ML19312B751
| ML19312B751 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 10/10/1969 |
| From: | Kelley W, Murphy C, Seidle W US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19312B750 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-69-08, 50-269-69-8, 50-270-69-07, 50-270-69-7, 50-287-69-07, 50-287-69-7, NUDOCS 7911180076 | |
| Download: ML19312B751 (22) | |
Text
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U. S. ATOMIC ENERCY COMMISSION REGION II DIVISION OF COMPLIANCE Report of Inspection CO Report Nos. 50-269/69-8 50-270/69-7 50-287/69-7 Licensee Duke Power Company Oconee 1, 2, 3 License Nos. CPPR-33, 34, 35 Category A Dates of Inspection Septen.ber 9-12, 1969 i
Dates of Previous Inspection:
July 15-17, 1969 Inspected By: /
M,
// +0 6f C. E. Mur hy, Rd'cto1 T spector (In Charge) 7Dafe 1/
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/D 6 S'Y W. D. Kellb, Rep 6 tor Inspector (Construction)
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2 W. W. Peery, Ra ation Specialist Date'
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/C!/$ d Reviewed By:
,-i W. C. Seidle,11enior Reactor Inspector Date Note: The portions of this report relating to weldor and welding pro-cedure qualification uere prepared by W. D. Kelley. The portion relating to the environmental monitoring program was prepared _
by W. W. Peery.
Proprietary Information None SCOPE 1
An announced inspection was made of the three 2568 Hwt pressurized I
water reactors under construction near Seneca, South Carolina, known j
as Oconee Station Nos. 1, 2, and 3.
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CO Report Mos. 50-269/69-8 50-270/69-7 50-287/69-7 Purposes of the inspection weres (1) to review changes to the quality cortrol organization and manual; (2) to determine the construction status and significant changes to schedule dates; (3) to review the welding QA/QC program in depth; (4) to review the licensee's environ-mental monitoring program and inspect the ronitoring facilities; (5) to review the electrical / instrumentation QA/QC program to determine the progress made in developing procedures; (6) to determine if pro-cedures were established to ensure that vendor inspection documenta-tion and QA certifications wee being' received at the site.
SUMMARY
Safety Items - Hone Nonconformance Items - Review of Unit 1 and 2 welding practices revealed the following items of nonconformances 1.
Dye penetrant was being removed from liner plate welds. prior to
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the application of developer in a manner contrary to Section VIII, AppendLx VIII, of ASME.
(See Section H.)
2.
Some welding procedures were not qualified in accordance with Section IX of ASHE.
(See Section G.)
3.-
In performing weldor qualification tests, the weldors used currents outside the range specified in the' welding procedure.
(See Section G.)
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Status of Previously Reported Problems -
1.
Vendor Inspection Documentation Procedures have been established to insure that Class I material and equipment received at r*te site cde not installed unless thcp have received proper vendor inspection 'and the QC acceptance documenta-tion is in order.
(See Section I.)
' 2'.
Electrical / Instrumentation QA Manual No additional work has been accomplished toward providing written procedures for the receipt, storc8e, installation and testing of Class I ciectrical/ instrumentation material and equipment.
(See Management Interview and Section L.)~
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CO Report Nos. 50-269/69-8 50-270/69-7 50-287/69-7 3.
Weld Discrepancy Procedures A checkoff list is now prepared for each weld in a Class I system.
This list is placed in a plastic envelope adjacent to the weld.
Each operation in preparing and testing the weld must be initialed by the responsible individual before the next operation is per-mitted. When the checklist is completed, it becomes a part of the QC record and ensures that all operations have been completed (See Section J.)
Other Sinnificant Items -
1.
The licensee informed the inspector that two lots of defective Cadweld powder had been received from the manufacturer.
the defective splices made with,ghis powder have been identified All of and replaced.
(See Section K.)u 2.
Ultrasonic tests performed by'the licensee have revealed extensive laminations in one heat of the containment liner plate for Unit 1.
The ef fect of the laminations on containment i
integrity has not been ascertained nor have repair procedures been developed.
Section M.)
(See 3.
Steam Generator A for Unit I has been received and placed in position in the containment.
(See ' ection D.)
S 4.
..n in-depth inspection of the site environmental monitoring pro-Bram and the monitoring equipment was found to ~be generally satis fac tory.
(See Section F.)
5.
Construction progress is discussed in Section D.
Management Interview - Three interviews were conducted; one, when Peery completed his inspection; a second, when Lee concluded his site visit t and the third, at the conclusion of the inspection.
items covered and the attendees at each meeting are discussed below The The first interview was held uith Wells _ and Lewis present.
Peery reviewed his inspection and concluded by stating that in general the monitoring program and facilities appeared to be adequate.
houever, that the emergency procedures would require the addition ofHe stated, detailed information on all aspects of _the emergency program.
In response to the inspectort s inquiry, Lewis stated that he planned to expand the number of environmental monitoring stations prior to the startup of the first reactor.
