ML19308C086

Developing Regulatory Program 1954-1956, Draft

ML19308C086
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Issue date:	03/28/1979
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DEVEEOPING A REGUIA'IORY PIOGRAM 1954-1956

.e me Nuclear licensing and regulation began to nake its public appearance

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in tlie early 1950s when the Atomic Energy Canmission, the Congressional Joint Ccmmittee on Atomic Energy, and industrial representatives initially explored opening the governnent nonopoly in nuclear matters to private I- - -

enterprise. The idea was to make atomic energy economically empetitive in the production of electrical energy. The nest significant by-product of the agency's early bdustrial Participation Program (1951-1955) was

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the Atomic Energy Act that substantially altered the original 1946 act

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and allowed private commrcial participation into many nuclear areas.

52 The new law did not guarantee that an ec:onomically feasible nuclear power

.:wm industry would energe inmediately, but it substantially encouraged such 1

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an industry.

The drafting of the 1954 act was based on a philosophy that the E.1.=.

governnent must, in broad terrrs, advance private developrtent into the t.. r.-.

new and heretofore governnent-controlled nuclear technology. The law-

.:5~2 rtaking was not an exercise on the specific issues of the technology.

On technical safety and health matters, for exanple, the authors broadly defined the objectives, leaving the details to be worked out by the ABC.

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~L l The air had prepared, as early as 1953, draft amending legislation to the 1946 act designed to develop this new nuclear power policy.

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The nest inportant issues addressed by the Air drafters were thorny

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Ironopolization by those capanies who had already gained cmpetence in nuclear technology through AEC contracts.

Safety and health matters

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were not nujor concerns. They could be dealt with under the broad

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regulatory p w ers given the AEC.

i, After review and scrre careful criticism by other agencies - the

. 3 Departtrent of State, the Federal Trade Corrmission, and the Federal N

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Power Comnission - two draft pieces of legislation - one dealing with international and security aspects of atomic energy, the other with

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private participation - were sent in early 1954 to the Joint Comnittee.

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F-The timing purposely coincided with President Eisenhower's Atans-for-Peace speech at the United Nations on Decerrber 8,1953 and the sub-sequent State of the Union and budget nessages in January 1954. The

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latter two nessages highlighted nuclear energy and told Congress that bb 3

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the administration was sending it anending legislation.

These drafts,

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however, were never introduced.

Sterling Cole, chaiman of the JCAE, I.C later told his House colleagtes the AEC drafts "gave the President such rather conplete, unlimited, and unrestricted authority, both in the domestic and in the international field," that he refused to

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introduce them.

He was adamant they would not have been ac ptable

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to the JCAE and certainly not to the House.

Consequ2ntly, Cole, JCAE vim-chaiman Bourke Hickenlooper, staff r:22 director Corbin Allardice and new conmittee munsel George Norris, Jr.

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drafted a fresh, consolidated bill. Norris, with extensive industrial

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=g experience, was particularly helpful in drafting portions of the

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legislation that would bring private industry into the nuclear energy

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5 realm.

It also was Norris who selected the Federal Comunications

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Act of 1934 as a rrodel for the legislation and extracted alnest

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verbatim the licensing provisions of that law for the new nuclear bill.

While these four nen were the primary authors of the bill, their initial draft was distributed and thoroughly discussed by other cut-c..

mittee members before being sent to the AT in preparation for both M.

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executive session and public hearings.

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In the hearings that followed and in later floor debates, patents, ownership of nuclear materials and public vs. private power develop-

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ment were the key debate topics. It is not necessary to dell here U'"

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on those issues.

It is, however, instructive to analyze the act's

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k safety and health provisions to understand the subsequent regulatory

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and licensing schene developed by the AT.

The 1954 act was different from its predecessor on safety and health matters. Ehile the earlier r-law was silent on these issues, the 1954 act inplicitly and explicitly

..==.u dealt with them. For after 1954 the A T was obligated by statute to protect the public health, safety, life and property. The means to

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do this rested in its licensing power and rule-making authority.

Chapter 10 of the act distinguished anong several types of reactors and licenses. The first type, ocumercial or " class 103". licenses as

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they came to be called, were, as it turned out, for the future.

Pe-actors detennined by AT as being "sufficiently developed to be of t---..

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7 a conmercial license under section 103.

The ABC interpreted " practical value" to mean economic feasibility.

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imagination to make a case for any of the early reactors to be judged

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economically carpetitive with other prevailing energy sources, section 2.1"$

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103 conmercial licenses were not issued to early applicants.

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Early reactors, then, were issued " class 104" licenses under the provisions of section -104, " Medical Therapy and Fesearch and Develop-

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nunt. " Three types of reactors fell under this section.

Reactors for use in medical therapy came under 104(a).

104(b) authorized the issuance of licenses for reactors used in "research and develeprent

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activities leading to the demonstration of practical value... for industrial or connercial purposes." And 104(c) allowed the ABC to

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license research reactors of any type not like those in subsection 9

104 (b).

A careful reading reveals that 104(b) licenses were meant to be internediate ones used until the industry could denonstrate " practical n

e value," i.e., ecnnamic cmpetitiveness.

Throughout these sections, general safety was cited. Section 103 II restricted the issuance of a license to persons "who are equipped to observe and who agree to observe such safety standards... as the

=.==.u Comnission by rule may establish," and who agreed to make available to D

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the Am such data as it determined necessary "to protect the health and safety of the public." 'Ihe three subsections of section 104 directed

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the AT to inpose the mininun anount of such regulations and tenns on p

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a license that would pemit the Comission to fulfill its obligations b

"... to protect the health and safety of the public." However, in

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104(b), the statute added that facilities licensed under that sub-Ex,,.G..

section must be "cmpatible with the regulations and tems of license" which would apply if a ccrmercial license under section 103 were later 10 to be issued.

