ML19308C167
| ML19308C167 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 08/09/1978 |
| From: | Himes J, Lopez A, Sandy G Metropolitan Edison Co |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR HPPO-1778, NUDOCS 8001210501 | |
| Download: ML19308C167 (10) | |
Text
_
k MITRE Technical Report 7618 h
Volume 11 Communications and l
Control to Support incident Management J. E. Himes A. F. Lo.oez G. F. SanJf November 1977 Contract Sponsor: US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Contract No.: NRC-00 77-044 Project No.: 13060 Dept.: W-33 Thit dOCurnent Wee preDered for authorized distribution.
It het not been GDorOved for public relette, METREK Division of The MITRE Corporation P
1820 Dolley Madison Blvd. McLean, Virginia 22101 l
0 q0 (9o 5 0
s u
l
f 4
MITRE Department j
and Project Approval:
.. M
_dh l
1 l
d 9
11 l
1
-x
FOREWORD This is Volume II of a two-volume report.
Volume I presents an overview of the study and a summary of recommendations, including detailed recommendations for initial operations at t13 NRC Head-quarters Operations Center.
This volume of appendices contains additional details of the scenarios, operational system concepts, communications requirements for full Concept II operational cap t-bility, and estinated start-up costs.
"A T
i e
lii
)
L
i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Vi LIST OF TABLES ix APPENDIX A - SCENARIOS 1
A.1 Hij acking of NRC-Licensed Material 1
A.2 Take-Over of Power Plant 2
A.3 Student Riot at Research Reactor 3
A.4 Theft of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) 4 A.S Transportation Accident S
A.6 Boiling Water Reactor Loss-of-Coolant-Accident with Gross Fuel Failure 6
A.7 Browns Ferry Fire 7
A.8 Abandoned Control Room 7
APPENDIX B R 2.'ONSE SYSTEM CONCEPTS 9
B.1 Basis 9
B.2 Federal Information Exchange 9
B.3 State Information Exchange 10 B.4 Local Information Exchange 11 B.S On-site Information Exchange 12 B.6 Concept Descriptions 13 B.6.1 CONCEPT I:
Monitor 16 B.6.2 CONCEPT II:
Advisory with Dependent Data 18 B.6.3 CONCEPT III: Advisory with Independent Data 21 B.7 Initial Alarm 22 APPENDIX C - CONCEPT II:
FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY 27 C.1 PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS 29 C.2 INFORMATION FLOW 33 k'
C.3 REQUIRED CON 5fUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES 69 APPENDIX D - PERSONNEL AND COST ESTIMATES 91 DISTRIBUTION LIST 9S V
L j
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Figure Number Page B-1 NRC-0C Manning Schedule for Advisory Concepts (Concepts II and III) 15 B-2 Principal Information Flow, NRC as Monitor (Concept I) 17 B-3 Principal Information Flow, NRC as Advisor with Dependent Data (Concept II) 19 B-4 Principal Information Flow, NRC as Advisor with Independent Data (Concept III) 23 B-5 Alarm Flow From Power Reactors and Fuel Facilities 24 C-1 Executive Team:
A. Public Information 35 C-2 Executive Team:
B. Extraordinary l
Commitments 36 C-3 Executive Team:
C. Interagency Policy Coordination 37 C-4 Executive Team:
D. Special Notifications 38 C-5 Executive Team:
E. Critical Decisions Pertaining to Normal Duties 39 C-6 Operations Team Chief:
A. Respond to Initial Emergency Call 41 C-7 Operations Team Chief:
B. Liaison Between OPS Team and Executive Team 42 v1
~
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS (Continued)
Figure Number Page C-8 Operations Team Chief:
C.
Liaison Between OPS Center and Other Organi:ations, Regional Offices and Site Teams 43 C-9 Operations Team Chief:
D.
Maintain Status Display 44 C-10 Operations Team Chief:
E.
Public Information Accuracy and 1
(F.) Display 45 C-11 Operations Team Chief:
G.
Control Federal EOC Monitor Net 46 C-12 Operations Team Chief:
H.
Special Notifications 47 C-13 Communications Assistant:
A.
Receive Notification of Possible Incident 49 C-14 Communications Assistant:
B.
Initial Notification of NRC Personnel and Other Agencies 50 C-15 Communications Assistant:
C.
Set-Up Operations Center Communi-cations 51 C-16 Communications Assistant:
D.
Arrange Conferencing 52 C-17 Communications Assistant:
E.
Contact Consultants 53 C-18 Technical Specialist:
A.
Respond to Initial Smergency Call 55 C-19 Technical Specialist:
B.
Identify Experts and Consultants 56 C-20 Technical Specialist:
C.
(Also "F")
Provide Technical Advice and Liaison 57 vii t
N
]
l 1
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS (Concluded).
Figure Number Page C-21 Technical Specialist:
D.
Brief Staff and Consultant Advisors 58 C-22 Technical Specialist:
E.
Provide Technical Analyses and Recommendations 59 C-23 Staff Advisors:
General Function 61 C-24 Information Assessment Team:
A.
Review and Assess Information 63 C-25 Information Assessment Team:
B.
Clarify Issues and Risks 64 C-26 Public Affairs Representative:
A.
Provide Liaison with Press and Public 66 C-27
' Public Affairs Representative:
B.
Prepare Approved Public Release 6,e C-23 Limited ET Conference (Schematic) 75 C-29 Full ET Conference (Sche:scic) 77 C-30 Direct Access to Staff Advisors (Schematic) 79 C-31 ETM Place and Receive Emergency-Related Out' side Calls (Schematic) 81 C-32 E'D4 Place and Receive Non-Emergency Related Outside Calls (Schematic) 33 C-33 TC and TS Hard Copy and Federal EOC Monitor Net (Schematic) 85 C-34 Team Chief / Technical Specialist Con-ference and Individual Communications; Team Chief - ETD Direct Contact (Schematic) 87 C-35 IAT Secure Communications and Individual Staff Advisor Communications (Schematic) 89 viii j
LIST OF TABLES Table Number Page I
Personnel and Preliminary Equipment Cost Estimates 92
'e e
ix
APPENDIX A SCENARIOS This appendix postulates eight scenarios which are intended to demonstrate the full range of incidents to which NRC might have to respond.
The basis for selecting these particular scenarios is given in Section 2.2 of Volume I.
~
A brief statement of the implications for NRC communications and control follows each scenario.
A.1 Hijacking of NRC-Licensed Material Situation:
An unescorted shipment of plutonium 238 for use in pacemakers is hijacked in Georgia, en route to the manufacturer.
The attack was well planned and violent, and timed to give a 25 minute getaway to the assailants.
The Region II office was notified by the shipping dispatcher when a periodic check-in was missed.
The dispatcher also notified the state police while the NRC notified the FBI.
The material is not ureable for a bomb.
The motive of the hijackers is unknown.
NRC Interests: This scenario demonstrates the need for a sharp decrease in the time delay before proper authorities (including the NRC) are notified of a transportation incident; for a positive means of determining exactly what materials are being transported; and for rapid provision of technical assistance to local police and the FBI.
NRC will have subsequent investigatory responsibilities.
Other Interests:
Local and state police will respond first and have a continuing responsibility to apprehe'nd the hijackers and recover the stolen materials.
The FBI will have the lead Federal agency responsibility.
Other agencies having a possible interest include the DOE, State Department and Customs.
1 i
Resources:
Local and state police will have their own communi-cations to their respective base stations; the FBI has a system of VHF radio communications, which may or may not be useable, depending upon the precise location of the incident.
A.2 Take-Over of Power Plant j
Situation:
A power plant is seized by a group of terrorists seeking to extort the release of some comrades from jail.
The utility headquarters notified the Regional Office of the NRC while the incident was in progress.
Following receipt of an ultimatum by the group, the FBI has requested advisory assistance from the NRC to aid in assessing the capability of the various threats and the safest means of taking the terrorists into custody, if possible.
l NRC Interests:
While the NRC role is similar to that in the foregoing scenario, this scenario also demonstrates the need for the immediate availability of detailed plant layout and safeguards l
plans and for on-going detailed coordination among the NRC, licensee management, local police, state police, FBI, DOE and i
possibly others.
An off-site, independent source of data on reactor operations would be useful and possibly crucial in limiting adverse effects on the health and safety of the public because the reactor-operator may not be free to act or speak.
Other Interests: 'Lacal law enforcement authorities (LLEA) would be first to respond, and utility headquarters would have a strong interest; DOE and EPA would need to be alerted (and put on stand-by for possible clean-up activities), as would state radiation health personnel.
2
Resources:
Local and state police would have communications to their respective bases, and the FBI would establish its own communi-cations link to Washington.
DOE and state radiation health author-ities would have their own local communications to support any clean-up activities that might be required.
l A.3 Student Riot at Research Reactor A Nuclear Moratorium Day rally at a large Eastern Situation:
i university has turned into a riot, and a mob has attacked and 1
seized control of the university's research reactor.
The take-over l
was not planned, and the mob lacks effective leadership; thus, the state police and university security forces are able to disperse the mob and regain the reactor facility.
However, several persons in the mob within the facility had fallen into the reactor pool, and, in their personal panic, have triggered a spreading panic about contamination.
The NRC Regional Office received notice from one of the facility operators shortly after the initial take-over, but they know nothing of the subsequent events, because the area telephone system is clogged.
Citizen's Band radio is disseminating misinformation, helping to keep demand for phone circuits at a high level.
NRC Interests: This scenario illustrates the NRC's responsibility to provide correct information to the public when misinformation is a significant problem, even when normal communications are disrupted.
Also shown is the potential need of the NRC to coordinate a response to an incident at a facility that is not ordinarily seen as a safety hazard, but might become such in the public mind.
3
Other Interests:
University and LLEA officials are most heavily involved, and state radiation health personnel could be involvod in surveying to verify that no ha:ard exists.
Resources:
University security forces would have short range communications, state and local police would have communications to their respective ha stations, and state radiation health personnel would be using short range communications for their surveying activities.
A.4 Theft of Soecial Nuclear Materials (SNM)
Situation:
A mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility is penetrated and a quantity of SNM is stolen.
The attack occurred in the after-math of a severe storm system that has devastated land line communi-cations throughout the area.
NRC notification occurred through the Regional Office several hours after the incident.
NRC Interests:
This scenario examines the NRC response to a non-reactor incident at a fixed site where communications have been disrupted, demonstrating the need for emergency communications to obtain immediate notification.
LLEA sad the FBI may need immediate access to expert advice.
There will be substantial investigatory activity in the aftermath of the incident.
Other Interests:
Strong involvement of LLEA and the FBI in dealing with the incident, with substantial interest by DOE, possibly the State Department and DoD, in the follow-up.
State Department interests would be limited to international implications, if any.
I 4
1 I
Resources:
State police and the FBI would establish their own communications to their respective bases, and DOE might request EGGG to set up temporary communications until common carrier ser-vice could be restored.
A.5 Transportation Accident Situation: A truck hauling spent fuel has collided with an abutment and the driver has been killed. Traffic is heavy on the outskirts of the city, and it is nearly half an hour before police notify the state radiological health agency that possible contamina-tion has occurred.
