ML19317E825
| ML19317E825 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 06/13/1967 |
| From: | US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19317E824 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7912191003 | |
| Download: ML19317E825 (27) | |
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SAftTY AllALYSIS cosmos, Betts M, 2, and 3 Imatrassataties, Centrol, and Feuer Imatrumemaatian and Centrala l
a),g3313313 h reester p.rW ayetam setematies11y trips the reedter to preteet j
the reester m under the following senditismos i
a) the reester pomer, as messered by mostres fines, reeshoe an established seminem limit er the limit set by reester emelant fles.
b) The startup sets renehme se established maximum limit.
e) Certata mismatek esadittene esist betmeen remeter ecolant fles and the member of pimy meter basehere la servlee.
d) The reester amtlet temperature reaches an established seminum limit.
i e) The semeter psessene reeshes as setablished mini-limit.
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The reester pressation system antamaties11y trips the resetse to protest the remeter emelant system under the fellestes esaditlens a) The seer.ter puessene renehme as. established ammimms limit.
The engissened asfoty festmano pseteetten system automoties11y perfemme the fellesing fumetless.te sitigets the effsete of a seriese aseidents a)
Initiates eyeenties of the esse emergemey injeettaa system upea deteetles of tee seestar eestaat pressuse.
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CFFICE >
SURNAME >
DATE >
Form AEC-318 (Rev. 9-P asmurmamanne u 7 912191 CO3
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2 b) 1mittates operaties of the reester heilding ecoling systems upos datesties of as ahmesually hi$ remeter building psessese.
e) Initiates aestai====* isolaties opea detectism of as ahmorus117 kigh reseter hu1141ag paessure.
A schematie diagram of the remotor protesties system is sbaus in f tpre 7-2 of the PSAR.
1he suelest imetrummatation has ei$t eh== amis of aestrea information divided into three reases of sensitivityt source range, intermediate reage, and peser reage. The three russes seabine to give a contimmaus messwoment of remeter power from seerte level to appremisstely 1257. of full poser, or tem doendes of lafermaties. A statsms of sea decade of everlapping inforustica is provided.
)
The phyelest loesties of the mentres deteeters is shoes in figure 7-10 (PSAR). The power range deteeters are leested is four primary posittens, The three chambers assectated 90 desroes apart armed the reseter core.
eith aask pesar range ehemmet are leested naar the top of the core, at I
the midplane,and most the betten of the sees. The too seeres smage propertiemm1 eastters are 1eested en opposite sides of the eene adjaeomt to too of the poser usage datestore. The tuo latermediate reage sempensated les chambess are alas leested en opposite sides of the sees, but are rotated 90 dessess from the saures masse es*=a*=rs.
Of71CE >
SURMAME>
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e, s eens.. n m,nw emca to-artsi-a f
Form ABC 318 (Rev.943)
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The seeres names ehemmels stilise propertiumal eeunters and asserete l
les somet rate med startup rats (deendes/ minute) sigents. There is as trip empshility. Memover, the starty rate signals tattista esmerol.
red etthdusasi hold is response to hi$ startup rate slassis (1/2 leste).
The latesmediate range imetrumsstaties has tse ehsensis ertsiastias in two sempeonated Isa chambers. Les N and startup rate tafeemsties is derived. h startup rate signals initiate esatre1 & ithdrawal-beid sad reester trip, as appropriate (1/2 legie).
h pesar range lastrumentatica esasists of four lianer level shsamels origiastlag in twelve useampenseted ice chambers. The sala of each ehmensi is adjustable, psevidlag a assen for enlibrattag the output assiast a reseter hast balamos. h as chaemmis senhine power, flew, and pum,
breaker infocustian and effect reseter trip (2/4 laje) under eartain esaditieme.
bre are tuo " flaw tubes", ses la asek primary leer, as shone in fisare 7-11 of the P$ 2.
Flow information is measured as a fumettaa et pressure deep by four 1 ' ;
'- ; sensere at seek tabs. The outputs of the eight sensors ase asubined as pairs seek that four SW g fler signals are dertved. Esek total. flee sigast is fed to ese of the four power rangs ehemmels, thus eresting four ladayendset peser/fles chammals. la addittee.
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$URNAWE k DATE>
Ybrm AEC 813(Rev.H3)
- e. s. es,mment,orume emes so--exist-s
I 4
esek pump unter breaker has four centsets which am roepeetively commested to the four poser / flee eheamela.
h, seek power / flee ehemsel resolves insetteel infenstion.
