ML19309G252
| ML19309G252 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/10/1979 |
| From: | Herbein J METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8005050473 | |
| Download: ML19309G252 (35) | |
Text
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8005050y73
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0t@iISSION I
l 1
In the Matter of:
i N
IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 3
of Jack Herbein, Vice President, Generation, Metropolitan Edison 4
5 6
7 8-Trailer #203 9
NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10 Middletown, Pennsylvania 11 Ma y 10. 1079 124 (Date of Interview) 13 July 1, 1979 (Date Transcript Typeo) 14, 15l 193 j
(Tape Number (s))
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20' 21; l
1 NRC PERSONNEL:
~22I Bob Marsh Robert D. Martin
/
23 Albert F. Gibson 24 25 i
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MARSH:
The time is 9:48 a.m. and we're located in trailer 203 at the 2
TMI site.
This is Bob Marsh and I am an investigator with the U.S.
3 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, assigned to Region III, at Chicago, 4
Today, we are together to interview Mr. Jack Herbein, Vice 5
President, GPU...
6 7
HER8EIN:
Generation, for Metropolitan Edison.
8 9
MARSH:
Generation Section of the Metropolitan Edison, correction.
To 10 begin with, I would like each individual in the room to identify themselves 11 and spell their last name, if you would start.
12 13 MARTIN:
This is Robert D. Martin, Chief Nuclear Support Section No.1, 14 USNRC Regional Office II in Atlanta, Georgia.
15j t
16' GIBSON:
This is Albert F. Gibson, Chief, Radiation Support Section, 17 Region II Atlanta, NF,C.
18 19 BEHRLE:
This is William H. Behrle, and I'm a Projects Engineer with 20f Metropolitan Edison.
21 22 MARSH:
Mr. Herbein.
23 24 25 t
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s 2
1:
HERBEIN:
Jack Herbein, Vice President, Generation, Metropolitan Edison.
2 3
MARSH:
Mr. Herbein before we turn.the tape on, we discussed briefly the 4
two page memo which you have in front of you and just for the record I'd 5
like to review a little bit of what's on those two pages.
As I indicated, 6
it does cover the purpose and scope of this investigation as well as the 7
, authority granted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
On the 8
second page, there appear three questions which I'd like to get your 9
verbal response to, to make it a matter of record on the tape.
First 10 question reads, "Do you understand the above making reference to the two 11 page memo?"
12 13 HERBEIN:
Yes, I do.
14!
15 MARSH:
The second question reads, "Do we have your permission to tape I.
16' this interview?"
17 IS HERBEIN:
Yes, you do.
19 20 MARSH:
Third question reads, "Do you want a copy of the tape?"
21 22 HERBEIN:
Yes.
23 24 MARSH:
Sir, at the end of this interview, I will provide you with a 25 copy of the tape at that time.
Further, as it is transcribed I will get
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you a copy of the trarscription also.
There is a fourth question that I 2
have not specifically called out, but it is covered in the body of the 3
memo regarding your rights to have someone from the company present, and 4
this has been presented to each of your employees as we have gone through 0
the interviews.
In instances as we discussed earlier, you did request 6
that Mr. Behrle sit in, is that correct?
7 8
HERBEIN:
That's correct.
9 10 MARSH:
Fine, okay, then at that point, Mr. Gibson do you have some 11 questions?
12 13 GIBSON:
Mr. Herbein, would you briefly describe your pos'.cion wit..
14 Metropolitan Edison, and include in that description your prior background 15 in the Nuclear Industry?
16I 17 HER8EIN:
As Vice President, Generation, for Metropolitan Edison, I'm 18{
responsible for all the generation that's owned and operated by Met Ed.
19f That consists of nuclear generation, a hydro station, two coal stations 20 and fourteen combustion turbines.
Additionally, Metroplitan Edison 21; owns the sixth...the Conaghaw (?) Generation Station fr Western part of f
22I Pennsylvania, which is actually operated by Pennsylvan a Electric.
My 23 previous background in the nuclear business consists of:
Navy Nuclear 24' training, which I received in 1964 under the Naval Nuclear Propulsion 1
25 Program.
It consisted of 6 months of prototype training, and 6 months i
l l
f of theoretical training at Naval Reactor School in Bambridge, Maryland.
2 Following my tour of duty in the Navy, I was employed by Yankee Atomic 3
Electric Company from May of 1967 through September of 67, at which time 4
I left their employ and came to work fo'r Metropolitan Edison at Saxton 5
Nuclear Reactor in that.. Western Pennsylvania.
I was at Saxton in' the 6l capacity of Supervisor of Operations from 1967 through 1970.
While at 7
Saxton, I held a Senior Reactor Operator's license.
I came to Three O
Mile Island in 1970 as Station Engineer, and was promoted in 1973 to the 9
position of Assistant Superintendent.
I was licensed as Senior Reactor 10 Operator on Unit 1 in 19.. 1974.
In 197.. 1974, I was promoted to 11 position of Station Superintendent, responsible for both Unit 1 and Unit 12 2.
Then in 1976 I was promoted to position of Manager of Nuclear Operations, 13 still responsible for the operation of both Unit 1 and Unit 2, but 14 headquartered in...in Reading.
1977, I was promoted to the position'of 15!
