ML19317F067
| ML19317F067 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 06/26/1973 |
| From: | Thornburg H US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Engelhardt T US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8001080758 | |
| Download: ML19317F067 (2) | |
Text
pg &*UW d.( l.Q e-o JUN 2 6 1973 Docket No. 50-269 Thomas F. Engelhardt Chief, Uaaring Counsel Office of the General Counsel DUKE POWER COMPANY (OCONEE 1) - EEQUEST TO DELETE PROPRI INFORMATION FROM RD REPORT UO. 50-269/73-4 25, 1973 from Duke Power Enclosed is a copy of a letter dated May Company in which Duke requests on behalf of Babcock and Wilcox Company that certain information be deleted from Pegulatory Operations Report No. 50-269/73-4 as proprietary. Also enclosed is a copy of a metaorandum dated June 4,1973, from C. E. Murphy, RO:II, which provides additional information relative to the Duke request.
We concur in the Region II evaluation that the data described by Duke One class of data and B & W should not be considered proprietary.
In this regard, proposed to be deleted relates to baron concentrations.In addition, in the the predicted values are contained in the ITAR. case of Turkey Po of boron have been made a matter of public record via an inspection Even if the proprietary report placed in the Public Document Room.
nature of the B & W data was questionable, it appears that Duke has not provided adequate justification to withhold such information.
We would prefer to reject the Duke /B & W claim outright; however, fairness probably dictates that we give Duke another opportunity to. is a draf t establish the proprietary naturG of the data.
letter to Duko requesting additional justification.
We would appreciate your views on this natter.
Orielut*im any H.C. D m b:rg Harold D. Thornburg, Chief Field Support & Enforcement Branch Directorate of Regulatory Operatious Enclonures:
- 1. C n of ltr to Moseley, RO:II, i
in Thies, dtd 5/25/73
- 2. Cpy of memo to Thornburg, RO, fm Murphy, RO:II, dtd 6/4/73 en Yh&.
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DFAFT:6/25/73 Duke Power Company ATTN: Mr. A. C. Thies Senior Vice President Power Building 422 South Church Street 28201 Charlotte, North Carolina Centlemen:
in requested that certain information Your letter dated May 25, 1973, be withheld from public disclosure 50-269/73-4 i
by the inspection report No.
on the basis that such information is considered propr etaryThis informat Babcock and Wilcox Company.
and measured values of certain plant parameters.
We have made a careful review of your request and conclude that you have not supplied suf ficient justification for our withholding this In order for this information information from public disclosure.
i h the provisions t
to be classified as proprietary data in accordance w tis required of of Section 2.790 of 10 CFR Part 2, a full explanation rietary.
the reasons why this information should be handled as prop Each item claimed to be proprietary must have an explanation as toTh why it is proprietary information.
i that the of proprietary data may include matters such as a show l basis for customarily held in confidence, that there is a rationa he information customarily holding the information in confidence, that t is not found in has, in f act, been kept in confidence and that itthe predicted values of In this regard, we note that i
y are, in certain parameters which have been claimed to be propr etar public sources.
contained in the Final Safety Analysis Report and are a matter Further, we note that the measured values of
- fact, lear of public record.similar parameters for a facility designed by a different nuc d
steam system supplier have been made a matter of public recor.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 2.79C(c) of 10 CFR Part 2, we if within will place the subject report in the Public Document d
l withholding the above stated inf ormation from public disc osure.
Very truly yours, Norman C. Moseley, Director Region II Directorate of Regulatory Operations
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t P. O. Box 2378 A. C. THlf S sanion vica Patssoamt Pa4DUCTtOM amo Taasesasseston May 25, 1973 Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director Directorate of Regulatory Operations Region II, Suite 818 230 Peachtree Screct, Northwest Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Re: RO:II:PIW 50-269/73-4
Dear Mr. Moseley:
Your letter of May 8, 1973, which transmitted RO Inspection Report No.
requested that we review this report to determine if any 50-269/73-4, We have information contained therein is considered to be proprietary.
been informed by Babcock 6 Uilcox that two items in DETAILS I contain Disclosure numbers which cay be used to derive basic design information.
to the public of.his information may jeopardize B&W's competitive These nuchers appear in Item 3 on Pages 1-2 and I-3 and position.
It is requested that the underlined numbers be Item 8 on Page I-6.
withheld from public disclosure.
Very truly yours, A.C. 7hlos A. C. Thies ACT:vr Attachment
~T 77/2/ 70,2 o
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RO' Rp t. No. 50-269/73-4 1-2 m
i 2.
