ML19316A132
| ML19316A132 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 09/08/1970 |
| From: | Kelley W, Murphy C, Seidle W US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19316A125 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-70-08, 50-269-70-8, NUDOCS 7911280663 | |
| Download: ML19316A132 (16) | |
Text
o O
- u. S. amuc - econ. mon REGIOil 1[
Report of Inspection CO Report No. 50-269/70-8 I.! c t nnee:
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June J9 - Ju ly P,
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?f7y~'0 W.
C. SWW1Of 'Salii or R:.ac Gar Innpec tar Diit'6 Note:
The sections of th ?.s report relating to welding and piping ware prepared in the nain by W.
0.
Kelley and those relating to the environmental conitoring and the health physics programs were prepared by W, W. Peery.
Propri e tary Informtion :
None
. SCOP _S.
A routine, announced : inspection Was mde of the 2568 Mat pres-surized tater reactor under construction near Seneca, South Carolina, known as Oconce Station No.
1.
Purposes of the inspec-tion. uere:
(1) to determine the construction status and 7911280 b L
o CO Upt, Mo. 50-PC/)/70-8
~2-nigni ficant changen to cebedule daten; (2) to review recorda and work performance relating to mechanical equipment and piping nyatema; (3) to review work performnnre r*.tive to fhe fnstal-7 nti on < > f h:1 < n o.d trayc; (4 ) t o revi tw the envi ronmental n aiturjug and the health physica programa; and (5) to review test proceduren.
SUMMARY
Safety itemn - tione Honconformmee 1tema -
1.
Sec tion 5 1.2.1 of the FSAR apeci fies the number of tendona required in the reactor building.
The licennee has deter-mined t. hat three of these required tendon cheaths contain blJekaden and cannot be used.
(See Section G. )
2.
Soution 5.6.1.2.2 of the FSAR upecifies the number of c,trai n gauges requi red to analyze the performance of the react or buU ding during proof tes ting.
The licensee has det.cominud that appro:timately 50% of the straj n gauges have failed imd cannot be used.
(See Sec tion G. )
Status of Previoaaly Renorted Problems -
- 1..
The liceaaee has repaired the containment liner by removing the temporary scaffold hangers and clips.
All surface defects were ground cut and repaired.
(See Section G.)
2.
The Bingham pump volutes have been removed in preytration for t.he inatallation of the Ucatinghoune pumps.
(See See tion F. )
3 The modifications to the polar crano control circuits have been completed.
the mo(difications were made. )The crane has not bee over, since (See Management In terview Section and Section H. )
Other Significant Items -
1.
The engineering department is rechecking the design of the main steam piping hangers to ensure their adequacy.
(See Section I. )
{
co apt. No. 50-r69//o-8
~3-i the licensee In inspecting the first forty control rod drives, 2.
has determined that eight control rod drive mechanisms have been incorrectly assembled add that the concentricity of the
' o to out of c ide 'cunhbts of thr: e units are ecm.idered u
An additional thirty rod drives rwaain to bc tolerance.
l Inspected.
(See Section I. )
The magnitude of the effort requ3 red to complete the health 3
Easic facili ties and physics progroan is very subs tantial.
equipment are not yet available and the training of personnel is incomplete.
(See Section K.)
Outs tandi nfr, Items - See Exhibit A for current status of out-ELWing DEE;.
Manngement Interview - The management interview was attended by Rogers, Beam ant RHntosh.
The results of the inspection of the health phystes and 1.
enviromaental monitoring progrma were reviewed.
The need for the licensee to complete the health physics laboratories and the manuals and procedures prior to core loading was The need for portable survey instrtenents and emphasized.
the procedures for their use during the power ascension prc-gran were also discussed.
McIntosh stated that these items were being actively followed by Thames and Sumnerlin and their completion was being puthed.
(See Section K.)
The repairs to the containment liner were discussed.
Ro6ers 2.
stated that some additional areas had been found to require repairs but that these repairs would be completed by the end of the week.
