ML19309G247
| ML19309G247 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/11/1979 |
| From: | Chwastyk J METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8005050467 | |
| Download: ML19309G247 (89) | |
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4 m:i;. 3 IN THE MATTER OF.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~X 2
3 In the Matter of:
THREE MILE ISLAND 4
[
SPECIAL INQUIRY DEPOSITIONS 5
X 6
DEPOSITION OF JOSEPH CHWASTYK 7
Trailer #203 8
Three Mile Island Middletown, Pennsylvania 9
in Thursday, October 11, 1979 12:10 p.m.
11 BEFORE:
12 For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
13 DENNIS ALLISON, Special Inquiry Group ja BARRY HORVICK, Special Inquiry Group DR. W.
JOHNSTON, Special Inquiry Group 15 RONALD EAYNES, Special Inquiry Group 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 s
23 24
' e-Federot Recorters, Inc.
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2 1
ESEEEEEE 2
WITNESS:
EXAMINATION 3
Joseph Chwastyk 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 P
22 23 24 Ace-F.o r : Recon n inc.
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MR. ALLISON:
This is an interview of Joseph J.
2' Chwastyk of the Metropolitan Edison Company, being conducted 3
by the NRC special inquiry group into the accident at Three Mile Island at trailer 203 at the Three Mile Island site on 4
5 October 11, 1979.
6 My name is Dennis Allison.
Also present from the special 7
inquiry group are William Johnston and Barry Horvick and Ron 8
Haynes will come in later and ask some questions.
9 Whereupon, 10 JOSEPH J. CHWASTYK 11 was called as a witness and was c:tamined and testified 12 as follows:
13 BY MR. ALLISON:
1 I
14 g
Mr. Chwastyk, before you went on the record, I showed 15 you our standard witness notification, which is on a July 30 16 memo from George Frampton to the special inquiry group.
Have 17 you had a chance to read that notification?
18 A
Yes, I have.
19 G
Do you have any questions about it?
20 A
No, I don't.
21 4
Okay.
Have you been previously interviewed with respect to the accident at Three Mile Island?
22 s
23 A
Yes, I have been.
24 G
How many times?
Ace-Federet Reporters, tric.
25 A
Once with I&E, I, guess it was.
P J
4 jtf 2 1
G All right.
We have read the transcript of that 2
interview and we have it with us today to refer to if need be.
3 Oka", just to set the background a little bit, as I recall 4
from your I&E interview, you came into the unit 2 control room 5
about 11:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon on Wednesday, March 28th, looked l
6 around to see what was going on and then you relieved Bill Zewe 7
on the makeup panel, is that correct?
8 A
No, I relieved Bill Zewe on the full console, not 9
just the makeup.
10 0
And what does the full console mean?
11 A
That means the control room controls of both primary 12 and secondary plants.
13 G
So you were in charge of all the operators 14 manipulating controls in the contril room?
15 A
That's right.
16 4
I'm glad you cleared that up, because there were two 17 different impressions I got from reading the I&E interview.
18 A
Well, most of the operations were going on, were in 19 the makeup reactor coolant systems.
20 4
Okay.
Now -- and I believe what you noticed according 21 to your I&E interview at that time was that the plant was 22 floating on the core flood tanks with them maintaining a 23 pressure of about 550 PSI.'
That the power operated relief 24 valve, block valve, was being cycled or else possibly erwwe r==nm. ine.
25 pressurizer vent valve was being cyclad and the hot leg i
I 5
jtf 3 1
temperature indicator was pegged high.
2 Does that sound right?
3 A
That sounds about right, yes.
4 g
And you understood that the cooling path was high 5
pressure injection water flowing in through the core out the 6
PORV or the pressurizer vent and that the core flood tanks 7
were holding the pressure up about 550 PSI?
8 A
Yes.
9 G
Okay, my first question is simply to confirm that to this was your understanding of the way the core was being cooled 11 the high pressure injection water going in and discharging steam 12 from the top of the pressurizer and the water would flow through 13 the core and provide cooling?
14 A
That's correct.
15 g
Okay.
At that time when you came in, did you think 16 that that method was working effectively in keeping the core 17 cooled?
18 A
I didn't have any indication to shcw that it wasn't.
19 0
Did anybody that you recall question that?
Did 20 anybody say that I don' t think it's working?
Or words to 21 that effect?
22 A
No, I don't remember anybody saying that possibly 23 except myself.
24 0
Do you think you might have said that?
A m-F.dw e n n m,inc.
25 A
I didn't like that means of control, but you know, l
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the people at that time told me that it was our primary means 2
of cooling and they told me it was working and I didn't have 3
any indication to say that it wasn' t.
4 G
Okay.
Why didn't you like that method?
5 A
I didn't like it primarily because it's so alien 6
to operating the plant.
And I personally felt that it was 7
just adding -- it wasn't giving us enough information of what a
we had in the plant, and it was just adding confusion to the 9
operators because it tas such an abnormal way to operate.
10 Now remember now, I just came in here and a lot of things 11 had transpired prior to my getting there, so I was sort of -
12 coming in cold to everything and I didn't know -- I'm still 13 not sure if I know how they got in that position, but what I i
14 was seeing I didn't like of course, because it was so abnormal.
15 g
You didn't like it, but because there was already 16 an 8-hour history of how it got there, I guess you weren't 17 Prepared to say I don't like this, let's go into something 18 I like more.
19 A
No, that's not true.
I did -
until the hydrogen
}
20 detonation or combustion or whatever you would like to call it, 21 I was prepared to -- I was, in fact, operating further directions 22 given to maintain the temperature.
t; 23 When the hydrogen. explosion occurred, it was -- it occurred i
24 simultaneously with an operation of the valve, and I'm not sure Aco Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 which one it is now, I think it was the block valve for the PORV I.
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or the PORV itself, I'm not sure which.
That led me to believe 2
that we had some kind of a problem in the solenoid operator on J
the valve.
And that's when I essentially thought I knew enough about what was going on to suggest to Gary Miller to -- well, 4
5 I asked permission to re-establish the bubble in the pressurizez 6
and that's what we eventually did do.
7 G
And that was after the detonation?
8 A
Yes, I think it was, yes, it was, I'm sure it was.
9 G
And that would put it about 1400?
10 A
Right, somewhere in that area.
11 G
The hydrogen detonation occurred shortly before 1400.
12 Okay.
Back to when you came in and prior to the accident, it's 13 true, is it not, that you had really two qualified analyzed 14 ways of circulating coolant through the core that was supposed 15 t'o work?
One, run the reactor coolant pumps and two, turn them 16 off and use natural circulation, is that correct?
I l'7 A
That's correct.
18 G
Did you consider this third method, discharging from 19 the pressurizer and using HPR water, did you consider that to 20 be a fully qualified way of cooling the core, that you had 21 confidence that it would work if you ever needed to use it?
22 A,
You mean prior to this happening?
23 Prior to 'the accident.
24 A
I don't know if I ever thought about that method of Ace-Federal Repo,ters, Inc.
25 cooling prior to the accident.
8 jtf 6 1
0 So you're not surc you really ever even thought about 2
using that method?
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3 A
No.
4 G
I suppose then, you weren't aware of an analysis done 5
by B&W that indicated that th st method could cool the core?
6 A
No, I wasn't.
7 G
Let me mention -- I haven't read the analysis either, 8
I just heard that it exists, so I don't want you to think that 9
that is a fact.
10 A
I know of no analysis prior to the accident.
11 G
In any case, the point here is that you hadn't 12 thought about it and you didn't -- so you were not by any means 13 sure that it would work prior to the accident?
14 A
No.
15 G
Or when you came in?
16 A
No.
17 O
Did you realize that when you tried that and you 18 opened the vent valve, that the pressure can hang up on you 19 due to boiling in the core, a certain flow rate of HPR water 20 going in in a certain vent area at the top of the pressurizer 21 and that vent valve may not be big enough to completely blow
}
22 the system down?
23 A
Yes.
l 24 G
Did you realize that there when you came in the Ac -re.rw m.oon n inc.
25 control room?
l l
9 jtf 7 1
A I realized that at one time when they wanted to go 2
and it was soon after I arrived in the control room and they 3
wanted to go down in pressure to go on K-heat system, that --
4 because no matter what they tried to do, they could not get 5
the pressure down and that's when I assumed that the reason 6
they couldn't get the pressure down was because our mode of 7
pressure relief was not enough to decrease the pressure that 8
was being held up by the water converting to steam.
9 G
So although you hadn't thought about the method 10 before, when you experienced that morning you couldn't get 11 the pressure down, you inferred that that was the reason, the 12 pressure was hanging up due to steam generation in the core?
13 A
Well, steam generation now not necessarily in the core..
14 G
All right, good.
15 A'
And remember, I also had the high TH indications and 16 at that time of course I didn't know how much water was in the 17 system, but I assume because of the high TH indications, that 18 I was flashing in the hot lines.
~
19 4
Okay.
That is a good point to pursue for a minute.
20 I think you stated in your I&E interview when you initially
}
21 came in you saw the TH was pegged high?
How high would that bel 22 A
700 degrees, I think is the max.
23 G
Did you later find out what the actual TH reading was 24 other than greater than 700 degrees?
Ace-Pederal Reporte,s, Inc.
25 A
No, I didn't.
20 jtf 8 1
G You didn't?
So your understanding of TH was that 2
it was greater than 700 degrees?
3 A
Yes.
4 G
Didn.'t know how much greater?
5 A
No, not how much greater, no.
6 G
And that was pretty much your understanding for what 7
comes several hours?
8 A
Yes.
9 G
That we're talking about here?
10 A
Yes.
11 MR. JOHNSTON:
Could I ask just a clarifying question?
12 BY MR. JOHNSTON:
13 G
Some time prior to that time from other testimony, 14 Ivan Porter instrumentation engineer said he had put on a fluke 15 meter, so you would have had a direct readout somewhe e in the 16 control room of the A hot leg temperature directly.
You know, 17 did you observe anything of that sort when you took over as l
l 18 part of the transfer over procedure -- you were never made 19 aware of the existence that they had actually put a meter in 20 the room that in principle at least could read the exact 21 temperatures?
Later on they put one on the Beehive also.
22 A
I don' t remember ever'seeing it.
Whether I was aware 23 it was there or not, I'm not certain, simply because the 700 24 degrees -- greater than 700 degrees was enough for me.
Am-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 MR. ALLISON:
Well, as it turns out, greater than
11 jtf 9 1
700 degrees wasn't that far off.
2 MR. JOHNSTON:
Actually, it was on scale on one of 3
your trip charts.
4 BY MR. ALLISON:
5 G
It sometimes got up as high as 800 degrees, usually 6
it was between 700 and 800.
7 A
That's where we started to inject.
8 BY MR. JOHNSTON:
9 G
You caue in about here, I guess, in time.
10 A
Thir is where we started.
11 MR. ALLISoli:
For the record, we are indicating to 12 about 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> on the chart, I guess.
13 MR. JOHNSTON:
14 G
This was on a stripped chart that was located in 15 the control room, so this in pencil was directly readable by 16 you folks without the computer telling fou it was above 700?
17 A
Yes.
18 G
APParently on scale.
19 A
Well, it was very high up on scale and it was so high 20 up, whether it was pegged or not at that time., was not very 21 kmPortant.
22 BY MR. ALLISON:
23 G
It looked pegged to you?
24 A
It looked pegged.
Ac -F aws aanm, Inc.
25 MR. ALLISON:
I guess I ought to identify this chart
12 1
jtf 10 1 for the record.
This is an unlabeled chart of Ivan Porter 2
plant paramaters versus time, and it was prepared by Mr.
3 Picklesimer of the special inquiry group and it runs from 4
zero hours to 17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br />.
5 Off the record.
6 (Discussion off the record.)
7 BY MR. ALLISON:
8 G
So you saw that the TH was 700 degrees or greater 9
or thereabouts.
Did that tell you immediately that there was 10 steam in the hot legs?
11 A
Yes, it did.
12 G
There is no question in your mind that that was 13 above the saturation temperature for the temperature you had?
14 A
Yes, you're right.
I knew we had steam in the hot 15 leg.
At that time I was not considering saturation temperatures 16 and pressures, I just knew we had had steam and therefore, we 17 had allowed steam to generate itself in the hot leg.
18 G
And the reason you knew that wa s the temperature 19 indication, is that right?
20 A
Temperature indication.
21 G
So there wasn't any questien, then, in your mind at 22 the time that 700 degrees meant steam in the hot leg?
l l
23 A
That's right.
24 G
700 degrees in the hot leg.