Other provisions of the act also had safety inplications. Section

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182, in describing requirenents for license applications, gave the AEC bro.d authority to determine what infornation must be included. Sub-section 182(a) required the applicant to provide specifics so that the

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AEC could determine that the facility would " provide adequate pro-tection to the health and safety of the public." Fbst inportant was

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section 185 which defined the construction permit:

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All applicants for li nses to construct or nodify production or T.. T...

utilization facilities shall, if the application is otherwise 222.

acceptable to the Cmmission, be initially granted a construc-tion permit. The construction pemit shall state the earliest T2 sa:=

and latest dates for the cmpletion of the construction or nodification. Unless the construction or nodification of the

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facility is canpleted by the completion date, the construction permit shall expire and all rights thereunder be forfeited, unless

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upon good cause shown, the Camission extends the cmpletion date.

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Upon the cmpletion of the construction or nodification of the I --- - l

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, facility, upon the filing of any additional infonnation needed to bring the original application up to date, and upon finding e= a =

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that the facility authorized has been constructed and will operate

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in conformity with the application as amended and in confonnity with the provisions of this Act and of the rules and regulations of the Comnission, and of the rules and regulations of the

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Camlission, and in the absence of any good cause being shown to the Cannission why the granting of a license would not be in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, the Ccmnission

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shall thereupon issue a license to the applicant. Ebr all other purposes of this Act, a construction pennit is deemed to be a 1;,

11 license.

h* nile there were no explicit safety standards within this definition,

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there was the broadly worded "otherwise acceptable to the Cannission" phrase that inplied adherence to ABC safety standards. As it de-

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veloped, the construction pennit became the principal event in the C

life of a production or utilization project. Without it a conpany

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could have no assurances upon which to procced. Consequently, the tenns under which a construction pennit would be issued became extremely

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inportant.

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The legislative history of the construction pennit section is

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instructive. Noted earlier, the idea was taken frun the 1934 Federal

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Camunications Act which defined the issuance of construction pennits j[;; 2 j

for radio stations with the proviso that they would be converted to a

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operating licenses upon the ccurpletion of construction. The purpose

-- y f in the FCC act was to mke radio ocxrpanies obtain a permit before proceeding with a large expenditure of construction funds that might in turn place undue pressure on the licensing authority to grant an

=d 12 t-1 operating license.

The hearings on the 1954 act mke it clear F

that this also was in the minds of the JCAE legislators. While in-j dustry spokesmen wanted more or less assurance that a construction 13 permit would be mnverted to an operating license, careful reading

-t of section 185 showed substantial discretion given to the agency on

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...m==.m whether or not a conversion would be effected. There was no auto-

,..J..'i matic conversion. And although the section mde no reference to

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safety aspects, the developmnt of ABC safety rules and regulations

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were inplied to be the standards against which construction permits 2.7::1 would be issued. Directly related to these licensing provisions was section 161(i) that authorized the ccomission to prescribe inple-nonting regulations, " including standards and restri.ctions governing the design, location and operation of facilities used in the conduct

. of such activity, in order to protect health and to minimize danger 14 to life and property."

It is obvious that these sections were broadly and vaguely worded for a purpose. Iegislators frame laws that give authority to suit a

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particular time. In the mntext of the developmnt of nuclear tech-

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guidelines and rules based on the technology's evolving nature. It j

would indeed be a poor reflection on menbers of Congress if they

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exacted specific legislation that in the long run might not work. To avoid such a situation, broad workable statutory language was the wise

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course; the inplementation could then be left to the technology experts:

the engineers, scientists, attorneys and businessmen whose task would 5.==

be to apply their special skills and knowledge to make the general law

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work within Congress's schene of protecting the health and safety of the public.

No clear precedents were available upon which to base their legis-

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lative work. The members of the Joint Committee realized that they

.,.e were embarking on a new venture that, in effect, hoped to create a private industry frca a government nonopoly. The nest solid ground they could stand on was their ability, based on years of legislative law-making, to create a workable statutory framework that would

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accxnplish their objective. That experience dictated that in areas which they were not sure they would purposely leave vague, clothing 7""

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their uncertainties in broad language. Time and experien would determine whether their course was correct.

Prior to the 1954 act, the safety of reactors was solely a government problem. To assist the AEC with its major concerns - where

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to locate the reactors and to determine what safety features should

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be designed for them - the Ccmnission established in 1947 an advisory group kncun as the Beactor Safeguard Ccumittee. This blue ribbnri

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camittee, crxtposed of 1.c.own nuclear experts headed by Echtard Teller,

%2[5 reviewed technical safety aspects of reactor hazards made by AEC r

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contractors and sutmitted rewmmidations to the Comission. 'Ibller described those early years:

"The cxximittee was about as popular -

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and also as necessary - as a traffic cop.

Scme of my friends, anxious for reactor progress, referred to the group as the Comittee for 22 Peactor Prevention, and I was kidded about being assigned to the A1E's

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15 Brake Departnent."

In 1950, a second advisory group, the Industrial Committee on Iocation Problems, was created to balance the " technical and scientific

._ 52 aspects of reactor 3 hazards, as developed by the Peactor Safeguard "7..

Ccrimittee, against the nontechnical aspects of reactor locations."

Three years later the Ccamission merged these functions in one ocm-16 "Y

mittee - the Advisory Comittee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

Based

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on the high standards set by its predecessor groups, this new ocamittee k' ""t t..

quickly was regarded as the nest influential in every area of reactor safety.