Cencral was conducted to determine The' inspection of April 11 and 12, 1973, that the prerequisites for initial criticality had been fulfilled.
20, 1973, was to review the The inspection of April 17 through prerequisites for initial criticality which had not been completed earlier, review the collection and interpretation of physics data, and witness the initial approach to critical to evaluate adherence to requirceents specified in the technical specifications, codes, procedures, FSAR, and other applicable documents.
3.
Initial Criticality i
Initial criticality of Oconee Unit 1 was achieved at 12:15 p.m. on 4
Initial criticality was achieved at a boron g
April 19,1973.
concentration of about 1340 com with all control rod groups withdrawn The all rods with the exception of group 7 which was 25% withdrawn.
out critical boron concentration was 1402 ope co= pared to the predicted The reactor coolant system (RCS) was at 2500F and
-_1334 + 100 ppa.
800 psig ano two reactor coolant pumps (one in each loop) were operating.
The RCS boron concentration prior to the start of dilution for the Boron dilution began at 6:30 p.m.
approach to critical was 2124 ppm.
on April 18, 1973, at a flow ot approximately 70 spm.
The feed and biced flow rate was reduced to 40 gpm for dilution below 1452 com.
Reactor coolant samples were obtained every 30 minutes and analyzed for boron concentrction, while the boronometer indicated the RCS boron concentration continuously.
The sample results were reported to the control room approximately 30 minutes af ter the samples were taken.
The nuclear instrumentation source range channels were observed to be The flux count rate was responding to the increase in neutron flux.
' stablized at approximately 30 cps af ter achieving initial criticality.,
The intercediate range channels were observed to come on scale when3 the two source range channels were indicating approximately 5 x 10 cps, confirming that a 2-3 decade overlap existed between the source and intercediate range channels.
The approach to criticality was conducted in a safe and orderly manner and in accordance with applicabic procedures, the FSAR, technical specifications, and license require =ents.
.umme
.3, e.
,e 1-3 RO 'Rp t. N o. 50-269/73-4
/
The inspector verified that the limits and precautions, the pre-requisite tests, the required unit status, 'and the l
i Test," (the controlling procedure for the initial approach toThe critical) were met.
d as they were completed and changes to the procedure were ma e as described in DPC's operaticaci quality assurance manual.
In addition, the inspector verified the following:
The starting neutron count rate was about two counts per second.
. a.
The signal to noise ratio was greater than two.
b.
The high flux trips had been reset to.5 percent of full c.
power.
to the proper The discriminator and high voltage were set values as determined by calibration procedures, and the d.
enbincts were locked.
The source range flux instruments responded to a neutron e.
source check.
The startup checklists had been completed.
f.
Precritical tests had been completed.
g.
Control rods were operable and drop times were within technical h.
specification limits.
Two independent plots of inverse cultiplication versus boron concentration were maintained during the deboration and rod Five-cinute counts were rmde on each source range The inverse multiplication plots had a " knee" in the vithdrawal.
This occurred at a boron detector.
curve at approximately the mid-point.
The angle of the inverse concentration of approximately 1450 pnm.
d in multiplicction curve below the knee and the delay experience he obtaining the RCS boron sacple analysis results reduced t the effectiveness of this technique for predicting the pointThis was discussed reactor would, achieve initial criticality.in the managecen he 24, 1973, the inspector identified plant superintendent on AprilDPC's actions, to take the inverse this as an unresolved item.
f multiplicction plot-a more useful tool to aid in the startup o other reactors, will be reviewed during the next inspection.
t l
4
a.
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- RO Rpt.,N3. 50-269/73-4 I-6
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c 7.
Resolution of Violation of Technical Specification 6.1.2.1
- The inspector reviewed the minutes of the SRC and verified that test procedure TP-800/5, " Reactivity Coef ficients at Power," had been reviewed and approved by the SRC.
This previously identified-enforcement matter is now closed.
8.
Recctor Coolant Pump Flou The reactor coolant pump flow was measured with the core in place per procedure TP-200/12, " Reactor Coolant Pu=p Flow Test."
The test acceptance criteria was met except for the maximuu flow at 2155 psig and 5000F with four pumps running.
B6W's evaluation letter states :
"The acceptance criteria for four pu=p operation at 500 F 6 lbs /hr maximum.
This number is based on was 147.2 x 10
.he 'end of life' (EOL) spring constant of the fuel assechly holddown springs and did not reflect the removal of the orifice plugs.
" Removal of the orifice plugs increases the EOL criteria to 149.2 x 106 lbs/hr.