Manager of Generation Operations...at that time responsible for both 16l nuclear, coal, oil and hydro generation for Metropolitan Edison.
In 17 1977....Can you shut that off for a minute?
18j 19' INVESTIGATOR:
together?
20!
21 HERBEIN:
Yeah.
22 l
23 INVESTIGATOR:
Sure.
24~
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MARSH:
Alright, we're going to take a break here for a moment the time 2
being 9:55.
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MARSH:
Okay, resuming now at 9:55.
Mr. Herbein.
5 6f HERBEIN:
As I stated previously, following approximately 6 to 7 months 7
as Manager of Generation Operations, I was promoted in 1977, I believe 8
it was May of 77, to trie position of... position of Vice President, 9
Generation, for Metropolitan Edison, and at that time responsible for 10 all generation activities for the stations, which Metropolitan Edison 11 owns and operates.
12 13 MARSH:
Sir, can you give me your corporate office headquarters? Where I
14 are you located now?
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16:
HERBEIN:
I'm located in Reading Corporate Office.
17, 18l MARSH:
What would the address there be sir?
19i 20 HERBEIN:
2800 Pottsville Pike.
21-1 MARSH:
Fine, thank you.
22 23 24 GIBSON:
Mr. Herbein, as...as I understand your position now as Vice 25 President, Generation, the Station Superintendent for Three Mile Island g
would report to you in a line organization.
Is that correct?
i I
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1!
l HERBEIN:
That's correct.
Approximately the first of March, Gary Miller 2'
was promoted to Manager, Generation Station, Nuclear, and at that time 3
his reporting responsibilities were changed so that he reported directly 4!
to me.
5 61 GIBSON:
Mr. Herbein, if ycu would now I would like for you to begin 7
discussing the events chronologically to the best of your memory, from the time that you were notified of the incident that occurred on March 9l 28, and just briefly describe who notified you, what information was 10 provided in that notification, and what your actions were following this 11 notification.
And we'll just let you have t.
floor, and just discuss 12L as best you can recall what you did on the 28th and 29th and 30th.
13l As...as you perhaps understand, our investigation covers the period of 14l time from the 28th at 4:00 a.m. until midnight on the 30th.
Part of the 15ll investigation...the part that covers operational aspects...is more i
16i limited to the first 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> following the event that occurted at 4:00.
17 The radiological aspects and emergency response aspects will...we will 1Nl investigate up to midnight on the 30th, which would be Friday evening at 19f midnight.
So with that if you would pick up and just discuss what you 20f did following initial notification.
21l 22' HERBEIN:
I received initial notification of the reactor trip at approx-23 imately 0630...well, it was actually between 6:30 and quarter to 7 that 24 Wednesday, the 28th of March.
My understanding based on that telephone t
25r call was that we'd experienced a low pressure suction trip of the feed-
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pumps such that both feedpumps were lost.
That in turn resulted in 2
a...a high pressure reactor trip.
They felt that code release had 31 I
opened and as 1 result of that, the rupture discs on the reactor coolant 4f drain tank were blown.
Following this depressurization, the operators 5
had secured reactor coolant pumps in the B loop, and then sometime later 6
they secured them in the A loop.
They believed that they had taken the 7
plant solid with high pressure injection.
At the time of our call, I 8
believe I was informed that pressurizer level was about 370 inches, and 9
that the pressure was around 700 pounds at a...at a 500* temperature.
I 10-was told we were using emergency feed to remove heat and promote natural 11 circulation and that they had found it necessary to shut off feedwater 12 to the B steam generator because they thought they had a leak.
I've 13 refreshed my...my memory of that initial phone call with some notes that 14; I jotted down following..following the conversation that I had with...with r
15l Gary Miller and members of the plant staff.
Following that initial 16 notification, I attempted to contact Bob Arnold to let him know that the 17 plant had tripped.
I called his home and his wife answered.
I believe 18i tnat was...I believe that was about 7:30.
Just prior to that, about 19f 7:15 I'd contacted Blain Fabian, who's Manager of Communications Services 2d with Met Ed, and let him know that there'd been an event at...about 4:00 21 at Three Mile Island.
I told him that the unit was off-line because a 22 feedwater pump failed in the secondary loop, which in turn caused a 23 turbine to trip, and that in turn caused a reactor trip.
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8 1.
j MARTIN:
I'm going to interrupt you....
2t 3
HERBL N:
Yes.
4 5
MARTIN:
Is it...would it be normal on any major plant trip in your 6'
system to contact this-gentleman?
I believe, did you say, Manager of 7
Communications Services?
8 9
HERBEIN:
Yes.
I 10 11' MARTIN:
I...I don't understand his function and therefore I'm guessing 12 at what his function was.
13 14l HERBEIN:
Okay, he's primarily Public Relations, and we do receive a l
15!
number of calls when the unit comes off-line, and in order to alert him 16, directly that this had occurred why, you know, I'd...I'd called him...there's 17 r.o...there's no written requirement.
I t ' e. really a courtesy...
18 19f MARTIN:
I was trying to understand what the purpose....
20 21 HER8EIN:
Yes.
Yes.
Yeah.
So, just to let him knew that the reactor 22 had tripped in case he got inquiries from the press, and so also that he 23 would inform our president, who he communicates with regularly.