The state agency contacts the Joint Nuclear Accident Control Center (JNACC) which calls the DOE Energency Operations Center which, in turn, notifies the NRC Headquarters.
NRC Interests:
This scenario demonstrates the need to ensure the cooperation of local police in providing the NRC with immediate notification and the need for the NRC to respond immediately with "first aid" advice and, a short time later, with more detailed advisory assistance.
The authcrities responding to the scene and the NRC will need to know very quickly the exact material being shipped.
Since several different agencies may be involved in the response, effective coordination of the activities of these agencies is needed, both 1,
.11y and at the Federal level.
Other Interests:
State police would be in charge on scene, with state radiation health officials in charge of clean-up activities, supported by a Radiological Assistance Team (RAT) dispatched by JNACC.
DOE would be following the activities closely, prepared to step in as Executive for IRAP should the need arise.
EPA and DOT would have investigative interests.
5
Resources:
State police would provide initial on-scene communi-cations and coordination, and state radiation health authorities would have their own commuications to their base.
The RAT dispatched by JNACC would provide its ewn short-range communications, but would not be tied to a base station.
1 A.6 Boiling Water Reactor Loss-of-Coolant-Accident with Gross Fuel Failure Situation:
At a Boiling Water Reactor a large Loss-of-Coolant-Accident occurred, and a grc'ss fuel failure was apparently triggered by the thermal and pressure transients experienced by the fuel elements.
Once hot shut-down was achieved, the site emergency plan was implemented and, in due course, the NRC Regional Office was notified.
This incident might result in radiation leakage off-site.
NRC Interests:
This scenario is a demonstration of the design-basis emergencies that the NRC might have to cope with at a power reactor.
If the incident results in radiation leakage, a very fast response and broad cooperation is needed in order to limit possible damage to people and property in the vicinity.
i Other Interests:
If the gross fuel failure resulted in leakage of. radiation off-site, then the licensee, state radiation health personnel and local police would have active roles, possibly assisted by a Radiological Assistance Team dispatched by JNACC.
DOE would be observing in its role of IRAP Executive and EPA might become involved because of its responsibilities relative to the environment.
Resources:
State radiation health personnel would have their own local and base communications, as would local and state police; if JNACC dispatched a RAT to the site it would provide its own local communications.
6 l
O A.7 Browns Ferry Fire Situation: A fire in a cable spreading room knocked out pcder j
and instrumentation to a power reactor.
In addition to requiring extraordinary measures to by-pass the disabled controls to achieve hot shut-down, the fire also required outside help and many hours to extinguish.
The NRC Region II office was notified only several hours after the fire started.
NRC Interest: This incident demonstrates the need for a source of expert help when an emergency falls outside the training and expertise of the reactor operators or when on-site resources fail.
Other Interests:
Licensee management, the local fire department, and DOE have interests.
Many other agencies must stand by in case the damage does not abate.
Resources: The local o#f-site radiation survey was performed by the licensee.
The fire department usually does not require communications support, but at Browns Ferry the information flow among the participants and interested local parties was not well coordinated and suffered from being passed through too many hands.
A.8 Abandoned Control Room Situation: As chlorine is being supplied to a pressure water reactor site from a truck containing liquid chlorine, a fitting ruptures and chlorine is released to the atmosphere and into the ventilation system.
As the control room is abandoned, the reactor is tripped and the site emergency plan is implemented.
Instrument failure leads to major alarms sounding, although the operators do not know what the problem is.
7
NRC Interest:
This scenario is presented to show that under some circumstances a lack of redundancy in the instrumentation and controls could lead to further problems where no one knows for certain that the problem is solely with the instruments.
Other Interests:
Fire and rescue units will respond to the gas release, and radiation health authorities may respond as part of the site emergency plan.
Resources:
Emergency units would maintain communications to their base and, if radiation health units respond, they would likely provide their own local ccmmunications.
W 8
APPENDIX B RESPONSE SYSTEM CONCEPTS B.1 Basis Any serious nuclear emergency will draw the intermingled interests of Federal, state and local authorities as well as those of private corporations and individuals.
These interests were not well-coordinated during the Browns Ferry incident.
This Appendix describes how the activities of a large number of particpants in an incident can be coordinated by channeling the information flows among them through natural foci. The idea that well-planned foci, or information exchange points, aid effective communications underlies the NRC response system concepts summarized in Volume I.
Each such information exchange point would act as the primary source of information about activities in its sphere -- Federal, state, or local -- during a nuclear incident.
Inquiries to it could, therefore, be answered in more complete context than they could if there were no such exchange point.
The organi:ations which act as information exchange points would be responsible during an incident for relaying requests, relaying situation reports, and keeping a record of all activities.
The more standardized these procedures are, the better 1
they will function in each emergency.
A major factor, then, in METREK's preference for the following information exchange points is the necessity to define an overall system which will operate in essentially the same way for any incident.
This is especially important for a system not expected to be used frequently.
B.2 Federal Information Exchange
~
The Federal responsibilities which demand the most urgent participation in the scenarios are those of the NRC.
In addition, the NRC's legislated responsibilities require some participation in all incidents involving its licensees; it is the only Federal agency that must be involved in all such incidents.
For those 9
l
l reasons the NRC should be the initial focus, at least, of information about all Federal efforts in such incidents.
However, the NRC would i
not necessarily be the best focal agency throught tt all kinds of incidents.
METREK proposes that the increasing number of Emergency Oper tions Centers in Federal agencies be linked by a listen-only circuit which would enable all EOCs to monitor selected situation reports of any incident.
The concept offers two major advantages:
(1)
Many agencies are likely to have legitimate interests in major incidents, and the question of which agency should have the lead role changes with time as immediate dangers pass and follow-up efforts begin to dominate.
With interested agencies monitoring activities from the start, the transfer of lead responsibilities is made easier.
After formal agreement by the executive officers to a shif, the new lead agency can take charge without t
needing an elaborate status report; the former lead agency then shifts to a monitor role.
The formal trans-fer clearly delineates responsibilites.
(2)
Some Federal agencies may decide to place more emergency responsibilities on regional offices than will other agencies.
Such varying plans can be accommodated with the fewest circuits by linking headquarters EOCs to each other so that an NRC regional office would work with a DOE regional office, for example, by patching through both the NRC and DOE Headquarters EOCs.
B.3 State Information Exchange State agencies may already be linked through an EOC, though such emergency centers typically do not operate full-time.
The NRC may encourage eventual full-time state conference circuits, but METREK considers it more likely for the near future that individual state agencies be linked to an outside focus.
The preferred outside
~~
focus is the licensee.
The licensee has the responsibility for his facility and the persons working there and would have the most thorough knowledge of a problem and actions which might be underway to alleviate it.
The Licensee Operations Center (LOC) should be located in a corporate 10 L
office already familiar with the functions of various state. offices.
In some states the pertinent agencies coordinate through an Office of Emergency Operations (or something similar) which, in turn, could communicate with the licensee when the office is open.
Some question still exists about the proper coordination point for state authorities if the incident involves material in transit.
In some such cases the carrier's dispatch office, which is in the truck driver's or railroad engineer's normal chain of command, may be a more natural and practical choice than the office of the licensee who originates the shipment.
For uniformity in procedures, METREK recommends that the NRC require its licensees who ship licensed material to provide 24-hour access for approved organizations to essential information about the shipments.
(It can be left to the licensee how best to do this.)
" Essential information" must be defined precisely; it must include all data needed for the NRC and others to decide quickly how best to protect the public health and safety if an incident occurs.
B.4 Local Information Exchange
" Local" refers to all groups actually at the scene of an incident but 'not under the authority of the licensee.
Loca'l activities may be linked by a face-to-face exchange of information to some extent, but real coordination is frequently missing at disaster scenes today.
(Fire, rescue and police units operate radios on different frequencies, for example.)
The best approach to the necessary coordination is not yet clear, but METREK
~
recommends that the state police be considered first.
The state police combine accepted authority with 24-hour operations and existing communications.
At transport accidents they are usually among the first at the scene, and they can reach fixed sites quickly if called.
Local and state actions are frequently coordinated 11
through a state emergency plan, and the emergency plans required of NRC licensees must be consistent with such state plans where they exist.
The state police, therefore, with their authority to help implement the state plan, should be a natural focus for local off-site (i.e., not on licensee property) activities in an emergency.
On the other hand, some issues remain unresolved with respect to the proposed state police role.
One is that the state police may not
.~
have formal jurisdiction in some localities, and mere designation in a state plan may not be enough to abridge formal or customary powers vested in local authorities.
One possible solution for such cases (if local authorities cannot fulfill the role adequately) is to encourage cooperation by the way in which the communication links are established.
If the state police at the scene have the best access to the most complete information about state and Federal activities, l
cooperation will be seen as advantageous by whatever agency is l
formally in charge.
The state police do not need total authority to be the local focus for information exchange.
Another is that tre state police may not have the communications capacity or manpower to serve as a focal point during an incident lasting more than a few hours.
A possible solution is development of communications vans or smaller systems operated by state and local civil defense units and cooperating agencies.
Federal funding is available for states inclined to move toward this type of capability.
i B.5 On-site Information Exchange 1
The power plant or other major fixed site of an incident should not be a focus for information exchange with local, state, or Federal agencies.
The licensee personnel directly involved with the problem should have a single point of contact with their on-site supervisor 12
or with higher management in the LOC.
ds noted above, the LOC should l
be the source of information for other organizations about on-site activities.
B.6 Concept Descriptions The three concepts which fol'Iow provide for different degrees of participation by the NRC in the immediate response to an incident.
All three concepts employ information exchange points as described above:
e An NRC Operations Center (NRC-0C) located at the NRC Headquarters; A Licensee Operations Center (LOC) located at corporate e
headquarters or some other site away from a nuclear facility; A temporary local operations center -- possibly a state e
police dispatch center, a state police cruiser, or a local civil defense center near the incident site.
The concepts provide for a single point of contact for the person in charge at a fixed site and add nothing to that person's responsibilities in an emergency. All three proposed concepts would, in fact, reduce the pressure on a reactor operator by providing for a simple, early alert of the LOC and NRC-0C.
No additional personnel or support systems (such as computers) would be needed.
Much of the work of the temporary local operations center would be face-to-face coordination of activities and exchange of information.
Each state must be individually consulted to determine those states in which some agcncy other than the state police should be designated to operate a local operations center.
Whatever agency is chosen, the requirements placed on it in these three concepts should not add much to that agency's normal functions.
The need for additional personnel or non-communications support equipment is not anticipated.
13 l
i The LOC should maintain a file of essential site details and l
procedures exactly like those available at the site and in the NRC-OC.
The full required data base has not yet been defined, but copies of l
state and Federal emergency plans with key personnel locators should l
be among the items available.
Although the proposed LOC need not be manned at all times, provisions must be included for the NRC to assist the site directly whenever licensee management is unavailable.
In such a situation the NRC would also be the focal point for infor-mation exchange between the local operations center and state agencies.