Did you make any further Am Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 inference, namely that that was a certain amount of superheat --
i l
13 jtf 11 1
A No, I didn't.
2 g
Some degrees of -- 100 degrees of superheat?
3 A
No, I didn't.
4 G
Did you infer that that temperature -meant that there 5
was a lot of boiling in the core?
6 A
No.
Again, I was -- I did not know what happened, 7
what transpired before I had gotten there and I did not have 8
time to take Bill Zewe or anyone else and get an update of 9
what had happened up to that point.
10 Bill was kind of busy trying to do other things and I, after 11 some time in the control room, I noticed that essentially at 12 the time, there was not anybody up there directing the operator, 13 so I felt the one thing I could do to help would be to take 14 that cver for Bill, simply because Bill was doing a lot of 15 meeting with Gary Miller and Mike Ross and a few other people.
16 He was being tied up in a lot of other things and I felt 17 because of the seriousness of what seemed to be happening, 18 that we needed someone at the console at all times.
And that 19 was when I told Bill, after I looked around and got'what I 20 could out of the operator, at least I knew where we stood.
2I I didn't know how we had gotten there.
So I was told that the
}
22 core, cooling through 80 gallons a minute through the core j
b 23 was sufficient to keep the core cool.
24 I assumed that was correct.
Am#ederes Reporters, Inc.
25 MR. JOHNSTON:
One question.
Was that 80 gallons
14 jtf 12 1
per minute through the core, would that, you would be taking 2
80 gallons a minute, at the same time you were putting 80 3
gallons in, so you were keeping a constant amount in, or were you trying to increase --
4 5
A At that time we were not making any attempt to change 6
anything other than maintaining 80 gallons a minute per flow.
7 g
So your let-down would also be running?
8 A
No, not necessarily.
9 G
Where might it have been going?
10 A
Out the pressurizer relief valve.
It was cycling back.
11 G
In the form of steam or liquid?
12 A
Well, it was liquid in the pressurizer period.
13 4
I meant out the valve.
14 A
Out the valve, of course it would turn to steam 15 because of the breakdown in pressure.
16 G
Well, okay.
17 BY MR. ALLISON:
18 4
To get back to the TH then, and I want to make sure 19 I understand you correctly, this 700 degree TH told you clearly 20 there was steam in the hot leg?
21 A
That's right.
22 4
But you did not make the inference that that was 23 telling you there was a lot of steam being produced in the core?
24 A _
That's right.
j A Fwww n.s nm. inc.
25 g
Looking back at it now, do you think that that's what w
9
15 jtf 13 1
the 700 degree TH indicates?
i 2
A No.
3 G
Have you looked at that?
4 A
I haven't looked at it, but I don't think it does 5
indicate that simply because it depends on the water volume 6
in the core and the pressure of the core.
There is no flow 7
in there if the water volume was such that the water levels 8
above the core, you know, it wouldn't matter -- I couldn't 9
tell from that temperature what the water volume was in the 10 reactor coolant systems.
11 G
That temperature does not tell you then whether or:
12 not the core is covered, if I understand you correctly?
13 A
That's correct.
14 MR. ALLISON:
Off the record.
15 (Discussion off the record.)
16 BY MR. ALLISON:
17 G
A little more about this method of cooling by 18 charging HPI water and discharging the steam space of the 19 pressurizer.
l 20 Did you appreciate at the time that there's a bypass path 21 when you charge water into the cold legs, it can go down the 22 bottom of the core barrel and through the core and out the 23 pressurizer that way?
It can also go back through another
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24 steam generator and wind up in the pressurizer that way?
Ace-Fooeret Repo,ters, Inc.
25 A
Yes, it was.
16 jtf 14 1
4 And so you appreciated this bypass flow going on 2
in the system where there could be?
3 A
Yes, that was primarily one of the reasons I didn't 4
particularly care for that mode of cooling.
5 g
one of its primary drawbacks is you don't know 6
whether it is bypassing or going through the core?
7 A
That's right.
8 Were you aware of the core thermocouple readings 9
during this time? '
10 A
I was aware that they were high, but I did not put Il maybe the attention on them I should have, simply because 12 again, I go back to the T Hot that was enough indication to 13 me to indicate that we had the problem and I had a fairly good 14 idea what the problem was and that was we were steaming in the 15 hot leg.
16 g
And so you are aware that the core thermocouple 17 readings were high, but not --
18 A
Not specifically how high, what the temperatures were.
19 0
Did you think at that time that you might have a 20 better chance with this method of cooling, if you followed 21 some different strategy.than the one you were following?
22 Some different strategies that come to my mind are pump 23 the pressure up high and only open the vent valve as need be 24 to prevent lifting the code safeties.
Another strategy is to 4 r.ew s neoo,i m.Inc.
25 leave the vent valve and vent as much as you can to open the 9
17 jtf 15 1
PORV in the vent valve and try to lower the pressure as much 2
as you can.
And a third one that can go with either one, is 3
the max the HPI flow.
4 Did you think at the time that you would have a better 5
chance of cooling the core with some combination of those 6
strategies?
7 A
Yes, I did.
My initial reaction was of course to 8
let the reactor coolant system fill and that was what I suggested, not long after I took the console and then getting -~ j 9
10 it was some time after the hydrogen explosion that I insisted 11 to Gary Miller on what I wanted to do and I requested permission I 12 to do it.
15 Remember at this time I could not do anything on that 14 console without prior approval from Gary Miller.
15 g,
So what was it that you kanted to do then?
16 A
I wanted to fill the system going to at some higher 17 flow rate than we were going whether it was 80 gallons a minute 18 or not, I don't remember.
But close up the pressurizer, 19 continue with the let-down and increase makeup flow, which 20 we did do eventually.
21 4.
So this was your recommendation shortly after you l
took charge of the control room?
22 i
23 A
I think it was shortly after, but again, time during 24 that time frame had no meaning because it could have been an Ace-Fessores Repo,ters, Inc.
23 hour2.662037e-4 days <br />0.00639 hours <br />3.80291e-5 weeks <br />8.7515e-6 months <br />, it could have been five hours, I don't remember.
18 jtf 16 1
G Do you think you definitely had made this recommen-2 dation to Gary Miller by the time we reached shortly after the 3
hydrogen detonation?
4 A
Yes, I had made the recommendation earlier.
I had --
5 the recommendation to allow me to fill the system -- at that i
6 time I didn't say to fill the system, to inject and draw a 7
bubble in the pressurizer.
And I assume that was under 8
advisement of Gary Miller and Jack Herbein, who ras at the 9
observation center at that time.
It was right after the 10 hydrogen explosion and I mentioned that I correlated the 11 opening of the valve with the detonation period that I again i
12 went to Gary Miller and explained what I thought had happened 13 as far as the hydrogen detonation and the simultaneous opening 14 of the valve, and it was shortly after that, Gary Miller got 15 back to me and said go ahead and draw the bubble.
16 BY MR. JOHNSTON:
17 0
What was it that you thought had happened that you 18 communicated to Gary?
19 MR. ALLISON:
I have a line of questions.
20 MR. JOHNSTON:
Okay, I understand.
21 MR. ALLISON:, Well, go ahead.
22 BY MR. JOHNSTON:
~
23 0
Okay.
I was juot going to ask you, you just stated 24 that when you were aware of the pressure spiked, you went to Am-Federal Reporters, Inc.
r 25 Gary and said something to hin about what you thought it was?
l
i i
19 jtf 17 1
A No, no, no.
It was after the detonation.
Now I 2
didn't realize it was hydrogen detonation immediately.
3 0
What did you say to Gary?
At this time the pressure spiked -- at that time, 4
A 5
I didn't know what it was.
But it was some time later when 6
someone mentioned an explosion that they had heard that I put 7
two and two together on the pressure spike and the noise that 8
we had actually had some kind of explosion in the building.
9 G
That was some time during the same shift?
10 A
Yes.
11 G
Then what did you say -- that's when you went to 12 Gary Miller and what did you say?
13 A
I related that to Gary that I thought that what we 14 had seen out there was an explosion of some kind in the building i
15 and it correlated with the opening -- one of the valves, and 16 I'm still not sure which one it was, I told Gary that I didn't 17 advise him operating that valve any longer.
And I requested 18 again, permission to inject and get a bubble in the pressurizer, 19 MR. JOHNSTON:
Okay.
20 BY MR. ALLISON:
21 4
Okay.
On that point, I just want to point out that
- 22 on. reading your I&E interview, it doesn't appear consistent.
23 On page 12, you said that despite the fact that the spike 24 startled you at first, when it came out, then you looked at Ace-Federal Reporters, int 25 it and you dismissed it as probably some kind of an instrument l
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20 jtf 18 1
malfunction.
2 A
No, no, I did not.
I never dismissed it simply 3
because my building spray pump started.
4 4
Okay.
Did you dismiss it --
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A Did I say that in the I&E report?
6 4
Let me finish the question.
7 A
Okay.
8 G
On.page 12, it startled you, you were concerned.
9 Spray pumps came on.
You looked things over and then dismissed to it.
Later on --
11 A
Well, maybe in my initial -- I didn't dismiss it,.
12 I couldn't explain it.
13 G
Okay.
14 A
So therefore, maybe in that sense, I did dismiss it.
15 The pressure stayed down so therefore there was nothing more 16 I could do.
17 G
The pressure was down?
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- 1 18 A
Yes.
19 20 21 22 23 24 Am-Federet Reporters, Inc.
25
CR7624.02 21 DAR rmg 1 1
0 Then later on on page 18 of your I&E interview you 2
talked about suggesting to Gary Miller that you don't open the 3
valve any more because it had caused some kind of an explosion?
4 A
Yes.
5 G
A-i that's the inconsistency that I wanted to clear
~
6 up.
The first statement that it was dismissed and then 7
suggesting that you don't do it again because it caused an 8
explosion.
9 A
Well, there was some time period between those two.
10 G
You already answered, and that it was same time 11 later that you put the noise together with the pressure spike, 12 is that correct?
13 A
Right, and also the final thing is opening of that 14 valve and how much longer that was after the spike, I don't 15 know.
Again, I would have to -- it would be not much -- my 16 realization of.'what had happened would not be too long prior 17 to our increasing the flow rate to above one that
~
18 logged on t.1at log I mentioned earlier somewhere.
I 19 G
Now, are you pretty sure that you told Gary you 20 thought opening that valve had caused an explosion?
21 A.
Yes7 I ar pretty sure, but whether or not I could 22 swear to that, I don't know.
23 G
Are you quite sure that that is what you thought?
24 A
That's what I thought.
Most definitely I did think Aco+%,eral Repo,ters, Inc.
25 that.
Now, whether or not I related that to Gary then, now
22 rmg 2 1
that I think about it, I don't really remember.
I may have i
2 just gone back to Gary and asked permission again to redraw 3
the bubble.
I just can't remember if I related to him my f
4 thoughts at the time of the correlation of pressure spike in
~
5 the operation of the valve.
6 0
Okay.
That's okay.
On the 80 gallon per minute flow c 7
your I&E interview indicates that when you came in and took 8
over the panels, that the instructions were to maintain an 9
80 gallon per minute injection flow.
10 A.
And the 80 gallons per minute -- and I think I said Il that in my I&E we put, I was not sure of that number.
That-12 may just be a number that is associated with the make-up 13 system that I kept in my mind, but at the time of the I&E 14 report, 80 gallons a minute came to my mind.
So it's possible 15 that I mixed those up.
16 G
It's possible the instruction was for some other 17 flow rate?
18 A.
Yes.
19 0
If it had been for 80 gallons per minute, would you 20 be happy with that instruction, would you think that is plenty 21 of flow?
l 22 A.
Part of the instruction was -- and I remember this 23 l
distinctly -- was whether or not it was actually 80 gallons a 24 minute.
woe.ree n.oonm, Inc.
25 The second part of that is that it was enough to maintain
=
r 23 rmg 3 1
the core cool.
Now, that's the word I got.
Now, how that was 2
determined, I am not even sure because, again, I didn't have 3
time to go back and recheck and recheck what people were telling 4
me.
~
5 4
But as you recall your instructions, however much 6
flow you were told to maintain, you were also told that was 7
sufficient; is that correct?
8 A
That's correct.
9 4
Did you think that whatever it was -- did you taink 10 at the time that you would have a better chance of cooling 11 the core if the flow rate were higher?
12 A
Then, I will restate what I said earlier.
I did 13 not like that method of cooling, okay?