(See Section G.)
The licensee's progran for the inspection of the control rod 3,
drives was reviewed.
Since the inspection of all the rod drives had not been completed, the inspector advised Ro$ers that this would be a future inspection item.
(See Section I.)
The inspector stated that he had discussed the repairs to the 4.
polar crano control circuits with Aycock and had been advised by Aycock that the crane had not been load tesbed af ter the modit'ications were made.
Since these modifications were relatively extensive and affected the emergency stopping capability of the crane, the inspector asked if load tests Rogers and Beam stated that no tests were were planned.
planned since the crane had been load tested prior to the modifications.
Even though the inspector pointed out that the s
crane would be used to lift the pressurizer over the reactor I,
t co apt. Ho. 50469/70-3
-b i
vessel and that the reactor vessel internals would be handled by the crane, Rogers would not commit the licensee to making further tests.
(Sco Foetion II. )
5 Rogers advised the inspectors that the results of the engineering
~ partment's review or the design of the main stena pipe ha gers would be available at the site for the next inspection.
(S m Section J.)
6.
The inspector stated that he had observed interferences between the cable trays and piping in the reactor building.
He questioned whether this might not represent a lack of independent review of the designs.
Rogers abated tha t i.he problem had been brought to the attention of the Charlotte engineering office and designs were belng changed to elimimte the interferences.
(The inspector was later advised by W. L. Lee, Vice president, Engineering, that the inter-forences were due to Duke's request for early releace of independent review.M)d was not indicattve of a lack of the design drawings an The inspec tor will review this item during the next inspection.
(See Section H.)
7.
The jnspector discussed the need for proper review of test i
procedure changes.
He pointed out that the construction department was releasing portions of piping syntens for
- f. lushing and hydrotesting whereas the procedures for these operations were for complete systems.
Since the valvi.ng and temporary connections could differ significantly for these operations, the procedures should be revised to reflect the changes.
He further pointed out that this requirement was spelled out in the licenace's Guide for Conducting the oconee Initial Test Program.
McIntosh stated that the procedures would be revised where the test boundaries differed from those specified in the procedure.
(See Section L.)
8.
The inspector stated that the test procedures did not specify valve numbers and which instrumentation must be isolated and protected from hydrostatic test pressures.
McIntosh said that an instrument technician would be available to valve out the instrumentation and that the licensee did not feel that a listing of the J nstruments uns needed in the procedure.
(
2/Telecon:
Lee to Murphy dated Isugust 13, 1970.
n
+
I Co Rpt, No, 50-e69/70-8
-S-The incpector pointed out that the licern;ce planned to calibrate the instruments i n many cases before the hydro-static touts were performed.
Since instruments could be overlonked or M rred enr woh, c m~-
nn t f>--
'~ae n,,
L. yond sM f t ch: ten, the ir;trt.cnts could be dcssud ur the calibration points shif ted.
The inspector advised McIntosh that the.L1 conceo should consider performing calibratlon tests af ter the hydrostatic tests if they dJd not uinh to list the instruu,;ntation in the hydralent procedures.
(See Ceetion L.)
').
Rogers advised the ilmpec tors that the records relating to Table A requi rewnts muld be at the ulte within the nonth and would be mode availuble during the next Jnupectlon.
10.
The licennee was advised tha t i t typeared he vas in non.
conformance with the requirtments of the USAR in that tae failure of the s train gauges would prevent the analysis of the response of the reaeter building dur.ing proof tenting.
Rogers alated that the FSAR uas being amended to show that instrumentation would be installed in the Unit 3 reactor building.
The performance of the Unit 3 building wou]d be analyzed rather than Unit 1.
(See Section G.)
ll, The incpector advised Rogers that the licensee appe'3. red to be in violation of the FSAR in that the required number of Londons could not be installed.
The inspector was told that an analysis had boon made to show that the missing tendons would not increase the loading stresses beyond the allowable design s tressps.