In 1955, the AEC reported to the JCAE with considerable pride

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that the " extraordinary reactor safety record" cued much to the " strict 17 criteria-laid down by the Reactor Safeguards [ sic] Ccxtmittee.."

Since all safety questions were referred to that group prior to enactnent of the 1954 act, it was logical that the comittee would continm to play a vital role in safety mattea.s in licensing procedures once the 1954 law Z::= ~:.;

was in place.

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But tne advisory c:xmtittee could not remain as the only group

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reviewing reactor hazards.

Its nonbers were part-time consultants and the workload under the anticipated pwer denenstration program would place an undue burden of work on them. So in October 1954, the Cm mission appointed its Deputy General Counsel, Harold L. Price, to

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serve as a special assistant to AE General Manager Kenneth Nichols

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with the task of developing an organization plan for the coordinated

.i 18 administration of the limnsing program called for under the act.

Prica, a University of Virginia law school gradtate, practi d law

~$S = 3 privately for a short tine before joining the Departnent of Agriculture in 1936.

He subsequently served in the General Counsel's office of the War Production Board and was General Counsel in the Civilian Pro-duction Administration before joinir.g the AE in 1947 as the chief law

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officer at the Oak Ridge Operations Office.

In 1951 he was appointed i==_==: i Deputy General Counsel. An indefatigable worker with a good mind for organization, Price cann up with a plan by the spring of 1955. The

]j Ccmnission approved his work and established the Division of Li nsing

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=-- ' l Three nonths later, a reorganization changed the name to the

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Division of Civilian Application and consolidated its activities 20 through assignments of functions frun other ABC divisions.

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=ar inconsistent with the primary task of the AT to prmote atcmic energy,

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the division actually took on both regulatory and promotional functions.

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....l The Licensing Branch under Lyall E. Johnson carried out the basic administrative work on licenses for production and utilization facili-

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ties, operators, and source and special nuclear materials. The Orders

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and Regulations Branch, headed by Bernard B. Smyth, developed rules C 2]

and regulations for the division's programs. Paul C. Aebersold headed the Isotopes Extension, located at Oak Ridge. This group had both a regulatory and promotional function:

it administered the program for

" T?T the licensing and distfibution of byproduct materials and related

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irradiation services and it encouraged the peaceful uses of such

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materials. Two other branches, the Connercial Development Branch 2

headed by Charles G. Manly and the Materials and Services Branch under Myron B. Kratzer were primarily prenotional. The Radiation and Inter-agency Branch directed by Eugene E. Fowler was responsible for both

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setting standards for use and disposal of byproduct and special nuclear nuterials and encouraging participation in the production and use of such materials.

In addition, the branch planned and administered

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prograns for cooperation with states in nuclear regulatory matters.

The Hazards Evaluation Branch was a key one in the division.

T.'.i.'.I..I Originally organized as a staff in the General bhnager's office, in the fall of 1955 it was transferred to Price's operation. Clifford K. Beck headed the branch.

Beck's nuclear career dated back to the

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thnhattan Project during the war years and as Director of the Gaseous

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E Diffusion Project at Oak Ridge from 1946 to 1949. He returned to his

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native North Carolina in 1949 where he chaired the Physics Departnent at North Carolina State College at Raleigh. hhile there he initiated a project that lead to the licensing of the first university research reactor and developed an academic program fran which the first doctoral d2grees in nuclear engineering were awarded. In November 1955, he returned to the AT as a consultant to Price's division and joined the 22 hazards branch full-time in 1956.

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Safety was the ob[ective:

the hazards branch was responsible for the developmnt of standards, criteria, guides and c:) des for the d2 sign, construction and operation of nuclear facilities. Equally

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inportant, its staff evaluated hazards a,ects of all nuclear facilities proposals including design, operation, supervision, containmnt and

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location.

In carrying out these tasks, the group provided advice to 23 other staff offices on every reactor's safety aspects.

In other words, the branch took on the functions that the Peactor Safeguard

"" t..._.t Comnittee had performed prior to 1954. It is inportant to imelier, though, that the ACRS continued its independent advisory role. For

- some tine, the hazards branch relied to a large measure on the I

Independent judgnent of the ACRS.

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With this consolidation of activities, the division's main tasks were apparent:

(1) development of rules and regulations amling with licenses and authorizations related to the civilian use of nuclear power, (2) assessment of hazards associated with the expanding civilian use, and (3) administration of the licensing program. In addition, it

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encouraged civilian participation in the development of uses of atcznic crs c

.=w energy. These jobs required a conbination of legal, scientific and engineering specialists. Slowly, Price expanded his staff which pro-

=m coeded to work on building a workable regulatory program.

To license the private facilities and assess the safety of the projects, the agency quickly established its regulatory policy and wrote the appropriate regulations. The Ca mission approach 3d its regulatory responsibility fully aware of the bearing that its regula-tions would have on the growth of the private atcmic energy industry.

77 Its policy, outlined to the JCAE by Chainran Lewis L. Strauss, was "one of exerting the minimum of control" needed to preserve the health

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and safety of the public.

Strauss emphasized that AEC regulations "should not impose unnecessary limitations or restrictions upon private

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participation in the developrent of the atom's civilian uses, that they should not unnecessarily interfere with managenent practices,

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and that such regulations should be enforceable in a practical and

.m uniform manner." While Price was organizing the Division of Civilian

. Applications in 1954-55, he also developed the initial set of regu-lations.