I did not like it 14 initially when I was told what it was and while I was at the 15 console and I was carrying out those instructions, simply 16 because it just did not give me enough confidence in any way 17 because I had no means of telling whether or not I was in 18 fact. keeping the core cool.
19 There were other people who were looking at the thermocouple i
20 temperatures and things like that that were, I assume, and 21 I don't remember specifically anybody telling me that the
'(
22 core temperatures were coming down or anything to that effect.
23 G
Were you aware that while you didn't know the exact 24 core thermocouple readings, no one was reporting to you that A -F.e.rw neoo,w,,, inc.
25 the core was being cooled; is that correct?
l 24 rmg 4 1
A No, no one was reporting to me that the core wasn't 2
being cooled.
I was told that the core was being cooled, 3
thats all.
4 G
Do you remember who gave you those instructions to 5
maintain whatever flow rate it was?
6 A
Mike Ross, I remember stating those.
Now, I think 7
also when I talked to Bill Zewe, as far as my taking over the 8
console, I think he also mentioned.
9 G
Although you are not certain of what the number was, 10 you are quite certain that there was a flow rate specified at 11 that time?
12 A
Yes.
13 0
When you took over?
14 A
Yes.
I'm quite certain there was a flow rate.
15 G
Could it have been 4-to 500 GPM?
16 A
No, no, I don't think so.
17 G
You don't think it was that high?
18 MR. ALLISON:
Off the record for a second.
19 (Discussion off the record.)
20 MR. ALLISON:
Back on the record.
21 BY MR. ALLISONi 22 G
When did you leave the plant on March 28th?
23 A
Once I got there, I didn't leave until the morning 24 of March 29th.
I think I left the plant somewhere around A=-Feo res neoo, m, Inc.
25 6:00 o' clock that morning and then went over to the observation
25 rmg 5 1
center for a while.
2 G
When you went home, did you think that the plant was 3
under control?
4 A
Yes, I did.
I thought the plant was under control 5
when we started the reactor coolant pump around 5:00 or 6:00 6
o' clock in the evening.
7 G
And why was it that you thought things were under 8
control at that point?
9 A
Simply because we had core cooling, definite core 10 cooling.
We had a means or renoving the heat from the core 11 which was the steam generator.
That was it.
That's under 12 control.
13 G
Do you remember what you knew at that time when you 14 went home about the radiation readings, either off-site or in 15 the plant?
16 A
I knew in the plant they were high.
That was related 17 to some water from the reactor building pumped in the aux 18 building off-site.
Yes, we of course had our off-site 19 monitors out and we were getting reports back.
I don't renember 20 l
anything very outstanding as far as off-site doses on that day.
21 4
Does-that mean you don't remember any large 22 readings?
23 A
Large readings, right.
24 G
In terms of off-site doses, is it fair to say that Ace F oerw n.nonen, ene.
25 the off-site releases weren't alarming you?
t 1
26 rmg 6 1
A Yes.
I 2
O In any way?
3 A
Yes, it is.
4 4
Were the in-plant readings alarming you?
5 A
I was concerned about the in-plant readings, simply 6
because they were high enough to keep us out of there, out 7
of some of those areas.
And that concerned me.
8 As far as their hazards of these doses, no, I wasn't 9
concerned, overly concerned, because I assumed that we would 10 take the proper precautions in, one, bringing the levels down, 11 and two, limit personnel access.
12 G
It sounds like the basis of your concern for the 13 in-plant readings was in the auxiliary building anyway.
Was 14 it an operational problem?
15 A
That's right.
16 0
You didn't infer from those readings core damage?
17 What kind of core damage you might have, did you?
18 A
Yes, I did that essentially when I got in the control 19 room.
I was, you know, essentially asking what happened up 20 to that time, and all the radiation monitors in'the reactor 21 building and of course in the auxiliary' fuel builing were high.
22 r assume we did have some core damage.
23 At the time I wasn't of course sure how much.
It looked bad, I'll say that, but, you know, and~again, I didn't really 24
- w. sere n com,.. inc.
25 have the time to think about it, you know, how much core damage i
27 rmg 7 1
there was and what the effects of that were as far as what j
2 was happening.
3 My main concern was, of course, to get things back to 4
normal status, I guess in the way I would like to say that.
5 G
Were you aware of the readings inside the reactor 6
building, namely, how many rem per hour the meters were 7
indicating?
8 A
I know they were high, what numbers they were I 9
don't remember.. I still don't know what they were.
10 0
Did you know at that time?
II A
I knew at that time they were high in the building, 12 yes.
13 G
But you didn't'know what the specific readings 14 were?
15 A
No, I didn't.
I'm sure someone mentioned them to, 16 but --
17 G
Did you connect those readings, the readings 1nside 18 the reactor bui1 ding with something specific set as a level 39 of core damage or a Part 100-type release design basis 20 accident or anything of that nature, make any specific 21 inferences from them?
I 22 A
No, other than we had had some core damage and we 23 had some radioactivity out in that aux building that we had 24 to maintain some control on.
i Ae +.oorm nepormes, inc.
25 g
But you didn't know from the radiation readings that O -
28 rmg 8 1
you had core damage?
2 A
Yes.
3 G
You knew the levcis were high inside the containment?
(
4 A
Yes.
There was no doubt in my mind we were under 5
a general emergency.
6 G
But you felt the core was being cooled?
7 A
Yes.
8 G
And that the operational problems in the auxiliary 9
building could be handled; is that right?
10 A
Yes.
11 G
Land that the high levels were being contained within 12 the reactor buidling; is that correct?
13 A
That's correct.
14 0
When were you on watch again in Unit 2?
15 A
I don't remember.
It was the next day or that 16 Thursday, and I don't remember if I came out -- I had been 17 scheduled to work the 3:00 to 11:00 shift all that week, and 18 I think I must have come in again on Thursday, somewhere around 19 3:00 o'clo'ck, what time I'm not sure.
20 0
You were on watch in the Unit 2 control room on 21 Thursday?
22 A
Yes.
23 G
Do you remember what happened while you were on 24 watch there?
we=sers n pomes, Inc.
25 A
No.
There were an awful lot of problems that we had,
29 rmg 9 1
and without my looking at some sort of log or something to 2
spark my memory -- I remember now, and I am not sure again 3
when this was, but it must have been Thursday, the gas problems
- (
4 in the reactor coolant system -- now that was a big problem 5
to 6s in that, you know, we had the gases there and we were 6
getting rid of them by venting the make-up tank, but unfortun-7 ately we had a leak in that system that was puffing radioactive 8
gases to the building and then from the building, of course, 9
to the ventilation system to the atmosphere, and that was 10 a continuing problem.
11 And I am not sure when it started or when we -- well, I'm 12 sure it started right after we started the reactor coolant 13 pump.
14 0
You are not sure if you became aware of the problem 15 on Thursday or Friday?
16 A
No, I'm sure that the gas problem was there Thursday 17 and at that time we were venting the make-up tank to get rid 18 of gases.
And of course that was%the big bubble in the 19 core time, too.
20 G
Okay, well that will square because other people 21 started worrying about the gas bubble and if you came in on 22 Thursday evening at 3:00 and stayed until midnight --
23 A
There is one thing I want to say.-
This bubble in 24 the reactor coolant system, in my mind was never under any
- 4. 7.ews n.oonm. inc.
25 problem.
We knew exactly what it was doing at all times.
i l
30 rmg 10 1
Now, I know I realize that a lot of other people didn't 2
understand, but the operator on the console was able to 3
distinguish what the bubble was doing just by spraying the 4
pressurizer periodically.
We could tell when we had a lot of
~
5 gases in solution in the water, therefore we had to vent it 6
simply by the action in the pressurizer and spraying it down.
7 G
How did you tell that?
8 A
Well, what we were getting was noncondensable gases, 9
pressurizer, by spraying it in there and the length of time 10 that you would spray to get it to fill the pressurizer with 11 noncondensable, determine how tiuch gas you had in the solution, 12 you know, I know again this was a great big thing as far as 13 the press and everybody else was concerned, but I had no 14 concern on the consold, because we knew exactly when we had to 15 vent, based on'how long it would take us to spray to get a 16 noncondensable gas out of the solution and into the pressurizer, 17 G
And by venting you mean open the valve or the PORV 18 vent valve?
19 A
Yes.
20 4
And venting those gases out?
s 21 A
And of course, simply by the duration of spray time b
22 to get the noncondensable gases or to ' fill the pressurizer 23 determine how much gases we had in the solution and we could l
24 say that time lengthening, according to the more venting we AeCederet Reporte,s, Inc.
~
25 did.
31 rmg 11 1
G How could you tell when you were spraying that you 2
had filled the pressurizer with noncondensable gases?
3 A
If you had a steam bubble in there, your pressure 4
would tend to decrease because your are collapsing the steam 5
bubble, where if you have noncondensable gases in there and 6
you spray, it doesn't -- as a matter of fact, the only thing 7
it does do is increase the pressurizing level.
It doesn't 8
change your pressure at all.
9 So depending on when you sprayed, what the rate of pressure 10 was, determined how many --
Il G
In the pressurizer gas base?
12 A
Yes.
13 0
And how much spraying you could do before you reached 14 that condition told you how much?
15 A
That was dissolved gases were still in the system.
16 G
So did you commence Thursday then to degas the system 17 by the method we just talked about?
18 A
I believe so.
Again, I would have to look.
We did
[
39 it for quite a number of days there.
l i
20 Okay, so when it actually started, I don't even remember.
21 4
There was. another method of degasing the system
}
22 going on, too, and that's with the let-down gases would come 23 out of solution in the make-up tank; is that right?
24 A
That was not a means of degasing.
There was nothing Ace-Poweral Reno,ters, Inc.
25 we could do about that, as you decreased in the pressure in 1
32 rmg 12 1
the reactor coolant system of course, the gases would come 2
out of solution.
3 G
I mean that was --
i' 4
A It was not the preferred method of getting rid of 5
the gases, but there was no choice.
6 G
It wasn't bad, it wasn't that getting rid of some 7
of the gas?
8 A
Yes, but if we could have stopped it without securing 9
the let-down, we would have.
10 0
Why couldn't you secure the let-down?
11 A -
We had had problems with let-down.
We did not --
12 well, first of all, we were putting water in the system 13 through the fuel injection lines, so you have to get rid of 14 that water somehow or else you would go solid, and with the 15 make-up pump running solid position, it a sery tenuous position 16 to be in.
17 So we had to maintain let-down to get rid of this water, 18 and of course, the let-down, because of the gases coming out 19 of solution, was giving us gas problems.
20 So we were sort of strapped in that position rather than 21 operating it solid, using the discharge to the make-up pump, 22 which is about 2700 pounds.
We d'd10ed not to do that.
23 4
Can you remember argrthil, jlse about Thursday and 24 Friday?
Ace-t woral Reporters. Inc.
25 A
There was something else about the make-up tank, now l
33 rmg 13 1
I'm not sure if it was Thursday or Friday.
We were, because 2
of the leasage in the system, we had a set pattern that we 3
were using preventing, and it was again, it was kind of
.(
4 shaky in that the pressure just kept mounting on us in that l
5 make-up tank.
6 And I think it was Friday night, wasn't it, where they 7
lifted a relief valve?
8 0
I don't know.
9 A
That was the day we got --
1 10 Friday morning was the 1200 millirem reading at 11 the stack.
12 A
And that was due to our lifting the make-up tank 13 and blowing the hot water and gases out into the building 14 Okay.
15 G
Were you also on duty on Friday?
16 A
Yes, I was.
17 G
Probably would that be'about the same, 3:00 o' clock 18 to midnight or so?
19 A
Yes, I think it was.
I think I stayed on that type 20 of all -- well, at~least that area of schedule for a while.
21 0
Pardon me.
Do you remember what happened Friday
}
22 when you were on watch?
23 A
No, I don't.
Again, I would have to have some kind 24 of reference material to spark my memory.
Ac -Fw.rm nan n. inc.
25 4
In those later days there were GPU engineers on
34 cmg 14 1
watch with you in the control room?
2 A
Yes.
3 G
I think I'm -- I'm not positive -- but in later
(
s
~,
4 days?
5 A
Yes.
6 G
They were there and they represented, I think, the 7
technical support groups.
8 A
Technical support groups, they were involved quite 9
a bit with the bubble.
I remember that.
10 0
Can you describe to me what their function and role 11 was, what kind of things they did?
12 A
I think their function was to help us to get out of 13 the position we were in and also, they were doing some 14 engineering help coming up with a means to increase let-down 15 slow, calculation of bubbles, things like that, things that 16 we did not have the time to do.
