ML19309G238
| ML19309G238 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/04/1979 |
| From: | Rogers L BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8005050457 | |
| Download: ML19309G238 (77) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMI55ICN f
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In tne Matter of:
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.i 2.1 IE TMI INVESTIGATICN INTERVIEW 3.
of Leland Rogers, Si e Manager,.BLU 4
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..:s 5i 7i SI Trailer #203 36 NRC Investigation Sita 1
TMI Nuclear ?:wer Plan:
1:P Micdlet wn, Pennsyivania
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'tay J, 1970
' 2l (Date o
.ntarview) 13i June 2E, 1979 (Date Transcript Typec) 141 117, 115 and 119 (Tape Numcer(s))
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NRC PER5CNNEL:
22-ffark E. Resner Thomas Timotny Martin 25i James S. Cresswell Darwin Ray Hunter
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l The following interview of Mr. Leland C. Rogers, is being conducted on f
,, l May 4, 1979, 9:30 a.m.,
EDT.
Mr. Rogers is a site manager employed by B&W at the TMI site.
The interview is being conducted in trailer 203 3;
south gate TMI nuclear facility.
The individuals present at this
.i interview are Mr. Thomas Timotny Martin.
Mr. Martin is an inspector j!
specialist, excuse me an inspection specialist with the US NRC in Region I.
Also present Mr. James S. Cresswell.
Mr. Cresswell is a 7l a!
react r inspect r with the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III.
Also present Mr. Dorwin Ray Hunter.
Mr. Hunter is an inspection specialist with the US NRC Region III.
Moderating this interview is
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Mark E. Resner.
I am an investicator with the Office of Inspector and 11;
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Auditor, USNRC.
Prior to taking this interview Mr. Rogers was provided with a two page document advising him of the purpose, scope and authority 13{
to conduct this investigation.
On the second page of this document
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Mr. Rogers has signed and dated indicating he understands what the 15:
document states.
In addition Mr. Rogers has answered three questions 16:
which I will state for the record.
(1) Do you understand the above?
17 Mr. Rogers has che:xed that he has ercerstood the cuestions.
Is that 13t correct Mr. Rogers?
19i 20!
ROGERS:
Yes 21!
22!
RESNER:
(2) Do we nave your permission to tape the interview Mr.
23)
Rogers has also checked yes, is that correct Mr. Rogers?
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i RCGERS:
Yes.
T, 2;
RESNER:
(3) You want a copy of the tace? Mr. Rogers has checked yes 3
he does wish a copy of the tape.
Is that correct Mr. Rogers?
51 ROGERS:
Yes.
ei 7l RESNER:
Okay we will see you are proviced with a copy of the tape.
C.
At this point in time I would like to ask Mr. Rogers if he will give ci
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10i us a brief resume of his experience in the nuclear industry.
I l'.i ROGERS:
Nuclear industry experience began in June 1955 when I was in j;
the Navy Nuclear Power Program assigned to the Idaho Falls Operations.
, f.
I remained there for approximately 2 years.
Went to Portsmouth Naval i
y Shipyard Commissioning of the USS Swordfish and I was there until 15i approximately March of 1959.
And I went to USS Scuplin in Pascagoula
- .c i I remained on the Sculpin until October of 1962.
At that time I went IT to Nuclear Pcwer Scncol in Braingricge Md as an instructor anc remained 13i there until February 1966.
Was assigned to the USS Tonosa until I 19:
believe it was tne summe.r of 1969 I got out of the Navy in mid-20l i
February 1970.
And I went to work for Westingnouse Nuclear Energy 21!
Systems Pittsburgh.
While there I was assigned to field service 22f operation with refueling startups, hot functional testing, construction 23f j
functional testing, and all the testing and operations associated with 2.li
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bringing several of,9e Westingneuse plants into operation.
I left 25!
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I Westinghouse in Octcber of 1972 and was hired by B&W.
Sirce that time, the fall of 1972, I have been assigned to TMI.
Initially as the
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3; temporary site manager for the startup operations on Unit 1.
Only had that joo about 2 months until a per:::anent manager was assigned.
That gj was March of 1973 until June of 1974 when I was then given the job as ma'ager to complete the startup testing of Unit 1.
Remained at TMI 9
7 since that time as service manager to the customer providing continuing g,I ope: ating service function task to Unit 1, preparation for startup testing of Unit 2, insuring procedures are being written, and various g
tasks assigned by the customer.
Then was assigned as startup manager,
, 01 startup site operations manager, for B&W for the Unit 2 operations g
which began around January 1977. And I remained in that roll since.
c 131 RESNER:
Thank you very much Mr. Rogers.
I now turn the questioning 1M over to Mr. Cresswell.
15j 15i CRESSWELL:
This is Jim Cresswell speaking.
Lee could you briefly 17!
cescrice to us wns; your relationsnip is with B&W presently in your 1St function and your relationship to Metropolitan?
13i 20(
ROGERS:
You mean assignnments?
1'.l 22f CRESSWELL:
Your assignments, your reportability, your responsibility.
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t ROGERS:
As of today or for the past few days anyway B&W was reorganized j
j into a separate group for recovery of TMI-2 art they provide assistance
,l cf TMI-l when necessary.
That particular organi:ati:n is just being
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formulated, so the reporting path is not clearly defined at this
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I believe I will report to Jim Finney as a line manager in Lynchburgh and he will report to George Kolench who is the task manager el
.,j for this B&W assigned organization.
't Si l
CRESSWELL:
If we can go say into March 1979 how would the responsibilities 91 been organized at that time?
10; 1 15 ROGERS:
I was then reporting to Bill Spangler as the startup service 12,'
i manager in B&W Nuclear Services.
131 The people on site were performing tasks for the NSS startup and for 14:
the contract services reporting through me to Bill Spangler.
i 12 16 Ci ESSWELL:
Did you report to anyone at Met Ed Co?
17' 13i ROGERS:
Yes, I had a service centractor provice a specific task as 19!
requested by Met Ed.
Ar.d reported in this area to Gary Miller, station -
20i manager.
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9ei"l CRESSWELL: Would Gary give you, for instance tasks to perform, or 23l
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directions in what your work would be at that site?
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ROGERS:
Yes.
Generally it would be a written task letter which would
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be transmitted between organizations to describe what those tasks were i
31 and what the expense was and maybe the length of time.
But it was not t
4l necessarily a complete detailed task description.
But it did outline, gl at least in general forms what it was.
So we had a written communication describing those tasks.
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CRESSWELL:
Mr. Miller would document his request to you in memos?
al si ROGERS:
Yes.
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11; CRESSWELL:
It is also my understanding that you supervised some 12l l
people here at the site is that correct?
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14i ROGERS:
Yes.
15' 15.
CRESSWELL:
Could you name those people briefly and what you do in
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directing their activities?
13t 19:
ROGERS:
At the end of March I had several engineers that were still 20' engaged in the close off work relating to the NSS contract with tne l
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customer.
Those particular people were Greg Shidel, who was the site
.e r e engineer working cirectly under me; Stan Mangee, Bill Pitka, and in 23!I another administrative function I had John.: lint and John Putnam 2tj; reporting to me ad.',istratively; but they were uncer specific tasks
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with the GPU organi:ation en comoletion of the unit 2 startup report I
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to be filed with the f4RC.
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CRESSWELL:
Those two individuals including Mr. Flint would have gj received other direction than from you?
Gi 7.lt ROGEDS:
Mostly only administrative, I was a B&W manager on site but in relaticn to the tasks they were doing they were assigned by the GPU S
organi:ation for specific tasks which had been an ongoing task for the g
duration of the startup.
So it was a long term type task.
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CRESSWELL:
flormally who would be directing the activities frcm the
,y, GPU side.
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ROGERS:
Some GPU management individual and that had been changing o
thorugh the past several months as the startup came to completion and
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they reorgani:ed several times.
13i CRESSWELL:
Lee, I would like to go back to the March 28, the time of the event.
Do you reca:1 about '.< hat time you arrived onsite on March
?S?
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22!
I ROGEDS:
- Yes, I arrived on site sometime shortly after 7:00.
I was 22i at the north gate.
And that was a bit earlier than usual.
I received a call about 6:00 '. the morning that the plant had suffered a turb'ne-05 t
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We were briefed.
People around that call were Gary g
Miller from Met Ed, Jack Her::ein from Met Ed, George Kunder from the control room and myself.
We were briefed on the --.
3 4i, gj CRESSWELL:
You were at home?
I Gi ROGERS:
Yes I was at home.
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ROGERS:
We were then briefed on the then as known at that time, of 91
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9 10 were informed what the operating plant conditions were and the parameters were at that time.
So I left significantly earlier than usual.
"I I usually do not leave home until about 7:30, get here about 8:00 I left a little earlier, I think.
The call lasted from about 6 to 6:25, 6:30, somewhere around there.
I didn't really note the time.
It was 15; approximately one half hour conference call.
15 ORESSWELL:
What was the nature of the discussions 'that took placa 1St during that conversation.
138 20i ROGERS:
Basically George Hunter in the control room was letting us 21l know he was operating at that time out of the shift supervisors office 22!
near the control room.
He was telling us what had occurred and what I
23' the plant conditions were and as a grouo we were discussing what we 21' thougnt wnat ougnt -
be attempted in trying to get tne plant to a 25!
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stable condition because it was quite apparent it was not a normal trip at that point.
The reactor cociant pumps were off and they had 2
an indication of tne drain tank rupture disk having failed and water "i
in containment at thzt time from that event.
That has happened at y
this site in the post on unit one several years ago.
It has happened
'i at other S&W plants, so there are certain things that we know to exist because of that type of event and ---.
S' I
CRESSWELL:
What would be some of the types of things noted?
101 ROGERS:
The first thing you'd note is that you would have scme pressure in the reactor containment building, you'd have some temperature indication above normal, at some of the temperature indicators in the 13)
,j building.
You would also expect to have some radiation alarms in the
.t v intermediate cooling letdown coolers area which are normally set on -
15' very low level; those are designed to be detecting any tube leaks in the coolers.
So we have them understandably set very low.
Even 171 tnough we cic acc talk abcut raciation concition at the time that is 13:
something that you would normally expect to have hacpen in the it did 2.*.h happen that is exactly the condition existing.
The fact that the 201 j
plant was not in the normal post cip condition was that t'he reactor 21{
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coolant pumos having been turned off and pressuri::er essentially full l
22l of water and not able to get a bubble back in the pressurizer as the 22 coerators would normally have been able to do so.
We are also informed, j
because of the moie ure in the building, we expected tnat we had lost i
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c stable c ndition because it was quite apparent it was not a normal 3
trip at that point.
The reactor coolant pumps were off and they had an indicaticn of the drain tank rupture disk having failed and water
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in containcent at that time frcm that event.
That has happened at
_l this site in the post on unit one several years ago.
It has happened e;
at other B&W plants, so there are certain tnings that we know to exist t
because of that type of event and ---.
7 Si CDESSWELL:
What would be some of the types of things noted?
10!
ROGERS:
The first thing you'd note is that you would have some pressure a;
i in the reactor containment building, you'd have some temperature 12!
indication above ncrmal, at some of the temperature indicators in the 131 l
building.
You would also expect to have some radiation alarms in the 1
14!
intermediate cooling letdown coolers area which are normally set on 15!
very low level; those are designed to be detecting any tube leaks in i
the coolers.
So we have them understandably set very low.
Even 17' though we cid not talk a:out radiaticn condition at the time tnat is e
_m, something that you would normally expect to nave happen in the it did 19l happen that is exactly'the condition existing.