(See Section F.)
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Inquiry Memorandum - Duke Power Company, dated September 16,'1969.
i CO Report Nos. 50-269/69-8
50-270/69-7 50-287/69-7 The second interview was held at the request of Lee prior to his This meeting was attended departure ' from the cite on September 11.The following items were discussed:
by Lee, Watkins, Rogers and Wells.
Lee was advised that the results of the inspection of the environ-1.
mental monitoring facilities and the review of the monitoring program were generally satisfactory.
(See Section F.)
The inspector pointed out to Lee that the site ciectrical/
2.
instrumentation QA/QC program had been reviewed in depth pn the previous inspection and a followup review had been conducted on this inspection. The inspector noted that little, if any, work had been done on the site electrical / instrumentation QA manual.
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l The need to develop a comprehensive program for the receipt, storage, and installation of the Class I electricciand instrumenta-tion material and equipment was emphasised. Lee stated that prep-aration of written procedures for the manual would be initiated promptly.
(See Section L.)
The inspector asked Lee if the probicm of the containment liner 3.
plate had been resolved. Ltc stated that Bechtel and Duke j
Engineering were conducting a study to determine what ef fect, if any, the laminations would have on containment integrity. He noted that the placement of concrete for the Unit I containment had been halted pending completion of the study. Lee further stated that although he had received recommendations on a course of action he had not been satisfied that they were adequate and that a decision had not been reache'd as yet as to what would be done. He concluded by saying that'as soon as a decision was reached he would advise the inspector.
(See Section M.)
The probica of the defective Cadweld powder lots were discussed 4.
briefly. Lee agreed to supply the inspector with the certifica-tion dates _ of the defective lots. The inspector concurred with Lee that the handling of the problem appeared to be adequate.
(See Section K.)
The items The final interview was held with Dick, Rogers and Wells.
covered in the previous interviews were briefly reviewed and the -
following additional items also were discussed:
1.
Personnel Hatch Ring The inspectors expressed concern that the personnel hatch ring It frame was being welded into place without backing strips.
was also pointed out that it appeared that. excessive current y
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CO Report Nos. 50-269/69-8 -
'50-270/69-7 50-287/69-7' had been used when some of the welds had been made since several-4.
burn throughs had been noted.
Dick instructed Wells to see that -
_ backing strips ~were installed and that the proper welding current was used.
(See Section H.)
4 2.
Dye Penetrant Tests i
Dick was advised that an excessive amount of dye was being left on the welds when dye penetrant tests are made on the liner plate. Dick stated that he would have~the Duke inspectors
- ' instructed to properly clean the welds prior to the application of developer.
(See Section H.)
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j 3.
Documentation Errors It was again-brought to Duke's attention that errors are being i
made in transcribing informat. ion. Dick nssured the inspectors i
that the Duke personnel would be cautioned to use greater care and that closer checks would be made to preclude errors from i
going undetected.
(See Section G.)
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I 4.
Cadwelds
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The principal inspector noted that the procedure for making
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Cadweld splices had been voided but that a repladement pro-j
.cedure-had not been issued.- Wells stated-that a new pro-cedure would be issued immediately.
(See Section C.)
l S.
Welding a.
Wolding Procedure The licensee was informed that Duke's welding procedures were t
audited and some contained errors. These errors included obvious typographic errors of the specified voltage, not limiting the weaving of the welding electrode,: not specifying the welding electrode to be used (only one procedure), and i
not specifying grinding to remove thcheat affected zone of-the carbon steel plate clad with 304 stainless steel.
(See j
Section G.I.a.)
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- b. ' Weld Procedure Qualification The licensee was informed that Duke's velding' procedures 1
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qualificatio' s were audited for conformance with the require-
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ments of ASHZ Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section IX,
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I-CO Report Hos. 50-269/69-8 -
50-270/69-7
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50-287/69-7
" Welding Qualifications," 1968 Edition, and that some qual-ifications did not meet code requirements. The examples given were; tensile test not performed, weld procedure qualification data not agreeing with the weld procedure, no weld procedure qualifications but weldor qualified in accordance with the procedure, and performing only two side bend tests for procedure qualification where four side bend tests are required.
(See Section G. I.a. )
c.
Weldor Qualifications The licensee was informed that Duke weldors were not following the weld procedures in their qualification. The weldors were using welding amperage and volts outside of the range specified in the procedures and using filler wire when none was permitted.
The welding superintendent and the weld test foreman were aware that the wcldors were not.following the procedures even though the weldor qualification form gave values identical to that stated in the wcld procedure.. (Sce Section G.1.b.)
i d.
Procedure Review The inspector stated that the procedures should be reviewed and corrected by a qualified person and he should check the amperes and volts specified for their compliance with the applicable
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ASTM Standards or the electrode manufactures recommendation. -
The inspector stated that the QC inspectors should check that veldors are not exceeding the ibmits of the weld procedure.
