ML19309G316
| ML19309G316 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 03/30/1979 |
| From: | Frederick E METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19309G305 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8005050544 | |
| Download: ML19309G316 (11) | |
Text
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__d STAFF INTERVIEW O. -
Ed Frederick 0124 Hrs.
March 30,' 1979 Conducted By:
R. Long and D. Reppert LONG:
This is Bob Long talking. It is 0124 hours0.00144 days <br />0.0344 hours <br />2.050265e-4 weeks <br />4.7182e-5 months <br />, 30 March 79. Don Reppert and I are interviewing Ed Frederick; Ed would you state your name and job function?
FREDERICK: Ed Frederick, Control Room Operator.
LONG:
And you were on duty the night this event started'?
FREDERICK: Yes, Sir.
LONG:
Can you begin by telling us where you were from, say, an hour before the event? Then just go ahead and start describing your i=pressions.
FREDERICK: I spent all my time in the control room at the panel.
LONG:
Right.
FREDERICK: During the hour before, I was just doing the nor=al checks that we do on our shift -- just monitoring metdrs.
I spent some time at the computer.
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LONG:
An hour before, were things essentially nor=al?
FREDERICK: Nor=al, yes.
The only abnormal thing I can consider -- something that hasn't happened in the past few days, or that I would consider unex-plained to this point ---was the alarms I received on the 2A Auxiliary transformer voltage drop. We were reading alarm responses and trying to figure out what was giving us that alarm sometime before all this occurred. Whether that's related or not, I can't tell you.
But that's what we were doing at the time.
It wasn't an intense research effort; it was just another alarm.
LONG:
Surely.
FREDERICK: And we were wondering what was causing it.
We weren't seeing any effects in the plant.
It looked to us to be a spurious alarm.
LONG:
The alarm was voltage low?
FREDERICK:
It was the 2A Auxiliary voltage transfor=er loss, I believe. As a matter of fact, the alarm response is still sitting up there open.
I saw it a few minutes ago. We were reading the sy=ptoms just try-ing to figure out what was giving us the alarm.
So we figured it was spurious. Now that I think back to what.we saw,
-- the initial alarms as this thing started to happen -- that may be significant that is, the only thing that effects the condensate pu=p is an electrical fault. There are no other auto trips.
LONG:
Can you recall the sequence of events?
FREDERICK: All right; a few minutes before everything happened there were two of us in there. Normally, the other guy is Craig, he was at the co=puter e
l console taking readings. I was sitting in ~n chair at the dia=ond q
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.. FREDERICK:
the rods. I don't know how familiar you guys are with this stuff.
I was at the diamond rod control panel.
At the time, I was facing the makup system, which is on the left -- panel 3.
What we have been doing for the past reveral weeks is constantly changing our makeup tank inventory to co=pensate for leakage that we had through the relief valves on the pressurizer. We had to keep swapping water back and forth to maintain rod position.
It became a routine operation, monitoring the makeup system levels and things -- swapping (mu=bling) water. That's where I was at the time.
And so when the initial alarms occurred, I saw Craig's reaction first because he was off to.ny left.
I could see him out the i:orner of my eye. The first thing he said was, "something's happening." Then he pointed at the panel, and then I started reading the alar =s.
I can tell you when I saw him in the n ut couple minutes, but I cannot tell you what he did.
I saw lots of r.larms, and I know where to look and I started reading a few that I felt were important. The first ones I
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read were " Condensate Pump Trip," " Turbine Trip."
Then Ilooked at the ICS p ael; I sa.c alarms flashing so I started moni: wing the ICS.
I didn't read the.larms, 'cause I know they're impor nt.
I looked at the ICS control modules 'cause I wanted to verify that we were progressing through a turbine runback. At that time, Bill Zewe, shift supervisor, was to my left, behind me, and he said, "We just lost the reactor, ' which means we changed then to a reactor trip.
Up to this point we were in a routine emergency pro-cedure. We were reacting to a loss of turbine and a loss af the
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reactor.
LONC:
Have you been through these before? You have had this occur when you have been on shift?
FREDERICK:
(Nodded yes) Nothing at this point was abnormal. We were questioning
-- I guess it was on my mind what caused it.