(The LOC must be manned 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> if the licensee is to remain the focal point at all times.)
In all three concepts the NRC would have three organized teams j
in its Operations Center during a serious incident:
i (1)
Executive Team (2)
Information Assessment Team (IAT)
(3)
Operations Team of three persons.
These teams would be assisted by a variable number of staff advisors, assigned as needed.
Only the IAT exists today in the form recommended by METREK for an effective NRC response.
The Executive Team wou'Id combine the current Ex :utive Management Team and Incident Response Action Coordination Team.
The Operations Team in all three concepts would consist of a communications assistant, an activity coordinator (the Team Chief),
and a technical information coordinator (the Technical Specialist).
FULL DETAILS OF PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS AND PROCEDURES ARE GIVEN IN l
APPENDIX C.
l l
Figure B-1 shows in summary how the Operations Team would man the NRC-0C if the NRC adopts an advisory role (Concepts II or III).
In a monitor role (Concept I), there appears to be no need for a 14
specialist on duty in the center, though they should be called for 1
emergencies.
A Communications Assistant would be on duty at all times in all three concepts.
DAY NIGHT
,h!!$i!!* !fb!
' 1:.' :**E.
C014fCNICATIONS ASSISTANT On TECHNICAL SPECIALIST l,
Call v.v..
TEAM CHIEF
/* * :-
On Call FIGURE B 1 NRC-OC MANNING SCHEDULE FOR ADVISORY CONCEPTS (CONCEPTS 11 AND lil)
The Operations Team should be physically separated from the Executive Team and the IAT, but all three should be near each other.
The NRC-0C should also have a Public Situation Room, manned by a representative of the Public Information Officer, but it should not be located near the other rooms.
(This provision is to assure that officers dealing with the public have access to only that informa-tion which has been publicly released.)
It must be freely accessible to the public; the other rooms should be inaccessible to all but essential personnel during an emergency.
15 l
The Info.rmation Assessment Team would be utilized primarily for real or potential safeguards problems.
Its room must be securn for storage and operations.
B.6.1 CONCEPT I:
Monitor Figure B-2 illustrates the information flow if the NRC limits its involvement to monitoring state, local and licensee activities through the LOC.and to coordinating its activities with those of other Federal agencies.
After the alarm (Section B.7), the NRC would receive periodic situation reports from the LOC, relay the reports as necessary to other Federal agencies, and also relay back to the LOC any information about Federal plans and activities.
Licensee and NRC press reports would also be coordinated.
In addition to the early alarm, continual situation reports, and better coordination, this concept improves on current operations by leaving a more complete record for later review.
If an incident lasts long enough, the NRC could provide specialized expertise to the LOC on request, but the NRC would not be able to respond to such requests rapidly at all times.
Monitoring state, local, and licensee activities while coordinating Federal information exchange I
approximates the least degree of involvement required of the NRC.
16 i
L.
- -am FEDERAL NRC-0C
""~~
\\(Alarm
/
7
\\only)
/
k
~~~__f g
STATE LOC
,"k k
\\
\\
-\\
LOCAL O
STATE
(
POLICE SITE KEY generally intermittent ' flow generally continuous flow
- - + flow predominates in one direction e
FIGURE B-2 PRINCIPAL INFORMATION FLOW NRC AS MONITOR (CONCEPT I) 17
B.6.2 CONCEPT II:
Advisory with Dependent Data If the NRC is to take a more active role in the response, its activities should be those which can be done better at Headquarters or a Regional Office than they can at a LOC or on site.
The NRC can offer two valuable elements to help relieve an emergency:
Specialited expertise
,Some NRC employees have a e
great deal of direct experience and detailed knowledge of reactors which could usefully supplement the licensee's own resources.
If other expertise must be retained, the very few and highly speciali:ed consultants
~
who would be needed could be retained on call more effectively by one organi:ation, likc the NRC, than by every licensee individually.
Perspective - The operator and senior operator e
in a power reactor incident will be talking to another licensed operator, their supervisor, at the corporate office or LOC.
The focus of their attention is necessarily the immediate malfunction, one malfunction at a time.
Not all LOCs are likely to have someone available who can maintain a broader view to help anticipate the cumulative consequence of everything that's going on, including possible sub-sequent malfunctions.
The NRC can furnish such a broader perspective because it is not caught up in the details of the moment.
If an NRC-0C is established, the NRC will also be able to offer another kind of perspective, a unique collective experience with all similar incidents in this country.
In this advisory concept (Figure B-3) NRC resources would be
'~
available to the LOC on request more quickly and extensively than in Concept I.
The LOC would alert the NRC through a periodic situa-
~
tion report to the potential need for help on some aspect of the problem.
The NRC would have a Technical Specialist in the NRC-0C to help the LOC decide which staff member or consultant might be needed.
Those persons would then be contacted and kept available for consultation as specifically needed.
Unless there is a Resident 18
)
NRC-0C FEDELL f- -~7 - - - ~ h
" " ' " " ~
- K I
r f/
/
CONSULTANTS
\\ (Alarm
/
/
/
\\ only)
///
\\
i
~
,~~
f
\\
STATE LOC
-A
\\
g
\\
\\
\\
LOCAL O
STATE
( POLICE SITE KEY
generally intermittent flow generally continuous flow
- - -> flow predominates in one direction l
l FIGURE B-3 PR'*!CIPAL INFORMATION FLOW NRC AS ADVISOR WITH DEPENDENT DATA (CONCEPT 11) 19 I
t
l l
l l
l l
Inspector at the site, the NRC would have no direct contact with the site after the alarm and all advice would be based on information furnished by the LOC or on file in the NRC-0C.
Essentially the same procedures would apply for transit incidents.
The police at the site of the incident could contact an LOC operated by the originator of the shipment (or, perhaps, the carrier's dispatch office) for initial instructions about how to handle the cargo.
Alternatively, the police could call the NRC-0C direct for such advice; the Technical Specialist should be able to give it.
The NRC-0C would then contact additional staff or consul-tants as needed.
l The significant advantage of this Advisory Concept over the Monitor Concept comes from NRC maintaining a specialist on. duty after hours (the Monitor Concept requires only a communications assistant),
maintaining a number of consultants and staff on call, and maintaining complete site details on file for use when help is requested.
The most obvious limitation is that the NRC must depend on the licensee for details of the incident.
If the LOC doesn't anticipate a problem, the NRC-0C is unlikely to have enough infor-mation to sense it, either.
(It is not expected that important data would be withheld deliberately.
The licensee also wants to limit damage and knows that NRC advice cannot go directly to a reactor operator while the LOC is operational.)
4 9
l 20
I B.6.3 CONCEPT III:
Advisory with Independent Data By adding a source of site information independent of the LOC, the NRC-0C may be able to help anticipate new complications in an incident and to offer the LOC alternative remedies. The licensee would still decide, ultimately, what instructions to pass on to his site personnel. The capability to assess the situation independently, however, gives the NRC an opportunity to exercise its incident response assignments fully.
From another viewpoint, the licensee might be very willing to pass the responsibility, and the burdsn, for certain decisions to the NRC.
In such cases, it would seem far better not to have to depend on information which someone else thinks is important.
The Executive Team may even have to decide in the most sensitive situations how much responsibility should be assumed by the NRC. Written regulations appear to leave quite a lot of room for interpretation, and significant liabilities may be involved.
In this concept, the NRC would receive sensor information trans-mitted dinetly from reactor instrumentation to the NRC-0C.
Trans-mission would probably be triggered by the alarm.
One NRC preliminary estimate is that data from perhaps ten sensors will give sufficient information to monitor the status of the reactor.
Closer monitoring of both the reactor and corrective actions will require data from perhaps 50 sensors.
During normal operations the NRC-0C could dial up any reactor on a standard telephone line and scan le data.
In an emergency, the alarm would trigger automatic dial-up from the reactor site to the NRC-0C and data would be recorded there.
The NRC-0C would also be able to select any number of the sensor inputs for concentrated attention.
It has not yet been determined which specific sensor data is needed, nor how the data can be obtained with-out interfering with existing operations.
21 l
L
i As indicated in Figure B-4, other information flow is the same with independent data as it is in Concept II.
In practice more files may be added and more staff experts may be summoned to help assess the data.
If Concept III is implemented and if the licensees find the advice reliable, in fact, much of the contemplated burden 4
on the LOC in Concept II might shift to the NRC-0C in Concept III.
This concept offers two additional benefits to these mentioned above.
First, the NRC-0C would be able to provide its consultants with data already snamavi:ed and analy:ed by staff experts.
- Second, a record of the ' aw data sould remain for more analysis and for
~
r review after the incident is over.
B.7 Initial Alarm The preliminary concepto proposed in this study include provisions in all three for a much earlier alarm to the NRC and the LOC than is now possible.
Current Emergency Operating Instructions for power reactors do not usually provide for immediate notification of anyone in the case of a potential problem.
Reactor operators must first ascertain that automatic plant operations are functioning correctly before calling even the plant supervisor, for example.
Some 20 - 30 minutes or more may elapse before a malfunction of one of the automatic operations is obvious.
An earlier alarm which would take none of the operator's time and
- ~
would allow others to brace for a possible emergency is recommended.
The alarm could be triggered by the operator with a single switch. The alarm would flow (Figure B-5) in two directions, to a LOC and to the NRC-0C.
Each of these two recipients would relay the alarm to the other to provide redundant notification.
The LOC would immediately establish and hold a voice link (a public telephone circuit) to the site control room, which would then become the only voice link from 22 1
b FEDERAL NRC-0C i
- - ~ - "
a
" ~~
.. - x CONSULTANTS (Alarm and data only)
STATE LOC
,"k LOCAL SITE E
KEY generally intermittent flow generally continuous flow
~~
flow predominates in one direction e
FIGURE B-4 PRINCIPAL INFORMATION FLOW NRC AS ADVISOR WITH INDEPENDENT DATA I
(CONCEPT lit) 23
i OTHER FEDERAL NRC-0C 2
AGENCIES
(
STATE LOC 2
AGENCIES Ni f
LOCAL AGENCIES larms CSTATE POLICE SITE FIGURE B-5 ALARM FLOW FROM POWER REACTORS AND FUEL FACILITIES 24
the control room to off-site locations.
The LOC would verify the alarm, determine when and what kind of assistance might be necessary, relay that information to the NRC-0C, and contact the appropriate corporate, state and local personnel.
The NRC-0C would contact the appropriate NRC Regional Office and other Federal agencies.
This alarm concept differs from current operations in that it:
Provides immediate notification to both the NRC and
~
the licensee headquarters of a possible emergency, Provides for a single point of contact off-site for the reactor operator, Transfers the final decision and manual burden for requesting outside assistance from the reactor operator to the LOC.
When the operator is busy, a request for help through his LOC is likely to be faster and take less attention away from site emergency procedures than a direct call from the control room.
Operators should retain the option to call direct for local help, however, in case the LOC does not establish
' contact with the site within a few seconds after the alarm, or in case of an extreme medical emergency.
(The circuits from the site should not all go through the same local exchange.
At least one shuuld be routed through a for eign exchange.)