Rogers thanked the inspector for bringing' these items to their attention and stated that
-(1)~all weld procedures would be reviewed and corrected; (2) all weld procedures that had not been properly qualified would be qualified as required by ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Sect!on IX; (3) the welding superintendent would be advised that all weldors must conform to the weld procedures; and (4) the quality control inspectors would be instructed to measure the amperage and voltage used by the weldors in field welding to ascertain they were conforming with the requirements of the weld procedures.
6.
Nondestructive Testing Radiographic Procedures The licensee was informed that Duke's radiographic ' procedures were audited and contained errors. These errors included an obvious typographic crror in the 1 cad screen thickness; an' error in the a
CO Report Nos. 50-269/69-8 -
'50-270/69-7 50-287/69-7 geometric unsharpness formula in one radiographic procedure, and errors in the proper size of penetrameter to use.
(See Section C.1.c.)_
Rogers stated thatt (1) the typographic errorin the screen thickness would be corrected; (2) the unsharpness formula would be checked and, if in error, corrected; and (3) there was a difference of opinion within their own organization on the i
selection of the penetrameters and the problem would be reviewed.
1 7.
Mondestructive Testing The licensee was informed that their nondestructive testing personnel appeared to be knowledgeable and well trained in their respective ficids and their radiography technique was good. However, it was detected that the technicians were not removing the excess dye before applying the developer in the dye penetrant testing.
(See Section H.I.)
It was also pointed out that the radiogranhs of main steam weld D01F-44 should be
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reinterpreted as there was an indication on film 3-4 ~at 3 that is not permitted by ASME Code.
Rogers stated they would correct the improner removal of the excessive dye in the dye penetrant testing. He also stated that the film in question had not yet been reviewed
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nor accepted by the SNT Level III technician as required by their administrative procedure.
DETAILS A..
Duke Personnel Contacted:
W. S. Lee - Vice President, Engineering C. E. Watkins - Vice. President R. L. Dick - Projects Manager J. C. Rogers - Projects Manager J. R. Wells - Principal Field Engineer L. L. Lewis - Staff Health Physicist C. B. Aycock - Field Engineer, Electrical O. S. Bradham --Instrumentation and Control ~Cupervisor G. L. Hunnicutt - Field
,ineer, Civil K. E. Cater - Instrumentation Engineer J. T. Moore - Supervisor Technician, Welding C. H. Craig - NDT Technician
.C0 Report Nos. 50-269/6v-3,
50-270/69-7 50-287/69-7 B.
' Administration and Organization The caly change of significance in the site organization since the last inspection was the appointment of Cater to the position of instrumentation engineer, reporting to Aycock. Cater was formerly at the Savannah River Plant.
The total work force assigned to the Oconce Station is approximately 1,050.
Of these, 42 are engineers and technicians.
C.
Quality Assurance 1.
During a review of the QC manual, the inspector noted that the last revision of procedtre S-134-2, " Specification for Splicing Reinforcing Bar Using the Cadweld Process," had been voided by letter from Duke Engineering. A new procedure had not been issued.
2.
Several deficiencies were noted in the procedures relating to'
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welding and weldor qualification. These items are discussed in Section C.
D.
Construction Progress I
1.
Rogers and Wells did not have a new estimate of construction j
complet ion..This information, according to Rogers, is generated quarterly by the.of fice in Charlotte based upon total expendit.ures, j
and is of littic use at the pr'oject site. AEC receives this report directly from Lee.
2.
The concrete for the Unit 1 containment is up to the 18th ring which is above the dome spring line. The containment dome c
truss steel is in place and dome liner installation has been started. The placing of the containment concrete has been halted pending resolution of the liner plate lamination pro-blem.
(See Section M.)
The first steam generator arrived at the site on September 7.
It was coved into the containment on September 12 and placed in position on September.13.
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- 3. ' Concrete for the Unit 2 containnent is up to the third ring
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frame.. Installation of ' the personnel hatch ~ frmr.e was ' in progress.
4.
Foundation preparation is ' continuing for Unit 3. -
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f CO Report Hos. 50-269/69-8 '
50-270/69-7 50-287/69-7
- E.
Schedule Dates 1.
The second steam generator for Unit 1 is now scheduled for shipment on December 1,1969, and would arrive at the site about five days later. The Unit 1 pressure vessel is scheduled for shipment on November 17,'1969, and is expected to be in transit about 7-1/2 weeks. The inspector was informed by Rogers, however, that the shipping date for this unit could slip by two necks. The last section of primary loop piping is scheduled for shipment on October 31, 1969. Core load!ng is still planned for December 1970.
2.
The inspector was told by Hells that B&W had promised to f
supply Duke with updated schedules for Units 2 and 3 by the end of October. Uc said, however, that the present shipping dates of October 1970 for the Unit 2 pressure vessel and August 1971 for the Unit,3 pressure vessel would probably be reasonably close. The steam generators, pressurizers, and coolant piping for each unit were scheduled to arrive
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at the site ahead of the pressure vessels.