It wasn't i=portant at p
the time to figure out what caused it.
We had to react to what was happening. So I went to the makeup system, because the next thing you have te do is preserve the pressurizer level; all right now, Craig had already closed MUV-376 which is the letdown isolation valve. He told me that, so I knew it was shut.
Somewhere between the time I read the ICS alarms, I looked at the ICS alar =s and realized we were in a reactor trip.
I put the pressurizer spray valves in automatic and I turned all ths heaters in automatic.
Previously they were in manual, as I was saying, with this water inventory control, we were spraying the pressurizer manually and I knew that we had discussed this before; and we said if we had a trip we have to put them in automatic immedi-ately, so the system will respond the way it is supposed to.
So I did that and I'm sure that wasn't very long.
1 Fred Schie= ann, Shift Foreman, went to the pressurizer instrumentation y.
I and started monitoring.
It's important to have someone call out the I
pressure.
Is it going down or is it going up? And I believe he was l
locked in on pressure and temperature.
This pressure was going down l
and the pressurizer level was going down.
He was saying that. The c=ergency procedure says startup the makeup pump; Craig, I believe, tried to stare "A" makeup pu=p.
It didn't start.
I think he tried
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s3varoltimes.o And wh3n ha couldn't etcrt it, ha scw me coming -- h2
. FREDERICK:
was still there -- I reached over and hit it and started it.
That was
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probably several attempts to start it, I only tried once and it went.
He immediately went then to the secondary panel while I was on the primary and he went to the feed station which is what you have to have; you have to have somebody at each panel. This is the way we drilled
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it anyway. You have to have somebody on nressurizer, somebody on make-up and feedwater, and somebody watching i...e whole thing.
Zeve, I y
believe, was standing back watching the whole thing.
So, the next thing I remember clearly is that I had the A and B makeup pumps running. Pressurizer level was coming down rapidly enough that I opened MU-V-16, A or B, I think it taight have been B.
They're manual drive valves for high pressure injection. And I o sned it up to get more water into the pri. nary system or I thought we would have gone past it.
It seemed like almost right away pressurizer level was up.
I never saw it changing; I looked over at the pressurizer level again, after not having seen it for a couple seconds and it was at 380 inches.
The pressurizer was almost full, which was unbelievabla to me at the time.
It was too fast.
LONG:
Uh-huh.
FREDERICK:
So, I backed off. That is the first screwy thing that hanpened. The y
pressurizer went full and be believed it was full.
It must have been full of water, but the next confusing thing was the system wasn't reacting as if it was solid. We weren't seeing pressure spikes, so I don't know if anyone concluded that there was steam building someplace i
else.
It was happening so fast, but we knew that we weren't solid.
And at that time Craig was somewhere there. While all this was going on Craig said, "We're not feeding, we're not feeding the generators,"
and this is how it had been now for several minutes. There had been no feed to the steam generators.
He had already, at that time, taken manual control at the emergency feed panels and he was leaning on the 7 manual open controls. You know they already indicated open; he was trying to open them manually because he didn't know why we weren't getting feed. His reaction was, "Something was wrong." He said that the pu=ps were running -- all three pu=ps were running -- the emergency feedpumps. But we don't have any flow. And "it's either going down" or "it is down."
Somebody said, "W at are these going shut," or some-thing like,."Why are these shut."
And it was the EFV-12 A and B.
They,.
l are manually operated valves. They were shut.
They're isolation valves for the OTSG's.
And I can't say we saw normal evolution; I think that we should have seen rapid cooling.
But we didn't.
LONG:
Those valves that you said you found shut, are they normally open?
FREDERICK: They are; they were covered by caution tags, I believe.
REPPERT:
Uh-huh.
FREDERICK: There was a caution tag on FWV-16B that says it is shut because the operator's bad on it.
The control for FW-163 is locatsd on the panel directly above EFV-12 A and B, and that caution tag was partially covering the valves and was probably why he needed to see a readout.
Of course, he didn't have to look for it.
He should have assumed that
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FREDERICK: th:y vera cp; And that may b2 why v2 didn't now th2y vara shut ecrlier in tha shift. Wa just stcrtad ccenning tha pensi cnd stuff
-- you don't notice things -- I guess we didn't notice that. We must have started feeding the generator, 'cause we heard it on the vibration and loose parts monitor. You can hear the water expanding and pu= ping through the steam generator from the upper tube sheet
. monitor.