Rogers stated that the FSAR was being revised to show that the tendons had been omitted and the results of the analysis. (See Section G.)
DETAILS A.
Person _s_ Contacted Duke Power Ccj any (Duke)
J. C. Rogers - Project Engineer D, B. Beam - Assistant Project Engineer J. R, Uells - Principal Field Jngineer G. L, Hunnicutt - Field Engineer, Civil C, B. Aycock - Field Engineer, Electrical i
K. E, Cater - Instrumentation Technician J, E. Smith - Plant Superintendent J. W. Hampton - Assistant Plant Superintendent
i CO Rp t. Ho, SC-CCi9//O-8 M. D. McIntosh - Operating Engineer P. II. Barton - Manager, Technical and Nuclear Services T..
L. Ta ri s
?f V:O th Phyni e'st C. L. Tiuuaes - Health rhysics Supervisor Babcock and Wilcox Cmyany (EfdQ W.
Paanne - Field Supervicor B.
Admi nis t ration and,0rganizat_f on The licensee nou hr s npprm bentely 1,'TOO construc tion personnel and 90 operations personnel at the site.
Vartous contractors have approxin?.tely 100 people on the job.
O.
Quality Assurance
~
3.
No changes have been tr.ade in the licensco's quality aasurance progrcua u tnce the last inspection.
2.
Qualit,y assurance items are discussed Ja the individual report sections.
Construetion Progress 1.
The main coolant piu.np volutes have been removed and three of eight weld preparations on the pipe ends have been completed.
2.
The generator stator has been set and alignment of the unit is in progress.
3 Installation of cables has started.
4.
The reactor vessel internals have been received.
5 The borated water storage tank has been pressure tested.
E.
Construction Schedule 1.
Erection of the turbine generator is expected to be completed in January 19'71.
2.
Core loading is scheduled for February 19'71, t
3 Installation of the new coolant pumps is expected to be completed in November 19'(0.
t c0 npt. No. 50-269/70-8
~7-4.
The plant is expected to be in commercial operatton by Augua t 19'(3.
F-i __ $.! i L... f n n t l y s, The four main coo] ant pumps manufactured by Binghaza Pump Coupany (Ringham) have bnen removed from the main coolant piping ruid placed in.:torage for possible use in Unit 2.
Four Ues t-i nghouse ince tvi e Corporation QI) p wp voluten have been received at the site from Pacit te Gas and Electric Company, Diablo Canyon No.
1, and are avaiting the modifica-tions of piping before i ns tallation.
The g he'tt and serial numbers of the four pump volutes are as fo tj o.is :
34836-t36489-1 (su-10) 37033/38950 (SH-13) 34026-1/36239-1 (SU-9))
359 s 1/3S279-1 (sH-11 The Bingham pumps wiare cut out and removed from the main ecolant 1000 in accordance with a Duke Special Procedure No. FIP-S, Removal of Priuary Coolant Ptuaps. "
The cuction linen ucre cut at elevation 800 feet, 3-1/4 inches.
The diceharge lines were cut at the 45 elbow.
The cutting was accomplished by using are air gouging of the stainless steel liner on the inside and oxyacetylene burning of the carbon steel prcucure boundary.
The locations of the cuts were celec ted to permit the remachining of weld preparations on the existing inatalled piping.
Three of the weld preps have becn remachined.
Four eight-foot coctions of p.ipe in the suction line were cut from the loop and the pieces were shipped to BMI, Mt. Vernon, Ohio, on Friday, July 31, 1970.
The cuction discharge piping accemblics required for the installation of the W pumps will be fabricated at BMI from theco seetions and are to be available at the site in approximately four weeks.