1 l'7 They were making suggestions on various things, writing 18 test procedures, and they were doing different functions from 19 then until now, as a matter of fact.
20 4
were they directly involved in operations in the 21 sense of being in the chain of command, or did you feel you 22 had to check with them before doing certain things?
23 A
Yes, they were.
They were doing a lot of.the 24 studying of problems for us, and you know, for instance, the A resere nepo,wes, Inc.
4 25 let-downplowproblem.
35 rmg 15 1
And I know that I was told that, you know, of course I had 2
the complete charge, but I should check with them before 3
changing anything in the let-down or anything of that type.
{
('
4 0
Would influential advisers be a good term for them?
5 A
Yes, advisers would be a good tern.
6 G
Did you feel you were in charge of operation?
7 A
For the most part.
8 G
Okay, do you remember anything else noteworthy that l
9 happened while you were on duty Friday, Saturday, Sunday, 10 other than the degasing evolution?
11 A.
The degasing evolution -- and of course, sometime, 12 during that period we put the hydrogen recombiners in service.
13 Now, that was the time I was nervous.
14 G
And why were you nervous?
15 A
Well, simply because the past history of the hydrogen 16 recombiners that I was aware of, as far as I knew, they did 17 not have a good reputation.
Put them on the line and they 18 would blow up, and that type of thing.
19 So if there was any time during that whole thing over there 20 in the first couple of. hours that I didn't have time to be 21 scared, that was the one time that I was rather apprehensive 22 with putting the hydrogen recombiners on line.
23 0
Were you aware of the plans for diluting the incoming 24 gas with nitrogen?
A=-Ans nonm, inc.
25 A
Yes.
s 36 rmg 16 1
G To prevent an explosion?
2 A
Yes, I was.
We also --
3 G
I take it you were all in favor of that?
4 A
Yes, I was.
5 I will be quite frank with you, I am not that well 6
acquainted with hydrogen or any other gases for that$ matter, 7
and I was a,little nervous when I came to hydrogen gases.
It 8
could be because I was there and saw the initial spike.
9 G
Okay.
You don't remember 1when those were put in U
service?
11 A
No.
No, I don't.
I know we put those in service.
12 We had done a few things like, well, hook up some lines to pump 13 the waste gas tanks into the reactor buildin;.
We tried to 14 hook up a line directly from the make-up tank to the reactor 15 building, things of that nature.
16 G
You weren't successful in hooking the make-up tank 17 directly to the reactor building?
18 A
No, we weren't, and I'm not sure why now.
19 G
Any other noteworthy evolutions that you recall, 20 say, in the first week?
21 A
No,.not without some reference.
22 MR._ALLISON:
Okay, why don't we go back to the 23 first day, Bill, and ask some questions.
24 BY MR. JOHNSTON:
Ac J uerm neponers, Inc.
25 G
Okay, we might want to refer to this chart while
37 rmg 17 1
we do some talking.
2 If I understand what is going on here, you starting taking
(,
3 charge in the control room at about somewhere here around 4
the 10th hour after the thing started, at least that would be 5
just before the hydrogen spike, the plant was already down 6
at its low pressure, so that was completed.
7 And the plant was -- let's see, was'it steaming?
8 L
No.
9 G
There was nothing coming out the secondary, both 10 atmospherics were secured and there was no vacuum yet?
11 A
That's right.
l 12 G
So it would be roughly in here?
13 A
That's right.
14 G
Now, actions that you recommended began to take place l
15 it looks like in no longer than about an hour after you got 16 there, at least if I see it right, they were already beginning 17 about that time.
18 We are already beginning to see the hot leg drop.
There is 19 hydrogen spark because it turned on the EEC at that time, j
20 ES'or whatever.
21 So we do have kind of a time period here, and it was'not
(
22 too long after that that we began to see the effect.
23 So why don't you just kind of start here, if you would, j
l 24 Joe, and go through with the kinds of things that you were 25 trying to do, and perhaps you could refer a little bit to this,
38 rmg 18 1
and if we have some errors in some things here like someone 2
indicated flows or so'mething, point out if you think we have 3
something.
4 A
Well, as far as indicated flows, again, I don't 5
recall what the flow rates were, and I would have to refer to 6
the log I had at the time.
7 But somewhere in this time frame when I got permission 8
from Gary Miller, we turned the pressurizer heaters on.
- Now, 9
it took some time to develop heat in the pressurizer to start end #2 10 to turn the water to steam.
11 12 13 14 15 s
16 17 18 19 20 21 22
~
~
l 23 24 Ace-Fouerel Reporters, Inc.
25
e CR 7624 39 DAR #3 jt^* 1 l
'O We have an indication down here that presumably 2
indicates which banks are on and my memory is that these lines 3
are the on periods.
So this talk's about banks 5 being turned 4
off and on, the other ones are apparently on most of the. time, 5
at least the ones that are working.
6 Does this make any sense to you to see things on and then 7
nothing for a period?
8 A
No, it doesn't, because it should correlate with 9
some period of time prior to the lith hour here to somewhere 10 at between lith and 12th hour when those heaters came off.
11 G
I think we have that.
That's tied in.
Well, you 12 go ahead.
13 A
Somewhere, and I would say it was probably 15 or 20 14 minutes prior to 1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br />, where when we turned on the fuel 15 heaters to start raising the temperature in the pressurizer 16 to bring it to saturation for the pressure, we were at.
17 We did find the reset temperature and when we started to 18 produce steam, the steam pushed the water out of the pressurizer 19 into the loops.
Now some. time in here, and it doesn't show on 20 the drawing, but,around 150 in pressurizer increase, the 21 injection flow :o what number again, I don't know, but I know 22 I did have it legged because I made a point to insure that I 23 logged the flow rates.
l 24 4
Well, you have done this by starting up another pump i
Am-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 or by changing the flow on an existing one?
d
i-40 jtf 2 1
A I think I started by the existing flow.
Now there 2
was a time when I did have to start the second pump, but I'm 3
not sure when that was or what the sequence was.
But I had 4
been, got 150, because the rate had dropped in the pressurizer 5
it seemed to me that we would not have enough water in the 6
pressurizer to fill the loops, so I increased the flow rate 7
at about 100 inches to drop in, the pressurizer level stayed 8
pretty constant.
That is when I had the heaters, 80 and 100 9
inches.
I had the heaters turned off again to give me some 10 time to inject some more. water into the reactor coolant systems 11 and that is when we see here, the level going back up.
I'm 12 not sure that that slope is' correct though, is seems it went 13 up faster.
14 G
It is a recorded parameter?
15 A
Yes, and once we got the pressurizer essentially 16 full again, and of course you remember this whole time I was 17 injecting at some greater rate than we had been, we again tried 18 the same thing.
We turned the heaters on and draw out the 19 bubble and it was some tiue in this time frame, around 1300 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> that we actually law the T Hot loops coming down.
I'm 21 not sure what this is indicating here.
It indicateu that it went back up again.
22 G
23 A
And we'did see that, we saw, as we -- as the 24 pressurized level would come down, the T Hot would come down l
Aa F.o r : n porters, Inc.
25 on A loop only, n(t B loop, but then when we had to shut the I
~
. ~;
41 jtf 3 1
heaters off, we allowed the water level to go back to the 2
pressurizer, the T Hot started going back up again and that 3
may be what we are seeing here.
4 4
Were you interpreting any of this?
Were you looking 5
at activities in the steam generator and interpreting your
~
6 temperature changes here, the cold legs for example are heating 7
up.
Did you infer anything about flow through the steam 8
generators?
9 A
Well, there was some point there where it was brought to to my attention, the TCs were changing, it was changing and 11 it indicated to me that we were getting some flow through the 12 generator, okay?
But I don't remember at what point that was.
13 But getting back to the drawing of the bubble, it seems to 14 me that this happened -- we turned the heaters on and off more 15 than is indicated here unless this is the time frame.
16 I remember it did take us quite a long time to actually inject 17 water and draw a bubble, and now this doesn't show the bubble 18 for some reason.
19 4
It shows a full pressure.
20 A
And that's not correct because there was some time 21 prior to this increase in pressure and this is where we went 22 on full high pressure injection, but there was some time prior 23 to that -- wait a minute, let me think on that a minute.
24 I don't remember what that pressurizing did, but I do know Am-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 that we had had at some time in this point here, had positive
42 jtf 4 1
indication that we had water in the A loop and that was 2
indicated by the T Hots and the TCs in that loop.
3 G
Right here they are essentially the same.
4 A
Right.
Now this is about the time I received -
~
5 instructions to go full high pressure injection. ~Now based 6
on what I had seen up to this point with the T Hots coming 7
down A loop and if I remember right, we had pumped in, I think 8
it was 20- or 30,000 gallons of water to this point.
9 G
Yes, I wanted to ask you about those flows.
You did 10 mention in the I&E interviews that first you put in something 11 like 20,000 gallons and began to see the A loop refill and 12 then later on you added some more and you said that it seemed 13 like 30,000 additional gallons?
14 A
Right.
15 G
Now I don't recall the exact volume of the primary 16 system, but 50,000 gallons is fairly -- like 50 percent or l
17 something?
18 A
It is 88,000 gallons.
19 G
If you put 50, thoughl in on a system that holds 20 80,000, what would that lead you to conclude about how much 21 water must have been in the system?
f 22 A
Until we went into the high-pressure injection, when 23 we put the first 20,000 gallons in, we saw the volume coming 24 down.
I thought we were pretty close to a full system and I Am Federet Reporters, Inc.
25 did not think at that time of the difference in the gasses in
43 jtf 5 1
the B loop that was preventing me from filling that loop.
2 I thought because the A loop was full, the B loop was right j
[
3 behind it.
And as a matter of fact I remember resisting going 4
to full high-pressure injection simply because we had the-A loop 5
full and again, because of that I thought the B loop was 6
directly behind it, but I received direct orders from Jack 7
Herbein to go to full high-pressure injection.
That is when 8
we did this and saw the pressure starting to come up.
When we 9
got the pressure up and I noticed we put in -- I know it was 10 a total of about 50,000 gallons of water that was when I 11 realized that we really had a big problem in the fact that we 12 had very little water left in the RC system and based on 88,000 gallons, we had about 38},ob/#7 13 gallons of water left and that's 14 when I personally knew that we had a lot bigger problem than 15 I originally thought about.
16 G
Of course, I think at the point that you realized 17 that you also solved it.
I mean, you also effectively refilled 18 it by the time you realized that you had it.
l 19 A
Right.
And there were no other means of determining 20 what we had in the system except to go ahead like we did.
21 G
Was the 20,000 or 30,000 somewhere in the log book 22 somewhere?
23 A
That's right.
24 0
On what is the basis of your recollection?
Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 A
The basis of my recollection was that I had them,
44 jtf 6 1
prior to starting, marked BWST levels and logged it when we 2
were completed and based on those calculations -- and it seemed 3
to me it was 20,000 for the A loop and 30,000 for the B loop.
(
4 I may have those backwards.
5 4
Were you doing anything by way of changing valve 6
lineups or anything in the periods here so that -- is it in 7
any way conceivable that perhaps all this water was in fact 8
leaving the BWST?
Was perhaps leaving it but not necessarily 9
going, all of it, into the core?
Or the primary system, let's 10 put it that way.
11 A
No, the DHP-5s were open and we were suctioning 12 right off the BWST.
Now it's possible, I guess, that it was 13 going somewhere else, but I wouldn't know where.
14 G
There is a valve lineup if you want to feed from 15 the C makeup line over into the A -- well, let me see how it 16 goes.
If you want to put in a different set of cold legs than 17 when you were at, you would have to open some valves somewhere 18 and close some other valves in order to, so to speak, cross-19 feed.
Do you have any idea of whether that kind of valve 20 arrangement was attempted?
21 A
Yes.
l 1
Changeover to feed two different legs?
22 4
23 A
Some time during this thing I was told that the high-24 pressure injection pumps were all cross-connected and that's Ace-Federes Repo,ters, Inc.
25 where common suction and common discharge points -- now I'm not i
i
45 jtf 7 1
sure when I was told that.
2 4
Let me say for the record that this is a piece of 3
paper showing the high-pressure injection flow arrangement with l
4 the valves.
~
5 A
Okay.
One thing it does not show is two valves here l
6 and two valves here.
7 G
On the inlets?
8 A
On the inlets.
9 MR. JOHNSTON:
Dennis, do you want to --
10 BY MR. JOHNSTON:
11 G
Now, is this A, B and C, as you put the thing, the 12 A pump was secured?
13 A
And it would be C, A and B.