In the alarm sequence, and in the concepts generally, the licensee headquarters plays the central role in response actions regardless of the degree of involvement by NRC. This not only seems like a natural responsibility, but it seems essential to obtalaing the real (not just planned) cooperation which will help to limit further risks and damage once something happens.
An operator will be following instructions from his usual supervisors.
When he first notifies anyone, it will likely be his supervisor, who need not hesitate to call for advice from other sources because all of the advice can be coordinated in the LOC before being passed on to the reactor operator.
The operator will not have other sources cf (possibly conflicting) advice.
25
It is not known whether the licensees would see this added coordination capability as a sufficient inducement to set-up LOCs.
Another possible issue has been raised about the reluctance of state executive officers to use the LOC rather than to call the state police, for example, for situation reports.
It seems likely that state officers and anyone else will contact whatever sources provide the most complete and reliable information for their own needs.
If the communication system provides such information at a LOC, the LOC will get most of the calls.
The shift from the incident area to the LOC is important for relieving the burden on communication facilities in the vicinity of 'the incident.
The concept for an alarm sequence for a transport incident is slightly different.
After an accident, the alarm sho41d go through the dispatch office of the first fire or police officer on the scene to the NRC.
The immediate need is to offer advice to protect those trying to clear the accident.
A hijack alarm from monitored ship-ments would start with the center which periodically monitors the vehicle's progress and it would go to the NRC.
Formal procedures i
already exist for responding to hijackings.
e 26
APPENDIX C 1
CONCEPT II FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY This appendix presents the requirements and rationale for specific communications capabilities for the NRC Operations Center.
The capabilities are those needed to support the NRC in a fully operational implementation of Concept II as described in Volume I and in Appendix B of this volume.
The METREK study team derived specific communications require-ments via several steps, beginning with a complete general concept for a response system.
After delineating the system responsibilities of the NRC Operations Center during various kinds of nuclear incidents, the team sequentially defined:
Specific personnel positions and the associated functions of each to carry out the responsibilities of the Operations Center.
Personnel positions were defined according to the Concept II tasks which have to be performed, without regard to the in-cident response organi::ation which now exists (Appendix C-1).
Sources and flow of information which should be used by each person in the NRC-0C to carry out each function (Appendix C-2).
Discrete communication capabilities required to provide for efficient information flow (Appendix C-3).
27
\\,
APPENDIX C-1 PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS If and when the NRC-0C becomes fully operational under Concept II, the NRC will be able to offer detailed advice quickly to a licensee, if requested.
The same advisory capability will permit the NRC to monitor licensee actions -- its primary responsibility -- more completely and knowledgeably. To analyze problems and prepare advice during an incident the NRC-0C will require An advisory staff which includes a broad range of experience and expertise; and A technical coordinator to identify the specific help needed and to act more generally as a liaison between the caller with a problem and the NRC staff.
Because the proffer of advice can possibly lead to situations which require an interpretation of NRC policy, the NRC-0C must also have K manag5 ment team empowered to interpret policy and direct the NRC response.
The management team should not be enmeshed in all of the details of the incident; there should be:
An activity coordinator to act as a liaison between the management team, other NRC response personnel, and other Federal agencies involved in an incident.
This person must know NRC policy and procedures, as well as the statutory and working relationships between the NRC and other agencies, sufficiently well to be able to identify the information and questions which should be referred to management.
The volume of communications during an incident and the need for close and continual coordination with the response personnel will justify the NRC-0C having its own Communications assistant to relieve the NRC telephone operators.
Wide public interest in nuclear incidents mandates that the OC work closely with A representative of the Office of Public Affairs.
29 l
The list which follows defines specific functions for each of the individuals or teams required to operate the NRC-0C at a full Concept II capability.
The requirements were derived from a new concept rather than from NRC procedures in past incidents.
Consequently, the recommended personnel and functions do not correspond exactly to the existing incident response organi:ation.
The list indicates which positions are new.
Also, the Information Assessment Team is distinguished from the other staff advisors because the team already e::Lsts as a specialized unit with distinct operational requirements, including security.
It should continue.
The numbers and letters are used to identify the same personnel and functions throughout Appendices C-2 and C-3.
I.
Executive Team (Existing Executive Management Team and IRACT)
A.
Specify the general content and approve the final text of
- public information releases.
B.
Decide the degree of NRC commitments for advice or action whenever the commitments could expose the agency to extra-ordinary risks or liabilities.
C.
Coordinate policy with other agencies and resolve conflicts of interpretation.
D.
Approve special notifications and infomation releases (to legislators, for example).
E.
Individually continue to perform the critical normal duties which cannot te delagated to others.
II.
Doerations Team Chief (New)
A.
Whether on duty or on call, assist one ETH in deciding whether to fully activate the OC.
When on duty in the OC, decide specific immediate response to every emergency call (e.g., trand by only, offer immediate advice, or call TS or other advisor).
B.
Provide liaison between Operations Team and Executive Team:
define issues and options for ET; fulfill ET requests for information.
30 l
l
C.
Provide liaison between NRC OC and other organi:ations (generally Federal and private; state and local as necessary) and between NRC ~ adquarters, the Regional Offices, and, if necessar-NRC site teams.
D.
Maintain current status disp 1<fs for ET and OT showing key events of the emergency and key responsive actions.
E.
Assure accuracy of,
.:_c information releases; maintain hard copy file of releases.
F.
Maintain public information displays for ET and OT.
G.
Determine which calls are to be placed on the Federal EOC monitor net.
H.
Make special notifications (e.g., Commissioners, U.S.
Senators and Representatives, and the White House).
III. Communications Assistant (New)
A.
Receive notification of possible incident, verify if necessary, and obtain specified information relating there-to.
Relay this informati,on to the Tea 2 Chief when he is on duty, and to the Technical Specialist at other times.
B.
Notify NRC personnel and other agencies according to established procedures and as instructed by Team Chief.
C.
Set up Operations Center communications:
reserve needed lines; assure proper functioning of OC systems.
D.
Arrange phone conferencing, both internal and external, as instructed by the ET, Technical Specialist or Team Chief.
E.
Contact and hold consultants as instructed by Technical Specialist.
IV.
Technical Specialist (New)
A.
When Team Chief is not on duty the Technical Specialist will decide the specific immediate response to every emergency call (e.g., standby only, offer immediate advice, call other advisor, or call the Team Chief).
B.
Identify staff specialists and outside consultants to be contacted based upon the most recent information avail-able; request CA to make necessary contacts.
C.
Provide liaison between NRC OC and the NRC licensees, con-sultants and SA's.
D.
Prepare and present situation briefing to advisors and consultants, as they respond to notification.
31
E.
Provide technical explanations, assess technical risks, and formulate recommendations at the request of the ET or Team Chief, using consultants or other sources as j
required.
i F.
Within the competence of NRC and the limits of its resources, l
provide technical assistance to anyone who calls the OC and requests such assistance.
V.
Staff Advisors (Existing Suppor'. Staff)
A.
Answer specific questions from ET or TS, researching and communicating as necessary with the licensee, outside consultants, and other NRC staff members.
VI.
Information Assessment Team (Existing)
A.
Review and assess information from various sources to determine when a safeguards threat may exist prior to a declared incident.
B.
Clarify safeguards issues and potential risks as required during any incident.
VII. Public Affairs Reoresentative (Existing)
A.
Provide liaison with the press and general public during an emergency; forward specific queries from the public to the TC.
B.
Prepare drafts for ETD approval of proposed public informa-tion releases, using outlines forwarded by TC.
Maintain hard-copy file of releases.
(Note:
The Public Affairs Representative should not be located in or near the Operations Center. His knowledge of the emergency should be limited to information publicly released.)
l i
32
APPENDIX C-2 INFORMATION FLOW This appendix contains diagrams of the communications steps which would be employed by the NRC-0C response team. in carrying out each of the functions defined in Appendix C-1.
(The functions are repeated in this appendix for convenience.)
The diagrams show who must communicate with whom, in what sequence, and with what information to perform each task.
I e
e I
33
I.
Executive Team A.
Specify the general content and approve the final text of public information releases.
B.
Decide the degree of NRC commitments for advice or action whenever the commitments could expose the agency to extra-ordinary risks or liabilities.
C.
Coordinate policy with other agencies and resolve conflicts of interpretation.
D.
Approve special notifications and information releases (to legislators, for example).
E.
Individually continue to perform the critical normal duties which cannot be delegated to others.
34
Question or uggestion Source About Release ET Wish S ecific Yes Arrange ET Yes P
t on Conferees Conference 7
No TC Executive.
'Obtain Provide
- Advisor, Information Information Others A
ET Outline Release ET Approve PAR Draft I
Release R
/
elease Release d
No Update Display TC Abbreviations CA Communications Assistant Exec Executive ET Executive Team Public Exec Room PA Public Affairs Situation PA Room PAR Public Affairs Representative Display TC TC Team Chief FIGURE C 1 EXECUTIVE TEAM:
A. PUBLIC INFORMATION P00R ORIGINAL
Prepare
Resources tion TC TC NRC
/ with ETConference\\ Yes ET Need Nre Yes Staff Yes Information y
g, 3,,,,,,
9 9
No No go TC Identify Other obtain Staff TC Conferees Information TS Conference I
m CA Arrange Conference
/\\
U x Conference with ET Ye5 Arrange ET g
Necessary Conference
?
No Conferees, TC Specify Terms of ET Commitment, Provide m
m If Any Information I
Relay Decision;
/
Regional TC Imolement Office Update Display
/
TC Abbreviations CA Commamications Assistant Status Exec Room Exec Executive Display l
ET Executive Team Ops Room TC Team Chief TS Technicai Specialist FIGUR' E C-2 EXECUTIVE TEAM:
, S,,, S. EXTRAORDINARY COMMITMENTS l f!(I!!I.,
m a g r,.'.t.
- J \\ a.t. '4 36
'd
.a i
Abbreviations CA Communications Assistant TC e
Exec Executive and ET Executive Team Context Ops Operations
)
TC Team Chief
)
i TC ar^
More appropriate ET Information Yes Ob i staff Needed
?
No I
N Need t Talk ET Yes Arrange Talk TC Direct with with TC at 7
Other Agency?
Other Agency
\\/
No Set up Call CA Discussion with ET 2
Other Agency ET Prepare Statement Relay TC Statement; Status Exec Room Change Display Ops Room Display FIGURE C-3 EXECUTIVE TEAM:
C. INTERAGENCY POLICY COORDINATION 37 9
l TC
/
ET Recommendation /
Nominate for Notification Recipients of i
L to Specific Special Persons Notifications I
t Draft the Notice ET for Each Recipient l
Abbreviations TC ET Executive Team TC Team Chief Notify as Directed l
FIGURE C 4 EXECUTIVE TEAM:
D.SPECIAL NOTIFICATIONS l
l l
38
i Secretary ETM Request for Need for Urgent Urgent Communica-Communica-tion tion 4
Secretary or ETM Abbreviations Call CA CA Communications Assistant ET Executive Team ETD Executive Team Director Em Executive Team Members CA CA es Place or Call Yes Transfer Call Pertain to to ETM Phone; Incident Record Call
?
