ML19309A798

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Forwards Fire Protection Review Items 3.1.3,3.1.4 & 3.1.5. Review Is Duplicate of 800307 Review W/Minor Paragraph Change in Item 3.1.3 & Clarification of Item 3.1.5
ML19309A798
Person / Time
Site: Zion  File:ZionSolutions icon.png
Issue date: 03/21/1980
From: Randy Hall
BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY
To: Ferguson R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8004010357
Download: ML19309A798 (4)


Text

e BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY

{ { }j ASSOCIATED UNIVERSITIES, INC.

Upton, New York 11973 Department of Nuclear Energy (516) 345-2144 March 21, 1980 Mr. Robert L. Ferguson Plant Systems Branch Division of Operating Reactors U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 RE:

Zion 1-2, Fire Protection Review, Items 3.1.3, 3.1.4, and 3.1.5.

Dear Bob:

Enclosed are Items 3.1.3, Gas Suppression Systems, 3.1.4, Water Suppres-sion Systems, and 3.1.5, Fire Water Systems for Zion 1 and 2 Nuclear Power Plant.

The items quoted in the SER for item 3.1.4 are the ones either noted with l

an asterisk or ones that we were asked to look at verbally. Note that the storage area adjacent to the fifth battery room is not included.

This completes our Zion 1-2 input for the items on hand.

Please note that this review is a duplicate of the one sent to you dated March 7,1980 with one minor paragraph change in Item 3.1.3, and a clarifica-tion of Item 3.1.5.

Respectfully yours, Wh gh Robert E. Hall, Group Leader Reactor Engineering Analysis REH:EAM:sd enclosure cc.:

L. Derderian D. Eisenhut W. Kato wo/ enc.

M. Levine E. MacDougall V. Panciera 06 E. Sylvester 5

///

J 800.4010 3 67

ZION 1 and 2 Fire Protection Review Item 3.1.3 - Gas Suppression Systems The SER states that an automatic Halon suppression system backed up by a man-ually actuated CO2 system will be provided to protect the following areas:

1.

Inner and outer cable spreading areas 2.

Containment penetration cable vaults Cables routed through the stairwell adjacent to the cable spreading area will be enclosed in a fire barrier and protected by an automatic gas suppression system.

An automatic gas suppression system will be installed to protect the diesel-driven containment spray pumps. A curb will be provided to limit the spread of an oil spill fire in this area.

The licensee on October 31, 1979 submitted design infonnation on 3.1.3, Gas Suppression Systems. The areas in the submittal included the inner and outer cable spreading areas, containment penetration cable vaults, and containment spray pump rooms. The licensee has eliminated the gas suppression system for the protection of the proposed enclosure of the cables in the stairwell and has indicated the redundant cables will be protected by a rated enclosure.

Design information on this protection of the cables in the stairwell was not included in the package. The licensee proposed in this letter to install an automatic Halon system in each of tn ; cable spreading areas and each of the containment penetration cable vaults. Each of these four areas is backed up with a manualy activated CO2 system. For the containment spray pump rooms, the licensee proposed an automatic total flooding C02 system.

We accept the licensee's proposal on the stairwell without the automatic gas system provided the redundant cables in the stairwell are protected by a two hour enclosure encompassing each division. Fire detection should be provided in each enclosure with separate annunciation in the control room.

The areas protected by gas suppression systems are designed for 5% Halon 1301 concentration with a soak time of 10 minutes. The system is actuated auto-matically by a detection system in each area and is backed up by manual actuated carbon dioxide systems for each area. The systems are designed tc maintain a 50% concentration for 10 minutes.

The licensee has demonstrated to the NRC that alternate shutdown exists from the cable vaults.

Since this has been done, we recommend that the staff accept the 5% Halon concentration for a 10 minute soak time. The NRC is also requiring the licensee to provide alternate shutdown for the inner and outer cable spreading areas. When this requirement has been fulfilled, we recommend that the staff accept the 5% Halon concentration for a 10 minute soak time.

The automatic total flooding carbon dioxide systems for the containment Spray i

Pump rooms are acceptable.