So, 24 following the ' phone calls to Fabian and the attempt to contact Arnold, 25 I...my next communication was about 0840 from Bob Arnold, Vice Preside:it, l
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9 1'
Generation, GPUSC, we briefly discussed the plant trip.
At that time I 2l don't believe there was any additional information over and above what 3
I'd previously given you.
He indicated that he thought that Walt Creitz, 4'
President of Met Ed would be calling me shortly.
I did get a call from 5
Walt Creit2. around 9:30 to quarter of 10.
We discussed, we again discussed 6
the trip briefly.
I don't recall exactly what was said at that time, but Walt felt that...that I should probably leave Philadelphia and 8
report to Three Mile Island.
I received another phone call about 10:00 9
from H. L. Roebada, Vice President of Operations with Met Ed who informed 10 me that...that a helicopter would be available to transport me from 11 Philadelphia to Three Mile Island.
Approximately 11:00, I left Philly 12 for Three Mile Island.
I arrive at the Observation Center about 11:40 i
13l and went immediately into the office normally occupied by Bill Gross, t
14 and we used the ' phone there to talk to Gary Miller in Station Staff and i
15i learn where the plant was with regard to status and the particular trip 16 that had occurred that morning.
Following discussion with Miller, and I 17l believe now it was about 1:15, I met with members of the press at the 18)
Observation Center, and they indicated there was a problem with the 19 secondary side of the plant, that we'd lost feedwater pumps, that the 20l reactor tripped on high pressure.
I indicated that no one was injured 21 and that I certainly felt that it was the company's position not to 22 intend to expose anyone in any subsequent plant cleanup efforts.
I 23 indicated that radiation levels at the boundary were Ming monitored, 24 and though we picked up small amounts of radiation at the plant boundaries, l
25, site boundary, I indicated I felt they were about a 10th of the general l
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emergency level.
I also indicated that we didn't see any indications of 2l high levels of radiation in the reactor building until approximately 10 3
minutes to 7, and at that time we declared a site emergency.
Following 4I l
the exchange of information with the press, and I guess this time it was 5
about 5 minutes of 2, myself, Gary Miller and George Kunder left the 6
Three Mile Island Observation Center to meet with Lt. Governor Scranton, who had requested the meeting from Walter Creitz.
He wanted to be 8
' briefed on the situation here at Three Mile Island, and I felt it was 9
necessary to take someone frcm the plant staff with me.
I'd asked 10I initially that it be George Kunder.
Miller and I had some discussion ll!
about that.
We subsequently 4. greed that he would...he and Kunder would 12 both go.
About 1400...
13 14!
GIBSON:
Excuse me, Mr. Herbein...
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HERBEIN:
Yes.
17 18!
GIBSON:
Before we get too much deeper into...perhaps we should go back l
19!
and ask a few questions on what you've covered so far...
20 21l HER8EIN:
All right.
I 22 23 GIBSON:
And then you can pick up here and carry on again later.
Could 24 you clarify at what point during the morning you became aware that this 25f was something more than...than just a normal trip?
You were notified at i
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j 6:30.
Was there information in that notification to indicate that there 2!
l had been some...more extensive plant damage?
3 4!
HERBEIN:
There was no indication in my initial phone call that there 5
was plant damage.
Of course, as I indicated, the reactor coolant pumps 6
were shut off and the plant staff thought that we'd...or least I recall they thought they had initiated natural circulation, but at that time O
there was no...no indication that there was fuel damage.
Now I...during 9
the morning, I guess sometime between...between 8:30 and...and...ll:00, 10 when I left to come back to Three Mile Island, I became aware that there 11; was...that a site emergency had been declared, because of radiation 6
12{
alarms that had been received in the Auxiliary Building.
Now I'm not 1$l exactly...I'm not exactly sure of exactly when that communication took 14f place, but I beiieve...it must've occurred between 8:30 and 11:00, which 1!
was the time I left from Philadelphia.
I may have talked to the plant 16l staff in Philadelphia that morning before I left to come back to Three 17!
- Mile, i
18l l
191 GIBSON:
You were telephoned by Mr. Creitz I believe you said around 20l 9:30.
This would not...would this be a normal telphone call if the trip 21 had been a normal trip or would this indicate something more serious?
22 l
23 HERBEIN:
This ' phone call would've indicated something more serious, 24 and Walt's concern with the status of the plant, so it was...it may have 25 been through that ' phone call that I became aware of the significance of j
l the problem, the initial significance of the problem.
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GIBSON:
Could you...you mentioned that you met with the press around 2
1:30 p.m. on Wednesday.
Do you know if Metropolitan Edison had made a 3
press release as of this time? Who notified the press of this event to 4
your knowledge?
5{
6l HERBEIN:
I... I... I don' t really know I... I would assume that it may 7
have been Communications Services from Blain Fabian.
8 9
GIBSON:
You mentioned that, in discussions with the press at 1:30, you 10 did discuss an assessment of the environmental conditions and I believe 11 you said that you believed environmental radiation levels were 1/10 of 12!
general emergency levels.
13 14 HERBEIN:
And that...and that goes back to the general emergency criterion 15!
of 125 mR at the site boundary.
