ML19308C505
| ML19308C505 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/02/1979 |
| From: | Hebdon F, Joseph Kelly BABCOCK & WILCOX CO., NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001270045 | |
| Download: ML19308C505 (66) | |
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N U CLE A R RE G UL ATO R'I COMMIS SIO N O
C IN THE MATTER OF:
TMI SPECIAL INQUIRY DEPOSITION l
DEPOSITION OF JOSEPH KELLY l
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Place -
Lynchburg, Virginia Date.
Tuesday, October 2, 1979 Pages 1 - 66
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(202) 347 37C0 ACE - FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.
OffiaalReporters l[j!W[i AAA Ncrth Ccpitol Street 80012700ff U NG)d[b] fNl[5)I@hlDJ Au Ou'dl W j K " 13 Washington, D.C. 20001 NAUCNWIDE COVERAGE DAILY
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
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DEPOSITION OF:
5 JOSEPH KELLY 6
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Conference Room A 8
Babcock & Wilcox Old Forest Road 9
Lynchburg, Virginia 10 Tuesday, October 2, 1979 11 12 l The Deposition of. JOSEPH KELLY commenced at 1:10 13 p.m.
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Present for the NRC:
Fred Hebdon and Fred Folsom.
Present for Babcock & Wilcox:
George Edgar, John 15 l
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Mullin and Lista Cannon.
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Witness:
Examination by:
Page:
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JOSEPH KELLY Mr. Hebdon & Mr.-Folsom 3
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2 Whereupon, JOSEPH J. KELLY 3
was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn, 4
was examined and testified as follows:
5 EXAMINATION 6
3..
BY MR. HEBDON:
7 0
W uld you please state your full name for the record.
8 A
Joseph John Kelly, Jr.
9 10 Q
For the record, this document is a letter addressed 11 to Mr.
J.
J. Kelly, dated October 10t, 1979, from Mitchell
); j Rogovin, as the Director of the NRC/TM! S'pecial Inquiry Group.
13
[ Handing document to witness.]
O 14 Mr. Kelly, have you had an opportunity to read that 15 letter?
16 A
Yes.
O Do you have any cuestions or comments'concerning it?
A No.
j,.
Q Do you understand the information set forth in the i
n letter, including the general nature of the NRC/TMI Special a
Inquiry, your right to have an attorney present here today 7,
l as your representative, and the fact that the information you 22 0
23 y provide here may eventually become public?
j A
Yes.
24j Ace Federst Reporters. Inc.
I 25 Q
Mr. Kelly, is your counsel representing you personally I
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today?
2 MR. EDGAR:
Yes.
3 MR. HEBDON:
Would you state your name?
4 MR. EDGAR:
George Edgar.
5 MR. FOLSOM:
I think we should perhaps identify the 6
others in the room.
3 -
7 MR. MULLIN:
I'm John Mullin, Babcock & Wilcox.
8 MS. CANNON:
Lista Cannon from Sullivan & Cromwell.
9 MR. FOLSOM:
May we mark this Insert 1 and put it 10 in the record?
II
[The document follows:]
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b-October 1,1979 In Reply Refer. to:
NTFTM 791001-02 Mr. J. J. Kelly c/o Coorge Edgar, Esquire Morgan, Lewis & Bockius Attorneys for Babcock and Wilcox Co.
1800 M Street N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036
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Dear Mr. Kelly:
I ac writing to confirm that your deposition under oath in connection with the accident at Three Mile Island is scheduled for October 2-5, 1979 at Babcock and Wilcox facility, Lynchburg, Virginia. This will also confirm my request for you to have your resume and any documents in your possession or control regarding THI-2, the accident or precursor events which you have reason to believe may not be in official NRC files, including any diary or personal working file.
The deposition will be conducted by members of the NRC's Special Inquiry Group on Three Mile Island.
This Group is being ?irected independently of the NRC by the law fir = of Rogovin, Stern and Huge.
It includes both NRC personnel who have been detailed to the Special Inquiry Staff, and outside staff and attorneys.
Through a delegation of authority from the NRC under Section 161(c) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Special Inquiry Group has a broad mandate to inquire into the causes of the accident at Three Mile Island, to identify major problem areas and to make recommenda-tions for change. At the conclusion cd its investigation, the Group will issue a detailed public report setting forth its findings and recommendations.
Unless you have been served with a subpoena, your participation in the deposi-tion is voluntary and there will be no effect on you if you decline to answer some or all of the questions asked you. However, the Special Inquiry has been given the power to subpoena witnesses to appear and testify under oath, or to appear and produce documents, or both, at any designated place. Any person deposed may have an attorney present or any other person he wishes accompany him at the deposition as his representative.
You should real.u:e that while we will try to respect any requests for con-fidentiality in connection with the publication of our report, we can make no guarantees.
Nancs of witnesses and the information they provide may eventually become public, inasmuch as the entire record of the Special Inquiry Group's investigation will be made available to the NRC for whatever uses it may deem p
appropriate.
In time, this information may be made availabic to the public V
voluntarily, or become available to the public through the Freedom of Information Act.
Morcover, other departments and agencies of government may request access to this infor=ation pursuant to the Privacy Act of 1974. The infornation may also be made availabic in whole or in part to committees or subcomnittees of the U.S. Congress.
omCe yl.
SURNAME.....
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N R C F o R I.* 338 (9 76) NRCM 0240 D U.S. GoVE RNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1979 289 369
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2 If you have testified previously with respect to the Threc lLile Island accident, it vould be useful if you could review any transcripts of your previous statc=ent(s) prior to the de;.osition.
Tnank you for your cooperation.
Sincerely, Mitchell Rogovin, Director URC/T!!I Special Inquiry Group 1
DISTRIBUTION TERA FFolsom FHebdon WParler PNorry RDeYoung O
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BY MR. HEBDON:
2 0
Mr. Kelly, you should be aware that the testimony 3
you give has the same force and effect as if you were testifying
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in a court of law.
My guestions and your responses are being 5
taken down and will later be transcribed.
You'will be given 6
the opportunity to look at that transcript and make changes 7
that you deem necessary.
8 However, to the extent your subsequent changes are 9,
significant, those changes may be viewed as affecting your 10 credibility, so be as complete and accurate as you can in 11 !
responding to my questions now.
12 If you at any point during the deposition do not 13 understand a question, please feel free to stop and indicate, 14 and we will make the clarification at that time.
Do you
- i 15 understand?
16 l A
Yes, I understand.
?,.
Q What is your current occupation?
d il g A
I am an engineer working with Babcock & Wilcox.
i; O
What is your position?
Z.
A
'I am a principal engineer working in the Plant 1
2i q Design Section, and in the Plant Integration Unit of Plant 22 Design Section.
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23 0
What is meant by principal engineer?
N 24 A
It's a level of experience and technical competence.
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25 It's promotion above senior engineer, which is above a normal d
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engineer.
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Q Does that require that you be a professional encineer, i
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that you be a P.E.?
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4 A
No, no, not necessarily.
5 Q
Are you a P.E.?
6 A
No, I'm not.
7 Q
What was your position in November 19777 A
I was working in Plant Integration at the time.
I 8
was still a senior engineer.
9 10 Q
All right.
For whom did you work at that time?
31 A
My immediate supervisor was Eric Swanson, and his 12 title was supervisory engineer, and he works for Bruce Karrasch 13 who was the unit manager for Plant Integration.
O ja l 0
What is your educational background?
15 A
I am a graduate of the United States Naval Academy, 16 Bachelor of Science in 1965.
O Do you have any postgraduate training?
l A
No, I was trained as an officer in the United g g States Navy Nuclear Power Submarine with the training that i
goes alJng with that.
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'2 Okay.
Would you describe your employment history, 22 incl'iding positions held at B&W?
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23 MR. EDGAR:
Could we go off the record a moment?
24 MR. HEBDON:
Certainly.
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[ Discussion off the' record.]
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Let's go back on the record.
2 Mr. Kelly has provided a copy of his resume, which i
I'd like to have i'ncluded in the record-at this point.
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!I RESUME
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- 'h JOSEPH J. KELLY l
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EDUCATION:
BS, United States Naval Academy, 1965 i
WORK EXPERIENCE:
July, 1971 to Present Babcock & Wilcox Company Lynchburg, Virginia l
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June, 1977 to Present t
I PRINCIPAL ENGINEER d
a Plant Design Section Nuclear Power Generation Division (NPGD)
Primary areas of responsibility include updating and revising secondary system design requirements specification and
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secondary sy.3 tem description for B&W 205FA Standard Plant.
2.
June, 1971 tc, June, 1977 i
. SENIOR ENGINEER Nuclear Service Department (NPGD)
A.
At Florida Power Corporation's (FPC) Crystal River Unit III site (6-74 to 6-77) worked as part of FPC Startup Testing Team in the following arcas:
1)
Assigned responsibility for cleaning and flushing program.
This included developing pro-O\\
cedures and scheduling and carrying out actual flushing assignments.
Supervised ten men in this effort.
2)
Assigned responsibility for all piping hydrostatic testing, including procedure writing and test execution.
Supervised twelvc men in this effort.
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KELLY 3)
Assigned responsibility for~
functional testing of all M
mechanical systems.
Super-(~'
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vised twelve men in this effort.
4)
Assigned overall shift testing responsibility for plant Hot
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Functional Testing._ Direct'ed shifts (sixteen men) through two plant HFT's.
5)
Through all of the.above, followed up on test results acceptance and approval by the customer and the NRC.
6)
Supervised a technical review of the customer's Zero Power Physics and Power Escalation test program.
t 7)
Assigned as Testing Superin-()
tendent for Zero Power Physics and Power Escalation Testing.
This involved supervising twelve Test Engineers.
Re-sponsibilities included overall coordination of entire Physics Testing Program, including test results review and recommendations to the Nuclear Plant Superin-tendent on advisability of escalation to the next power plateau.
B.
At Arkansas Power and Light's Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit One site (10-72 to 6-74).
Primary respon-sibility was reactor coolant system advice and consultation during startup and testing.
Was there through Hot Functional Testing and
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Fuel Loading.
C.
In Lynchburg, writing test speci-fications and procedures, was acting Test Working Group repre-sentative for Arkansas (7-71 to i
10-72).