F.
Environmental Ifonitoring Program 1.
Ceneral 1
On September 9,1969, an 'onsite review was made of Duke's environmental monitoring program for the Oconee Kucicar Stations. A comparison of the program with that contained in Sections 2.1 through 2.7.4 of the licensee's FSAR revealed no particular departures from that _ represented. Personnel
-qualifications and experience were reviewed. Actual visits were made to a majority of the sampling stations for the environmental monitoring program. A discussion was held con-cerning the status of emergency procedures for Oconee. A copy of a procedure entitled " Description.of the Proposed Emergency Plan for_ the Oconee Nucicar Station," dated liayfi, 1969, is contained in the files of Region II.
(See Section F.4.)
Interviews were held with Rogers, Wells, <Bradham, and Lewis.
The environmenta1' monitoring program has been established by Lewis and he is' responsible for providing continued-l technical support and an audit of the effectiveness of the
-program.1 Lewis has a 13 degree in Radiological Biophysics,
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and he.has several years of training and experience in health' physics including six years as ~ health physicist at the CVTR,_Paar, South Carolina.
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2.
Preoperational Environmental Radioactivity Monitoring Progren The environmental monitoring program at the Oconee Huclear Station is under the supervision of Charles L. Thames, Health Physics. Supervisor at the site. Thames has fourteen years of practical experience in health physics gained at the Savannah River Plant and the CVTR.
His training in health physics included on-the-job training at CVTR and completion of the ten-week course in Health Physics at Oak Ridge in 1968.
Currently, Thames is being assisted by Charles Young, Health Physics Technician.
Young served as a reactor operator ac I
CVTR where he received training as a health physics technician in the operations group. Young is now-on training status in the environmental monitoring program under Thames.
.There is one additional Duke employee directly involved now in the preoperational environmental monitoring program, William C. Orth, Chemist.
Orth was temporarily assigned to the Radio-chemistry Labocatory at the CVTR and he participated in training in Radiological Health, Radionuclide Analysis, Camma Spectroscopy and a training seminar on Nuclear Plant Liquids.
Orth is involved in the analysis and counting of the preoperational environmental conitoring sampics for Oconee.
i Lewis stated that Robert Cudger, Vildlife Biologist, South Carolina Wildlife Resources De'partment, has cooperated in the environmental nonitoring program by furnishing fish samples.
In answer to the question as to whether or not there is any. firm arrangement between Duke and any other organization whereby that organization is depended upon to provide any part of the environmental monitoring program, Lewis stated that there is no such arrangement and that Duke intends to conduct the program in its entirety.
He did state, however, that two companies, Eberline and Isotopes, Inc., have been used to count fish and anical samples and that Isotopes, Inc., also has counted tritium in water samples.
Eberline has'also furnished film badges and thermoluminescent dosimeters for the measurement of radiation dose and dor a rates inside the plant area and surrounding areas.
.According to Lewis, the preope tational environmental monitoring program has been discussed
- ith the South Carolina State Board of
. Health,' South Carolina Pollution Control Authority,.and the U.. S. Fish and Wildlife Service. -
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CO Report Nos. 50-269/69-8
- 50-270/69-7 50-287/69-7 According to Lewis, a laboratory for the analysis and counting of the sampics from the preoperational environmental monitoring program is being operated at Duke's Riverbcnd Steam Station, Mount Holly, North Carolina (ncar Charlotte, North Carolina).
A description.by Lewis of the equipment' in the laboratory included a low background gas flow proportional counter for gross alpha and beta measurements and a 400 channel gamma scintillation spectrometer (multi-channel analyzer). Lewis stated that this laboratory equipment will be installed in the Health Physics counting room at the Oconce site upon completion of thuae facilitics. He said that inst rumentat ion (tri-carb scintillation counter) for tritiuin counting capacility also will be installed in-the counting facility at the site.
Sampling has included surface and ground water (' including L
cunicipal water supplies), airborne particulates, rain and s
settled dust, radiation dose and dose rates (TLD and film badges), silt, terrestrial vegetation, plankton, milk, fish and animals. Primarily gross beta gamma determinations have j
been made.
Camma spectral analyses for specific radionuclides also have been performed. Analysis for tritium in water, cesium 137 and strontium 90 in milk, water, fish and animal camples-have been accomplished. Lcwis stated that location of the sampling stations was based on meteorological and hydro-logical data as they relate to population densitics and land
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e e and the interrelationship of these with anticipated liquid and air effluents from the plant.