And at that time I didn't believe that I
16(
we'd seen anything that was...that was greater than a 10th of that i
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- value, i
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19l GIBSON:
What...what basis did you have for that statemer.t?
Had you 20 been provided results of environmental measurements at that time?
21l l
22l HERBEIN:
In discussions with the plant staff, I'd asked them what...what l
231 levels the site monitoring teams had been reporting to the emergency l
24l control station.
As I recall they...the... don't recall the exact values, l
25j but..but I did make that statement based on what I'd been told.
13 ll j
GIBSON:
When you arrived at the Obscrvation Center, what role did you 2
play at that point?
Did you assume control of operational events in the 3
control room, or...or did you assume responsibility for interface with 4l the media, or was...I guess what I'm asking is did you have some specific functions that you were performing or had that been clarified?
61 7
HERBEIN:
Vice President, Generation, really isn't included in the 8
formal emergency, formal emergency plans.
As such, there're no specific 9
assigned responsibilities and du+ies which I was required to execute, so 10I my concern primarily was with the situation at hand.
There were a 11 number of...of reporters here.
They all felt the immediate need to 12 know, in order to keep the public informed and kept relatively abreast 13 of the events which were transpiring.
I felt the plant was certainly in 14 capable hands and that the emergency plans were being executed according
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15; to their design.
After I had discussions with the plant staff and heard f
16 their version of events and their...their implementation of emergency 17l plans, I was satisfied that the control was being exercised as it should i
181 be, so my initial response was to talk to them, sort of following what 19f they were... sort of follow what they were doing, and then make an effort 20!
to communicate that to the media.
21 22 GIBSON:
Did you bring with you staff from your office or did you come 23 to the site alone?
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HERBEIN:
I came to the site alone from...from Philadephia, and only 2
later established a staff watch with structure and specific responsi-3 bilities, and of course they evolved as the...as the series of events 4!
unfolded over here at Three Mile Island, but there was no specific plan c*
for...for doing that.
6{
MARTIN:
May I ask how the decision was reached to go to the Observation 0
Center as opposed to going directly to the site itself?
9 10 HERBEIN:
Well, again, because the emergency plan procedures specifically 11' assign responsibilities to the Station Superintendent, Station Manager, 12 and I felt he is perfectly capable of with his staff and his group of 13 carrying out those responsibilities, I didn't feel it was appropriate to 14 insert myself into...into the procedures and organization, which was 15j well defined and well established, and to the best of my knowledge, at 16!
the time we're coping adequately and effectively with...with the conditions.
17 18{
MARTIN:
Is...is there direct communications available between the 19!
office that you went to in the Observation Center and the control room 20' or is this...just use of commercial telephone?
21.
22 HERBEIN:
Use of commercial telephone lines.
We subsequently established 23 more direct means of communication using portable radios, additional 24 phone lines and walkie-talkies.
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l' MARTIN:
Is this in a first day time frame or the second or third day 2
time frame?
31 4,
HERBEIN:
That was the first or second day, and I'm not...I did order on 3/28/79 additional ' phones be installed in the observation center, and I 6l also asked for radio communication and that occurred sometime in the 7
afternoon of the 28th.
I would think somewhere between 2 and 4 o' clock.
8 9:
GIBSON:
Were they installed shortly after you ordered them?
10 11 HERBEIN:
Yes, they were.
Don Barry could possibly give more definitive 12.
information as to the exact time they were installed.
13 14l GIBSON:
Why don't you continue with your chronology.
I 15j i
16i HERBEIN:
Well, we were to the point where Miller and myself and Kunder 17 went to talk to Lt. Governor Scranton, and informed him of plant status 181 and an attempt to answer his concerns with regard to the general public.
19j l
20 GIBSON:
What provisions were made at that point to enable either you 21 or, in this case I would expect primarily Mr. Miller, to stay in contact 22 with the plant staff or those in charge involving conditions at the l
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23 plant?
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1 HERBEIN:
Well, the plant was I think, due to the depressurization 2
effort which was the strat'egy initiated shortly before we left to tal.k_
3 to Lt. Governor, in a relatively stable state compared to what we believed 4
we had during the morning.
Miller had established Seelinger in charge 5
of the emergency control station ECS and he'd left Joe Logan in charge 6
of Unit 2, Joe Logan's the Unit 2 Superintendent.
Mike Ross, the Unit 1 Operations Supervisor, was also available for assistance and I know that 8
there were other engineers and I believe Lee Rogers from B&W was present, 9
so based on that I felt it was appropriate to take any member of the 10-plant staff with me for response to any detailed questions regarding 11 plant status that might arise in our session with the Lt. Governor.
12 13 GIBSON:
Was the trip to the Lt. Governor's office initiated by you as a 14 result of a request from the Lt. Governor, or was it by your management i
15l by the President of the company?
16!
i 17 HER8EIN:
No, as I understood it was...as I understood it from my boss ld!
Walt Creitz, there was a direct equest that someone with knowledge of 19l the incident report to the Lt. Governor and brief him first hand on what i
20 was going on, and as I understand it they really weren't interested in i
21.
talking to Mr. Decamp who just happened to be in Harrisburg at the time.
22 They wanted to talk to somebody from the plant with the first-hand 23 knowledge of events, so I got the word from Walt Creitz, by boss, that I 24 absolutely had to...had to make every effort to be there in a timely 25 fashion and brief the Lt. Governor.