Ibbert Imenstein, an attorney with the Office of General 24

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Counsel, worked closely with Price in this task.

f We have noted how safety standards cited in the 1954 act were

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vague, but intentionally so in order to fulfill the Ccnmission's.

policy on atomic developnent. The first ones were approved and sent ky

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out for public cx] ment in April 1955 (published as Title 10, U.S. Code

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[10 CFR]) and additional rules were published in subsequent nonths. These included Part 50 on the licensing of production and utilization facilities; Part 70 on the use of special nuclear naterials; Part 25 on the safeguarding of restricted data; and Part 55 on limnsing operators of production and utilization 71.2

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facilities. Regulations in the areas of radiation protection

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(Part 20) and administrative procedures (Part 2) were announ d later in the sumer. To obtain the widest possible views in developing

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these regulations, nectings were held between Price's staff and repre-t= =.

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sentatives from +te public utilities industry, equipnent nanufacturers, f ~'~I 25 J

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the chemical industry and research organizations.

Considering the scope of the task and the short tine within which the initial regulations were written, the workload was herculean.

=r Those early Part 50 regulations indicated the evolving nature

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of AEC's regulatory process. Generally speaking, production and b

utilization facilities covered under Part 50 included reactors; isotope separation plants, such as gaseous diffusion plants; and chemical

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separation plants.

Fuel element fabrication plants, which were required M-l T' to be licensed under the originally proposed regulations, were excluded in the final rule. After lengthy consideration, the ccanission decided

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that the special nuclear naterials regulation under Part 70 provided NM 26

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enough safeguards for that type of facility.

Given the fact that the

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larger agency mission was to pronote nuclear developtent and use, strict regulations would hinder that goal. Yet developnent had to be TI cx trolled. Part 50 included detailed requirements on the data to

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2 be submitted as part of the licence application, nost of which per-tained to considerations of safety. An applicant was obligated to provide information on his technical and financial qualifications as l

well as the earliest and latest dates for the conpletion of construc-27

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tion.

While technical qualifications w re obviously related to safety aspects, the requirement for financial qualifications also p..

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took in safety considerations. This reflected the 1954 law in that i3CAE numbers believed that if an applicant was not financially quali-fled, he might take shortcuts in construction which might affect the b

28 safety of the facility.

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The section on submission of technical infonnation on a given C----

29 project, the " hazards suamary report," was detailed enough, but the regulation provided little information on how the ABC would judge that data in eventually issuing a license. The key secticn succinctly

$h stated that a license would be granted if:

I (a) The process to be performed, the operating procedures, the

'I facility and equipnent, the protective devices, the location or place of use of the facility, and other technical specifi-xx:e cations, or the proposals in regard to any of the foregoing

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collectively provide reasonable assurance that the health and

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safety of the public will not be endangered.

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(b) The. applicant is qualified by reason of his reliability, L

technical ocupetence, and financial responsibility, where these are factors.

p::.1 (c) The issuance of a license to the applicant will not, in the opinion of the Conmission, be inimical to the camon defense and security or to the health and safety of the 30

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There were additional fequirements relating to class 103 and 104 2

mm.m licenses that d2 alt with natters other than health and safety, i.e.,

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jurisdiction of rate-making regulatory bodies, mnflicting license 31 applications and anti-trust provisions.

But the burden of judging 3..

the quality of an applicant's proposal fell on the astute technical appraisals of the Hazards Evaluation Branch and the ACES. Certainly,

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then, these regulations were made to fit those early days of the

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rapidly changing nature of nuclear technology and the varied research j?

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and development program.

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.,M The government owned all special nuclear ma*ialm under the

- 1954 act. Consegmntly, Part 70 required each person who possessed a

32

_.e.

special nuclear materials to hold a li nse allowing him to do so.

(( "4

]

.. =.. =.,

The power Inactor owner normally applied for the Part 70 license at the sane tine he applied for a facilities license under Part 50.

][f 4 proval of the facilities license concurrently assured him the

z..

33 r

availability of fuel for the duration of the license period.

l

?...m g

p'~

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=...

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. : :..= =.

==

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The processing facility owner, unlike the reactor owner, would

};Z.

...,.y

,not get an assured supply of mtnHal during the period of his

==%

wg facility license although he, too, would nornally nuke application

.==I to possess special nuclear ma+aHala at the sam tine he applied for the facility li nse. He could, however, remive a given anoun'. for m

develornental work or for a snn11 mrking inventory. The grant of

=

a noterials license to these units was analogous to a hunting license

.

n a

because both fabricators and processors had to solicit business from

=:..::.

reactor owners. Consegmntly, their nnin supply of material cane 34

w = = :

out of the allocations granted to the reactor owners.

The regula-tions also provided for the transfer of special nuclear unterials from 35 one licensee to another.

All of this was subject to appropriate record keeping requirenents and financial acmunting between the 36 limnsees and the ABC.

],]

Promising reactor designs were being developed, but it was by no

< 52 neans clear in the mid-fifties that one or two particular ones would beccxto the nuinstays of the technology. Under the 1954 act, the AEC

=--c had the authority to build large-scale reactors for research and

... =

developnent purposes. However, it was not allomd to construct re-

.a actors for the sole purpose of generating or selling power. Backed by the new act and under the often mntroversial leadership of

==

Strauss, the AEC pursmd a policy based on the assurtption that ocm-petitive industry would bring about econcruic nuclear pcuer faster Z:I'.I E

3:.. ::.,

~ :

[.

mf

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.=

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than any governnent-run program. _The ABC announced a scheme to cb

{;

this in January 1955, which it naned the Power Denonstration Peactor p

Program (PDRP): " designed to open the way for Arrerican industry to

~~

37 develop, fabricate, construct, and operate experimental reactors."

i..