The fact that the 201 i*
j plant was not in the normal post trip conditien was that t'he reactor 21j coolant pumps having been turned off and pressurizer essentially full 22!
l of water and not able to get a bubble back in the pressurizer as the 23!
cperators would normally have been able to co so.
We are also informed, 2Lf because of ne moisture in the builcing, we expected that we had lost 251
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Yes, and from what I have been able to detect new in looking 2,
back everything really existed as one would have expected at tnat time, about six o' clock.
Yes, that is essentially what we would have 3
expected.
't t CRESSWELL:
Was the hign sump level discussed g
6i RCGERS:
No, we did not discuss that at all at that point.
Mainly, we
/
El were more interested in getting the reactor coolant system in a more l
normal cperating condition.
Post trip 10f
_I CRESSWELL:
Okay.
So during the discussion, did George initiate the telephone call or do you have any feeling for who initiated this conference call?
121 le ROGERS:
I, well we did'nt discuss it at the time later on.
Gary 15!
Miller and I talked it over.
He had stated that he was talking to 16:
George earlier and felt there was a lot of information we needed to 1*.
get some mere heads together.
So he either himself initiated it or 181[
had George initiate the call.
I can't be sure of that but it was at 19!
Gary Miller's request t:.at the conference call was made.
20l Elf l
CRESSWELL:
You menticned that Mr. Herbein was a party to the conversation.
22' Do you remember what his comments were?
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ROGERS:
Yes, and from what I have been able to detect new in looking 2,
back everything really existed as one would have expected at that time, about six o' clock.
Yes, tnat is essentially what we would have expected.
9 CRESSWELL:
Was the hign sump level discussed Si ROGERS:
No, we did not discuss that at all at that point.
Mainly, we j
were more interested in getting the reactor coolant system in a more
- c. c normal coerating concition.
Post trip 10t CRESSWELL:
Okay.
So during the discussion, did Gecrge initiata the telephone call or do you have any feeling for who initiated this conference call?
131 6
10 ROGERS:
I, well we did'nt discuss it at the time later on.
Gary 2.F.-
Miller and I talked it over.
He had stated that he was talking to 15:
George earlier and felt there was a lot of information we needed to 17:
get some more heads trgetner.
So he either nitself initiatec i, or 18!
had George initiata the call.
I can't be sure of tnat but it was at 191 Gary Miller's request tt.at the conference call was made.
21 CRESSWELL:
You mentioned that Mr. Herbein was a party to the ccnversatien.
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l Do you remember what his comments were?
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l 12 ROGERS:
As George cescribec the operators were getting indications of 3
very unstable flow in the reactor coolant system.
Current readings 3) for the reactor coolant pump motors, a randem reading, was oscillating
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all over and the initial action had been to secure the 2 pumps in the m
B loop.
I maybe wrong here, but we secured two of the pumps in one of the loops as he described it and that seemed to satisfy the conditions ei for a period of time within the same conditions compared in the other
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loop.
And the cperators folicwed their normal operating procedure to
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secure the pumps when you have these conditions existing, the unstable pump operations.
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CRESSWELL:
You mentioned readings for the pumps.
Wnat kind of readings?
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ROGERS:
The current readings for the motors on the control panels 14 that the operator has right in front of him above the pump control 5_
center.
And then the oscillations of flow indications are also right is:
l on the console right in front of the reactor coolant system ficw.
IT Direct system rsading wnich is displayed for him.
IR 19t CRESSWELL:
Did you make any recommendations to the staff at during 20l that conversation?
21:
esi ROGERS:
As a group discussion we all arrived at the conclusion that 23ls to try to reestablish reactor coolant syster. flow was obviously a steo 2M t
that nad to be made., Then, of course, we prcbably, I have to say
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ROGERS:
As George described the operators were getting indications of 3f very unstable flow in the reactor coolant system.
Current readings 3
f r the reactor coolant pump motors, a random reading, was oscillating all over and the initial action had been to secure the 2 pumps in the B 1 cp.
I maybe wrong here, but we secured two of the pumps in one of 5
the loops as he described it and that seemed to satisfy tne conditions et for a period of time within the same conditions compared in the other o
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loop.
And the cpera',crs followed their normal operating procedure to secure tne pumps when you have tnese conditions existing, the unstable cump operations.
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l'.I CRESSWELL:
You mentioned readings for the pumos.
What kind of readings?
12' 13:
i ROGERS:
The current readings for the motors on the control panels 14!
that the operator has right in front of him above the pump control 15:
center.
And then tne oscillations of flow indications are also right
,a on the censole right in front of the reactor coolant system flow.
27' Direct system reading wnich is displayed for nim.
1St 19f CRESSWELL:
Did you make any recommendations to the staff at during 20:
that conversation?
7.M t
22' ROGERS:
As a group ciscussion we all arrived at the conclusion that 23!
l to try to reestablish reacter coolant system flow was obviously a step that had to be made.
Then, of course, we precably, I have to say 25:
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k CRESSWELL:
Which gate?
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y RCGERS:
The north gate. So I pulled up to the security guard and asked him what was the problem.
And he said we're in a site emergency m
6.:
and please report over to the visitors center.
I said I am from B&W; et Lee Regers and one of the guards popped out of the office that knows el me pretty well.
And he said:
"Okay let Lee through.
I don't know 7,;
Sl whether they had any orders to do so but he knew it was okay for me to come in at least.
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That was my first mistake.
My second mistake was that I tried to get 101 into the inner' security fence and they let me through that one too.
11!
i Sut before I got to the second security fence down by the unit 2 12; turbine building I stepped in my effice, which is in the building 131 j
directly across from the reactor building, and took my brief case in 14!
and got my hard hat--.
r 15; 15 ',
CRESSWELL:
Is that the trailer?
17; 13; RCGERS:
No, it is the temporary steel building, green building that's 19!
i directly cpposite Unit 2 reactor building.
I got my hard hat and I 20r i
went cut to security gate.
The guard at that point again said you 2'E can't go in Lee.
We can't let anybody in.
And he had his walkie--
pol
~l talkie and I asked to call control room and get clearance to let "l
n me in.
That took a few minutes of course.
So after that was cleared 9.:
I went on to the turbine building and got into the control room.
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CRESSWELL: Which gate?
l e,
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ROGERS:
The north gate. So I pulled up to the security guard and a
asked him what was tne problem.
And he said we're in a site emergency m[
and please report over to the visitors center.
I said I am from B&W; Lee Rogers and one of the guards popped out of the office that knows me pretty well.
And he said:
"Okay let Lee througn.
I don't know
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i whether they had any orders to do so but he knew it was okay for me to S '.
come in at least.
91 That was my first mistake.
My second mistake was that I tried to get l
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into the inner security fence and they let me through that one too.
11.'
But before I got to the second security fence down by the unit 2 12f turbine building I stopped in my office, which is in the building I
13:
directly across from the reactor building, and took my brief case in 1ti t
and got my hard hat--.
15!
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15i CRESSWELL:
Is that the trailer?
17' 13(
ROGERS:
No, it is the temporary steel building, green building that's 191 directly coposite Unit 2 reactor building.
I got my hard hat and I 20i i
went out to security gate.
The guard at that point again said you 2
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can't go in Lee.
We can't let anybody in.
And he had his walkie-nl l
talkie and I asked to call control room and get clearance to let me in.
That took a few minutes of course.
So after that was cleared l
e I went on to the turbine building and got into the control rocm.
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CRESSWELL:
That was the reactor building?
2'.
ROGERS:
- Yes,
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CRESSWELL:
What about the Aux building?
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I didn't know whether we had any problems with the Aux building
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at that time.
Of cc',trse as I went through the control room myself I looked at the indications and I did not get an awful lot of information
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from other people, but that was the cDvious ones that I had that I
.v3 could report back.
I told Spangler then that I'd try to get my handle
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,j on what is going on and get back witn each cther later on.
Am 121 CRESSWELL:
What was the nature of your conversation with Spangler?
141 What sort cf things did you say?
16[
P0GERS:
I just gave him what informa-ion we had, what the plant
'7' conditions were, and th-t as soon as I could find out wnat more was
'.S t going on I would get back to him.
19i 20:
q CRESFWELL:
Did ycu for instance mention that there was a site emergency 21l that had been declared?
.m 22hj ROGERS:
Oh Yes.
Yes, that we had emergency conditions existing.
I-20 knew there was a site emergency at tnat point obvicusly because of the l
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.j CRESSWE*.L:
That was the reacter building?
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RO3ERS:
tes.
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CRESSWELL:
Wnat acout the Aux building?
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I didn't know whether we had any problems with the Aux building i
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at that time.
3;:
Of course as I went through the control room myself I looked at the indicaticns and I die not get an awful lot of information from other pecple, but that was the obvious ones that I had that I could report back.
I told Spangler then that I'd try to get my handle e.
y on what is going on and get back with each other later on.
13, CRESSWELL:
What was the nature of your conversation with Spangler?
14!
What sort of things did you say?
15; RCGERS:
I just gave him what information we had, what the plant
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conditions were, and that as soon as I could fir.d out wnat more was
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going on I would get back to him.
1.;:
20:
RESSWELL:
Did you for instance mention that there was a site emergency that had been declared?
22',
23!
i ROGERS:
Oh Yes.
Yes, that we had emergencj conditions existing.
I 22 knew there was a sP,; emergency at that point obviously because of the 25i l
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13 CRESSWEL' :
This is Cresswell speaking again, Lee, I would like to go 2l back to the time where you first started up to the control room.
As I 3
remember there is a flight of steps up to the control room and you 4l could go through a door and you passed by some windows where the shift supervisor's office is; some windows that you can look into the control room and if you make an entrance in say on the left side of the control 7
Do you remember passing by the window there where the.11ft room.
~
.f supervisor's office 's located?
9!
ROGERS:
,j I know I passed by the window because in my route that corning I tried to take the elevator in the turbine building and it did not 22; arrive fast enough for me so I went up the steps adjacent to the
,an, elevator level whien brought me up to the high pressure end of the 121 turbine.
14:
15!
CRESSWELL:
Okay you entered through the turbine --
~.7 '
j ROGERS:
The turbine operating flocr then into - through ne fire 13t door, into the control tower, at that point, wnich brings you right 19!
out at the windows of tt:e shift suoerviscrs.
And then I went left and 20:
into the door of the control room.
21; i
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CRESSWELL:
Did you recall what you saw as you came through the fire 23; i
door looking into the control room? The number of people the ---?
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CRES $'.lELL:
This is Cresswell speaking again, Lee, I would like to go
-4 back to the time where you first started up to the control room.
As I e.
remember there is a flight of steps up to the control room and you 3
q could go through a door and you passed by some windows where the shift
- t supervisor's office is; some windows that you can look into the control room and if you make an entrance in say on the left side of the control oi
,j room.
Do you remember passing by the window there where the shift
~
/
supervisor's office is located?
g 9!
ROGERS:
gj I know I passed by the windcw because in my route that morning I tried tc take the elevator in the turbine building and it did not arrive fast encugh for me so I went up the steps adjacent to the i
elevator level whien brought me up to the hign pressure end of the 13t turbine.
14' 15; CRESSWELL:
Okay you entered through the turbine --
.o 1
17!
RC3ERS:
The tureine cperating flocr then into - :nrough the fire door, into the control tower, at that point, which brings you right out at the windows of tre shift supervisors.
And then I went left and 20!
into the door of the control room.
21; 22 CRESSWELL:
Did you recall what you saw as you came through the fire 23!
l coor looking into the control rocm? The number of people the ---?
21!
