ML19312B773
| ML19312B773 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 11/22/1977 |
| From: | Parker W DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | Case E, Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7911190564 | |
| Download: ML19312B773 (17) | |
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dg NRC DISTRIBUTION pon PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL FROM:
DATsopoocuueNT TO:
Duke Power Company 11/22/77 Mr. Edson G. Case Charlotte, North Carolina cave maceivso William O. Parker, Jr.
11/28/77 70.arre n ONoTomizeo amor iNeur,ueu Nuussa or copies maceiveo geniciNAL fvNcLAssieis o C * *"
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PLANT NAME:
Oconee Units 1-2-3 DISTRIBITIION OF FIRE PRUIECTION INFO PER S.SHEPPARD 9-22-76 FOR OPERATING REACTORS RJL 11/29/77 (1-P)
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SAFETY FOR ACTION /INFORMATION
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I OELD l BENAROYA (2) i EISENHL7 i BUTLER (5) 1 WAMBACH R. MURANAKA HANAUER I
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Reference:
Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, -287
Dear Sir:
In response to requests for additional information raised by members of your staff at the Oconee Nuclear Station fire protection visit during the week of October 3, 1977 and by your letter of November 10, 1977, the attached information is provided.
truly yours,/
Ver
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William O. Parker, M MST:ge Attachment 773?20140
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ATTAC1011:h'T 1
-RESPONSE TO ADDITIONAL I2 FORMATION
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- 1). Provide a description of the Oconee fire protection administrative controls which showe how the NRC guidelines are met.
A description of the Oconee fire protection administrative controls which shows how the NRC guidelines as established in Mr. A. Schwencer's 4
letter dated August 19, 1977 will be transmitted by January 16, 1978.
2)
Identify the systems and instrumentation required to achieve safe shutdown in a fire situation.
The routing of instrumentation, power and control cables associated with safe shutdown systems required by question 3 is in progress.
The purpose of this study is to minimize the amount of equipment which must function in order to achieve a safe shutdown. Therefore, those systems and instrumentation required have not yet been fully identified.
A response to this question will be provided by April 1, 1978.
- 3) The routing of instrumentation, power and control cables associated with the safe shutdown systems should be reviewed to determine the separation of redundant cables.
Provide the results of this review l
for the Turbine Building, Auxiliary Building, Block House, Reactor Building, and Keowee Hydro facility.
The routing of instrumentation, power and control cables associated with safe shutdown systems in the above mentioned areas is in progress.
The results of this study, to include adequate provision for safe shutdown of the unit in the event of a fire, will be forwarded to you by April 1, 1978.
The description of the power distribution system in the Unit 1,2 block house and interconnection to the Unit 3 block house are indicated on the attached drawings.
0-702-A 0-1976 0-702 0-1976A 0-1702 0-1930 0-952 0-1931 0-952-A 0-1929 0-976 0-2930A 0-976-A 0-2976 0-931 0-2952 0-931-A An inspection of Keowee hydro station has been conducted.
There are several areas in which a fire could disable part of both Keowee start circuits.
These areas of susceptibility are the Keowee Battery Room, and the Mechanical Equipment Gallery.
Details of the cable routings i
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are provided on drawings K-710, K-890, K-897, and K-897-A.
It should be noted, however, that the Oconee Nuclear Station can attain and maintain a hot shutdown condition without offsite or emergency power and therefore this should not be a concern.
- 4) Clarify the fire hazard analysis to identify separate fire areas and the rating of fire barriers separating fire areas.
The attached drawings OFP-2 through 0FP-8 have been marked to show the fire rating of all walls at Oconee.
Separate fire areas are noted on each drawing.
Drawing 0FP-5 shows that the entire elevation is a single fire area with the exception of the 7 separate fire areas shown on the drawing. These separate fire areas include the Unit 1 Unit 2, and Unit 3 equipment rooms; the Unit 1, Unit 2, and Unit 3 storage rooms and the hot machine shop located in the Unit 2 area.
5)
Identify all those ventilation duct and doorway penetrations of fire barriers which will not be upgraded to a rating equivalent to that required of the fire barrier. Justify not upgrading these.
All doorway penetrations of fire barriers have been upgraded to a rating equivalent to that required of the fire barrier.
The results of the study on ventilation duct penetrations will be submitted by April 1, 1978.
- 6) Provide the results of an analysis of the radiological consequences of fires in radwaste areas.