14 G
And these were being used later on in the event and
(
15 if you wanted to put feed up into this part of the plant and 16 I think this is the A side --
17 A
A side, right.
18 G
And you were using this pump as your driving force, 19 now you've got to move it through several valves.
l 20 A
That's right.
21 G
Normally it goes like this?
22 A
Yes, and these two valves would be closed.
~
23 G
Those are manual valves?
24 A
Yes.
I was told that these valves along with these Ace-Federet Reporters, Inc.
25 other groups of two were all open.
So that you could feed the
i 46 jtf 8 1
C pump into the A loop or B loop.
2 G
This would have been done same time to your arrival?
3 A
Yes.
a 4
G Nothing that was done under your direction?
5 A
No, No.
6 G
Knowing what you know about the radioactivity in 7
the auxiliary building, would you have suspected there would 8
be any difficulty in getting anyone in to make those kinds of 9
changes, obviously after there was activity around?
10 A
Yes, I would assume -- and depending when during the 11 accident had happened, I say that because that --
12 G
You say the C valves were not really begun to be 13 used until four hours into the accident and that was when the 14 A was secured.
So some time after this period, say five hours, 15 if you can give us some feeling about the levels of activities 16 that might have been in there in this time period, is that a 17 feasible thing for someone to have done?
18 A
Yes, that is feasible.
As far as giving you an idea, i
19 I'm not sure what the activities would have been at that time.
20 4
Okay.
Thanks very much.
21 Okay, so we have moved along now to the repressurization.
22 Off the record.
23 (Discussion off the record.)
24 MR. HAYNES:
Back on the record.
Ace Federse Reporters. Inc.
25 l
l
47 jtf 9 1
BY MR. JOHNSTON:
2 G
Back in the repressurization mode and doing it with 3
a full HPCI on, you're repressurizing, were there any events
- (
4 that took place in this time zone that were other than straight- -
5 forward activities that you would take place in order to make 6
preparations to bring it up and start the pump, which was done 7
at this time period?
8 A
Well, let me explain.
Again, I mentioned earlier 9
that I was not all that hot to go ahead with the high-pressure p) injection.
So I was ordered to go with the high-pressure 11 injection at 125 gallons per minute per leg, which would come 12 out to 500 gallons.
I started off doing that, okay.
But as 13 the pressure started to came up, I decreased that flow rate 14 quite a bit until we got up to 2300 pounds and that was fairly 15 low by that time.
Okay.
Now somewhere also in here we got 16 vacuum back on a condenser and we started to steam a generator, 17 right here.
And that was just about the time we started the ug high-pressure injection.
That was one of my considerations 19 when I decreased this flow rate, that we were steaming the 20 generator at that time.
21 So I didn't feel we needed to go fully solid.
My indication of the 2300 pounds and the temperatures being down were enough 22 23 indication to me that we had core cooling throughout the steam i
24 generator.
Ace-Fooeral Reporters, Inc.
l 25 G
Okay, one final thing on that and that is, you I
~
48 jtf 10 1
mentioned earlier in the interview about the fact that you were 2
venting to remove gas and that the period of time between when 3
you had the vent, it gradually got longer and longer as you 4
were gradually moving the gas from the primary system.
Did 5
that venting operation start very shortly after you got the 6
pumps going or was it a number of hours later or was it almost 7
inmediately that you were doing this venting operation?
8 A
I don't remember.
9 G
Okay.
10 Do you remember when the concerns about bubbles and so forth 11 began?
You say you weren't particularly concerned, but --
12 A
When I came back the next day, of course that was 13 the big thing, the bubble in the reactor vessel itself.
And 14 like I mentioned earlier, based on what we could see at the 15 console, I had no concern at all.
The bubble -- other than 16 rapid pressure decrease, of course, any rapid pressure decrease 17 would have forced the gas bubble and would have made it bigger.
18 G
You had that same problem while you were on until 19 6:00 o' clock the following morning and this was something like 20 l
6:00 o' clock in the evening, so you had another 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of 21 this sort of thing while you were in charge, and was it 22 essentially the same kind of operation that was going on when 23 you came back?
24 A
Yes, it was.
l A ew.m n==nm. inc 25 G
Did you sort of initiate -- you had to do some ventinc
49 jtf 11 1
or something along during that period and I had the sense of 2
a soft system.
3 A
Yes, as a matter of fact, and I mentioned this
(
earlier, but this point here when we started the RC pump, 4
5 I figured the emergency essentially over and the cleanup 6
portion of it beginning and we did get into the gas problems 7
and I'm not sure when and how we determined -- I know we were 8
getting the gasses in the makeup tank, the whole while because 9
of the letdown.
The venting of the pressurizer, I don't 10 remember when we started that to get rid of the gasses.
I do 11 remember though, my lack of concern about the bubble in the -
12 RC system based on what we could see at the console.
13 g
You did feel though, that the venting started while 14 you were still on this first period and while you were as part 15 of this continuation rather than when you came in on your next 16 shift?
17 A
Boy, I don't remember.
I really don't.
I would have 18 to look to see if we were actually venting there or not.
You 19 must remember that I came in somewhere around 11:00 or 12:00 20 o' clock that morning.
I didn't leave until 6:00 and I was back 21 at 2:00 or 3:00 and we were working kind of crazy hours there i.
22 and everything was sort of all together.
23 G
Could you give us a little bit of discussion on the 24 letdown line problems?
When -- did you have them in this A. s e n s n = = n m.ine j
25 period here?
t l
i
50 jtf 12 1
A Yes.
2 4
And what was the nature and what did you feel was 3
wrong?
i 4
A The problem was when I came in, they had.the problem 5
with the letdown.
The problem was we did not have any 6
indication of letdown flow.
We would see a periodic spike 7
in the indication of flow, which led me to believe that we 8
had a relief valve somewhere lifting and there are a number 9
of relief valves in that system.
We did try to go to concen-10 trated effort to determine which relief valve was leaking and 11 isolate it.
We ran into some problems.
One of them that I.
12 remember was on certainty as to whether or not we had isolated 13 the letdown demineralizer and bypassed them.
There was some 14 question on -- it was originally reported that the demineralizers 15 were isolated and bypassed, but then there were some problems 16 later on, some conflicting reports came back on that.
So I'm 17 not sure that I ever had it straight in my mind where the 18 problem was, based on the conflicting information that I was 19 getting.
But we were going through somewhat of an orderly 20 checking system to determine what the problem was in that 21 system.
And I don't think we ever did find out why, for instance, we didn't get any flow indication which relief valve 22 l
23 was lif ting.
And I feel certain there was one lifting somewhere t.
l 24 Now you must have been getting flow or you wouldn't Ace-Fooeral Reporters, Inc.
25 have been filling up the makeup tank.
Do you know what measures
54 jtf 16 1
identified at the time -- I think that the number you quoted 2
is based on new calculations that were done on our method of 3
calculating leak rate.
I' 4
Q.
Were you -- was the flow -- did you have a normal 5
procedure of emptying the drain tank?
6 A
Yes.
7 G
How often did you do it?
Was it once a shift or 8
every couple of shifts or roughly?
9 A.
Roughly it was once a shift, but then it had been o.t.
- 3 10 increasing which indicated that our leakage had increased.
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 l
l 19 20 21 I
22 23 24 wk.rw n.conm, inc.
l 25 i
m---
CR7624.04 DAR 55 rmg 1 1
g I see.
Were you paying any attention to the 2
temperatures on those thermocouples on the down?.
l 3
A We were trying to use those to identify which valve
(
4 was leaking, but unfortunately we couldn't.
They tie into 5
a common exhaust line, and apparently the steam flow was such 6
that it was heating all three equally, or just about equally, 7
so we couldn't determine.
8 4
Is there a record somewhere that would show that 9
the three temperatures were almost the same?
10 A
I'm sure --
11 G
As part of the standard reporting?
12 A
No, there is no place that that is recorded, but 13 if we went back and looked on.the computer printout, you 14 know, prior to the accident, I am sure that you will find l
15 them there.
16 4
Okay.
This was kind of standard for this particular 17 plant to have something like that going on, these values give 18 you trouble before this in group?
19 A
Yes, we had some trouble with Unit 1 on one of the 20 release valves and almost the sane type of problem where the 21 leakage, we had to continue to pump down the drain tank and of course ake.up to compensate for the leakage.
22
~
23 Our biggest concern and our. biggest aid in determining 24 the leak -- that the leak rate was getting worse was the boron Ace-A<.i neoorwes, Inc.
25 concentration in the pressurizer, because the steam leaking
56 rmg 2 1
and the boron staying in the pressurizer, you get a concentrated Wewouldequalizebyestablishingl 2
mechanism in the pressurizer.
3 a constant spray and recirculation.
4 And one_of the things we were getting into prior to the.
5 accident was the amount of time that you had to resent, 6
was increasing to me.intain equalized borons which again 7
indicated that our leak rate was increasing out of the 8
pressurizer.
9 4
Okay.
From an operational point of view, was this 10 the kind of a thing that would lead to a plant shut-down?
II A
Yes.
12 G
Essentially?
13 A
Yes.
14 G
And the other thing I wanted to ask was with concern 15 to the resin process that was going on, was that started on 16 this shift or was that started on a shift before yours?
17 A
I don't remember.
I don't remember any problem on 18 my shift.
Whether or not they were in the process of regen-19 eration, I don't remember.
Again, I would have to look back 20
.in the logbooks.
21 g
Okay.
Our information seems to suggest that~ this 4
22 was a carryover from the prior shift.
23 A
It would take us normally two or three days or 24 longer to regenerate a polisher, so it is very possible that Am-._. eW Ranm, Inc.
25
(
it was in fact a carryover.
l I
l l
57 rmg 3 1
G How about the actual process of transferring the 2
resin from a fluffing and moving it to another tank?
How long 3
has that particular process gone on?
4 A
Normally it is not that long, unless you run into 5
problems where it closes up, which it did quite often.
It would 6
take an hour or so to transfer it.
7 G
Had you had any experience with problems before the 8
water backing up into the airline to the check valve?
I mean, 9
apparently it had happened once before, but was it part of 10 your experience, or was that somebody else's shift?
11 A
I don't -- well, the problem with that is I can't.
12 say it was ever initiated while I was on.
I don't know, 13 simply because of the long process it takes to do a polisher, 14 it could very well have started one day when I had the shift 15 and of course not come to light until sometime later.
16 MR. JOHNSTON:
Okay, I think I won't pursue that l'7 any further, then.
So, really, Dennis, that covers the items 18 I think I wanted to ask.
19 MR. ALLISON:
I have two more questions and then we 20 can get Ron back.
21 BY MR. ALLISONr 22 G
Back to the method of cooling.
That was in effect 23 when you came on watch, you really didn't like that method, 24 if that method had been qualified by an analysis, then to Ace-A.W Reporte,s, Inc.
25 support a procedure that would tell you how much flow rate, i
l 1'
58 howmuchlet-down,howtohandlethepentvalveand somebody rmg 4 1
2
- said, "I have done all this analysis and it will work if you 3
do it this way," or maybe by testing a prototype plant as well, 4
then would you have felt comfortable with that method if you 5
had that sort of a thing in hand?
6 A
As a last resort, but only as a last rescrt.
7 G
But all of this work wasn't done beforehand and 8
that's why you didn't like it, basically?
9 A.
Basically, I had nothing to indicate to me that it 10 was satisfactory.
11 G
Strictly intuitive approach?
12 A.
It was intuitive, but let me say this:
I had seen 13 loss of bubble before', so when I saw what was happening there, 14 it indicated to me immediately that we had done the same 15 thing.
Because we had lost the bubble in the pressurizer 16 and transferred the bubble to the hot legs.
17 Now other than the radiation monitors going off, that's 18 the problem I saw, and it immediately was that we had lost the 19 bubble and transferred the bubble to the hot legs and of course 20 I assume there must have been something covering the core, i
21 because the radiation level we saw, but I had no means of 22 determining how had that was even with, you know, the radiation 23 monitors --
24 There is no way to readily correlate radiation monitor wNorm noonm. inc.
25 reading with core damage, as far as I know.
Anyway, I am sure
59 rag 5 1
there probably is if you go through a long calculated method 2
of some sort, but for me as an operator in that control room, 3
I had no means to correlate those two.
4 G
Second question.: When you came in,-is it fair for 5
me to assume that nobody, neither you nor anyone else, thought 1
6 natural circulation was working at that time?
7 Does that coincide with your picture of the control room?
8 A
I knew that natural circulation wasn't working.
9 Whether or not anybody else thought it was or not, I don't l
10 know.