During the three " rounds" of the PDRP, from 1955 to 1963, the govern-nent offered funding to private oaapanies for conducting research and cbvelopnent on proposed reactor designs, waived charges for the loan

=

of source and special nuclear fuels for up to seven years, and pro-vided free research and developoent in governnont laboratories for certain mutually agreed-upon projects. These were the incentives

"==

frcxn the governnent; for their part, the reactor owners took on the

~ ~ - - '

economic risk of their proposed projects.. During the period, several reactor designs were tried including the fast-breeder; the sodium-oooled, graphite noderated design; the organic moderated nodel; the

= - -

..m=

heavy water cbsign; and the gas-cooled reactor. By the end of the program in 1963, however, the light water reactor family (boiling

==

j water and pressurized water designs) had developed as the future f.

38 workhorse of the nuclear industry.

" = - "

Rules had to be written to allow as much freedom as possible for

[.""'

the developers to experiment as they progressed in their construction.

This included experinentation with safety factors. Thus the regu-m- -

p = =.m lators wrote into Part 50 an " Extended Time for Providing Technical F-Information. " That allowed the AEC to issue a conditional or pro-visional construction permit even though all the technical information

,C.*::::.':W.

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w

.mm s wm..,

m. ::.wvm.w - -

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required for the application was not initially subnitted. The qm14-TM fication was that the "Canmission is satisfied that it has sufficient e..

information to provide reasonable assurance that a facility... can be constructed... without undue risk to the health and safety of 39

="""

the public and that the omitted information will be supplied...."

~

This provision was desirable from the point of view of both the 17I=

applicant and the AEC. The fact that the applicant would be issued

. m a permit, albeit conditional, would assure him that his construction

=55 permit was converted to an operating license. For the agency, issuing

~

a conditional construction pennit provided the necessary flexibility

]

to prmote the proposed reactor designs that had not yet proven them-

.=

selves while at the sane tine it assured, within a reasonable doubt, that the outstanding safety features would be satisfied by the time the reactor was ready to operate.

"U This appeared to be a less conservative safety philosophy than

=a

.

one would think desirable in such a dangerous technology. The ABC did not believe this was the case. General Manager Kenneth E. Fields reassured the Joint Conmittee that the agency's hazards work was a program that made a careful evaluation of every nuclear reactor to

~'

ensure that all hazards had been recognized; assured that "all reason-able steps" were taken to " minimize the probability of the occurrence C.i=_'

\\

:

i of an accident;" assured that if an accident did occur its con-

=~

=:===.

sequences would be minimal; relied greatly on the technical cropetence Z:Z:.

C-^-...

.: =..:..

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. -... ' '... ". ~..

' " ~ '. '. ' ~ ~ -

~ ~ * * *

. 2 ~ :'.i

r-6

=n-en== = = - - -

.... =.

..^. :.4....

of the designers and operators as well as the hazards staff; and checked constantly on the reactor operator for ocuplian with the

[.

40 Z.;;

agency's rules and regulations.