The peser/fles sh===m1m will faitlete seester trip its a) reseter poser emoeede 1971 F.7. under any esadittene, er b) the peser/fles atte a====da 1.07 under say conditisme, or
%) ene pump is lost as a woult of a tripped pump meter breaker when operettas above a predetermined neutres poser level (X1 F.F.), or
{
ed) ese pony la lost for reasons other them tripping of its buseher (e.g.,
a sheared roter) when operettag above X% F.P., or
%) too pumps are last as a result of tripped pq ester breehere, and the rette of resetor peser to the steady state fles e.c r;--_'ias to the remoteles pumpe is greater then 1.07.
An autenette serve action, calling for a redestion la peser to achieve a proper power / flee ratie, will seenr when poser is belas X1 F.F., and a) one pump to lost due to tripp'ag of its breaker, or b) more them see peep is lost due to breaker tripping and the rette of reester pesar (et the instaat of brseher trip) to the steady state fles estreopending to the remolains pisys la less than 1.07.
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SURMAM2 >
DATT >
Porin ABC-818 (Rev,(Mal e, s. oommener menos emca re--427st-s
.S.
l The aheve preetsieme allee the W adjustaaet of reester pesar to a level========mte with the reesistas pumps as a meses of "keeplas ahead" of the fles essetdeva unless it is a foregnes comelusian (as
" judged" by the various eenparater aircuits) that the impendlag less-ofa flow transient is suffieleetly seven to warrest 1sumsdiate trip.
Reester satist temperatan is moeitered by alght resistenes elements, i
i fear eleuants is seek toep. Four of these, tee in seek loop, an ese-nested to the reseter preteetten system (2/4 leste). The remmistas four feed late the reseter sostrel system.
Fear force-balance tramoeitter chnrices measure reacter oselant system pressore. There are tee transmitters at seek leep. Their setputs are emesseted to the protection system and effect remeter trip p esineidense of tee high er tee les pressere signals (2/4 leste).
As shese in figure 7 25, all trip-producing chsanels (with the azeepties of Startup Aste) have four sensors aboos outputa respectively interrupt surrest to four independest bistable units. Each bistable unit, la turn, 1startupte see of roer relays. The relay esatsets are esubiand se as to de-emergine the undervettage est1s of fear strosit brembers whtak eemtzel l
the a.o. pesar impet to the name-=1 sad drive system poser supplies.
A.C.
l impet poser is fed from too stagne phase seuroes, both of skish must be l
I interrepend as pseemse a resetor trip. The streelt breaker legis itself CFFICE >
$URMAME>
DATE >
Ftrna ABC-818 (Rev.M3) a s. novannes=v nieme omcs te-e27st-a
i 6
is "ees set of tue-esissa (1/2 I 2), and reopende to the instrumer.t shamals en s 2/4 legte basis (1/2 for the startup zata).
The d.e. seepuse of the tue red drive pesar supplies, skish sue roepeatively emstrelled by the tuo s.e. lisme described la the peeending pessgeoph, are h la perellel threegk diedes te a samme tea (Bef. flg. 3-59, FSAR).
This h e supplies poser to all sixty-eine red elatehoe. Thee, reester trip is esemey11ehad by de-emergistas the bus.
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Nament trip to seg11shed by diseetly de-emergising the underveltage soils at the einesit beenbers.
1 hse preteetten system ehemsels sine have a osotret fumaties. The setput of one of the Sour mesteer flem level ehemsels is seat to the teneter serve system. Anse, see of the four pressure memoors is used to esseret pseaseriser p.
Imettement ah====?a ohich tattiate engineered safety feature setion are distlast fuse these used la the pseteetten syntam sad have no sentrol f w tan, these peesseen semains shommets (2/3 legie) start eyesettaa of the high peessese asetest lajeetten system upes deteetten of les seester emetemt myseen pensense, and. start eyesetten of the les psessee tsjesties system apen emeesties of vesy les samme== emotemt system psessees, ora >
SURMAME >
DATE >
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Sese other puessene sameer eksamela (2/3 legie) lattiste reester heildlag emessemoy cooling and esateiasset !aelaties y seseipt of hisk presenze signals.