No CA CA Place or Inform EU or ETD Transfer Call that Call is to Non-Ready, if Recorded ET Necessary Room Phone FIGURE C-5 EXECUTIVE TEAM:
E. CRITICAL DECISIONS PERTAINING TO NORMAL DUTIES l
l i
39 l
l
FUNCTIONS II.
Operations Team Chief A.
Whether on duty or on call, assist one ETM in deciding whether to fully activate the OC.
When on duty in the OC, decide specific immediate response to every emergency call (e.g.,
I stand by only, offer immediate advice, or call TS or other advisor).
B.
Provide liaison between Operations Team and Executive Team:
define issues and options for ET; fulfill ET requests for information.
C.
Provide liaison between NRC OC and other organi:ations (generally Federal and private; state and local as necessary) and between NRC Headquarters, the Regional Offices, and, if necessary, NRC site teams.
D.
Maintain current status displays for ET and OT showing key events of the emergency and key responsive actions.
E.
Assure accuracy of public information releases; maintain hard copy file of releases.
F.
Maintain public information displays for ET and OT.
G.
Determine which calls are to be placed on the Federal EOC monitor net.
H.
Make special notifications (e.g., Commissioners, U.S.
Senators and Representatives, and the White House).
i I
40 i
any Perceived source Nuclear Incident TC/TS Action TC/TS Receive No CA Needed
/ Standby CA Call if Necessary Yes Advise:
_Yes Yes
^{
if s ry No NO Advisor Relay Problem f Advis:r
[ Follow Up CA
- Notify to Best Advisor TS (Notify TS/TC Not on Duty) if Necessary TC Need Yes Full 2
Abbreviations TC CA Communications Assistant ETM ETD Executive Team Director Suggest No ETM Executive Team Members full Activa-Log Action CA 3
OC Operations Center tion?
/ File Report TC Team Chief
/
TS Technical Specialist TC Yes ETM TC Em p,gg N7 Approve CA Activation Notifications 7
Yes O
FIGURE C 6 OPERATIONS TEAM CHIEF:
A. RESPOND TO INITIAL EMERGENCY CALL 41
ET TC Request for Initiate Information Report l
[
TC Need More No
/
Report to Information dk ET
?
\\
Yes 4
Request Assistance TC (Any Source)
Abbreviations ET Executive Team ETD Executive Team Director TC Team Chief l
TC i
Response
No OK
?
Yes iFIGURE C 7 OPERATIONS TEAM CHIEF:
B. LIAISON BETWEEN OPERATIONS TEAM AND EXECUTIVE TEAM 42
TC Other Abbreviations Agency; Request for CA Conusunications Assistant Propose RO Information R0 Regional Office Status or SA Staff Advisors Briefing Coordination TC Team Chief CA Set Up Conference TC TC
/
an Status so Brief Requestor "ded Conferees 7
Yes Conferees Need Yes More 2
Infomation 7
TC, SA NO TC Need Identify CA Site Team No Information Informationf Sourcss 6 End Conferer.ce
?
Obtain Information Yes l
i TC Other No Agencies on Query R0 Site Known For List 7
l Yes C CA cordinate Contact Site Team other Activities Agencies or Provide Information FIGURE C4 OPERATIONS TEAM CHIEF:
C. LIAISON BETWEEN OPERATIONS CENTER AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS, REGIONAL OFFICES AND l'TE TEAMS 43 I
l
)
Abbreviations Any Information Source About TC Team Chief Emergency TS Technical Specialist or Responses OPS Operations TC
\\
TC k No Inf rm TS Does Information and Enter Change Status '
in Log NV Yes TC Prepare New Status Executive Room Status Display isplay OPS Room FIGURE C-9 OPERATIONS TEAM CHIEF:
D. MAINTAIN STATUS DISPLAY 44 l
ET Outline of Public Release m
TC TC Are Details N
Currently Update Details Accurate
?
u PAR No TC Are Draft Details Release Currently Accurate
?
Yes ETD Approve Release No
?
Yes TC Release PAR Update Display; File Copy C
to Public; File Copy Abbreviations ET Executive Team Public Exec Room Exec Executive Situation l Public Affairs Room
/ TC ETD Executive Team Director Display /
PAR Public Affairs Representative TC Team Chief FIGURE C-10 OPERATIONS TEAM CHIEF:
l E.PUBLIC INFORMATION ACCURACY AND (F.) DISPLAY l
l 4s l
l
Call from RO,
- "f,b Abbreviations 3
er Agency EOC Emergency Operations Centers RO Regional Office TC Team Chief TC TC /
eta s Useful to Oth'er' No Do Not Add to EOC Net 4
Agencies
//
?
Yes TC, Caller
/\\
TC Details Proprietary No Inform Caller of Intent or Sensitive /
Yes Caller Object
?
Yes TC Do Not Add to go EOC Net; Tape TC l
Call; Prepare
/ Specific Agencies AdbtoET I
~
Summary for Net: Identify Call for Listeners l
1 l
FIGURE C.11 OPERATIONS TEAM CHIEF:
G. CONTROL FEDERAL EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER MONITOR NET i
46
/Prepare List of Special Notifications
/
CA ET Obtain Required Additions \\ Yes Telephone Numbers; g,
Delete as Deletions Directed 7
No I
CA Place Call Abbreviations CA Communications Assistant ET Executive Team OC Operations Center TC Team Chief TC 1
i Provide Briefing and Special
~
OC Access Number FIGURE C-12 OPERATIONS TEAM CHIEF:
H. SPECIAL NOTIFICATIONS l
47
FUNCTIONS III. Conusunications Assistant A.
Receive notification of possible incident, verify if necessary, and obtain specified information relating there-to.
Relay this information to the Team Chief when he is on duty, and to the Technical Specialist at other times.
~
B.
Notify NRC personnel and other agencies according to established procedures and as instructed by Team Chief.
C.
Set up Operations Center communications:
reserve needed lines; assure proper functioning of OC systems.
D.
Arrange phone conferencing, both internal and external, as instructed by the ET, Technical Specialist or Team Chief.
E.
Contact and hold consultants as instructed by Technical ie d -list.
- O 48
CA Call to NRC CA 1
File Report A
No CA CA Possible Actual Yes to Incident Verify
?
?
Yes No 4
CA
^
Record Specified Information CA Communications Assistant TC Team Chief TS Technical Specialist CA TC CA on N
Notify TS Duty
?
Yes Call May be Patched CA Through to TC or TS if Immediate Advice is Needed Notify TC FIGURE C 13 COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANT:
A. RECEIVE NOTIFICATION OF POSSIBLE INCIDENT 49
l l
t TC i
List of j
Notifications Abbreviations CA Communications Assistant
~
g TC Team Chief TS Technical Specialist Place Call TS (When Available)
TC (Otherwise)
Called GIV8 Yes CA Party Request Extemporaneous Status or Recorded 7
Status No 4
CA ang up or l
Hold Line l
as Instructed
/
FIGUR E C-14 COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANT:
B. INITIAL NOTIFICATION OF NRC PERSONNEL AND OTHER AGENCIES 50
TC Order to Activate OC l
i CA, NRC Operator Activate Additional Emergency Outside Lines to OC CA Check out OC Systems Abbreviations CA Communications Assistant OC Opcrations Center TC Team Chief FIGURE C-15 COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANT:
C. SET UP OPERATIONS CENTER COMMUNICATIONS l
l 51 l
i l
Abbreviations CA Communications Assistant TC Team Chief
.l, Advisors, Specialist, Others TC Request for Request for Management Technical Conference Conference CA CA Call Other Call Other Executives, Conferees; Notify TC When Notify Requestor Ready When Ready 1
1 FIGURE C 16 COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANT:
D. ARRANGE CONFERENCING 52
TS Request for Consultant CA Place Call;
" Hold" if Instructed l
CA Notify Specialist l
Abbreviations CA Communications Assistant TS Technical Specialist FIGURE C 17 COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANT:
E. CONTACT CONSULTANTS 53 t
FUNCTIONS IV.
Technical Snecialist A.
When Team Chief is not on duty the Technical Specialist will decide the specific immediate response to every emergency call (e.g., standby only, offer immediate advice, call other advisor, or call the Team Chief).
B.
Identify staff specialists and outside consultants to be contacted based upon the most recent information avail-able; request CA to make necessary contacts.
C.
Provide liaison between NRC OC and the NRC Licensees, consultants and SA's.
~
D.
Prepare and present situation briefing to advisors and consultants, as they respond to notification.
E.
Provide technical explanations, assess technical risks, and formulate recommendations at the request of the ET or Team Chief, using consultants or other sources as required.
F.
Within the competence of NRC and the limits of its resources, provide technical assistance to anyone who calls the OC and requests such assistance, l
G 4
54
Any Perceived Source Nuclear Incident TC/TS
/ Standby TC/TS CA Receive Action No CA Call Needed If Necessary Yes TC/TS TC/TS CA TC Able es Yes Advise:
on lo Follow-Up Duty Advise If Necessary N/
No N
Wsu CA TC/TS Notify Relay Problem Advise:
TS to Best Advisor poggg,,gp (Notify TS/TC Not on Duty)
If Necessary TC Need Yes Full 2
OC
?
Abbreviations TC V
No CA Communications Assistant ETD Executive Team Director
<SuggestFull Activa g fLogAction No ETM Executive Team Members f
JL
/ File Report OC Operations Center tion?
/
TC Team Chief h[
TS Technical Specialist Yes TC ETM TC ETD Full No Approve CA Activation Notifications l
?
JL Yes FIGURE C 18 TECHNICAL SPECIALIST:
A. RESPOND TO INITIAL EMERGENCY CALL 55
TC Any Situation Briefing Source Report to on NRC TS
Response
Abbreviations CA Coazmunications Assistant TC Team Chief TS Technical Specialist TS Brief TC TS CA
/\\
1 TC, TS More Compare Help Contact Advice Yes Needed with File Selected Needed f of Staff and Con-Advisors
?
/
sultant Experts N/
i No TS Advisors / \\
Need Brief Yes
/ Status Advisors
' 8 ng 7
Monitor TS N/
Situation No TS Request Specific Advice FIGURE C 19 TECHNICAL SPEClALIST:
B. IDENTIFY EXPERTS AND CONSULTANTS 56
Abbreviations CA Communications Assistant
^^Y Request ET Executive Team 30"#C' for TC Team Chief Advice TS Technical Specialist TC CA TC A
TS j Standar Advise on No
/ Remedies Yes Standard duty
\\ Adequate [
Procedures N/
CA Yes No Contact s
TS I
TS s
TS Yes
/
ce be \\ Yes
/
for /
ur Answer
\\ Risk for /
ET Decision
/
sr A
No No TS TS Identify Needed Provide and Staff or Con.
Record sultant Advisors Advice Yes TS TS TS, 1
Advisors P W de Advisors Compile
/ Advice Be N
and Record Advice NRisk for NRC/ No i
Advice
?