So we knew that water was going in but I guess it didn't have any effect for awhile, because the steam generator level was so lov.
If you want to know what time to say they were e=pty, there is no way to tell now. You can go back to the instruments somehov and find out. That must have caused the shift in the bubble, and all the screvy stuff we were seeing.
We have to go back to where I was trying to control pressurizer level.
OK, I had 16 A or B, one of them, and I was trying to bring up pres-surizer level, ES actuation occurred.
I may have only been controlling "
a few seconds, I don't know.
I did begin to see an increase in pressurizer level. That was caused by me before the ES, now, the shifting bubble, caused by no emergency feed and ES, probably would cause an abnormally rapid rise in pressurizer level. Now I didn't recognize that at the time.
Ok, where do I go from here?
LONG:
Were you fellous essentially making the decisions on what to do your-selves? Or was the shift supervisor giving you guidance?
l FREDERICK: Not until this moment, where ES occurred and the problem with the emergency feed. We were carrying out emergency procedures. We were 1
checking and double checking each other on making sure each step we I
could remember was taken. There was someone in the Control room --
somebody came in -- but I don't know who it was, and I told them to get the procedure out and read it, =ake sure that we had done every-thing.
I knov later on, Ken Bryan was there -- shift supervisor of y
Unit I.
He got there pretty quick. And he vent behind us and made sure we had done everything. That was several minutes later.
Up until that moment, we were doing everything by memory. Like I say, it was a routine reaction to the turbine-reactor trip. ES and emer-gency feed are what changed everything; then we started talking to each other aboat, "something's wrong -- where are ve over here?"--Bill Zeve, myself and Craig, and Fred.
It was all goofed up.
LONG:
OK, at that poio which was what, maybe ten minutes after the trip?
FREDERICK: I don't have any idea. People asked me how long things have taken, and I have said a minute to three minutes, and found out it was only a few seconds. There was only a few times I looked at the clock in the whole five to six hours that I was there.
LONG:
Basically, then, you did have somebody within a very short time look-ing at the emargency procedure. Were they talking out loud to you, saying, "Did you do this?"
FREDERICK:
No, it was a licensed person; it =ight have been Ken Bryan, or Bill Zeve doing it.
The book was right there on the desk and there was no reason for them to check with me.
He was still behind me hi=self.
LONG:
He was following behind and seeing that....?
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'. FREDERICK: I know th2rs was o manual racctor trip rapart -- th:t's on2 cf th3 parts of the procedure.
I had verified the trip when Bill Zeve said over my shouldar, "We lost the reactor." I went over the rods, the intermediate range level and the diamond control panel.
By those indications I knew the reactor tripped.
I didn't take the time to manually trip. I had verified that each individual rod was on the bottom.
LONG:
When you got to the point where you decided you had some unusual things happening, how basically did you proceed from there? You said you started to have discussions. Did you try then to get any additional input?
FREDERICK: We were afraid about going solid in the pressurizer -- and seeing high pressure spikes.
I believe we took manual control of the ES to prevent going solid. We had to establish pressurizer level. That's one of the things that we wanted to do.
But that was one road we started going down, and we decided it wasn't working. We increased letdown, and we verified the path from the bleedtank. We thought maybe car letdown passage was blocked; that's why we filled up so fast. We tried several things to try to establish pressurizer level.
Then an instrument foreman showed up, Doug Weaver.
I don't know how long that g
We said, "We don't believe the pressurizer level instrument, it was.
says we're solid, but we're not reacting that way, it must be wrong."
He did whatever he does to check it and asked us some questions about l
how did it go up, did it peg out, did it go up fast or slow? Then he went to the computer and verified some other things, and he said, "That's your level."
LONG:
How about towards quarter to seven or so when Gary Miller declared a site emergency:
Can you give me some background as to what led to that?
FREDERICK: All this time now we had no radiation =onitors. And we had things that were abnormal, the pressure was going down, the pressurizer level was up, and the Th was high.
So we began to worry about.the reactor cool-ant pumns, because the pressure was getting to the point where we weren't allowed to run them.