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^ ^ ' ^ ~ ~ ~
y JOSEPH J. KELLY June, 1965 to July, 1971 Commissioned Officer, United States Navy
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1.
June, 1969 to June, 1971 ON 1
INSTRUCTOR t
U.S. Naval Nuc1 car Power School Taught Reactor Plant Technology (RPT) t -
to enlisted students; was head of RPT Department; supervised 9-11 instructors and approximately 130 students.
2.
April, 1967 to May, 1969 USS Lewis and Clark (SS&N 644),
Auxiliary Division Officer, Machinery Division Officer, Qualified as Engineering Officer of the Watch, Qualified in' Submarines.
3.
September, 1965 to October, 1966 US Navy Nuclear Power School (6 months) ;
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US Navy Prototype Training (6 months).-
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1 BY MR. HEBDON:
1 2
O Just for reference purposes, could you give us 3
just a brief description of your employment background?
4 A
Okay.
Upon graduation from the Naval Academy, I 5
spent six years in the commissioned service of the United 6
States Navy in submarine training, nuclear power, including 7
two years of duty onboard a submarine, and two years of instruc-8 tion at the U.S. Naval Nuclear Power School in Maralin, 9
10 In 1971, I resigned my commission and came to work 11 l for Babcock & Wilcox, and went to work in the Nuclear Service 12 l Department, and became a field service engineer.
I was 13 trained in Lynchburg for a year, and then went to Russellville,
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14 Arkansas and assisted in the start-up of Arkansas Nuclear 1, li 15 one of our customer's units.
16 I spent approximately two years in Russellville, l'
and then was transferred to Crystal River, Florida, and spent t
0 4p three years there on a start-up of the Crystal River Unit 3, i.
I; another one of our customers.
2:
I was involved in mechanical start-up and testing, g
21 functional testing, zero power, physics power, escalation 3
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22 testing at Crystal River.
23 j In 1977, in May of 1977, I transferred back here 4
24 i to Lynchburg, got out of field service and into our engineering.
Am-FMud Reorms. W.
25 in Plant Integration, and have worked there ever since.
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9 a-Q Okay.
I'd like to ask you some questions concerning j
an incident that occurred at Davis-Besse on September 24th, 2
3 1977.
I'm particularly interested in the knowledge that you
()
had of that incident and your understanding of that incident 4
5 Prior to the accident that subsequently occurred at TMI.
SPecifically prior to March 28, 1979, what knowledge 6
did you have concerning the incident that occurred at Davis-7 Besse on September 24th, 19777 8
A Well, I was detailed to go from Lynchburg to Davis-9 10 Besse and report in to the B&W employee there, our site 11 i operations manager, Fred Feist, shortly after the September
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i 12 24th -- 27th?
13 0
24th.
14 ;
A
-- 24th, 1977 incident at Davis-Besse.
My assign-I h
15 ment was to -- and his name is Fred Feist -- my assignment j
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16 was to assist him in uncovering the secuence of events that occurred during that transient at Davis-Besse, and I did that.
v We used -- we reduced data'that:was available
- 3q at the plant site, reactimeter data, graphs and charts, et
- a cetera.
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ng Q
Was it normal for you to be involved in such an 22 activity?
Was that a normal function of your job?
O I;
23 d A
That was the first time I was asked to do that.
2 4 ".
Q Would it have been considered to be a normal func-
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25 tion of your job to do such a thing?
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A I don' t believe it would be on a job description 2
for someone in my position in Plant Integration.
However, I 3
think I was picked because of my plant experience and my r~
4 recent association with Nuclear Service, and my knowledge of 5
how plants -- B&W plants operate.
6 BY MR. FOLSOM:
o -
7 Q
What prompted sending anybody out to this particular 8
site?
9 A
Fred Feist asked for it.
10 0
He asked for it.
Do you know why he asked for it?
11 !
A I think he had a great deal of data he wanted to l
12 i reduce.
He knew the people back here in Lynchburg were 13 interested in the details of the transient, and. he wanted 14 j help to do it.
15 '
O What was peculiar about the transient that sparked 16 all this, either in Feist or in the people back here?
17 A
Well, to my knowledge, what I had heard about the h
p transient, they had suffered a loss of feedwater and they knew M
that they had electromatic relief valves stuck open, and they t
Mj had to blow in a ruptured disc on the quench tank and got I
a i
2i ti primary coolant into the reactor building, and it was just 22 unusual in its complexity, and he wanted someone to help him 23 l sort it out.
24 BY MR. HEBDON-A&FMerd Reprters, inc.
25 0
Was it usual for your particular group to send
1 11 i
1 somebody out to assist -- I think his title was a site rep?
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2 A
He was site operations manager.
3I Q
-- following a transient, such as this, or following I
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a transient?
4 5
A No.
6 Q
So then it was somewhat unusual for somebody to be sent out from Lynchburg as a result of this particular incident?
7 A
Yes.
8 9l 0
Did you talk with or meet with.ny representatives 10 l of the utility while you were there?
4 11 A
Yes, I did.
I met several of them.
Most of the 12i ones I met, I just met -- socially is not the right word.
I'
'3 was just introduced because I was there.
I talked with Jack O
1.t f Evans who was the plant superintendent at the time and was US '
introduced to him.
16 Fred Feist was doing most of the talking.
This was 7h after Fred and I had gone through the secuence of events, and l
- 3 y he was telling Jack, you know, what we found out.
O What concerns were raised by the utility people that l you talked with?
n iq A
The only thing I remember about that -- I don't 22 remember any particular concerns that the utility raised.
O 23 ! Fred and I had uncovered a few of our own we wanted to I
l 24 i investigate, but the utility's interest was mainly in parcel-t Aa Fdesl Recorters, inc.
25 ing out the assignments on how to recover from the transient, j
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get the plant back on line.
It was more of an organizational 2
administrative concern.
3 In other words, they said to Fred, "You look out
()
for the B&W concerns, and get us some recommendations back, 4
5 on! what we have to look into for your plant," those type 6
questions, as opposed to, "I'm worried about the cooldown 3 _
7 rate," or, "I'm sorried about loss of insulation," or something like that.
8 You understand the difference in what I'm trying 9
10 to say.
11 0
What was the basis of the concerns?
What was the 12 source of the concerns that they were trying to address in 13 order to get the plant back on line?
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1a A
I don't think I understand what you're asking.
i 15 '
0 You said there were several things that needed to 16 i be done.
Who identified the things that needed to be done?
l Where did those concerns come from?
j A
Well, Fred presented a few that we had, and I i:
don't know where Jack Evans got the rest of them from.
n Q
Did you get the impression that they were concerns l
y, that were internal to the Toledo Edison people, or were they 22 concerns that he was simply passing along from someone else, 23 h like from the NRC, for example?
do 24 q A
I don't remember that kind of detail.
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Q Let me ask, you indicated, if I un'derstood you, 2
3 that the Toledo Edison people's concerns were managerial in 4
nature.
5, A
Yes, from what I can remember.
l 6'
Q And what Fred is asking is the content of those i
7 managerial concerns.
8 MR. EDGAR:
I don't think he was asking that.
Were 9
you?
You were asking for the origins.
10 MR. HEBDON:
I was asking for the origin of II concerns, whether they were concerns that had been raised by 12 Toledo Edison rcOple, or they were concerns that had been 13
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raised by the NRC, for example, and Toledo Edison was just I4 being responsible for getting them answered so they could get i'
FS the NRC to approve restarting the plant.
16 THE WITNESS:
I can remember, since you mentioned
,, l the NRC, I can remember that they were preparing for a i
'2 " meeting with the NRC.
I don't remember the exact date, but it was like two or three days after the incident, where they 21,l were going to go over the sequence of events and how they were 2I l
handling the recovery to try and satisfy any concerns that the 22 NRC had.
22 l I know that they were talking about the upcoming 24 t NRC meeting at Davis-Besse.
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l BY MR. HEBDON:
2 O
Okay.
3 A
I know that also'because after I came back from 4
Davis-Besse, Fred -- Feist came back with me, and Fred and I 5
gave a briefing here at Lynchburg again.
At the conclusion 6
of that briefing, there were a planeload of people going 7
back up to Davis-Besse from B&W to support the customer in 8
that meeting with the NRC.
That's the kind of thought 9
process I'm going through.
10 Q
Okay.
You mentioned this meeting with the NRC.
II Did you talk with or meet with any representatives of the NRC?
12 A
I didn't go to that meeting.
While I was still up 13 there -- that meeting happened after I had come back to 14 Lynchburg.
That was subsequent to that, and I was not 15 involved.
But while I was still up there, yes, I met an NRC 16 representative, but I don't remember what his name was.
O Do you recall what concerns he raised?
l l
A No, I don't remember any details about it.
~
0 Okay.
What were the concerns that you and Mr.
E,i Feist raised or developed?
21 A
We had, after reviewing the pressure and temperature 1
22 plots, and Fred had -- I think Fred had been in the reactor 23 h building, but there were such things as we knew that they had 24 -
had boiling in the loops and boiling in the core, and we knew Ac3-F:dw:;l Reporters, Inc.
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25 we'd have to address the cuestion of whether there had been i
15
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l any fuel damage, of whether that could have damaged the fuel 2
with boiling in the loops.
3 We knew that they had run reactor coolant pumps
()
4 under that condition, and we at least had to address the 5
question of possible damage to the reactor coolant pumps.
6 Fred had said that the steam escaping from the ruptured disc --
7 ruptured portion of the quench tank had knocked some insulation 8
off the steam generator, and Fred was worried about boric 9
acid crystallization on the exterior of the carbon steel 10 piping, whether there was any chemical damage to the pipe.
11 These are the types of concerns, knocking some of the insula-12 tion off of the steam generator.
13 Fred was worried about possible mechanical stress 14 because of the large delta T across the steam generator.
l 15 Without the insulation, the delta T is going from the 550 16 degrees on the inside of the loops to ambient on the outside, i
U j, as opposed to what it would normally be with the insulation h
13 9 on it.
Fred was worried about exceeding the 100 degree M[
per hour cooldown rate at some portion of the transient which A
2I was a design parameter not to exceed 100 degrees per hour,
(~N 22 and that would have to be addressed.