Modifications to be performed are shown on EMI Drawings 154618E, " Cutoff and Final Assembly 1
l of Modification 28-Inch ID Suction Pipe,4616E," 154647E, " Modified l
A Inch ID Inlet Suction Piping " and 15 1
" Modified 28-Inch 1D Inlet DLucharge Piping. 7' l
l The installation of the four W pump volutes will require a l
total of 16 welds, eight of tliese will be stainless steel and uelded in accordance with Duke Welding Procedure WP9,
(
l and the remaining eight will be carbon steel with stainless l
cladding which will be welded in accordance with Duke Welding i
\\
CO Rpt. I!o. 50-E69/'(0 8 I Procedure WP5 The quality control records of weldors performing the uelding, electrode heat number, nondestructive testing results and inspector's signature will be recorded on tie
- e cc-a s v r ea rc r -,1 M 7 "f ".n min m elent loop in its urJ uinal crec tion.
L. '.u u a t i on u r the U punp a will be made in accordance with Procedure FIP-6 "W IEin Coolant Pumo Ins talla tion. "
In order to use the U puvFs, it was necessa'ry to modify the outlet nozzle for the i~ pray line in the pump discharge from a side penotcation in the pipe to a top penetration in the p pe.
The detailed subassemblies of the i
?,'-inch spray line mod trications are shown on D&W Drawing 13193'(M, Revision 8.
The ';elding of the modifications will either be in accordance with Duke's Ueld Procedure P2, which is a tungsten-$ nert gas with coated electrode material, or P8, which in tunguten-inert gas welding with an EB incert r3ng.
The documentation of the weldor, eleetrodes, non-destructive testing, uelding inspector, and UDT technician uill be recorded as it has been on all Class I piping.
G.
Con tairment 1.
Contain'nent Liner During a previous inspection,l/ it had been determined that temporary scaffold clips and brackets had been uclded to the contabuaent liner and it could not be verified that qualified welding procedures and weldors had been used when making these attachments.
The licensee has now removed the attachments and repaired the surface defcets by grinding and repair velding.
The repaired areas were given in PT inspection.
Pro-perly qualified procedures and weldors were used in effecting the repairs.
During a tour of the containment on August 7,1970, the inspector observed the final repairs being made.
This item is cosidered to be complete.
2.
Strain Gaup;cs As a part of the structural proof testing, strain gauges were 3natalled in the reactor building so that the struc+ ural response of the building could be assessed by comparing the theoretical analysis to test resulta of strains and deformations.
The licensee has found through routine testing mado after installation, after concretc 1_/CO:IIReportNo. 50-269/70-5 l,
I CO Rpt, Ifo. 50-269/(0-8 placement and during the stressing of the tendons that approximately 50% of the gauges are no longer operable.
Each test has revealed more inoperable gauges.
The impretor en ~M yd by Wcers and "ecor that the licenseo planned to replace all -ccet nible caucus on Unit 1 and obtain data from these during the containment proof testing to determine the response of the building.
In addition, they planned to fully instrument the Unit 3 reactor building and perform a complete analysis on that structure.
When queried, Hager stated that they believe the failures were due to the epoxy bonding Material.
When Rogers and Hager were advised by the inspector that it appeared that the 1:icensee was in nonconformance with his F3AR, they stated that they were aware of this and the FSAR was being revised to reflect the changes noted above.
This item was diccussed in the i
mn.na[$o flent IDLOrView.
3 Tendons Rogers advised the inspector that during the course of installing tendons, the licensee found that two horizontal i
ond two vertical tendon sheaths contained blocka6es.
One of the vertical sheaths was subsequently opened, but the licensac was unable to open the remaining three and has abandoned them.
The remaining blocked vertical sheath is in the area of the equipment hatch.
The two horizontal sheaths extend across the construction access opening.
One of these also extends across the equipment hatch area.
The inspector advised Rogtrs that since the tendon instal-lation requirements were specified in the FSAR, it appeared that the licensee would be in nonconformance with these requirements.
Rogers stated that the licensee was sub-mitting an amendment to the FSAR to justify the omission of these tendons, H.
Elcetrical and Instrumentation 1.
Polar Crane ModificatLons_
The inspector was advised by Aycock that the polar crane modifications had been completed.