L 55N t
0 4
p I
t I
i i
20 like tnat, when the Unit is uncoupled and you are running the motor to p
check out whether you're coupling up to the pume again curing some 3'
maintenance or outage period.
t 4l g
CRESSWELL:
Do you recall who the individuals were that you talked to
-i i
when you went into the control room?
oi 7!
j ROGERS:
Bill Zewe was the shift supervisor. I noticed him. I don't g
know whether I - yes, I think I probably asked him whether or not to g
pump had been run.
Most likely I asked him, being the individual who would know conditions occurring.
Gary Miller was there and I exchanged y
a hello with him and told him I was there for any kind of discussions that he needed. And I am not too sure any other individual, by name, that I spoke to.
More than likely I did but I can't recall.
141 15!
[C] What was Gary doing at the time?
./,
CRESSWELL: What was Gary doing at the time?
15t
'.9 !
ROGERS:
He was gettinc all kinas or data fed into him.
Plant conditions
(
20!
station positions, and etc.
I really wasn't paying much attention to 21!
the information flow in that area at all at that time.
I was more or 22!
l less trying to find out for myself where we were so that I could let em9 Lynchburgh know just in a brief summary.
Oa!
l t
25!
I
)
i i
i i
i 20 like tnat, when the Unit is uncoupled and you are running the motor to f
J check out whether yeu're coupling up to the pumo again during some e,.,
3 maintenance or cutage period.
4!
gl CRESSWELL:
Do you recall who the individuals were that you talked to when you went into the control room?
01 7!
ROGERS:
Bill Zewe was the shift supervisor. I noticed him. I don't 81 know whether I - yes, I think I probably asked him whether or not to g
pumo had been run.
Most likely I asked hira, being the individual wno
,,j would know conditions occurring.
Gary Miller was there and I exchanged a hello with him and told him I was there for any kind of discussions A_.
l that he needed. And I am not too sure any other individual, by name, 131 that I spoke to.
More than likely I did but I can't recall.
14, r
15;
[C] What was Gary doing at the time?
,i CRE55WE'_ L:
What was Gary doing at the tice?
ISt 19i ROGERS:
He was getting~ all kinds of data fed into him.
Plant conditions l
20!
l station positions, and etc.
I really wasn't paying much attention to 21!
the information flow in that area at all at that time.
I was more or eel
'N less trying to find out for myself where we were so that I could let 238 Lynchburgh know just in a brief summary.
2:!
~ ~
23!
.1 4
l
I i
I 22 i
,j CRESSWELL:
What were they at that time?
2.
ROGERS:
Numbers I would not be able to tell you.
Most of them were
~!
in alarm as I looked at them and that of course was a significant y
change from normal.
That was the impressive part of it.
-s Gi CRESSWELL:
Okay, so what other parameters did you look at beside th'e radiation levels? The radiation monitors.
8!
91 ROGERS:
I looked to see what the steam generators levels were and I saw that we had scme level indications.
I looked to see what the 11l temperatures in the loops were and they were. numberwise.
I would not l
12' y
be able to tell ycu what I saw that morning.
There were abnormal 12l conditions.
The THs were not indicating on the panel at all on either 141 loop.
Of course, I would have expected that anyway with no flow.
I 15i would have expected abnormal temperature indications.
So it did not is' necessarily surprise me seeing that the temperatures were acnormal.
./;
' Si CRESSWELL:
From the information that you looked at, what did you 19!
think was happening inside the reactor coolant system?
20l 21; ROGERS:
Well, I guess as I looked at it I would have guessed that
~ ~d with no flow conditions obvious, the high pressure !.1jection was 22{
operating although I can't say for sure whether it was operating or
~al c
]
not.
I really did not look at those indications.
25?
ii I'
s i
1 i
I J
t
4 i
22 1
![
CRESSWELL:
What were they at that time?
.c..
ROGERS:
Numbers I would not be able to tell you.
Most of them were
,s, l
in alarm as I looked at them and that of course was a significant I
change from normal.
That was the impressive part of it.
..c.
t si CRESSWELL:
Okay, so what other parameters did you look at beside th'e
/-
radiation levels? The radiation monitors.
8; l
L 9!
}
ROGERS:
I looked to see what the steam generators levels were and I l
101 i
saw tnat we had some level indications.
I looked to see what the 11; temperatures in the loops were and they were. numberwise.
I would not 12.
be able to tell you what I saw that morning.
There were abnormal conditions.
The THs were not indicating on the panel at all on either 1 41 l
loop.
Of course, I would have expected that anyway with no flow.
2 13; would have expected abnormal temoerature indications.
So it did not j
,,.w necessarily surprise me seeing that the temperatures were abnormal.
I I
ist i
CRESSWELL:
From the information that you looked at, what did you i
19i I
think was happening inside the reactor coolant system?
20; I
7
?
~~}
ROGERS:
Well, I guess as I looked at it I would have guessed that l
22!
with no flow conditions obvious, the hign pressure injection was 23l\\
]
coerating although I can't say for sure whether it was ooerating or i
Eai!
- j not.
I really did ot look at those indications.
2Wl 3
i t
i6 i
4 4
~
I 24 i
CRE55WELL:
Can you recall while you are looking at these parameters on the cont.ol board what tne operators were doing?
u.
I 2I ROGERS:
Well, I had one man stationed back at the radiation moni.toring y
y panel feeding information to somebody in the control room who, at that 2
j time, was recording everything that was being said.
At least from the
,,el operators.
/
I S!
CRES5WELL: Which radiation monitor, just the one ---?
9!
10i ROGERS:
This is the whole area of radiation monitoring communication 11, in the back of the panel.
As the operators stands looking into the 121 l
l fore part panel, the second panel back is all red conitoring indications.
121 They had a man standing right in front of tne indications on the steps i
1C so that he can read off the indication.
16i CRES5WELL:
Eut he is actually in the front of the control room.
When 17' you say tne back - nel tnere are two se s of panels, in the walk
'Bi space.
19l 20!
211l ROGERS:
Setween the two sets of canels.
c_l e.
p CRESSWELL:
He is oading the information off and giving it to an 230
[
operator out in front of the paneis?
24 l
I l
1 5
i 3
i I
I i
24 t
i CRESSWELL:
Can you recall while you are looking at these parameters Al on the control board what the operators were doing?
t.
3!
ROGERS:
Well, I had one man stationed back at the radiation monitoring panel feeding information to somebody in the control room who, at that g
gj time, was recording everything that was being said.
At least from.the operators.
/
S' CRESSWELL:
Which radiation monitor, just the one ---?
91 10i This is the whole area of radiation monitoring communication ROGERS:
in the back of the panel.
As the cperators stands looking into the m
n
-~<
fore part panel, the second panel back is all red monitoring indications.
,,al They had a man standing right in front of the indications on the steps lat so that he can read off the indication.
15!
16 CRESSWELL:
Eut he is actually in tne front of the control room.
When IT c
you say tas back panei there are two sets of panels, in the walk 13l space.
19{
20l l
ROGERS:
Between the two sets of canels.
21{
79i "I
CRESSWELL:
He is reading the information off and giving it to an 23![
operator out in front of the panels?
2af i
2Ei l
l
+
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\\
4 l
.1 t
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j 25 f
RCGERS:
No, I con't I really don't.
As long as I have been here, all e
these pecple are so familiar to me I don't bother to pay attention to 3;
wno they cre. I see them all everyday and they are totally familiary
~1 faces.
+
_ i.
o!
CRESSWELL:
Do you recall what reactor coolant system pressure was at ei i
this time?
.I SI 4
ROGERS:
No. I think it was I think it was down around 1300-1500 lbs 91 category but I am not sure.
I 10i CRESSWELL:
So we are getting back to the period of time about when you would have gone over the instrument to make the call at 7:45 is
.25/
tha; correct?
- 4!
.:i FCGERS:
Yes.
16' 17' CRESSWEL'.
You locked at the parameters and so f:rth and you maca the 13:
call tc Spangler, at B&W?
19!
i' ee.
_a ROGERS:
Yes.
i eai
- !i CRESSWELL:
So what happened after you get off tne telephone call?
j
-l, e,
l 24
['.
I 4
f
f i
l I
1 25 ROGERS:
No, I don't I really don't.
As long as I have been here, all ii 4
these people are so familiar to me I don't bother to pay attention to c.
.y who they are. I see them all everyday and they are totally familiary
-i faces.
5tI CRESSWELL:
Do you recall what reactor coolant system pressure was at
=\\
this time?
71 i
81 i
ROGERS:
No. I think it was I think it was cown around 1300-1500 lbs 9!
category but I am not sure.
g
, u.
1, j
CRESSWELL:
So we are getting back to the period of time about when 12l you would have gone over the instrument to make the call at 7:45 is that correct?
14!
ROGERS:
Yes.
.0:
CRESSWELL:
Ycu looked at tne parameters and se forth and ycu made the 13l call to Spangler, at B&W7 19{
22i l
ROGERS:
Yes.
21l r
I 22!I p
CRESSWELL:
So what hacoened after you got off the telephone call?
23 229 l
4
'l:.
h 1
L i
i f
i i
28 i
i point; what shoulo we do; let's see if we can get together some kind t
2; f plan.
Essentiaily the guidelines of the caucus.
1 3h CRESSWELL:
Do you recall who was in that caucas? Would it have been m
.j you and Gray Miller and who else i
5i ROGERS:
Joe Logan was there, Geroge Condor was there.
I think Jim
/
gl Sealinger the Unit ' superintendent was there.
I am not sure because c
he was in and out of the different caucuses and in the control room 1
7 from time to tima during the day.
Again it is knowing faces and not
~
I trying to figure who they all are.
You don't need to do that at the j
i time.
l 12!
13:
CRESSWELL:
Okay, so there was this brain storm session trying to come up with some sort of course of action.
Well during the process of
.cr this brain storming session what sort of things were discussed?
If,i i
17; ROGERS:
Well, I think the tnrust c'f this sessicn was to try to get 13l the reactor coolant system to a some kind of operable condition.
It 19:
i s
wasn't totally clear to us exactly what the conditions in the RCS were 2Cl
~
t
[
at that point, as far as temperatures and distribution of those temperatures. l
.n..
l I believe that we decided at that point to again attempt reactor 22i l
coolant pump operations.
I know we did.
That is one of the major 23:
1 thrusts of that first caucas.
That is, let us go see if we can get a 2a!
pump started again. And we talked over what we had seen before and j
l i
i 28 t
y point; what should we co; let's see if we can get together some kind of plan.
Essentially the guidelines of the caucus.
g 4j s.
CRESSWELL:
Do you recall who was in that caucas? Would it have been 4
[
you and Gray Miller and who else 5
5 ROGERS:
Joe Logan was there, Geroge Condor was there.
I think Jim
/
i Sealinger the Unit 1 superintendent was there.
I am not sure because g
he was in and out of the different caucuses and in the control room from time to time during the cay.
Again it is knowing faces and not
,Of trying to figura who they all are.
You don't need to do that at the time.
12 ',
131 CRESSWELL:
Okay, so there was this brain storm session trying to come up with some sort of course of action.
Well during tne process of ici this brain storming session what sort of things were discussed?
- o!
l 1
17' ROGERS:
Well, I tnink the tnrust of this session was to try to get i
i ISi the reactor coolant system to a some kind of operable condition.
It 19!
wasn't totally clear to us exactly what tne conditions in the RCS were 20i 21[
at that point, as far as temperatures and distribution of those temperatures.
I believe that we decided at that point to again attempt reactor 22'
{
coolant pump operations.
I know we did.
That is one of the major l
23!
~
thrusts of that first caucas.
That is, let us go see if we can get a 24i pump started again..And we talked cver wnat we had seen before and j
l i
4 I
a
1 I
i u
4 30 t
the luces were filled with steam.