V FIGURE C 20 TECHNICAL SPECIALIST C. (ALSO "F") PROVIDE TECHNICAL ADVICE AND LIAISON 57
Advisor Request for Status Briefing TS Play Taped Briefing; Read Abbreviation Latest Public Release TS Technical Specialist TS TS Advisor Write Questions Obtain Answers Additional Yes Questions Not Readily in Priority Answered Order No TS TS Request Provide Specific Answers to l
Advice Advisor i
FIGURE C-21 TECHNICAL SPECIALIST D. BRIEF STAFF AND CONSULTANT ADVISORS 53
TC Abbreviations Request for TC Team Chief Analysis or TS Technical Specialist Recommenda-tion 4
TS TS Identify and Need Yes Consult with Help Staff or Outside Advisors No 4
TS, Advisors Perform Assignment; Prepare Summary Is TC Summary No Adequate
?
Yes TS f
fAnswer TC Forward Summary if I I
Questions Necessary as Needed FIGURE C 22 TECHNICAL SPECIALIST:
E. PROVIDE TECHNICAL ANALYSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 59
FUNCTION V.
Staff Advisors A.
Answer specific questions from ET or TS, researching and communicating as necessary with the licensee, outside consultants, and other NRC staff members.
e 9
l
.. l 4
60 1
4
Abbreviations ET ET Executive Team TC Specific SA Staff Advisors TS Question TC Team Chief TS Technical Specialist SA SA Advise TS of Need No Help Task, If 7
Necessary Yes SA Need No Clarification
?
Yes SA SA, TS Consult with Identify Requestor Best Advisors SA, SA, TS Advisors Review Develop Question Answer; 2
and Write Summary Summary TS/TC SA Forward Answer
- Summary, Questions If as Necessary Needed FIGURE C-23 STAFF ADVISORS; GENERAL FUNCTION 61
FUNCTIONS VI Information Assessment Team l
A.
Review and assess information from various sources to determine when a safeguards threat may exist prior to a declared incident.
l B.
Clarify safeguards issues and potential risks as required during any incident.
I e
.~
1 1
l 11
- 0 62
Abbreviations ET'l Exective Team Members Information IAT Information Assessment Team About FBI, CIA TC Team Chief Potential ERDA, State Dept.,
L n ees r
IAT IAT IAT Search files, Is P
e Make Inquiries v
NO File to Obtain Relevant Data Indicated Information 7
Yes IAT IAT Identify Possible Brief TC Threat Scenarios IAT IAT IAT Assist Other Is Agencies in Safeguards NO Monitoring Incident Continue to Situation Probable
?
~
Yes IAT IAT Brief
/
Critical
/
Brief Facts to TC Licensee and ETM FIGURE C-24 INFORMATION ASSESSMENTTEAM:
A. REVIEW AND ASSESS INFORMATION 63
Abbreviations ET Executive Team ET IAT Information Assessment Team Indications TC RO Regional Office of Possible IAT TC Team Chief Safeguards Licensee TS Technical Specialist Issue RO Other Agency IAT IAT, TS, RO Give IAT Full Confer with Other Confer with Background of Information Incident Incident, if Sources (FBI, Licensee Needed ERDA, etc)
(or Carrier)
IAT IAT, RO IAT Recommend the ere Specific Plan g
Plans for this ;
Appear to be
/
to ET Tes Contingency Yes an Actual Threat?
7 No IAT, Licensee, IAT N#
- FBI, RO Prepare Specific Monitor Plans to Monitor Situation as a and Counter Separate Threat; Assess Possible Risks Threat IAT IAT ET; Licenset Recommend A prove and s"""'#II P
Involved CahaW I8Plement Plan ief TC, Agencies Achs IAT I
Monitor and l
Report to ET FIGURE C-25 INFORMATION ASSESSMENTTEAM:
l S. CLARIFY ISSUES AND RISKS 64
FUNCTIONS VII Public Affairs Representative A.
Provide liaison witit the press and general public during an emergency; forward specific queries from the public to the TC.
B.
Prepare drafts for ETD approval of proposed public informa-tion releases, using outlines forwarded by TC. Maintain hard-copy file of releases.
O 1
{
65 l
l l
PAR Question or /
Write and Confirm A"Y Source Request for Question; Prepare Information Information Request 4
C, TS TC Can Obtain Yes Question Information Be Answered Now?
No 4
ET PAR Approve Relay Yes Release Requestor No TC Modify Statement TC PAR Does Transmit Statement NO Statement Satisfy to PAR equestor' Abbreviations ET Executive Team PAR PAR Public Affairs Representative File TC Team Chief TS Technical Specialist FIGURE C-26 PUBLIC AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE:
A. PROVIDE LIAISON WITH PRESS AND PUBLIC 66
i TC
/ Outline of Public Release Abbreviations ET Executive Team PAR Public Affairs Representative TC Team Chief TC PAR Yes Questions g
?
No
/\\
TC Are Details
" * "*II Update Details Accurate so
?
Yes PAR ET Approve Release to Release Public; 7
Yes File Copy No FIGURE C-27 PUBLIC AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE:
B. PREPARE APPROVED PUBLIC RELEASE 67 t
APPENDIX C-3 REQUIRED COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES This appendix complements Appendix C-2.
The latter presents functional information flows which may require the use of various communications capabilities; this appendix contains schematics of discrete capabilities, each of which may be required to support several functions.
(At the request of the sponsor the required capabilities are not further defined as specific kinds of equip-ment such as teletypes or facsimile machines.)
Schematics of the capabilities are preceded by a summary table which Cross-references the response team functions (which con-stitute the rationale for each capability);
Indicates where existing NRC capabilities may be adequate for a Concept II Full Operational Capability (FOC), or for an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) with which the NRC-0C can begin to function.
The schematics in this appendix should be interpreted with an emphasis on the functions which would be performed during an incident, rather than on the proposed location of specific individucis, because the space allocations and specific floor plan for the Oper-ations Center remain somewhat fluid at this time.
The schematics show the study team's idea of an efficient layout in a space planned for use by the Operations Center at one time; other layouts are possible.
For example, the Technical Specialist could actually be in another office if the indicated functional links were provided.
The same is true of the other positions.
Note, however, that there are important functional links (for example, among all members of the Operations Team) which METREK believes can best be maintained by face-to-face contact.
69
Some general notes about the requirements:
At least three telephone numbers will be needed for nuclear e
emergencies - one publicized number for the Operations Center.
another publicized number for public information during an emergency (actually connected to a Public Affairs Room not in j
the Operations Center), and a third unpublicized number to the Operations Center for VIP use.
All emergency-related outside calls to or from the Operations e
Center should be taped on a master multichannel recorder after a decision is reached to fully activate the Center.
This complete sequential record of NRC outside activities would be valuable for subsequent investigations.
Internal NRC calls would not need to be recorded.
Telephones in the Operations Center should not have dials or e
bells.
Dia11ess phones tend to discourage non-emergency-related traffic and aid the coordination of essential traffic.
Emergency lines must be reserved:
incoming lines to assure e
that a caller can always reach NRC assistance, and outgoing lines to assure that NRC personnel can always reach additional help.
The Executive Team and the Public Affairs Representative should e
be able to monitor commercial television network broadcasts to gauge media and public reactions.
Abbreviations are defined on the schematics and in the List of Abbreviations in Volume I.
O 70
SletuRY TABLE OF CAPABILi1Y REQUIRDtLNTS FOR CONCLPT II FOC Required Primary Capability Users Rationale Comments 1.
Limited ET Conference ET, SA, Functions capability 8 requires similar conferencing; I + 8 combined peak consultants, 1 A, B, C load: 4 concurrent conferences. Present capability adequate for Licensee II C IOC if two conference circuits are available or can be pre-empted.
(Figure 1)
IV C VA VI B 2.
Full ET Conference ET, licensee, Functions Would not be used concurrently with more than 1 Limited ET other organi-I B, C Conference. Not required for IOC.
zations II B, C (Figure 2)
IV C 5
VI B 3.
ETM ET, SA, Functions SA and IAT Conferees need not be colocated with TC during calls Direct Access IAT IB,C E if TC is advised of act.vities.
to Staff Advisors (Figure 3)
VA VI B 1
4.
ET Emergency-Related ET, ET Functions VIP callers could use a reserved Centres extension for FOC. For Outside Calls personal IA,B,C,D IOC, recorded status b lefing could be replayed by anyone who
- contacts, can provide follow-up infomation.
VIPS (Figure 4) 5.
ET Non-emergency-ET, ET Function Separate room preferred if space tu:comes available.
related Outside Calls personal IE contacts (Figure 5)
e r
SLSetARY TAtlE OF CAPABILITY REqulRE: MUGS FOR CONCLPT !! FOC (Continued)
Required Prima ry Capalillity Users Rationale Comments 6.
liard-copy TC TS, Functions Fax between Haryland National Bank Building and OC will be adequate for 1C PAA, RO, 1A for public affairs IOC, perhaps FOC. IOC may exclude licensees if OC and TS FBI, DOE II E, F maintains duplicate of licensee. file of critical documents. Fax licensee IV D E relay at willste or other buildings adequate for FOC if delays not (Figure 6)
VA excessive.
VI B VII A, B 7.
Federal EOC TC, Federal Functions optional for FOC if TC or equivalent has time available for knitor EOCs II C. G frequent agency contacts at peak of emergency.
Network (Figure 6) 8.
1C/TS TC. TS, off-II A, 8, C, il See Capability I.
Conterence duty E1M, SA, IV A, B, C, D Conferences will ng always incluJe TC and TS, who should be yw and calls consultants, E, F able to place or receive one individual outside call spiece for licensee.
IOC (two apiece for FOC) concurrently with the conferences.
other organt-zations (Figure 7) 9.
ETD-1C ETD,1C General For IOC, OC may not be manned at all times. ETD-TC contact Direct (Figure 7)
OC Support
- t be established as soon as possible after decision to Contact activate the OC, regardless of locations of E1D and TC. Esisting radio telephone appears to be adequate.
10.
IAT Secure IAT, FBI, Functions Faz relay through Willste will be adequate for IOC if delays not Communications
- DOE, RO, VI A, B excessive. FOC will require relay from any other NRC buildings liq. offices which may acquire secure terminals.
(Figure 8) i e
SIM4ARY TABLE OF CAPABILITY REQUIRtJtDiTS FOR CONCLPT 11 FOC (Concluded)
Required Primary Capabillty Users Rationale Comments II. Staff Advisor SA, Function For IOC, SA m rk area need not be in OC and SA may use standard Communications consultants VA leRC telephones.
(Figure 8) 12.
Rapid Access TC, TS, General Recorders should be interchangeable, monaural, show cassette (or to Previous SA, IAT OC Support other) identification and some movement while recording, provide Conversations a single " beep" to indicate beginning of record, have cue and review capability and a reasonably accurate footage index.
U
J 1.
Limited ET Conference Capability Supports:
Executive Team functions A, B, C Team Chief function C Technical Specialist function C Staff Advisors Information Assessment Team function B e ET member wants OT or other help in clarifying some specific question or answer not likely to be of general interest to l
entire ET.