The main hoist motor control circuit had been rodified to permit slower opera-tion and a blower had been installed on the motor to per mtt continuous operation.
In addition, the brake control circuit had been modified to prevent overtravel on loss f
of power.
Aycock said that the manufacturgr's drawings contained errors and that it had taken considerably more time to make the modifications than had been anticipated.
l
{fa N-
co npt. Iro. 90-n69/70 4 Mien asked by the inspec tor, Aycock stated that the crane hoist had not been tested with a load af ter the circults were modified and he did not believe that a load test was planned.
This itm1 "ns
<1' en-red in the 2,nact an t ! a '.m ' ew.
2.
Cables and_ Cable Tral (5205.06)
The inspector and Aycock toured the facility and inupect:d the cable tray layout.
The arrangenent of the trays and the installation appeared to be satisfaciory in the cabl 3 spreadind room and other auxiliary building areas.
Uher?
arranged vertically, the trays were spaced wi th a five-inch clearance.
In renponse to the i nspec tor 's ques t f or.3, Aycock stated that power cables were to be LLed in place 4
l wLth one quarter diameter spacing.
Instrumentation ani j
control cables would be arranged in an orderly fashion but would not necessarily be tied in place to maintain spac5ng.
The inspector observed several trays in the reactor building that appeared to present interference problems with piping, stairs and handrails.
Aycock stated that he had requested that the design department review the tray designs because of these Interferences.
The Inspector discussed the problem in the management inter-view.
Mien asked when the cable installati.on would be started, Aycock stated that the firs t safety-related
.lables were being pulled but that it would be several uacks before a significant number of cables would be inatalled.
I.
Control Rod Drive Mechanisms - Attachment L 1.
Folloutp_ Record Review (!!205.05.a.2)
The inspector reviewed the Receipt Inspection Reports, Form QC-31, for the control drive mechanism.
The mechanisms had been received in two shipments, one of forty meenanisms and the other of thirty mechanisms.
The report stated that no shipping damage was noted and that the mechanisms were to be stored in a heated building.
The mechaniams were stored in the warehouse whi'ch had been assigned for the storage of the B&W equipment.
The con-trol rod drives were not uncrated and do not require s torage inspeation.
2.
Control Rod Dr;ve Guide Bushings i.
Diamond Power Sp eciality Co., oration (DPS) found during the production tasting of the control rod drive mechanisms
.n CO Rpt. IIo, 50-EG)/(0-8
~ 1 1 -.
that the concentricity of some of the guide bearings was out of tolerance.
An inspection of the mechanisms that had been shipped to Oconee was performed on August lf and 5, 19'/0, at the alte.
Three non from DPS, Fwo from RW 4 one fr.
T' A m a f o i a d um i n ;p ec t,3 no.
The incper.or witnossed a portion of the inspection.
A special jig had been fabricated by DPS to check the concentricity of the guide bushings.
The jig appeared to be uell made, accurate, and easy to use.
The Duke inspec Lor has rocc.-
monded that three of the nochanisms he returned to Dps for replaccment of the guide buchings.
During the con-centrie t ty checks, it uns noted that eight of the mechanisms had their to cque tubes incorrec tly inserted.
The Lor (pte tuben may be physically installed in tuo positions 1800 apart.
An incorrectly installed torque tube prevents coupling of the drive to the control rods i
and proper operation of the absolute position indicator.
The Duke inspec tor stated that the torque tubes may be eas tly repositioned and he did not consider this to be a problen.
J, Pallure of the Main Steam Plue Hangers During the erection of the main steam piping, two hanger supports failed.
Hanger support H-17 failed when the Nelson studs uelded to an insert plate embedded in the concrete beams pu'lled loose from the plate.
The failure was in tension with the typical shear lips.
Hanger No. H li support began failing by elongation of the Nelson studs.
The pipe hangers were designed by the Grinnell Corporation (Grinnell) and are shown on their sketch sheets 1-116 for Hanger H-17 and 1-103 for Hanger H l.