A study has been performed to evaluate the potential consequences of fires in radwaste areas.
Each area which contains radsaste equip-ment was evaluated for the presence of combustible material.
If no combustible material is present, the possibility of fires was not considered.
In those areas which contain combustibles materials an evaluation of the consequences of a potential fire was performed.
In all cases, no significant release of radioactive material to the environment would occur.
- 7) Verify that the fire detection system can be powered if the normal station power is lost.
The fire detection system panelboards are normally fed from the static inverters. These are supplied from one of two batteries which in' turn are each supplied from battery chargers from safety related motor control centers.
In the event normal station power were lost, the safety related motor control centers would be fed from the Keovee generators or from the dedicated 100 KV transmission line from the Lee combustion turbines.
- 8) Verify that the fire detection system is self monitoring for failure such as opens or shorts.
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Tha fire alarm system is a Pyrotronics, Inc. Pyr-a-larm System.
It is self monitoring for opens and shorts.
Shorts to ground, as long as they.are on the same lead, do not effect the ability of detection.
If shorts to ground occur on both leads, this then becomes a short which is monitored and alarms to the control room.
- 9) Describe the provisions for audible alarm in the coatrol room indicating water flow in sprinkler and deluge systems.
A nuclear station modification has been initiated to provide an audible alarm in the control room indicating water flow in sprinkler or deluge systems.
This modification will be completed by April 1, 1978.
- 10) Provide the results of an analysis of the potential for a fire in a safety-related area causing loss of both regular and emergency lighting to areas providing access to the fire.
Lighting at Oconee is accomplished by use of three basic lighting systems, each of which is independent of the other except for required switching interfaces, and each of which are actually broken down into rather small systems providing lighting to small specific areas.
These lighting systems are defined as:
1.
The normal AC lighting is provided at 208/120 volt AC through lighting panelboards fed from many divers power sources and located at multiple areas throughout the Turbine Building, Auxiliary Building, O actor Building and other plant areas.
2.
The backup 250 volt DC deadlight system is also known as the emergency DC lighting system.
DC lighting is located at selected areas in the Turbine Building, Auxiliary Building, Reactor Building and other plant areas and provides emergency lighting in those areas whenever the normal AC lighting is lost.
The DC lighting
'is automatically switched on by a DC relay which drops out when AC to the area lighting panelboard is lost.
There are many DC lighting relays and associated DC lights.
3.
The emergency 208/120 volt AC lighting system is our third system.
It'is actually two systems per unit. The two systems are identified as "A" train and "B" train with each train fed from a separate engineered safeguard motor control center. The emergency AC' lighting is utilized in the Auxiliary Building and the Reactor Building to supplement the normal AC lighting and the DC deadlights in these areas.
In order to help understand the Oconee lighting layout, the following draw-ings are attached:
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0-839 0-2846 0-840 0-2846A Unit 3
'0-841A 0-2846B Auxiliary 0-841B 0-2846C Pullding 0-842 0-842A 0-842B 0-830 Unit 1 0-842C 0-830A Reactor 0-844 Unit 1-2 0-832 Building 0-844A Auxiliary.
0-846 Building 0-846A 0-850 0-846B 0-850A Unit 1 0-846C 0-851 Turbine 0-846D 0-851A Building 0-847 0-852 0-847A 0-8478 0-847C 0-847D A few points which we wish to make are as follows:
1.
The three lighting systems (and their parts) are each installed in their own separate raceways or condult.
II.
Although one system providing lighting to an area may be lost, lighting in
'that area as provided by other systems or by spill-lighting from adjacent areas would easily provide access into and out of the area involved.
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AUXILIARY BUILDING DRAWING PNLBD.
PNLBD. LOC.