Ese addittemel sete of these paesamme asesers (2/3 logie withis seek set) respoetively tattiato eyeesties of ens reseter heilding opsey pump and assestated vetves.
As see he seem la ftpara 7=2e (PSAE), the final legie sirgults feeding esak safeguard are dupliented and redendent.
The inosse feetromsstaties eseelste of 52 assemblies of selfg _ x M mostros detesters, temperatuse detestees, and support tubes leested at pseselected peettiene eithis the ease. This system provides neutres flues and temposature datasters to semiter eene perfe====ma.
There la ao preteetles settaa er sentrol fumaties.
Reek insere deteeter assembly esmeists of four lose 1 flux detesters, one boekground deteeter, tue (istet med entist) temperatura deteeters, and a es11bretten tube. 1he fles desseters ase peeltlemed at four different antal elesettens to peneide the asial flus seedicat. The boekareemd detestsee, wh4eh are lasemettive to neutree flas, provide a uness of syylylag sena.'se eermeettees to the outputa of the active chambers sheald the signal to (neekground) melae metie beesmo tee 1er.
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SURNAME >
DATE>
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tendent is perfemmed by a data redesties system. This system asunde alarus if lees 1 flus senditises enesed predeternimod values.
Reactivity eestrel is maintained by morable control rods and soluble poissa (boris' acid) dissolved in the reseter eeolant.
There ase sisty-eias sentrol reds, seek of thish is drives by a slagia phase symehreeses stopping meter through as everrunning and an electrs=
assantic clutsk. Enesty-five rede are used far setsmatie centrol purposes, the reenlaims forty-four being assissed as safety reds.
Individual red peefttom resdest devices are provided. There are tue redendent positten tramanittore at enek red.
"Ia* and "Ost" limit informatica is sise available.
For operations 1 perpeses, the centrol rods are divided late four groups.
No more then ene of these groupe een he withdraea at a gives time enespt that, ever the last twenty-five pereest travel of ses aroup and the first twenty-five perosat travel of the next arsup, ever1Lappias motion of the tes groups la permitted.
The safety rods esa he divided late as many as sidst groups. These are withdrome lattially, een group at a tira, and are controlled by mammel masas only.
OFTICE >
$URNAME >
DATE >
Ptrm A30C 818(Rev.IHl3)
- e. s. novumes=7 ecume orms 16-e27st-s
9 All rods ase 4rtwee at seestemt speed by unene of a pulsing siremit whiek stape the., "
-- - unters with a e. pulses of esentant frequemey and duraties.
^
the automatie esserel (serve) system posittees the ometrol reds la respesos to angsumet demand, enslaat system everage temposature demand, and amasured mostrum flus sisaals. As error eisesi is asserstad skish is the deviatten betones the total damned sigest and the seasured asutres flus. Ces of the four pesar mengs ehements will provide the mostrum flus sisent.
Ihm antematis sentrol system will aise, under eartain senditions, redoes poser gen less of sea er more pumps. This ontles has been discussed previously.
As fusi hurmuy progresses, dilutten of the melable poteen is== man 117 initiated and automatiently tesm6asted as felleues When the partially withdraum active oestrel red group renehes the fully wth point, interleek airtattry perndte setting up of a fleo path fans the dimiseen11and seter tank, la lies of the mammal flem path of hemated nahoup, to the aseter seal.
est system. h the seatset geog hoe hans laserted to the assenty ftvo pereomt withdumma positten, the 411stian flee is aseemsties11y bleshed. The diluttes eyete is ales teamtmeted omer. - den a inew.ineessneer (met.a tsmer, as Atmend la 1em rMa) dea===a=== det a penset mesames ament of unter hus heen injeeted.
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10 b) Analysis the appliemmt has stated that the lastrumentation util be designed, built and tested la seemedemos with the g:,: :f NEE Standard for 5eelear Peser Flaat Protestism Systems (Aer. 8). In addities, the app 11esat will destas la asserdenes with the fe11estas speelfle arttaria estlined la Seatten 7 of the PSAR:
a) Me slagle compeammt failure shall prevent the preteetten systems from fulfliling their protective fumettees whom regelred.
b) No slagle esapenest failure shall lattiste ummeessaary preteettve system acties, provided implementation does not eseflict with the above erttarten.
e) All protecties system fumations shall be imp!ssented by===== ef rh sensors, lastruheet striage legte devices and setten deviens ektek osablue to form the protesties chamaels.
d) h protesties system eksomnia and their asseeisted ele===*=
shall be electriestly 1 ":r
" it and packaged to provide physisel seperstiaa.
c) A lesa of a.s. pesar to the reacter preteetten system shall cause the effected ehemmel(s) to trip.
f) Equipment la divided hetueen the redundant easianered safeseerde l
I shoomets la such a way that the less of een of the d.s. poser ?.susses does not takihit the systeme' intended safegeerde fimettaan. liens i
OmCE >
f chemmela tai trip.