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s 23 I Oh, of course, the automatic relief valve had stuck l I
t 24 open and we were all concerned about why at that point in time.
1 Ace Federd Reporters, Inc.
25 0
Were these concerns written down anywhere?
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A Oh, yes.
2 O
In what form?
3 A
They were typed and entered into the site, problem 4
report on the site incident.
l 5
Q Do you have a copy of that?
6 MR. EDGAR:
That's already been furnished to you.
7 MR. HEBDON:
It has been?
All right, we'll tot j
8 that out of the file.
9 BY MR. HEBDON:
10 Q
What was your involvement with the incident after II you returned to Lynchburg?
12 A
Well, as I said, Fred and I gave a briefing here 13 in one of the training rooms down next to the cafeteria to a Id large number of B&W people who came to find out what had 15
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happened.
16 O
Do you recall the substance of that particular I,l briefing? What sort of issues did you discuss, what sort of
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'3" concerns did you raise?
I' A
We talked about this list of concerns that we 2I]previouslydiscussed.
I went over the secuence of events 2I '
as we had reconstructed it to date as to what had happened O
during the transient, and Fred at that time could reconstruct L
23 l what had happened to the electromatic relief valve, and he 24
- went into the electrical details of a missing relay that would Aes Federst Reporters, Inc.
25 not seal in that valve once it was opened and keep it open.
i I
4
17 1
That was the gist of the meeting.
2 Q
Did you have any involvement with the incident after 3
that meeting?
()
4
'A Yes.
I continued to reduce all these, my sequence 5
of events and everything, into writing so it could be finalized 6
in a site problem" report.
7 Q
And that was all included in the site problem report?
8 A
Yes.
9 Q
Did you receive the Toledo Edison reports concerning 10 the incident?
11 A
I think I -- once you mention it, I think I did, 12 but I don't remember them in any detail.
13 Q
Do you recall if you reviewed them at all?
l A
Yeah, that's what I'm saying, I think I did,
14 15 because you just keyed my memory into that, I think I got 16 their reports -- at least their preliminary reports, to the U
NRC, because I would use that in my own mind to help formalize dj the sequence of events, at least as they understood them.
L Q
Do you recall any of your conclusions as a result l
20 i of that review?
l 21 A
Well, my review was directed towards determining 22 the sequence of events, not necessarily reaching conclusions.
23 I don't understand.
24 i
0 Did you find the sequence as described in that Aes Fedud Reporters, Iric.
25 report to be reasonably consistent with the sequences as you l
18 had understood?
j 2
A I don't remember any discrepancies.
3 0
Do you recall if you referred any or all of that
()
a report to anyone for additional review?
5 A
It's in the site problem report.
6 0
still in the LER?
7 A
Yeah, the LER is what I'm talking about, I think.
0 Yes, yes, the reports that were prepared by Toledo 8
Edison, did you refer them to anyone for additional review?
9l 10 A
They went out to many people besides myself, I'm 11 !
sure.
I did not -- they were included in the site problem I
12 l report, I think.
I don't remember.
13 0
All right.
I'd like to ask you some specific O
14 j questions about the incident itself.
You mentioned you i
15 realized that steam had formed in the reactor coolant system 16 during the transient.
What significance did you assign to that 7
fact?
il g
A What significance?
O Well, trying to get a perspective on how significant n
that particular event is.
When you found out that steam had
- ) g formed in the reactor coolant system, was this something that il 22 you had fairly well expected to happen?
Is it something that
(
c 23 l was very much a surprise to you?
Was it a major problem that 24 was much different than what you had anticipated?
Ace F6 der:.I Reporters, Inc.
25 MR. EDGAR:
Answer one question -- I mean let's I
l I
I i
19
~
I pin the question down, because you got three questions right' 2
and just be sure we're fixing what the question is and
- now, 3
what your answer is.
s THE WITNESS:
The one I heard was did I expect 5
to see steam formation in the reactor coolant system.
The 6
answer is no, I would not expect to see it.
That was a surprise 7
to me.
8 BY MR. HEBDON:
9 Q
Okay.
How serious a problem would you describe that 10 to be, or would you consider that to be?
II A
I don't know how t'o answer that.
I mean in the 12 scale of serious compared to what?
13
(}
Q Well, if you take -- if you want to use a scale of I# !
1 to 10, core is melted in the bottom of the reactor vessel, h
15 which I think would be a surprise to you on an incident such 16 as this, and 1 being that some trivial little situation that you weren't aware of, but that had no real safety significance, "I
where would you put the fact that boiling occurred?
m MR. EDGAR:
In this incident, in the context of II a
this incident.
I 21 "
BY MR. HEBDON:
22
{}/
Q We're still talking ab(ut Davis-Besse, and we're s_
23 ll still talking about your perception at the time, without 24 the additional coloration of TMI.
Act.Fedircl Reporters, Inc.
15 MR. EDGAR:
Not in the abstract.
Looking at i
I t
20 Davis-Besse, did you regard that fact as significant, and if j
so, how significant?
2 THE WITNESS: Yeah, I thought it was significant 3
()
because I didn't know the impact of boiling on the core and 4
in the loops, and what effect that would have chemically or 5;
metallurgically on the fuel assemblies, for instance.
I thought 6
that was significant in my mind.
7 It was one of the things I very clearly pointed out 8
during the interview -- during the debriefing, rather.
9 10 BY MR. HEBDON:
11 Q
Is it your understanding that Mr. Feist shared 12 your level of concern with this particular problem?
13 A
Y e.s.
14 O
What was done as a result of this concern?
l 15 A
After the formal briefing, we were all still 16 l gathered in the meeting room, and I discussed it with Bob l
Jones and Bert Dunn, and Bob Jones said yes, there was boiling pl I.
- 3 [ in the core, but no, there would be no damage.
That was his opinion, and he was sure the analysis would confirm it, and that put a lot of my fears to rest about the fuel problem.
1 Bert Jones said that he was concerned that the 21 22 operators had terminated high pressure injection prematurely, O.
tl 23 in his opinion, and that he said that he could develop l
i 24 scenarios where they would -- I'm probably paraphrasing now,
' A&FMerd Reprters, lnc.
25 I can't quote him exactly -- where they could get into trouble I
21 1
if they secured high pressure injection.
)~
2 BY MR. FOLSOM:
3 0
Why did he consider the HPI terminated prematurely?
()
4 A
I guess because they had boiling in the core, but 5
you'd have to ask him.
I didn't --
6 MR. EDGAR:
Could we define who "him" is?
3 --
7 THE WITNESS:
Bert Dunn.
8 MP. EDGAR:
Did you misspeak yourself when you 9
said Bert Jones?
10 THE WITNESS:
Oh, did I say Bert Jones?
I'm sorry, 11 I meant Bert Dunn.
There was Bob Jones and Bert Dunn I was 12 talking to.
13 MR. FOLSOM:
Yes, I got them confused, too.
14 BY MR. HEBDON:
0 15 Q
So then would it be safe to say that Mr. Dunn's 16 comments laid to rest the concern that you had about the fact 7! that boiling had occurred in the reactor coolant system?
15 j; A
At th at time, yes, laid the concern -- any concerns I had about fuel damage as a result, direct result of Davis-Besse incident.
In other words, I didn't think there 1
21 would be any problem with it.
fs 22 0
You say at that time.
At some later time did your
\\-
23 concern reappear?
24 A
Ch, no, not with the fuel damage.
What I meant was Ac.4,oco neporters, inc.
25 he raised.another one in my mind, in ' this time, with regard -
I
22 to securing high pressure injection.
i In other words, Bert was saying that they secured 2
high pressure injection and nothing happened, but under 3
O dierere=e otrcum t =ce ther cou1d a ve dee= 1= troud1e, o
4 that I was no longer worried about the immediate results S
of that Davis-Besse transient on the Davis-Besse plant.
I was 6
more concerned now about a similar thing happening.
7 O
S he replaced the one concern with another concern?
8 A
Yes.
9 10 0
All right.
Did you realize at the time that the 11 steam formation in the reactor coolant system caused the 12 ;
pressurizer level to increase while the leak was continuing?
13 A
Yes.
14 0
What significance did you assign to that fact?
15 A
I -- it was obvious to me, given that now I have 16 the reactor coolant loops in saturation and continuing in saturation, I expected the level to y up.
You know, I mean i
the water is boiling in the core,' it's got to be expanding and
- 39 i
going somewhere in the loops.
na O
Did you raise that as a concern that pressurizer 1
level had increased as a result of this _ boiling in the core, 2;
despite the fact that the water continued to escape through 22 23 l the PORV?
i Il 24 -
A I don' t think I raised that as a direct concern.
Aes. Federal Reporters. Inc.
25 There were boiling in the core -- I mean in the reactor coolant l l
t
23 1
system because they're losing -- because the PORV was open 2
and they'16st pressure control.
3 In other words, I would have pointed that out in 4
trying -- I can't say I directly remember this, but normally 5
I would think logically at the time I'd. point it out that 6
they had reached saturation conditions and level was going.up 7
in the pressurizer.
But not in -- I would not raise that as a 8
concern.
That was an expected result to me.
9I Q
So then it didn't anomalous to you that pressurizer i
10 level was increasing during the LOCA?
11 A
I don't remember ever asking myself that question, 12 but I also do not remember raising it as a concern, so I can 13 only conclude that, no, it wasn't.
(-
14 Q
Okay.
You mentioned that Mr. Dunn had raised the 15 concern in your mind about the high pressure injection.
Prior 16 to your discussions with him, did you realize that the 17 operators secured HPI before they identified the leak?
1 il j!
A Yes.
Yes, that came out in sequence of events.
Q Did that cause any concern in your mind?
Ej A
No.
j
!l 2I '
Q So then it wasn't until you talked with Mr. Dunn
(~
22 that he raised your consciousness concerning that particular 23 issue?
24 A
Jes.
Ace Federd Reporters Inc.
25 l
I i
l
m 24 1
BY MR. FOLSOM:
2 0-Do you know how the operators determined that the PORV 3
was stuck open?
7
()
4 A
No.