LONG:
Right.
FREDERICK: We looked at an operating curve. Actually we secured two pumps because we thought we were below the net positive suction into the pumps. And then we had somebody read the curve; then we verified that we were actually getting very close to turning off the other two.
At the time we turned them off, they weren't pumping what they should have anyway, because we had two pumps running and only showing sixty percent flow.
We should have had 80-90-100 percent flow in one loop.
Because we secured the RC pumps in the other loop, flow should have been 100%.
i But'it wasn't.
So it seemed like we were losing flow to the pumps.
So we turned them off. Now, somewhere along the line, I don't know how much time lapsed, we tried to start the pu=ps again, because we were at the position then we weren't having any natural. circulation flow.
Without the reactor coolant pumps going, (=u=bling) steam generator level and emergency feed going in we should have been able to establish cooling. We should have seen the Th at least on scale, s
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, FREDERIICK: cr Te Ja shsuld h3va sa:n comething chtnging in temp 2ratura.
We had nothing that showed us we had natural circulation flow to the generators. So we wanted to start A-pump. And I think we intended to start RC LA pump or it indicated A -- start -- a red light.
But the amps moved and came back down near to zero. What I saw was the amps went up, the red light came on but I never saw any flow indication or normal amperage. We had a man verify the amps at the local panel. He went down and looked at the amp meter on the local station thinking maybe our a=pmeter was screwed up.
This was when we started to mis-trust the instruments. And, there were no amps showing.
It was just a little bit off the peg, but there was hardly anything there.
So we figured it must not be right and we turned it off.
'Cause when we actually did jog that pump, it didn't move, it didn't move the water.
We knew af terwards, because we 'got a lot of radiation monitors. Now, why turning on the pump gave us all those radiation levels, I don't know.
I was reading radiation levels in the aux building.
Something happened there that I don't understand.-
LONG:
The first radiation levels you saw were in the aux buildingt FREDERICK: In the aux building.
LONG:
But this occurred after you tried...
FREDERICK: We were feeding the steam generator and jogging the reactor coolant pumps, those were the things that we were doing. That's when we got /
the alarms.
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LONG:
Who made the decision to declare the site e=ergency?
FREDERICK: Bill Zewe and myself.
LONG:
Bill is the shift supervisor?
FREDERICK: Yes, he's my shift supervisor. I didn't actually initiate a site emergency. I said to Bill, "We have those radiation alarms, we should call Unit I and tell them to secure -- that we had a release.
He agreed.
And at the time he wasn't thinking site emergency. We had a local emergency. We were deciding whether or not to have a site emergency.
But then we came to the point where we made the decision, "Ok, this is a site emergency".
And I called Unit I and told them we had a release, that was the action I took as far as initiating a site emergency.
Then I went back to the panel, I was concerned with the release to the river during site emergency. That was one thing, I don't know why, I was keyed up, but that was important.
So then I verified that they stopped the release, it was' only seconds later.
I saw the light drop, we have an indication on that release valve. And I waited for it to go shut.
REPPERT:
They were making river release?
FREDERICK: Yes.
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Th2 clerm3 ysu')c w in th2 Aux Bldg., varo thsy cran alcrms, cir
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monitors, or liquid monitors?
FREDERICK: Liquid Monitors.
Yes, that's what didn't make any sense. The first ones that we saw were intermediate closed. Then the other ones, they're all in a group there, and we saw them all lighting up.
You know, there's decay heat flow, letdown, they're all on the same panel.
I didn't look at the area monitors; it was the liquid monitors that suprised me.
LONG:
For the site emergency, you then have additional procedures that you follow?
FREDERICK: Ny job is to continue operating the plant. Fred Schiemann, myself, and Craig, were involved with still working on the plant. The only thing that shifted is priorities to establish an emergency plan.
And, I don't know what happened there.
LONG:
Ok, your job doesn't cover those things.
Generally, we've been talking about the sequence of events.
One other thing that we wanted to include was the flow of instructions.
I've asked you several questions about who was making decisions.
How about your instructions? Don Miller said he got most of his instructions from the CRO's.
Were you interacting with auxiliary operators?
FREDERICK: Most of the orders tHat went out of the control room were from me.
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They may not have originated with me.