The inspector questioned Lewis as to the basis for the farm chosen for milk sampling (7.5 miles west of the plant) and the location (visitor's center at site-and Clemson University) and number.(2) of air samplers. Lewis stated that to the best of their knowledge this was the only dairy farm near the Oconee -
plant. Lewis agreed that the county and state health depart-ments could'probably. furnish additional information as to dairy.
fann locations in the area and that this would be pursued. He said that. the air sampler locations were considered adequate i
for base line infr.emation for the preoperatfor.a1 program, and i
that air effluentsEfrom the plant during operation will be
' closely monitored and sanpling stations outside the plant exclusion area ' established as the need indicates. He said that thermoluminescent-dosimeter sampling stations ' presently l
in existence should be adequate to measure radiation dose from cascous radionuclides.
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.The licensee's preoperational' monitoring program is scheduled-to be operative for a period in excess of one year.
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CO Reoort Nos. 50-269/69-8,
50-270/69-7 50-287/69-7 3.
_ Operational Environmental Monitoring Pronram Lewis said that the statement in 2.7.3 of FSAR concerning the modification of the environmental monitoring program after operation begins refers to additional monitoring stations and not fewer stations.
He said that the preoperational conitoring program will be continued in its entirety with compilation of the same data for ease of comparison with postoperational data.
Lewis assured that the establishment within the exclusion area of supplemental sampling stations prior to initial operation as described in 2.7.3 of the PSAR will be definitely accomplished sufficiently in advance of initial operation. Lewis stated that supplemental sampling I
stations may be added ;f waste releases indicate the need.
He said that in any e at be installed prior ti a continuous water sampler is to peration under the South Carolina Highway 163 bridge over the spillway from Lake Keowee.
Lewis stated that the South Carolina State Health Department also plans to install a water sampler at this same location.
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4.
Emergency Procedures The licensce's nroposed emergency procedures were discussed with Lewis, and it was pointed out to him that the procedures would need to contain all-the detailed information on all aspects of the emergency program far enough in advance of the licensed operation for thorough review for completeness by Region II.
Lewis indicated that this would be acomplished.
5.
General Onerational Health Physics Program Lewis stated that selected operations personnel at Oconee will receive considerable specific health physics training to assist in this program particularly during night shifts as was done at CVTR.
G.
Welding (4800) 1.
Review of Quality Control System (4805.04)
Qualification of Weld Procedures (a.1) a.
The' Duke Power Counany construction Department, Oconee Nuclear Station Quality Control Manual, Section F,
" Welding Procedures," states:
" Welding procedures to be used at the Oconee Nuclear Station by the Duke Power 1
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CO Renort Mos. 50-269/69-8 50-270/69-7 50-287/69-7 construction department fall in two categories, DP procedures and 0-WPS procedures. The 0-WIS procedures are contained in the Duke Power Company Power Fiping Quality Assurance Manual. These procedures apply to all piping in Duke Class 'A' through
'H.'
The Power Piping Quality Assurance Manual should be consulted in all cases to determine ~ the correct welding procedure for this pipe including preheat ten.peratures, postheat, procedures, and inspection requirements. A copy of these procedures is referenced in the Welding Proccdure Manual.
j "All other welding done at Oconee Nucicar Station will be done to a qualified DP procedure. These procedures and all weldors using them will be qualified in accord-ance with Section IX of the ASME Code. The originals of these procedures and their proc edure qualification test sheets are kept'in a Welding Procedure Manual in the Oconee engineering of fice."
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The following Duke Power Company welding procedure qualifications were audited for _ their meeting' the -
requirements of ASIE Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section IX, " Welding Qualification," 1968 Edition.
(1) Specification No. DP-1 dated Anril 3, 1968 Procedure Snecification for Manual Metal Arc Welding-of Low' Carbon Steel This procedure stated that the welding current-for a 1/8-inch E-7018 electrode should be between 100 and' 150 amperes.. ASTM Specification : A-233 for " Mild Steel Covered Arc-Welding Electrodes in Table A " Typical Current Ranges in Amperes for E,lectrodes" gives' a value of 115 to '165 amperes for E-7018 electrodes. The recommended amneres and voltage varies from manufacture to manufacture; therefore, the welding procedure' should limit the current range to' the ASTM or the electrode manufacture's recommended value.
This ' procedure does not limit the weaving of. the weld bead. Good welding normally limits the weaving of the ' manual metal arc-E-XX18 ' electrodes to three C
diameters. to prevent slag ' entrapment. ~
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.CO Report Nos.~ 50-269/69-8 50-270/59-7' 50-287/69-7 the welding The procedure qualification states that amperes unu 145 and the voltage between 24-25.
This is in excess of the specified voltage of the The procedure clearly states under the I
procedure.
section " Joint Welding Frocedre": dThe welding machine shall be set within tue an.nerage and voltage range shown on the attached sheet."
(2) Snecification No. DF-2 dated IIay (( 1963 Procedure Snecification for Seminutomatic Cas 1:etal 4
l-Arc Welding of Low Carbon Steel _
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The nrocedure states in Figure 1 for the SG welding position that the voltage for the 0.035-inch welding wire shall be 79 volts. This is an obvious typo-graphical error. Figure 1 also states for welding in exposed locations that the gas flow (75% Argon, 25% 00 ) shall be allowed to be increased 50% to 2
4 100%. - This is considered an essential variable in the procedure qualification requirements of Section-1, IX Welding Qualifications of the ASME Code; therefore, another welding procedure and procedure qualification would be required for outside locations.