5 0
You don't have any factual knowledge of how they 6
made that decision, that discovery?
j 7
A If you're asking how did the operators at Toledo f
8 specifically discover, the answer is no.
If you're asking 9
what information they had in general, I can comment on it, but 10 I don't know what keyed them onto it, whether it was the t
11 quench tank pressure or building temperature or whatever it 1
l i
12 !
was, I don' t know.
13 BY MR. HEBDON:
14 O
In the course of your review, what consideration 15 did you give to what the operators saw and what they did 16 with that information?
I7 A
Which information?
30 Q
The information that was available to them during H
the transient.
E[
A I didn't consider that was part of my assignment.
1 2i [
I was strictly trying to chronologically detail.what they did
[}
do, not why they did any particular thing.
22 23 Q
Did you give any consideration.at all to what 24 might have happened if the plant had been at a higher power Aca Federet Reporters inc.
25 level?.
i l
[
i
25 1
A No, not that I remember.
2 O
Did you consider that any of the events that 3
occurred during this incident had any generic implications'to
()
4 other B&W plants?
5 A
With this concern that Bert Dunn raised in my mind 6,
about them securing high pressure injection, that could have
>~
7 been generic in my mind, yes.
8 Q
Any other issues other than that one?
9 A
Not that I remember, no.
10 Q
You mentioned that you had a training session here 11 af ter you returned from that particular incident.
Did you give i
12 any consideration to sending information about that incident 13 to other utilities, general information about what happened,
(-
14 l
the chronology of events that you prepared, for example?
I!
15 MR. EDGAR:
By training session, you mean briefing 16 session?
BY MR. HEBDON:
P I
- 5 r Q
The debriefing in the training room, yes.
~
MR. EDGAR:
And alsoE just to fix the time when you 2'
said did you give any consideration, at what time do you mean?
Il j MR. HEBDON:
At the time that he was involved i
I
(~}
22,
with the actual incident, say %ithin two to three weeks
\\_/
23 ]
following the incident i' 53 Lf 24 '!
THE WITNESSt Nc, I did not do that.
Acs-Fsdit&l Reporters, Inc.
25 i
i I
i
1 l
i 26 1
BY MR. FOLSOM-l 2
O Would it have been someone else's job to do that?
3 A
Yes.
4 Q
Who?
5 A
Customer Services, atthe time they were called 6
Nuclear Services, if they felt th'at the transient was 7
significant, to inform other 177 owners, would have done so.
8 Q
Did they?
9 A
I don't know.
10 BY MR. HEBDON:
11 Q
You mentioned that one of the reasons for the 12 !
failure of the PORV was a missing relay.
Were you able to i
13
{
identify why the relay was missing?
14 A
Fred Feist can answer that question.
It had li 15 something to do kith their -- they did maintenance on it 16 and didn't replace it.
By "they," I mean Toledo Edison 17 maintenance personnel, but I don't remember any of the details.
ii
- 3 [
Q That wasn't something you were involved with personally?
i 2 '-
A No.
21 "
Q I'd like to ask you a few questions concerning-22
{)
the operators themselves, and by this I mean the control room 23 operators who were actually on watch during the time of the 24 4 incident.
Ace FWttst Reporters, Inc.
i 25 What was your impression of the knowledge and ability 1
i
27 of the operators?
A I did not, during my day and a half or two-day 2
visit at Davis-Besse, personally talk to or meet any of the 3
()
operators that I can remember.
I didn't get in to talk to a
them at all.
5 6
Q As I understood it, you said that you were involved with reconstructingnthe scenario of what happened.
Did you feel 7
that you could do that without talking to the operators who 8
were there?
9 10 A
In the time that was given to me, I used the available hard data, alarm printouts, the reactimeter printouts 11 l i
12 '
strip charts, a'nd I figured out, at least to my own satisfac-13 tion what had happened, without having talked to the operators.
14 The operators were very busy at that time with their own t
15 '
people trying to find out what had happened.
16 Q
Was it a matter of you didn't have the time to l
7 talk to them, or they were too busy to talk to you?
A No, I didn't have the time to talk to them.
I got
- 3 u there and went to the B&W trailer and spent I don't know how 3,,
many hours the first day and the second day just reducing M
3 the data that was sitting there on the table in front of me.
22 Q
What was the reason for your time constraint?
O.
I 23 A
I wanted to come back here to brief people back I
i 24 here what had happened, and to start addressing these concerns i
Aes Federst Reporters, Inc.
25 that we had identified to help support Davis-Besse in restart I
l
28 l
r 1
of their plant.
2 Q
So then would it be fair to say'that the time I
l 3
constraint was associated with the need to address the concerns 4
that had to be addressed before the plant could return to 5
power?
6 A
Yeah, that would be fair.
7 O
Do you recall what indication was available in the 8
control room of the PORV position?
9 A
No.
10 0
Okay.
11 MR. EDGAR:
Can we go off the record?
12
[ Discussion off the record.]
13 MR. HEBDON:
Let's go back on the record.
14j BY MR. HEBDON:
i' 15 Q
Do you recall talking with a Mr. Leon Engle who 16 works for the NRC7 He is the project manager for Davis-Besse.
I' A
No.
13 Q
The reason I ask is he was out there doing basically 4
the same thing you were doing, he was trying to collect data 2:
and reduce it into some graphs to develop a chronology of l
2i l events.
I 22 A
I said I met one man from the NRC..Now I might --
/~)N
's-j.
23 ll if I saw him, I may recognize Mr. Engle as that man, but I i
l 24 F didn't have a chance to remember the name.
Ace Fedient Reporters, Inc.
25 Q
Okay.
Do you recall at any time after the incident i i
I
29 I
discussing with people from the NRC their scenario or their 2
chronology of events that they had developed following the 3
incident?
4 A
No.
5 Q
Okay.
6 MR. HEBDON:
Can we go off the record for a minute 7
and take a break?
8
[ Discussion off the record.]
9 MR. HEBDON:
Let's go back on the record.
10 BY MR. HEBDON:
i II I O
I'd like to go on and ask you some questions I2 !
concerning some memos that were written that I think have 13 become known as the Kelly and Dunn memorandum.
14 Specifically for the record, this first memo is a 15 memo from J.
J. Kelly to distribution, dated November 1st, 16 1977.
The subject is " Customer Guidance on High Pressure Injection Operation."
i3 1!
[ Handing document to witness.]
Did you write that memorandum?
25 d A
Yes, I did.
21 0 Q
Why?
22 A
Well, as we have said, in discussions with Bert i i 3
Dunn after the briefing, he had raised some doubts and con-2 24 cerns in my mind about whether the Toledo operators had i
Ace Feder;l Reporters, Inc.
l 4
I 25 operated correctly in securing high pressure injection during i
l i
30
~
l that transient.
2 I talked some with my supervisor after that, to 3
the best that I can remember, Eric Swanson, and we didn' t do 4
anything about it at the time.
During my investigation, as I 5,
said, I was formalizing these curves and submitting informa-6 tion to Nuclear Service for the site problem report.
7 I was in communication with Fred Feist who was 8
back at Toledo fairly often during this period of time, over 9
the next few weeks after the accident, and he told me one 10 day that they'd had a second incident where they lost feedwater,
Il and Fred told me at this time the operators did not let high 12 pressure injection initiate.
They had bypassed it before it 13 would even initiate.
14 i
Again there were no consequences directly to Toledo P
15 from that incident, but then to my mind I had two incidents 16 relatively quickly in succession where it was not clear to me
?
l that the operators were operating the high pressure injection Je system correctly.
~
Q Excuse me.
Do you recall the date of the second 2: j incident?
21 A
October 23rd, 1977.
22 O
Okay.
23 l A
So I talked about that one again.with Eric ac.S 24 q said, "I think we ought to do something about it," and Eric Ace-F;derel Reporters, Inc.
25 said, " Write a memo."
And Eric advised me at the time, he i
l
31
~
1 said to put down my feelings on when they should secure high 2
Pressure injection, and I did that in the memo, and then ask 3
for comments.
()
4 In other words, I was trying to give these people 5
something to comment on, rather than juJt say create some 6
rules for high pressure injection, I was giving them something 7
to aim at, and I sent this out to distribution and expressed 8
my concerns about high pressure injection.
9 Q
Was it a normal part of your job to prepare such a 10 formal memorandum?
i 11 l A
I felt responsible for preparing it in the sense i
12 that I'm a B&W employee, and I felt that this was an area 13 where we ought to -- where we may not be -- we're not being (S
%)
14 specific enough to our customers.
So from that respect, I 15 would say, yeah, it was part of my job, because I was a 16 conscientious-thinking engineer, and I thought something was
- 7 not, you know, going the way I thought it ought to, and I 1
- 5 }
wanted to bring it to management attention.
6 If you looked at the job description for Plant T.
Integrator, I don't think this would show up.
'I n
I don't know if that answers your question or not.
22l Q
So then would it be fair to say that the subject i
(
231]
of how the operators are operating the high pressure injection 24 system would not normally fall within the purview of the Ace Fed 1<st Reporters, Inc.
l group that you are assigned to?
25 I
I I
32 1
A That's correct.
That's not Plant Integration's job.
2 Q
What group would that come under?
3 A
To my mind -- and you're getting my opinion -- it's
()
4 got to be the Nuclear Service who is giving the instructions 5
to the customer and/or Emergency Core Cooling Systems, ECCS, 6
who has -- who were putting the design information into what 7
the high pressure injection system had to do, anyway.
8 Q
But the people that you sent that memo to, who on I
I that list is in Nuclear Services?
9 10 A
Don Hallman and Norm Elliott, and at the time Ron 11 Finnan was.
12 O
Okay.
And who in that group was in the ECCS Analysis 13 Group?
O 14 A
Bert Dunn.
He's the manager.
15 Q
All right.
16 BY MR. FOLSOM:
17 Q
Before we leave this subject, will you get me off 12h the hook and tell me how it was that the October 23rd, '77 A
b incident was resolved without further complications, despite 2: ;' the fact that HPI was secured before -- prematurely?
Do you 21 ; recall?
i 22 l
A I can't answer that.
O-22 l1 0
Okay.
24 BY MR. HEBDON:
l
" A&FMwd Reporters. lm.