I don't know that I ever addressed the question, because 11 there was never any question in my mind that we did not have 12 natural circulation.
13 MR. ALLISON:
Let's go off the record.
Id (Discussion off the record.)
15 MR. JOHNSTON:
Let ma just stay on the record for 16 -
a second.
I have just thought of a question.
You kind of 17 answered it anyway, but I am kind of interested in the 18 different folks' perception of how bad the accident was and 19 when people beg'an to think, you know, we really have something 20 that is much worse than the ordinary, anything that we have 21 ever had before.
l j
22 Do you feel that anybody was in that mode at the time you 1
23 came in?
1 i
24 A
Yes, there were rumors, there were conjectures of Aco-Federal Reporters. Inc.
25 total core damage to very little core damage.
That is one of
60 rmg 6 1
the reasons I personally did not even want to get involved in 2
how much core damage there was, or if in fact there was any.
3 I had enough to do to get the plant in what I would feel was 4
a stable condition.
I really didn't have the time to sit
~
5 down and determine or talk over what kind of core damage 6
there was.
7 0
But it is reasonable that the other folks in there 8
at the time you came in really felt that something rather 9
unusual and serious had happened?
10 A
I think the consensus was that there was core 11 damage.
I think just the magnitude was ander discussion.
12 G
But there seems to be an equally strong feeling i
13 that they had done something or other that stopped it from 14 having further damage?
15 A
I am not sure I understand.
16 G
Did they also feel though that the problem was over l'7 as far as continuing damage to the core?
I mean, I think they 18 for example told'you the core is covered.
Was that a statement l
19 of faith?
20 A
When I took the watch, I was under the impression 21 that something had happened, but right now we were in a 22 low -- and very inappropriate position.
At least the core j
23 was covered and we were providing cooling to it.
That's what 24 I was told.
Ac. w w n a n m.inc.
25 MR. JOHNSTON:
Off the rect'r! for a second.
61 rmg 7 1
(Discussion off the record.)
2 MR. HAYNES:
Back on the record.
3 BY MR. HAYNES:
4 G
I would like to speak a little bit about the training
~
5 program, if I may, and ask some questions along that line.
6 I understand you were in the nuclear Navy for five years, 7
the nuclear program in the Navy for five years; is that correct?
3 A
Yes.
9 G
And then you came to work for the Metropolitan Edison 10 station at Crawford station which is a coal-firing station?
11 A
Yes.
12 G
And in 1969 you came to Three Mile Island and entered 13 into the reactor operator training program at that time?
14 That was a 42-week training program?
15 A
That's correct.
s 16 G
In 1972, you made shift foreman, according to your 17 information I had from the I&E interview; about that time?
18 A
It was about that time.
19 G
At the -- during this training period of 42 weeks, 20 what did that training comprise of?
' 21 A
Pretty much like the Navy program in that we had X 22 amount of weeks that -- well, we started off with basic
~
23 mathematics as a matter of fact, and took it right up to the 74 reactor kinetics, plus interspersed in there were system Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 training where we would go over the description of the
I 62 rag 8 1
system and its design criteria and how it operates, that type 2
of thing.
3 And part of that was -- remember now, this was early on in 4
4 the construction, the part of that was if the system was
~
5 somewhere near completion, you would go out and walk it through 6
and trace it through, that type of thing.
7 G
System training.
Did this include how that system 8
responded to plant transients or was it more how the system 9
itself was put into operation, taken out of operation, the 10 different evolutions thau they could perform?
11 A
No, it was how the system operated on plant transients 12 like, for instance, the high pressure injection.of the make-up 13 system, that type of thing.
But that was included.
14 G
The training was conducted by whom?
15 A
There were various instructors we had like for a 16 reactive theory we had a fellow by'the name of Zechman, 17 Z-e-c-h-m-a-n, who had just come from Penn State where he was 18 assistant instructor there, I think at their reactor facility.
19 Most of the system training was done by the shift foremen, 20 people that were designated shift foremen at the time.
i 21 4
They were Metropolitan Edison employees?
l I
22 A
Yes.
\\
t 23 G
Did you receive any training from Babcock & Wilcox?
24 A
ch, yes, we attended their simulator training, I weders neoormes. Inc.
25 think it was a 2-week session, and again, I would have to look.
63 rmg 9 1
It was quite a number of years ago for the initial training.
2 O
The simulator training, that includes, as I recollect 3
from my testimony, work in the simulator itself, simulating 4
plant start-up, shut-down, casualties, and also electromagnetic 5
theories, is that correct?
6 A
That's correct.
7 g
At the end of that training program, did you take 8
the AEC examinction?
9 A
No, we didn't take the examination until 1973, 10 I think it was, when we finally took the examination.
Three or 11 four --
12 G
And how long --
13 A
It must have been '74, yes, because I was shift 14 supervisor.
Sometime after 1972 and before 1974, how'r that?
IS A
That's fine.
Was it prior to the Unit 1 fuel 16 loading?
17 A
Yes, it was.
18 4
Okay.
Fine.
Did you notice that the simulator 19 control room appears to be quite a bit different than Three 20 Mile Island Unit 2 control room?
21 A
Definitely.
22 O
How do you feel about that, how it differs in the s
23 simulator control room layout, equipment and so forth, with 24 respect of the quality of the training you get in the simulator A N.rw n nm, inc.
25 because it is so different from the Three Mile Island Unit 2 I
t
67 rmg 13 1
A The problem with plant solid is that you are d o.yPL*'
2 possibly going to exceed the ac;iguod rating which is 20-some 3
hundred pounds or 2750.
That is one of the reasons why we 4
shy away from going solid.
5 Your make-up pumps do pump out about that pressure, 2800 6
pounds, that type of thing.
As a matter of fact, it will 7
even go higher.
8 G
Is not, though, overpressure protection provided for 9
the primary system?
10 A
By way of relief valve, yes.
11 G
In the coolant safeties?
12 N.
Do you know, or is it your belief, that the code 13 safeties are adequate to avoid overpressurization of primary 14 system in the reactor system?
15 A
As far as I know, they are adequate.
One of the 16 problems you get into, though, of course is you know the code 17 safety's lift at essentially the same pressure.
Of course, 18 very little bit lower, but at one time they were 2500 pounds.
19 That was the maximum range of pressure indication that we 20 had.
21 So that if the pressure relief valve lifted, there was 22 no way to determine whether or not they in fact prevented the 23 pressure from going any higher.
24 G
As I understand it, nowhere in the control room did A F.o.rw n o on n,inc.
25 you have a reactor pressure instrument that went beyond 2500 t
68 rmg 14 1
psi?
2 A
No, nothing that was recorded.
3 G
So that if you -- how about indicators?
4 A
I am not sure.
I would have to look.
But I think 5
maybe in the RPF cabinets -- no, they only go up to 2500, too.
6 No, there is nothing greater than 2500.
7 G
Well, how would you know if you exceeded it if you 8
didn't have an instrument to monitor it?
9 A
You would have to do an engineering evaluation.
10 G
Is that one of the reasons why there was concern 11 about going solid here?
12 A
No, I think it was more of a concern' that a solid 13 systen is very difficult to control, and of course you get 14 into -- well, you W those safety reliefs and after some 15 time, they are going to fail one way or the other.
16 G
F&il how?
F7 A
Well, who knows.
They could fail open or closed.
18 And in any case, you have a problem and you are compounding it.
19 G
All right.
20 BY MR. JOHN 5 TON:
21 g
I wo61d like to ask a question.
22 You said there was nothing in the small break to indicate 23 an increase in the pressurizer level, but I am trying to recall l
24 isn't there a procedure though for a stuck-open PORV?
Ace +..rw naso,tm, Inc.
25 A
Yes.
- s
69 rmg 15 1
g Or something of that sort.
And under the diagnostics 2
for that, wculd that include an increase in pressurizer level 3
as one of the diagnoses?
4 A
Somehow, I don't think so.
I would have to look~, but
~
5 I don't think it was ever picked up at, that the level in 6
fact increased.
7 BY MR. ALLISON:
8 g
Despite that, do you think that a stuck-open PORV, 9
taken by itself without a turbine trip, without the auxiliary 10 feedwater valve shut and the other things that went along with 11 this accident, do you think that the operator can respond to 12 a stuck-open or relief valve very reliably if it occurs as a 13 single event dur.*.ng operation?
14 A
Yes, if he has some indication that that has in 15 fact happened.
16 BY MR. JOHNSTON:
17 g
Well, what would the indication be?
18 MR. ALLISON:
Pardon me, Bill, I am speaking about 19 the indications that he would have in the plant.
6 20 THE WITNESS:
That he will have or that he had?
l 21 MR. ALLISON:
That he had.
22 THE WITNESS:
The indication that he had was very 23 difficult for that operator to know that he had a stuck-open 24 relief valve.
He did not have any position indication.
He A=-Feners Recor=. inc.
25 did not have the temperature indication.
It was unreliable.
70 rmg 16 1
The only thing that he had to indicate that there was a 2
leak was the decrease in reactor coolant pressure, and he had 3
no means of determining where that leak was, other than the
,.g,.
4 pressurized level, possibly.
~
5 BY MR. ALLISON:
6 0
Given the decrease in pressure during operation, 7
do you think you can handle that?
8 A
Yes.
9 G
Did he do the right thing?
10 A
Did 'ho do the right thing?
w 11 0
That the operator would reliably do the right thing?
12 A
Well, I think that would depend on the operator.
13 I would imagine just like at any time any transient of any 14 kind would happen, be it in the plant or a blowout on the car 15 going home, depending on the driver and how he can react and 16 how he has been trained, you know, there are a lot of variables 17 that come into effect.
18 I don't think I can answer.
I would like to think if I was i
19 the operator, yes, I would react the proper way, but I don't 20 know that for a fact.
21 0
Okay.
22 BY MR. HAYNES.:
23 4
You mentioned on that stuck-open relief valve as 24 a s, ingle event that the temperature indication was unreliable?
Aces.ows newters, Inc.
25 A
Yes.
i 65 l
rmg 11 1
Now, of course, controls are not exactly at the same 2
location, that type of thing, but the design of the system and 3-how it functions is primarily the same of that of Unit 2.
4 G
While at the simulator training-center at Lynchburg,
~
5 you also underwent what they call casualty training; is that
~
6 correct?
7 A
Yes.
8 G
That's where plant transients are --
9 A
Yes.
10 0
During the transient training, was the leak in the 11 steam space of the pressurizer one of the transients covered?
12 A
Not prior to the accident, that I remember.
13 4
Well, let's say pressurizer safety valve or 14 pressurizer relief valve failed 4%sopen.
15 A
I would think that there would have been -- I 16 don't remember specifically,but if was, I think the results 17 were a lot different from what we had.
18 G
Really, what I am trying to get at in the training 19 that you took here at the site and also at B&W, was it:' covered --
20 the plant response to a leak in the steam space wherein the 21 pressurizer, wherein as you tend to depressurizet the direction 5 l'V y
you get is an increase of water,rather than a falling ed 22
> liv" water)fromthattypeofloss?
23 24 A
No, not that I know of either here on-site or at A=-Faswa n.oorwr inc.
25 the simulator that it was covered.
m
l 66 rmg 12 1
G Did you know that if there was a loss of coolant 2
in the steam space of the pressurizer, that there would be 3
in insurge of water into the pressurizer?
4 A
I don't know that I ever thought about what would 5
happen to the pressurizer, you know, of course, you know, 6
and I don't know if I am thinking about this postaccident or 7
preaccident, but it seems logical that if you have a big l.#
enoughwater[tthetcp.itisgoingtoreplacethewaterfrom 8
9 the reactor coolant ;ystems and that could be based on what 10 I know of now, March 28, too.
11 Now, if 1 would have thought of that prior to March 28,.
12 I don't know.
13 G
Do you recollect any emergency procedures at this 14 facility, whether one of the symptoms for a loss of coolant 15 accident is an increase of the water level as opposed to a 16 decrease in the water level?
17 A
No, I don't.
Generally, the symptom that is listed,p
'v>
18 g
a decrease 19 in water level?
l 20 A
Decrease in water level and of course a decrease 21 of pressure.
sol, d, /d 22 4
With respect to taking the~ primary systems fe~ rf, t
23 what was your understanding of the problems associated with 24 the taking of primary system. solid at any time during plant wNns n.ponm. inc.
25 operation o_r plant shut-down?
64 rmg 10 1
control room?