Based upon the above review we find 3.1.3 Gas Suppression Systems satisfactory and we recommend that this item be accepted by the staff.

Item 3.1.4 - Water Suppression System The SER states that:

1.

An automatically actuated water curtain will be provided to protect the diesel generator air intake.

2.

An automatic directed water spray system will be installed over the diesel-driven fire pump and day tank.

The area will be curbed and drains provided to a separator.

3.

The turbine building sprinkler system will be extended to cover the track-way at the north and south end of the building.

4.

Automatic fire suppression systems will be installed in the areas of the remote shutdown panels, auxiliary feed pumps, and component cooling water pumps.

The licensee on October 31, 1979 submitted design infonnation on 3.1.4, Water Suppression Systems.

The areas included in this submittal include (1) water curtain for diesel generator air intakes, (2) water spray system for diesel fire pump, and (3) sprinkler system for trackways in turbine building.

1.

The water curtain designs protecting the diesel generator air intakes are acceptable providing the systems are deluge systems automatically actuated by a detection system.

2.

The following are recommendations on the automatic water spray system for the diesel fire pump. We recommend that upon implementation of these recommendations, the staff accept the water spray system.

a.

Heat collectors shcald be provided for all the detectors. The purpose of the collectors is that the products of combination will collect at the detectors and tterefore give a faster response.

b.

The water feed far the system should be connected on the system side of the pump isolation valves. The reason for this is that if the pump is isolated from the system for maintenance work and a fire breaks out at the pump area, the sprinklers will come on and extinguish the fire.

c.

The density was not noted in the licensee's submittal; in accordance with NFPA 15 paragraph 4-4.2.2, a density of 0.5 gallon per minute per square foot should be provided for the projected surface area. NFPA 15 paragraph 4-4.2.2 reads as follows " Nozzles shall be installed to impinge on the areas of the source of fire, and where spills may travel or accumulate. The water application rate on the probable sur-face of the spill shall be at the rate of not less than 0.50 gpm per square foot."

o d.

The remote actuator for the deluge valve should be provided at the entrance to the crib house inner room so that the system can be oper-ated without the necessity of the operator going into the pump room where the fire is in progress.

3.

The turbine building sprinkler system extension for the protection of the north and south trackways is acceptable.

The licensee has provided local automatic application carbon dioide systems for the protection of the auxiliary feed pumps and component co'ing water pumps instead of the requested water suppression system. The su.f has re-quired the licensee to provide alternate shutdown from these arec Based on this requirement the local application carbon dioxide system is acceptable.

The licensee did not submit design details for the suppression system to pro-tect the remote shutdown panels. We recommend that the staff require cable tray barriers and area automatic sprinkler protection be provided if alternate shutdown is not available outside this area.

We further recommend that the details of the protection of the remote shutdown panels be reviewed by NRC.

Based upon the above review we find 3.1.4, Water Suppression Systems, satis-factory and we recommend that the staff accept this item.

Item 3.1.5 - Fire Water System This item was addressed in our submittal to you on December 28, 1979. At that time the concern was the leak detection system; the asterisked item in the SER.

A review of the current concern of Item 3.1.5 is for the following:

"An approved controller which confonns to the requirements of NFPA 20 will be provided at the electric motor driven fire pump."

The licensee is proposing to install a motor controller Square D Catalog #9001 KYC-6, U.L. Guide #NFCR File E 42259. We have checked the UL listing and FM approval guide for fire pump controllers and this unit is not listed. We recommend that the staff require that this licensee install an approved fire pump controller that is in accordance with NFPA approval guide and UL listing.

l The licensee's letter of October 31, 1979 indicates that the control room will l

have the ability to start and stop the fire pump. Paragraph 7-5.2.3 of NFPA 20 states "When additional control stations for causing nonautomatic con-tinuous operation of the pumping unit, independent of the pressure actuated switch, are provided at locations remote from the controller, such stations shall not be operable to stop the motor." We recommend that the staff request that the stop switch for the fire pump be disconnected in the control room.

l We recommend that the staff reject this item.

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