TRAhsFORMER MCC/ LOC 0-839 ILI Q-64; El. 771 30 KVA IXL El. 775/S-72 0-839 IL2 R-74; El. 771 208V Bus Section IXN E1. 775/T-72 0-840A ILIA 45 KVA 1XN El. 775/T-72 0-841A IL7 U-74; El. 856 45 KVA 1XQ El. 796/J-75 0-841B ILl4 T-74; El. 856 203V Bus Section IXT El. 838/N-72 0-841A IL5 V-72; El. 810 30 KVA IXQ E1. 796/V-75 0-8418 IL6 0-842 IL3 Ra-63; El. 796 30 KVA IX0 El. 796/P-72 0-842C 2L3 Ra-83; E1. 796 30 KVA 2X0 E1. 796/P-74 0-842A IL4 Ra-71; El. 796 20LV Bus Section IX0 El 706/P-72 0-842B 2L4 Ra-75; El. 796 208V Bus Section 2X0 El. 7o6/P-74 0-844 IL8 X-71; El. 813 30 KVA IXR El. 838/P-71 0-844A ILIO P-67; El. 813 208V Bus Section 1XT E1. 838/N-72 0-844A 2LB X-75; El. 813 2L10 208V Bus Section 2XR El. 038/P-75 0-846 IL21 R-72; El. 826 208V Bus Section IXP El. 796/Q-72 0-846 IL22 R-72; El. 826 208V Bus Section IXP El. 796/q-72 0-846 2L21 RQ-74; El. 826 208V Bus Section 2XP El. 796/Q-73 0-846 2L22 RQ-74; El. 326 208V Bus Section 2XP El. 796/Q-73 0-846 2L23 RQ-75; El. 826 208V Bus Section 2XP El. 796/Q-73 2L2 30 KVA 2XN El 775/S-54 IL9 15 KVA IX0 El. 796/P-72 2L9 15 KVA 2X0 El. 796/P-74 0-846B IL20 P-71; El 818 208V Bus Section 1X0 El. 706/P-72 0-846C 2L20 P-75; El. 818 208V Bus Section 2X0 El. 796/P-74 0-8560 IL2h R-72/73; El. 826 208V Bus Section IX0 E1. 796/P-71 0-846D 2L24 R-73/74; El. 826 208V Bus Section 2X0 El. 796/P-74 0-847 IL11 P-70/71; E1. 842 208V Bus Secticn IXR El. 838/P-71 0-847A 2L11 P-75/76; El. 842 208V Bu' Section 2XR El. 838/P-75 0-847B IL15 T-73/74; El. 842 208V Bus Section IXR El. 838/P-71 0-847C ILik T-74; El. 842 208V Bus Section IXT E1. 838/N-72 0-2846 3L21 Q-87/88;.El. 826 208V Bus Section 3X0 El. 796/Qa-80 0-2846 3L21A q-87/88; El. 826 208V Bus Section 3X0 E1. 7o6/Qa-89 0-2846 3L22 Q-8.o/90; El. 826
-208V Bus Section 3XR El. 838/N-89 0-2846 3L22A Q-89/90; El. 826 208V Bus Section 3XR El. 838/N-89 0-2846B 3L20 P-00; El. 809 208V Bus Section 3X0 El. 796/Qa-89 0-2846C 3L24 R-88/89; El. 796 208V Bus Section 3XP El. 796/Qa-89
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TURBINE BUILDING DRAWING PNLBD.
PNLBD. LOC TRANSFORMER MCC/ LOC 0-850 IL30 J-16; El. 775 45 KVA 1XF El. 775/M-22 0-850 IL31 D-16; El. 775 45 KVA IXB E1. 775/B-19 0-850
!L34 J-16; El. 800 45 KVA IXGB E1. 796/M-15 0-850 IL35 D-16; El. 800 45 KVA IXA El. 796/D-13 0-850A IL36 J-24; El. 800 65 KVA 1XGA E1. 796/K-21 0-850A IL37 D-24; E1. 800 45 KVA IXA El. 796/D-13 0-850A IL33 0-24; E1. 775 45 KVA IXC El. 775/B-25 0-850A IL32 J-24; E1. 775 45 KVA IXE E1. 775/H-27 0-851 IL38 J-17; El. 826 45 KVA IXGB El. 796/M-15 0-852 IL38A J-17; El. 826 IL39 D-17; El. 826 30 KVA IXA El. 796/D-13 IL39A 0-851A IL40 J-24; El. 826 45 KVA 1XGA El. 796/K-21 0-852 IL40A J-24; El. 826 0-851A IL41 0-2 4; El. 826 30 KVA IXA El. 796/D-13 0-853 IL41A o
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11)
Provide details on the Reactor Coolant Pump oil collection: system.
The attached simplified diagram describes the typical reactor coolant. pump oil collection system.
- 12) Provide information on high pressure service water pump autostart circuit, and describe the potential for a fire causing loss of the auto-start capability.