The Insert plates embedded in the f
cunereto support utrueLure for the main steam from the tur-bine building to the reactor building were designed by the structural department of Duke.
After the failure, the structural department of Duke redesigned the hanger supports.
The hanger supports consisted of two fabricated plates with two stiffener bars welded across each of them.
One plate was located on top of the concrete beam and the second on the bottom.
Six bolta clamped the plates to the concrete beam.
The Region II inspector made an analysis of Hanger H-16 which consisted of a 3[-inch rod furnished by Grinnell and the '//8-inch-diamo ter rods on the beam clamp.
The operating load given to Grinnell by Duke was 78,000 pounds and the hydrostatic test load of 50,000 pounds.
Using the operating load, it revealed that the stress in the 7/8-inch rods assuming i.
all equally tensioned would be in the order of 27,000 psi.
Miller from the piping design group of Duke was onsite and in a dis-cussion he stated that the structural department had utilized
GO Rpt. !To. 90--P69/ (0-8
- the AISI allo.aab3e for 't36 steel ubich permitted under occantonal loads a P2 Klpa load foe Sa.
Miller agreed wi th the Region I E i n':peo Lor that the beam clamp uns ac Lua3ly a continuatic;n of the pipe hanger and should be
.h
'jl. 3. u t,i l < i rc a 1. 2 Sa u _ v
=1 'n m
ic nLeuus value for occasional loads.
Charlotte engineering stated that the loads given to Grinnell were actually prel imi nn ey load s 30 that they could desi gn the hangers.
After the design was comnleted, the 30 ads uoro comewhat less ut th a maxj mum operation load of 67 Kips ihich included on a i lowance for the acicmogr.' phi c load.
Miller agreed that upon his return to Charlotte engineering, Duke would revleu the d.
ign of the bor
>r an mmbly and if their analysis abo' ed the need, t he de ;igns uould he nodift ad as regul. red to maintain a : tress level o f 1.2 Sa for '(8 Kips whe re Sa i s de fi ned by B31.1.0 (1967).
Duke will also i nv e n ti cate t he design of the conc rete beam and verify that the af. cess level aced for design was '/8 Kips.
This inves tica-tion wil1 also include Hangers H-2, H-3, H-lS, H-16, n-4, and H-l'( for Unit Ho.
1.
The.inves tig'ttion will also be included for Unit 2 whe re a modification was made on the anchor balts and a plate.
The inspector will review this item dur_ ng the next inspection.
K.
Hadiation ProLeetion 1.
Review of Environmental Monitorin$ Data The rat data available at the uite for the environmental ronitocing program was reviewed and the values found to be reasonable and apparently adequate to satisfy FSAR commti nonts (Section 2.'().
Lewis stated that the data is in the procons of being compiled into a finished report which will facilitate review of the total program.
C0 Report No. 50-269/69-8 contains information on the initial evaluation of the program including personnel, facilities and equipment.
Visits by the AEC inspectors to randomly-selected stuapl.ing stations revealed continued satisfactory operation.
2.
Pmergency Procedures - Evacuation Alarm The detailed procedures for implementation of the emergency plan referred to in Section 12 3.2.1 of the FSAR were not availab3e for review.
Lewis is preparing i
the detailed procedures.
Discussion revealed that actual arrangements with outside organizations have included the Souti
'arolina State Eoard of Health, Civil i
I i
=
l i
C0 Ept. Ho. 50-nG9//0-3 Defense Agoney for Oconce County, CLvil Defense Agency for Pickens County, t.he Sherif f's Department of Oconee County, the Sherriff's Department of Pickens County, the South Carolina liighway Patrol, the Oconee County Rural 1 Expltal, ad
~ w r% t.c ol ".i y la C. nee M 4
the Memorial Clinic.
Lewis stated that Dr. J. Carpenter, M.D,3 Duke, and Dr.
