ML19308C377
| ML19308C377 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/21/1979 |
| From: | Vollmer R NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001230345 | |
| Download: ML19308C377 (81) | |
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i N U CLE A R RE G U L ATO R't CO MMIS SIO N i
IN THE MATTER OF:
i THREE MILE ISLAND SPECIAL INTERVIEWS I
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INTERVIEW OF RICHARD VOLLMER i
I Place -
Bethesda, Maryland i
Date -
Friday, September 21, 1979 Pages 1 - 81 l
,79,W31
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.4.osen.:
(202)047-3700 t
ACE - FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.
OffiaalReponers 444 North Ccpitol Street 8001230345 Woshington, D.C. 20001 l
NATIONWIDE COVERAGE DAILY l
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1 4
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1
2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AC1
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -x 3
4 In the Matter of:
5 THREE MILE ISLAND SFECIAL INTERVIEWS 6
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 7
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8 Room 9609 9
National Bank Building 7735 Old Georgetown Road 10 Bethesda, Maryland Friday, September 21, 1979 O
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13 For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
),
JOSEPH SCINTC., NRC Special Inquiry Group l
15 GEORGE T.
- FRAMPTON, JR.,
Special Inquiry Group 16 17 i
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_C _O _N _T _E N _T _S 2
3 WITNESS:
EXAMINATION Richard Vollmer 2
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P R O C E E D I N G S 2
MR. FRAMPTON:
This is a deposition being conducted l
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'by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comndssion's Special aquiry 4
Group on Three Mile Island, in Bethesda, Maryland on 5
September 21, 1979 of Mr. Richard vollmer.
6 Presentlin addition to Mr. Volmer are Joe Scinto and 7
Gar,rge Frampton, both of the Special Inquiry Group.
8 MR. SCINTO:
I have been delegated by the 9
Commission authority to administer the oath for the purpose 10 of taking your deposition today.
11 Would you please raise your right hand?
()
12 Whereupon, 13 RICHARD VOLLMER 14 was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn, was 15 examinea and testified as follows:
i 16 EXAMINATION I
17 BY MR. FRAMPTON:
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I 18 Q
Did you receive a letter from Mr.'Rogovin setting 19 for the purpose of this interview your rights in connection 20 with the interview and apprising you of the fact that in time
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(j 21 the transcript of the interview may become public information?
22 A
Yes, I did.
23 Q
And did you understand that and do you have any I
I 24 questions of that?
1m Feers! Reporters, inc.
25 A
I understood it and I have no questions.
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1 Q
Let me begin by asking you when you first learned of the incident at Three Mile Island and what you did briefly 2
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3 during the day on March 28.
4 A
I first learned of the accident around 8:15 a.m.
5 on March 28 when I went to Mr. Stello's office on an unrelated 6
matter and Mr. Stello, at that time, was on the phone to the 7
I&E headquarters office.
He was discussing with them the 8
information that was coming in relative to the accident.
9 Soon thereafter we formed a small group in the Division 10 of Operating Reactornoffices, near my office, because Il Mr. Stello and others went over to the incident center at
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I2 that time.
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Our small group was trying to pull together information 14 and independent of the incident center understand what was s
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15 going on and studying the systems involved, pulling together I
16 system diagrams and so on, to again try to obtain an l
l 17 understanding of what was going on and make any possible 18 recommendation and be available as more or less a technical i
19 support group to the incident response center.
20 So that carried on all through the March 28 until early
(')T 21 evening on the 28th in a conversation with Mr. Stello he
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22 suggested that I form a group to go up to the site the 23 follwoing morning.
24 Q
During the day were you periodically given 2ce Federst Reporters, Inc.
25 information about what the incident response center was il
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I hearing from the site as to plant status?
2 A
Yes.
We were getting plant status from the
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3 incident response center.
We were also in communication on 4
a periodic basis with Babcock & Wilcox in Lynchburg.
We 5
were, again, trying to understand the facts as they were 6
coming in.
7 First the facts were rather sparce, but I think between 8
the incident response center and B&W, we were able to form 9
a picture of roughly what had happened and the status of the 10 plant and try to understand at that time what was important 11 to do to bring the plant into a more normal status.
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i 12 For example, much of the effort during that day was at w,
13 trying to reestablish recirculation flow through the core.
14 That because obviously the core was not getting adequate flow, 15 the temperatures were relatively high and with all the pumps i
16 turned off there was, I would ssy, concern at that time that i
17 further damage might proceed.
13 I don't think that, from my own personal point of view, e
l9 I had a good understanding that the core had been so severely 20 damaged at that time.
Many of us felt that from what we knew
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21 of the circumstances that many or all of the fuel elements had l t
22 failed in terms of releasing the fission gas in the top space t
23 of the fuel rods.
But I don't think that I personally felt 24 l that the core damage had been as significant as it was or as i
Ace Fedwa' Reporters. Inc. l 25 l significant as we knew when we found out of the massive j
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hydrogen release.
2 Yousaid first thing in the morning that you started O
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3 to get out various documents and try to_ figure out what had happened.
At that time you couldn't have known very much about 5
the facts from the site.
Was getting a group together 6
primarily to have people and information available about how 7
this kind of plant ordinarily responds in the case of a trip 8
and so on, so when you got information you could work on it?
9 A
Yes.
We had reactor systems people.
We had the 10 project manager for the license of that particular plant.
11 Q
Who is that?
A Harley Silver.
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I3 We had people who were knowledgeable about accident 14 analysis and radiological calculations and back-calculating 15 from -- for example, a measured dose at a place away from i
6 the site and knowing the meteorology and getting an estimate ofhow much of the release had taken place.
i I
These types of people that were familiar with these 19 calculations could do them in a quick and reasonably accurate 20 way.
I mean people with experience in that type of thing i
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21 rather than going to a computer code reading.
22 0
Where were you located physically?
i 2'
A At that time we were physically located in
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Darryl Eisenhut's offier.
)ce-Feder ' neporters ine 25 Q
Where is that in relation to the incident response I
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center that was set up?
2 A
Eisenhut's office is in the -- as mine is -- in rx(,)
3 the Phillips Building complex and the incident response center 4
is over on East-West Highway.
They are roughly half to a 5
three-quarters of a mile apart.
6 I personally did not go to the incident response center at 7
all throughout theewhole course of this event except for a 8
few minutes on Thursday morning when we stopped in before we 9
embarked for TMI just to see -- get a last minute update of 10 what was going on.
II O
Did you have good communications with the incident 12
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response center; if you needed to find out complete
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13 up-to-date plant status, could you grab a phone and say, 14 "Okay, give it to me," and you would get it?
15 A
I think that we.were getting the information as l
i 16 much as was known at that time.
But I think part of the l
l 17 problem was difficult to be able to ask the right questions 18 until you understood what was going on.
So we were getting j
19 information.
f I think we were getting all the information that we could 20 21 from them and from B&W, but I think the problem that a lot of 22 people had in the beginning of the accident was not being able 23 to ask the right questions, to get the right information out.
24 i
For example, at 8:00 o' clock in the morning, if NRC had
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25 concentrated and asked the I&E inspectors up there what the f
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1 fuel temperatures were and so on, which I don't think was 2
done, that would have given a different perspective perhaps
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3 than asking for plant conditions.
4 O
My question really goes not to whether people were 5
asking the right questions to get the information from the 6
site, but rather whether your group in the Phillips Building 7
was getting all of the information that the incident response 8
center people were getting.
9 A
I guess it would have to be a judgment on my part.
10 The judgment on my part would be that we were kept as 11 informed as the people in the incident response center.
12 0
Did anybody suggest that your group ought to move
(~)T 13 over to set up in or around the incident response center 14 and be able to talk to the site on the telephone, if necessary?
15 A
Not to my knowledge, nobody suggested that.
I was 16 quite aware that the incident response center had a similar 17 technical capability setup.
They also had the systems people i
l 18 and radiological people over there already.
So knowing the i
19 logistics of the information and the people that already 20 existed in the incident response center, we didn't feel O
21 compelled in any way to get involved in that particular act.
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22 We felt, I think, that our better mission was to try to 23 solve any special problems that might have come up.
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24 example, we were asked to do such things as -- given a piece t
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of information on radiological release, what your best estimate' l
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8 jon-1 of what might have taken place, We did those type of problems, 2
O I certainly don't want to suggest that it was a f
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3 bad idea for you to have pulled together a bunch of people who 4
had a lot to offer here.
But why do that if there is a 5
separate group of people trying to do the same thing who are 6
located at the incident response center?
7 You see what I am asking?
You suggested that they had a 8
group and there was a group in the Phillips Building.
Why 9
weren't these two groups pooled or why wasn't there some 10 attempt to bring together the people who would be able to offer 11 the most familiarity with the project and the plant itself in
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12 one place?
13 A
I think that the people that we had in our group in 14 Bethesda probably had more familiarity with that particular 15 plant than some of the people at the incident response center. i l
l 16 I think we were set up to try to understand rather than to l
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17 advise on very current situations basis and, you know, as you i
18
- say, it might have been better to have us together, you know.
i 19 That is a judgment question.
I 20 Q
You said you had gotten information from B&W in f_)
21 Lynchburg?
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Yes.
i 23 Q
During the day.
Did you get plant status information' 24 from them as well as from the incident response center of the i
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A Yes, we did, as a matter of fact.
Normally our 2
communication with B&W at that time was one of calling them O
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and clarifying, perhaps, a lack of understanding on our part 4
of certain things that were going on, or asking specific 5
questions on the systems and how they might have operated 6
because we may not have had as detailed a knowledge as we 7
would have liked.
We would call B&W.
But we did get plant 8
status on them.
9 If I recall, I think that B&W was the first one to let 10 us -- to be heard that they had restarted the reactor 11 effluent pumps.
12 Q
Did you hear during the day that people from B&W Cs}
13 were making any recommendations or trying to make any 14 recommendations about the strategy that the people at the 15 plant.should follow to achieve forced cooling?
l 16 A
Yes.
We were aware of the strategy.
I think the i
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strategy as it evolved was, for a while there, to try to get
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18 the decay heat removal system operating by reducing the i
19 pressure down to a point where that could be achieved.
They 20 were not able to do that so the strategy changed somewhat to
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23 day to minute strategy.
24 O
Were you aware of whether B&W engineers were l
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strategy?
2 The reason I am asking the question is that it appears that 3
B&W people made attempts during' the afternoon to reach the
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4 control room and Unit 2 and tell them or strongly recommend 5
to them to repressurize the system.
But they were unable to 6
get through with that message.
7 I am wondering wnether there were any conversations 8
betweer your group and B&W in which the B&W people expressed 9
frustration or dissatisfaction about getting through to the 10 plant.
II A
Not that I recall.
I2
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MR. SCINTO:
Excuse me.
Who in B&W -- either 13 persons or groups or kinds of people -- can you recall your Id groups -- not the IRC people, but your groups work with?
15 l THE WITNESS:
They had a specific group setup, i
16 I think somewhat along the lines that we had wherein, you I7 know, squawkboxe communication would most likely take place.
lI think they had a fair amount of communication with the IRC.
18 l9 l I would have to go back and try to look at some notes or f
something.
I don't recall specific names at this time 20
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21 because I am not familiar with any of the B&W people.
22 MR. SCINTO:
But was it your impression they were in l
communication with the site?
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THE WITNESS:
Yes.
Because they did give us some WFeders' Reporters, Inc.
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MR. SCINTO:
Let me pursue just one more point.
2 Do you have any picture about what time during the day?
3 Early in the day or very late in the day?
4 THE WITNESS:
Late afternoon I'
think we had 5
more communication with B&W than any other time.