Review of the drawings (previously given to NRC) covering the high pressure service water pump motors and associated controls indicates the following:
1.
Power circuits to the high pressure service water pumps A and B are secure in that cables from the switchgear to the motors is run in. separate conduit embedded in the Turbine Building wall and basement floor concrete.
2.
The pump motors are fed from redundant switchgear.
High Pressure Service Water Pump motor A from Switchgear B2T and High Pressure Service Water Pump motor B from Switchgear BIT.
3.
The motors can be energized manually from the switchgear or from the control room at any time.
4.
Automatic start capability is based on water level control of the elevated storage tank.
Redundant control devices are used to initiate starts and stops. These control devices are located in the elevated storage tank and brought together at the tank base and from there in weight-conduit control connection.
These devices terminate in the terminal cabinet SSTC which is located in the Unit 1 cable room.
Fires at any of the three following areas could cause loss of the auto start capability of the pumps.
1.
A fire at the base of elevated storage tank.
2.
A fire that involved the 8 conductor cable.
3.
A fire in the cable room involving terminal cabinet STTC.
Although a fire could cause loss of auto start capability to both pumps they could still be started manually at the switchgear.
It is also noted that a fif ty horsepower service water jockey pump is normally available and running to supply water to the high pressure service water discharge header piping.
This in combination with the stored source of water in the elevated storage-tank is considered sufficient.
- 13) Provide the data sheet on the "Armaflex" Foam Insulation.
Information concerning the foam insulation is attached.
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- 14). Verify that'the oil fired boiler conforms to NFPA 85, " Oil-and-Gas-Fired Watertube Furnaces - One Boiler, '73".
The Auxiliary Boiler meets the provisions of NFPA 85 except:
a.
NFPA requires that the unit trip if control. air to the controls is lost.
The Oconee Auxiliary Boiler will drop to minimal firing if control air is lost to controls.
b.
NFPA requires a permissive signal indicating fuel line valves are closed prior to fan start.
The Oconee Auxiliary Boiler will purge to remove fuel leakage prior to fan start.
The Oconee Auxiliary Boiler was constructed in accordance with FIA Standards.
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ATTACRMENT 2 RESPONSE TO NRC POSITIONS 1)
Hose stations should be located at suf'ficient points so that all safe shutdown and large fire hazard areas in Auxiliary and Turbine Building and Keowee facility may be reached with 100 feet of hose located at the hose stations.
Drawings of 3,4,5,6 and 8 included in this report show location of proposed hose stations on each level of the Auxiliary Building to assure that safe shutdown equipment and large fire hazard areas can be reached with the 100 feet of hose located at these hose stations.
2)
Double leafed fire doors should be provided with closure " coordinators" to assure that doors close properly.
Double leaf fire doors will be modified to assure that only one door may normally be opened; therefore, assuring that doors will close properly.
- 3) Double glass doors should open into the Auxiliary Building so that these doors will not-impede closure of the sliding fire doors.
Double glass doors leading from the control rooms to the Turbine Building will be modified to assure that only one door may normally be opened; therefore, assuring that doors will close properly.
4)
Where the cable study shows that cable for redundant safe shutdown systems are in proximity or exposed to a common fire hazard, adequate barriers, suppression or rerouting should be provided so that redundant systems are not exposed to a fire.
If the redundant cables are in the cable spreading rooms, equipment rooms, one set should be routed outside of the area due to the fire. loading in these rooms. An alternative would be to provide a remote shutdown station with adequate controls and instrumentation to reach hot shutdown with the capability to reach cold shutdown by manually activating breakers and operating valves.
Details should be provided as to how this position will be implemented.
Details of this study, to include provisions for implementing this position, will be submitted by April 1, 1978.
- 5) Auxiliary Rooms around the control room should be separated from the control area by at least one hour doors and barriers.
The fire loading in auxiliary rooms around the control room is such that fire barriers and rated doors would not be required.
Portable extinguishers and automatic deteccion.are provided and are considered sufficient protection for the control room area.
6)
Propane tanks outside the Turbine Building should be moved or provided with exc'ess flow valves and have the bottle strapped in place.
Propane tanks located outside the Turbine Building will be anchored and provided with excess flow valves.
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- 7) Cloth' identification tags should be replaced with noncombustible tags in the Unit 1 cable spreading room.
' Cloth identification tags will be replaced with noncombustible tags in the Unit 1 cable spreading room.