(E.g., NRR Director may wish clarification of licensee and staff views of a particular regulation.)
Member calls CA who connects him to appropriate SA.
ETM relates problem, possibly suggesting conferees.
e SA notifies TS of problem and proposes conferees.
e TS (who may suggest additional conferees) asks CA to call conferees and hold them for the conference requested.
o When ready, CA notifies ETM which line the conference is on.
Any ETM, the TS, and the TC should be able to access the conference on invitation of the requesting ETM.
e It would be useful, but not essential, if CA could switch a limited conference onto the full conference circuit.
Two such independent conferences should be possible con-e currently, e
Each Limited Conference requires two outgoing lines for external conferees such as:
the licensee, personnel of other Federal agencies, NRC regional offices, NRC contract consultants and NRC Headquarters personnel not at Headquarters.
e Each Limited Conference requires the capability to place up to 2 " internal" conferees on the conference.
" Internal" conferees are NRC staff anywhere at Headquarters (including Staff Advisors in the OCl and possibly one staff member en route to Headquarters.
74
!.14l Mi:
E a telephone (no dial g y,g., y ;
or bell) gg 6 microphone e logieat connection txt x lines in the indicated cable
.a*
Notes:
l.TU @
i 1.
One Limited Conference Capability
,N-shown. Two Required.
2.
Capability illustrated represents maximum loading for one Limited h
h6 Conference.
Abbreviations ETD' Executive Team Director Full Conference Circuit m
CA Communications Assistant
- (See Figure C-29)
TC Team Chief
'hard j
OPERATIONS TS Technical Specialist
,(
C UY
[
ROOM ET Executive Team CA
~
\\
l
\\
l 2 External Muktichannel 6
Conferees " ~
't tporde[
f,i i
g j 2 Internal 4
d Con ferees<-
- M I
b b
necure hard conv Informat ion Staff Advisor Assessment Con fe rees Team UUUUUU g
E a
a a
UUU UUUUUU Staff Advicor STAFF AtWISORS Work Arca p
i UUUUUU FIGURE C-28 LIMITED ET CONFERENCE (SCHEMATIC) 75
2.
Full ET Conference Capability Supports:
Executive Team functions B, C Team Chief functions B, C Technical Specialist function C Information Assessment Team function B e TC relays to ETD a request from another agency or the licensee for ET conference.
ETD should be able to put TC call over speakers to full ET if desired, but no ETM input needed.
e ET decides whether to conference.
If agreeable, CA arranges conference such that full ET can listen together to all other participants but members can only input to conference when individually recogni:ed by ETD.
TC, TS, SA can access the conference at request of ETD.
(These procedures are to help maintain an orderly conference when NRC cannot control the number of outside participants.)
ooo e
ETD requests TC to request conference with, for example, another agency or the licensee.
The subject of the call is of interest to the entire ET.
o CA places calls and TC provides explanations as needed.
TC signals ETD when conference is ready.
It will be useful if conferees can be held off the full conference circuit while awaiting the " ready" signal so that the circuit can be in use during that wait, if necessary.
Notes:
ETM inputs should not be relayed through the speaker system.
ETM should not be able to control individual voice pick-ups but should know when pick-ups are live.
Speaker system should not interfere with voice pick-ups.
i ETD control should include individual voice pick-up on-off t
switches; speaker on-off and volume controls; TC, TS, and SA access control; switch to put any other ETD call on speaker system.
~
I Two outgoing lines for external conferees and the capability to place up to four " internal" conferees on the conference is required.
The participants are the same as those listed for the Limited ET Conference Capability.
76 l
i.i.t;l.NI):
Speaker U
C telephone ino dial System Note 1 g g.g or bell) noo,y
$ mieruphone e logical connee'. ion g
g g
Q tx) 1 lines in the g
g indicated cable Notes:
e.N
- . The speaker systen location
- 6. O U h shown is for illustration only.
- 2 Con-
,N The actual location of components OE Trol N,
of this system should be such as gE Panel 4 g
to provide good sound coverage b o Note throughout the room.
$ 2I C
U U
U 2.
The control panel shown should k
be mounted in such a manner as n
to allow its movement to any I
place along the side of the t'
conference table arrangement
///
/
occupied by the ETD.
J
'h a rc
/
OPERATIONS Abbreviations Same as t
f CA Communications Assistant ET Executive Teaa Limited Conference ETD ET Director (See Figure C-28)
TC TS TC Team Chief TS Technical Specialist orde[
f%
/f t
t j
securc hard cony Informat ion Staff Advisor Assessment Cc n fe rees Team UUUUUU C
a U
UUU g
UUUUUU Staff Advisor STAFF A!WISORS Work Area p
i UUUUUU 1
FIGURE C 29 l
1 FULL ET CONFERENCE (SCHEMATIC) 77 1
3.
Capability for ETM Direct Access to Staff Advisors Supports:
Executive Team functions B, C, E Staff Advisor 3 Information Assessment Team function B ETM wishes staff help in clarifying some specific question or e
answer not likely to be of interest to entire ET; research may be necessary.
ETM should be able to contact SA or IAT member directly; TC and TS need not be involved.
e CA will connect ETM to SA conferees' desk (thus assuring that TC is aware of the activity) and inform the specified SA or IAT member.
IAT will use this link for unclassified exchanges only; classified discussions should be in person in the Executive Room.
~
CA should signal appropriate ETM and identify line when SA or e
IAT member places return call.
Two such accesses should be possible concurrently.
e e
78 l
i s
l.i.t;t..%D:
O Q telephone (no dial I.xt.CUTIVL 6 mieruphone e logieat conneetson 9
91 93 9
ixt x lines in the indicated cable Abbreviations D-(
CA Communications Assistant TC Team Chief g
ETD Executive Team Director TS Technical Specialist g( } g g
g g
UUUU (9)
'hara
/
OPE?ATIONS copv ROOM
\\
l Muktichanne!
i O,
/O ttjorde{
em y
B d
~ ~
,eeure hard conv informat ion Staff Adytsor Assessment Con fe rees Team UUUUUU o
a a
UUU g
UUUUUU Staff Advisor STAFF ADVISORS
' ' ' ^ ' "
p i
UUUUUU FIGURE C 30 DIRECT ACCESS TO STAFF ADVISORS (SCHEMATIC) 79
I i
4.
Capability for ETM to place and receive emergency-related outside calls Supports:
Executive Team functions A, B, C, D ETM may wish to consult counterparts or personal acquaintances e
in other organizations to obtain specific information or expedite cooperative activities.
ETM asks CA to place call.
CA notifies ETH when call is ready.
(As an outside call pertaining to the emergency, it will be recorded.)
Two such calls from the ET should be possible concurrently.
Key officials in other organi:ations may request direct contact e
with the NRC ET during an emergency, even though the TC will handle most such calls.
Certain of those officials (e.g.,
Commissioners, U.S. Senators and Representatives, and the White House) should be able to call CA on a special VIP number reserved for such uses.
CA will route VIP calls to the TC or the ETL as the caller prefers.
These calls should be recorded.
Two such VIP calls should be possible concurrently.
I TC should be able to play a recorded status briefing for the e
caller, if the caller desires.
Two single-channel recorders are needed in order to update the briefing material.
Unchanged material should be transcribed from one tape recorder to the other and the new material inserted as required.
e l
80 l
t.lf.l.ND:
o E
Q telephone (no dial or bell) 131. CUT IVI; gooy 6 mieruphone e logical connection g
g jg g
txl x lines in the d4) indicated cahte Abbreviations CA Communications Assistant LTD O=
, N * %,
ETD Executive Team Director TC Team Chief r
TS Technical Specialist j
EIN Executive Team Member I(4) ' h h
h d
UUUU m
Vi 2 outgoing
===e
'h a rc
/
OPERATIONS outside lines %.
COPY ROOM 2 incoming n
L I
outside lines I
i (Special VIP (4) i number) l i annet f
f 2 Single Channel Tape Recorders _.,, "
y accare C
C hard conv Information Staff Advisor Assessment Con t'e ree s s Team X
UUUUUU C
U U
UUU UUUUuu Staff Advisor STAFF ADVISORS Work Area
,UUUUUU p
i l
FIGURE C41 ETM Ps.. ACE AND RECEIVE EMERGENCY RELATED OUTSIDE CALLS (SCHEMATIC) 81 l
I 5.
Capability for ETM to place and receive non-emergency-related calls Supports:
Executive Team function E i
ETM may wish to place outside calls for business unrelated to e
the emergency.
Such calls need not be recorded.
Provisions for one call at a time will suffice.
ETM contact should not be able to overhear ET discussions, Persons outside the NRC may place urgent calls to ED4, related e
or unrelated to the emergency, on ETH normal business numbers.
Secretary or other recipient should transfer incoming call to e
CA, who will ascertain the nature of the call.
Emergency-related calls must be recorded and need not be screened from other ET discussions.
Other calls need not be recorded, but callers should not be able to overhear ET discussions.
9 e
l S2
l.1 t;l Nii:
O relet' hone (no JLal
, gg., g or bell)
ROOM h mie rophone e logical connection g
glg g
lxl s lines in the
((4) 9 indicated cable Notes:
~~ -
.Ti> O-1.
Incoming or Outgoing calls not
., ',, ~ ~
related to the emergency.
,r 2.
Calls related to the emergency g(4) blb b
b but incoming on non-0C telephones.
)
Abbreviations CA Communications Assistant Note 2 ETD Executive Team Director ETM Executive Team Member
[
TC Team Chief
/ /
TS Technical Specialist
,naro
/
CPERATIONS C DY ROOM to NRC
]
CA telephone +(3)
\\
/
system (5) t f
1 Mu{tichannel 8
teporde{
f rmy
..p mucure C
C hard conv informat ion Statf Advisor Assessment Con t'e rees Team s
UUUUUU g
a a
a UUU UUUUUU Staff Advisor STAFF ALWISORS
' ' ' ^ ' "
p i
UUUUUU FIGURE C,32 ETM PLACE AND RECEIVE NON EMERGENCY RELATED OUTSIDE CALLS (SCHEMATIC) 83
l 6.
Hard-copy capability for Team Chief and Technical Specialist Supports:
Executive Team function A Team Chief functions E, F Technical Specialist functions D, E Staff Advisors Information Assessment Team function B Public Affairs Representative functions A, B e TC should be able to receive PAR drafts, and transmit to PAR the ET-approved public releases, with no transcription or retyping required.
TC must be able to retain hard copies of all releases for rapid access by OT and ET members.
Wherever possible, requests for advice and the advice itself e
should be transmitted in hard copy.
TS should be able to transmit and receive diagrams (such as e
electrical or instrumentation diagrams).
7.
Federal EOC Monitor Network Supports:
Team Chief functions C, G Lead responsibilities for reactions to an incident may e
shift to other agencies as immediate problems are alleviated and emphacis shifts to follow-up efforts.
Agencies with legitimate interests should be able to monitor key activities from the beginning of an emergency.
A capability for all interested agencies to listen-only will greatly reduce the burden on the Operations Team for providing periodic individual status reports to each agency.
