ML19312C384
| ML19312C384 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee, Mcguire, McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 06/12/1978 |
| From: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Parker W DUKE POWER CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7912130911 | |
| Download: ML19312C384 (2) | |
Text
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<,,...,..,e JUN 121978 in Reply Refer To:
Pll:JPO 50-369, 50-370 50-269, 50-270 50-287 Duke Power Company Attn:
Mr. William O. Parker, Jr.
Vice President, Steam Production P. O. Box 2178 422 South Church Street Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 Gentlemen:
Enclosed is IE Bulletin No. 78-08 which requires action by you with regard to your power, test or research reactor facility (ies) with a Fuel Element Transfer Tube and Operating License.
Should you have questions regarding this Bulletin or the actions required of you, please contact this office.
Sincerely, pf James P.
'Reilly i
r/
Director
Enclosures:
1.
List of IE Bulletins Issued in 1978 l
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JUN 121978 f Duke Power Company i
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J. C. Rogers, Project Manager McGuire Nuclear Station P. O. Box 2178 Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 M. D. McIntosh, Plant Manager McGuire Nuclear Station P. O. Box 488 Cornelius, North Carolina 28031 J. E. S=ith, Station Manager Oconee Nuclear Station P. O. Box 1175 Seneca, South Carolina 29678 4
i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMEhi WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 June 12, 1978 IE Bulletin 78-08 RADIATION LEVELS FROM FUEL ELEMEhi TPANSFER TUBES Description of Circumstances:
On April 5, 1978, two radiation protection technicians at Portland General Electric Company's Trojan Nuclear Power Plant received whole body radiation doses of 27.3 and 17.1 rem while performing a survey adjacent to an exposed section of the fuel element transfer tube during the plant's first refueling outage.
The exposures occurred in a shielded space inside the containment building which housed one The second of two fuel element transfer tube seismic relief bellows.
bellows outside of containment had been provided with removable shielding and appropriate access controls.
The bellows. space inside containment was constructed with labyrinth-type shielding, however, access to the space was not controlled. The technicians were per-forming surveys in an attempt to identify a reported possible source of higher than expected radiation and had scheduled the survey to coincide with the passage of a fuel element through the fuel element The technicians believed that the fuel element transfer transfer tube.
tube was buried in the concrete beyond the compartment they occupied and assumed that the structure passing through the compartment was a ventilation duct.
The licensee staff had performed surveys of all areas of the plant during the outage in an attempt to identify intermittent sources of radiation resulting from refueling activities; however, nothing significant was identified because of the transient nature of the Subsequent to the exposures, the licensee resulting radiation fields.
performed surveys in numerous areas surrounding the general area of the fuel transfer tube with an irradiated fuel element stopped in the The surveys identified a nu=ber of areas previously transfer tube.
The unidentified where significant radiation streaming was present.
principal paths of radiation streaming were the narrow seismic relief spaces between the containment and internal and external structures.
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IE Bulletin 78-08 June 12, 1978 Action To Be Taken By Licensees:
While the exposures above occurred at a pressurized water reactor, i
similar situations could occur at any reactor facility designed to transfer spent fuel between the reactor refueling canal and a spent fuel storage pool outside of containment by means of a fuel element transfer tube. Accordingly, holders of power, test and research reactor operating licenses where plant design incorporates a fuel element transfer tube, are to take the following actions:
1.
Perform a thorough review of shielding design of plant areas adjacent to the fuel transfer tube to identify potential high radiation areas, both continuous and transient, as defined in 10 CFR 20.202(b).
2.
Assure that positive control of access exists or is included in the facility design for entryways into potential high radiation areas where a portion of a fuel transfer tube is accessible in an unshielded condition.
Assure that points of access to potential high radiation areas 3.
associated with accessible unshielded portions of a fuel transfer tube are conspicuously posted in accordance with 10 CFR 20.203(c).
4.
If the action from Paragraph 1 above identifies the potential for radiation streaming from shielded spaces, plan and conduct special radiation surveys during the next refueling to identify and control such areas.
It is not necessary to survey in areas where the transfer tube is exposed, but if it is found desirable, extreme care should be exercised to control and limit personnel Care should also be taken in planning surveys and fuel exposure.
movements such that survey requirements do not override any technical limitations on fuel movement.
Conf'irm by written reply to the NRC Regional Office within 60 days 5.
that the actions for Items 1-4 above have been or are being taken.
A record, detailing findings, actions taken and actions to be e
taken, should be retained for review by NRC during subsequent radiological safety inspection.
Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires 7-31-80.
Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
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f' IE Bulletin No. 78-0B June 12, 1978 LISTING OF BULLETINS ISSUED IN 1978 Bulletin Subject Date Issued Issued To No.
78-01 Flammable Contact -
1/16/78 All Power Reactor Facilities with an Arm Retainers in G.I.
OL or CP CR120A Relays 78-02 Terminal Block 1/30/78 All Power Reactor Facilities with an Qualification OL or CP 78-03 Potential Explosive 2/8/78 All BWR Power Reactor Facilities Gas Mixture Accumula-with an OL or CP rd7ns Associated with bWA Offgas System Operations 78-04 Environmental Quali-2/21/78 All Power Reactor Facilities with an fication of Certain OL or CP Stem Mounted Limit Switches Inside Reactor Containment 78-05 Malfunctioning of 4/14/78 All Power Reactor Facilities with an Circuit Breaker OL or CP Auxiliary Contact Mechanism-General Model CR105X 78-06 Defective Cutler-Hammer 5/31/78 All Power Reactor Facilities with an Hammer, Type M Relays OL or CP with DC Coils 78-07 Protection afforded 6/12/78 All Power Reactor Facilities with an by Air-Line Respirators OL, all class E and F and Supplied-Air Hoods Research Reactors with an OL, all Fuel Cycle Facilities with an OL, and all Priority 1 Material Licensees Page 1 of 1
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