The tempera ure indications the
'l,1 pump operating the way it was, we just concluced we had steam in the
'l m!
loops and there was no further sense in continuing attempting to put a i
reactor coolant pump on.
We just had to do something to get the steam 4
[
out of loops.
To be able to run a pump later on.
The next step was to begin raising system pressure; try to collapse the steam.
Which w
was really a time related operation we had the system pressure up.
I
/
say we but the contr 1 room the system pressure up.
31 9:
l CRESSWELL:
How did they do that Lee?
- 2.
ROGERS:
Increased high pressure injection flow was the source of our increasing the pressure.
And assuring that everything was closed off
- 2:
6 that we knew that could be closed off.
la!
15 CRE35WELL:
That would be like let down?
15; 7.1 I
ROGERS:
No.
I am not too sure that we did anything witn ietdown at 13!
the point.
I don't really know I don't know the condition of letdown.
19i
? don't know whether we adjusted that at all.
The blocked valve on 20t j
the pressuri er; the electromatic relief line was closed and we ran a 21i high pressure injection pressure up.
We were successful brought the
.e ei m
j pressure up to normal operating conditions.
Then became a cuestion of 23i I
how high will we go into pressure.
It was generally agreed that we
'a t e
s did not want to bemo up against the code relief valve set pressures.
l
?:a 1
'~!
So we tried to ---
l 4
i I
I 1
4
,4 I
30 the lubes were filled with steam.
The temperature indications the pump cperating the way it was, we just concluded we had steam in the aj loops and there was no further sense in continuing attemoting to put a reactor coolant pump on.
We just had to do something to get the steam out of loops.
To be able to run a pump later on.
The next step was ei to begin raising system pressure; try to collapse the steam.
Which ci was really a time related operation we had the system pressure up.
I 71 say we but the control room the system pressure up.
9!
CRESSWELL:
How did they do that Lee?
".0 !
ROGERS:
Increased high pressure injection flow was the source of our increasing the pressure.
And assuring that everything was closed off 131 that we knew that could be closed off.
la!
2.. '
CRESSWELL:
That would be like let down?
15;
- n..
ROGERS:
No.
I am r,ot too sure that we did anytning with letdcwn at 131
- 19i, the point.
I don't really know I don't know the condition of letdown.
I don't know whether we ldjusted tnat at all.
The blocked valve on 20i j
the pressuri:er; the electromatic relief line was closed and we ran a high pressure injection pressure up.
We were successful brought the
.?? f pressure up to normal operating conditions.
Then became a question of 231 j
how high will we go into pressure.
- t was generally agreed that we J
did not want to bum-.p against the code relief valve set pressures.
-=;
So we tried to ---
i
i i
i j
32 i
CRESSWELL:
Did everyocoy feel that if you got the pressure up you could collapse the bubble.
3
[
RCGERS:
Initially we felt that that would haopen.
I don't know at m
_I what time this happened.
We hooked up or had the instrumentation f
people hook up instrumentation bridges to the RPS panel indications of
=i our het leg temperature RTDs so that we could read a resistance out on
.)
/
l them and with a calibration sheet along side of them we could look at 3 ',
it and see apprcximately what the temperature indication was.
Now 9i when we first got that information back into the group of people, we
,j didn't believe that the RTDs were working correctly.
We assumed tnat 21.
they're in a steam phase and that they were not prooably telling us 12l what exact temperatures were.
They were at temperatures were over 12i 700*.
That kind of threw everybody off.
That piece of information 1M that did not seem to be correct with where we thought we were.
L5 15!
CRESSWELL:
That would have ir.dicated like suoerheated--?
2?;
13; R0GERS:
Yes. Right.
For temperatures to get that hot it would have 191 been superheated for whlre we were.
We did not realize that was the 20!
condition we had at the time.
We stayed at the hign pressure condition i
21f for, as I see the charts now, about an hour and a half and did not 22
feel we were getting anywhere.
So we again caucused and decidec at
[':
that point, as a group, that maybe we should be trying to come down in i
pressure and float the core-flood tanks on the core, to insure in 25!
(
d 4
i t
i i
i i
l r
32 l
i i
CRESSWELL:
Did everycody feel that if you got the pressure up you l
could collapse the bu ble.
2:
31 k[
ROGERS:
Initially we felt that that would happen.
I don't know at what time this happened.
We booked up or had the instrumentation
- t people hook up instrumentation bridges to the RPS panel indications of m
q/
our het leg temperature RTDs so that we could read a resistance out on j
them and with a calibration sheet along side of them we could look at 8 i it and see aporoximately what the temperature indication was.
Now 91 when we first got that information back into the group of people, we l
10!
22.
didn't believe tnat the RTDs were working correctly.
We assumed that they're in a. steam phase and that they were not probably telling us
- 2' wnat exact temperatures were.
They were at temperatures were ever 22; 700.
That kind of threw everybody off.
That piece of information 14!
that did not seem to be correct with where we thought we were.
I 15:
CRESSWELL:
That would have indicated like superneated--?
13, ROGERS:
Yes. Right.
For temperatures to get that hot it would have 19i been superheated for wh1re we were.
We did not realize that was the i
20!
condition we had at the time.
We stayed at the hign pressure condition i
e,i
'].
for, as I see the charts now, about an hour and a half and did not
'JJ l
feel we were getting anywhere.
So we again caucused and decided at 23 that point, as a grous, that maybe we shou:d be trying to come down in l
i oaj l
pressure and float,'*e core-flood tanks on the core, to insure in I
j a.
l e-i l
f i
I i
I i
i 6
I i
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34 g
ROGERS:
Yes, if we maintain system pressure down near what the core-i i
fl od tank volume pressure was at :nen the core flood bank would l
'iy always open up.
The check valves would always open up and float water on the core area.
And even though we knew we had steam in the lines er
=;
of the reactor coolant system piping, un.....
A i
5i CP.ESSWELL:
Which lines?
/
i 8!
ROGERS:
The hot legs and we also knew tnat the steam bubble was down as low as the pump impeller area.
So we knew we had a large volume of 10!
steam in both legs.
That was concluded earlier when we got the running 11!
I indication off of the pumps.
But the project I guess you'd have to 12:
I say was to insure that we nad that core in a wet condition.
Using the i
131 core flood tanks as a knowr source of water that we felt that we could lo make sure that the core was flooded.
As we came down in pressure and I5i reached the point where the check valves would close on tne core, the
.o.
l operator, who was standing at the back panel and core flood tank s
173 level in:ications, nc ified us that ycu have floated a little bit of water in.
And we expect that if the core had been voided that as we im
~~
got to a low enough precsure we would have had a large volume flow out 20$
l of flood tanks into the ccre area.
And when we got very small volume e,i
'"I flow, everybody was then satisfied that the core was wet at the time 22 and the core flood tanks are now floating on core.
23l r
l
.v y i
^
f 1
i i
i v
1 i
l l
I i
j 34 i
i ROGERS:
Yes, if we maintain system pressure down near what the core-l l
flood tank volume pressure was at then the core flood bank would
'i always open up.
The check valves would always open up and float water g
on the core area.
And even thougn we knew we had steam in the lines Si f the reactor coolant system piping, uh.....
i 6i CRESSWELL: Which lines?
8!
ROGERS:
The hot legs and we also knew that the steam bubble was down 9!
as low as the pump impeller area.
So we knew we had a large volume of 10(
l steam in both legs.
That was concluded earlier when we got the running 11.
l indication off of the pumps.
But the project I guess you'd have to i
7..e.l say was to insure that we had that core in a wet condition.
Using tne core fioed tanks as a known source of water that we felt that we could lai make sure that the core was flooded.
As we came down in pressure and 15:
reached the point where the check valves would close on the core, the operator, who was standing at the back panel and core flood tank 1T.
level indications, notified us that you have ficated a little bit of IS.
i water in.
And we expect that if the core had been voided that as we 191 got to a low enougn precsure we would have had a large volume flow out 20' i
of flood tanks into the core area.
And when we get very small volume ml
~~!
flow, everybcdy was then satisfied that the core was wet at the time 22 and the core flood tanks are now floating on core.
22l i
24!
d' [.
l e
i
i l
i-i
[
1, 36 i
CRESSWELL:
Let's go back to the period of time when the pumps were started.
You know after you'd caucussed and the first decision was
~1 y
made.
You must have tried to get some pumcs on to provide forced flow
/,
through the core.
When those pumps were, well first of all, you
_l mentioned that you had some problems with some oil pressures, oil flow to the pumps?
7!
ROGERS:
Yeah, we co'J1dn't get any indication that the lubricating g
- l systems had started.
91 10!
CRESSWELL:
What control panel? What did people tnink was the problem 11:
about that?
12; 131 ROGERS:
Well, electrically we lost some of the electrical distribution 1M but a --
15i 15i CRESSWELL:
Was that to all the pumos?
13g ROGERS:
No.
191 2Gi CRESSWELL:
Just the two?
01,!
-9l ROGERS:
As I recall there was one pump that didn't.
We couldn't get
'~l l
^'
the oil system started on it at that time and the other ones did.
I i
24:
25i i
I l
l l
l J
.i.
[
t l
i 1
f 36 CRESSWELL:
Let's go back to the period of time when the pumps were g
started.
You k*now after you'd caucussed and the first decision was made.
You must have tried to get some pumps on to provide forced flow through the cere.
When those pumps were, well first of all, you
.{
mentioned that you had some problems with some oil pressures, oil flow
_l to the pumps?
Of l
7{
RCGERS:
Yeah, we couldn't get any indication that the lubricating El systems had started.
10:
CRESSWELL:
What control panel? What did pecple think was the problem 11.'
about tnat?
12l t
131 ROGERS:
Well, electrically we lost some of the electrical distribution 14'.
but a --
16!
CRESSWELL:
Was that to all the pumps?
17;
..: I i
ROGERS:
No.
19i 20!
CRESSWELL:
Just tne two?
21l 22'
}
ROGERS:
As I recall there was one pump that didn't. We couldn't get 22 tne oil system started on it at that time a.id the other ones did, 2:a 1
k t '
1 I
'd
- j a
i.
I l
I 38 i
9 This is a continuation of the intarview of Mr. Leland C. Rogers.
The i
time now is 10:30 a.m. eastern daylight time.
,.1
+
g CRESSWELL:
At this point I would like to let Mr. Hunter ask a few
- l j
questions.
I know he is very interested in this particular sequence of time.
Gi 7!
HUNTER:
Leland, I would like to go back and talk about a couple of i
things and specific items.
During the conference call, early in the 91 morning, with Gary Miller and Jack Herbein, George Kunder was in the 10:
control rocm at the plant.
During this particular conversation aid you fellows get involved in discussing pressurizer levels specifically
'2' with George?
131 lai ROGERS:
I think that George told us that they had gone solid in the pressurizer and essentially that is wnere he was at the time.
15; HUNTER:
Can ycu give us your impression of -hat particular parameter 15/
being awakened and finding that you had gone through a trip and also
~~'
that the pressurizer war solid?
20' 21!
ROGERS:
Well, I guess, maybe the impression would be that with the S 91
'~'
reactor coolant pumps off and post trip condition existing to have a ed t
l pressuri:er solid was certainly not normal, but that was something we had to face and see whst we could do about it, but I think George had 25; i
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1 23 l
This is a continuation of the interview of Mr. Leland C. Rogers.
The
=
time now is 10:30 a.m. eastern daylight time.
i 3!
CRESSWELL:
At this point I would like to let Mr. Hunter ask a few
_l questions.
I know he is very interested in this particular sequence m
of time.