The AEC recognized that the mnditional construction pennit was not the ideal limnsing procedure. But because the power reactors

~~~ " ~

under mnsideration were still being developed and useful standards

=. _

or maes could only be developed as the facilities themselves became

= = =.

"~"

sonewhat standardized, the AE had to bend with the tires. Fields

. = =.

noted:

"This is the type of construction pennit that we will probably have to issue for all the power denonstration reactors, and even for

-~~?'

rrany of the research, testing, nudical reactors, for the next few 41 5g=E5 years."

The nub of the luzards problem lay in the evolutionary and danger-ous nature of the technology. Teller was not the first to recognize m.

it when he discussed the early work of the Safeguard Comrittee:

" "~

In assessing reactor designs, we could not follow the usual' nothod of trial and error. This nethx1 was an integral part

==

of Anerican industrial progress before the nuclear age, but

...m..

in the nuclear age it presented intolerable risks. An error in the nanufacture of an autmobile, for instance, might kill

.a.

one to ten people. An error in planning safety devices for t...._..

W....

an airplane might mst the lives of 150 people. But an error J.Z.Z i-allowing the release of a reactor's load of radioactive t ====

i w

l

:. u:.=;

1

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J O'.;*/.;L

~

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.:GM..a.' 4 particles in a strategic location could endanger the population

. ;..a of an entire city.

In developing reactor safety, the trials had

==-

42 to be on paper because actual errors could be catastrophic.

_. = ~

Seeing this danger, the Reactor Safeguard group established what Teller called a "sinple pro dure." 'Ib each reactor planner, the crmnittee

.b.$

asked that they:-

".E.=.

+

IIragine the wrst possible accident and to design safety apparatus

=-

guaranteeing that it could not happen. The comnittee reviewed s'" "

each reactor plan, trying to inngine an accident even wrse than dY that conceived by the planner.

If m could think of a plausible mishap mrse than any discussed by the planner, his analysis of the potential dangers was considered inadequate.

In nest cases, I

3_....-

the required discussion created a reasonable spirit of caution, and we could advise the Atomic Energy Ccmnission that the reactor

. ~...C 43 would be sufficiently safe.

This novel procedure, utilizing for the first tine in any najor industrial

'~(("

developent an attempt to foresee the possible accidents or disasters

. =. ~

i and to take steps to prevent them, was used with all AT contractors.

)).

In 1955, the Hazards Evaluation Branch took over frcru the ACRS the prinary responsibility for safety determinations. With nuclear

' " " ~ "

power developent entering the non governnent, crmpetitive arena, and E-wr

=.c =a

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s 1-

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.= -

..

with the planned size of reactors increasing, the safety staff saw

((f'

==s.=.

that a nuclear accident could set the new industry back many years.

Excessive caution, though, by not remgnizing the already established

.1._ =,7 essentials of reliable, safe reactor design and operation and by

- = - -

overloading the machines with unnecessary anci expensive safeguards, 44 could also have a negative impact on the industry.

Yet the task was formic able.. There were Inany unanswered safety qmstions that had to C

.= : ::-

be dealt with in a realistic way to acomplish the agency's mission.

.M.__._

ACRS Chainran C. Rogers htCullough was a leading spokesman on technical safety rratters for the AT.

Chainran sin 1953, he pre-viously served as chaintnn of the Industrial Ccmnittee on Reactor it- _

Iocations Problems. With his MIT doctorate in chemistry and years of research experience in chemistry and nuclear engineering with dbnsanto ZZ -

Chemical Carpany, he was a respected figure in the nuclear comunity.

McCullough wrote frequently on reactor safety in trade and scholarly I~

journals and often testified before the JCAE on behalf of the AT.

htcullough was a rare breed for he could transmit highly technical

. = - =

traterial into words understood by the non-technical layman. In 1956, he joined the division's safety evaluation program as Price's Deputy I.E..

.....1 Director for Hazards Evaluation. At the same time he continued as

?""~

45 l

hCRS Chainnan.

.=>.. 1 In the spring of 1956, Mfullough sphasized to the JCAE that the t= =..;, 1 objective of constructing and operating a safe nuclear reactor facility L. m.

"must not be lost sight of in the effort to get the necessary license

= _ _ -..

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46 hE=9==

approval."

Yet, the very real problem facing both the regulators

{""5""

and applicants was a lack of definite safety standards and criteria

==-

against which to judge a proposal. A technology filled with mny CZJ 2r reactor designs all in the develognantal stage mad 2 it difficult to apply uniform standards against the machines. Furthernore, the A T 47

a--

did not think it desirable at this stage of developrent.

The hazards staff and the ACRS had to pay individual attention to the

-~=1Z:

d2 sign details of each reactor. Even the experience gained to the

=~"~~;"l e

....:. A mid-fifties that answered mny technical questions had not given the

..6.L".~.,

certainty needed to translate the answers into standards. Writing about this in 1957,.McCullough enphasized that a " discussion of un-3.3 d.2 kncwns in reactor safety could be lengthy indeed." He underscored some of them: nuclear properties of reactor cores were not fully au..

understood; the knowledge of the proporties of steel and other retals

. 5.__.-f

..'.'.'a, under stress was not conplete; a quantitativa knowledge of the effect of various forms of radiation on reactor materials neeaed nore study;

= - -

the question of the reaction of water with aluminum, zirconium,

. =. -.

uranium and thorium needed nore th2oretical and experinental work; j==5 and in the event of a major reactor accident, how &cs one decontam-48

= - -

inste a large area, a city, or take care of radiation exposure.

Questions such as these presented special problems for the agency.

x. -_

In a report to the Joint Conmittee in 1957, the Carmission admitted

.:_ x.;

it had not " reached the stage where there are rules of thumb which

=

49 can be applied to the hazards evaluation of reactors."

The agency's

...se.yu.

....e,

~ ~;.;f t..

I e.- h=-=-

=-

2 =-= =

"=-

=.

' = =

^-

C

JEE.;

=

. GrG~.;

...h'.'...

policy was a cautious, deliberate approach to the issuance of detailed

[2 La a.. J.

criteria since nearly every application " presented new problems or h"C required the reconsideration of prob 1cm in new contexts." In spite

=C of this lack of codes or formulas, the Cmmission believed it could 2-~7 nove forward in the safe licensing of reactors:

We can identify a good unny elem2nts or factors which nust be 7i__

evaluated in consideration of the safety aspects of reactors.

We can, also, in the case of sme of these factors provide

((~

general guides against which we attenpt to evaluate the per-

=

===.

tinent infornntion available for the particular reactor. Ibt "C~