The procedure qualification datatst et states that the i-l used were 110 which is in agreement with the amperes procedure; however, the voltage was 19 which is a reasonable voltage and indicates the 79 volts s,ecified in the procedure should read 19 volts.-
(3): Snecification No. DF-3 dated August 1,-1968 Frocedure Snecificat_ ion for 11ctal Arc Uciding of Low Carbon Steel The spccification permits the root pass to be made with 1/8-inch E-6010 electrode and the range given for the.
amperes and volts are close to that given by the ASTM
. A-233 and a leading electrode nanuf actuer; however,.
the values given for the subsequent passes cade with, 4
1/8-inch E-7018 ciectrode'do n'ot meet recommended values of either the ASLT A-233 or an electrode manu-facturer.
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50-270/69-7 50-287/69-7 The procedure qualification data sheet states that the amperage is 100. The voltage stated in the-procedure specification for the 1/8-inch E-6010 rod ic 24-26' volts and for the 1/6-inch E-7018 4
20-22 volts. The procedure qualification states that the voltage is between 22 and 26 which is above.the limit for the 7018 rod. The procedure states in the Joint Welding Procedure: "The welding machine shall be set within the amperage and voltage range shown on the attached sketch."
(4) Goecification No. DP-4 dated October 14, 1968 l
Procedure Specification for Manual Metal Arc Welding of Carbon Steel l
r This procedure states that the welding current for 4
a 1/8-inch E-7018 electrode should be between 100 and 150 amperes. The welding procedure should timit the current range to the ASTM A-233 Table 4
A-2 or cicctrode manufactures value.
t The procedure qualification data sheet states the welding amperage for both the 3/32-inch and 18-inch diameter electrode was 100 and the voltage 70. 'The voltage value ~1s an obvious typographical error.
b.
Qualification of Weldors (a.2)
A total of 111 weldors have been qualified to Specification DP-1.
All of the Ill. qualification test reports state the current was 145 amperes and the voltage was between 24 and 25 volts. When the weld test foreman and welding superin-l tendent were questioned about the data sheet being repro-duced with these values, they admitted that the 'weldor did-not always conform to these values. The veldors were per--
mitted to use the. voltage and amperes of.their choice.
Six weldors were. qualified to specification DP-2.. The qualification test report voltage does not agree with the procedure qualification data sheet. The qualification test report gives a value of 19 volts 'where"the ' procedure qualifi-cation data. sheet gives a value of 79 volts.
It.is obvious that.this 'is' a typographical' error in the procedure qualification.
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.50-270/69-7 50-287/69-7 Twenty-eight weldors have been qualified to specification DP-3.
All qualification test reports state the amperage wac 100 and the voltage was between 22 and 26.
The weld test foreman confirmed that these weldors did not neces-'
sarily follow the weld procedure.
i No weldors have been qualified to specification DP-4.
Only the weldor who performed the procedure qualification is qualified to weld to this specification.
c.
Qual'ification of NDT Technique (a.3)
Duke Power Company's general procedure for radiographs and 33 individual radiographic (RT) specifications were audited.
The geometric unsharpness formula in specificati^n RT-2 does not agree with the formula given in the general pro-cedure for radiography. This specification requires an increase of the filia to source distance by 20% over that general procedure for radiography. Addendum 1 to this.
specification shows the film cassettes being curved to fit the weld for the welding of the personnel lock.. (This would require bending a flat cassette in a compound curve i -
with bends made in two directions 900 apart.) The radio-graphy was done by others and they did not use this specifi-c at ion. The penetrameter size specified in specifications RT-4, RT-5, RT-6, RT-12 and RT-13 were based on the thick-ness of the weld plus the backing bar per Paragraph UW-51(c)(5).,
Paragraph UW-51(b) of Section VIII of the ASME Code States,
"... The thickness of the penetrameter shall be as shown in Table UW-51."
Table UW-51 requires the penetrameter size to be based ot..the veld thickness. Paragraph UW-51(c)(5) states, "... The shim thickness shall be selected-so that the total. thickness being radiographen under the penetrameter j
. is the same as the total weld thickness (including backing strip if used and.not rezoved)..The penetrameter thickness shall be based on the total metal thickness under the penetrameter including shims." These two paragraphs are being interpreted as conflicting -with each other and Duke Power Company states they had dif ferent views within their own organization as to which paragraph governed. They agreed to review the ' conflict and, if nccessary, ask for
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advice from the ASME.
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~60 Report Hos-750-269/69.