Si 7\\
HUNTER:
Leland, I would like to go back and talk about a couple of S'
things and specific items.
During the conference call, early in the 31 morning, with Gary Miller and Jack Herbein, George Kunder was in the i
101 control rocm at the plant.
During this particular conversation did 22.'
you fellows get involved in discussing pressurizer levels specifically 22.'
with George?
13!
I 1:
r ROGERS:
I think that George told us that they had gone solid in the 15 pressurizer and essentially that is where he was at the time.
15:
17 HUNTE~i:
Can you give us your im:ression of that particular parameter 13i being awakened and finding that you had gone througn a trip and also 1ci that the pressurizer war solid?
20l mi ROGERS:
Well, I guess, maybe the impression would be that with the
l 99 reactor coolant pumps off and post trip condition existing to have a p'l l
pressurizer solid was certainly not normal, but that was something we 9]
had to face and see what we could do about it, but I think George had
.e::
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ROGERS:.Well, I guess, maybe the impression would be that witn the reactor coolant pumps off and post trip condition existing to have a pressurizer solid was certainly not normal, but that was something we 31 had to face and see what we could do aoout it, but I think George had
?!
already told us that he had lost a lot of his heaters and that he had
- l
,i difficulty in using the pressuri:er as a heat source in its own.
01 l
7!
HUNTER:
During the conversation with George and the fellows, were you 81 under the icpressior, that they had any idea of what happened to the
- o. '.
plant at that time following the trip and wnat tne conditions were?
1Gi 11i ROGERS:
No, I don't think they had a good handle on what had occurred 22' at all.
I guess the thing I was searching for when I ask whether or 131:
not the block valve for the electro magnetic relief line had been 14!
closed was that that was a possible source of losing volume to containment
'5 and somebody should have closed it.
If it was not I wanted to find 15i out if it was closed or not.
When I asked the question I was told it
,m was closed.
It kind of closec that :ning off in my mind as being a 1Si potential source of our real problem.
19' 201 HUNTER:
Ok Leland, in staying with the pressuri:er level now, particularly, l
when you got to the plant was that one of the, did you in fact go and "2'
}
look at the pressurizer level at that time?
23l i
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a ROGERS:
Well, I guess, maybe the impression would oe.that with the reactor coolant pumps off and post trip condition existing to have a
{
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pressurizer solid was certainly not normal, but that was something we had to face and see what we could do about it, but I think George had already told us that he had lost a lot of his heaters and that he had A
,1 difficulty in using the pressurizer as a heat source in its own.
el 7;
HUNTER:
During the conversation with George and the fellows, were you under the impression that tney had any idea of what happened to the 9!
I plant at that time following tne trip and what the conditions were?
7-ROGERS:
No, I don't think they had a good handle on what had occurred 12' at all.
I guess the thing I was searching for wnen I ask whether or f
13' not the block valve for the electro magnetic relief line had been lai closed was that that was a possible source of losing volume to containment 15i and somebody should have closed it.
If it was not I wanted to find i'-
out if it was closed or net.
When I asked the question I was told it 17
was ciesed.
It kind of closed that thing off in my mind as being a 131 potential source of our real proolem.
19' i
20!
HUNTER:
Ok Leland, in staying with the pressuri:er level now, particularly, i
21!
when you got to the plant was that one of the, did you in fact go and oo\\;
look at the pressuri:er level at that time?
22l e
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42 i
i ROGES.5:
- Jo, I tnink, I woulan't say general.
What I would say is it l
developed events that had occurred as George was relating them to us, c.
i
,j letting us know where the plant was at that time and what he knew c.;
[;l about how it got to where it was and what should we do from this point on?
of I
6i HUNTER:
Pressures, temperatures were pressurizer was solid that
,'i coolant pumps were eff at that time and tnat is were you were sitting?
E' 9l ROGERS:
Yes.
. r.,,
HUNTER:
A question, at that time did the discussion of the fact that i
,0 I
the auxiliary feedpumps did not start at until 8 to 10 minutes after 131 l
the event.
Was that discussed in tne conference call? Do you Recall?
i lL 13!
ROGERS:
No, it was not.
I think you mistated the question though.
_ g.
The pumps did start.
They started automatically and they did.
g HUNTER:
I did?
'.9 ?
on.
~*
ROGERS:
That was not entered in that discussion at all.
21{.
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HUNTER:
Ch, ok.
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,p ROGERS:
No, I think, I woulcn't say general.
What I would say is it ceveloped events that had occurred as George was relating them to us, 2:
s; letting us know where the plant was at that time and what he knew about how it got to where it was and what should we do from this point
_l on?
Si
,j HUNTER:
Pressures, temperatures were pressurizer was solid that el I
coolant pumps were off at that time and that is were you were sitting?
8I i
9l ROGERS:
Yes.
10l HUNTER:
A question, at that time did the discussion of the fact that 12{
the auxiliary feedpumps did not start at until S to 10 minutes after 13l the event.
Was that discussed in the conference call? Do you Recall?
ly 15l ROGERS:
No, it was not.
I think you mistated the question though.
N' The pumps did start.
They started automatically and they did.
i 17i si
'9 HUNTER:
I did?
lb 2 01 i
ROGERS:
That was not entered in that discussion at all.
21f r
col HUNTER:
Oh, ok.
.ed 2:a
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g wasn't necessarily, why did you do that, it was just that they had
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already been done.
2!
1 2!
f HUNTER:
No, I am not asking that I am just asking the. reasons why and
+,
the logic that he used to secure the pumps - loss of suction pressure
,t
,l that type of logic that he used that was used to secure the pumps.
0:
i RCGERS:
First, as I now recall, the reason the first two pumps were a!
turned off, I better go back to make sure this comes out this way 91 because the first two pumps were turned off because of the reactor 10i coolant system pressure was down and ne snouldn't have those four l
l 11.
pumps running in that condition.
They secured the two pumps in the 22 B loop because of the temperature / pressure relationships.
That's as
.'2 '
he said it at that time now.
You made my memory come back a little.
141 15i HUNTER:
We have a sequence and I don't mind doing that to try do it Bi and I am having trouble asking questions because I want to ask a 17 1
4 ouestion te get your impression of a certain item.
Don't'wcrry acout i
~Si the times because that's -- we will fit the times in.
If, in fact, he 191 says we reached an the net positive suction head limits and we secured 20i i
the first two pumps or whatever it was.
That is what I was talking i
21.!
5 about.
22i 2'{
~
ROGERS:
No, I think as he said was we'are at pressure temperature i
2:!
I violation for four pumos and we turned two pumos off.
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wasn't necessarily, why did you do that, it was just that they had already been done.
3i HUNTER:
No, I am not asking that I am just asking the reasons why and the logic that he used to secure tne pumps - loss of suction pressure et
,l that type of logic that he used that was used to secure the pumps.
of 7k i
ROGERS:
F'irst, as I new recall, the reason the first two pumps were
=,
turned off, I better go back to make sure this comes out this way because the first two pumps were turned off because of the reactor 1Ci coolant system pressure was cown and ne shouldn't have those four 22; pumps running in that condition.
They secured the two pumps in the 2.T.
B loop because of the temperature / pressure relationships.
That's as 13!
he said it at that time now.
You made my memory come back a little.
lai f
15, HUNTER:
We have a sequence and I don't mind doing that to try do it 15i j
and I am having trouble asking questions because I want to ask a 17!
question to get your impression of a cartain item.
Ocn't' worry a: cut
=,
~9 the times because tnat's -- we will fit the times in.
If, in fact, he 19I says we reached an the net positive suction head limits and we secured 20
the first two pumps or whatever it was.
That is what I was talking 21 l
about.
22[
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'~i ROGERS:
Nc, I think as he said was we are -t pressure temperature 9,
Violation for four cumes and we turned two pumDs off.
- si i
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46 plant under control as it was then and not necessarily trying to y
reconstruct anything, not to that peint.
We had high radiation levels.
y We had the plant parameters the way they were and even though we cidn't under tand all the indications as we had them.
As the day went on we got more understanding of them but the thrust of everybody's c:j thinking, I believe, was to get the plant stable first.
I don't Delieve we went back at all.
'I 3!
CRESSWELL:
So you would more less ignore what caused the high radiation 91 alarm?
10j 11!
ROGERS:
Yeah, what caused it? Sure, We had it.
We didn't want it to 12',
get any worse, we didn't want it to get out of hand, we didn't want it 13l to get any place else. We knew we had it in containment and I believe, 1M oh its pretty obvious in the early morning hours that we also had had 15; water in the auxiliary building and had problems there.
I wasn't 15:
personally involved in helping Met Ed contain their radiation prcblems.
IT I was more instrested in stability cf the plants.
1i
- c ;l
~]
CRESSWELL:
I understand that.
Is it a fair characterization that 20!
regarding the high radiation readings tnat the... say the release of n;
that activity that the mechanism that caused that was unknown?
22ld
',d ROGERS:
Yes, that true.
I said that in when we actually brougnt the
'y system pressure down delibrately by control action and'we did net get e
J 1
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j 46
[
plant uncer control as it was then and not necessarily trying to reconstruct anything, not to that point.
We had high radiation levels.
'I We had the plant parameters tne way they were and even though we g
didn't understand all the indications as we had them.
As the day went on we got more understanding of them but the thrust of everybody's thinking, I believe, was to get the plant stable first.
I don't c:
believe we went back at all.
71 i
8' CRESSWELL:
So you would more less ignore what caused the high radiation 91 alarm?
10' 11!
ROGERS:
Yeah, what caused it? Sure, We had it.
We didn't want it to 10!
get any worse, we didn't want it to get out of hand, we didn't want it 1
13.
to get any place else.
We knew we had it in containment and I be*,1 eve, 14!
oh its pretty obvious in the early morning hours that we also had had 15i water in the auxiliary building and had probims there.
I wasn';
15i personally involved in helping Met Ed contain their radiation pr:blems.
17!
I was more instrestad in stability cf the plants.
18j
,oi
~
CRESSWELL:
I understanc' that.
Is it a fair characteri::ation t!.at regarding the high radiation readings that the... say the release of 21i that activity that the mechanism that caused that was unknown?
22l l
l
'31 9
ROGERS:
Yes, that true.
I said that in whan we actually brougnt the l
'n i system pressure dow-delibrately by control action and we did not get 25:
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?
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I 48 I
ROGERS:
Yes.
ee 2.
HUNTER:
Did you have any feel for what the temoeratures might have been, like 750 or maybe 2007 I)
CRESSWELL:
I think he said, and you correct me if I am wrong Lee, ei that they cidn't believe those indications.
/l s!
HUNTER:
I heard himi I understand that.
Jim I want to know what they Si were.
10; II.
ROGERS:
Yeah, I am not to sure just how high the calibration curves go but it's only over a little of 700 degrees and the correspondence 135 resistence that we are reading was a little above the nighest value 14i that the calibration curve goes to.
15;
'.6 ;
e HUNTER: Ok, that's what I want to make sure and another thing at this 17' same time, did you in fact, or was cis:ussed in tne caucus cid you 13r discuss the incore thermoccuples and reac in all of those?
19!
00:
ROGERS:
Incore zone thermocouples?
21?
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HUNTER:
- Right, e, :.
I 2d!
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ROGERS:
Yes.
2:
HUNTER:
Did you have any feel for wnat the temperatures might have j
been, like 750 or maybe 800?
9
.I 3.
CRESSWELL:
I think he said, and you correct me if I am wrong Lee, 06 that they didn't believe those indications.
le gi.
HUNTER:
I heard him? I understand that.
Jim I want to know what they 91 were.