all of such factors would require consideration in connection

""~

with every reactor, and the general guides stated for these factors might need to be revised or nodified in connection 50 with particular reactors.

~="1 hhile there were substantive unanswered qmstions on reactor safety,

={

there was one area in which the AE was nore secure. Part 20 of its

.C 51

-. =. =..

rugulations dealt with " Standards for Protection Against Radiation."

-{

. Better known as health and safety regulations, these rules established

. J.T maxinun permissible limits on exposures to external radiation and con-centrations of radioactive nnterial as well as controls over the release of radioactive nuterial frun licensed facilities. In addition, Part 20 included requirennnts for porrennel nonitoring, nusks and clothing, bi

= = =.:

and storage of licensed nnterials. In this field, the agency could

= =

".". 2.*:.';'

rely on note scientific data to set its standards. Since 1929, the

[.21

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M::

...:.=..

Q::M: =...

f=:.'4':::.

0==== -

3g_.=

75a==.3._ :.-

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=. = =. =.. =. =. -. = =. =

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=

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L National Conmittee on Radiaticn Protection (NCRP) had established f.~E3 w

=-

health standards and the ABC based Part 20 regulations to a large

~

.[~"

52 w=:.-

dMIec on ICRP reconnendations.

It is obvious that the accumulated

= + =-

data and mny nore years of scientific experien in the radiation

?"..

protection field provided the air of assurance the ABC gave in issuing these regulations.

In this respect, Part 20 regulations were stypical 1_ '

anong the AEC safety regulations.

" " ~ "

With hindsight it is clear that the developent of standards and criteria should be based on an independent safety research program.

That was not so obvious to the ABC in those developnental regulatory

Z years. Safety research was conducted as a part of the Division of Peactor Developnent's on-going research and developonnt pwwus at its various national laboratories. This was cbne on a specific safety program basis and, in some instan s, on an individual reactor project s..=d basis.

For exanple, experinents on obtaining safety informtion Uere

...=a.

the Borax I and the Experinental Breeder Reactor-I (EBR-I). The Borax

^-

reactor, at Argonne National Iaboratory, was used for several years

... =.

' until the fuel elenunts in the core had been nearly exhausted netal-t..:.._..

lurgically, A final experinent with it was carried out in which the

-] 7 reactor intentionally was allowed to destroy itself. Over a period of years, EBR-I, located at the governuent's test reactor center in Idaho, was put through a series of tests which incitrbd operating through a E.i i

:.:..::::

zone of tenperature instability ocmbined with rapid power increases.

[=.. ="..

During the last test,.neltdown of the core occurred.

In addition to r

t._..,

g..

V

. :: a y.

. age: L;..;;.;E.~J";'";;rst;.

C.C:. -

~r;Tr"

-" 1 J

.I N.

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y.

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b.= =:w.:a these two early test mactors, others were in the design or con-p.-

struction process.

Programs also were established to test mtal-water se --

sg.=

reaction, netal-ignition, reactor fuses, containmnt, and reactor

[2['."

53 Instrutentation and control.

wa=

y:

==;

hhile an increasing amount of noney was spent on these expanding e-m=

safety research projects in the early years, the important natter to

{: L.:.s..W keep in mind is that the regulators had no direct control over the I.' ~~

program. There was, indeed, much cooperation betsmen the hazards evalu-ation staff of the Division of Civilian Application and the Reactor YF.T Development Division staff.

In adiition, the regulatory staff received

"="

research results from applicants for production and utilization facilities licensees and their mnufacturers.

In those days e en the agency placed a priority on the successful developmnt of a nuclear industry, there

..ET!

was a need for top level coordination in the entire atomic energy T"-

program. To unintain flexibility, to cut red tape, and to increase administrative efficiency it can be seen why the safety research program

="

54

~ ~. ~...~-

was a part of the develognent program.

But in retrospect, the organi-

~

~ zation pointed toward a sizeable lack of control by the regulators to m

determine their own objective safety conclusions and perhaps inpeded

[...:.m.

an earlier developtent of som standards.

In the long run, it laid

="

scue of the groundwork for later charges of conflict of interest between n..=c:a regulation and 62veloptent, b

Meanwhile, the decisions on evaluation and licensing had to be 7.I nada with existing knowledge and through established procedures. Before f ~-

.:.:=......

' .L' ~L :

a'2'

" 21s

" ' ~ ' ' ~ ~ ~ * ~

~ _.

'^*

~

h-

.~.

--m

= - -

=

g._;

[... :.m -

p. __._,

==

.s e-a an applicant for a production and utilization license subnitted an f;ty official application, a lot of infornal discussion took place with b2

" = " " -

various A m divisions. Because the several reactor designs applied.

for both under the PDRP and independently wem developtental, it

~ ' ~ ~

benefitted the applicants to discuss early their proposals with ABC

..an...;..q, staff to determine if the projects were first of all feasible, and

]

second, to sort out the necessary technical data, financial require-Z.;

nunts and safety provisions that would be necessary for the formal

= - -

55 7"="""

application.

..:.=

At these early ncetings, which were nuaerous and long, the staff

=--

indicated to the applicant that the responsibility for the safety of the reactors rested with them. Consegmntly, the applicant's engineers p

[...

i and scientists were told that they must revicw every phase of their r...

proposed reactor design and operating procedure to assure that the l=

probability of a serious operating mishap had been brought to an

.. i!.Z acceptable low level.

In addition, the applicant had to provide

']l-]

information on a second line of defense to prevent serious consequences should a highly unlikely accident occur. This preliminary discussion would bring out:

=s.!"

the relationship of location to containment and the fact that y.:.

the li nsee must select his site on the basis of cmplete know-

=,%

ledge of pertinent radiological factors; that he must consider the hydrology, noteorology, and seisnology of his alternate

l;;I

.====

.l

%:.^

L': ;

. 2LL

"b*=.t

~ll'.'i

.,..a.e.e g.e e s.. h

~.

= =.-

.~if m=

,.c...u...m..,

__..a sites; that he must look at the population density of the sur-L i.. :.:.::2.d rounding areas and attmpt to foresee the prrh,hle population

=m

" =m distribution in future years; that he must determine whether m

the surrounding areas are used for industrial, cxamercial,

-ss=,

agricultural, or residential purposes, or are not likely.to

]

m._m attract human habitation; and that he must kncw whetinr the surface of ground waters that might be subject to mntamination

~ " " " "

56

.m=.

by his reactor are used for human or animal mnstmption.