25 Q
What were the concerns that you had with the I
i L
i
33 operator securing the HPI when they did secure it?
j 2
A I didn't understand technically what Bert Dunn was 3
talking about, but I know Bert Dunn and I was-convinced.that-a he probably knew what he was talking about.
And I'm not trying to be sarcastic, I'm trying to lead into my thinking.
5 I felt that if Bert said that there were situations 6
~
where they could get in trouble by securing high pressure 7
injection early -- now I had just gotten two examples, one 8
9 from September 24th and one October 23rd, 1977, where they l
had apparently done that -- then I had Bert's concern reflected 10 j 11 in me, and I said I'd rather bring this matter out and get i
12 l some attention on it.
13 That's where my motivation --
ja Q
So then the technical basis for the concern really 15 o riginated with Bert Dunn?
16 A
Yes.
m Q
And then you were just reflecting yor.r perception of his concern?
- 3 p i
A Yes.
O Now /ou sent the memo to a list of people.
Why to 2;
those particular people?
22 A
Go down the list.
Bruce Karrasch is my unit it manager.
I send him a copy of everything I write.
23 g!
24 Eric Swanson is my supervisory engineer, and he Ace Federst Reporters. Inc.
25 and I had talked about this a few times, and so I wanted him l
1
34 I
1 to see what I had written.
P 2
Ron Finnan was in Plant Performance Section of 3
Nuclear Service, and to my thinking was one of the people who
()
4 would be writing or looking into any guidelines that would be 5
given to the customer from Nuclear Service.
6 Bert Dunn, as I said, was the manager of ECCS, and 3 -.
7 I knew he was interested in that.
8 Danny La Belle was the manager of Safety Analysis.
9 I wasn't sure whether Safety Analysis would be concerned with 10 this area or not, but I wanted to keep him informed in case 11 he wanted to comment on it.
12 Norm Elliott is the manager of the ' raining Section T
13 of the Nuclear Service Department, and his simulator 14 instructions train operators, utility operators.
I wanted to 0
15 make sure he knew, or at least keep him informed of what was 16 going on.
- 7 And Don Hallman is the Plant Performance manager.
- E g He is Ron Finnan's boss, and I wanted to just send it to him.
0 Okay.
What did you have in mind should be done Z
vith the memo?
o 21 ]
A Well, as I said, I,
in the memo, I'm saying I 22 wonder what guidance, if any, we should be giving to our 23 customers when they can safety shut down the system following 24 an accident.
This system of high pressure injection.
And I Ace Feders Reporters, Inc.
l 25 put in there "if any," because it wasn't clear to me that we l
l e
35 1
weren' t already giving them adequate guidance.
I didn' t know 2
where the -- or even if there was a problem.
But I knew that 3
I had seen it happen twice, and I wanted to get some attention
]L 4
on it.
5 Q
Okay.
Did you feel that they should respond to your 6
m emo?
o --
bu2 7
A Yeah.
8 Q
Did you ask them to do that?
9 A
The last sentence says, "I appreciate your thoughts 10 to this subject," and it was directed to those people.
II Q
Okay.
Did you feel that it was appropriate to put 12 any sort of a due date on it?
13 A
No.
I didn't consider that question consciously.
14 I just didn't do it.
15 Q
Did you give any consideration to whether or not 16 that particular issue should be referred to the NRC?
I7 A
No.
i30 Q
No, you didn't consider it; or no, you didn't h
think it should be?
22 A
No, I was -- at the time I wrote this, I wasn't N
21, sure that we weren't already giving them adequate guidance, 22
()
and this was just to get the problem looked into; even if 23 there was a problem, I was sure at the time that I didn't 24 i
want to bring it up with the NRC.
I had to check internally Ace FedIrar Reporters, Inc.
25 first and see if we weren't already addressing it.
That's all.
i
36 l
Q All right.
When you wrote the memo, did you 2
consider the potential problems associated with going solid 3
or with water surges through the relief valves?
4 A
No.
5 Q
What was done as a result of your memo?
6 A
I got an answer to this, one answer, it was from 0._
7 Frank Walters.
I read Frank's memo and his answer to mine.
8 Frank's memo was confusing to me, and he was talking about, to 9
me, when I read the thing, he said that the Training Depart-10 ment that Toledo Edison had acted correctly, and I went down il and I talked to simulator instructors about what they were 12 teaching -- these are Norm Elliott's pec?le.
13 Q
Excuse me.
Do you recall specifically who you
{
14 talked to?
I 15 A
Yeah, Harry Halmer was there, and John Lind, and 16 there were probably one or two others, but I can't put the O
faces to them, and we went over the September 24th Davis-13 !! Besse incident, the sequence of events as I understood them at i
is that time, and Harry and John Lind both said that they didn' t I '.
understand why the operators would react that way; that they.
21 p were not trained to do.that.
t 22 Q
Let me clarify this just a little.
I'm a little
}
23 confused.
24 i They said that they disagreed with Mr. Walters' Am FMerd Reporters. W.
25 statement that the operators were trained to respond in that I
\\
i
37 I
way?
2 A
No, I didn't -- I don't think I mentioned to them 3
that Frank had answered my letter.
This is Frank's confusion 4
that I kept to myself.
I just wanted to go in there and 5
try to get an unbiased opinion from them about what they thought i
6 was going on.
3 __
7 Q
Okay.
Did they express the opinion that the 8
operators responded correctly, or did they say the operators 9
responded incorrectly?
10 A
No, they said the operators responded incorrectly 11 from the way they had been trained.
12 O
Did they give you any specifics as to how they 13 thought the operator had responded incorrectly?
14 A
They said that they should not have turned high 15 pressure injection off unless they had primary temperature 16 stabilized and primary pressure increasing and pressurizer I7 l level in the indicated band.
h U ll I don' t remember the exact words about pressurizer U
level, but under control-is what they mean.
2 ;;
Q So then it was your understanding they felt that
'i 21 l the operators did secure the high pressure injection 22
{}
prematurely, based on how they were trained?
23 l A
Yeah.
24 Q
All right. Did anyone else give you any sort of Acefeder:A Reporters, Inc.
25 feedback or response in result to your memo?
i
-l l
I i
38 I
A No.
2 Q
Did you make any efforts to obtain additional 3
information from any of these people?
4 A
No.
5 Q
Did you call any of them to ask if they'd had a 6
chance to take a look at it, and if so, what their comments 7
were, or anything to that effect?
8 A
No.
I didn't expect Bruce Karrasch to answer it.
9 I got the letter from Hallman -- from Frank Walters, so that 10 would take care of Finnan and Hallman.
11 I knew what Bert Dunn's feelings were.
12 Danny La Belle didn't answer, and I just assumed 13 he didn't have anything to say.
14 When I got Frank's reply, and after talking to the 15 simulator instructors, then my concern was that I was convinced 16 that we were teaching the right thing in the simulator, but U
I wasn't convinced any more that we were putting the right 13 ii words out on paper.
I didn't know what we were putting out, 9
so I told the simulator instructors that I was going to --
E,,
now maybe -- you know, as I'm goir g over that, maybe I talked 9
21 to the simulator instructors before I wrote this and before 22
{}
I got Frank's memo.
23 h You know, that's the first time that popped back 1
24 '
into my mind.
I don't -- I'm confused on the dates now as Ace Federsi Reporters. Inc.
25 to whether I talked to the simulator instructors before or l
l l
t
39 I
after I got Frank Walters' memo.
2 Q
Okay.
3 A
But in any case, I was convinced that we were 4
teaching the right thing, and I wanted to make sure we were 5
putting the right words out.
Okay?' So that's -- maybe that 6
makes sense to me.
I must have talked to them before I wrote 3..
7 this, before November 1st, I must have talked to the simulator 8
instructors.
9 Q
Okay.
You said that you wanted to make sure that 10 you were putting out the right words.
What did you do to make 11 sure that you were in fact putting out the right words?
A That's what convinces me that I did that before I 13 wrote this memo.
Id Q
Did you check to see what guidance, what was being i:
15 given?
16 A
No.
I7 d
Q Did you have a copy, for example, of the procedures i !
U that B&W provides to the utilities?
A No.
I could have gotten them, they were in Nuclear l
Service, but I didn't check them.
q Q
Now you got a response from Mr. Walters, and I guess:
22 Q
from what I understand, you didn't expect a response from any
- *c p p
of the other people.
What did you do next?
2 A
Went to talk to Bert Dunn and told him that Frank.
Aes-Federcl Reporters. Inc.
Walters was the only response that I had gotten; that I was l
6
)
40 I
confused by his response; and I think we ought to go ahead and 2
have him write a letter and escalate it and see if he can make 3
sure that we are putting out the proper guide: (nes on this bd 4
thing.
5 0
Was there any reason why you didn't simply recommend 6
to him in the first place that he write his memo?
T.2 7
A I may havenmentioned that to Bert before I wrote 8
this one and told him that I was going to write this one, you 9
know, but, no, I don ' t know why I didn ' t have him write it 10 right to begin with.
I 11 Q
Now Mr. Walters wrote you a memo back, and you 12 received that.
You went to Mr. Dunn, and could you then 13 describe what happened after that?
{}
14 A
A period of time went by, and in the beginning of 15 February Bert Dunn did write a memo, and he wrote it to Jim 16 Taylor, I believe.
17 MR.,HEBDON:
Excuse me, could we go off the record i
4g just a minute.
[ Discussion off the record.]
- [
MR. HEBDON:
Let's go back on the record.
1 21,
For the record, just to refresh your memory, this 22 is a copy of the memo from Mr. Walters to you, dated November
[}
23 h 10th, I believe -- it's handwritten, and I can't read the 3
24 date for sure -- 1977.
It's either the 10th or the 18th.
i Ac3 Fedust Reporters, Inc.
25 MR. EDGAR:
It's the 10th.
t
i 41 1
MR. HEBDON:
Is it the 10th?
Thank you.
2 BY MR. HEBDON:
3 Q
And this is a memo from Bert Dunn to Jim Taylor, 4
dated February 9th, 1978, od the subject of " Operator 5
Interpretation of High Pressure Injection."
6
[ Handing documents to witness.)
7 And just one more reference.
This is a memo from 8
Mr. Dunn to Mr. Taylor, dated February 16th, 1978, on the 9
same subject.