D. Richardson, M.D.,
South Carolina State Board of IIcalth, received training in the carc of radiation accident victims at Brookhaven Hattonal Labora-tory.
lie said that arrangements have been made through Richardcon and Darner, Hospital Administrator, for the treatment a t oconee Memorial Hospital of Oconee Nuclear Stat:l on employees.
Lewis stated that all outside organiza-tions have been gi.ven written statements confirmind the understandings of their participation in cuergencies.
Mner6cney equipment was discussed and although commi.t-uents for this c<1u tpnent are made in the FSAR (12.3 2.3),
none was available for inspection.
Lewis and Thames Laid that part of the equi.prent has been ordered.
Hampton nod Louis indicated that the evacuation alarm will consist of a combination of loud electric signal horns outside restricted areas and alarms sounded over the public address
(
system inside all operations areas.
The system was not complete at the time of this inspection.
3 Etal us of Personnel Trainin6 in Health Physics
.1 According to Lewis and Thames, the training of personnel in health physics is in progress but apparently not nearly complete for reactor shif t personnel.
I.
Radiation Protection Manual and Procedures f
A Health Physics Manual for Oconce Nuclear Station has been prepared by Lewis as Staff Health Physicist, Duke, reviewed by station ataff and approved May 1, 1(J/0, by i
Smi.th, Superintendent, Oconee Nuclear Station.
Lewis stated that the above is a general manual.
He furnished 4
an outline of the contents of a " Radiation Safety Manual" being prepared by he and Thames to furnish more detailed health physics procedures.
5 Discussion of Prooperational Tests of Radiation Monitoring ~
instrumentati~oH~
This sub; ject was discussed with Lewis and Thames and con-(
current inspection made of the s tatus of installment of area and process monitors.
This matter was also discussed during the management exit interview and the state of
CO Rpt. Mo, 50-Th)/'/0-8 readiness expected at the time of prelicensing inspec-
- tion, I/anagement acknowledged that they really.ed the full degree of completion expected and they assured that current planning is oriented to satisfy full com-e1y
'hedule.
The p nel n.odu?es for f
on a
f the process nuallors were Installed in the control room console but none of the area mont toring system
'ms installed.
L w]s stated that he and Thnmes witneesed the calibration of all the r,onitoring Jystema at the supp' lier's plant.
6 Fuel Handling fcoceduros The inspecLor inquiced as to Lhe ;Ln.Lus of fuel hand)i np; procedures.
Hatipton stated that the procedures had been recently revised and a copy of the updated procedure
';ould be furn tched to the Ilegion II inspec Lor.
'/.
Ileview of Facilities and Equipments The inspection of the counting room, hot laboratory, cold laboratory, health physics office, change rooms, health physics monitoring stations and control points, decontamination facilities and calibration facility re reated that poured concrete walls were in p] ace but construction of parti Lions for the various areas was not complete and in the case of the hot laboratory, cold laboratory and health physics office, construction of the partitions was just beginning.
No furnishings, equipment or instrumentation had been installed in any of the health physics associated facilities.
8.
Formulation andp_roval of Ucalth Physics Procedures The staff health ph'nicist is responsible for establishing i
the company-wide health physics program and auditing it's of fec ti vene ss.
In this capacity, the staff health physicist has written a Health Physics Manual of a general nature for application to all licensee nuclear facilities; houever, approval by respective plant staff up through the superintendent is requi. red.
The staff health physicist collaborates wLth the plant health physicist in formulating detailed procedures upeci fic to a given plant, but these procedures must also be revioued and approved by plant staff and management.
CO Hp t. lTo. 50 469/(0-8
- 9.
.R..ad i a t ion Survoya nu ri nf; Powe r Asc ens t on The licensee's plans for radiation curveys during power ascension were discucced in detn!), inc V r :.v a i l d l '.',y of w ropr3 ate, calibrated survey instnaunts and the contents of plans and procedures for the survey.
Th:ute s stated that in is his responsibility to wcLtc the pro -
cedure but only preliminary conalderation has beengtven tbc content of the procedure which he expects to wrLtc p romp tly.