6 MR. SCINTO:
That is the point at which you felt 7
that they were in communication with the site?
8 THE WITNESS:
- Yes, endl 9
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BY MR. FRAMPTON :
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O Was it Mr. Stello who asked you to get together people
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to go to the site?
4 A
Yes.
5 Q
What did he tell you that your mission or role was to 6
be there?
7 A
Well, that was sort of open.-
He felt -- we all felt 8
that there was a lack of communication -- adequate communication 9
between the site and.the groups that were needed, knowledge 10 of what was going on.
11 When he originally suggested that we pull together the
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12 group he said we had to have a firsthand knowledge of what was 13 going on and also they wanted us to reconstruct, as best we 14 could on an early time basis, what had happened.
Put together 15 the system responses and things of that nature.
16 So I got two experienced system people, two instrumentation 17 control people, and two radiological people.
That was the 18 group that was formed.
19 Q
Were you originally told that this group would assist 20 in recovery?
21 A
No.
No.
I think it characterized to the extent that
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22 it was because we went up without a real definitive charter i
23 in my view, but one of trying to establish communication and 24 understand what was going on and reconstruct the sequences of l
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25 prior in the past day so that we could perhaps understand what i
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might best be done in the next few days.
4 2
Q Did you understand that you would be taking over
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3 all NRC activities on the site?
That you would be in charge 4
of all the NRC _ people on-site?
5 A
Well, I think at the time I went up, I knew that -- I 6
was the senior NRC person on the site.
I&E operation was 7
already established.
8 Q
They had several teams of people?
9 A
Several teams.
10 Q
And supervisors?
11 A
That's right.
And I assumed that I would be the
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12 principal NRC contact on the site but --
13 O
Contact with whom?
14 A
With Bethesda.
We can get to that later.
But as 15 far as involving myself in the environmental measurements or 16 the inspection activities at the site, my role there was one 17 of juct keeping abreast and trying to integrate the findings 18 that they had with the findings that we had in terms of the 19 system itself and 'inar to make recommendations on that basis.
20 0
Did anybody tell you in substance, look, there have
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22 you are the supervisor of all the NRC people there, they all 23 report to you and you are going to tell them what to do?
l 24 A
No.
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All right.
I have read somewhere that there are l
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people who thought or say they thought that the team that you
-2 took down there was primarily a recovery team, to help
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3 recover the plant.
You say that is not precisely your 4
understanding; is that correct?
5 A
Well, I don't think that recovery was --
6 Q
Really talked about?
7 A
Really talked about at all at that time.
Understand-8 ing what was going on and trying to provide assurance that 9
further damage to the system and releases of radioactivity 10 could be precluded to the extent possible was the objective.
11 I don't think we even thought recovery for a substantial 12 period of time af ter that.
It depends on what you mean'by
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13 recovery, you know.
14 0
We have a very rough transcript of a telephone 15 conversation that appears to be a conversation between Mr.
16 Stello and Boyce Grier, the director of Region 1,in which Mr.
17 Stello is telling Mr. Grier that your group is not coming 18 down there to take over charge of NRC activities, but will 19 concern itself with licensing issues only.
20 I am not sure precisely what that means, but does that accord 21 with your understanding of just what you were told to do?
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22 A
well, I guess licensing issues would be curren:
23 problems of the plant itself.
I think what Stello might have 24 meant there is that if the licensee needed to have an W-Feded Reconers. tre.
25 emergency change authorized to his license to perform an l
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activity that was felt to be needed at that time, I had that 2
authority.
However, I think people weren't really concerned O
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3 at that point with exactly what the license said.
They were 4
concerned with trying to achieve some sort of a normality in 5
the overall process.
6 Q
We also have a transcript that indicates that on 7
Thursday morning Mr. Gossick told the commissioners in a 8
briefing that your team was going down there to take over 9
supervision of all NRC activities on-site.
10 Does that accord with your understanding of what you were Il told you should do?
(~T 12 A
I think I indicate before that that would not have
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I think the Stello conversation 14 with Grier would be more in accord with the understanding.
15 Although when I did get on the site, Mr. Keimig, who is 16 the lead I&E representative on the site at that time, had 17 acknowledged in a sense that I was the senior NRC man on the 18 site and essentially said if there was any particular thing I
l 19 that I wanted him to do, to let him know.
20 I said, Since they seem to have things pretty well theyweredoing!
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21 established, I wanted them to continue on what
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22 and we would try to do the job we thought we were there for.
23 Q
The Commission has a very brief emergency plan which,
I 24 I understand was developed after the Brown's Ferry fire i
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l 25 which defines an emergency management team and so on and so i
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forth.
Do you know whether there had ever been any drills 2
or seminars or dry runs of how people would respond in the (D
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3 event that a large number of commission staff members had to 4
respond to some kind of a major accident?
5 A
I was never involved in any.
The incident response 6
center had been activated on a number of times and people had 7
been called over.
I am not really sure they had been called 8
over in accordance with the team concept laid out by those 9
charts.
I think they may have been called over in accordance 10 with specific wishes of people at that time.
So I had never 11 been involved in any exercise.
(~)S 12 Q
Before you went down or up to the site, what were 13 you told by Mr. Stello or others either Wednesday night or 14 Thursday morning about the plant status?
What was the 15 impression that you had in your mind, the in'ormation that you 16 had in your mind about the situation there when you got in the 17 car and left for TMI?
18 A
Okay.
19 0
I know that is hard after the fact, but --
20 A
Not too, because we discussed it on the way up in the
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21 car.
The picture we had of the plant status was one that 22 at that time the plant parameters were reasonably stabilized 23 and that the temperatures, pressures, and flows in the primary 24 system had been established.
Heat from the plant was being Lee-Federst Reporters, Inc.
25 discharged by a reasonably normal means, a steam generator.
I l
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The extent of the core damage that I had pictured in my 2
mind at that time was pretty much as I described before, one O'
3 of apparently the rupture of a high fraction of the fuel pins 4
themselves.
But I certainly did not have a picture of the 5
massive amount of core damage, with core damage down to perhaps 6
a level of half way down the core which was indeed the case.
7 At that time we didn't have -- we weren't aware of the 8
mnount of hydrogen that had been generated.
So I think -- I 9
guess my best characterization was that there had been a 10 severe accident accompanied by on-site releases that would II probably persist for some time, because we knew that a
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12 significant amount of radioactivity had been released from the 13 fuel and that plant conditions were still not terribly stable, 14 because they did have difficulty in keeping their pressures 15 and their levels and their makeup tank -- let down and makeup 16 tank parameters stable over e long period of time.
17 So there were some questions about plant stability.
But 18 it did not appear that the situation presented any immediate 19 threats.
Things seemed to be under control, if you will.
20 Q
Did you have the impression that they had pretty much
()
21 gotten it under control after struggling with most of the day, 22 once they got the main reactor coolant pumps started again?
23 A
I think that was a milestone that ended the struggle 1
24 during the day to achieve some stability.
I think that was a h Fewd Remum, N.
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Q And you did have some knowledge that they were having 2
problems with maintaining let down?
3 A
Yes.
Because they were -- they were having problems --
4 well.
I guess I didn't know tha* *ae first day, rather in 5
the morning of the second day, pe. ticularly when I got up at 6
the site.
Because it was clear by that time that they were 7
having a fair amount of gas being released to the makeup 8
tank and I think it was in that day, the second day, that it 9
seemed to correlate the facts that when they had to release 10 gas from the makeup tank, they were also getting high radiation Il levels both in the areas and as releases out the plant vent.
()
12 And I don't know particularly if it was well understood 13 why the system was off gassing as much as it did.
I don't 14 think that my group on-site came to the conclusion that it was 15 because there was so much hydrogen generation from the metal 16 water reaction.
17 Whether or not the people in Bethesda understood why so much 18 gas generation was taking place or gas evolution out of the l9 reactor coolant device, I can't say because our communications l
20 until late Thursday night were rather poor with Bethesda.
~
()
21 Q
What happened when you got up there?
Maybe you can 22 take us through Thursday chronologically?
23 A
Okay.
When I got up to the site, I went to the 24 observation center.
That was roughly between 11:00 and 11:30 Sce Foder:A Reporters, Inc.
25 Thursday morning.
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Q Did you first go to the motel and meet Mr. Higgins?
2 A
Yes.
A
(_)
3 Q
Who took you to the site?
4 A
Exactly.
At the site I met with Herbein; I don't 5
think he was there when I first got there.
He was briefing 6
somebody.
But very shortly thereafter, Herbein got back to 7
the site and he briefed me as to the reactor status.
8 They had set up there somewhat of a command post at the 9
observation center, and they were in pretty constant 10 communication with the control room.
11 Q
Did you make any attempts to get on the island?
Was
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O 13 A
We didn't make an attempt to get on the site at that 14 time because I didn't really see any purpose in it.
15 I,
of course, knew that I&E had inspectors on the site.
I 16 was in -- through I&E could be in communication with them 17 and they were in communication with Bethesda.
18 What I did was discuss the situation with Keimig.
I asked 19 two of my people to follow what I&E was doing in the taking 20 of samples and the environmental monitoring.
The balance, 21 the five of us, concerned ourselves with trying to establish 22 or get up to date on the systems, where they stood at that i
23 point in time, what their plans were for the next few hours 24 or few days.
i h FMnd Amortm, W.
1 25 Q
Did you have a hard time finding somebody at the i
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observation center who would sit down with you and lay out what 2
was known up to that time?
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3 A
No, not really.
I think that they were pretty 4
cooperative.
There was a great deal of confusion there.
But 5
I think that they were very cooperative with us in letting us 6
know, in my view, letting us know what they knew.
7 And, again, their information like that of the incident a
response center was not gained by getting a complete integrated 9
picture of what was going on, but getting a picture by asking 10 questions.
11 0
The observation center didn' t have any contact with
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12 Bethesda at that time; did it?
With NRC headquarters?
V 13 A
No.
No direct contact.
14 0
You said before that you met Mr. Keimig at the 15 observation center.
Was this when you arrived, do you recall, 16 or later in the afternoon?
17 A
Oh, it was shortly after we arrived.
Mr. Keimig 18 and Mr. Stohr were too involved and I believe before noon I 19 had talked to Keimig.
20 Q
Did Mr. Stohr have some kind of set up there at the
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21 observation center?
Was there an I&E man posted?
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22 A
That was set up next to the parking lot on tne road.
23 They had some radio phones that they could communicate with 24 the survey teams that were out.
They had also communication j
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l 25 through that means to the control room.
They had I&E people i
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in both Unit 1 and Unit 2 control rooms.
They were there for 2
different purposes, but in both control rooms, eii 3
Q But you didn' t get your plant status information m
4 direct over that radio phone?
5 A
No.
I got it from the status boards that Met Ed 6
had in the observation tower.
7 Q
Had you met Jack Herbein before?
8 A
No.
I didn't know him.
9 Q
Did he appear to be the person in charge?
10 A
Yes.
11 Q
For Met Ed at that point?
/'
12 A
Yes, definitely.
About the same time I guess -- let's.
'w.j) 13 see, about the same tim.e Herman Dieckamp came on-site and I 14 had known him from sometime before from past jobs that I have 15 held.
16 I think Mr. Arnold came on-site at that time, too.
I am i
I 17 not quite sure, but I think he did.
Basically, my contact j
f I
18 was with Herbein.
He seemed to provide the integration of 19 the plant -- the management integration for the whole plant.
j i
20 In other words, the people in the survey teams doing the 21 surveys and so on for Det Ed, they got their instructions from 22 Herbein.