'50-270/69-7 50-287/69-7 The viewing room is equipped with a IIcLeth Densitoir.eter with a range from 0-4.0 on H&D density. A chart of the plus 30%,-15% density requirement is posted and adjacent to the vicwing equipment includes a ticker X-ray high intensity viewer with an fris diaphragm. To assist in interpretation, copics of AST11 porosity charts are ' posted on the wall... Defective welds or areas that do not.neet the code are logged on clear spent filu to prevent' the necessity of taking radiographs to the field for marking weld repairs.
. nit 2 Containment Liner _
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During 'the course of the inspection-of the Unit 2 construction area it 'was observed that the ring frame for the personn'el access hatch was being welded into place without the usu of
' The gap between the frame and the 1/4-inch backing strips.
liner plate varied from contact to approximately 3/8. inch.
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Alignment of the frame and the plate was within about 1/16 inch of being flush.
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The Duke specification for the liner erection, 05-139-4, permits a root gap of 3/16 inch to 1/2 inch with a misalign-ment of the 1/16 inch for bute welds. Although the text of the specification for welding th'e liner plate, OS-139-4a, does not specifically state a requirement for a backing strip, Figure 1 of this specification indiuaces that a backing strip is to be used at p'enetration frame welds.
This' specification also ifmits the maxLmum electrode size to 5/32 inch.
The inspectors also noted burn throu8 s in the welding of the h
hatch frame indicating that the weldors might be using excessive electrode current. The lack of backing strips and the apparent use of excessive uelding current'was brought to the attention of mhnagement at the management interview.
It'was' pointed out that the 3/8-inch gap exceeded the liner plate thickness of 1/4 inch' and that the 5/32-inch rod 'could not effectively. bridge the cap. L The use of excessive currents vould furtherl complicate the-task'of obtaining-good welds. Dick and Wells agreed that" backing ' strips sliduld be'uned. Dick instructed Wells to have
-the strips 11nstalled hanediately and to require the weldors to use: proper currents when welding the liner plate.
It liad alsoLbeen noted that th'e dye was not being properly.
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removedLfroin liner plate velds prior to the application of -
' developer.~ - The FSAR states ' that the ' containment shallibe -
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CO Report Nos. 50-269/69-8
-le-50-270/69-7 50-287/69-7 designed and constructed in accordance with Sections III, VIII, and'IX of the ASME Pressure Vessel Code. Appendix VIII of Section VIII requires the cos plete rer.. oval of any i
penetrant prior to the application of the developer. This was not being done and as a result, the color of the dry developer ranged from pink to deep red. This required the inspector to depend upon judgment as to whether discontinuities existed. When this condition was brought to the attention of raanagement, Dick directed McIls to instruct the inspector to properly clean the welds prior to the applicati;n of developer.
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Receipt Inspection Site procedures now require written certification from Engineering that vendor QC records are in order before material or equipment may be installed. The mechanism to accc 111sh this certification is to send a copy of the receiving report to Engineering. The material or equipment in q'uestion cuy not be installed until l
Engineering returns the receiving report to the site signed by
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a responsible engineer approving the installation.
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Weld Deficiencies During the last inspection, it was brought to the attention of management that procedures did not exist to ensure that weld repairs were effected. During this inspection the inspectors scre advised that this deficiency had been corrected. A weld checkoff list in a plastic pouch is attached adjacent to each weld.. Each step in the preparation and testing of the weld must be initiated by the responsible individual before the next operation is begun. The completed list is signed by the weldors, the foreman, and the welding inspector and it becomes a part of the weld history.
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Defective Cadweld Powder The principal inspector was advised by Ve11s that in late July 1969, No.14 rebar test splices had failed, by pullout of the rebar, well below the specified minimum limit of 75,000 p i. Subsequent checks revealed that the filler material c1 the sleeve was porous and brittle indicating that certain lots of the Cadweld powder were defective.
The details relating to the defective powder problem are as follows.-
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50-270/69-7 50-287/69-7 The first in a series of defective splicos noted failed at 44,000 psi. A canister of peudor from the work area was used to make a second splice; it failed at 33,000 psi.
Another canister of powder from the work area was used to make a third test splice; it failed at 86,600 psi which is above the 75,000 psi minimum, but below Duke's control limit of 90,000 psi. All powder used in the above-contioned tests were from Cadweld Lot No. FF-CS-2.
Inasmuch as the powder taken frou the work area could have been subjected to moisture, a canister of powder from the smaa lot was taken from the powder house and used for the fourth test; it failed by rebar pullout at 85,700 psi.
As a result of these several tests, sampics of powder were taken at random from the powder house and tested. These tests produced results ranging from 90,200 psi to 100,800 psi.
In light of the results of the several tests made, Duke decided that all powder from Lot No. FF-CS-2 be placed in quarantine.
It is not known how many Cadweld splices had been made in the field with powder from Lot No. FF-CS-2.