SURNAME >
DATE >
Pbra ABC.418 (Rev. 9-C) e, s. eoves==rar menne wnce 1s-e27st-a
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3 11 g) Messel trip shall he i W of the setematie trip lastrumentaties.
h) heeperational and es>11as testing espah111ty shall he psmeided.
The beste design of the protacties system is shoom la ficare 7-2 of the PSAR. The !!ael reester trip circuit is shese la figsse >&
All remeter trip lastrussatatism (with the exception of the "startup rats
- ehemmela) are estasidset and N-Four i W ehemmela saatter eneh " trip" pasemater, and one (and caly see) autpet of eseh ehemmel oestrela four ladspendast siremits which, respectively, eestrel fear independent anlays (23 1,2,3, and 4). The output of these relays are sembined (2/4 legie) to operate four circuit breakers which de-emersias the two a.s. input aireelts feeding the red drive (d.e.) pesar empplies.
The streelt buesker legia is 1/2 X 21 1.e., a trip reentta if (at least) een of the tus einemit krankers in een a.s. line and (at leset) see in the other line are speend. Issh a.s. line farmishes power te one of the slutabes through deadas shiek permit tasting of the final trip si::sults dueias remetsr eyeration.
Only gg of the four asalaar peser range ch== amis will provide as loput to the reester emetrol system. This la a departune from the original deelsa which esmoseted all four pesar nonce channels to the serve. The deelse ses semanese to Section 4.7 of the IEEE Standard.
OFTICE >
SURMAME >
DATE >
Form AEC-318 (Rev.9-63) e, s. eersa.eser reisme omes to-e27st-s L
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l Gar amanyets of the pomer/flem lastrumentaties fadiestas that the design i
esafem t.a the current criteria. bre an eight 14- ' a flammatars, fear in each primary loop as deum in f tpre 711. The flammatar outputs are seanneeed as four independset pairs (the flaummeste is each pair esatterlag a different leep). such that they heemme fear iW (total) flew chamesis. A fles chamasi is Gambined with emiy one of the peser range abannels. T ',rAcce is further preserved by heding each of the four peuer/fler signals to only one of the four Ingic circuits.
These trip strosits whieb fumaties as a result of =h==-m1 pany breaker operaties are destynd to be 1==== to single electrien1 failures. Eack l
bresher has four ladspeedsat eestaats which are respeettvely essmasted to see of the four peser range chamaels. Tlass, a failed esatset will affect only ese ehemmel. Basever, a usehmaient failure withis a brusker (e.g., a bresher which failed to apen even though peser to its pump had been interrupted) would not be esses 11ed by system redundeney. Our smalysis shone that this failure, or any similar fatisse involving pump breaker trip etremits, does not constitute a hazard insamesh as the aireutta prwide sely " anti:1patory" trip functiees and are always booked up by the "peser/fles > 1.07" siremits whiek would be effective under may esaditions of pump motor less.
l OFT 1CE >
$URKAME >
~
DATE >
Form ABC-818 (Rev. 9-63) e, s. esvas.. =, menee omes ie-exist-s I
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13 The startup rate abwls are effective saly when reacter poser is less than 10% of full pesar. Above 101 F.P. an operations 1 bypass, accussed by the pesar range chemmals threesh 2/4 legis circuits, removes the Our sam 1 sts indlestas that the tse startup startup rate trip fumeties.
7 rata da== mis are IP=*. that me single failure, leeludlag a failure within the bypass removal stremits, esa psweest their fumettening.
These is one set of four pressere sensors and see set of four camperature sensers which trip the remeter sa bish and les primsry system pressure 3 and high ecolant outlet temperature. The legte is 2/4, and the lastrument chaansla are 1.f:; z ":nly eennected to the four Ic31e channels in the same amener as the poser rease abannels. One g a re ehemmet mise provides a signal to the pressuriser pressure oestreller. The other three chaemmis will provide trip settee se a re&andant bests should a consen failure initiate a pressure transient med disable the one channel. This design comforms to the prwisions of Seettaa 4.7 of the proposed IIII 2tandard (Yev. 8).
