ML19312C228

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RO 269/76-02:on 760128,1A LPIS,1A Reactor Bldg Spray & 1A Hpis Pump Motor Circuits Found Inoperable.Caused by Apparent Procedure Deficiency.Correct Substitute for Engineered Safeguards safety-related Breakers Not Clearly Identified
ML19312C228
Person / Time
Site: Oconee Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 02/26/1976
From:
DUKE POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19312C226 List:
References
RO-269-76-02, RO-269-76-2, NUDOCS 7912100704
Download: ML19312C228 (1)


Text

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  • 4 DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE UNIT 1 4

Report No.:

R0-269/76-2 Report Date:

February 26, 1976 Occurrence Date:

January 28, 1976 Facility: Oconee Unit 1, Seneca, South Carolina Identification of Occurrence:

Inoperable 1A LPI, lA RBS, and 1A HPI pumps due to failure of ES spare breakers.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Unit at 100% full power Description of Occurrence:

On January 27, 1976, during the performance of periodic maintenance on the Oconee Unit 1 Engineered Safeguards (ES) electrical breakers, spare breckers were placed in the 1A Low Pressure Injection, lA Reactor Building Spray, and 1A high pressure injection pump motor circuits.

Each pump was verified to be operable at that time; however, the pumps would not start on January 28, 1976.

Subseqcant testing revealed that the pumps could be successfully started only once after resetting the breakers (spares installed on January 27, 1976).

The original ES breakers were reinstalled and tested and the pumps declared operable by 1030 hours0.0119 days <br />0.286 hours <br />0.0017 weeks <br />3.91915e-4 months <br /> January 28, 1976.

i Apparent Cause of occurrence:

This occurrence was apparently caused by a procedure deficiency in that the procedure did not clearly identify the correct substitute ES safety-related breakers to be used in these circuits.

In this case, the original breakers were replaced with ones similar in appearance, but lacking an installed 250 OHM 50 watt resistor necessary for the breaker to correctly cycle.

Analysis of Occurrence:

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Although the ES electrical breakers mentioned were replaced with inoperable spares, the redundant systems were tested and verified operable as required by Oconee Technical Specifications 3.3.5 and 3.3.7 and would have functioned properly if required.

Also, the original breakers were reinstalled within the 24-hour maintenance period permitted by Technical Specification 3.3.5.

Therefore, it is concluded that the health and safety of the public was not affected by this occurrence.

Corrective Action:

To prevent further occurrences of this type, a color coding scheme is Faing devised to assure that electrical breakers are properly matched to correct cabinets and that spare breakers are properly identified.

This scheme will be completed and implemented in station maintenance procedures by June 1, 1976.

7912100 NY