10
[ Handing document to witness.]
11 Could you go on, then, and describe your involvement 12 with this whole issue now?
13 A
Okay.
After talking to Bert Dunn and telling him,
[}
14 I recommending to him that he go ahead and write a letter, this a
li 15 memo of February 9th, 1978 showed up from Bert Dunn to Jim 16 Taylor, and I was on distribution so I got a copy of it.
I Q
Did you feel that this memo reflected basically t
12 ;!
the same concerns as you had. discussed in your memo?
is A
Yeah -- yes, I did.
I thought he was addressing 0 4 the concerns.
21 "
Q Did he add anything in his memo that you felt 22 wasn't there in the memo that you had prepared?
{}
23 A
He's got a lot more technical detail about why I
he ses concerned that I couldn't supply in my memo.
24 Ace Federst Reporters, Inc, 25 0
Do you recall why he sent the memo to Mr. Taylor?
I i
t 42 U
I A
I don't think I knew why he sent it to Mr. Taylor.
2 O
Why didn't you send your memo to Mr. Taylor?
3 A
I thought that the -- the people concerned were O
4 the Customer Service or Nuclear Service Department who handled 5
the guidelines, and ECCS, who had the original concern.
I 6
didn't think of sending it to Mr. Taylor.
7 Q
Could it have been tliat it was sent to Mr. Taylor 8
because of the possibility of Part 21 implications?
9 A
Bert Dunn could answer that.
10 Q
Okay.
Did you at any time in the course of your II involvement with this incident consider the possible Part 12 21 implications of the incident -- of this particular concern?
13
(
A No, I never considered putting it on a preliminary I#
safety concern report to turn it in.
15 Q
What was done as a result of Mr. Dunn's memo?
A Well, about a week later, a second memo came out 7
from Bert Dunn on February 16th, which you just handed me, 3
and again I got a copy of it because I was on distribution,
~
and from reading it, it says that -- the contents said to me a
that Bert Dunn and Nuclear Services had worked out their l
2I 'j differences of what the guidelines should say, and what O
22 aou1a de 1 uea to the cu tomer> thet ther were ia eereemeat I
'3 ly because Bert Dunn says, "I find this as acceptable from the
^4
[
standpoint of preventing adverse long-range problems."
Acs Federol Reporters, Inc.
25 So when I read the second Bert Dunn memo, I thought 9
l
43 j
the problem was resolved; that there was agreement reached between ECCS and Nuclear Service, and that Nuclear Service 2
3 would subsequently generate whatever words had to be put out
()
to the customer.
4 5
0 Now specifically what differences are you referring to?
3 I
A Well, I don t know what the difference -- what 7
concerns that Field Service had when they came to Bert Dunn 8
9 as a result of this first memo, okay?
My point was that 10 reading the second one, Bert is saying that he and Field 11 Services worked out their differences, and he reached this 12 conclusion here as he preserrt it in the second memo.
13 0
Would these concerns have been the concerns that O
ja Mr. Walters had raised in the memo that he wrote to you?
15 A
I assume that.
I assumed that that was part of it, 16 that no one had any more problems with it.
p Q
So then it was your perception -- I realize this
)
I i
- 3 ;, is a perception only -- that the concerns that lir. Walters had i
had and the concerns that Mr. Dunn had had, had been resolved i
y.
to some sort of a mutually-acceptable solution?
1 i
2; f A
Into these two paragraphs that he states in his 22 February 16th memo, correct.
j 23 i
O What did you expect would then be done?
I s
24 A
Well, as I said, I thought that Nuclear Service Ace-Fedirst Reporters, Inc.
25 would go ahead and issue appropriate instructions to the
44 1
customers, that they had to.
2 Q
Do you know if those instructions were ever issued?
3 A
I think they were sent out after TMI 2, we sent
(
out the high pressure injection memo station instructions, 4
5 but again I don't think I ever saw them, even to today.
6 Q
But prior to the accident at TMI 2, it's your understanding that the instructions were not sent?
7 A
Prior to TMI 2, I was acting personally under the 8
9 assumption that they were sent, but that was only a perception 10 as a result of this memo here from February 16th.
I never 11 saw anything again after this until after TMI 2.
12 {
Q Just as a matter of timeframes and the rate at 13 which things normally progress through the system, would it 14 i
have been surprising to you if it had taken to, say, the d
i 15 middle of April '79 to get out the instruction to the utilities?
16 A
Based on this February 16th, 1978 memo, that would g
surprise me.
,3 Q
Do you have any idea why the instructions weren't sent?
l
- . i A
Are you asking me what I learned since TMI 2, now, 1
- )
- l or what I knew before TMI 27 22 Q
Well, let's do what you knew before TMI 2 first.
23 A
No.
As I said, I thought they were sent, acting 24 on what I believed -- this happened -- I thought it would Aca-Fc:lers Reporters. Inc.
I 25 generate through the mechanics and send them out the door, and j
I l
45 I didn't worry about it any more.
~
j 2
0 Okay.
What have you learned since TNI 2?
3 A
Apparently this did not address all of Nuclear-()
Service's concerns, and there was another memo written.
Don 4
Hallman wrote a memo to Bruce Karrasch on August 3rd of 1978, S
asking Bruce as manager of Plant Integration to resolve the 6
diff erences between Nuclear Service and ECCS.
7 0
You did not receive a copy of that memo?
8 A
No, I didn't know about that memo until after TMI 2.
9 10 0
What was your understanding again after TMI:2, what 11 was your understanding of the concerns that remained to be resolved?
12 A
From what I've learned from Frank Walters after 13 14 TMI 2, they were concerned that these instructions that Bert 15 proposed in his February 16th memo were too restrictive, in 16 that there could be non-LOCA events causing initiation of
- 7 high pressure injection that could subsequently, if the
- 3 g operator followed these instructions, fill the reactor coolant c
1; system solid and challenge the primary code safety valves.
3a 0
Okay.
Have you ever discussed any of this material i
24 with anyone from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission?
r^s 22 A
Anything we've talked about today?
i
- 3 l 0
Yes.
24 i A
Let me tell you what I'm thinking of.
One of A&FMwet Reporters, Inc.
25 my earlier interviews has been with a Mr. Shackleton and i
46 1
Creswell from the NRC, and I don't remember the dates, but 2
that was pretty soon af ter TMI 2.
3 Q
But it was after TMI 2?
4 A
Oh, yes.
5 Q
Prior to TMI 2, had you had any contact with Mr.
6 Creswell concerning this particular issue?
7 A
No.
8 Q
Were you aware that he, at a similar time that 9
you were raising your concerns, had himself raised similar 10 concerns?
11 A
No.
12 Q
So you were never aware of the concerns that he had 13 concerning possibility of high pressure injection had been 14 secured prematurely?
i 15 A
No.
16 Q
Okay.
P BY MR. FOLSOM:
3h Q
Do you know what changes were made by Davis-Besse
'l in their house instructions for their operators?
- C j A
No.
9
! i 21 BY MR. HEBDON:
22 O
I'd like to ask you some questions that are a little
{
23 bit more general in nature on the issue of,particularly of 24l plant procedures.
Aes-FcdJtsi Reporters, Inc.
l 25 Who in B&W organizationally is responsible for i
I
47
~
1 Preparing plant operating procedures?
2 MR. EDGAR:
If you know.
3 BY MR. HEBDON:
4 Q
To your knowledge.
5 A
Well, I'm confused.
When you say plant operating 6
Procedures if you're talking about what we sent out to each 7
individual utility, I think that that's the Plant Performance 8
Section -- well, it's more general than that.
It's --
9 I don't know what they're called.
Some group in Nuclear Service.
10 Because there are many different types of procedures, there 11 are testing procedures, emergency procedures.
If that's your
~
12 question, I think, you know, it's somebody in Field Service 13 or Plant Performance, like Hallman's group.
14 When you say operating procedures, if you're 15 talking about simulator operator procedures, I guess that's i
16 somebody in Norm Elliott's group.
- 7 0
Is that an area that you and your group get involved
,i
- 5 h with at all?
A They -- Procedure prepares and Nuclear Service n
- [
sends over procedures that they want an engineering review on, 21 they serid them over to our group to get them reviewed, yes.
22 O
Would you be involved with that type of review?
23 A
I have, yes.
That's part of our normal job I
24 - description.
Aes Fed 2rst Reporters. Inc.
25 Q
How would you take into account operational l
t
48 3'
I information in the course of that review?
2 A
Operational information?
3 Q
Operational experience.
Somebody sent over a 4
procedure for you to review, is there any way that you can 5
incorporate in that review operational experience from plants 6
that have already been in operation?
Or would your assessment 7
be strictly in engineering?
8 A
Our assessment would be engineering, unless, as in 9
my own case, for instance, I happen to know of something 10 operationally.
If anybody feeds in the plant operational Il experience, it has to come from the Nuclear. Service side.
12 They are the ones that handle all the site problem reports 13 and disposition of all those.
14 0
Were you ever asked to review any procedures that i
15 were relevant to the incident that occurred at Davis-Besse 16 on September 24th?
Ul A
No.
I i3 0 0
To your knowledge, who in B&W is responsible H
for preparing standard technical specifications?
27 f A
Technical concent of the technical specifications 21 h are farmed out to appropriate organizations, such as fuel, 22 thermohydraulics, ECCS, technical specs, fuel management for 23 rod position specifications, and to my knowledge, I believe 24 that's coordinated for standard technical specifications by Ace Fedsrol Reporters, Inc.
25 Licensing, but I'll admit that's just a feeling I have.
I f
49 1
don' t know whether that 's true or not.
2 Q
Is that an area that your group gets'in'volved with?
l 3
A Eric Swanson's group does not, no.
4 Another mini-subsection of Bruce Karrasch's 5
Plant Integration, I believe, does get involved with technical 6
specifications.
3 --
7 Q
Are you part of that~ subsection?
8 A
No, I'm Eric Swanson.
9 Q
To your knowledge, who in B&W reviews the actual 10 procedures developed by the licensee to see that they are Il consistent with procedures proposed by B&W?
12 A
To my knowledge, that's not done.