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Operational bypeas circuits within the les preneure portions of the preteettaa system will esofems to paragraph 4.12 of the IEEE Standard.
The four logic chenasis have hoes analysed and found;te be " fail safe" in the event of voltsee loss, insames to stesle failures, and testable for eredible #m=1tm.
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DATE >.,
Form ABC 318 (Re? 4r.
- s. s. enmanent eerstine emca no-es7st-s
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The fail safety is laborest staes the chamaels are tripped whom de-enerstand.
l A partially er completely failed ehesnel w!11 disable sely een "tS" relay.
Asties of the three remmising eh==nels will open all fear stremit breakers at the e1steh poser supplies. Asties of enty tuo of the re==inias ehammels is astmelly regstand, and they will eyes at least one einesst huseher at I
eseh peser empply. Testing for fanits withis a logie ehemmel ta straight-foruards e.g., a sheet withis a abonnel will be revealed eben the bypassed eestasta de est trip their 15 solay when tasted. Open strosita are self-reves11as. h siremita betseen ehements een be detested by tripping the "hi$ pressure" sentaeta one at a time (these are the ~~= loested l
fortbest W. For esemple, a short between ehmensla one and tuo stil passent 351 from dropping out when "El Pressure #1" is tripped 3 ther analysis of the final trip asserits (Esf. fig. 3-59) shaus that they are fall este, imumme to stagle isilase, and testable. The lose of ens breaker la ensk s.a. 11am een be talousted. Diede failure, open er shorted,will met provost trip metica. A "het* short at the positive d.e.11am will have as effect stase the d.e. system is engrammded. The system will be ognipped with greem6 fmalt desseters. Less of a.s. and/or d.e. will essee, or tend to sense, rooster trip.
Testing at peser is seemmplished by trippias the strosit hueshers een at a time and settas the shouses of d.e. weltage at the appropriate pesar a;!y g Z: -_; 1 -- d != !_-i ^ "; 9 : ':.
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SURNAME >
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The maanal trip suitek esataets are la series with the four circuit breaker underveltage esils. There is as _':,- '-
en inntrementattom.
We agree with the appliemat that his preteetles system design eriteria are seemptable, and that the spostfie desises which are belas proposed confess to these eriteria.
Fear sets of pressure semelas channels initista the engineered amfety featurse. Reek met is estasident and M (2/3 leste). Oma set ialtiates the hisk W 1es pressume sealaat !ajeetten systems. These six ehemmals operate thromah amplifiers and bistable devices and are fail safe la terms of voltage less. Een other sets of three abemmels respectively metaats the tue reester batiding spesy systems. In these chamaels pressure suitehos are operated dizeetly = there is as ',:- t- - en electrieel peser for switch operatten.
Contacta emetrelled by the aforementissed chamaals are respectively combined ints pairs of redondant lesia ehstas ektek la tura, emetrol the safety feature systems. This is aboua la fisere 7-2m. PSAR. These ahmins are testable at poner by seems of taso 11M wired aereas the esetaats of esek chain such that the tripptag ed a shaia predeone a maigne reopease from its 113 hts.
Each h legis eksia is amargised free as t=dap==a==* d.e. pseer omCE >
$URNAISE >
DATED
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16 Should a power source be ir.. the dewestream siremits fall "as is."
5emover, we believe that system redondancy aliens this condities to be defined as tolerehts withfs *.he m ang of criteriem #26.
The engineered safety features instrummet chamaels de not control the parematars which they usesureg 1.e., there is seyeraties of ammewal and safety.
1 Nemasi actuation espability is provided.
1 We agree with the applieset's criteria a8 believe that the p.;,r:'
design of the easianered safety features system properly iglements these and all other appliemble criteria.
h incere teatrumentation system provides as automatic eestrel er preteetion The system is leested entirely withis semes'arusset, thereby functions.
proeloding the ased for isolattom of peastrations assestated with the system.
h centrol red drives are being desissed is asserdamse with detailed eriteria statsd on pages 3-65, 3-M, and 3-67 si the FSAR which esa he ausesrized as fo11suss a) " Single fa11eres" shall ha limited to one drive.