So, following that briefing, then, I
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j we returned to the Observation Center about 4:30 p.m. and I...at that 2
time again communicated with the...with the plant staff, and learned of 3
the system status and what particular strategy they may have been using i
4 at the time.
And I guess it was about 4:30 or 5:00 I communicated the 5
plant status with...with Bob Arnold'and he and I mutually agreed that the strategy of attempting to...to remain at low pressure and use core I
flood tanks and possibly decay heat was really not being as successful 8
as we initially hoped that it..that it might be, and by we I mean the 9
plant staff, and so Arnold and I agreed that we ought to pressurize and 10 if necessary take the...take the plant solid, and attempt to start... attempt 11 to start the reactor coolant pump.
We began that effort to the best of 12, my knowledge around 5 or 5:30 p.m. that evening, and after getting power 13) supplies rigged to some of the reactor coolant pump auxiliaries we were 14!
able to successfully start the reactor coolant pump in the A loop around 15!
8:00 p.m.
I then stayed and talked some more with the plant staff, made 16 an effort to work with the observation center watch that we established, 17 improving their communications, assign tasks, status and so on.
I left 18!
the Observation Center about, I don't know if it was 1:30 or 2:00 in 19l the...in the morning.
The next day then, the 29th, I appeared on Thursday 20 morning at WHP studio, Harrisburg at 7:30, then at 10:00, I and Walt 21I Creitz held a press conference in the Aztec Room of the Hershey Motor 22 Lodge at...it was around...it was around noon that Walt and I also 23 talked to the Public Utility Commissioners, gave them a briefing on the 24 plant conditions.
At about 2:30 p.m., perhaps it was closer to 3:00, I 25 briefed Senator Gary Hart, Senator Schweiker, Congressman Rotel and
,i
P 18 11 others who came up from Washington.
Herman Decamp was present at that i
2 briefing, to also following that briefing there was another briefing of 3"
additional Congressmen an.1 Senators that came up from Washington.
That 4
first briefing that I gave to Senator Hart was taped.
Lt. Governor's 5
office taped that briefing.
Then again on Friday, March the 30th, I 6l held an 11:00 press cr.nference at the Middletown American Legion Hall 7
along with Walt Creitz.
8 9
GIBSON:
For the record Mr. Herbein, I know that you are referring to 10-some notes that you brought with you this morning.
Are these notes you 11l prepared yourself based on your recollection of the events?
12 13 HERBEIN:
Yes, and I also had some assistance with the...with the prepar-14 ation of these notes by people that report to me trying to key in on...on
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times, but they were prepared under my direction, and as such I would...would 16 represent them as mine.
17 18{
GIBSON:
At the conclusion of the interview, I'd like to request a copy 19l of these notes for the record.
20 21-HER8EIN:
We'll certainly provide this.
22 23 GIBSON:
I noted that you held several press conferences, and I presume 24 that in each there was some discussion of environmental conditions 25l around the plant.
Could you generally describe how you were kept informed i
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of what environmental radiation and contamination levels were as the 2!
l event unfolded?
3 4!
HERBEIN:
Well, as I indicated we had established an Observation Center 5
watch at the Observation Center, with communication links to the various 0I monitoring teams and to the Emergency Control Station, and we were able to...to keep a plot of results that were...that were being recorded by 8
the various monitoring teams.
So, I was through...through this system 9
able to keep reasonably informed as to the type of radiation levels, and 10 amounts that were being recorded offsite by the monitoring teams.
11!
12 GIBSON:
You said that you were able to keep a plot.
Was this done in 13 such a way that there is a record now of the data that you were recording 14l in the Observation Center?
15j 16 HERBEIN:
There are...there are records, but I can't speak to the exact 17 form of them.
Logs, as I understand it, were maintained and the logs 181 did included radiation readings from monitoring teams, and that information 19l should be...should be available.
20; 21 GIBSON:
Okay.
Mr. Herbein, would you describe generally the type of 22 technical support that was provided by your Reading office during the 23 first three days?
I'm particularly interested in any support that you 24 may have either provided directly or arranged for through consultants in 25 areas such as radiation protection specialist, public relations and h
21 1
HERBEIN:
The utilities in some instances voluntarily sent people, and 2
in other instances I used Joe Colitz as a manpower coordinator and he in turn...he in turn asked for some specific people to come in and help us; and I don't recall the exact... exact date that we got Joe involved the 5
manpower business.
I don't recall whether that was the 29th, 30th or 0
31th, but somewhere in the initial phases, why, we used Joe.
7 8
GIBSON:
Is it fair to state that most of the arrangements for offsite 9
consultants, administrative support, public information services, help 10 from other utilities was arranged by the Met Ed general office staff, 11 either from the site or from the Reading office or...did 12, 13 HER8EIN:
I'm not...I'm not 14, l
15i GIBSON:
The basis for my comment is, for my perspective, it appears i
16:
that the plant staff was primarily involved with coping with events in 17 the plant.
18-t 19l HERBEIN:
That's true.
The plant staff handled events in the plant, and i
20l offsite events were...were handled by the...by the corporate group, by 21 myself, by the other officers of Met Ed and to some extent there was 22 assistance from...from GPUSC.