13 0
You mentioned the concerns that you had had about 14 l the premature securing of high pressure injection, and I i
li 15 think Mr. Folsom may have touched on the subject a little bit 16 already.
I7 Are you aware that the Davis-Besse small break 15 h procedure was subsequently revised to include precautions n
R designed to prevent premature securing of high pressure injec-T- /
tion and to alert the operators of possible failures of the 21 n poRy?
l 22 A
No.
If you asked if I was aware of that.
23 l 0
That's right.
24 A
No.
Ace Fedrect Reporters, Inc.
25 Q
Do you know if that change was ever reviewed by i
I
50 1
B&W?
2 A
I have no knowledge of that.
3 MR. HEBDON:
Let's go ahead and take a break for 4
about 10 minutes.
5
[ Recess.]
6 MR. HEBDON:
Let's go back on the record.
7 BY MR. HEBDON:
8 0
I'd like to ask you some questions concerning the 9
events that happened after the TMI accident, and particularly 10 the first day or day and a half following the accident.
I1 First of all, would you describe your involvement 12 with the TMI task force that was formed on March 28th, 1979?
13 A
I was -- I came in to work on that morning, and 14 was in a meeting with my supervisor, Eric Swanson, when Bob i
15 Wings came up and told me that there had been an incident at 16 Three Mile Island, and they expected that he and I would be 17 sent out there to investigate it, similarly to what I had done i3 at Davis-Besse.
1 4
And about 9.30 that morning, we were invited to a 2C meeting down in one of the classrooms next to the simulator
.i 21 where we were briefed by Don Hallman and Bill Spangler of what 22 they knew of the events that had happened that morning, and 23 at that time they told Bob Twilley in Customer Services and i
24 '
Bob Wings in our Control Analysis Unit "nd myself to go home l
Aes-Feders;l Reporters. Inc.
25 and pack a bag and go to the L3nchburg Airport, and they chartedes l
1
51 1
a flight for us to fly up to Harrisburg Airport.
2 When we got to Harrisburg, we were told to check 3
into a motel --the motel was in Hershey, and then get ahold of 4
Greg Schadel, who was the site engineer that worked for B&W 5
at Three Mile Island, and we would get further instructions 6
from him at that time.
3 -
7 In the meantime, they would try and get ahold of 8
Greg and using the airplane flight time, two or three hours 9
it would take us to get there, they would formulate some 10 further instructions for us.
Il The only instructions we were given at the time 12 were to try and reconstruct the sequence of events, and also 13
(}
to assist Greg Schadel and Lee Rogers, who was the site 14 operations manager, in any way we could once we got there.
15 Q
What did you do once you got there?
16 A
Well, we called Greg from the motel-in Hershey, I7 and he said -- we called him at his home, there was a message 13 ii waiting for us at the hotel to call him there.
He said he y
E couldn't get on the site, that Lee Rogers was on the site, 4
5 and he brought us up to what he knew about what was happening 4
2I at that point in time, and gave us directions on how to go 22 over to his house.
23 Q
Lee Rogers or --
24 A
Greg Schadel.
Lee Rogers was on Three Mile Island Aca Fet;erci Reporters, Inc.
M at that time..Greg was in his home, in Greg's home.
So we i
52
~
l did, we went over to Greg's home and essentially spent the whole 2
day there being on one side of telephone conversations 3I between Greg Schhdel and Lee Rogers in Three Mile Island, O
4 Greg Schadel, and Lynchburg back here.
5 0
Okay.
When did B&W people learn that high off scale 6
hot leg temperatures existed?
c 7
A I learned that at Greg's house.
That was one of the 8
things he told me when we got there.
9 Q
Approximately what time would this be?
10 A
You're talking maybe 2:30 in the afternoon.
II Q
Okay.
Do you know when he became aware of the 12 high temperatures?
13 A
No.
14 Q
Do you know if and when the B&W people became aware 15 that the strategy at the plant was to try to depressuri'ze 16 the system and blow it down in order to assure the core was I7 covered by dumping the core flood tanks into the core?
I3!
MR. EDGAR:
By B&W people, do you mean Lynchburg?
I BY MR. HEBDON:
q Z]
Q Any B&W people from Rogers on the plant through 21 the people that were maintaining the phone relay position O
", to the veov1e et tv=chaure-oo vou rece11 eet=e thee *vve lofinformationgothroughatall?
23 2#
A No.
Ace Federce Reporters, Inc.
25 l
Q During the time that you were there?
l
53 A
No.
~
1 2
0 And you were there from what, about 2:30 on?
A With the exception of going out to a restaurant 3
()
for dinner till about 11:00 that night, yes.
4, O
Okay, and you don't recall seeing any discussion 5
of that particular strategy or that type of stra'tegy pass 6
l through the communicatioas relay point that you had established?
7 1
A No.
9 0
Were you requested by the plant at some point 10 to calculate and provide a number as to how much high pressure 11 injection flow to maintain?
I 12 A
No.
13 0
Do you recall if such calculations were made?
14 A
No.
15 0
When did you reach some appreciation of the fact 16 t hat the high hot leg temperatures meant superheat and voids?
- 7 And did you form a recommendation that it was simply to
- 3 increase high pressure injection flow?
MR. EDGAR:
We got two questions there.
Can we get a
3j them one at a time?
2; BY MR. HEBDON:
22 0
okay, let's make two separate questions.
O Il 23 When did B&W reach an appreciation of the fact that 24 the high hot leg temperatures meant superheat and voids?
! cs Feder:A Reporters, Inc.
A 25 A
I heard that information, as I said, when I got
54 j
to Greg's house.
I don't know when before that he relayed 2
it on to Lynchburg.
3 Q
At the time that he explained that to you, did he O
eive you the imgression thee he understood ehet thee meane 4
5 that superheat, steam and voids existed in the reactor coolant 6
system?
A No.
At the time that I remember talking about it, 7
the report came across as a technician with a bridge going 8
down to an RTD circuit some place and coming back with a 9
10 reading of like 700 degrees, and we were -- we being Twilley, 11 Wings and myself and Greg -- we were thinking that maybe that 12 l reading wasn't right and what kind of credibility we'd put 13 on that reading at the time.
But that was just our little 14 huddle.
I can't speak for what information was relayed back I
15 to Lynchburg and what the thoughts were back here.
16 0
You don't know what of that information was relayed 17 to Lynchburg?
b
- 3l; A
No.
O Do you recall any recommendations to the effect 3,
that high pressure injection flow should be increased?
4 2;
A I don't remember any of that, no, any of the 22 details.
I remember them talking about high pressure injec-23 tion, but I don't know what words were being used.
i 24 Q
Do you recall approximately when the discussion i
- Ace Fed.rst Reporters, Inc.
25 took place?-
l
55
~
1 A
No.
There were several phone calls during that day, 2
back and forth, and I don't know when.
3-0 Do you recall any recommendations concerning getting 4
pressure up again?
5 A
No.
I don't remember pressure being down.
You know c 6
I just can't recall any facts about what I knew about the 7
primary pressure at that time.
8 0
Okay.
Do you recall having any conversations 9
with Mr. Bob Arnold around 4:00 or 4:30 p.m.
that day?
10 A
No.
11 Q
Do you recall talking to him at all that day?
12 l A
No.
13 0
Okay.
14 A
I am sure I did not talk to him, let me put it that 15 way.
It's not a matter of recalling.
16 Q
All right.
Did you learn at any time on Wednesday
'7 i that the high pressure injection had been turned off or l
l i3h throttled a good bit during the day?
)
i II A
Other than what I already stated, that there was
- j discussion about high pressure injection, I don't remember
'l 2i n any of the details.
22 Q
Okay.
Were you aware on that day that they had 23 turned off high pressure injection?
24 A
I may have been, I don't know.
Aes Forteret '4eporters. Inc.
25 Q
Did you make any connection or did the experience l
i
56
~
l that you hdd and the concerns that you had about securing high 2
pressure injection at Davis-Besse raise your consciousness at 3
all concerning what was going on at TMI?
Did you connect the 4
two issues at all?
5 A
No.
I had very few f acts about what actually had 6
happened on that Wednesday.
7 BY MR. FOLSOM:
8 Q
Let me ask, you were sent up to gather facts, I 9
gather, with your two compatriots.
Why couldn't you get them?
10 A
We were -- we were getting the conversations as Il relayed between Greg Schadel and Lee Rogers on the site, and 12 Greg Schhdel and Lynchburg here.
13 From what I can remember about it, I guess they just la weren't coming -- Greg didn't know them, either.
There were l*
15 not enough pieces of the puzzle to put together at the time.
16 BY MR. HEBDON:
I7 Q
Was he carrying on the conversations, or were you 13 !!
involved in the conversations at all?
II A
No, it was he.
,9 P-O So what were you doing?
Were you just standing 2I there listening to what was -- listening to one side of the Q
22 conversation?
23 l A
one side of the conversation.
I can remember asking 24 him why they turned direct coolant pumps off.
He -- you know,
. Ae>Federse Reporters, Inc.
25 he relayed that question and then came back with the answer.
I
57
~
l I can remember asking what primary system 2
pressure and temperature was, but I don't remember the answers, 3
is what I'm saying.
(
4 0
Well, the three of you were sent up there.
5 Obviously somebody had thought that you had a f airly important 6
role to play, because they chartered a plane to send you, and 7
yet it sounds like you were just basically standing around 8
listening to one end of a conversation.
Is that an accurate 9
statement of what you were doing that day?
10 A
Yeah.
We couldn't get onto the site, and all we i
i II could do was get the information that was caming across.
I 12 The recommendations, such as they were, were being handled 13 from Lynchburg to Schadel to the site, and we were not -- we I4 were up there to determine the sequence of events, and we were i
15 just not privy to the information.
16 BY MR. FOLSOM:
17 Q
Did you feel that your mission had been aborted?
I3 il A
I felt so.
By aborted, I mean I was being frustrated I i from accomplishing it.
20 ]
Q All right.
21 A
And that nobody consciously said, okay, we don't 22
[}
need those guys any more.
It's just that we were not getting 23 l access to the information.
24 BY MR. HEBDON:
Ace Federal Reporters, Inc, 25 Q
Let me theorize just a little.