3e stasis failuss shall enese the uneestrolled withdmari of any red.
b)
Es mese thra too esserel groups een be withdress at ese ties.
c) d i
CFFICE >
SURNAME >
OATE >
Ebrsia ABC-818 (Rev. 9-68)
- e. s. eovss.m mm e om.:
to-.esises
. d) The withdrew speed shall be limited se se not to asesed 25 pereent overspeed in the event of speed esatrol fault.
e) Contiawm:: position indication shall 5 previeird.
We agree with these criteria and have perfosued a fatture mods analysia to deternias the prepased syntam s degree of eenferuity to these criterias 8
In ordr; to de*===<== the weret effset af "slagte fa11szes" which might not be esefland to a slagle med drive,we asked the appliesst to perform "startup eseident" saalysee essering the entire spectrum of fattial pesar levels (Ref. Supplement 2, Queetten 4.9 and answer). This aesident assumes the wesenerelled sienttaasens withdrausi of all rods at maximse deatsa speed, and further assumes that the escurstee le tarainstad saly by doppler feedheck and trip acties of the power reage aucteer ahennats. The applisset eensleded: "Be fuel damsga would result from stamitaneses all-red withdraust free any laitial peser level."
From the preceding us have eensledad that a stasia failure whlek allesed an extra red group to be withdraum, helag of laea severity them the accident analysed, womad met eense feel damage.
l These will to two " speed limiting" featuses. Que is the peleer (or stock) i-l sedeh will he desissed met to asesed a certain nextuum frequency. The OFFICE >
SURNAME >
DATE>
PDFIR ABC=818 (Ref. N
- e. e. esvammeent reistine errtCE IW61-3
[
18 ether is a " speed astersttag etzweit" devastream of the pulsar which has the inherent property of met reopending to a frequemey greater than 125%
of ratedaregasesy.
There are tem *=dara=d==* anslag red pesities senaare at seek red drive, a potentlemster and as IFET. There are tue i=dar==da== limit esitches. In additten, the LTEPs will also gamerate lindt signals. Thee, thste are redundsat anslag and limit position ladiesting systems at asek red. Seek anales sissel at a red esa he fed late the ladividusi red peettien ladienter.
We undsstand, at this writing. that a " drive-down, heid-dema" maahamiam la the form of an everrumming c1 stet will be installed at each rod drive.
We agree with this deelston.
Essee en our analysis, we believe that the applissagea ersteria manaman ta sur own, that no single failure can predacs an esaursian shiek will breach the preteetles system, and that the proposed rod drive designs esa i
be built in meeerdence with theas critaria.
Rasctivity is aise oestrelled by a permissive system whiek allows manus 1
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dilution of the primary system emelame, when a partiente omstrel red groep renehes the fully withdessa potat. Diluties is automatiently tereinsted whom the ved gremy, drives deum by the serve, resehms a eresertbed posities, or whom the insagrated diastian flew has resebed a preset muzimum. We under.
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SURNAhtE >
DATE >
Form ABC.818 (Rev. H3) e, s. enven org esignee emcs 10-e27st-a
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1 We agree with the Amylied eriteries that as stagle failure should present matematie teeminatism of dilution, when restred.
la summary, um emoclude that the aplienet's design ertteria relatlag te last W elm and ammtwels see satisfactory and that tbs propeeed prellminary destys esafees to these eriteria.
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6
Power Descriptions sach unit will generate electric power at 19 kv which will be fed through an iselsted phase boa to a unit step-up transformer (auniliary trans.
former) where it will be raised to 230 kv for units 1 and 2, and 500 kw for unit 3.
Two 130 kw everhead transmission 11 ass will carry power between units 1 and 1 and the station switahyard which will be connected to the existing Duke 230 kg transmission line by six cirecitst two north to Jesasse, two southeast to Central and (spea completion of Unit 2) two east-northeast to Tiger. From Unit 3, an overhead transmi'ssion line will carry power betwees the staties and the switchyard which will be connected to Duka's 500 kw transmission network by two circuits one to the Lake Norman area and the other to the Lake Wylie area, both being run in a general northeasterly directies. As autocransformer will tie together the 230 and 500 kv systems at the statism switchyard. la addition, a separate 100 kv line will be run directly from the gas-turbine generating station at Lee.