It appeared that when movement was made in terms i
i 23 of activating or shutting down or making alterations to systems l
24 or process in the plant, it was Herbein who was consulted on AwFMwd Reponus, W. )
j 25 those decisions.
I was present when he was sketching out l
jc 11 22 1
systems, pieces of paper, trying to make decisions on what 2
should or shouldn't be done in the plant.
(~\\
3 It was my view from there that he was basically responsible ll 4-for the decisionmaking that was going on in the plant.
5 MR. SCINTO:
I have a question of timing on that.
6 Can I have a picture of during that cay --
7 THE WITNESS:
During the day, the first thing that we 8
did was get briefed on what was going on.
I made assignments 9
to the people in my group, as I said, with the radiological 10 people to follow with the I&E operation, to see that they were 11 satisfied that both the. extent of the I&E surveys were adequate
()
12 and that in their view the releases were not something that 13 should be alarming from a public point of view, public safety, 14 we should think about evacuation or anything like that.
15 Secondly, I asked the systems people to try to get the 16 information they could to start forming a scenario of what 17 had happened to evaluate the systems that could be useful in 18 keeping the reactor conditions in a stable condition in the 19 next -- then I think we were talking about the next few hours t
20 or few days.
21 We weren' t looking too much further than that.
As part of
()
22 this, Senator Hart and Representative McCormick both brought 23
'eams up to the site.
We sat in on those briefings which 24 took, I would say roughly, half an hour to 40 minutes apiece.
i i
AwJewst Recrters, inc.
25 We got,at that time, some fairly good background on what, as i
I I
je 12 1
best Met Ed knew it at that time, what had actually happened.
2 I guess that is the first time I had gotten a detailed re-3 construction of the scenario as they understood it at that 4
time.
Prior to that, I was just discussing with Herbein end 2 5
actual plant conditions.
6 7
8 9
10 11 0
13 14 15 16 i
17 18 19 20 O
22 23 1
24 w.Federst Reporters, Inc.
25 l
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1 BY MR. FRAMPTON:
3 1p 1 2
O Did Mr. Herbein do those briefings?
4GPg W
3 A
Yes,-he did.
4 Q
Did he tell the Congressman and Senator anything inconsistent with what he had told you?
5 6
A No.
I think -- my recollection back on that was as well as my recollection back on other information 7
- one, that Met Ed had given us, I never felt that they told me any-8 thing that was not the best that they knew or tried to hide 9
10 anything from me.
I felt that the communications were open 11 in retrospect.
I think there were a lot of things that
's 12 never came to light either to their management, for example, (G
in hydrogen burning of the morning of the 28 which didn't 13 14 come to light until sometime Friday.
15 I think these were things that were just not generally 16 known and for that reason not passed along.
I felt that 17 they told us what they knew.
18 0
Were the briefings of the Congressman and 19 Senator relatively reassuring in tone as you recall it?
20 A
Yes, I would say they were relatively reassuring.
t I think the expression was made that the plant was in a very 7
21
)
stable condition at that point in time and that the cooling 22 23 systems were operative and that there were back up systems 24 available.
The only part that wasn't reassuring and couldn't 2ceJederaf Reporters, Inc.
25 be was that they didn't fully understand why the releases I
i
25 rip 2 1
were continuing.
I don't know if a great large point was made IGM 2
of that, but basically I would call it reassuring.
/ ')
You said that you learned on Thursday that b
s/
3 0
4 they were degasing the system through the make-up tank, 5
that is, getting a lot of gas in the make-up tank and at some 6
point had correlated the venting of the make-up tank with 7
releases.
I believe we have some notes that show -- control 8
room notes that show that correlation was made at least by 9
late afternoon or early evening of Thursday by people in the 10 control room.
Do you remember what you learned about this 11 on Thursday and from whom you learned it?
i
(^,
12 A
Well, I would say I learned it in the late l
'w/
l 13 afternoon Thursday, probably after the Washington tours had i
14 ended.
It became fairly apparent that let down flows,achiev-l i
15 ing a stable let down flow and stable make-up tank levels were 16 a continuing problem.
The pressure was building up in the 17 make-up tank much faster than they normally would have 18 expected and as this pressure was built up, they did have to l
19 release that to the make-up -- to the waste gas decay system.
i i
20 It was apparent that when they did that, they did get area r
21 alarms going off and so forth.
22 They did get monitored releases from the helicopters.
M I think I asked the question at that time, you know, why is i
24.j there so much gas generation.
I guess I never got an answer.
Ace Feder:t Reporters. Inc.
I 25 O It was not possible, of course, for anybody to measure the h
i
26 elp 3 1
constituents of the gas from a cheraical point of view, they MGM 2
just knew that they were highly radioactive.
I think it was
,/
\\
3 clear at that point, too, that there was -- the system itself, which is basically a compressor which onould take 4
5 that gas and put it into a -- into the waste gas decay tanks 6
which are a normal part of the facility, just were not 7,
functioning as they should.
I just didn't understand why they really couldn't get in and do anything about it because 8
9 the radiation levels were se high.
10 Q
here was some appreciation of the fact that 11 there were leaks or problems with the compressor or something 12 like that?
13 A
Right.
The thought at the time was that a valve 14 was sticking open and there was a substantial leak in the 15 valve -- the valve that would have to open to discharge the 16 gas from the make-up tank.
That seemed to be the culprit i
17 at that time.
18 0
Were you aware that they were consciously, that f
t 19 is, intentionally, venting the make-up tank periodically?
20 A
Yes.
i 8
(
21 Q
Was this discussed during the briefings?
Do you i
l 22 recall that as a possible source of releases continuing, low i
i 23 level releases?
24 A
I don't think so but I don't recall.
I have a j
i Ace-Feers RMeners, Inc.
25 tape of one of the briefings that the State sent me, they had i
i 4
i i
27 1
taped it.
But I have never listened to it.
glp4 CGM 2
Q Do you recall whether you were aware on O
k/
Thursday of the kinds of readings that they were getting 3
4 right over the stack?
5 A
Thursday of the kinds of readings, "es.
Data was being reported to Region 1 and was 6
transmitted back to Bethesda, apparently, Thursday night 7
showing short readings of 1200 MR and 3000 MR on Thursday.
8 9
Were you aware of those kinds of readings?
10 A
I was certain;y aware of some of several hundred 11 MR during the day Thursday.
We were keeping close track of
('T 12 the on-site, on-ground doses in off-site areas.
None of
\\s/
13 these were particularly high.
14 0
You don't remember 2000?
15 A
No, I don't remember 3000?
I think the highest 16 that I recall was on Friday morning is when I was told that i
17 there was a helicopter reading of 1200 MR.
j MR. SCINTO:
But Friday morning, that was the 18 j
19 highest one you had heard of?
THE WITNESS:
The highest one I had heard of was l
20 21 Friday morning, yes.
It was 1200 MR.
My question was what
{}
i 22 were the doses off-site on land, populated areas.
I was told i
at that time that they were on the order or 10 or so MR.
23 24 BY MR. FRAMPTON:
l 2ce Federot Reporters, Inc.
25 Q
It appears from our interviews that a number of l
I
28 clp 5 people who were at the observation center, a good part of 4GM 2
the day Friday --
I'm sorry, Thursday and Thursday evening --
3 were aware of some stack releases that -- on the order of 4
400 to 500 MR maximum but were not aware of any 1200 or 3000 5
MR release.
Does that correspond with your recollection?
6 A
That's.what I said.
The first one that I heard of being in the thousand or higher MR was Friday morning.
7 8
0 Do you think that would have made a difference 9
in your assessment of the seriousness of the situation if l
10 they were chalking up numbers for instantaneous measurements 1
11 of stack releases in the thousand of MR Thursday?
Or would 12 that have been the same order of magnitude of seriousness?
(}
13 A
I guess I would have to say the seriousness 14 of the situation would have been not a specific MR per hour 15 reading above the plant but how many ' curies per second or l-l 16 something like that were going out that we could in fact 17 calculate.
Because that has the most significance in what 18 the dose is off-site.
I guess our general thoughts was to l
t 19 follcw very carefully the off-site readings and make our t
i 20 judgment on that basis.
l 6
21 We were aware that many of the monitors were reading j {}
22 high in the plant and I don't think I felt that they were
{
23 particularly indicative of what. dose the public was receiving.
24 I felt more comfortable about actual off-site measurements.
j i
pm-FWers Remnon, tnc.
25 MR. SCINTO:
You also indicated that from the j
4 i
_., - -..., ~
29 flp6 1
standpoint of assessing the situation you wanted to know in WGM terms of what releases were in terms of curies.
2
()
3 THE WITNESS:
We didn't have that capability.
4 MR. SCINTO:
I'm trying to get a picture of why you felt back calculated from an environmental reading 5
and then back calculating with meteorological readings 61
}
and various assumptions of what is going on tells you more 7
about what is going on in the plant than a closehand reading 8
under those conditions, not general matter but the conditions 9
10 you saw then.
Why did you have more faith in off-site 11 readings?
12 THE WITNESS:
Because it appeared that the
{'
l on-site readings were -- certain instruments w'ere off scale.
13 The stack monitor would have been perhaps the most reliable 14 15 reading and that was not available.
What we were getting 16 was simply helicopter readings at some position above the
-l plant with the down draft blowing the fission products away.
l 17 I frankly just didn't have much faith in it.
18 19 (Recess.)
BY MR. FRAMPTON:
20 fN 21 Q
On Thursday, did you send some of your people
(_)
22 onto the site to try to get scme additional information?
23 A
Yes.
The sysetms and the instrumentation control 24 people did go on site and in late afternoon, early evening, f
co Feders Reporters, Inc.
25 they were on site in the security area talking to the Met Ed i
i d
\\
30 1p 7 1
people, and I believe at that time also some B & W people
, GM 2
who were trying to put together the background scenario of
()
3 the accident and trying to bring it to a current status so 4
they could find out what systems were performing satisfactorily.
5 Q
Was that basically what you were trying to do 6
at that point, reconstruct what had happened to get a better 7
understanding of where you were?
8 A
I think that was, as I indicated in response 9
to your question earlier, I think that was the basic mission 10 as I saw it.
Reconstruction, developing the plans for the 11 very immediate future to be sure that enough systems were 12 available to keep the plant in safe condition.
13 0
Was your group looking at future, possible 14 future failures or breakdowns at that point?
In other 15 words, were you supposed to be looking at what happens if 16 we now have a loss of coolant accident or another loss of 17 coolant accident?
18 A
We were looking at such things as what happens 19 if we lose the reactor coolant and pumps and what cooling 20 modes can we achieve in the core, things of that nature.
So 21 I guess in a sense we were looking at contingencies even at 22 that time.
23 Q
Can you describe what you and other members of i
I 24 l
{
your group did the rest of that day?
l 3D Federst Reporters, Inc.
25 A
The rest of that day, we went back to the motel I
31 clp 8 1
where I had set up a conference room, a working room if you MGM 2
will, and we worked that night in the motel room in communi-O k/
3 cation with the incident response center, putting together 4
the information that we had gained during the day and keeping 5
abreast of the situation at the plant during the evening.
6 Things really didn't change particularly on Thursday 7
evening in terms of plant parameters and so on.
The releases 8
were continuing and the plant parameters themselves were 9
reasonably stable, so that the evening was spent trying to 10 develop in more graphic form what the accident scenario was,
'l l the performance of.the systems that led up to it.
12 O
Had you been able to establish communications
()
13 with Bethesda during the day, prior to the evening?
Can 14 you talk about the communications problems that you had?
15 A
Communications were very bad.
At the observation i
16 center there were a few phone lines.