Using the 'beginning of life' holddown 6 lbs /hr.
spring constant increases the criteria to 151.8 x 10 "As measur.ed flow at this condition was 150.8 x 106 lb s'/hr,
the acceptance criteria for beginning of life has been met.
' Flow ecasurement capability wiil be refined by the 40% power heat balance.
Data from the test should be re-evaluated at that time to determine whether or not the EOL critieria has actually been exceeded.
Corrective action will be determined then, if required."
~
This was discussed during the management interview.
DPC indicated this unresolved item will be re-evaluated at the 40% power level.
During a subsequent conversation with the plant superintendent (on April 30, 1973), the inspector was inforced that both B&W and DPC agree that a more meaningful evaluation can be made af ter test data are obtained at 75% of full power.
They plan to make their evaluations at that power level.
1/ See RO Inspection Report No. 50-269/73-3, Details I, paragraph 3.
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[" ' %g UNITED STATES
, ' g,, _ffS ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY CPERATIONS I 7r e REGION H - SuaT E 818
/
230 PE ACHT H EE ST R E ET, NORT HWEST 8/argg O' AT L. A NT A. GEORGI A 30333 JUN 4 W3 H. D. Thornburg, Chief, Field Support and Enforcement Branch, Headquarters DUKE POWER COMPANY (OCONEE 1), DOCKET No. 50-269, LICENSE NO. DPR REQUEST TO DELETE PROPRIETARY INFORMATION - REPORT NO. 50-269/73-4 This memorandum confirms my telecon with R. Paulus on May 31, 1973, relating to the Duke Power Company request to delete inforrnation they considered to be proprietary from the subject report. Additional information received by Region II subsequent to the telecon is also included.
'Ihe information considered by Duke to be proprietary relates to the measured and predicted values of boron in the reactor coolant system with the reactor critical and at shutdown. They also consider the measured and predicted values of reactor coolant flow to be proprie-The Duke letter requested the deletion on the basis that dis-tary.
closure to the public might jeopardize B&W's competitive position.
The predicted values of these parameters are in the FSAR, however, and the measured values were obtained in tests designed to confirm the predicted values.
The Principal Inspector contacted DPC on May 31, 1973, and again on June 1, 1973, to obtain additional information, since the effect of publicizing the information on B&W's competitive position was not The following information was received during these con-apparent.
versations with J. E. Smith, Plant Superintendent, K. S. Canady, DPC Staff Nuclear Engineer, and R. St aub, B&W representative:
1.
DPC and B&W were concerned about releasing the boron concentra-tion values because the measured values were found to have been in error (2.4% or 30-35 ppm in the 1300 to 1400 ppm range).
This error was caused by using an overaged reagent when titrating the Smith also advised the Principal Inspector that errors had boron.
been made in determining boron concentrations during the period April 21-24, 1973. The errom were caused by nct following pro-cedures in preparing a bat-.. of. reagent (Na0H) that was used in analyzing for boron.
Transmitted Via Facsimile 6/4/73 - 3:55 gg i
77poCoppy
JUN 4
$73
, H. D. Thornburg 4
l dgable persons B&W stated that they were concerned that know e ether with other could analyze the measured flow values togbasic 'esign 2.
information contained in the FSAR and deriveThe me that data.
B&W may have been in error.
functional tests, (The coolant flow rate, as measured during hotd values, but sinc appeared to be higher than the calculate d not been determined, accuracy of the flow measuring system haThis discrepancy had been l flow rate could this was not confirmed at the time. carried a be determined by heat balance.)
1973, that the Smith stated during the telecon on June 1,
+
i tests had been acceptance criteria for the pow'er ascens onThe new crite te 6
be between 102.3% and 110.8% of the 131 x 10He f rewritten.
design flow given in the FSAR.new acceptance criteria Oconee 1 will be re-stricted to 3 pump operation until the s gd corrective actions can be tion from design can be evaluated anThe flow rate of 150.8 x 6 lbs/ hour, as taken if required.
measured in the tests, would not appear d B&W, Region II does Basco upon the information provided by Duke anbe considered prop not concur that the information should et the Technical Further, Region II considers that both events med has requested tha Specification definition for Unusual Events and in the Technical Spe Duke consider reporting them as specifieDuke has not a table.
cations.
es duriag the next Region II plans to followup on these occurrenck of June 4, 1973.
Further inspection which is planned for the weeactions will ived at that time.
propriate action to k
It is my understanding that Paulus will ta e ap f the data as proprie-tary information is to be allowed.
events, please h
If you need further information relating to t ese advise us.
S0l.N Ukuck' S
C. E. Murphy, Chief Facilities Test and Startup Branch I
4 %~