2 A
Well, the quality was based on, you know, we used 3
what we call the integrated control or control of the
~
4 plant, and that was the basis behind the simulator training. -
5 It was how do you operate that plant and do the integrated 6
control system, and based on that fact I don't see any problem 7
with it, because it was mainly designed to control the primary 8
plant using this integrated control system which is essentially 9
very little different at all between the unit and simulator.
10 g
The integrated control system itself, what equipment 11 or systems are involved in that system?
1 12 A
Well, what essentially -- just about all of it, 13 as far as the main line of the primary system and secondary
-14 system.
I mean, in the secondary side it controls things like 15 feedwater pumps, feedwater regulation valves, the steam valves, 16 the steam dump valves, the turbine.
17 on the primary side it controls things like temperature, 18 control rod drive position, essentially that type of thing.
19 4
But it does have no control, if I 'inderstand then, 20 if I understand you correctly, with respect to the high
,e.t h a
21 pressure injection system or the 4-i- ; __' afeguards system, 22 this type of system?-
~
23 L
No, it doesn't.
And again, there is very little 24 difference in the basic design of, sa'y, the make-up system Aes Fooerm neo,=,,, inc.
25 at the simulator and the make-up system at Unit 2.
51 jtf 13 1
if any, were taken?
Did they change temperatures of inter-2 mediate coolers or do you know of anything?
3 A
Yes, there was something that happened.
We cycled --
4 it seems to me we did something.
We cycled a valve and that 5
gave us a positive indication of letdown flow.
And when I say 6
positive, I'm talking about an increased value of letdown flow.
7 G
You have a flow indicator in the line somewhere?
8 A
Yes, but other than periodic spikes that were fairly 9
regular, it sits at zero for awhile and then it would spike 10 ar.d then sit at s'ro for awhile, that indicated a relief valve 11 l i.f ting.
That was all that I saw.
12 G
Even after this valve was cycled?
13 A
Yes.
14 G
How about during later on in the period when you were 15 using the makeup tank and say on Thursday, Friday you still 16 didn't see flow indication?
17 A
No, we still did not see flow, and we still didn't 18 have flow indication.
19 G
But you --
20 A
Yes.
21 G
So it may be the indicator?
22 A
Yes, we feel it is the indicator now, but I think 23 again it was a combination of problems and with the letdown, 24 for one, the indicator didn't indicate and two, we did have A -7.ww n.aonm. ine.
l 25 some kind of blockage, because we, at one point, we did
52 jtf 14 1
something and I think it was cycling one of 'tdue valves some-2 where that increased our letdown flow, but it did not of course 3
change our indicator letdown flow.
i 4
g I have just two other things and they are just a bit 5
different.
Do you have a question?
6 BY MR. HAYNES:
7 g
Do you recall if the restricting orifice in the 8
letdown flow line was bypassed?
9 A
! remember we bypassed just about everything we 10 could in there.
I assume we did, but I can't say for sure 11 that we in fact did because we were at that time, because of 12 the lack of indication, we were bypassing everything we could i
13 to try and get the flow indication.
14 g
There is a log room entry -- log book entry to that 15 effect in the control ::com operator's log on the 29th.
16 A
Okay.
17 g
With a time.
So I would assume that that would be 18 correct.
19 A
What time was that, do you remember?
20 MR. HAYNES:
Off the record.
21 (Discussion off the record.)
22 MR. EAYNES:
At 0121 hours0.0014 days <br />0.0336 hours <br />2.000661e-4 weeks <br />4.60405e-5 months <br /> on 3/29 there is a 23 statement that MUV-100 is open, which I understand is the l-24 bypass around the blocka6 orifice in the letdown line?
Aa.-
w nomm, inc.
Af 25 A
Yes.
And like I said earlier, I do remember that
S3 jtf 15 1
we bypassed just about everything in that system 're could.
2 We never did get any indication of flow although there was 3
one time we did get an increase in letdown flow, although 4
not indicated.
5 BY MR. JOHNSTON:
6 G
Can you get an indication of the flow by making 7
a change in the makeup tank?
8 A
Well, you can, but you have to do a couple of things.
9 one for instance, you would have to stop taking suction out of to the makeup tank.
Your other alterna'.rce would be, of course, 11 to swap the suction from the makeup tank to the BWST and 12 isolate and watch your level go up.
But that in itself is 13 shaky because you are taking a chance of wiping out your --
14 G
I wanted to ask you a couple of questions prior to 15 the accident.
I believe you had the shift just before the 16 accident?
17 A
Yes, I did.
18 G
There was a fair amount of leakage apparently from 19
,either the relief or the PORV beforehand, I guess it was some 20 time around five, six gallons per minute.
21 Did you have a routine in your shift of emptying the 22 reactor coolant drain tank periodically or -- I understand 1
23 this vapor had been going on for perhaps some time before this.
24 JL We had a leak in the one relief valve.
We knew that Aa >
.m n oor w s,inc.
25 the five or six gallons a minute -- I don't believe that was w
q
CR 7624
)
CAR 94 1
jc 1 I
Q Are you speaking of the temperature in the tail pipe?
2 A
Yes.
3 Q
Why do you scy it is unreliable?
i d'
A Simply because it did indicate all three temperature s 9
5 about equal and not very high.
6 Q
Well, what would you expect a tail pipe tempera ure 7
to be with the relief stuck open?
600 degrees F?
8 A
Well, I welid think it would approach somewhere 9
around 600 degrees.
Of course, there would be some difference, 10 but it would approach somewhere near ihat temperature.
II Q
Do you still believe that?
12 A
Yes, I believe -- and I haven't looked at it, just 13 based on what I have seen and, you know, some of the 14 discussions that I have heard, it seems to me that the 5
temperature elements on the exhaust manifolds are too close 16 to the common line and, therefore, they all indicated about 17 the same because it was right at the point where the steam 18 expanded into the common discharge line.
19 Now I don't know whether that's true, that's my opinion.
20 DR. JOHNSTON:
Can we go off the record?
21 BY MR. HAYNES:
1 22 Q
Do you recollect in your training whether it was 23 ever covered what you would expect to see in the tail pipe 24 remperature with a stuck open relief valve?
Aco-Federei hwrters, Inc.
25 A
Yes.
I jc 2 o
72 I
Q Do you recollect that was covered in your training?
2 A
Yes.
3 Q
To your recollection what were you told to expect?
4 A
I think we were told to expect a high temperature 5
in the ranges of, you know, greater than 200 or 230 or 240 6
degrees on the one that happened to be leaking or lifting.
7 I know that's not true, simply because normally those 8
temperatures run in the area of 190 to 210 without leakage.
9 So, you know, based on that, you know, I would expect the 10 temperatures to go up a lot higher with a leaking valve.
II Q
Okay.
I want to talk about minimum shift crew 12 complement, if I may.
13 DR. JOHNSTON:
Off the record.
14 (Discussion off the record.)
15 BY DR. JOHNSTON:
16 l
Q There was some discussion several months ago in 17 connection with this.
Apparently there is some 1.ind of a 18 procedure existing that does describe an open PORV and what 19 to do about it.
And it does give a list of diagnostics that 20 you are supposed to look for and one of them is something to 21 do with the pressure, with the temperature indicated above 22 130 degrees F or some number of that sort.
23 A
That is probably true.
l l
24 Q
So and one of them is pressure dropping and I'm not Ac. s.o.,e n.co,tm, inc.
25 positive whether it says increase, but are you familiar with
I jc 3 73 1
that procedure?
2 A
Yes, I am.
3 Q
Well, that being the case, I am a little interested 4
in your response a couple minutes ago that you expected to 5
see -- well, you said expected to see vaqrhigh temperatures.
6 If that is the case, it would seem like the procedure would 7
appear to you then to be an incorrect, erroneous procedure.
8 A
And I think the procedure states temperatures at 9
180 degrees, not 130.
10 Q
Okay.
11 A
And even that is low, because on what we had seen,-
12 you know, prior to the accident --
13 Q
Of course you had some leakage already.
If you 14 didn't have leakage though, you wouldn't have temperatures 15 as high as you are seeing and then the diagnosis would have 16 been made easily.
17 A
I am not sure that's true without the leakage you 18 still see the high temperatures, now I'm basing that on t
l 19 Unit 1.
It had power operations without any leakage by this, 20 the temperatures were still up around 200 degrees, simply 21 because they are close to the pressurizer and the pressurizer 22 is awfully warm.
~
23 I'm trying to think -- Unit 2, I don't know that I -- without 24 looking, I don't know if I could determine what the temperatures Ace-Federal Regn,ters, Inc.
25 are without leaking, but I would assume it would be up in the i
jc.4 74 1
180 to 200 degree range.
2 Q
It sounds like that procedure then should probably 3
have been updated?
- (
4 A
You're probably correct.
5 DR. JOE!!STON:
That's all.
6 BY MR. HAYNES:
7 Q
I would like to go into now about the minimum 8
shift crew complement.
My reading of the technical 9
specification for Three Mile Island Unit 2, the requirements 10 from the NRC are that there be one senior reactor operator II licensed personnel on shift and two reactor operator 12 licensed personnel on shift and two others as a minimum
/
13 number.
Is that your understanding of the technical 14 specification?
15 A
That's right.'
V 16 Q
Also, on technical specification that fo$r periods j
17 ofuptotwohours,thenumberofreactor(operators' licensed!
t-
//39 18 available can be reduced by one.
Is that your recollection?
19 A
That was in there at one time, but that was taken 20 out.
21 Q
Well, do you know if you have ever operated with just 22 9
two licensed operators?
23 A
I don't know.
I know -- well, at least to my 24 knowledge we have never operated with less than the required Aco Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 tech spec number.
I jc 5 75 I
Q okay.
I'm saying the tech spec requires two.
2 A
Okay.
3 Q
For periods of up to two hours.
Also reading the
- \\
4 technical specification, is that during periods of equiiibrium, 5
there is one licensed reactor operator required to be in the 6
control room and only one.
Is that correct?
7 A
Thac's right.
8 Q
Tv you knowledge, have you ever operated that way 9
with just one man in the control room?
10 A
Yes.
I'm sure I have.
II Q
Why would that be, under what circumstances?
12 A
Well, under the circumstances when the two of them I3 were in the control room and one goes to the bathrcom.
You Id know, you are down to one, you know, something in that order 15 where the one man goes out of the plant for some reason or 16 another.
I7 Q
And normally you also have a shift foreman that is 18 on duty?
I9 A
That's right.
20 Q
And he has a senior reactor perator's license?
2I A
Yes.
22 Q
And he would also be out of the control room at the 23 same time.
24 A
It is possible.
Now since then we have instituted Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 a two-man rule in the control room, always at least two people
(
jc 6 76 1
in the control room at all times.
2 Q
Why was that rule instituted?
3 A
That was instituted on, I think it was based on an 4
IE bulletin that just came out.
5 Q
That other man in the control room, he need not be --
6 A
He need not be a licensed operator.
7 Q
Okay.
On your shift here, you also have auxiliary 8
operators as I understand?
9 A
Yes.
10 0
And normally about four auxiliary operators on each Il shift, is that correct?
12 A
A minimum of four, usually more than that.
13 Q
And these are auxiliary operators classed as A, B, A
14 C auxiliary operators with thegauxiliary operator being the e.g wi J h.a 15 more licensed, is tha. correct?
16 A
That's correct.
17 Q
Based upon your experience here, and also during the 18 accident, is this minimum shift crew complement adequate to 19 respond to plant transients?
20 A
Probably not in the auxiliary operators' rooms, two 21 people -- there is no way that they could really control 22 everything that has been happening It needs to be taken care 23 of outside of the control room.
M'p 24 Q
What type of manipulations are necessary?g Are these Ae.-F.o rw n.conm, inc.
25 people outside the control room do'ng, is it mostly secondary?
i
jc 7 77 1
A Yes, mostly taking of fuel pumps that are no longer 2
needed or putting on steam heating that is required, that type 3
of thing.
- r 4
0 What would happen if those types of operations were 5
not performed by the auxiliary operators?
6 A
Well, we would probably -- you mean what first effect 7
would it have?
8 Q
With respect to plant safety, if any.
9 A
I'm not sure that it would have any adverse effect 10 to plant safety.
It is more of a requirement to -- probably, 11 if anything, just -- well, at the most it would be to protect 12 some equipment that is no longer required, that has been taken 13 off, but even that is -- I'm not sure that's true, Id Q
Some of the operator manipulations during the 15 accident on 3/28 that took place outside the control room 16 included manipulations with switch gear and also manipulations 17 with the diesel generators, is that correct?
18 A
I assume so, yes.
19 Q
Who would perform those types of manipulations?