Agencies offe' ring or requesting more informaion, or those e
offering to assume lead responsibilities, should call the NRC-0C number.
e Any other agency on the EOC net should be able to assume sole control of the input to the net if the agency currently in control agrees to the transfer.
This will provide clear identification of the agency in control during each phase of an emergency for all listeners.
84
l.l.Gl.ND:
g telephone (no dial 1.XI. CUT IVI.
or bell) gg 6 mieruphone e logical connection g
g g
g txt A lines in the indicated cahic Abbreviations CA Communications Assistant EOC Emergency Operations Center ETD Executi"> feam Director PAR Public.$ airs Representative TC Team Chief g
g g
g TS Technical Specialist UUUU Regional Office,
'2
'h 8 r
/
OPERATIONS AR
~
copy ROCM Input to EOC Monitor Not ;
b
(
l All outside lines except<3glll J "on/off volumet EOC Monitor net i.M
[TC Single Multichannel Channel Output from Federal y
{
} Recorders t-Tape ECC Monitor (listen-Speaker
~ ~ ~ ~
only) net System U
~
meeure C
C
- ]
hard conv Information Staff Adytsor Assessment Con fe rees Team UUUUUU a
a a
UUU g
UUUUUU Staff Advisor STAFF ADVISORS hork Area p
i UUUUUU FIGURE C 33 TC AND TS HARD COPY AND FEDERAL EOC MONITOR NET (SCHEMATIC)
I 85 i
l I
l L
8.
Team Chief or Technical Specialist Conference and Call Capability Supports:
Team Chief functions A, B, C, H.
l Technical Specialist A, B, C, D, E, F.
TC and TS should have duplicate capabilities which allow either e
to assume duties of the other during temporary absences.
e The TC should be able to conference with one ETM outside the OC l
and with a licensee (or other person reporting an emergency} to l
help decide when to fully activate the OC.
Liaison with other agencies during an emergency may require e
conferencing with two other agencies and the TS to clarify issues with a minimum reliance on voice relay.
The TS should be able to conference with one contract consultant, I
e l
one spokesman for whoever is having an emergency, and no more l
than two staff advisors at Headquarters (but not necessarily in the OC).
TC and TS should be able to place or receive individual exteraal e
or internal calls concurrently.
TC and TS require individual capabilities to record and replay l
e such portions of their telephone conversations as they think may be needed for accurate reference during. the emergency.
TS requires a capability to record, update, and replay status e
reports for consultants or staff advisors as each is notified of the emergency.
(.These are the same status reports referred to in Capability 4.)
9.
Capability for direct contact between EID and TC Supports:
General support -- no specific functions The ETD (as focal point for ET activities) and the TC (as focal e
point for OT activities) will need to communicate directly and frequently.
l Either the ETD or the TC should he able to signal the other.
e Either should be able to talk briefly and privately with the I
other without disconnecting any other calls in progress, (Privacy is necessary to prevent callers from overhearing internal NRC OC information.1 4
86 l
1.111 \\0:
g
/
g telephone (no dial or bell)
I.XI CUTIVI-ROOM
$ microphone g logical connection C
O O
C ix) s lines in the indicated eshic l
Notes:
1.
Two TC/TS concurrent Conferences required.
1.TU C 2.
If TC and/or TS at home, or en route, I
'4 capability for CA to contact them; hold
%,N i
them on line while contacting ETM; patch TC to ETM; and Conference with others is required.
O g
Q Q
Abbreviations CA Communications Assistant ETD Executive Team Director TC Team Chief TS Technical Specialist ETM Executive Team Members 4 outside
'nara j
OP RATIONS Note 2 lines copy ROOM 4 internal
'E-
\\
/
' Sing.e lines 4
g
(
(6j el
- 51tichannel Conf nce C ability q,porder f
2internallinesq
]
~ ~ ~ ~
2 external lines <-
secure b
hard conv Information Star'f Advisor Assessment Con fe rees Team UUUUUU O
C C
UUU UUUUuu Staff Advisor STAFF ADVISORS
- ^ -
g uuuuuu l
l l
FIGURE C-34 i
TEAM CHIEF / TECHNICAL SPECIALIST CONFERENCE AND INDIVIDUAL COMMUNICATIONS: TEAM CHIEF-ETD DIRECT CONTACT (SCHEMATIC) 87 l
l
1 10.
Information Assessment Team Secure Communications Canability Supports:
Information Assessment Team functions A, B The IAT requires a capability to exchange hard copy secure e
information with, at least, the FBI, DOE, Regional Offices, and any NRC Headquarters office with safeguards responsi-bilities.
Text will comprire most of the information to be exchanged, but site security discussions may refer to diagrams.
Inf' rmation exchanges should allow as rapid an interaction as o
e possible, particularly when an incident appears probable or certain.
At those times ET questions about risks or other safeguards issues must be answered quickly to be current.
11.
Individual Staff Advisor Communications Capability Supports:
Staff, Advisors e Staff advisors should be able to place or receive external or internal calls (through the CA) to perform research requested by the ET or TS.
SA should have a work area in or near the OC which it reasonably screened from the noise and activity of the Operations Room itself; three individual lines in such a work area should suffice.
e The CA should be able to summon any SA to the SA telephone to receive calls related to the emergency.
When the CA ascertains that an important call is not emergency-related, the call should be put through to'another telephone where the caller cannot overhear OC discussions.
Outgoing calls through the CA should also be possible from the non-emergency telephone.
l l
88
i 1.lft. Nil:
)
j Q telephone (no dial gy g gg. g g g.,
or bell) ggy 6 microphone e logical connection g
g g
g (x).s lines in the indicated cable Abbreviations:
g CA Communications Assistant
,N ETD Executive Team Director TC Team Chief TS Technical Specialist IAT Information Assessment Team C
O D
C UUUU E
E NRC Telephone System ;
'harc OPERATIONS e py Rooy 3 internal lines 9/
g g
3 outside lines C stuktichannel
,g i
g To E
'I
\\ o' Secure Net rm g
U C
U necure hard conv information Stat'f Advisor i
Assessment Con t'e rees Team V
C OUUUU C
UUU UUUUUU Staff Advisor STAFF AlWISORS Work Arca l
FIGURE C4 IAT SECURE COMMUNICATIONS AND INDIVIDUAL STAFF ADVISOR COMMUNICATIONS (SCHEMATIC) 89 i
12.
Capability for Ranid Access to Selected Communications Supports:
General support -- no specific functions I
(No Schematic) e The TC, TS, SA, and IAT may from time to time require a capability to replay previous conversations to assure accurate interpretations and responses, for example.
The multichannel recorder should not be stopped for replays during an emergency.
Specific uses.for smaller single-channel recorders are described in Capabil' ties 4, 7, 8, and 11.
Less frequent needs may arise at othe* c'.aes.
All such recorders should be inter-changeable o thr.t malfunctioning equipment can be replaced easily.
e CA should control recording and equipment as much as possible if CA is in the Operations Room.
Tapes must be readily accessible to OT for replay.
e ET should have one recorder available for replay.
Generally, ET conversations which contain the details for which replay might be necessary will be those in which the TC, TS, SA, or IAT participate, also.
The ETM can request that any of these other participants record a particular call.
For full coverage, however, any ETM should be able to ask the CA to begin record-ing a call at any time.
l i
90
I APPENDIX D PRELIMINARY PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT ESTDtATES Table I summarizes personnel and preliminary equipment cost estimates for each of the concepts defined in this report, including the IOC version of Concept II.
Actual costs may differ from the estimates for two reasons:
1.
Operational testing and evaluation may indicate desirable changes; 2.
Equipment actually selected may differ somewhat from that used by METREK to price the recommended communication capabilities defined in Appendix C.
The costs shown are for purchase of necessary equipment (except telephones) not already on hand.
(The Regional Offices already have versatile hard-copy (fax] capability which is likely to be compatible with the licensees' equipment.)
Two capabilities have not been provided for in the estimates:
Secure communications beyond those already planned for the NRC are not clearly necessary.
The secure fax link planned between East-West Towers and the Willste Building will allow classified information exchange with the FBI, DoD, DOE, State Department, and the White House via the SACNET.
A decision to add secure links to the Regional Offices and the licensees is currently complicated by questions concerning physical security at the terminals and legal protection of the plant security information which would be transmitted.
Communications support for the Resident Inspector and in support of all operations away from fixed sites must be evaluated in more detail.
The original METREK suggestion has been supplemented by other Jdeas for providing part or all of the needed support including suitcase radios, reactor site perimeter phones, slow-scan television, civil defense units, and complete air-mobile systems.
Headquarters and field exercises are being planned to determine the best combination for supporting NRC actions in a nuclear incident.
(The communications package now being planned by the NRC to support the first eight Resident Inspectors has not l
been evaluated by METREK for its emergency capabilities.)
l l
91 l
1 1
TABLE I PERSONNEL AND PRELIMINARY EQUIPMENT COST ESTIMATES CONCEPT I CONCEPT II CONCEPT III IOC FOC PERSONNEL (new positions)
Communications Assi-t
(~~.1, all times 4
4 4
Unnamed position, /.
.surs/w'ek 1
Technical Specialist (TS), 128 hours0.00148 days <br />0.0356 hours <br />2.116402e-4 weeks <br />4.8704e-5 months <br /> / week 3
3 Team Chief (TC), 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> / week 1
1 EQUIPMENT START-UP COSTS (thousands of dollars)
NRC Operations Center Communications consoles... CA 20 30 30 TC 5
'5 5
TS 5
5 Executive Team conference equipment 10 10 10 Recorders..
20-channel master 20 20 30-channel master 30 30 portable casset?e... 5 units 1
1 10 units 2
2 Pagers... on-call DC personnel ($300/ unit) 1.5 0.9 1.2 1.2 staff advisors during incidents 3
3 6
6 liard-copy (non-secure)... one unit 6
6 6
two units 12 Data processing equipment 26 Visual aids and Executive Team TV monitor 4
2 4
4 NRC-0C TOTALS 71 33 99 131 e
h 9
TABl.E I (CONCLUDED) 4 CONCEPT I CONCEPT II CONCEPT Ill IOC FOC Licensee Operations Centers (LOC) liard copy (non-secure), I unit each 6
6 6
Da'ta processing equipment 16 LOC TOTALS, 40 LOCATIONS 210 0
240 880 8.
Power Plants liard copy (non-secure), 1 unit each 6
6 6
Pager and broadcast unit for Resident Inspector 0.8 2.3 2.3 Data processing equipment, recorders, dialers 0.3 0.3 20 PLANT TOTALS, 80 LOCATIONS 568 0
688 2264 TOTALS 879 33 1027 3275 l
\\
I
~
DISTRIBUTION LIST i
W-12 H. Benington Nuclear Regulatory Commission (10)
C. Grandy A. Tachmindji W-30 J. Quilty W. Woodward s
l W. Yondorf W-33 A. Distler W. Flury J. Himes S. Hirsch A. Lope:
E. L. Rabben C. W. Sanders F. Sandy Praj ect (10)
METREK Library MITRE /Bedford Library Document Control 6
4 95 l
e
.