ML19308D811

App B, Sodium Hydroxide Injection During Recirculation

ML19308D811
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	07/09/1976
From:	GILBERT/COMMONWEALTH, INC. (FORMERLY GILBERT ASSOCIAT
To:
References
NUDOCS 8003180750
Download: ML19308D811 (13)

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APPENDIX B SODIUM HYDROXIDE (NaOH) INJECTION DURING RECIRCULATION G@rtICommoneesto 8 0 0 318 0 7TO

TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION SYSTEM DESCRIPTION A

RESULTS OF ANALYSIS

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SUMMARY

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LIST OF TABLES B-1 Recirculation Piping Branch Data 4

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LIST OF FIGURES B-I Model of Decay Heat and Reactor Building Spray Syscams for NaOH Injection During Recirculation Mode (A-Train)

B-II-Reactor Building Pressure Transient B-III NaOH Level in BST-2 Versus Time - NaOH Valve Failure Case S

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INTRODUCTION Analysis of the reactor building spray and decay heat systems during the initial injection period following a postulated loss of coolant accident indicates that an insufficient quantity of sodium hydroxide would be injected into the system in the event a valve in the sodium hydroxtde piping fails closed.

(Refer to main bcdy of report.) Further analysis indicates that the required quantity of' sodium hydroxide can be injected with no modifications to the system nor additional operator action during the recirculation phase within ninety (90) minutes af ter the beginning of the postulated accident.

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l SYSTEM DESCRIPTION l

l The model of the reactor building spray and decay heat systems during the recirculation phase of operation is shown in Figtre B-1.

Only the A-train was modeled because it has been assumed a valve in the B-tr2in NaOH line

'has failed closed. Since the A-and B-train recirculation piping are independent, B-train operation has no effect on the injection of NaOH from the NaOH storage tank, BST-2.

B-train operation in the event the A-train valve fails closed was not considered separately because of the similarity of the two trains; the analysis performed is representative of either case. The properties of the physical piping are listed in Table B-1.

The proposed NaOH check valve change from a stop check to conventional swing check valve has been assumed.

The level of NaOH in BST-2 at the beginning of recirculation is 11.5 feet above the centerline of the outlet nozzle, the level calculated at the end of the initial injection phase in the valve failure case (Table V of the report). To inject the minimum acceptable quantity of NaOH, the NaOH must be drawn down to a level of 3.8 feet.

The reactor building sump has been modeled as a large tank; no credit is taken for friction loss in the sump. The accident sump level of 99.85 feet is assumed for the duration of NaOH injection. This corresponds to a head of 13.60 feet of water at the sump outlet nozzle in addition to the containment pressure. The temperature of the sump water has been assumed to be 2000F. During the time period of interest, the sump temperature will be higher than this. The calculated NaOH injection rate is lower because of the higher density, and her higher driving force of the sump water than if the actual sump temperature were more closely estimated.

The atmospheric pressure inside containment will affect the performance of the recirculation system. Althougn credit is not taken for containment pressure in NPSH calculations in the design of the recirculation system, credit is taken in the present analysis because it will decrease the m

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injection rate of NaOH. Containment pressure vers'us time is shown in Figure B-II for the first twenty-four hours following a postulated ace'ident.

This curve is the pressure response for a 5 ft2 hot leg break with two (2) coolers and one spray. NaOH flow can be established when the containment pressure decays.to less than 20 psig. In the case being analyzed,

' recirculation starts about 41.6 minutes (2500 seconds) after the accident i

at which time containment pressure is down to 18.5 psig. Thus there will be

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little or no interruption in NaOH injection when recirculation is initiated.

The containment pressure history is not modeled in detail in this analysis.

Instead a pressure of 10 psig, which is attained 4000 seconds (1.1 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />) after the accidenn, is assumed for the duration of NaOH injection. This j

assumption results in a twenty-five minute (1500 second) delay in NaOH injection. The pressure steadily der.reases af ter reaching 10 psig until it reaches 5 psig. Thus the assumed 10 psig is higher than the predicted containment pressure in the time period of interest, resulting in a low calculated NaOH flow.

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RESULTS OF ANALYSIS The level of NaOH as a function of time in BST-2 during recirculation of the sump mixture is shown in Figure B-III.

With the conservative assumptions discussed above, it would take 15 minutes after containment pressure decayed

' to 10 psig for the minimum acceptable quantity of NaOH to be injected into the system and an additional 10 minutes for the tank to empty completely.

The required amount of NaOH will be injected in less than 90 minutes after the beginning of the accident. The actual time would be even less than calculated because flow would be established immediately upon initiaticn of recirculation instead of the assumed 25 minute delay.

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SUMMARY

The present analysis indicates the required amount of sodium hydroxide can "be injected with no modifications to the system nor additional operator action in the event one NaOH valve fails closed. The analysis discussed in the main body of this report indicates the required amounts of chemicals

' are injected in all other cases considered. Thus, the performance of the system satisfies design criteria during desigr. basis and single failure modes of operation.

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