You said that you l
58
~
1 were sent up there to get the sequence of events similar to 2
what you had done at Davis-Besse earlier.
Is it possible that i
l 3
when you were sent, people didn't realize the severity of the 4
incident, because it seemed like by the time you got there, 5
they weren't even close to being ready;to start looking at 6
the sequence of events to do a reconstruction type of thing yet,
>~
7 they were still fighting the fire.
8 Could it be that when you were sent,- they just 1
9 didn't understadd what was going on yet, and that once you 10 got there, it was realized that they weren't ready for you yet?
11 A
That's a reasonable scenario.
It could have happened 12 that way.
13 BY MR. FOLSOM:
{}
14 Q
Did they ever get ready for you?
15 A
We were admitted the next day.
16 O
And you did prepare the sequence?
17 A
Yes, and we did a lot of reactimeter data, i5 g prepared charts and graphs similar to this, and telecopied i!
them back to Lynchburg, and start standing 12-hour watches on
- 0 (!
and off, and providing data, detailed data of what had happened a
21 n back to Lynchburg.
}
But the first day they were still fighting the fire.
22 23 [j BY MR. HEBDON:
I 24 Q
In the course of this reconstruction work that l
l Aa FMad Reporters, 4nc.
25 you did, did any of the iinformation or any of the l
59
~
1 recommendations that I've just discussed with you, did you find 2
out anything about those?
Was there a log of these recommenda-3 tions as they went back and forth?
Or did you find any
(
4 indication of where somebody had noted that these questions 5
had been asked or recommendations had been received?
6 A
I der.' t remember seeing anything like that.
3..
7 Q
So yotr work was mostly with the hard data, such 8
as the data from the reactimeter?
9 A
Delogging and plotting the reactimeter data, 10 looking at control room graphs, gleaning whatever information 11 we could get from that.
12 0
I'd like to go on and ask you some very general 13 questions, and these are more just to get a sampling of
[}
14 l perspectives from B&W people than to dwell on any particular 15 expertise that you might have.
16 In your opinion, what is meant by the term an
- 7 unreviewed safety question?
Og A
I think it means somebody has postulated a problem n
H that has not been formally analyzed or is outside the bounds
- ,i of what has been formally analyzed already in Chapter 15 21 events in the FSAR.
(}
22 0
Okay.
What issues or problems should be submitted 23 to the NRC for review?
24 A
I guess problems that could have a significant Aco Federol Reporters. Inc.
25 safety concern should be submitted to them.
lll t
4
i 60 i
l O
How would you define a significant safety concern?
2 A
That has to be as each individual's judgment as to 3
what he thinks can really get the plant in trouble.
I don't 4
know if I can put words around it.
5 0
Is there a difference in your mind between 6
a significant safety concern and an unreviewed safety question?
7 A
Well, from the way I'm defining it, I think an 8
unreviewed safety question could be a subset of significant 9
safety concerns.
10 Q
So the significant safety concerns would be the 11 broader group?
12 A
Yes.
(
13 0
What would you do if you identified an issue that 14 i you felt should be brought to the attention of the NRC?
15 A
If I thought it should be brought to the attention 16 of the NRC, I would fill out a preliminary safety concern l
- 7 lI and turn it over to Licensing.
I!
I3 h Q
How is operating experience incorporated in the work U
that you do?
Ed A
Everything I review, I1 ring my operating experience il 21 to -- you 're talking about me personally?
O 22 O
I'm talking m re about how you would include not s
23 the operating experience from your own personal experience, r
24 F but the operating experience associated with plants that are l
Aes-Fsderci Reporters, Inc.
25 now in operation, B&W plants specifically that are now in i
i I
i
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61 P-1 operation.
How do you feed that back into the work that you 2
do?
3 A
Well, to my knowledge, there are site problem reports
()
4 that document problems that happen in the plants.
There is 5
an availability group that looks at and counts the numbers 6
of times, for instance, any particular valve would break, and 7
then if it gets to be significant, you look into the design of 8
that valve and methods of improving availability of the plants.
9 There is an organization in Customer Services 10 that we appoint a constant service manager for to deal i
11 directly with each plant, any problems that they have.
Each
'2 l operating plant has a resident engineer, a B&W engineer is 13 at the site that they can direct any problems that they have 14 to that man.
I' 15 Q
Well, that's more from the perspective of solving 16 the problem.
What I'm getting at is more from the perspective 17 of how this body of knowledge that's developed as a result v
15 of the operation of all these plants, that 400-some reactor U
years of operation, how is that information provided to you, l,
and how is it used by you in the work that you do?
2:
au3 21 '
A From where I'm operating, I see very little of that 22 coming back to me, other than a review of site problem reports
)
23 that I get involved with.
If there's anything else happtning, 24 I don' t directly know about it.
ACS Fed!fel Reporters, Inc.
25 Q
But is your review of site problem reports more fromI i
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62 I
the perspective of solving the problem or more from the 2
perspective of just being aware that it happened?
3 A
Both.
In the answer to your question, I was --
4 we get the review and Plant Integration site problem reports 5
from the aspect of incorporating it into any future design 6
or incorporating it into our newer design.
7 Q
So then you do make some effort to take these 8
site problem reports and feed back that information into 9
subsequent designs?
10 A
Yes.
Il Q
okay.
In the area of plant integration, what is 12 your perspective of the operator as far as how the operator is 13
{}
integrated into the plant?
Do you consider the operator at 14 all as a subsystem of the overall plant?
I' 15 I A
I guess if' you're talking about before Three 16 Mile Island, the answer is no, the whole system design I7 philosophy is to try and minimize operator involvement and i3 j get him out of the picture as much as possible.
If you' e talking about currentlyr there has a
72 q
obviously been a great recent emphasis on operator involvement 21 in getting him into the design of the plant, and I am running 22 a program now on abnormal transient operating guidelines 23 as a result of NUREG 0578, where we are taking a possible 24 plant malfunction and operator malfunctions and equipment Act Fedml Reponm. Inc.
25 malf unctions, and categorizing these and logically developing I
I
63 I
event trees, and then we are eventually going to develop 2
guidelines and give the operator not only. operating guidelines, 3
but also the basis and expected plant response, su that we
(
4 can close the loop between the engineer, the analyst. and 5
the safety analysis guy who analyzes the transient with 6
computer codes, and knows why he needs.to have a certain a __
7 safety function.
We want to reduce that to words and give 8
them to the operator so he can study them and have a greater 9
understanding of why he is being asked to do a certain thing.
10 We ask now there is a lot of emphasiso in our II organization in closing the loop between the engineer and 12 the operator.
r' 13 Q
Was that sort of work done prior to Three F
.s V) 14 Island?
15 A
No.
16 Q
Do you know why it wasn't done?
17 A
In my opinion, as I said, I thought it was just a 13 different philosophy.
We're trying to design the system to preclude any necessary operator action.
l 2I Q
Do you know of any other --
- i 21 BY MR. FOLSOM:
22 O
Let me ask a question,.following up on something
(}
23 Mr. Hebdon asked about integration of experience from the
-24 P industry into design variations.
Ace Federst Reporters, Inc.
25 Do you find any pressure not to vary designs-from t
l l
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the way that the NRC scheme is set up?
2 A
You find pressure to minimize design changes that 3
cost money.
4 0
From what sourcc dOes that pressure come?
5 A
It comes from my supervisors.
6 Q
Okay, from the industry side, then, I'n talking 7
now about "RC, its philosophy of supervising the industry, 8
does that philose phy tend to minimize design changes?
9 A
To minimize design changes?
10 Q
Do you understand what I'm driving at?
II A
No, I don' t think before Three Mile Island, the 12 NRC's emphasis has always been to design a system and change 13 the design of the system as necessary to preclude any operator 14 action, to get the guy out of the whole picture, following 15 up with what he's saying.
That's been their emphasis that I 16 can see.
17 Q
Well, quite apart from operator action, the 13 engineering design, is that -- does that tend to become I
stereotyped because of NRC pressures?
A I haven't seen it, but I don't get involved with 2C 21 them that much.
22 O
Okay.
Thank you.
1 23 BY MR. HEBDON:
24 l Q
Do you know of any other precursor events that AcsJeda$ Reporters, Inc, j
25 re relevant to the accident at TMI?
i
65
~
1 MR. EDGAR:
Do you understand the term precursor?
2 THE WITNESS:
Precursor, the only time I've heard 3
the word used is in nuclear reactions.
(/
4 BY MR. HEBDON:
5 Q
Well, let me define it, because I think we may be 6
using it a little bit differently than it's defined in the 3..
7 dictionary, anyway.
8 Precursor, in the sense of what I mean here, is 9
any sort of an event or an action that would have given some 10 indication or some forewarning that an accident such as TMI 11 might happen some day.
12 Your memo is considered to be a precursor.
The 13 Davis-Besse incident would be considered to be 'a precursor, 14 and what I'm wondering is if you know of any others that we 15 haven't discussed.
16 A
That I would consider precursor events to this 17 thing?
No.
13 BY MR. FOLSOM:
H Q
Does the Michaelson report strike a responsive
)
- :! chord?
b A
I have heard of it, I have never read it, I've 21 22 never had any dealings with it.
)
23 BY MR. HEBDON:
24 i
Q Do you have any additional information that might Ace-Federst Herorters, Inc.
25 be relevant to our inquiry surrounding the accident at TMI?'
\\
'I i
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A I don't think so.
2 O
Have we failed to elicit any information in areas 3
that you believe to be important?
4 A
No.
5 0
Is there anything else you want to say?
6 A
No.
7 MR. HEBDON:
Okay, do you have anything else?
8 MR. FOLSOMi'EIf the witness wants to volunteer 9
something, we are here to listen.
10 MR. HEBDON:
We 'll lis ten.
Il THE WITNESS:
No, I don' t have anything else to 12 say.
13 MR. EDGAR:
Off the record.
^
14
[ Discussion off the record.]
15 MR. HEBDON:
Let's go back on the record.
16 If you have nothing else to add, then that's all
- 7 we have.
That ends the interview.
l I3h Thank you very much.
5 I?
[Whereupon, at 2:55 p.m.,
the interview was 2 ;'
adjourned.]
21 h 22 i
23 i
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24
, Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 l
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