Each unit will have its sua 40 N A startup transformer. The 100 kw lina will terminate in a transformer at Ocones which will serve all three units, l
as re, pired.
l Merusily, ensk unit will supply its swa anziliary leads directly from
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the gamerater via the statien samtliary grensformer. Sines each unit is beias designed to assept a 1001 lead asjesties, the primary seurte of I
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Fcrm ABC-818(Rev.1Hi3) u.s. sownnuorr rentine crTxt : isse-o-ai4-e:s
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2-power for the auxiliary loads in the event of system blackout will be the unit generators themselves. In the event of a unit trip, the power sources will be automatically switched onto the auxiliary busses in the preferential sequence as follows:
a) the startup transfo1nner bua b) the other units' auxiliary electrical system (subsequent to the ese-i pietion of Unit 2) c)
the 100 kw transmission line from Lee i
d) the Esowee Hydre Station 13.8 kw line.
The Keowee Hydro Station will be located approximately one half toile from the station switchyard, and will consist of two 70 MWe generating units.
Each unit is essentially independent of the other and is provided with its own startup equipment located within separate cubicles within the Esowee control room. The initiation of startup is accomplished by control signals from the Oconae centrol room areas. Normal startup of either unit is by operator acties while emergency startup is automatic. Both units are started automatically and simultaneously on either of two conditions:
if the external transainaies system is lost er if engineered safeguards action is required.
Either hydre can be amated to either of two linea feeding the Oconee station. One is sa overhead 230 k,line to the station switchyard; the other is as
' N..__ ' 13.8 kw line rua directly to a 10 MFA transformer.
OmCE >
$URNAME >
DATE>
u.s. sownmutwi mnrins crix2 : tsee-o-214-e:s
. Four 125 v.d.c. batteries and six battery chargers will be supplied for Unit 1.
One pair of batteries and one set of three chargers will feed one 250/125 volt bus and the remaining pair of batteries and set of chargers will feed a redundant 250/125 volt bus (Esf. Fig. 8-3, PSAE).
A Upse completion of Unit 2, this d.e. system will serve both units.
1 third three-wire system will be installed upon completion of Unic 3.
Switching circuits will permit any d.c. system to serve any unit.
Initially, there will be six 125 v.d.e. distribution panels, each of which will receive d.c. power from both three-wire d.c. sources through isolating diodes. Two more panels vill be installed with Unit 3 and will be similarly powered. Four vital instrument busses (single phase) will be provided for Units 1 and 2, and will be independently energized from static inverters connected to one of the six d.c. distribution panels. Two more vital instrument busses will be added with Unit 3.
These will be powered, through statie inverters, from the two additional d.e. panels.
In addition, there will be three single phase 120 v.a.c. regulated instrument busses. These will normally be connected to the 600 v.a.c.
busses of their own units through reguisting equipment. Provivion will be made to switch over to the vital instrument busses, if necessary.
l omes >
l sunwes >
DATE >,
l
Power - Analysis Schematic diagrams of the electrical power systems are shown in Figures 8-1 and 8-3 of the FSMt.
Criterion #39 of the Commission's proposed General Design Criteria has served as the basis of our review of the off-site and on-sita electrical power systems. In order to comply with the criterion, the off-site and on-site power systems must each, independently, withstand the failure of a single active component.without loss of function.
l Upon completion of Unit #1, eff-site power will be available from the
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I 100 kv system and from the 230 kv system which fed power uto Oconee over separate trancaission lines from Jocasse and Central. An additional 230 kg tie to Tiger will be installed upon completion of Unit #2; and, upon completion of Unit #3, a tie to Duke's 500 kv system will be installed. All off-site lines will be energized from several power genera-ting statians, and the Duke system is designed to withstand the step-loss of any single generating unit within its network.
Redundant transformers will be available to distribute power to engineered safety feature loads. Transformer CT1 (to the 230 ky systee) and trans-former CIS (to the 100 kv system) will be installed with Unit fl. An additional startup transformer will be installed with each of the other two units as they are completed, and ear.h transformer will be able to l
energise the emergency loads of any unit.
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OmCE >
$URNAME >
DATE >..
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In view of the foregoing and the fact that the Duke Power Company 'aas never experienced a system-wide blacket, we agree with the applicant that the proposed off-site power sources and associated distribution equipment are sufficiently reliable for the intended purpose.