20 Would they be licensed operators or auxilisry operators?
l 21 A
Auxiliary operators.
l 22 Q
Do auxiliary ope ators also perform valving on i
23 engineering safeguardie systems?
24 A
Yes.
Ame.o rw n.pem, Inc.
25 Q
High pressure cooling injection?
l
l l
jc 8 78 l
I A
Yes.
2 Q
I also understand that during the accident that the 3
12 valves on the auxiliary feed waters system were found 4
closed.
5 A
Oh, yes, EFE 12.
When you said 12 valves, I thought 6
you meant 12 as a number.
7 Q
This misvalving or valve being out of the expected 8
position, have you run across this before in Unit 27 9
A Not that I can remember, no, not that I could remember.
10 I'm sure there were some valves that were out of position at II some time or other.
12 Q
But in your view it is certainly not a very common 13 event?
Id A
No, it is not a very common event at all.
As a 15 matter of fact, I will take this opportunity to point out now 16 that those valves would probably not have been out of position, I7 that is the only reason they were out of position.
18 Q
Why is that?
I9 A
Well, we have to, of course, comply with the new 20 in-service inspection requirements.
Those requirements are 21 to verify the check valves do not allow flow in the opposite 22 direction that they are supposed to and that is the only reason 23 those valves had to be closed, was to verify that those check 24 valves hold.
They do not have to be closed to verify whether Ace-Federal floporters, Inc.
25 an emergency feed system will function as an emergency system.
I
I jc 9 l
79 I
I Q
This checking of the check valves, is this done via 2
procedure?
3 A
Yes, it is.
4 Q
It is what is normally called surveillance procedure?
5 A
Yes.
6 Q
The surveillanca procedure, does this include valving 7
checklists?
8 A
The surveillance procedures do involve things like 9
checking check valves, yes.
10 0
Well, I believe you said in order to verify that the Il check valves were tight, that these valves had to be operated?
I2 A
That's right.
13 Q
Now that procedure that specified that test, would Id that say to open these valves and close the valves?
15 A
Yes, it would.
16 Q
When a surveillance test like that is run at the I7 site, who performs that test?
18 Q
Well, various people.
A control room operator will I9 operate required equipment from within the control room and, 20 of course, the auxiliary operator from outside the control 21 room.
So it would be a combination.
22 Q
When the aux operators operating these valves, safety 23 related valves outside the control room, is there a licensed 24 operator in attendance?
Am-Federal Repo,ters, Inc.
I 25 A
No.
1
$c 10 80 1
0 Should there be?
In your view?
A Not unless we are going to want to license everybody 2
that works in a nuclear station.
3 4
Q What's your view on that, should they?
A Licensing everyone?
My view on that is if wo 5
required something like that,we will probably kili the industry 6
7 quite frankly.
8 Q
See now, you were in the Navy, four-five years in 9
the Navy nuclear program?
n)
A Right.
11 Q
I haven' t been, but I understand that in the Navy.
12 program the personnel are qualified for the specific job
'3 they are performing, is that correct?
- 4 A
That's correct.
15 Q
Which includes some sort of training inicertification?
jp*
16 A
Well --
17 Q
Training and testing.
ja A
Training and testing, yes, but that's true also of 19 our auxiliary operators.
20 Q
There is a training program, a testing provided for them?
21 22 A
Sure.
23 Q
To qualify them for the duties that they would perform?
24 A
That's right.
w.ows n.conm, Inc.
25 Q
Like the surveillance test?
I
jc 11 81 1
A They go through very much the same type of training 2
as a control room operator does except, of course, that 3
concentrates more on the in-plant type operations.
At the 4
end of their training program, which includes on-the-job
~
~
5 training, they are tested both written and orally before they 6
are allowed to become aux operators.
7 Q
Now when a man first comes on board as an aux 8
operator, is he classified as a C operator?
9 A
That's correct.
10 0
So there is no prior training itself involved to be Il classified as a C aux operator, is that true?
2 12 A
That's true.
"C v 3-13 Q
Do ycu )_,: operators perform valving manipulations?
14 A
Yes, they do, but let me explain how that works.
15 When a person comes to work at Three Mile Island as an aux 16 operator C, he goes through a three-or four-month training l'7 program, then he goes on shift, and then he works strictly 18 on secondary equipment.
He is not involved, for instance, with S6}d d pa S
19 a M component.
He works on the secondary plant, turbine, l
20 generator type thing and he gets some experience there for 21 about a year and then he goes to what we call the aux operator j
22 B.
And then he becomes a trainee on the primary side of the 23 plant and again he goes through certain schooling that prepares l
l 24 him to take the aux operator A test.
And he essentially --
Am-FewW Reorwn, lm, 1
25 he is the aux operator B for at least a year.
And then at the
'I 1
l
I jc 12 82 I
I end of which he takes a written and oral test, and if he 2
passes those, he will be qualified as an aux operator A.
3 O
So the progression from C to a is automatic, but
- 4 from tid. B to A --
5 A
No, no, maybe I misled you there.
Before he goes 6
from C to B, he must take a written and oral examination 7
there also.
8 Q
So there is a --
9 A
But there is a time frame that he must be an aux 10 operator C for at least a year and receive the proper training Il that is outlined in job classification.
Then at the end of-12 that year, he gets a test, both written and oral.
If he passes 13 those, then he progresses to B and then B is the same type Id of thing.
He has certain training that he goes through plus 13 on-the-job training.
And at the end of the year, he takes 16 a written and oral test and if he passes that, then he becomes 17 an A.
And the next move would be to the control room operator, 18 but that aux operator A must be qualified as an operator A 19 for at least two years before he can bid on a control room 20 operator's job.
21 Q
When we were talking about the minimum shift crew 22 manning a moment ago and we got over to the auxiliary operator 23 training, if you were limited to two, would-that affect your 24 ability to respond to transients with respect to licensed Am-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 operators, the three required licensed operators?
Is that an "
l l
l I
)
l 83 jc 13 1
I adequate number to respond to transients and accidents, in 2
your view, in the control room?
3 A
My view, yes, simply because you only need, essentially, 4
two operators, one to operate the primary plant and one to 5
operate the secondary plant and one to control or look over 6
the operation of both.
That's what that manual essentially 7
says, you have two control room operators that do the 8
actual manipulation and a senior license that directs that 9
manipulation.
10 Q
Now on the day of the accident here, of course, II they had more licensed operators than that in the control 12 room.
In fact, if memory serves me at least during the first 13 hour1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> they essentially had three senior reactor operators at Id one time or other in the control room and at least two licensed 15 reactor operators for a total of five.
10 A
In the first hour.
17 Q
During the first hour.
18 A
I only know of -- well, there would be three 19 licensed on-site.
I don't know where the other two would 20 have came from.
21 Q
Well, I believe Mr. Bryan came over from Unit 1 to 22 assist and then there was a Mr. Schiemann and Mr. Zewe, so t
l 23 those are the three senior operators.
24 A
I thought you said there were five, I'm sorry.
Aa-Federed Reporters, Inc.
25 Q
A total of five, perhaps I misspoke, five licensed i
i
jc 14 84 I
operators, three senior and two others.
It seemed like
(
2 they were all busy.
How does that reconcile with your 3
account that three would be adequate to respond to an 4
accident?
5 A
Well, let me juc.'. say this, first of all, Mr. Zewe, 6
Mr. Schiemann, and Mr. Bryan were all doing the same function.
7 The only two people that were operating the controls were the 8
two reactor operators.
And I'm sure there probably was one 9
of those three people probably did do some of the controls, 10 but you essentially have three seniors there who were doing II one function and I would have to be there to know what they-12 were doing.
13 I'm not going to make any comment on what they were Id doing.
15 Q
But from your own experience and your view is tihat
- s /a#
16 the three licensed people are adequate for the primary system, oneforsecondarysystemand[seniorlicensedguytostand 17 18 back and take a look over thd' shoulder?
I9 A
In most cases.
Let me just say that would be the 20 minimum number that you would need in there, maybe that is 21 more correct, but three can do it, I think.
22 O
Are there any cases that you know of where they 23 cannot do it?
2#
A No.
se..r.o.rs n. con n,Inc.
25 Q
Okay.
You have heard this idea put forth about a
(
jc 15 85 1
shift engineer or a shift safety officer, is that correct?
2 A
Yes.
3 Q
I understand that's in effect now.
- i 4
A It's in Unit 1 now, they have a unit engineer that is 5
on shift now.
s mr 6
Q Youtre the shift supervisor and this shift sor 7
is going to be reporting to you, is that correct?
8 A
I don't think that has been defined as yet.
9 0
What is your viewpoint of this, do you feel -- is 10 that going to be a help or a hindrance to you as a shift 11 supervisor?
12 A
My view is, of course, that the more people you put 13 on shift, the better or the easier and better my job is, 14 simply because we can delegate some more work, but whether 15 it benefits anything other than the day-to-day work, that 16 has to be done, whether it contributes anything to safety, l'7 I would say probably not.
18 And the reason I say that is in any situation that happens 19 in a nuclear power' station, there has got to be one individual 20 that makes the decisions on what to do and when to do it and 21 how to do it.
And if'you start putting in people or more 22 people and you lose that definition, you are only creating 23 problems, because then no one knows who is giving the 24 direction and therefore what direction to take.
Am-Federet Repo,ters, Inc.
25 And I have seen that any number of times just in the last ten b
jc 16 86 1
years at this island, something happens in the control room 2
and you get 50 people flocking there and it only complicates 3
matters.
4 0
It is more difficult for you as a shift supervisor 5
to control the situation, isn't that correct?
6 A
That is right.
7 BY MR. ALLISON:
8 Q
Did you think it would enhance safety if tuia shift 9
engineer were in charge so that there is a clear line of 10 command?
11 A
I think a clear line of command, yeah.
12 Q
So he is another backstop.
Okay, but you would 13 need a pretty highly qualified engineer to put him in that 14 position, would you not?
15 A
Yes, you would.
16 0
Supervise the existing structure.
I'7 A
Yes, you would, you would need a really highly 18 qualified engineer.
19 MR. EAYNES:
I really don' t have any further questions
- l 20 along this line.
21 MR. ALLISON:
I just have one last.one.
22 BY MR. ALLISON:
23 Q
Were you aware of the press reports on this accident 24 when you went home on Thursday and Friday?
Aco-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 A
I did not really get too involved with what the press l
(
jc 17 I
was saying until about Thursday night, I guess, Wednesday and l
2 Wednesday and Thursday.
I guess either here at the island or 3
at home in bed.
I think Friday is when I became more aware f
i 4
of what the news media was saying and then Sunday is when I 5
quit reading the accounts and listening to them altogether.
6 Q
I think you were aware on Friday during the day 7
before you came into work on Friday?
8 A
Yes, I would say.
9 Q
Did you think at that time that things were worse 10 than was being reported by, let's say, Jack Herbein to Il the press?
12 Were you aware of what he was saying?
13 A
No, I'm not sure I was aware of what Jack was saying 14 to the press, because I think when I started to pay attention 15 to' what the press was saying, he had already been relieved 16 of that responsibility.
I was aware, though, that when I 17 was away from the island, I would listen to the news or read 18 the papers and things seemed to be a lot blacker than when I 19 was actually here.
20 Q
So you perceived it the other way around.
You thought 21 the press reports sounded blacker than the situation?
22 A
Oh, definitely, definitely.
As a matter of fact, there 23 were some times when I would read,the press accounts and l
24 as a matter of fact one time I actually did call in because I Ac.-F.o.r. n.,ori.ri, ene.
25 heard something on the radio or television that was utterly
88 jc 18 1
different from when I had left the plant a few hours earlier and I had called back in to find out what had happened because --
t 2
and I'm not even sure of what the actual subject was, what 3
?
was related to, but I did call back in to find out what the 4
5 hell happened, what changed.
6 And I was told nothing, it is essentially the same as 7
when I left it.
You don't remember what report it was that caused 8
0 9
you to call back in?
No, but I think it had something to do with the 10 A
11 hydrogen.
12 Q
Hydrogen bubble?
What the actual 13 A
Yes, I think that's what it was.
14 news report was, I'm not certain.
I think that's about when I gave up looking at news reports and reading newspapers about 15 16 Three Mile Island.
17 MR. ALLISON:
Okay, I think that is all we have.
I thank you very much, Mr. Chwastyk, for your cooperation.
18 19 We think we are done.
We might come back with a few more 20 questions, but thanks an awful lot, you have been very helpful 21 (Whereupon, at 2:56 p.m., the interview was
'., J4 22 adjourned.)
l 23 24 Am-Feoord Reporters, tric.
25
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