- Heat Transfer None None None
- l.
See Fire Hazard Analysis for identification of safe shutdown and cooldown components.
2.
See enclosed Table and drawings SK 6292-E-54-SH2, SK 6292-E-55-SH2, and SK 6292-E-56-SH2 in Appendix of Fire Hazard Analysis for exact location of components.
Evaluation There are no other zones which would be effected by the Design Basis Fire in this zone. Since this zone is the operating floor of the Reactor Building, all of the heat from this small fire would be directed upward to the area under the containment dome.
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7 Figure. 1.
Zone Communicabbn Schematic, geockr conhuivnent V'n,
Va%i l
6 I
W7////A Bf"//f~eA v < <,
r'
- Fire Area.
66/tonsI(* indicates combuslible other +han cable.)
l
- - - - zone swnsg (no a) l W/k - opeary in zone bwnso<y (door, hatch,gatrog etc.)
l
TABLE 1 Reactor Containment Building Analysis of Zone Boundaries (SolidWallsarenotDiscussed)
Jire Shutdown /Cooldown Component's Distance Comment Lrer/
Opening in Boundary Adajacent Component Exposed I
Zone to Heat from This Zone Zone Bo nda 58/l
. East (-10'-6") Labrynth 68/4 IIV 26514 & Channel 17'-0" B Conduit
. North (-24'-0") Labrynth 68/4 None N.A.
^
).
. West (-24'-0") Labrynth 68/3 IIV 26513 & Channel 17'-0" A Conduit
~
. Grating at Top of Zone 68/11 None N.A.
68/2
. East (-10'-6")Labrynth 68/4 Channel A Conduit 12'-6" from HV26514
. South (-12'-8") Labrynth 68/4 Channel A Conduit 20'-0" from liv 26514
. West (-24'-0") Labrynth 68/3
. Channel A Cable Tray 11'-8"
. Two Channel A Conduits 10'-0"
. Grating at Top of Zone 68/11 None N.A.
3
\\.
/
18/3
. Northern Zone Boundary 68/4 None N.A.
with 68/4
. Southern Zone Boundary 68/4
. 2-Channel A Conduits N.A.
Conduits are in Both Zones with 68/4
. 1-Channel B Conduit N.A.
Conduit is in Both Zones
. 1-Channel B Conduit 21'-0"
. Opening to 68/l & 2 68/1 & 2 None N.A.
See 68/1 & 2 for detafis
Reactor Containment Bu.ildind (cont'd 2) i l
Analysis of Zone Boundaries (Solid Walls are not Discussed)
Fire Shutdown /Cooldown Component's Area /
Opening in Boundary Adajacent Component Exposed Distance Comment
- F Zone Zone to Heat from This Zone Bo nda
'68/3 Openings Above 68/5
. PT21043 and Channel 15'
@nt' d)
- Northwest Quadrant Channel C Conduit 15'-6"
- Southwest Quadrant 68/5
. Two Channel A Conduits N.A.
Conduits Drop and Enter This Zone
' )
68/4 Northern Zone Boundary 68/3 None N.A.
with 68/3 Southern Zone Boundary 68/3
. 2-Channel A Conduits N.A.
Conduits are in Both Zones
. 1-Channel B Conduit N.A.
Conduit is in Both Zones
. 1-Channel A Cable 6'-0" Tray
. 1-Channel A Conduit 6'-0" Openings to 68/1 & 2 68/1 & 2 None N.A.
Openings Above
- Northwest Quadrant 68/5 None N.A.
d
- Northwest Quadrant 68/6 None N.A.
- Southwest Quadrant 68/6
. 4-Channel B Conduits 7'-0"
- 16'-0" x 18'-6" Hatch 68/6
. 1-Channel B Conduit 16'-1" s
68/5 Northeast Boundary with 68/6 68/6 None N.A.
Southern Boundary with 68/6 68/6
. 2-Channel B Conduits 25'-0"
. 2-Channel B Conduits 25'-0"
. 2-Channel B Conduits 42'-0"
]
ReacterContainmentBuildind (cont'd 3)
Analysis of Zone Boundaries,.
(Soliii Walls are not Discussed)
Fire Shutdown /Cooldown Component's Area /
Opening in Boundary Adajacent Component Exposed Distance Comment from Zone Zone Zone to Heat from This Zone Boundary 1
68/5 cent'd)
. Openings Above
- Northwest Quadrant 68/7
. 1-Channel C Conduit 14'-0" Conduit Drops and Enters this Zont
- Southwest Quadrant 68/8
. 1-Channel C Conduit 13'-3"
,)
68/6
. Northwest Boundary with 68/5 68/5 Ncne N.A.
. Southern Boundary with 68/5 68/5
. 3-Channel A Conduits 22'-0" i
. Grating Floor Above 68/8
. 1-Channel-D Conduit 16'-0" &
t 7'-9"
. 16'-0" x' 18'-6" Hatch (Above) 68/8
.1-Channel D Conduit 24'-0" 68/7
. Western Boundary with 68/8 68/8
. 1-Channel C Conduit N.A.
Conduit is in Both Zones
. Eastern Boundary with 68/8 68/8
.1-Channel D Conduit N.A.
Conduit is in. Both Zones
. Grating Floor Above 68/9 None N.A.
b
. Two 4'-0" x 8'0" Grating 68/9 None N.A.
Openings 16'-0" x 8'-0" Hatch 68/9 None N.A.
68/8
. Western Boundary with 68/7 68/7
. 1-Channel C Conduit N.A.
Conduit is in both Zones
. Eastern Boundary with 68/7 68/7
.1-Channel D Conduit N.A.
. Openings Above
- Grating Floor at South-68/10 None N.A.
west Quadrant
- Two 4'-0" Grating Openings 68/10 None N.A.
t R:: actor Containment Buildin)
(cont'd 4)
Analysis of Zone Boundaries,
(SolidWallsar'enotDiscussed) l l
fire Shutdown /Cooldown Component's
<rea/
Opening in Boundary Adajacent Component Exposed Distance Coment Zone I
one to Heat from This Zone
~
Bo n 1
58/9
. Western Boundary with 68/10 68/10 None N.A.
. Eastern Bouadary with 68/7 68/10 None N.A.
. Openings Above
~
l 4'-0" Grating Openings 68/11 None N.A.
- 16'-0" x 18'-6" Hatch 68/11 None N.A.
'8/10
. Western Boundary with 68/9 68/9 None N.A.
6
. Eastern Boundaar with 68/9 68/9 None N.A.
. Openings Above 3 4'0" x 8 Grating Open-68/11 None-N.A.
Openings 58/11 None None N.A.
)
-