10:
11, RCGERS:
Yeah, I am not to sure just how high the calibration curves 22.'
go but it's only over a little of 700 cegrees and the correspondence 12t resistence that we are reading was a little above the highest value 1M that the calibration curve goes to.
23.;
16:
HUNTER: Ok, that what I want to make sure and another thing at this 17' same time, did ycu in fact, or was ciscussed in the caucus did you 13i discuss the incore thermocouples and read in all of those?
13!
20:
ROGERS:
Incore :ene thermocouples?
21l t
22f HUNTER:
Right.
22l 24!,
- f 4
p
d 50 ROGERS:
Yeah, we neard some numbers but they varied from 200 to 600 to one that reads extremely high.
No one knew was sure what that was really meaning at that point.
a:
HUNTER:
O k.
51 CRESSWELL:
Just a moment, an IT is an instrument technician.
Go
/'
ahead Dorwin.
3l 9'
HUNTER: Ok can you give us a feel for the time wnen you were made aware of the thermocouple readings or wnen you felt like they came up?
12' ROGERS:
It was in the morning, that's all I can say.
121 la?
HUNTER:
Ok, alright, that's fine.
In the area of a reactor coolant 15r pressure you had a low pressure condition, OK, 1,250 pounds.
Getting
_VJ back when tnis was the plant status when it was given to you.
13:
ROGERS:
Yeah, right.
13!
20:
HUNTER:
During the morning in that time frame and the power operated
~,;
'~
relief isolation valve had been closed, as indicated to you and by you during your telephone conversation somebody had indicated it was 2 '"
closed.
Was there any discussion c:ncerning a loss of coolant from
'r:
e another source other than the power operatec relief valve at that 25; i
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50 i
ROC Yeah, we hearc some numcers but they varied from 200 to 600 1.
to one that reads extremely high.
No one knew was sure what that was I
really meaning at that point.
t 4;
HUNTER:
Ok.
Gi CRESSWELL:
Just a moment, an IT is an instrument technician.
Go ahead Dorwin.
Si 91 HUNTER: Ck can you give us a feel for the time wnen you were made 101 aware of the thermoccuple readings or when you felt like they came up?
2:,;
12
[
ROGERS:
It was in the morning, that's all I can say.
13) f 11; HUNTER:
Ok, alright, that's fire.
In the area of a reactor coolant 15i pressure you had a low p' essure condition, OK, 1,350 pounds.
Getting N:
back when this was the plant status when it was given to you.
171 15I RCGERS:
Yeah, right.
19j 20f HUNTER:
Durina the mcrning in that time frame and the power operated e-relief isolation valve had been closed, as indicated to you and by you c o s' "l
curing your telephone conversation somebody had indicated it was 23i closed.
Was there any discussion concernir.; a loss of coolant from another sour::e othe than the power cperated relief valve at that 25i i
+
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?
52 i
condition by you, by Gary Miller any discussions with Jack Hertein that we need to increase the pressure and get the plant aoove saturation m(
pressure?
i 4;
,r ROGERS:
Not that I recall.
I don't think we talked about saturation pressure temperature conditions existing at all.
Ci 7!
HUNTER:
Do you recall what you were keying on or what these fellow a
were keying on? Wha; you keyed on were... you know you are the site 91 Operations manager, wnat did you key on?
10!
0 11:
ROGERS:
I frankly didn't have any idea of where the coolant system 22 '.
temperatures were, what we were dealing with.
On the panel indications we were off scale on the TH.
Our TC's were low.
They were in a low t
14t temperature range.
I guess, maybe I am going back to the years and 15:
years of looking at regular reactor coolant systems conditions and
.Y~
figuring that when they don't have reactor coolant system flew by pump l
cur RTDs are not telling us anythinc about the conditions in the core.
15!
I kind of forget that it's really telling me anything about core
'Qs
~~'
conditions because I dor't have anything I can directly read the core 20f I am not directly looking at the core or a reactor vess'el area.
Also
~~'
I guess I'd admit at this point thinP.ing as long as we have no flow I
- m l
~~
wasn't necessarily believing any of the RTDs telling me system conditions.
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That would be my impressions of my tnougnts.
I
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52 m
condition by you, by Gary Miller any discussions with Jack Herbein that we need to increase the pressure and get the plant above saturation
,,a.
l pressure?
4!
RCGERS:
Not that I recall.
I don't think we talked about saturation
.::s pressure temperature conditions existing at all.
m 7i HUNTER:
Do you recall what you were keying on or what those fellow were keying on? What you keyed on were... you know you are the site Si operations manager, what did you key on?
11!
ROGERS:
I frankly didn't have any idea of where the coolant system 12 '.
temperatures were, what we were dealing with.
On the panel indications 131 we were off scale on the TH.
Our TC's were low.
They were in a low 14t temperature range.
I guess, maybe I am going back to the years and 15 '.
years of looking at regular reactor coolant systems conditions and lo* :
figuring that when they don't have reactor coolant system ficw by pump 17l our RTDs cre net tellir.g us anything ateut the conditiens in the core.
ISf l
I kind of forget that it's really telling me anything about core 19i conditions because ! dor't have anything I can directly read the core 20t I am not directly looking at the core or a reactor vess'el area.
Also
-,!']
I guess I'd admit at this point thinking as long as we have no flow I 02' i
wasn't necessarily believing any of the RTDs telling me vstem conditions.
I 93; That would be my impressions of my thoughts.
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54 RESNER:
For the record TH is for temperature hot and TC is temperature 1.
cold.
w I
31 y"NTER:
Looking back again I want to make sure tnat the emergency n
feed water system and the comment before is that -- and I want to make Si sure that I follow is that, generally in the caucus and in your discussion ei j
that really wasn't picked up until the next day, if I understand you l.
right.
?!
ROGERS:
That's correct.
1?
11.
HUNTER:
OK.
l 120 i
121 CRESSWELL:
If you have a minute there Dorwin I would like to ask a 141 question.
Could you go back and look at the day of the 28th and 15:
discuss with us the contacts that you made personally with B&W? We li, have already established that you had a discussion semewnere around 7: 45 in :ne mornin; with Mr. Spangler. When was the r. ext time you made 13 contact with B&W in Lynchburg?
131 2Ct ROGERS:
They felt that I could talk easier to my guy Greg Schidell 3,.
'E offsite in the local area.
It was a local call and so I didn't call
-9:"l Lynchburg directly until later on in the day so any conversation that av
']
I had with B&W people it was through Greg Schidell I used him as my er communications assistent because I could cal'. directly out to his home l
23.!
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t 54 RE5NER:
For the record TH is for temoerature hot and TC is temperature 1.
cold.
2:
l 3:
f HUNTER:
Looking back again I want to make sure that the emergency g
feed water system and the comment before is that -- and I want to make
,l e
j sure that I follow is that, generally in the caucus and in your discussion n
that really wasn't picked up until the next day, if I understand you
/.
3l right.
I, 9;
ROGERS:
That's correct.
10]
i HUNTER:
OK.
12!
1 13; CRESSWELL:
If you have a minute there Dorwin I would like to ask a 14!
question.
Could you gu back and look at the day of the 28th and
- 5 discuss with us the contacts that you made personally with B&W7 We 15 have already established that you had a discussion somewhere around 17 7: 45 in the morning with M". Spangler. When was the next time you mace 15; contact with B&W in Lynchburg?
19:
20l ROGERS:
They felt that I could talk easier to my guy Greg Schidell
']
offsite in the local area.
It was a local call and so I didn't call
-m
^{
Lynchburg directly until later on in the day so any conversation that
'y I had with B&W people it was through Greg Schidell I used him as my Zai communications assistent because I could call directly out to his home l
c
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41 J
l 56
[
ROGE.5:
I can re'. ate it to events better than time.
l 2:
CRESSWELL:
Ok, good, that's fine.
M ROGERS:
After Miller and Herbein had gone to see the governor or Bill el Scranton, I am not sure who they were called out to see.
It was j
either Governor Thornburg or Bill Scranton.
They went'to see him.
By the time they got back, shortly after Miller got back into the control room Herbein had dirceted that we must take the plant back up to full 9!
system pressure and even though the people in the control by that time
.Ve had felt some measure of success we had got the A locp filled back with water again.
We were hoping to get it with the B loop.
We did 12:
not feel we would get from what we've seen earlier in the morning, at 12) least, would not get the loops filled with water at high pressure.
14.
Whatever the mechanism was, we know it occurred at a low pressure IS.
condition and not a high pressure.
So, we were hoping to get that B 16' loop filled with water at that point when it was directed from the 17' visitors canter tnct the plant must be taken cack up to fui system 13:
pressure.
Around the 1,700 pounds in that escalation, I had a c::nversation 13!
with Her::ein and suggested to him that our best move at this point was 20iI to get a reactor coolant pump started in the 1000 and we could then
,,3 maybe sweep the steam voids out of the B loop and the rest of the n.]
system.
He said, fine, go ahead I talked to Miller and told him what-l 22l1,;
Herbein and I had discussed.
My go ahead their was to contact Lynchburg 9
2a" I
and get them on boarc with us, knowing that we're going to try anc
- 4 9
start a reactor ccolant pump.
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1 ROGEP.5:
I can relate it to events better than time.
l 2:
CRESSWELL:
Ok, good, that's fine.
S ROGERS:
After Miller and Herbein had gone to see the governor or Bill a::
,t Scranton, I am not sure who they were called out to see.
It was el either Governor Thornburg or Bill Scranton.
They went'to see him.
By the time they got back, shortly after Miller got back into the control c,.
room Herbein had directed that we must take the plant back up to full
' 01.
system pressure and even though the pecgie in the control by that time had felt some measure of success we had got the A locp filled back with water again.
We were hcping to get it with the B loop.
We did 12' not feel we would get from what we've seen earlier in the morning, at 1
' 3 '.
least, would not get the loops filled with water at high pressure.
14 Whatever the mechanism was, we know it occurred at a low pressure 15i condition and nct a high pressure.
So, we were hooing to get that B li' loop filled with water at that point when it was directed frem the i
17!
visitors center tnat the plant must be taken back up to full system 13!
i pressure.
Around the 1,700 pounds in that escalation, I had a conversaticn o,
~~{
with Herbein and suggested to him that our best move at this point was 20i to get a reactor coolant pump started in the loop and we could then caybe sweep the steam voids out of the B loop anc the rest of the 1
22l system.
He said, fine, go ahead I talked to Miller and told him what w!
Herbein and I had discussed.
My go ahead their was to contact Lyncnburg
-15 I
and get them on coa-d with us, knowing that we're going to try and l
.?
6 start a reactor cooiant pump.
t i
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4'
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j It was concluded.nat instead of going in and saying, let's run a pump 1y
.let's give it a bump first to see what is going to occur a delibrate 5
f act of a short run, let's say a 10 second run or something like that.
4:
Similar to what you are doing when you are venting your reactor coolant system, in order to give your pumps a bump just to sweep small sections of the system.
It was around 7:25 or 7:30, something like that, ci
,j somewhere around in there where we actually went ahead and started the e:
pump for that short bump.
I left the phone off the hook in the superviscr's i
Si office and want out and observed the conditions.
When they ran the 91 pump for that short temp and came back and reported to them what had
,a occurred, we had seen some indicaticn that we had moved some water 11:
into the 3 Lcop and the T RTD had taken a significant change downward.
H 12!
They had to increase HP high pressure injection flow to make up the 13:
collapsing of the voids, I guess, is the best way to say it.
System 14i pressure did take a fairly severe transient during that first bump.
15!
CP.ESSWELL:
In what way?
171
.Si ROGERS:
Downward.
13!
20!
CRESSWELL:
What did you attribute that to?