Even when the phone 17 was available, some of the circuits were often busy.
t 18 I can recall actually crawling under one of the tables l
19 to get away from the noise and the people and so on and f
20 actually trying to hold a phone conversation back to Bethesda. !
21 In one case I had to drive back to Middletown to call back
{~-)
s 22 because even the pay phone happened to be out of order at I
23 the response center, and there weren't any phones generally 24 available.
There were a few homes around there but I didn't beFeery Remners Inc.
j 25 feel I would burst in on people and use that.
So I drove back
1 8
32 i
1p 9 1
to Middletown to make some phone calls.
[JGM 2
The communications really were all right after we got 3
back to the motel.
4 Q
What motel were you staying at?
5 A
The Skyways.
I told them that there would be 6
a lot of people up there and we needed a place to hold sort 7
of a meeting room, and they gave us a free room to meet in, 8
a'large room.
They set up some large table in it so we could 9
have board space.
So I had seven or eight of us in there that 10 evening working on the scenario.
11 Q
Do you remember there was a flap about release 12 of contaminated industrial waste water?
{}
13 A
Yes.
14 Q
During the afternoon or evening of Thursday?
i 15 A
Yes.
16 0
What do you recall about that?
l 17 A
Well, we didn't really get involved in that too i
18 much except as being sort of after the fact.
I guess my 19 recollection is that we heard that Met Ed was making a 20 release and somehow the State got involved because there were 21 some noble gases in the water, detectable activity in the
/^)%
l 22 water.
So the NRC called a halt to the release until we 23 could better understand what was going on.
24 The understanding involved the fact that the -- they were j
t hm FMwst Reporters, inc.
25 industrial wastes, they were well below maximum permissible i
i i
1
33 rip 10 1
concentration and what is more, if we didn't release the MGM 2
water, it was just going to overflow anyway.
There was 3
just no place for the additional water to go.
So it would 4
be better to put it into the main portion of the rive rather s
than having it overflow into a more stagnant portion.
Whether 6
the activity was -- would have been high or low, it would 7
have been preferable from an environmental point of view to 8
put it where you had the most dilution in the river.
So I 9
think after a period of a few hours it was agreed by all that 10 the release -- it was appropriate to continue the release.
'I 11 So it was continued.
cam
(])
12 O
Do you recall what role you played in that?
13 Did you have a role in trying to ascertain what it was they 14 were doing and what the problem was?
15 A
No.
I didn't personally.
I'm just trying to 16 recall the exact time frame.
I guess that was Thursday 17 afternoon, if my recollection is right.
Eleanor Adensam 18 who I had brought up as one of the radiological experts with 19 us, I think sge was in communication with Bethesda, but out 20 role in that was not really one of decisionmaking or anything.
f 21 We were just informed of what was going on.
I think we were
()
22 asked to try to find out what the activity was in the water l
23 and, of course, that was I & E's job, and she was in communi-l 24 cation with I & E.
j Sce Feerd Reprters, inc.
25 0
You were asked by Bethesda to find out?
)
I
34 rlp 11 1
A I believe that Bethesda was in communication with MGM 2
I & E at that time and I don't think we were asked directly k-)
3 to find out anything.
4 Q
Did you find out anything during the evening 5
of late evening that would indicate that the situation was more serious than you had previously thought it to be?
6 7
The evening of Thursday?
8 A
No.
No.
Either in our reconstruction of what was 9
going on or our communication with Bethesda, I don't recall l
10 anything which would have indicated things were more serious.
11 I have to say that we still were concerned about a lack of
(~T 12 full understanding of why the releases were continuing.
I l
\\_)
13 think we knew where they were coming from but not a good 14 understanding of why we wouldn't hold up that gaseous activity.
15 Other than that, I think the feeling was that the plant and i
16 the system itself was performing about as was expected for i
17 the decay hear that was there and for the one pump running.
We thought that the system parameters were reasonably stable.
13 17 :
O Let me tell you what information we have which is l!
20 very fragmentary.
Let me see if that refreshes your recol-(~}
21 lection at all.
%s 22 Apparently Mr. Wilson, Richard Wilson, AGPU engineer, made an assessment late Thursday night from whatever informa-23 24 tion was available to him, I think perhaps the primary coolant ce Fe trat Reporters, Inc.
25 I
sample that had been taken that afternoon and other information, I
l c
35 rip 12 1
that the condition of the core was quite degraded.
As a MGM 2
result of that, he decided to get a lot more help from GPU
,C) s 3
the next day.
He had some conversations with people quite 4
late in the evening about his assessment.
Do you recall 5
knowing about that or talking to GPU people late at night on 6
Thursday about this?
7 A
I talked to Wilson and some of his people on 8
Thursday night.
As a matter of fact, we drove over to their 9
hotel probably at -- I would say about 10:00 o' clock is as 10 close as I can pin it down.
We drove over to their hotel f
11 and I took with me Jerry Mazetis and Jerry Klingler, I think 12 were the two people were me.
We discussed with Wilson, and
{}
13 I think he had two of his people there.
But their assessment 14 was that what the plans for the next few days were -- and 15 I don't think I came out of that meeting with any different tnd 3 16 impression than I had before I went in.
l t
17 18 I
n 20 y 21 i
22 1
I t
23
{
24 Acy.Fedsrst Reporters, Inc.
l 25(
i i
3
HCR 7 240 36 MGM #4 jc 1 1
Q Do you remember what he told you his assessment was 2
at that time?
g)
's-3 A
I think the assessment at that time was that there 4
had been a substantial fission product release which we knew.
5 I don't think that we discussed the degradation of the core 6
except to the effect that I think we agreed that most of the 7
fuel pins themselves had probably ruptured, which is something 8
that I thought I knew on Wednesday.
9 I don't think at that time that we discussed a serious 10 degradation or high core damage that I think has become 11 generally accepted knowledge now.
('}
12 O
Were you aware at the time of that meeting about the 13 level of activity in the sample, primary coolant sample'that 14 had been taken on Thursday?
15 A
We knew that they had very high activity readings 16 close to that coolant sample.
I don't think I knew at that 17 time the results of the coolant sample as they would reflect 18 back into the amount of core inventory that might have been 19 released.
20 In other words, assessment of core damage.
(}
21 Q
What else did you know at that time?
For example, 22 did you know about the pressure spike as of Thursday night?
23 A
No.
24 Q
So at that time there wasn't any appreciation -- there!
Ca.Feerel Reponers, W.
25 had been or might have been an enormous amount of hydrogen
37 jc 2 1
generated compared to what you thought?
2 A
That's right.
That was not appreciated at that time 3
by me anyway or by my people.
~
4 Q
What about a high in-core thermocouple temperatures?
5 A
I didn't know about any high in-core thermocouple 6
temperatures until -- to the best of my rer911ection until 7
Friday.
8 I knew that the reactor coolant outlet loop temperatures 9'
measured on Thursday were in excess of 600 degrees which would 10 have applied core uncovering and superheat steam up there 11 because the plant conditions, if that had been saturated at
(}
12 the time, would have indicated. a lower temperature.
13 Q
Did you know that the hot leg temperatures had been 14 at 600
'.o 750 degrees for many hours, off scale high for 15 many hours, five, six, eight hours?
16 Did you know by Thursday night that they had been that high 17 for that long a period of time on Wednesday?
18 A
On Wednesday I knew that they had been above 600.
19 I think they go off scale at 62 or something like that.
I 20 guest I got this communication by virtue of speaking with f~N 21 Stello who had indicated that he was telling the operators
%)
i 22 that they should recognize that they had problems, because 23 the outlet leg tenperatures were higher than they should have l
l 24 been if the core was in saturating conditions.
l pmFMe,W Remners, lric.
25 I don't recall if I had on Wednesday realized how long they i
jc 3 38 1
were there.
But I think Thursday when we were putting 2
together our scenario, we were looking at temperatures and 3
flows and things like that.
We did recognize for a fair 4
period of time, and I don't recall exactly how many hours 5
at this point in time, we realized then that there were 6
temperatures higher than they should have been in the hot leg, 7
if there had been water there.
8 0
Would temperatures that high in the loops for a 9
number of hours necessarily imply to you that the core might 10 well have been uncovered, partially uncovered?
11 I am simply asking that question out of ignorance.
How 12 strong is the implication from seeing that kind of condition
()
13 that you have a serious risk of core uncovering?
How strong 14 is the logical connection?
15 A
The logical connection is very strong.
And only if 16 you have some good reason for not believing your temperature 17 measurements, then I think you should believe the core had to 18 be uncovered to result in that -- in those temperatures.
19 Because if the core was uncovered or there was water in that l
20 particular loop, and knowing the pressure in the loop, you
()
21 would have to assume that the temperatures should have been i
22 down and they were 400 or 500 degrees.
23 Q
And Mr. Stello had told you that he was communicating 24 that to the operators?
j Bo. Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 A
That's right.
i i
i d
i
jc 4 39 1
Q Did he ever express any doubt to you as to whether 2
that message was being received on the other end?
3 NJ 3
A Yes.
I think he expressed a doubt that they 4
appreciated it enough to take what he thought was appropriate 5
response.
But those communications were rather fragmented 6
at that time.
7 I couldn't rely on them too much in the sense of my 8
recollection is, a very brief discussion and him telling me 9
that was about the extent of it.
Most of the reflection and 10 longer discussion of that came many days later.
11 Q
Do you have any recollection of getting some people
()
12 together and going back to the site very late Thursday night 13 or early Friday morning, in the early morning hours?
14 A
No, we did not.
We wrapped it up probably around 15 midnight on Thursday night and went back -- did not go back 16 to the site until early Friday morning.
17 O
When you were at the point on Friday morning of getting 18 ready to go back to the site, did you have any method in mind l
l 19 to set up some kind of communications from the site to Bethesda?
20 In other words, were you intending to rely on motel to l
()
21 Bethesda lines or was there going to be some way on Friday to try 22 to set up more direct communications?
23 A
My intention on Friday was to keep a -- after we got j
24 in and appraised the situation, getting some people back on Ace-Federst Reporters. inc.
25 the site again, was to use the motel to Bethesda, that room, f
l
40 1
jc 5 1
as sort of the communications center recognizing that it was 2
15 minutes or so away.
O
(/
3 At that point in time it didn't look very promising for me 4
getting a dedicated line or something like that or the 5
availability of communications from the observation center it-6 self.
7 I&E was trying to set up some communications.
They have 8
their own source of communications back to Bethesda.
- Again, 9
they weren't accessible to us because they were primarily from 10 the site -- the control rooms themselves.
So my intent at il that time was to use that room as sort of the board room for l (]
12 us.
13 When I got on-site Friday morning, late in the morning --
14 let me go back to Thursday night.
Talking with Bethesda 15 Thursday night, we did indicate that they needed help in 16 developing procedures and we probably needed help in 17 radiological areas.
I asked for some more people at that 18 time.
And some very specific people.
19 For example, it was obvious Wednesday alot of contaminated 20 water and waste to contend with and I needed some people
(~T 21 familiar with HP and rad waste treatment and things of that U
22 nature.
Then we got to site Friday morning and a number of,
+
23 I think four of the engineering people went on to the site.
t j
They were working with the Met Ed and the GPU and B&W l
24 AmFwws Reporters, inc.
l I
25 people that had congregated over there.
They were getting 1
l l
l 1
jc 6 4
I updated on the course datas and background on what had occurred 2
over the evening.
~
3 I guess it must have been late Friday morning when -- I am 4
not sure if it was Ms. Adensam or the I&E fellows came and 5
told me that they had gotten a reading of 1200 MR in the 6
helicopter.
