ML19312D855
| ML19312D855 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 05/01/1980 |
| From: | Richard Bright FLORIDA POWER CORP. |
| To: | Reid R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0578, RTR-NUREG-578 3-C-4, NUDOCS 8005050261 | |
| Download: ML19312D855 (3) | |
Text
,,.n f 8 %
g :4,: %
gg/
- r; a y a 4 y g ggo5050 6
2 4'
- p s
03 y ',sy
' ty ' ~
,y
(*
"d Q, g fju Florida Power C O f4 P O R A Y 8 0 N May 1,1980 File:
3-C-4 Mr. Robert W. Reid Branch Chief Operating Reactors Branch #4 Division of Operating Reactors U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Subj ect:
Crystal River Unit 3 Docket No. 50-302 Operating License No. DPR-72 Automatic Initiation of Emergency Feedwater Flow
Dear Mr. Reid:
In accordance with Section 2.1.7.a of NUREG-0578, the follow-ing design change for the automatic initiation of the motor-driven emergency feedwater pump is submitted for Staff review.
If you have any questions concerning the enclosed design change, please contact this office.
Sincerely, FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION Ronald M. Bright Acting Manager Nuclear Support Services RMBekcR01(D1)
General Office 3201 Tnirty-fourth street soutn. P O Box 14042, st Petersburg. Florda 33733 e 813-866-5151
STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF PINELLAS R.
M.
Bright states that he is the Acting Manager, Nuclear i
Support Services Department of Florida Power Corporation; that he is authorized on the part of said company to sign and file with 4
the Nuclear Regulatory Coninission the information attached hereto; and that all such statements made and matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.
k R. M/ Brigft i
Subscribed and sworn to before rc, a Notary Public in and for the State and County above named, this 1st day of May,1980.
hn,
l W
9 totary P,0blic Notary Public, State of Florida at Large, My Conunission Expires:
February 3, 1981 i
i
-.w.
AUTOMATIC INITIATION OF MOTOR DRIVEN EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMP EFP-1 Prior to the present refueling outage at Crystal River Unit 3, an automatic start of the motor-driven emergency feedwater pump (EFP-1) was not possible during a stat. ion blackout (loss of offsite power).
Modifications summarized below, have been made to control circuits for EFP-1 that now permit an automat-ic start with a station blackout.
In the event of a station blackout coincident with either a loss of both main feedwater pumps or low-low levels in both Once Through Steam Generators (OTSGs), EFP-1 will automatical-ly start fi ve (5) seconds after Engineered Safeguards (ES)
Block 1 is loaded onto the "A" train diesel generator.
If an ES Actuation Signal occurs concurrently, or anytime af-ter the above-listed conditions occur, EFP-1 will be automati-cally tripped, if already loaded on the diesel generator, and automatically restarted five (5) seconds after ES Block 4 has been started. This assures that ES Blocks have priority load-ing on the diesel generators.
Under worse case conditions of ES Actuation with "B" Train diesel generator unavailable, concurrent with a station black-out condition, the automatic starting of EFP-1 will result in a voltage drop to 69.7% of nominal (4000 Volts) voltage.
The voltage drop, however, will last only 43% of the load-sequence time interval and will, therefore, preclude problems with op-erating rotational equipment.
In addition, equipment such as contactors will remain energized since the design dropout voltage is 55% of nominal.
With the addition of EFP-1 to the loads associated with ES Blocks 1 through 4, the "A"
train diesel generator, under worst case conditions, will be operating at 3181 kW, which is 96.4% of the 30-minute rating of 3300 kW.
In order not to ex-ceed this rating, a watt transducer that monitors the diesel generator output has been installed.
Alarms will be seen in the Control Room when the 2000-hour rating of 3000 kW is exceeded, and again when 25 of the 30 minutes have been expended.
At 30 minutes, EFP-1 will be automatically tripped and subsequent breaker closure will be prevented until the trip circuit is manually reset.
Resetting the trip circuit will be administratively controlled.
l FPC considers this design change a short-tenn solution.
Long-l term solutions are still under consideration and future design changes will be submitted as these final solutions are dctermined.