One thing I know is we always /
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discuss things before we give them.
We, Bill and Craig and myself, and later on Ken Bryan and Mike Ross, when they showed up, were talking about things before we were doing them. As reports came in, at least two of us would analyze them before we took any action.
The operators that were calling in were generally calling me or Craig.
If I sent somebody on a job, I remember specifically telling them, if they could, come to the control room and make a report.
If not, they were supposed to call.
LONG:
Generally, were people responding?
FREDERICK: Yes, we had excellent response on things that we needed i= mediately.
LONG:
Did they volunteer information to you?
FREDERICK: Yes, some of the information that we got from the Aux Building came from Terry Daugherty, for example, when he spotted a high sump level in the reactor building.
Very early, he reported that RM-14 near the fuel handling b1dg. access to Unit I was in alarm. That's a very low range instrument.
And, it had an audible alarm on it.
He made a gamma survey with an E520 and got IMR and its less than
.1'R, less than.1 mrem.
And, he reported all that. We saw no explained reason for radiation there, but he verified that it was very, very low, without taking any action on it.
So reports like that were coming in frequently.
REPPERT:
When did he report, if you remember this, the level in the reactor building su=p.
Do you recall that?
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.. FREDERICK: We were pretty for, cbout 45 einutoo to en h:ur into it.
I hrd given him a series of jobs, one where he went by the panel.
I don't remember what he was assigned to be doing at the time.
LONG:
Timevise this was between four u.m. and seven, so it was well before the...
FREDERICK: This was about 45 minutes to an hour into it, something like that.
He had already been working on the secondary side.
Craig was in charge of the secondary plant.
There was shouting back and forth.
I remember they were shouting, but I don't remember what they were shouting.
LONG:
Did you at anytime make recommendations to supervisors? It sounds to me like you fellows were doing this pretty well as a team, discussing it with each other and feeding back. But do you remember making any recommendations of things that you felt should be done?
FREDERICK: Yes, there were specifics, a reco=cendation to bypass the ES.
It's tough to remember.
I remember talking to Flke Ross about several ideas, but he went.in the back room at that point. There were lots of people there.
I talked to John Flint about a couple of ideas of stuff, but I'd have to remember all the details of where we were in order to tell you where I wanted to go.
LONG:
But, do you have any communications outside the control room other than with your auxiliary operators? As CRO, you don't get involved
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with co=munications off site? For example, who called Gary Miller?
Is that something you did or - somebody called him at 6:30 in the morning, I think that's what we heard?
FREDERICK: I had no idea how long it was. before people started arriving.
People that were off site started arriving in the control room and I wasn't aware of when they were arriving.
I know that some of the first people that arrived ' vere Ken Bryan and F1ke loss, George Kunder s
I think was called almost right away, but original notifications must have started with Bill and Mike Ross.
LONG:
Mike Ross was on Unit I?
FREDERICK: I don't know where he came from.
I think he was in Unit I some-where. And, I remember the conversation on the phone, Bill was talking, he paged him, and he said he wanted him to come over and help with a few ideas. This was after the ES, after the full pressurizer and stuff like that where we had a few minutes to think. We wanted another man, and as many ideas as we could get.
So Mike came over.
LONG:
How long did you continue to work that morning? You didn't go after your normal shift?
FREDERICK:
No.
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FREDERICK: Last night there were fresh CRO's on the panels. They had just been there a few hours. So I tried to head up the radiation problems we were having in the aux building.
As far as I could tell, people were going in and coming out crapped up.
But, we needed some infomation on whether there was really water in the aux. building basement. We suspected that. There was a question as to why the activity was as high as it was in the aux. building.
Where was the water coming from? And, somewhere back there we lost power to 232A and 242A electrical MCCs.
Up until that time, no one had noticed that demin water seal pumps were powered from those panels.
I had sealing water to all of the radwaste pumps that we have. Which meant that any pump that was lined up for retire or lined up to provide transfer had water leading out the seals.
So I recommended to Bill that we go in and verify what's happening or try to start it to eliminate that possibility.