This was a Met Ed reading of 1200 MR in the 7
helicopter, 600 feet over the plant or something of that 8
order.
9 I asked what the significance was in terms of doses on the 10 ground, and they indicated that they had teams out in downwind 11 directions and they were indicating readings 10 to 20 MR
(]}
12 on the ground following that.
4 13 I guess it was soon thereafter --
14 Q
Was that off-site?
15 A
That is off-site, yes.
It was shortly thereafter 16 I guess when I heard of the evacuation discussion.
I guess we 17 were a little miffed because we felt we were not involved in 18 that discussion, because we had the most current information, 19 particularly in terms of exposure to the public that we felt 20 should be taken into account in any evacuation recommendation. '
()
21 I guess we felt at the time that, you know, if we had a 22 part of that recommendation, ours would have been that it was 23 not necessary.
At that point in time, however, I was not i
24 aware of the burning of the hydrogen in the containment pressur'e ke Feed Anonm, Inc.
25 spike, and va were aware at that time that the system was l
l
42 jc 7 I
behaving as if there were substantial amounts of non-condensable 2
gasses and you could tell that by how the pressure responds O
3 as the level of water in the pressurizer is increased.
4 You have a small amount of gas there the pressure rise is 5
rapid with level rise.
If you have a very soft system, the 6
pressure :esponse is very slow and gentle and you make a change 7
of water consistent.
8 I guess that about summarizes what we knew at that point 9
in time on Friday morning.
10 Q
How did you learn that Mr. Denton and Mr. Stello and II various other people in communications gear were going to O
I2 sesceea om the site >
13 A
I heard that, I believe, through one of the I&E 14 representatives; I don't know if it was Mr. Keicig or Mr.
15 Stohr.
Probably around 11:00 o' clock time frame, to the 16 best of my recollection, they were on their way up.
17 0
Did you hear anything before they arrived about why 18 they were coming?
l9 A
No.
And I guess I didn't know how many were coming.
20 Just that Denton and Stello and -- I knew a couple of the O
2' veon1e enet nea erecieice11v reaue eea or essumea thet e 22 couple of people I specifically had requested were coming out.
l 23 Q
What happened when they arrived?
24 A
When they arrived that afternoon, I gave Denton and i
lee. Federal Reporters, Inc.
l 25 Stello a briefing as to the current status of the plant I
I
I jc 8 43 2
I parameters as of that time.
I discussed where we thought things 2
stood in terms of the process and the plant'itself, and dis-O 3
cussed the fact that releases were continuing, but they didn't 4
seem to be reflecting any significant dose rates in the off-1 5
site areas.
1 6
Then that was maybe ten minutes and then I took them in and 7
they met Herbein.
I don't remember if Dieckamp was there, 8
but they met Herbein and Arnold, I believe, at that time, and 9
discussed the situation, as they saw it, which I think 10 pretty much confirmed what I had told them.
11 I was involved in the two of them, and I was listening,
(}
12 so I don't recall that there was any big discrepancy.
Then i
13 Denton asked if there was a place that we could get the group Id together and he was apparently in communication with, of 15 course, the Commission and the White House and so on.
16 They offered a house nent door to the observation center 17 which was lived in by a Met Ed employee, I guess they had 18 offered the house as a communications center for Met Ed.
We 19 went over there and a great deal of the discussion then centered 20 around what needed to be done, what about press relations, j
l
(}
21 and communications and things of tha.t nature.
CommunicatiDns 22 was a big issue.
23 I think for the first time they recognized that I had a 24 very difficult time communicating back to Bethesda on the D.FMwel RMmrters, inc.
25 day before.
Then I think the first break in communications was, I
I I
jc 9 44 1
made when Stello contacted a friend of his in the state police 2
organization and got them to agree to bring us'to the state O
3 police mobile communications trailer on the site rather quickly 4
to provide at least observation center communication with 5
Bethesda or who else -- whoever else we wanted to communicate 6
with.
7 At that time also we decided what needed to be done in 8
terms of assistance to Met Ed, and we then split up into 9
shif ts and assigned people to work on the shif ts so that we 10 would have 24-hour coverage at the plant.
II Q
Let me go back and ask you a couple questions about O
1 thee.
13 Did Denton and Stello bring vith them some White House 14 communications gear or people or did they not bring any 15 communications?
16 A
I don't think they brought any communications 17 with them, to my knowledge.
18 Q
So at the moment they arrived at the observation 19 center, they.
the same phone booth as a means of communicating 20 with Bethesda as you had had the day before?
O i
^
vee-exceet them thee net ta offerea to them the 22 house next door which had just a regular phone line.
We did 23 use that.
That was used quite a bit.
l 24 Q
Mr. Stello had a personal friend in the state police, !
Sca F oer-; n. porters, inc.
l 25 is that how he started to find out what they had available?
l
jc 10 45 I
A Right.
I forget exactly who, but he knew or his 2
brother krew or somebody knew the state police commander O
3 in that area and -- as I recall, something on the order of 5:00 i
d or so in the afternoon he had achieved agreement with the 5
state police that they would get some sort of a' communications 6
trailer on-site.
7 0
What did that trailer look like?
Did it have tele-8 phone lines, was that the main thing?
9 A
The trailer had a telephone switchboard and telephones 10 in it.
As I recall, they just plugged it into the nearest II telephone pole and at least had a number of lines available O
'2 to the out iae et thet vo1=t i= ti e-13 O
Do you know when that arrived?
Was that in Id Harrisburg or someplace very close?
15 A
I guess it arrived Friday in the evedng.
I am not 16 sure what time, because I wasn't there for a portion of Friday 17 evening.
It must have arrived Friday evening.
18 Q
Did your group then try to have watchbill or something 19 that would put a person in the control room of Unit 2 around 20 the clock or were you relying on the I&E rotation that had i
{')
21 already been set up?
22 A
We set up a watch which did include a systems 23 engineer in the control room.plus systems people that were 24 over in the Security Building working with the Met Ed,GPU, and
\\ Federal Reporters, Inc, j
l 25 B&W people that were analyzing plant parameters and systems l
i
46 jc 11 1
and also writing emergency procedures to cope with the changing 2
needs of the plant.
O 3
The plant was in a condition that was not a familiar one 4
to the operators.
They were operating in an off normal mode 5
and it very quickly became apparent that new procedures that 6
reflected those need to be generated.
7 Also, the high radiation areas that existed throughout the 8
plant made it very difficult to gain access to areas that 9
would be normally accessible and health physics procedures 10 had to be developed to accommodate needed working in those II areas.
O
'2 ror exe 9 e, i= ten 1=e coo 1 -e 9 e e=d th1=9 or taet 1
1 13 nature.
So a good portion of the people were designated to do 14 procedure area, to go out in the plant and provide health-15 physics assistance.
To integrate the operation ars much as 16 possible and lend consulting assistance to Met Ed rather than 17 standing back and looking as a regulatory sense, observing 18 what they were doing.
19 The intent was to actually provide as much real kind of 20 assistance as possible, because it became clear that help was O
the bee 1ta-v v ic eree hei=9 o=e a
2' aeeaea im e=== der or eree -
22 in particular.
23 I was on the -- at that time, the day shift which was headed 24 up by Denton; and I was his assistant on day shift.
Stello Sce Fooerst Reporters, Inc.
25 headed up the night shift, and I think Denny Ross was his
I I
47 jc 12 I
i 1
second in that.
The shifts were 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m.
shifts j
l l
end 4 2
with several hours overlap on either direction.
j O 3
4 F
5 6
7 i
8 9
10 11 0
13 l
14 l
15 j
16 i
17 I
i 18 19 20
[
L i
O 22 23 24 m FederW Reporters, Inc.
25 l
I L
i-. - -. _ _ -, -, _ _, _ _ _ _ _
L
48 940 05 01 ltMGM i
0 Going back to the first conversation that Denton 2
and Stello had with Herbein, did Herbein and the other
()
3 comoany people express any hostility or questioning about 4
the evacuation recommendation?
5 Did they say to you or to Denton in substance, what are 6
you guys doing to us up there in Washington or we are glad you came down here to see what's really going on because I
9 it's obvious the people in Washington don't know what's going on, or anytning like that?
10 A
I think they reflected some coolness, I felt, il anyway that there was some coolne ss.
12 I had tried to develop some rapport on the day before and 13 I think some of that was lost by the evacuation O
14 recoamendation.
15 I'd have to say that under the circumstances, and undar 13 the tremendous crusn of people that were there at the tim 3, Is I would have to say that the communications seemed to be 13 reasonably cordial and adequate.
19 I don't think they were hostile in that sense.
1 23 2
In the discussion of press relations that occurred 21 there or in any discussion that you 'cnew about later in the 22 cay, or participated in, was the decision reached that 13t 23 Ed would step out of the meala ousin? ss and let the NRC be 24 the spokesparson?
25 A
I wasn't involved in that.
I sort of heard of k.
49 f40 05 02 ltMGM i
that later, that that was -- that accommodation was reached.
2 I wasn't in on -- or a party of any of the negotiations 3
that I recall.
I might have caught a bit here anc there
()
4 out --
5 0
- fou don't really have any firsthand knowledge then 5
as to whether that was a joint decision or whether NRC 7
people said we'd really like to do it that way?
8 A
No, I don't.
9 0
Very briefly, can you summarize what you were 10 doing as you recall it on Saturday, Sunday and Monday?
11 A
Okay.
Saturday, Sunday and Monday.
- Nell, 12 basic ally, I guess, I was trying to integrate my shifts 13 ope ra tions.
Saturday, Sunday and Monday, Denton was away k ')
14 quite a bit of the time in press briefings and with the 15 Governor and many other activities that took.him out.
16 So I tried to keep the flow or work going on my shif t.
le And my people were generally associated with the writing of 18 new emergency procedures.
The work was going on at that 19 time on tying in the hydrogen recomoiner, that was f elt to 20 be a high-priority a f f ort bec ause, of course, at that time 21 we knew that the hydrogen burn and the f acts that the 2d hydrogen in the containment was at an eleveted level.
23 We also recognized that the releases were coming because
()
24 of the high volume of gas that was comiqq out of the makeup 2a system.
50 540.05-03 ltMGM 1
So we tried to ge t the -
get what makeup --- excuse me,
2 not the makeup, the waste gas decay tanks and vent them back I'S 3
into the containment..
%-)
4 rne containment was at a negative pressure so those tanks 5
should oleed back in there.
We felt that was the saf est 6
place for it.
Besides, we thought that reducing the pressure in those s
8 tanks would make it easy for us to suck the gas out of the 9
makeup tank waste gas system and thereby take care of the 10 releases that were taking place.
11 A'e were also trying to stem the large amounts of water 12 that were accumulating in the plant and we did this by our 13 people and their people reviewing all of the necessary or un (D
N/
14
-- and unnecessary sources of water in the plant an'd seeing 15 which of these could be shut down to cut down on the 15 accumulation of wa ter. because it looked like we would be 1/
Very quickly running out of places to store highly 18 contaminated water.
19 fnat would have posed a problem oecause it we ran out of 2J space, it would have to be put into the rive r.
That didn't 21 seem to be a very good alternative.
These were the pressing 22 items at that time.
23 de were trying to establish what various engineering
()
24 expertises we needed at the site to provide additional 25 assistance.
51 440 05 04 ItMGM i
We were calling for people every time we thought of every 2
other need.
We were trying to set up the laboratories to f')
3 provide assistance.
Also, we were working, at that point in uj 4
time, pretty strenuously on ways to degas the reactor and 5
that was probably, I guess, in the Sunday, Monday s';he;:a of 6
things that was the pressing or important project, se tting d
up the procedures and setting up operation for degassing and 8
getting the hydrogen bubble out of the reactor.