23 24 MARSH:
Excuse me, before the break point, this is Marsh speaking, I'm 25l going to break briefly at.10:33 and we're leaving 700 on the meter to I
l break and turn this tape over.
h
22 1
l MARSH:
The time is now 10:35 and we are set to resume.
Mr. Gibson, I 2'
think you have the floor.
3 4,
GIBSON:
Mr. Herbein.
Did you have on your staff at Reading a specialist 5
in the area of radiation protection and environmental monitoring?
6 7
HERBEIN:
We've got a radiation safety and environmental engineering 8
section, yes.
And we do have a person with a radiological protection h
background in that...in that group, that's...that's Beverly Good.
I'm i
10' not sure exactly when she came out to the plant site, whether it was on 11 the 28th or 29th, but she was here to the best of my knowledge in the 12 early... in the early stages of the event and lent support to the...to 13 the plant activities.
14
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15i GIBSON:
To what extent, you...you mentioned earlier, Mr. Herbein, 16[
that... that the corporate office was not included, or is not included, 17 in the emergency plan, the emergency response plan, which is true.
But 18{
to what extent had you been involved prior to March 28 in you capacity 19j as Vice President, Generation, in emergency planning activities here at i
20 the site.
I noticed, for example, that your name was on letters arrang'r:g 21 support from offsite agencies.
22 23 HERBEIN:
That's... that's true, we are required...we are required to 24 show prior to being granted a facility license that arrangements and 25l agreements have been made with offsite agencies for a response capability.
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j Those agreements were made and were submitted to the...the NRC as a part 2
of the licensing requirement, and it was probably those letters in which 3
you saw my...my signature.
4l 5
GIBSON:
Have you participated in drills conducted previously at Three 6
Mile Island?
7 8
HERBEIN:
As the annual emergency plan drill is conducted, yes, I was 9
notified of...of an exercise in...in progress as a part of the offsite 10 notification of Met Ed management.
11 12 CIBSON:
Following that notification, did you take some active part in 6
13 the exercise?
14!
15' HER8EIN:
No, that was not...that was not called for in the plan.
I was 16 notified and...and acknowledged that...that I'd been informed of the 17 plant status, but no, I did not take an active role in the exercises.
18[
s 19!
GIBSON:
I noted earlier you mentioned upon to returning to the visitors 20 center from the Governor's office, after being briefed on the condition 21 of the plant, you made a recommendation to the plant staff that they 22 increase pressure and take the pressurizer solid.
I found that....
23 24 HERBEIN:
I don't know that I said take the pressurizer solid.
I recom-25}
mended that they increase pressure.
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4 24 1!
GIBSON:
Okay.
To what extent were you involved in making operational 2
l decisions in the plant during this period?
3l 4-HERBEIN:
I wouldn't say that I was...that I was involved directly.
I 5
believe that was the, certainly, it was the station staff's responsibility 6-and they were...they were in fact making the decisions.
I was...I was 7
kept informed and I did ask questions regarding the...regarding the 8
process by which the decisions were...were being made, and I was satisfied that they...that they were doing the best they could, and had the best 10 technical input.
111 l
12 MARTIN:
There's a few questions I would like to direct to you and have 13 you focus your attention, just to the 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> between the time of the 14 trip and the time in which the ; W nt pump returned to...you were able 15 to estahlish cool... coolant pump.
During that period...that beeper was 16{
just the... Mr. Behrle's beeper going off in the background...With 17' regard to your arrival at the Observation Center and the activities you 18; undertook there, you have already discussed the communications that were 19 established and what additional communications you called for and were 20' installed later in the day.
Did you collect together during that first 21 day any technical staff from Reading to come join you at that Observation 22 Center to provide you with assistance or establish any communication to 23 technical support consultant, B&W, or other personnel that could give 24 you additional advice or technical input during that first 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />?
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HERBEIN:
Well, I was aware that a link had been set up directly with 2'
j B&W.
I satisfied myself that that had occurred.
I was also satisfied 3"
that...that the NRC had come directly to the site and had people in the 4
control room with....with open ' phone lines.
As I indicated earlier I 5
did...I did ask for assistance from...from Porter-Gertz.
I was satisfied 61 that the NRC had...had been asked by us to bring additional monitoring teams in, and I think Phil Stohr came down from Millstone about 8:00 at 8
night.
I had also...I think that's...I think that fairly well summerizes 9
the assistance that...that I recall we requested.
10 11 MARTIN:
I think I asked previously and did not recognize that probably 12 asked a complex question previously, and you answered a portion of it, 13 and I just noted that I don't think we covered all the points.
In the 14!
trip to the Governor's office that had occurred after the briefing to 15!
the press with yourself, Mr. Miller, and Mr. Kunder, I believe I had 16!
asked or at least I had intended ask did you know of any communications 17; equipment that had been established?
Did Mr. Miller or Mr. Kunder carry 18{
either a...a beeper or voice communication, or a walkie-talkie or something 19l that...by which they could maintain some sort of contact with the site?
20' 21 HERBEIN:
Yes they...they did to the best of my knowledge, and I believe 22 one of them had a beeper.
23 24 25 i
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MARTIN:
Did you carry any such equipment or?
2, I
3l HERBEIN:
No.