L.
Tes t Procedure :
The followin", procedures were revicued with the I!censee:
Procedure IIo.
Title TP 1A 202 02 A 00 High Presuure System Hydro Teat TP 1A P03 04 A 00 Low Pressure System Hydro Test TP 3A 203 05 A 00 Low Pressure InjeeLion System Funetion'il Test TP 1 A 204 02 A 00 R13 Spray System Hydrostatic Test TP 1A 150 05 A 00 RB Electrical Penetration Leak Test The inspector in discuccions uith McIntosh and Rogers pointed out that valve r..~uers were not specified in the procedures but the drawings and the valves therselves are identified by number.
In addition, the procedures for maLing hydrostatic tests do not specify which instrumentation n.ust be isolated from the test pressures.
McIntosh stated that an instrument man would be on duty and would know which instruments required valvi ng ou t.
The inspector advised McIntosh that the licensee should be prepared to demonstrate that no instrumentation had been i.nadvertently damaged by hydrostatic tests. McIntosh was also advised by the inspector that since the construction forces were releasing partial systems for tests and the pro-cedures were written for the complete systems, the procedures would require revisions to conduct many of the tests.
McIntosh stated that this would be done.
The inspector witnessed the testing of one group of electrical penetrations.
The testing was conducted in accordance with TP 1A 150 05 A 00, "RB Electrical Penetration Tests. "
Evaluation of the data was not completed during this inspection.
Attahment:
I Exhibit A i
i I
I
i s
4 DA Pcw r c J,J Ci.H:;F#,
_ _ __ _ '_ _.. _ _ - __. ' m ; i n:r_.. _. _ _ _ _
Ocence !!t iti c. n !!o. 1 DOCKi.T & I,TCEllSM L'OS. _S0flo C g
REACTOR OUTSTAUDING ]TF1'S I
l IDEhTIFIED ITEM I
CI.0SFO f>G2,3/5/68,1;E Cacrete t.ust cylinder breaks below s;":ca 6P-3, 7.4.,
/ /19//,?
/ e-3, 6/19//A, !;C.
l'nauthori zed revision to Ca hield ar..c i ficat.icna 6R-/, "
m:,
9/25/(v 6c ',, />/19/68, FC Failure to provide concrete inq.ector
( e-!., :'.
- ir4, o/25// r.
/ 8-/., 9/25/(8, FC Failure to prorarly test C vh. eld splices 69-1, Cn i r:,
1//,/69 69-8,9/9/69,pc Failure to Pro; orly quali fy mld procosluros 69-9, 'i, ' !/J/69 69-8,9/9/69,FC Failure ' o prog erly quali ry weldors 69-9, C,:1/3/09 c
I F.P 1,/11/(>9 Proceduro for rurair of arc strikes not availablo 70-S, Du miry 1 /2*(/'(o 4
Gi, 1/8/VO IIDT of core flooding valves
'.*eno, WCS to HQ,
2/2/'l0 70-1, 1/6/70, K Welding and :iDT deficiencies, CD:I issued Memo, WC.! to FQ, 3/M/70 Fingham 69-1, thin coolant pr.np discrepancies Closed,li to, UCf 12/9/69,l1C, t.o 11Q, 4/21/ 70 70 1,14/27/70,PC, f.ev strength concrete Memo WCS fo H],
4 8/7/70 IEB, S/1/70 Pressure vessel sure ends Memo WCS to HQ 8/5/70 70-6, S/2S/70,:lC, Tendon stressing discrepancies Me to HQ
- 70-8, 8/3/70, EC Tendons and stress causes closed, No
'Responne Required
(
7'or IIMI?f1FIED Column:
S - cal'ety ite:n; lYy item; IED - Reactor Inspection NC - noncompliance or nonconfornance item; UN - unrecolveiT item; IN - inqu j
and EnNrcement Branch request; ~O - other cource of identification j
(briefly specify)
Fxhibit A j
? age 1 o r 1