9 Some of these days run together at that time, out that 10 proba bly summarizes that three-day pe riod, 11 0
Did there come a time when there was an 12 understanding of some sort reached that NRC people would be 13 in the loop in approving procedures or approving major
\\
14 actions that would oe taken in the plant?
15 A
Ye s.
15 0
Haw did that come about?
.ias there a meeting 17 where peop13 sat down anc decided that or was that more or 13 less assumed?
Id What do you recall about that?
2J A
'ty recollections would be, I would say that 21 Sature.
that I think Stello told me and others that we 22 would be approving all of the procedures and operations.
23 I guess that was -- he stayed there all.riday night, he f) xs 24 won the night shift.
He was there all.:riday night.
So I 23 wou1J have to assume -- I think I did a ssume, whether he
52
$40 05 05 ItMGM i
said it or not, that - he had discussed this with the licensee 2
and they had agreed to it.
(])
3 There were several times when, in general discussion" 4
with the licensees, that the NRC made it reasonably clear 5
that if we f elt strongly enough about doing something that 6
he di dn' ' want to do, that we would and could issue an e
immediate order at the site.
S de had that capacility.
I don't recall at any time 9
whether the licensee balked at the suggestion that we could 13 tell him what to do and what not to do.
11 I think the licensee at that point in time was very numb 12 and for a period of a few days, I would s ay, the operation 13 was very significantly controlled by NRC decisions.
14 The licensee's technical people had expended themselves, 15 in my vie w, very early on and we had a fresh supply of 13 tro3ps coming up from the headquarters all the time.
Il 30 I think the licensee did not seem to object at all to 13 this type of a situation.
Whether they did privately or 19 not, of course, I don't know.
j 23 2
Let me go back for a moment and ask you aoout the 21 question of the core being uncovered.
2; The testimony that you gave in your deposition oefore the 23
? resident's Commission lef t me a little bit confused aoout 24 what you thought or had communicatea to you as of dednesday 23 oefore you went to the site.
l l
440 05 06 ItMGM i
And if you know, what Mr. Stello thought about whether 2
the core had actually been uncovered on Wechesday.
What did
- ({])
3 you know or think or fear as of the end of Wednesday about 4
the question of whether the core had ever been uncovered 5
during that day?
6 A
Okay.
I felt that there was no question, I guess e
in my mind, that the core had been uncovered because to 8
release the amount of fission products as had been released 9
would have, in my view, taken a core uncovery to make the 10 elements get to a position where they would have at least 11 relea sed the gasses that were held and the spaces between 12 the fission -- between the pellets and the cladding.
13 I guess I agreed with Stello's ooservation that the core 14 must have been uncovered to achieve hign reactor outlet 15 temperatures.
15 I don't think that there was any question in my mind that 17 the core had been uncovered but at that point in time, I did 13 not visualize that the core had been reduced to the 11 ondi tion that I think we now believe it's in, namely that, 20 you.:now, a great deal of oxidation, of cladding which would 21 h ave formed a significantly recent core geometry than I 22 thins we had assumed in the very beginning.
23 J
So would it be f air to say that on Wednesday, you 21 procably th3ught the core had been uncovered and some core 23 aumege had occurred but it wasn't until Friday when you
---n-p,
54 440 05 07 ltMGM i
learned among otner things about a probable hydrogen 2
detonation that you substantially changed your impression f')
3 about how much core damage there had been?
v 4
A My impre ssion on core damage didn't change from 5
one of releasing or popping a great many of the fuel pins 6
and releasing those gasses until I was made aware that
/
massive amounts of hydrogen were generated which implied B
high fractions of the cladding had oeen oxidized.
Then that completely changed my view of the core IJ s itua ti on.
16 "Q.
SCINTO:
Can I ask. sometimes I have oeen 12 confused about the core uncovery.
When you talk about the 13 core uncovery having a division in it, are you talking aoout 14 boiling in the core or steam olanketing of significant 15 portions?
13 THE WIT:4ESS:
I am talking about l ack of a lig' aid le phase surrounding tne fuel pins.
Tne boiling in the core 13 would not have been significant because you cooperate with a 1/
significant amount of coiling in the core.
23 What I an referring to is the no-water phase in the core, 21 s teem blanketing, if you will, the no-water phase.
22
%1. SCI;JTa r Okay.
Now, you said picture of the 23 pins popping, I am just trying to get a better picture of 24 wnat you pic tured.
DiJ you have a vision, f or example, of a i
2; lot of ruptured ballooning of the cladding?
i
40 05 08 55 ltMGM i
THE WITNESS:
Yes.
And release of the upper 2
fission gas plenum space.
3 MR. SCINB):
I am just trying to deduce now.
If
()),
4 you knew that had been superheat, I am just trying to get a 6
picture of whether you had a picture that had existed for a 6
number of hours, the same question George has asked before.
/
If you had a feel that existed for a numoer of hours, the 6
missing piece, how come nobody was thinking about a lot of 9
metal water reaction?
Was it just not focused on or was 10 there just a lot of missing information to make that thing 11 come into focus?
12 THE WITNESS:
I gue ss the main reason for that was 13 that I thought that w'ater had been delivered to the reactor O
ss 14 f or most of the time on Wednesday.
15 Actually, in excess of that needed to keep the core 15 itself covered.
Il 3econdly, it did not appear that the core had become 13 uncov ered -- assuming that it had oecome uncovered oecause 1) of the high temperatures, for a period in excess of a hour 2J and a half or two hours af ter the accident at which time the 21 aecay heat generation was reasonably low.
22 Inirdly, the information from the -- initially, at least, 23 from the site itself indicated that, you know, that the core C)
(_
2?
had maintained a lot water.
23 30 i t -- in my judgment at that time, it appeared that it 2
-r
56
$40 05 09 ltMGM i
lost water, that it had blown out fission products, but that 2
it had recovered.
(( )
3 It just didn't -- maybe it was my lack of judgment in the 4
area or something, out it just didn't fit to me tha t --
5 there was no information which I knew about which would say, 6
hey, you blue out the enormous amounts of hydrogen.
I MR. SCINTO:
What I was trying to get at was the 3
picture that is there.
We use a lot of terms that are 9
shortcuts but I need to push you further to see what you 10 really thought.
11 50 you are talking about uncovery or periodic uncovery?
12 THE WITNESS:
Right.
Or maybe symbolic boiling in 13 there which caused the cladding of the calloons.
I don't r
14 know if anyoody at that point in time, say Thursday night, 15 had in their minds massive core damage.
16 MR. SCINTO:
I dian't get to Thursday night.
I
/
gy) 1/
was talking aoout Wednesday night and Thursday morning.
13 THE WITNESS:
I maant to say Wednesday night.
If 19 I said Thursday, I meant Wednesday night.
20 (discussion off the record. )
21 22 23 A(>
24 2;
57
@40 06 01 amnMGM l
BY MR. SCINTO:
2 0
Mr. Vollmer, on Wednesday evening or Thursday
-(])
3 morning, before you lef t the site, were you aware that the 4
dome monitor in the containment was indicating extremely 5
high radiation levels?
6 A
Yes.
7 0
I am trying to ask you what you recall as of that 8
time.
What was your asse ssemnt of what that meant?
9 A
I think we tried to back calculate what that meant 10 in terms of amount of activity in the containment 11 atmosphere.
I was unsatisfactory because I think we didn't 12 know how the monitor was shielded and exactly what it was 13 reading.
I think that some rough calculation showed that
\\-
14 releases of that order of -- the releases that we thought 15 had taken place, namely noble gases into the containment 16 would not have. resulted in a reading that high.
17 We were aware of another monitor, as I recall, on the 18 operating deck, which was reading much, much higher values.
19
-I think that particular monitor corresponded much better 20 than we thought was our understanding of release in the 21 containment.
I thought that.
I can't speak for anybody 22 else.
23 0
on that Wednesday that you were working --
()
24 Wednesoay of the accident tha t you were working at your 25 office, were you f ollowing the status of the containment, l
I
L I
40 06 02 amnMGM i
how the containment was f unctioning?
L 2
A We knew that - in the sense.the answer is yes.
l C) 3 We knew'that the containdment pre ssure had gone up, as I 1
4 recall, to something on the order of three pounds.
We knew 5
later on in the day that the containment pressure was down f
6 to about atmospheric.
I On't recall knowing that the 7
containment. sprays had come on.
8 0
Okay.
Do you recall getting -
9 A
I don't think I ever asked either.
i 10 0
Do you recall getting any information about the 11 composition of the containment atmosphere?
12 A
No.
13 0
I think earlier in response to a question you 14 indicated as an example of your f eeling that Mr. Herbein was 15 in charge, a recollection that Herbein was going over with 16 re spe c t to decisions being made about modification systems 17 and things.
I am trying to get a timing on that.
18 The reason I want to get a timing on that is that the 19 picture of lots of system modifications just surprises me --
20 that if that is early in the day, because of the indication 21 of how stable everything is.
22 Is this early in the day or is this late in the day?
I'm 23 trying to get a picture of that?
24 A
This would be late in the day of Thursday and 25 Friaay.
I think I might have used system modifications
59 tR7240 1
incorrectly in terms that they weren't physically modifying
{6 3
rlp 1 2
systems but they were lining up different paths to use systems 2GYg w
3 to accomplish such things as getting a more stable letdown, 4
make-up, balance and trying to get down on the amount of 5
gas that was going into the make-up system tank and subse -
6 quently out to the atmosphere.
I think I recall several times 7
my standing by Herbein and observing him discussing and 8
drawing out the systems as part of his discussions with the 9
plant and saying such things as well, how was it lined up 10 and why don't you try this and why don'y you try that.
So 11 modification, not the physical word but perhaps an alignment
(~
12 of valves and things of that nature.
13 I would judge, though, that he clearly was consulted --
14 in my opinion he was clearly consulted on any alterations 15 to the operation.
Any time they wanted to do something, 16 any time they had a vent to make-up tanks, I think he was 17 consulted if he was there.
18 Q
I wasn't chasing that aspect of it.
What I'm 19 chasing right now in this response is that doesn't sound 20 like a condition where everybody thought things were stable.
i l
21 The description in the middle of the day, the description l
(^]
l s_
22 we gave to the commissioners Thursday morning, the description i 1
23 Herbein's giving the the Congressman early Thursday afternoon 24 is a description of stability, very careful slow steps.
- Now, re.Feoeral Reporters, Inc.
25 what you're describing now does not, in my mind, doesn't have j
l l
60 rip 2 1
a picture of that.
They don't course.
I may be off but they MGM 2
don't seem to course, to me.
(n) 3 A
I think they do because I think that the aspect that we were chasing at that time was a small segment of the 4
5 overall system.
The reactor, the core, and the gross flows 6
of those big systems feeding the reactor on its heat rejection 7
I think were stable.
I think that at aspect that was being 8
chased was the release of gaseous activity, the make-up and 9
letdown systems.
That was the thing that was not stable.
10 Q
Okay.
I guess what I'm after is from the make-up 11 system, the stuff coming out of the make-up system, the re-12 lease of gaseous activity, wasn't that felt -- some component 13 of that felt to be coming from things like pump seal letdown?
14 A
Yes.
15 0
And you know the picture of dealing with the 16 pump seal letdown does not sound like a nice, stable system, 17 when you're worrying about the letdown on those pumps systems?
18 A
Well --
19 Q
Let me start with that proposition.
Was that i
20 thought to be a source of the gas problem?
