ML19309A141
| ML19309A141 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point, Rancho Seco  |
| Issue date: | 12/13/1971 |
| From: | Rich Smith US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Mattimoe J SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003260856 | |
| Download: ML19309A141 (2) | |
Text
,
~,
St
(
Q; UNITED STATES i
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
.l X
g oivis On Or couruAncs V
REGION V 1111 BANCROFT WAY BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 94704 m e m. stas snr.ess December 13, 1971 1
Sacramento Municipal Utility District Docket No. 050-0312 P. O. Box 15830 Sacramento, California 95813 Attention:
Mr. John J. Mattimoe J
Chief Engineer Gentlemen:
We recently received information from the Florida Power and Light Company concerning an occurrence during preoperational testing of the Turkey Point 3 pressurized water reactor which may relate to the performance of steam line pressure relief valve headers in your facility.
This letter provides you with a copy of the body of a telegram sent to all Og operating reactors by cognizant Regional Offices of the Division of Compliance.
No response to this letter is required for your reactors which are not yet licensed to operate. We will zsview this matter during our continuing inspection program.
Should you have any questions concerning this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.
Sincerely,
% c.t w
-l R. W. Smith Director Enclosure, Body of Telegram 8003260g 1 5291
~
R
l t'
]
ENCLOSURE l
G BODY OF TELEGRAM TO LICENSEES OF OPERATING POWER REACTORS 4
We recently received information from the Florida Power and Light Company of an occurrence during preoperational testing of the Turkey Point 3 Westinghouse pressurized water reactor that may relate to performance of the steam supply system at your facility. The information is as follows:
During hot functional testing of the unfueled reactor, three of four relicf valves were catastrophically ejected from two main steam line headers, to which they were mounted. The failed headers were 12-inch diameter, spool pieces fabricated by the Dravo Corporation, Marietta, Ohio, from Schedule 60 (.562-inch wall thickness) A106, Grade B carbon steel pipe manufactured by U.S. Steel, Lorain Works, Lorain, Ohio, mounted horizontally,180 degrees from each other on the tuo sides of the main steam line.
The headers were hydrostatically tested at 1356 psig under cold conditions prior to hot functional testing.
On one side of the main steam line, the failure occurred in the vicinity of the heat affected zone of the weld which joins the riser to the header and appears to be largely confined to the 12-inch header, on the other side of the main steam line, the failure apparently originated in a similar manner and propagated through the pipe header causing si catastrophic damage to the header assembly. The secondary system was at 990 psig and 545 F and the primary system at 2232 psig and 546.60 F at the time of the header failure. These systems had been at their respective pressures and temperatures for nine days.
No transient conditions were reported to have existed in these systems at the time of failure.
The failed header assemblies each consist of two valves mounted vertically in a dead-end, 12-inch diameter pipe projecting at a 90 horizontal angle from the main steam line. The two headers are mounted at 1800 to each other on the opposite sides of the main steam line. The headers were designed to meet Section I of che ASHE code by Bechtel Corporation.
For your reac'; ors which are licensed to operate it is requested that you provide this office within 10 days, in writing, as to whether headers as described above are installed in the steam lines of your facility.
Should you have any questions concerning this matter we will discuss them with you. End. REF: CO:V:GSS.
I
\\s_s l
i o
.