8)
Certain penetrations were noticed which should be sealed.
a.
Flexible "greenfield" conduit penetrations into the Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room should be sealed inside the conduit; b.
The metal plates in the floor between Unit 1 and Unit 2 control and the cable spreading rooms should be upgraded to three-hour fire-rated; and c.
Bus duct penetrations in the barrier between the transformer and switchgear in the Block House should be sealed.
Flexible "greenfield" conduit penetrations will be sealed inside the conduit.
The metal. plate penetrations in the floor between Unit 1 and Unit 2 will be upgraded to three-hour fire-rated.
Bus duct penetrations in the barrier between the transformer and switchgear in the Block House will be sealed to three hour rated penetration.
9)
Smoke detectors should be located in all safe shutdown areas with an adequate number of ceiling level. Details identifying the quantity of detectors to be located in each area after the modifications should be provided.
Drawings 0-756 and 0-2756 attached with this submittal indicate the smoke detectors which are pres.ently located in these areas. Detactors to be added will be located at the ceiling level and are included in Appendix B to the original submittal dated December 21, 1976.
- 10) Water or halon type 1211 portable fire extinguishers should be provided in the control rooms.
Portable halon type 1211 portable fire extinguishars will be provided in each control room.
- 11) Fire doors separating redundant safe shutdown equipment or protecting safe shutdown equipment from large fire hazards should be locked, alarmed or provided with a fire sensitive closure device.
Fire doors separating redundant safe shutdown equipment or protecting safe. shutdown equipment from large fir e hazards are alarmed to the control room and provided with automatJ.c closure devices.
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- 12) Portable smoke purge fans and portable duct work should be provided.
" Portable smoke purge fans and portable duct work will be provided for station personnel.
- 13) Two separate air bottles and a six hour supply should be provided for each air mask required for fire brigade personnel and operators.
Two separate air bottles and a six hour supply will be provided for each air mask required for fire brigade personnel and operators.
- 14) Fixed repeaters should be provided to allow use of portable radio communications in the Reactor Building.
Investigation is in progress to determine the feasibility of the use of fixed repeaters in the Reactor Building.
This will be addressed by April 1, 1978.
- 15) Portable hand lights should be provided for fire brigade use.
Portable hand lights will be provided for fire brigade use.
- 16) A single type of hose nozzle that goes through the spray stream before going to the straight stream should be provided for all interior stations.
Interior hose stations located near electrical equipment will be provided with spray stream nozzles or the present nozzle will be modified to prevent a straight stream flow.
- 17) Cable penetration fire stops should be tested to demonstrate a fire rating equivalent to that required for the fire barrier from which the penetration is used.
The test should be performed in accordance with ASTM E-119 with the following exceptions.
a.
The cables used in the test should include the cable insulation materials used in the facility.
b.
The test sample should be representative of the worst case configuration of cable loading, cable tray arrangement and anchoring and penetration fire stops size and design.
The test sample should also be representative of the cable sizes in the facility. Testing of the penetration fire stop in the floor conEiguration will qualify the fire stop for use in the wall configuration also.
c.
Cable penetrating the fire stop should extend at least three feet on the unexposed side and at least one foot on the exposed side.
.d.
.The fire stop should be tested in both direction unless the fire stop is symetrical.
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Y c.
Th: fire stop should b tested with a pressure differential acro::s it that is equivalent to the maximum pressure differen-tial a fire stop in the plant is expected to experience.
f.
Temperature levels of the cable insulation, cable conductor, cable tray or conduit and fire stop materials should be recorded for the unexposed side of the fire stop.
g.
Exceptance criteria - the test is acceptable if.
The cable penetrations fire stop has withstood the fire endurance test without passage of flame or ignition of cable on the unex-posed side for a period equal to the required fire rating, and The temperature levels recorded for the unexposed side are analyzed and demonstrate that the maximum temperatures are sufficiently below the cable insulation ignition temperature, and The fire stop remains intact and does not allow projection of water beyond the unexposed surface during the hose stream test.
Cable penetration fire stops will be tested to demonstrate a fire rating equivalent to that required for the fire Earrier in which the penetration is used.
The test will be performed in accordance with ASTM E-119 with the exceptions enumerated above.
Test acceptance criteria will be used to qualify the fire stop.
Results of the fire test will be available in February 1978 for evaluation.
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