We cannot, however, determine that these collective off-site sources are i - me to the adverse effects of single failures. Recent blackout expe-rience elsenbare suggests that such 1 - nfty may not exist. Accordingly, j
and inasmuch as the the design and utilization of the on-site power sources are under the direct control of the applicant, we have analysed the proposed on-sita power system on the basis that the single failure criterion can and must be met.
Upon loss of the external grid, redundant voltage and frequency sensing devices on each of the 230 kv switching station busses will initiate, through separate and redundant channels, tripping of all 230 kv switching station isolation breakers, closing of all 230 kv switching station power supply breakers and startup of both Keowse units. They will synchroniza and be connected to the 230 kw lines. One unit will also feed the 13.8 underground line. Shedding of non-essential loads (a requirees nt because of the limited especity of the 13.8 kv/4.16 kv transformer) will be accom-l plished by circuit breakces with duplicate trip coils energized free different d.c. busses.
Upon loss of the external grid and the tripping of a given Oconee unit i
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Wrm Asc-sis an. wn l
6-autsmatically switched onto the emergency (4.16 kv) busses of the affected unit in the following sequences a) the startup transformer bus b) the other units' auxiliary electrical system, when available e) the 100 kv line d) the 13.8 kw underground line.
(Switching to (a) above will attempt to conneet the emergency loads to the Keowse station via the 230 kv line.)
Our analysis indicate that the sequencing system described above is essential to plant safety since its failure could leave the emergency l
busses with no power. We have been assured that this system will meet the single failure criterion.
The Kaowee hydre units can pick up smergency loads from black start in 23 seconds, which is adequate under DBA conditions. If tripped off line at full power due to a system disturbance, each unit can pick up full lead in seven seconds. Each unit's voltage regulator is equipped with a volts-per-cycle limiting featurn which permits it to accept load at the outset and thus drag the loads up to full speed in synchronism vita f
its own acceleration. This serves to reduce the time regal; a for the l
initiation of safeguards system action. We eencur with the applicant that it is a desirable feature.
OFFICE >
SURNAME >
DATE>
h AEC 818 (Rev. 9-53) um, gg i
The hydro plant is started by opening gatas which are powered by hydraulic accumealators. Stored hydraulic energy is sufficient for three full opening and closing cycles. Control circuits for meergency actuation of the accumu-lators will be redundant. A shear pin arrangement within the mechanical l
portion of the gate drive will release a jasmind or otherwise fouled gate from the others.
The protection system on the hydro plant will be limitad to only those i
i parameters that will prevent gensation of power, such as generator insulation breakdown or loss of field.
In the event both hydro units must be shut down briefly for maintenance, emergency power can be made available to Oconee via the 100 kv line which can be isolated from the rest of the grid and kept continuously energized by one of the Lee station gas turbine generators set aside axclusively for this purpose. We believe this merits consideration even though it would allow a temporary non-redundant source of emergency oower. We will continue to pursue this matter with the applicant and, at present, I
see no obstacle to eventual satisfactory resolution.
The engineered safety feature auxiliaries are provided with reduminary.
To maintain this redundancy, the applicant has stated that these auxili-artes will be ea===*ted to r h==t busses such that safety feature auxiliaries performing the sees function are connected to different busses. Each of these busses is sepplied from the redundant 4160 volt I
i ect >
SURNAME >
DATE >
u.s.soVERMu!NT PRfMTimG CmCE : thN4-629
4 main feeder busses which are, in term, supplied from the redundant sources described previously. We concur with the applicant in this design approach since it is an offsetive and simple way of implementing
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the single failure criterion (Ref. Fig. 8-1, PSAR).
Our review of the station battery system (shown in Fig. 8-3, PSAE) indicates that it is redundant and testable. Voltage at each of the panelboards, De-A, De-B...etc., is derived from redundant sources feeding through isolation diodes such that failure of one source does not affect the voltage at the panel board bus. Loss of voltage at a panelboard bus will not negate the d.c. system function.
Our review also indicates that no single failure can cause a loss of voltage at all vital instrument busses.
l We have been informed by the applicant that means will be devised to 1
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cast the diodes at power, and *.o determine (also at power) that no J
battery has become diseoanected from its d.c. bus. We concure in i
these test procedures.
In suimmary, we agree with the cyplicant's proposed criteria for the design and laplementation of the off-site and on-site power systems, and we further agree with the preliminary design approaches to implement these eriteria.
onu >
$URNA90E >
DATE >
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