21;
,nl"[
RCGERS:
Collapsing of the the voids and the volume was changing the on system.
The high pressure injection was on and there was an operatcr
' 1il e.
calling out the flow rates of the hign pressure injection system.
l w) 1 l
t.
9
1 h
i 58 It was concluded that instead of going in and saying, let's run a pump "1,;
.let's give it a buco first to see wnat is going to occur a delibrate I
4.
)
act of a short rur., let's say a 10 second run or something like that.
Similar to wnat you are coing when you are venting your reactor coolant 4,:
1 system, in order to give your pumps a bump just to sweep small sections
_.:t of the system.
It was around 7:25 or 7:30, something like that, ci
,l somewhere around in there where we actually went ahead and started the l '.
pump for that short bump.
I left the phone off the hook in the supervisor's i
- m..
office and went out and cbserved the conditions.
When they ran the l
9!
pump for that short bump and came back and reported to them what had
.u, occurred, we had seen some indication that we had moved some water I
into the 3 Lcop and the T RTD had taken a significant change downward.
g 1..m.
They had to increase HP high pressure injection flow to make up the v
1,
-m collapsing of the voids, I guess, is the best way to say it.
System 14i pressure did take a fairly severe transient during that first bump.
i 15:
15!
CRESSWELL:
In what way?
}
_ S.-
ROGERS:
Downward.
IS' 20:
C9ESSWELL:
What did you attribute that to?
i 21-I
-a l
~~j ROGERS:
Collapsing of the the voids and the volume was changing the b
system.
The high pressure injection was or and there was an operator I
calling out the flev rates of the hign pressure injection system.
l 25!
I 4
?
4 l
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4
+
l' 60 RESNE?:
For the record, the final cuestion by Mr. Cresswell.
- Tim, l
2:
MARTIN:
Tim Martin here, Mr. Rogers at any time during the period you 3;
were in tne No. 2 control room did anyone refer to the side panel primary system temperatures that are on a recorder.
If you walk into c:
the control room and you are facing the panels it's on a back panel to ei the left.
7l i
Si ROGERS:
You mean the multipoint recorder up to 800 ? I don't really 9!
know I can't say for sure.
10i 11.
MARTIN:
Mr. Rogers to your knowledge who made the ultimate decision 12!
to repressurize at approximately 5:00 on the 28th?
131
. i.
ROGERS:
That came from the visitor's center so I would say that was either Jack Heroein or anybcdy else that was in there at that time.
I 16 know Jack was the person to communicate it so I suppose it was Jack.
17 l
1S; i
MARTIN:
At anytime during the day did anyone outside agency express i
195 concern that the core was covered and ask that the temperatures both 20!
thermocouple and Tp, be considered real and that they in fact indicated a superheated condition?
22.
i 231 ROGERS:
Not to my knowledge.
I am not going to say they did not but e.
I don't know.
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60 1
4 RESNER:
Fcr the record, the final cuestion by Mr. Cresswell.
- Tim, 2'
1,j MARTIN:
Tim Martin here, Mr. Rogers at any time during the period you 4,-
were in the No. 2 control room cid anyone refer to the side panel primary system temperatures that are on a recorder.
If you walk into
- i the control room and you are facing the panels it's on a back panel to
,a, the left.
7:
St ROGERS:
You mean the multipoint recorder up to 800 ? I don't really 3!
know I car.'t say for sure.
10:
11.
MARTIN:
Mr. Rogers to your knowledge who made the ultimate decision w
to repressuri:e at approximately 5:00 on the 28th?
13i 10 ROGERS:
That came from the visitor's center so I would say that was either Jack Herbein or anybody else that was in there at that time.
I 16-know Jack was the person to communicate it so I suppose it was Jack.
17 l
MARTIN:
At anytime during the day did anyone outside agency express Sc; concern that the core was covered and ask that the temperatures both
'Of thermocouple and T be considered real and that they in fact indicated g
a superheated condition?
22l
.l ROGERS:
Not to my knowledge.
I am not goirg to say they did not but I don't know.
{
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1, 62 i
MARTIN:
What was the basis to distrust the HPI capability the high pressure injection caoability in keeping the core covered.
I i
3i l
ROGERS:
I guess from an operator's standpoint even though you know I
the water is coing into the systam somewhere.
At that point we were
- n j
not all convinced that we had t1e water going into the core area it ei j
was no real over' riding convinc'ng evidence that the HPI was putting I\\
water into the core e ea.
I think because we were unable to collapse St the steam voids in tne reactor coolant system piping where all, more i
9' i
of a major, I guess, concern that the core has got to be covered.
If I
it is not covered we want to make sure it is covered.
Lets ensure that it is and the only way we could definitely verify that we had water at a level that would go into the core area was with the core 0,
flood tanks.
14!
15i MARTIN:
To your knowledge did anyone refer to the incore subpower 15.
monitors to see what they were doing during this peried?
ISt ROGERS:
Not to my knowledge.
There were a lot of people, let ma
,ci
~~ '
acplify that this way.
There were a let of people in the control room i
20!
I that were doing constructive esta collection etc.
I am not discounting I
l what was going on I I am not verifying that it was.
It is just one of
'm'!
these tnings.
I don't know if anybody looked at the SPND systems at j
n{;
~~
all during the day if they did.
I would suspect just knowing John 1
-,i Flint that he probably cid.
John is the kind of guy that used tne
~~;
c:moute and SPND ano tnings like that e.
1 i
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MARTIN:
],
What was the basis to distrust the HPI capability tne high a
pressure injection capacility in keeping the core covered.
l 3:
j ROGERS:
I guess frem an operator's standpoint even though you know the water is going into the system somewnere.
At that point we were j
not all convinced that we had the water going into tne core area it ei j
was no real over^ riding convincing evidence that the HPI was putting 1.
water into the core area.
I think because we were unable to collapse 8'
the steam voids in the reactor coolant system piping where all, more 9'
of a major, I guess, concern that the core has got to be covered.
If 10!
it is not covered we want to make sure it is covered.
Lets ensure 11'g that it is and the only way we could definitely verify that we had 22l water at a level that would go into the core area was with tne core 131 flood tanks.
14j 15!
MARTIN:
To your knowledge did anyone refer to the incore subpower 3'
monitors to see what they were doing during this period?
173 f
ist ROGERS:
Not to my knowledge.
There were a lot of people, let me 19i amplify that this way.
There were a lot of people in the control room
'i
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that were doing constructive data collection etc.
I am not discounting what was going on I I am not verifying that it was.
It is just one of or
"'{
those things.
I don't know if anybody looked at the SPND systems at
~ ~y i
all during the day if they did.
I would st pect just knowing John 20' i
1 Flint that he prcbab'y did.
e::l Jonn is the kind of guy tnat used the l
'~l ccmouter and SPND anc things like that 1
i i.
1 i
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i 64
(
,)
heat, sure, so we would be in an area where we will be able to go to 3
it.
No cne in the control room was going to try to go into decay heat I
when we did not have water in the looDs.
M.
4; MARTIN:
Mr. Rogers as far as I can determine, you contacted Lynchburgh
=!
J about 7:45 a.m. and you also contacted them directly around 5:00 p.m.
m from my time scale, the other contacts that were made to Lynchburgh were made through Mr. Shidell.
Can you give me an ided when those occurredandwhatt$epurposeofthosecontactswere.
1Cl R0GERS:
Well, at one time Greg contacted me and said that we had 22:
i three people being chartered up here from Lynchburgh which were going l
12' to be able to help us in anyway possible during that day.
Scb Twilley, 2.K Bob Winks and Joe Kelly.
There are all systems people and systems 14!
components people that would be able to assist us anyway possible.
Bob Winks is essentially control analysis engineer and I think at that 5
time Mr. Schidell notified me he said what do you tnink we ought to do j
17';
with tnese guys wnen they get here?
I said why don't y:u marshall
.V.-
them all over to one central location and keep them there until we can 13t find out what we can do.
That particular conversation I know it was 20t more people oriented then plant cperating conditions.
The intent was 9,;
[.
of course was to get somebody up here who could nelp us analyze where om
(
we were and where we going if they could possibly do so and there was
'3[l 0
no easy access on and off the island at that time and I knew that, so i
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- figured it would be best to keep tnem located at some central place l
ec.
like Gregg Schidell's house or something.
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64 l
(
i heat, sure, so we wculd be in an area where we will be able to go to it.
No one in tne control room was going to try to go into decay heat i
when we did not have water in the loops.
MARTIN:
Mr. Rogers as far as I can determine, you contacted Lynchburgh
_.c:
about 7:45 a.m. and you also contacted them directly around 5:00 p.m.
- t from my time scale, the other contacts that were made to Lynchburgh I
were made through Mr. Shidell.
Can you give me an idea when those occurred and what the purpose of those conta::ts were.
10 ROGERS:
Well, at one time Greg conta::ted me and said tnat we had three people being chartered up here from Lynchburgh which were going f
, m, l
to be able to help us in anyway possible during that day.
Bob Twilley,
'.T.
Bob Winks and Joe Kelly.
There are all systems people and systems 141 components people that would be able to assist us anyway possible.
Bob Winks is essentially control analysis engineer anct I think at that so^i time Mr. Schidell notified me he said what do you think we cught to do
'7'_;
witn these guys wnen they get here?
I said why don't ycu marshall
'R them all over to one central location and keep them there until we can 1ci
~~
find out wnat we can do.
That particular conversation I know it was 20I l
more people oriented then plant cperating conditions.
The intent was nj
~~
of course was to get somebody to here who could help us analy::e where
- 2.. '
we were and where we going if they could possibly oc so and there was 23 g
no easy access on and off the island at that time and I knew that, so I figured it would be best to keep them located at some'caltral clace
~~'
like Gregg Schidell s nouse or something.
i i
3 1
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55 I
MARTIN:
Mr. Rogers curing the period that Mr. Miller was called away 1
semeplace in the state government wnc was in control.
i 35
- 0GERS:
Wno was the manager in control room for Met Ed?
5; MARTIN:
Affirmed.
Of 7 ';
ROGERS:
Okay, Mike Ross was the operations supervisor who I believe 3
was the designated r.ln in charge of the control room.
1d i
MARTIN:
Were any enanges made during that period of absence.
o,
-~,
ROGERS:
No I don't think I can recall vividly that Gary stated as he I
12!
ieft don't change anything until I get back unless you have to because 10l of an emergency.
That was kind of a marching orders that Mike Ross had.
15i 17 i
MARTIN:
Did Mr. Herbein continue to contact centrol reem fr:n the I
151 observation center curing this perid of absence of Mr. Miller.
- C..
.)
?
'Os i
ROGERS:
No, Mr. Herbine was with Mr. Miller.
i 21t nou
~'[
MARTIN:
He was.
Was there anyone in the cbservation center who was t
e-1 maintaining contact during this period l
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..00 RCGERS:
Tnere msy nave been I don't know.
I know the emergency l
ee j
i control station over in Unit 1 Control room was in communication
- with l
the cbservation center in that regard as far as plant operations go I
,ai i
don't know of any communications or directions that were coming from
~,
them at all.
No, I don't know.
o!
"i MARTIN:
What problems were experienced in Unit 2 control room relative
,l
/
to communications when you had to find yourselves in respirators?
C 9l ROGERS:
Any communications is difficult in respirators.
Except for a i
10i few incividuals who had the right resonant voice frequency it is very 11:
difficult.
I say that in somewhat lighter circumstances because Dick 12L Dubiel voice is one of those voices that is unbelievably tuned to the 13!
resonnance of the respirator face mask he had on.
He was at one side 4:
of the control room speaking in conversatinn wita someone standing 15!
next to him and everybody in the control room could hear him.