I did not.
i 4'
5 MARTIN:
Let me go to a few more detailed questions.
In discussions we 6l have had with others...This is Martin speaking again... In discussions we 7
have had with others there has been some alluding to, or discussion 8
about, the degree of throttling with low pressure, high pressure injection, i
sir, high pressure injection, during the early phases, especially when 10 you...the operators were approaching high pressurizer level indications.
11 Were you aware of the extent or had you any knowledge of that kind of 12 detail about actions that had been taken during the course of the...the 13 early phases of the event?
14; 15l HER8EIN:
No, I was not.
As indicated in my...my briefing to the Senators 1
16i and Congressmen on the...on the 29th.
We indicated at that briefing 17 that there were probably events on which we had not had the time to 18{
become briefed on, and that only after the investigations were sorted 19{
out would we know...would we know the true facts surrounding some of 20 the...some of the allegations, and particularly high pressure injection 21!
and emergency feedwater valves.
22 23 MARTIN:
The... bringing up the...your briefing to the Congressional l
24 group on Thursday the 29th, do you recall if during that period you were 25' aware of the pressure spike that had occurred in the containment prior I
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to, in fact it was just shortly prior to, Mr. Miller leaving the site to i
2f I
come to meet you at the Observation Center to go to the Lt. Governor's 31 i
office?
4l 5
HERBEIN:
I was not...not aware of the pressure spike.
6 I
MARTIN:
You don't recall mentioning anything about that during the 8
briefing or the Congressional...?
9 10'
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HERBEIN:
No, I don't.
11 12' MARTIN:
At the time the decision was reached, or you conveyed your 13 recommendations, I'm not sure how to characterize it, but let's say that 14 you conveyed your recommendation to the operating staff to repressurize 15l the primary system using high pressure injection to try to get a reactor 16) coolant pump in operation, was the operating staff in agreement at that 1
17l time, or did they...did they see a need for it, or did they feel that 18{
plant conditions was sufficiently stable that repressurization was not 19 the alternative that they would recommend?
i 20 21 HER8EIN:
No, we talked about it and ultimately we...we agreed that was 22 the approach that they would take.
Now, I don't recall the...the specific 23 dialogue but, you know, we...we recognized that we had some...we had 24 25 i
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28 1:
some fuel damage at that point and that, you know, we were into a rela-2 tively severe transient, so there, you know, there was some discussion 3
over whether or not we should increase system pressure and following 4l that discussion by joint agreement, why, the pressure was increased.
S 6
MARTIN:
In your comments about that, you did mention it was necessary 7
to rig power at certain auxiliaries to the reactor coolant pumps.
Could
'O you expand on your knowledge of that that activity?
9 10 HERBEIN:
Well as I recall that...there was the need to get power to a 11 DC lift pump.
This is an oil pump and that...that effort did go forward 12 and was...was satisfactorily accomplished and that enabled us to start 13 reactor coolant pump.
14 15 MARTIN:
To your knowledge, at least, that was the only auxiliary that 16I you needed to service?
17 18 HER8EIN:
To the best of my knowledge, yeah.
19 20f MARTIN:
There was a conference call established early in the morning of 21f the transient.
I think it was at the time of the first call that you 22 received.
There was, let's see, Mr. Miller I think was at home, Mr.
23 Rogers, of B&W, and then yourself.
And I think it was, I believe the 24 contact was by Mr. Kunder from the control room.
You have discussed the 25i nature of that phone call.
Could you characterize to me your impression i
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1l of Mr. Kunder's motivation?
I don't mean his personal motivation, but 2'
what you think lead him to generate a...a conference call at that partic-3:
ular time? Did that occur after the...both sets of reactor coolant 4
pumps had tripped?
5 61 HERBEIN:
To the best of my knowledge, yes, that's when....
7 8
MARTIN:
And, this is about 6:30 when.....
9' 10 HERBEIN:
Yes, yes.
1 14 l
12-MARTIN:
...when both pumps had tripped?
13l 14 HERBEIN:
Yes.
I think he was...I think he was concerned because they 15I had experienced a...a decrease in pressure such that he felt it was 16' necessary to protect the pumps from operation below net positive suction 17 head, and as a result of the pump trip he was...he thought into the 1 81 natural circulation...into the natural circulation mode of cooling.
And 19{
as such I believe he felt it would be responsible and prudent on his 20' part to notify...to notify plant management, so he...he did that.
21-22 MARTIN:
Do you recall during that particular period of time if anyone 23 noted that the reactor system temperature pressures were essentially 24 corresponding to saturation conditions at that time?
Do you recall a 25 discussion of whether or not the RCS was basically under saturated
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conditions under....?
k
30 1
HERBEIN:
No, I don't re...I don't recall that.
2 3
MARTIN:
Do you recall if there was, in subsequent conversations or in 4'
conversations with others, either the plant site or personnel offsite 5
during the course of the day, a discussion of the possibility of saturated 6l conditions in the...in the' reactor coolant system, not necessarily in so 7
many words, but in the sense of whether or not one could be 8
establishing... let me... let me rephrase... what I'm trying to get at is, 9
that at what point did you become aware of the fact or the recognition 10!
that natural circulation had been compromised, and you were not achieving 11' natural circulation in the primary?