However, all accessible splices were rechecked in the Unit I area with a hammer and chisel for any indication of brittleness at the taphole and the top of the 'siceve. All sleeves checked were completely filled. Those that did not have shiny metal completely around the top of the sleeve were rejected. Those that indicated brittleness when struck with the chisel were also rejected. Eleven splices ~ around the Unit I refueling canal were rejected as a result of this recheck. All No. 14 vertical splices made around the emergency sump in the Unit 2 secondary shiciding walls were rechecked in a similar fashion; no brittleness was detected in the filler material in these splices.
The powder from Lot No. FF-CS-2 had been certified by ERICO Products Com?any in their report dated July 8,1969. The latest No.14 Cadweld splices made prior to the splices which were rechecked were in a Unit I secondary shielding wall
-placement that was made on Iby 26,.1969. Therefore, there is no possibility of a splice, made from the powder lot in question,- being embedded in concrete,-
ERICO Products Com?any was notified of the low breaks, and
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on August 7, Messrs. Pfeiffer and Crockett of ERICO Products Coropany visited the site to qualify a crew in the Cadweld
'l CO Report Mos. 50-269/69-8.
'50-270/69-7 50-287/69-7 process and to test various lots of powder. These tests were esde from powder lots which exhibited "hnns fires" in the ficid; i.e., where the powder burned and remained in the crucible and did not' flow to the pouring basin and sleeve.
Based on these tests, six lots of powder were placed in quarantine pending the results of tests made by ERICO in their laboratory on sempics taken from these lots. ERICO's testing resulted in their replacing 16 boxes of Lot No.
Eli-BW-3, as well as 21 boxes of FF-CS-2.
The additional lots of powder were deemed acceptable and were removed from quarantine on August 21, 1969. Since the replacanent of this defective powder, no other splicos have failed from this cause.
In response to the inspector's questions, Wells stated that he did not know the number of boxes of powder that they received in each lot, but that the information could be obtained. He also stated that he did not have the certifi-cation report by ERICO on Lot No. EM-BV-3, but that he would obtain a copy of this report and send it to the inspector.
(Region II was subsequently advised by Duke that the certification report could not be found but promised that Engineering and ERICO would be contacted to obtain a copy.)
The inspector will review this report to determine by the date of the' ccrtification whether or not Cadwelds made from this lot could be embedded in concrete.
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Site Electrical / Instrumentation QA/QC ProRram As a followup to the electrical / instrumentation QA/QC review conducted during the last visit, the inspector asked Aycock and Cater if any progress had been nade in preparing site QA/QC procedures. Aycock stated that although he and Cater had discussed the work that was to be done, no cdditional procedures had been written. The inspector nointed out that as more equipment arrived at the site and installation began little time would be available to formalize these procedures.
He also emphasized that procedures developed after-the fact were of littid benefit in making installations.
In the' discussions that followed,'Aycock and Cater discussed in fair depth their plans for the control of the ciectrical and instrumentation installation and both stated the pro-q' ceduos would be developed'in time for them to be of value.
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CO Report Mos. 50-269/69-8,
50-270/69-7 50-287/69-7 4
The inspector plans to review the progress in this area during the next inspection to determine if discussions held with u.anagement in the management interview have been effective in having this work accomplished.
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Liner Plate Laminations The principal inspector was advised by Wells that it had been detennined that extensive laminations existed in one heat of the Unit 1 containment liner plate. Wells stated that the full extent of the laminations had not as yet been resolved. Wells and Craig reviewed the problem for the inspector.
On August 23, a craftsman preparing an edge of the liner plate in frame 18, Section D.2, for welding noted a b mination open to the edge of the plate. The craftsman reported his observations' to.the engineers. After examining the defect In this plate, it was decided to ed-e an ultrasonic examination
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of all the plates with the same beau number. This heat No.
22D279 included 28 plates.
i The instrument used for ultrasonic testing the plate was a Krautkramer Minature detector liodel USK511 with a Smm crystal st 4 megahertz. Of the 24 p1'ates examined at the time of the inspectors visit, 13 had no defects. None of the 11 defective plates were in sections where concrete had been placed.
Craig stated that in making ultrasonic examinations, he laid out grid lines on nine-inch centers beginning two inches from
_ the edges of the plates and surveyed along these lines. Most 4
of the defects found ranged in size from _one to three feet long by six-inches wide. To date, the main effort in testing has been directed toward deternining which sheets contained laminations rather than to map out the errors on each sheet.
-l Duke management has halted concrete placement in the Unit 1-containment pending resolution of the lamination problem.
1 Lee stated that he would advise the principal inspector of i
conclusions reached.
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Vendor Inspections The' inspector reviewed the master vendor inspection log. The log included _ visits made through July 1969. The ucchanical sectiailisted 25 visits made since the first of the year. The i
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50-270/69-7 50-267/69-7 o
site receives copics of the ninutes of these inspections.
the A review of a few of these reports indicated that insnectors were atten.pting to perforw. legitimate CA audits and were keeping the site QC engineer inforrued of the status of Q0 probicms.
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