Something
~_ i l
I never reali:ed was that critical but it certainly was.
Yes respirator 1T communication is less than desirable.
13i 191 MARTIN:
We had recorts that people had to temporarily remove their 201 masks to communicate in some cases because of difficulties in this v
area, is that true?
22!
23 ROGERS:
I don't know of that it may have been but I don't know that.
i 2ai 25!
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CRESSWELL:
You, yourself did not have to do that?
2!
l g
ROGERS:
No at least I don't know if they heard me or not but I was g
saying things through it.
I presumed that they did.
4
~:
I 5:
MARTIN:
Once unit 2 control recm was evacuated around 10:30 in the m
a.m., approximately how many people were in the control room?
.d, 3!
ROGERS:
I don't knc., I reali:e that, I remember that that occurred.
9!
I remember that the kind of order was all non necessary people will evacuate frem the control room and I was requested to stay, beyond that I really don't knew how many people.
A fairly large number of I
22 maintenance people and maintenance supervisors and other kinds of 25 plant cperating people that were in and out of the control room all ly that morning long during the period of time there were very few cf 15i those people around they were being brought in as requested at that l
16' l
time I would not know how many people.
It was a large number change i
- n of oecole were ccT.ing in and going cack out of tne control room but
- 3 l
probaoly the number of cperators remained relatively the same.
Critical 19' operators.
l 20' i
t MARTIN:
Mr. Rogers who was directing the operators to take action?
2~d Was it the Shift Suoervisor or...?
23i e : :.
~ = = *.
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n' 4
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68 ROGERS:
The supervisor was for the operators, yes.
Any of the other i
,,?
~
people in there were acting as a consultant so to speak.
We would d
[
sit down and Ceciae what was proper action to take place, you know a
- t caucus type of arrangement, and the shift supervisor then be notified m
- 1 of what action to take.
They carried out that action.
.s l
6!
I CRES5WELL:
Were there points at which Gary Miller directly gave 7!
I orders to the operators?
S!
t 9l ROGERS:
Not that I recall,.no I would say as far as the normal mode of doing business in the control rocia that continued all through that
,,a day as if there had been no incident at all.
It was pretty much the t
j same kind of operation that you would always expect to see the shift I
13!
supervisor was directing the operators in the control room and the 141 shift supervisor was getting his suggestions from the other people 15i that were there.
Any kind of condition that was going to change wnere we were or attecct to cnange where we were it was pretty much always a
'7!
caucus agreement everybcdy that was tnere was invhed into the caucus
' 5; area, haa input irto what could go wrong, what is going to be the next
,r
~~!
step if tnis doesn't work, what should we expect to see if it does 20; work? A pretty thorough type of caucusing really in light of conditions.
Oh 22!
CRESSWELL:
I have before me a series of cnarts dated 4/27/79 they are 23L j
identified by a B&W mark they are further identified by a numbering l
- .1 i
system RM l-1 thru 16, RM 2-1 thru 16, RM 3-1 thru 16, RM 4-1 thru 3,
'h i.
4 i
.t
{
l 4
l 69 I
i RM 5-1 thru ll, E.: 6-1 thru 11, RM 7-1, RM 8-1 and RM 9-1.
I would l
l like to ask you at this time nave you seen these enarts before?
t i
31 I
,j ROGERS:
Yes, last nignt.
~;i Ei CRES5WELL:
Is that the first time you have seen them?
ci 7l ROGERS:
Let me say I have had them in my possession for'a week and a St half but last night :.as the first night I really sat down and looked 91 at them to see what they had in them.
Because the fact that we had 12; generated our own set of curves here at the Island and those were the t
curves we had been looking at up to this point.
And when I was in 1$
Lynchburgh I got a copy of these I cid not necessarily nave the time 13t i
to digest them until last night.
1M 15i CRESSWELL:
Who in Lynchburgh gave you a copy of these?
_T
/]
RC3ER5:
I am not sure, sor,ebody in nuclear service asked me if I hcd
..ti a copy and I said I did not th' ink I did so they gave thent.to me.
13t 1
20l CRES5WELL:
Do you know how these particular curves were generated?
nel i
ROGERS:
I believe the majority infermation in there came frcm the ed
'l reactimeter system cata collection, wnich we transmitted to Lynchburgh 241 i
enl in addition to making our own curves we sent data down there for them i
-j t
71 i
going uo or goi.ng cown especially going down we just continued to keep J
it c id.
2a Tne heaters we had available were just not getting anywnere.
i 3,
That was one point we recognized curing the day.
l y
CRESSWELL:
g How was the high pressure injection keeping the pressuriter cold?
m 7!
ROGERS:
We are pumping water into the system we got the vent valve coened on the pressuri:er.
It is mostly high pressure injection that is going out to the pressurizer.
CRESSWELL:
Okay so what path did the high pressuri:er injection water take.
ROGERS:
High pressure injection in the A Hot leg through the surge
'5 line into the pressurizer and out the, I am sorry it does not go that way.
In the A cold leg, it would then cet into the A hot leg from the
'T Li?,
top of the core ano go out to the expansion surge line in :ne pressuri:er out to the pressuri:er top.
131-20:
i CRESSWELL:
Let me see, how did it get in from the ::old leg up the hot
- /
i leg.
22!
23!
(
ROGERS:
Through the reactor vessel.
l 22i 25)
.l
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72 l
CRESSWELL:
Througn the vessel huh, i
2:
i HUNTER:
Hunter speaking, Lee what I think what Jim wants you to a
indicate is the flow path of cold leg injection all the way out the power operated relief valve.
i 5i ROGERS:
The four injection lines connected into each of the 4 cold legs.
The flow path in a normal consideration would be into the cold i
2 '.
leg, injection into the vessel which would then go through the annulus into the bottom of the core up to the core area and out the hot leg if 10; we are going to flow path out through the pressurizer this is the flow path it would take.
If a piece of water took that path let us say 12!
that the discussion went on in the control room at least several 131 times, maybe we were bypassing the core maybe we are not going through 14i the core.
Not knowing what we had and not understanding everything 15!
that was available to us, there was a lot of discussion in that particular 15:
As we continued to the put high pressure injection cold water area.
./
into the systen the wa er tna. was going tnrough the core was still
~.o?
coming out at colder temperatures as a volume flow than going out f
19 through the surge line into the pressurizer keeping even the pressurizer
}
201 I
cold as we~ continued to pump it through.
That was colder than the temperatures we had in the loops up there in the steam bubbles.
We 22!
j were, frankly, we were not sure what we had but we did know we...
23!
24j h
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73 i
I This is the continuation of the interview of Mr. Leland C. Rogers.
The time now is 11:28 a.m.
i 3:
i 4!
CRESSWELL:
This is Jim Cresswell again.
Lee, we were ' talking about the postulated flow paths that were discussed during the event regarding ol i
what the path of high pressure injection water could have been to
,d reach the pressurizer.
If you would go back in detail discuss what S!
the postulations were at that time.
9' ICI ROGERS:
11!
Most of the discussion was that the flow path should have been, but we know that it is? That is the kind of development that i
12!
everybody, in their own minds was trying to figure out and is there 131 something going on that we don't know about.
Is there really a flow 14' path in there that is not the normal flew path.
Again because of the 15; little knowledge we had we knew we had no heaters so we could not do 16!
much there.
Everytime we did put HP injection in we were getting 17 ',
keeping the pressurizer temperatures low we were not thoroughly convinced ISI that as a group or maybe individually that maybe we were not bypassing 19i the core in some form and getting through the pressurizer like that.
20!
We really didn't have enough clear data, to us, to come up with a 21t l
conclusion that all that water was going through the core.
22l 23 i
CRESSWELL:
Well somebody must have postulated some sort of way to
~f.
o i
l bypass the core.
Some path.
j 25i i
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1:
74 l
I ROGERS:
Well, they may have but I don't know that it ever happened 2l, like that.
All. can say is that I know there were discussions that maybe we're bypassing the core I don't think anybody ever gave you 31 what is broken or anything like that that kind of thing that may have 41
.i provided those flow patterns.
- t i
6i CRESSWELL:
For instance the... internal vent valves were never discussed 7!
in this regard.
8I 91 ROGERS:
10l Not that I can remember no.
They may have.
11; CRESSWELL:
Okay you stated that the temperature measurements that 22,'
i were being taken were in the liquid normal liquid space of the pressurizer 131 from resistance temperature detector.
14!
15j ROGERS:
Yes.
16i i
17!'
CRESSWELL:
If no one has any further questions then we will turn it ISI back over to the moderator.
19i 20!
RESNER:
Thank you Jim.
The time now is 11:32 a.m., EDT, we will 21;3 close this interview.
22l I
23[
RESNER:
This is Mark Resner this is going to be a continuation of the 24i interview of Mr. Rogers.
The time now is 11:35 EDT.
Mr. Rogers wants i
9:1
~~l to make some additio.nal comments.
h
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ROGERS:
I think wnen we started the interview a point was made that I
g maybe scme recommendations could be asked.
There are possibly a lot 3;
of recccmendations if I had more time to tnink about it I might come 3
nq up with them.
A significant contribution in a post trip or post incident could be obtained if we had a system in the control room like
.:y
,l the aircraft inoustry inflight recording system which whenever a plant et transient such as a turbine trip or reactor trip or either, it initiates 7!
a system which comes on line and records conversations and maybe even b
more detailed and complicated system a lot of parameters which need to
- )
be recorded for prosterity.
Something that would be rather costly but I
would be well worth it in the long run even though I don't want to have any more of the incidences, scmething like this on a normal plant 12!
t trip would help for future training and operator understanding of what 121 did go on and maybe even psychological affects on some of the people.
Es As far as communications, in the control room goes, one of the worst f:~ f things that can occur in the middle of operators who are licensed and 16i qualified in running a plant is interruptions by the outside agencies 17!
over the telephone or radiophone'trying to find out wnat is going on
'2 and trying to make decisions of how to go to the next step.
My personal op1nlon 1s, the people offsite even if they are only two hundred yards
~
2Di across the river at the obaservation center don't have enough plant
-,;"i data information available to them to be able to direct and make a 20 9
decision which the operator should then be carrying out.
I don't 23 think it is the way something should be handled.
I think it is by 2M operating by remote control.
You can't have enough required information 25j I
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to make proper decisions which many times coulc complicate the operation and maybe in some cases cause severe damages.
Inat is my opinion, but
.,c I think it is something that really has to be considered before people
.si move in and try to cirect operations of a complicated system such as a reactor plant by remote control.
It is just something that is too
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deep and too complicated for anybody to attempt.
Afterwards, the only 01 thing I will say about NRC is that in the days after this occurrence i
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there were too many NRC people onsite that did not know the plant Si systems, the plant operations and how they should be operated.
They 9!
seriously inhibited proper information flow and proper guidance from the NRC because they did not understand the questions that they were llj asking, they did not understand the answers they got.
An awful lot of 12!
I time in my own personal case was devoted to answering people from the 12t NRC's questions.
By making sure I qualified the answers before I gave 12 the answer.
I wanted to make sure the guy asking the question understood 15i what the answer meant.
Just doing that takes a lot of time, I had to 15i make sure the person understood what information he was getting so 17!
that it was required for him to have a lot more pieces of information ih fed to him before I could tell him what the answer was to the basic 191 question.
The NRC people should be here asking questions that understand
'20 '
l what the question really is and what the answer means when they get 21]
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79 HUNTER:
This is Hunter speaking thank you Mr. Rogers.
That is good v'. !
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Aopreciate your time.
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,j RESNER:
This interview is ccmplete and the time now is 11:40 a.m.
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