12 13 HER8EIN:
I think that's a difficult...that's a difficult question to 14!
answer because I don't specifically...I don't specifically call just t
15j when I...when I became aware.
I think in my discussions with...with 16t Arnold after I came back from the...the Governor's office, I think at 17 that time I was aware that that... that we...that we had a problem, and 18f that we weren't getting the natural circulation that we...that we'd 19 hoped for.
20 21{
MARTIN:
There was a decision after the...
22 23 HER8EIN:
There was..there was during the...during the...during the day 24 with my...my discussions with the plant staff, I guess some concern 25 about...about saturation conditions-in the...in the hot legs and as a l
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31 1.
result o' that, the inability to achieve natural circulation that...the 2
central...the central approach by the plant staff to the...the transient 3
following the shut off of the pumps had been to attempt to achieve 4
natural circulation and then they attempt'ed in the morning I'd say 5
between...between 8:00 and 9:00, and I don't rec'all the times exactly, 6
to repressurize and..and start reactor coolant pumps.
I believe they continued pretty much that effort through the morning, and then the key 0
effort during the afternoon was primarily to...to depressurize the 9
plant, attempt to inject core flood tank water on the core and depressurize 10 possibly to the point of operating the decay heat pumps.
That was...that 11 was primarily the thrust during the afternoon.
They also...they also 12 felt with the injection of the core flood tanks and with the depressuri-13 zation that afternoon that they had achieved some measures of natural 14 circulation and core cooling.
Again, we came back from the Governor's 15 office and reassessed the condition.
We felt it was necessary to try 16!
again the increased pressure and get forced circulation.
17 18{
MARTIN:
The decision on the mode of operating, the pump 1A, when it was i
19l put into operation, it was decided to jog it at first.
Was that a l
201 precautionary type start to protect the pump or was it for the purpose 21 taki g some sort of data to see whether or not it was effective?
22 23 HERBEIN:
It may...it may...it may have been some of both, I...
24 25 i
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MARTIN:
Okay.
Did you...there was no...nothing stands out in you mind 2
specifically about the...the method of the start of the pump or about...any-3 thing about the starting of that pump?
4 5
HERBEIN:
Well, I know that the plant staff had talked to... talked to 6
Lynchburg about the pump start, but the thrust...at least my concern...was 7
to get the pump started and initiate forced circulation, 'cause I thought 8
that was...that'was...the... the...the important aspect that we wanted 9
to accomplish.
10j I'
MARTIN:
Let me ask something much more in general and less specific to 12 the 16 hour1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> time frame.
There had been as you are well aware other 13 transients on...on both Units 1 and 2 of either turbine trips or other 14!
plant trips.
And during the course of analyses of that... those trips, 15 post-trip analyses, does your staff or the Reading staff or any portion 16 of it become directly involved in the review of those analyses, either 17 from an investigation or an engineering review and analysis?
18l l
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,HERBEIN:
Well, to the extent that...that our licensing group reports... pre-20' pares reports for me to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission both the 21 licensing group and the engineering group would have some involvement, 22 again, if the incident was reportable to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
23 Additionally, there's a requirement for the generation review committee l
24 to review certain kinds of...of events and this is a requirement of 25 the...of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications.
To that extent the people t
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get involved with the review of transients and analyses and primarily 2
due to a...or through the licensing... the licensing requirements.
Now 3
we...we have on occasion utilized service company personnel to help us 4l with transient analyses.
Bob Arnold's group has been...has been helpful a
in...in transient analyses in the past, and Metropolitan Edison the 6
operating company does rely on the...on the service company expertise in 7
this particular area, and it has again as I've indicated in the...in the 8
past.
9 10 GIBSON:
Based on any experience or information that is gained as a 11!
result of these reviews of transients, it would be through your organiza-12-tion or directly from the site organization where any training benefits 13 from prior transients are factored into the operator... operator training, 14i requalification training, retraining of staff, generally informing the r
15 staff of these transients?
16; 17 HERBEIN:
That transient information would...would be handled here 18l directly at the site and would be incorporated into the...into the 19 training.
20 21 GIBSON:
I'll just take a moment to browse over my notes, and see if I 22 have any other...
23 24 25 f
ea 34 ll MARTIN:
At this point, I have no further questions of Mr. Herbein.
2, 3
GIBSON:
Yes, and I have no further questions.
4 i
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MARSH:
Okay, I have just one question sir.
The Emergency Director in 6
this program...in this plant here, as it stands now, would've been Gary 7
Miller, the Station Superintendent, am I right?
8 HERBEIN:
That's true.
10 11 MARSH:
During the course of the event on, let's say the first two days, 12 did you have cause to override any of his decisions or did you ride 13 pretty much with what he had come up with?
14I 15 HERBEIN:
No, I rode with...with the decisions that he had made, and 16i felt that his...his notification of...of the offsite agencies was in 17 fact timely, and I...I agreed with the decisions and the approach 18{
that...that the plant was taking, as I understood it.
19I 20 MARSH:
Did he seat your counsel in any of those decisions? As an 21 example, the shutting off of the ventilation systems, was that discussed 22 in any great detail oefore a decision was made?
23 24 HERBEIN:
I believe the ventilation system may have been securvi iate on 25j the evening of the 28th.
I believe we did...I believe we did discuss I
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