1 So Don Miller and I planned to go out through the auxiliary building to do several jobs, one was to energize those pu=ps and the boric acid pumps, and the decay heat pump sump pu=ps, decay heat pit sump pumps, and a few other pumps that we felt were going to be vital - the neutralizing tank pumps, the aux building sump tank pumps. We figured we had a limited amount of time in there, l
Let's do the most important stuff and not fool with the bus, Once we had the bus re-energized, we planned to go to the radwaste panel, start the seal water and then exit the building.
We quick checked our dosimeters, and if we were less than one R, we were going to go in the basement to see what the water situation was...
In other words, run down the steps, see the water, where it was coming from, what was the condition on the decay heat pumps, was it flooding or what? We did that, we went in - I went to 232A he went to 242A to find the main breaker trip. We went to the radwaste panels. While he was starting the seal water system I was to vent some of the gauges that were down there and verify the vaste gas compressor was running.
So we left immediately. And, we got to the HP area and I read my dosimeter and it hardly read at all.
All this time I had a teletector with me and I had not monitored anything over 2 R, which was surprising.
LONG:
Yes, Don (Miller) mentioned that; it sounds like the same entry.
FREDERICK:
I was surprised at this point, I was afraid our instruments were reading wrong.
So I read my low range dosimeter.
It was hardly showing anything on that. And, neither was he.
And, the teletector I had verified 1-2 R range was near the PEG and the 0-50 R range was down around 2.
So it had to be pretty sure we weren't seeing any.
And, I said that's "let's take a look".
I extended the teletector down the hole and there was nothing there, and I left him on the open platform where he could see me and gave him the teletector, and I went down, and I think he extended it down to me, where I was.
There was water on the floor.
Down at the bottom of the steps, somebody had unrolled plastic down the RE, big sheets of plastic.
Some of the water was under the plastic.
So I don't I
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- i know when it was done,'it might have been done the day before.
Because the water that was on the floor was coming out of the reactor building emergency cooling pu=p seals - vater pu=p seals.
The water laying on the floor was river water. And I looked in the south decay heat pit, it was dry, I looked in the north one and it had a couple inches of water.
I could see that water was coming directly from the RR pumps and running down the hole. The rest of the floor was damp, sweating, and this was all surprising.
- And, we left - we got up and I read my dosimeter again, and it still showed hardly any trace. When we went up, two guys, Terry and Steve, were waiting to undress us, I reported to the control room and talked to Zeve, and he couldn't understand where the radiation went.
I think that's when they decided that it must be coming out of the makeup tank vent, the puffs were decaying off, and we were going in at the wrong times.
So alot of what we were seeing in the aux building, all th,se high radiation levels was pretty confusing.
Why was everything still pegged up high if we were that low?
That's as far as I got in the investigation; I got tied up in other jobs.
LONG:
Ok, well that could be helpful to have that infonnation - again in trying to fit it all together.
FREDERICK: Yes, we were happy after that entry - we Jot alot of information.
LONG:
Ok, can you think of anything else that has occurred that you ought to try to report?
I'm sure that there are other questions which will develop as we talk with others.
FREDERICK:
I'd like to see a group discussion myself.
LONG:
Yes, we hope at this point, getting everyone's impression by themselves may turn up some details.
A group discussion would also help.
FREDERICK:
I would like to make a suggestion, you know? If there is anybody who is going to suggest a change in things in the future so something like this could be better understood or more casily followed, or more easy to reconstruct, which is pretty important to us even during what was happening - if we could have a tape recorder or videotape y-in the control room, even little tape recorders like these, that we could pull out of a desk drawer, turn it on and sit it on the desk -
they could hear and we could then reconstruct the sequence. Even an hour into the event we could say listen to a time ten minutes ago and we could retrace it, and find out and we wouldn't have to remember this stuff.
LONG:
Yes, that would be something that would be fairly easy to do.
FREDERICK: Maybe they could rig it up so that it would automatically start, but maybe that's too expensive, I don't know.
Maybe they just could put it there where we could hit the button, We may not remember it l
for a couple minutes, but it's better than nothing.
Because even 1
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the following day, Bubba Marshall trisd to intervisv me, cnd I was supposed to try to remember all this and at the time, I was still working and there were alot of things going on.
And, we can't take the time to stop.
If your asking for recom:nendations, I would like to recommend that.
END OF INTERVIEW WITH ED FREDERICK
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