21 A
I think that at that time there was severa?
es k) 22 that were considered to be the source of the gas prol lcme One was water that was over in the auxiliary buildint. and 23 24 was known to overflow from some of the bleed tanks.
Certainly Ee Feder:3 Reporters. Inc.
25 with the very high, at that time, known primary system t
l l
j
61 contamination any pump valve leak would have been considered rlp 3 1
MGM 2
to be a source.
B'It I think that my recollection would say
/'s kY 3
that fairly quickly on Thursday, Thursday afternoon actually, that the realization was that every time that pressure in the 4
5 make-up tank, gas and make-up tank was vented, it caused a 6
release.
Those facts just became apparent.
And my recollectior.
is that Herbein spent a lot of time Thursday and Friday try-7 ing to get ways to cut down on that particular release.
So 8
a lot of the attention was focused on the make-up tank 9
10 pressure, getting the compressors to get that gas pumped 11 into the waste gas decay tanks where it should have been.
12 As far as reactor systems go, the temperature and the
()
13 flows and things of that nature, I would think that as I 14 saw it, the characterization Thursday of being pretty stable 15 to the Commission was an accurate one.
16 Q
Okay.
Do you recall Friday the evacuation 17 decision day, do you recall being informed or being otherwise 18 aware that Met Ed was planning to depressurize the primary 19 system because of the problems they were having?
20 A
No.
/
21 Q
Do you recall on Friday being informed or being
%s) 22 aware of any information that suggested that the waste gas 23 decay tanks were full?
24 A
At all times I thought the status of the waste f
Ca FMerst Rnorters, Inc.
25 decay tanks because I think that the pressure of those tanks --l i
62 rip 4 1
we were kept up-to-date on those because of the significance MGM 2
of them, as I indicated to you before.
As far as being full, O\\J 3
.e/ recollection on Thursday was that those tanks were of the 4
capacity of 80 pounds each and we looked into that situation 5
each and we' looked into the situation and it appeared that 6
they could take another 20 pounds or more before they would 7
be at a point where they would reach their discharge limit.
8 Met Ed said 105 pounds or more.
But very quickly it 9
appeared that they were not -- their pressure was not in-10 creasing and the reason for that appeared to be that the 11 compressors were not working satisfactorily.
They were not 12 pumping gas in.
13 Certainly, we were aware and kept close tabs on the 14 pressure difference between the waste gas decay tanks and 15 the point of which they might have relief because they would 16 relieve into the atmosphere when they relieved.
So, again, 17 the thought there was to try to find a way to pipe that 18 back into the containment and that was during that particular 19 time frame.
20 Q
You said you were doing this on Thursday?
()
21 L
Yes, Thursday.
Right.
Certainly Thursday 22 afternoon.
23 O
Do you recall on Friday being informed or being 24 told or getting any information thec suggested that the l
hco Feder:A Reporters, Inc.
25 relief valves on the waste gas decay tanks were lifting?
l t
l i
I
63 rlp 5
'l A
I was informed of that, they thought they were MGM 2
lifting.
And both the people that I had on site and Eleanor p)
'w.
3 Adensam and myself tried to track that down.
I think we 4
came to the conclusion that it wasn't -- it was not likely 5
that those valves were lifting but that the activity was one 6
that the system itself was incapable of handling.
I think 7
there were suggestions of where the leakage might be.
Some-8 body at that point in time said there was a water seal in the 9
system that they thought had blown.
Some said compressors 10 were leaking and some thought it was simply the valve that one 11 had to open to allow gas to flow from the make-up tank into 12 the waste gas decay system was the culprit.
(-)/
13 I guess there was just so many or so much activity 14 floating around that it was never clear that one single 15 manipulation led to the source of gas and it was not easy to P npoint.
I don't think for days or weeks after the i
16 17 accident we were able to pinpoint what the leakage pattern 18 was.
19 Q
On Friday morning -- let me just get a picture 20 again of what was your status with respect to communications 21 with Bethesda on Friday morning at or around 8:00 or 9:00 22 o' clock in the morning.
Did you have a specific telephone 23 or something available to you, to you, to communicate with 24 Bethesda?
\\ce f Federd Reporters, Inc.
25 A
Not at the site, no.
I i
I 64 rip 6 I
Q And similarly, was there a phone available MGM 2
from which Bethesda could have gotten a hold of you?
O V
3 A
Only through I & E, by calling -- well, they 4
were in direct communication with the. control room so they and I & E by radio phone at the observation 5
could have 6
center was in communication with the control room.
7 0
Do you recall at all on Friday morning communica-8 ting with Bethesda?
9 A
Yes.
Friday morning, as I recall communicating 10 with Bethesda, I think it was not to the response center.
II I think I called either Darryl or Vic's office, I don't recall O
which.
to1f them we needed ar's end red weste treetment 13 people because that siuation was clearly -- at that point Id in time, I didn't know anything different than I did Thursday 15 as far as the reactor system.
16 Q
I
'm going to ask the other side of the coin.
I7 Do you recall that Bethesda got a hold of you Friday morning?
18 A
No.
I9 Q
Okay.
On Friday morning or early at noon or 20 early afternoon, following the evacuation decision, were you 21
(
instructed by anybody in Bethesda to follow the plant status 22 and releases closely for the purpose of making the determina-23 tion as to whether or not an additional protective action or 24 evacuation would be needed?
'oFeder:A Reporters, Inc.
25 A
I don't recall any specific instructions to that l
I
65 rlp 7 1
effect.
MGM 2
O Okay.
O( /
We were following them closely, but I don't 3
A 4
recall anybody asking that we do it for that particular 5
reason.
6 Q
All right.
You were following it closely.
Is 7
your recollection that you felt that afternoon that you had 8
the authority to decide that more -- that if more evacuation 9
was necessary, if more protective action was necessary, that 10 you would make that decision?
11 A
No.
12 Q
Okay.
Friday afternoon, a little later in the
(}
13 day, were you contacted by Bethesda to -- for the purpose 14 of instructing the licensee not to depressurize the reactor?
15 A
No.
16 Q
Were you aware in the early afternoon that --
17 A
You're talking about Friday afternoon?
18 Q
Friday afternoon.
19 A
There was a number, by this time there was a 20 significant staff up there.
21 Q
Before the staff arrived.
In that period of time
()
22 before the staff arrived?
23 A
Not to depressurize the reactor, no.
24 Q
Do you recall knowing or being aware that there Ace.Federet Reporters, Inc.
25 was a concern in Bethesda for the consequences of -- that wouldj i
l
66 rip 8 1
depressurizing that reactor system with a big hydrogen MGM 2
buble in it, that Bethesda or. Washington had a serious concern O
\\_/
3 about depressurization of that reactor?
4 A
With the soft system?
5 Q
Early Friday afternoon?
6 A
I don't think that I can recall being made 7
aware of that from Bethesda.
8 0
What I'm getting at is the rather well discussed 9
concern about depressurizing the reactor with the bubble in 10 there, were you aware ot, hat or instructed about that or 11 not?
(~)
12 A
No.
\\_)
13 BY MR. FRAMPTON:
14 Q
Mr. Vollmer, at the time of the accident, you 15 were an assistant director in DOR; is that right?
16 A
That's correct.
17 Q
And perhaps you can just describe very briefly 18 what your functional responsibilities were.
You had both 19 project manager people underneath you; is that right?
20 A
That's correct.
I had at that time approximately 21 95 people, 60 of which were technical branch people, reactor f)
m 22 systems branch and the plant system branch.
The others were l
23 project people in the systematic evaluation program which 24 are the old reactors and a project branch which had responsi-Scs FMer"J Ressners. Inc.
25 bility for al) Westinghouse reactors.
Lastly, there was a l
i 1
i
67 rip 9 1
group of 15 that were technical specialists who did the tech-MGM 2
nical reviews for the systematic evaluation program.
There's
/*
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3 five branches all together.
I had that responsibility or 4
took that job somewhere along the end of January of 1979.
5 O
Did each operating reactor, either reporting 6
ultimately to you or another assistant director, a project 7
manager for that reactor?
8 A
That's correct.
9 Q
In DOR?
10 A
In DOR, except for a couple of reactors of which 11 TMI 2 was one, that was operating but had not be transferred 12 from the project management organization over to operating
( );
13 reactors.
14 Q
I understand that.
Leaving that anomaly aside --
15 A
That is true.
The rest is true, yes.
16 Q
Would a project -- does a project manager in DOR 17 typically have any staff under him of people who look only 18 at that plant or are his staff people the systems people, in 19 effect?
20 A
The project manager would normally have, on the 21 average, two to three plants for which he's responsible.
()
l 22 he has no staff of his own for technical assistance.
He has 23 to go to the technical branches and request their input on 1
24 specific technical problems.
Each project manager has his j
i pm-Feud Remnus Inc.
25 own expertise and sometimes he will do some of his own
(
I l
68 rip 10 1
technical work, but, of course, not everybody can do every-
.MGM 2
thir.g.
(~/'i 3
Q In the case of an operating reactor, where the w
4 licensee wants to make a change, a design change in a safety 5
system, does that design change get reviewed by NRC in DOR?
6 A
Yes.
That technical change request would ulti-7 mately go to the project manager who would then assign the 8
needed review work out to the technical branches.
And then 9
he would coordinate the activity that takes place between 10 the technical branches and the licensee and would eventually 11 prepare whatever implementing package that was necessary to 12 accomplish the license change.
En{}
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 CE) 2' 22 23 24 t
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25 l
69
$40 07 01 ltMGM 1
O What document is it that defines what systems in a 2
plant. require such review in the cases of design change and
()
3 which ones don't?
Is that -- is the FSAR the document that 4
defines tha t?
5 What's the most up-to-date document that specifies what 6
systems must receive so review by NRC in the case of design 7
c hange?
8 A
The technical specifications would be the first 9
document that the project manager would probably refer to.
10 If that particular system was not part of the requirements 11 in the technical specifications, but yet represented a 12 saf ety significance to the plant because of its opera tion, 13 or if it -- if the change involved any modification to a n
14 Class I safety system, then the projec t manager would 15 immediately know that it needed NRC review and approval.
16 The licensee normally does this himself first before he 17 makes a decision in accordance with 10 CFR 1050.59 as to 18 whether or not he can perform the change and notify us of it 19 subsequently or whether he has to get NRC review and 20 a pproval.
21 And the guidance con tained in 5059 basically says if it's 22 a change in the technical specifications, he has to to ask 23 us.
If it has a question of unreviewed saf ety, he has to
(
24 ask us.
25 That's how the decision is generally made.
l l
70 240 07 02 ItMGM 1
O In what way does the project manager or some other 2
person or group in DOR monitor problems that a given plant
( );
3 or number of plants may be having with a saf ety system?
4 How does that information get to DDR and get assessed 5
other than through licensee event reports?
6 A
Okay.
Other than through licensee event reports, 7
it is.the project manager's responsibility to keep himself 6
abreast of what's going on in the plant and particularly 9
look at inspection reports and periodic reports f rom the 10 licensee.
11 So, depending on the individual to a greater or lesser 12
. degree, a reflection of plant operating experience should 13 come to the project manager and get fed back up into the
-)
14 organization that way.
15 0
How does he principally get that information?
16 Does he get it f rom I&E?
17 A
He gets the I&E inspection reports from I&E.
The 18 licensee's semiannual reports are directed to him.
All 19 information generated in the NRC and sent to the NRC on that 20 particular plant should find its way to the project 21 manager.
22 O
From what you have said, it would appear that t he 23 two people in the NRC who know the most about what's
(
24 happening at a particular plant, 1(
s say TMI-1, are the 2S project manager in DDR anc the principal I&E inspector for I
71 240 07 03 ltMGM i
that plant.- Do those people have direct communication, 2
constant communication?
