ML19308D737
| ML19308D737 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River, Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 12/19/1972 |
| From: | Rodgers J FLORIDA POWER CORP. |
| To: | Deyoung R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19308D738 | List: |
| References | |
| 6984, NUDOCS 8003120896 | |
| Download: ML19308D737 (5) | |
Text
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P 0 W E ll' } C O R P 0 H AT I O N FLOHIDA ST. PETERSDURO FIDRIDA
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Assistant Director for
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United States Atomic Energy Commission Washington, DC 20545
SUBJECT:
CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT #3 Docket No. 50-302
Dear Mr. DeYoung:
This is in response to your letter of September 26, 1972, which requested that we review Crystal River Unit #3 with respect to failure of any non-category I (seismic) equipment, particularly in the circulating water system and fire protection system. In our letter to you of 1
October 26, 1972, we indicated that our review would be completed by O-December 31, 1972. Attached please find a summary of the results of our 1
review.
You also requested in your letter that we provide plans and schedules for corrective action in the event that ou: review indicated that safety-related equipment could be adverself affected by failure of non-category I equipment. Our review shows that no correctise action is required.
The attached summary will be included in the next update amendment to our Crystal River Unit #3 Final Safety Analysis Report.
If any of the above needs further clarification or discussion, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Yours very truly,
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T. RodgerY Assistant Vice President and Nuclear Project Manager
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Crystal River Unit #3 Docket No. 50-302 December 19, 1972 t
As a result of AEC concerns due to an expansion joint failure in the circulating water line at Quad Cities' Unit #1, we have reviewed the Crystal River Unit #3 Circulating Water System to determine whether or not a failure could result in the flooding of s&fety related equipment in the turbine room as at Quad Cities.
A catastrophic failure in the circulating water system, such as the expansion joint failure at Quad-Cities is an extremely remote possibility at Crystal River. Crystal River #3 has a straight through circulating water system without any valves or other flow control devices in the piping. During normal operation the maximum pressure that can be obtained is only slightly above atmospheric. During a hurricane, the maximum pressure that can be reached in the circulating water system is approximately 'l.5 psig.
Normal water le;e1 in the intake and discharge canals is at elevation 88'-0".
The turbine room basement floor elevation is 95'-0".
Flooding during normal operating periods can therefore be avoided by tripping the appropriate circulating water pump. Without taking credit for the amount of water being removed by tue sump pumps, the operator will have 65 seconds to trip the circulating water pump before the sumps in the turbine room will overflow.
Tripping the pump will eliminate any possihility of the sump overflowing.
The foregoing assumes a total disintegration of the expansion joint which is extremely improbable. The actual mode of failure of this type expansion joint is a crack which will result in a minor amount of leakage that can easily be accommodated by the sump pumps. Repairs can be made by shutting down the appropriate circulating water pump.
The other possibility considered is that a total disintegration of the expansion joint will take place during high water level caused by a hurricane. This design high water level is 112'-6".
It is conceivable that the turbine building could be flooded to elevation 112'-6" in the event of a complete disintegration of an expansion joint. The possibility of a coincidental catastrophic failure of an expansion joint with a hurricane is considered incredible.
If such a hurricane were to occur, the circulating water pumps would have been submerged and out of service, therefore, the maximum pressure in the circulating water system can only be the static head of water in the canals which ia approximately 7.5 psig. The design pressure for the expansion joints in this system is 40 psig. As can ')e seen from this, it is impossible to reach the design pressure of 40 psig, on the expansion joint. The actual mode of failure will be the same as during normal operation and possible flooding will easily be controlled by the sump pumps.
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It should be noted that the failure at Quad-Cities resulted from a valve malfunction. Because of this, pump shut-off head and water hammer were applied to the joints. Crystal River #3 does not have shut-off valves in the circulating water system, therefore, pump shut-off head cannot be applied to the expansion joints.
The Crystal River #3 installation has also be.en analyzed for other systems, the failure of which could result in flooding or the release of chemicals that might affect the performance of safety related equipment. Attached is a tabulation of these systems which indicates. that the failurss would not adversely affect the performance of safety re.'.ated equipment required to safely shut down the facility.
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FLORIDA FCL f CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 ANALYSIS OF NON-VITAL EQUIPMENT FAILURh AFFECTING SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT Indication
. Equipment
-to Fost-Action Reg'd Hazard to or Cont. Room ulated to Contain Safety Related System Operator Failure Result Hazard Equipment Remarks Circulating Sump hi level Expansion Joint Flooring of turbine Shutoff None See attached detail Water System alarm Rupture at normal room sumps CW Fump(s) analysis sea level Circulating Sump hi level Expansion Joint Flooding of turbine Repair Flooding, if See attached Water System alarm Rupture at room and portions large failure detail analysis hurricane sea of intermediate &
(in excess of level auxiliary buildings sump pump capacity)
Fire System Fire pump (s)
Rupture in Local flooding Secure fire Flooding, if auto start, auxiliary build-pumps, isolate not terminated alarm ing affected section Hydrogen Low H Leak or Flammable gas Shutoff source 2
Storage pressure alarm rupture releases of leak None Storage is outsioe; piping in auxiliary building is shrouded.
Csustic None Tank Rupture Release of Corrosive None - tank None Located outdoors, Storage or leak liquid surrounded by remote to any curb & drain safety related system equipment 4
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PAGE 2 ANALYSIS OF NON-VITAL EQUIPMENT FAILURE AFFECTING SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT Equipment Indication or to Post-Action Req'd Hazard to Cont. Room ulated to Contain Safety Related System Operator Failure Result
_ Hazard Equipment
. Remarks Acid Storage None Tank Rupture or Release of None - Tank None Located outdoors, leak Corrosive liquid surrounded by remote to any curb & drain safety related system equipment Amonia None Tank Rupture or Release of odorous None None Located outdoors-Storage leak liquid remote to any safetp related equipment Chlorine None Tank Rupture Release of None None Storage area is Storage or leak Toxic vapor outdoors, remote from safety-related equipment.
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