()
3 A
The -- at the time of the accident, you mean?
4 0
I am speaking generally now, not in terms of the 5
a ccidents.
Normal everyday --
6 A
I'd have to say that depends on the people 7
involved.
As a one-time project manager, I did communicate 8
with the princi pal inspec tors.
9 I think the spectrum is probably rather broad as to how 10 much communication occurs between the project. manager and 11 principal inspec tor.
12 Perhaps it's a reflection of how much a project manager 13 and principal inspector are involved with other projects.
14 0
Is there a direct relationship ther.e?
l 15 A
No.
16 0
Is there a direct channel that requires the 17 principal I&E inspector or. supervisor to regularly 18 communicate with the project manager and directly send him 19 all I&E material relating to inspections at that plan t?
20 A
Well, when the inspec tion report clears I&E, it's 21 sent to the project manager.
Tha t is a distinct line.
22 When all licensee communications are received, they are 23 forwarded immediately to the projec t manager.
The informal
(-
24 communica tion, that is if the principal inspector sees a 25 problem or something is on his mind with respect to the l
l
@40 07 04 ItMGM i
plant, then it gets down to the real people. situation 2
whether or not he picks up and calls NRR or whether or not
. ( )/
3 he uses his own line of communications through I&E.
4 In some cases, either there are reactor inspectors who 5
communicate a lot with the NRR licensing people and 6
technical staff.
I think there are some who communicate 7
very li ttle.
And vice versa, too.
8 Because there are some of the NRR project managers that 9
keep the field people very forward of what's going on in the 10 licensing activity and the changes and generic problems and il there are some who probably don't communicate at all.
12 But all formal pieces of paper do go to the project 13 manager.
14 0
What about changes, major design changes in 15 nonsafety systems?
Are those required to be notified to NRC 16 or a pproved by NRC?
17 A
No.
18 0
Does the project manager or anyone else in DDR 19 typically get notice of such changes?
20 A
Mell, in the -- in some instances, the licensee 21 would notify or discuss with the project manager just to 22 keep him up to date with what's going on that such a change 23 was being made.
24 On the other extreme would be the project manager might 25 find it out if he reads the annual report where it should be
940 07 05 ItMGM 1
identified that change was made.
2 The inspector looks at or should look at all of the O
2 11censee's terminetions es.te w8 ether or-not e chenee 4
involves NRC notification per 5059 5
Of ten the NRC inspector may question the licensee's 6
termination and give NRR involvement.
So it can go from 7
immediate involvements of NRR into the change up to he finds 8
out about it if he reads the annual report carefully.
9 0
Let me give you a specific example.
It a ppears 10 that in the case of this accident, the initiating system was I
11 the condensate polisher system.
12 It also a ppears that there had been a number of changes 13 in design and operation of that system prior to the q
14 accident.
Changes relating to whether the discharge and 15 inlet valves'on the polishers closed or f ailed as is, lo recommended changes that were never adopted to have an 17 automatic bypa ss valve that would have made it irrelevant as 18 to whether the discharge valves f ailed to close and that had 19 a series of trips and a series of problems involving these 20 design ma tters.
21 Typically, is there any place in the process f rom initial 22 cesign review to design changes at least go through the 23 quality assurance program of the utility, that the NRC would O
V 24 ever have to be notified of the original design, the design 25 changes or any problems with the design or any determination
I 74 240 07 06
{
l tMGM 1
as to whether such changes ought to be notified to the 2
NRC in the case of that system?
()
3 A
In the case of that system, I would imagine that v
4 the licencee made a determination which he should do in 3
5 writing tha t such changes did not constitute a required NRC 6
review and approval.
7 And that he would go ahead and do it himself.
6 0
In other words, there should be written 9
documentation that one, this involves no change in the tech 10 specs and, two, it involves no other unresolved saf ety 11 questions.
12 A
Right.
13 0
And that's supposed to be part of the filc before 14 a major design change is made anywhere in the plant?
15 A
Yes.
Or a change which is a nonmaintenance lo activity.
17 In other words, if a physical change in the system is 18 made, there should somewhere along the line that ty pe of an 19 e val ua tio n.
20 It can be f airly trivial an evaluation, but it should be 21 made.
22 0
What is the most recent document that would 23-define, in a typi cal case, wha t systems, if any, in a plant 24 have to be included within the quality assurance program if they don't receive NRC review?
That is, requires 25 even
75
'240'07 07 ItMGM 1
some second engineering review by the utility before changes 2
are made?
()
3 A
The broad definition would be if it's a 4
safety-related system and that would deal with any system 5
that has to do with -- has the potential of causing or 6
mitigating an accident.
7 That would include the primary systems and all of the 8
secondary side systems whose performance is important to 9
keeping the primary reactor loop in operation, either in 10 normal or transient conditions.
11 It would also encompass all of the systems that are there 12 solely for mitigation of the consequences of an accident.
13 For example, the ventilation system in the f uel handling k,,3 14 is a saf ety-related system.
Containment sprays are 15 saf e ty-related system.
They are just there for mitiga.'.on 16 purposes.
17 0
My question is:
Where do you look to determine 16 t hat specifically?
Let's suppose I am the licensing manager 19 for Duke Power, and my engineer comes to me and he says, we 20 have a line that goes between the condensate poli sher 21 system, which is not a safety system, and the emergency 22 f eedwater system which in our plant is a safety system, and 23 I want to make a change in a valve in that line that may s) 24 have some significance to the interaction between those two 25 system.
Mr. Licensing Manager, who do I have to get to s
l.
76
$40 07 08 ltMGM i
review that?
2 Do we have to tell the NRC about this?
Where do I look
()
3 to find the answer to that question?
Do I look to the FSAR, 4
do I look to NRC regulations, do I look to the technical 5
spe cif ica tions?
6 What is going to tell me the answer to that question?
(
7 What document?
6 A
If there is a document that would tell you the 9
answer, it would most likely be the FSAR.
10 0
That would list the systems that are in the 11 quality a ssurance/ quality control program?
I 12 A
Yes.
And, also, identifies -- some of the FSAR 13 are lists of "saf ety-related systems" or identify those 14 systems.
15 The connecting systems to those, as you go down in the lo tiers, are of ten just a matter of judgment call as to 17 whether or not they are -- should be considered under the 18 envelope of the quality assurance program.
19 In many plants, that envelope extends to all parts of the 20 plant because it's more convenient to do it that way.
21 0
Do you think that would be an advisable 22 requirement?
23 Do you think that the Commission ought to require ever
't; 24 licensee to have an internal quality a ssurance program that 25 covers every single thing that happens in the plant?
Or i
l l
77 240 07 09 l tMGM 1
every single piece of equipment in the system, I guess I 2
should say?
,,()
3 A
You are speaking to the X branch chief of the 4
quality assurance branch.
And I would say my general ansewr 5
to. that is yes, but you have to be clearly. defined the 6
extent of the applicability of the program to various 7
systems.
8 For example, I think' that the general concept of making 9
sure in all phases of plant operation that you have a 10 quality assurance procedure identified with each operation 11 is very important.
12 But it may be important to the primary system, for 13 e xam ple, that you have traceability all the way back to the s
14 manuf acturer of the history of a piece of material because 15 i t's important to the primary system.
But when you get out 16 of the switchyard, it may not be so important that you have 17 t ha t.
16 So the various aspects of the program have to be defined 19 in accordance with the needs for safety and the needs for 20 assurance of quality and that varies dramatically f rom, say, 21 the primary system out to some other piece of material which 22 might very well be served by a piece of plastic pipe.
23 0
I take it it's I&E that is responsible for at G
I A/
24 least primarily responsible f or making sure that a licensee 25 is a pplying its quality assurance program?
78 340 07 10 ltMGM i
A That's true.
Yes.
2 0
Well --
'()
3 A
Basically, the NRR reviews the program elements, 4
if you will, and these elements are supposed to be applied 5
to the operation and the operating documents and the 6
operating procedures and things of that nature.
7 I&E reviews these on a -- on an audit basis to see that 8
they do contain the proper QA program elements.
t 9
But it's their responsibility and I think somewhat even 10 there of an audit bar:. s because they don't review all of the 11 plant procedures to assure that each one has.the proper QA 12 program.
13 They depend on the licensee to implement that.
I)
\\-
14 0
Let me just ask you one question out of total 15 ignorance.
Is it in DOR that there is some cognizance of 10 operator requalification and licensed operator retraining to 17 incorporate lessons being learned f rom operator experience?
18 Or does such cognizance occur anyplace within the NRC?
19 A
Well, the cognizance on operator licensing, 20 retraining and requalification is PM, division of project 21 mana gem en t, under the assistant director of quality 22 assurance and operations.
23 I can't speak to how much that operation is influenced by 24 operator experiences.
Having once been an operator license 25 examiner, I don't think, to my knowledge, that experiences
)
1
Y 79 i
$40 07 11 ltMGM i
have been f actored in a great deal into the operator
[
2 examination program.
3 But that may have changed in the recent two years.
m 4
0 Do you know whether there is any substantive 5
review of the training or requalification that 6
already-licensed operators get in order to keep their 7
licenses renewed and updated?
8 A
I believe the operator-licensing branch reviews f
9 that program, but whether or not they review the documents 10 and the substance of the training itself, I don't know.
Il BY MR. SCINTO:
12 0
I have two questions I did want to touc h on.
13 I asked you about Friday morning, now I'd like to go back 14 to Thursday night.
15 Were you aware of -- aware, in other words, did you have 16 any information on late Thursday night that the licensee, 17 Met Ed, was considering depre ssurizing the reactor on la Thursday night?
19 A
I believe in a conversation that we had f rom the 20 motel with Bethesda, a rather lengthy communication which, 21 sinced we didn't have a squawk box, there was one of us on 22 the horn, that the a pproaches as to whether or not the 23 systems should be put on to decay remCval or kept on its i
\\. /
24 on the cooling mode that it was on, namely reje: tion of heat 25 through the steam generator, was discussed, l
!40 07 12 80 i
ItMGM 1
I don't recall, however, any serious discussion of the e
2 licensee depre ssurizing and going to the decay rule system
()
3 because with all of the activity in the primary system, t ha t t-4 would then be spread out to the auxiliary building because j
5 t ha t is where the decay removal system is.
)
a 6
My recollection is that it was f elt that just wasn't the 7
prudent thing to do.
0 8
I don'.t think -- I don't recall anyway, of being 9
concerned about depressurizing because of the expansion of 7
10 hydrogen gas and blanketing the core with that.
11 If that was a particular concern at that time, I don't t
12 think that I recall being made aware of it at that time.
13 0
When you were there, did you think that you wre
[
14 being kept abreast of the key things known at Bethesda?
Did i
15 you think Bethesda was making an effort to keep you abreast f
16 of that?
li A
only ir, re trospec t, perhaps not at the time, I i
18 t hou g ht that f
19 0
Did you think you were being kept abreast?
20 A
Yes, I.did.
21 0
Well --
22 A
Because the things I was hearing f rom Bethesda, 23 were -- and the things that we were hearing f rom m) 24 Metropolitan Edison was pretty much in agreement.
5 25 I was not aware of the pending -- I was not aware of the i
o 81 e
940 07 13 i
ItMGM 1
thoughts about evacuation until it was accomplished.
i 2
MR. FRAMPTON:
Thank you very much for your time
,o(y' 3
and coopera tion.
4 (Whereupon, a t 12:20 p.m., the hearing was 5
adjourned.)
6 7
8 9
IO 11 I2 A
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 b
24 25 L