=

. :.=w.e The concept behind these initial informal neetings was nore than merely

[~

to underscore the responsibility for the safety of a proposed project.

=--

=.

Through the discussions, outstanding technical problems would be

!N N isolated so that the applicant could resolve them before subnitting the formal application. To cb this the staff provided not only guidance but also information from current state of the art research

=

conducted by AT laboratories. All this facilitated the li nsing

~~

57

. _ = =..

process.

The Conmission's rules of practice established a formal procedure

~~

58 for processing the application.

After being docketed by the Division r

of Cidlian Application, the application was subjected to an admini-I""""

stratim review for empleteness. This checked items required by the 1954 act and the Part 50 regulations. Data on the financial and technical qualifications of the applicant, the earliest and latest a===

dates for conpletion of the project, a request for allocation of special nuclear material, the nature of restricted data within the b=..

===.

n._<

.1 v= l==

..............i 7

.. -.. -.. +.

_.Q

,. ~

_.. =. =

m. :

. =.. =..

p..... t" t

uz.-

d.ad.'

u.

== =_;

application, and the inclusion of the hazards smmary report were the

""=

nost inportant itens.

If data was found incmplete, it had to be

[

59

'=

F="

supplied by the applicant before the process noved forward.

Several ABC divisions then worked on the application. h Division of Inspection was kept abreast of the proposed design and technical,

{.

g..:..,

aspects of the project. h Division of Finance conducted a review of P

the applicant's financial qualifications. The Division of Peactor 7;[;,;

Developmnt Inviewed the application to detennine the technical cun-potence of the applicant and the reasonableness of the special nuclear

'.=.

nutorial regmst. The Division of Nuclear Paterials Managment also reviewed the special nuclear materials requirenunt to calculate the

.[,]

anount to be allocated. The Division of Production, under whose supervision the ABC reprocessing plants were operated, gave advim on Z.'._.

whether existing or proposed AT reprocessing facilities could handle

="-

60 the returns from the applicant's facility.

.---;.9 To the Hazards Evaluation Branch fell the task of reviewing the 61 all inportant hazards sunmary report.

In addition, the ACRS con-

[;.~~Z:

62

=_....x ducted a review of the application.

These tuo reviews were the heart of the application process. Much of the information in the hazards sunmary report, as we have noted, already had been discussed

=-. -.-

with the applicant in the informal, preliminary neetings. The cbcunnnt m,.

=

now included the applicant's best technical opinion as to what events

.=

could possibly take place in his reactor which could result in the P""

release of radioactive matorial<: from its core and his conclusions I

concerning the effectiveness of the facility's containment and isolation j

g...

~

L:aa_ '...

~

'~

2 h'

~..~-- -

_~

g_. e

[.__.._....

u_.m m.

;s=..

E =_ ;.....

in minimizing the effects of such events if they should occur. The

=:==1.=

staff review of the report judged the safety of the reactor by use of much of the sane procedure as Teller's Peactor Safeguard Conmittee.

"=T[

In doing so they continmd to seek the advice of the ICRS and held nore neetings with the applicant to discuss further any questions raised by the report. The staff's goal was to arrive at a point

- = - -

where they believed there was reasonable assurance that the reactor could be operated safely or that any unresolved safety problems muld E- - - '

be mitigated over the intervening construction period after which Z.Z the applicant had to subnit a final, emplete hazard sunmary report

==

63 to convert the construction permit to an operating license.

Following this review, the Division of Civilian Application subnitted a staff

'~

'. m :.

paper to the General Manager that analyzed all pertinent facts on the

.Ti..~:.1.

proposed facility and gave rewmendations regarding the issuance of a construction permit and the allocation of special nuclear material.

After review by the AT General Counsel, the reomunndation along with the independent ACRS appraisal was presented to the Ccomission for its decision.

If approved, Price issued a construction permit.

The construction permit might have conditions placed on it. As

=...:.

General bbnager Fields stated to the JCAE, in the case of the early reactors this was cxmnon. Conditional pennits were allowed under the II..=;.

section of Part 50 that " extended time for providing technical infor-65

===="

nation. "

Since early reactor designs were in the develognent stage, m.m.m..

the applicants often could not iniHally provide all the technical data

.== = w

.--e.-

e

,,*h

~G,

~:.".i....

' * * * * * * ~

s

[y. -.~l.'.

~"

'~---f-

s n 2.G& -

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m.2 u w.

<s

=. a. c e + s-v

.*w w

-cm n -.

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need2d to nuke a final safety judgment. But as long as the staff could detemine that there was reasonable assurance that the ansers could "7'i

. = = ~

be provided before subnission of the final hazards sumary report, a

--- = " ;

conditional permit was issued. This was an inportant decision in these

.. j.7_~j critical first years because it allowed for the proaction of given "I

d2velopnental designs without jeopardizing any known safety consider-

.22.~."_

....;.u-.

ations. It also provided a push to the licensee, for a conditional construction permit indicated that the licensee nust rerreve those conditions before an operating license would be issued. Yet at the

=....

same tine, the conditional pennit guaranteed fuel for his reactor and 2

z.

al. lowed construction to proceed side by side with continuing technical

" * ~ '

reactor refinenunt.

Semi-secrecy surrounded the hazards staff's evaluation of an

=

application.

In 1956, the ABC established a Public Docuaent Ibom at its 1717 H Street building in Washington where certain itcrns regarding t........

an application kure placed for public inspection. These included i

..=.=

" records of license and access pennit applications and issuances,

!. "i coments from interested persons on proposed regulations, and records b

66 of licensing hearings."

But the staff safety analysis on its review

' " ~ ~ ~

of an application, and ACRS safety reports were not considered public

=-

docunents.

In addition, any neetings conducted with the applicant as

'..s ll as Commission meetings where decisions were made on an application s'.

..

=..:

L..

. A**::."..'

k.,

e sgg6'.a.a.ug r

55d==

k-t=55- "~.':".m 54 3 were not public, nor were minutes.of those ncetings made available.

= =

67 Only the Ocumtission's cbcision was disclosed.

Even the JCAE was not routinely informed of staff and JCRS recomendations on proposed facilities.

==-

Thus no outside or public participation was easily available prior to the isstnnce of a construction permit.

It would not be far into the licensing business before this proceduru was questioned.

~~

=.....

The conmission's rules of practice allowed limited public partici..

==

z

pation, in the form of hearings.

The rules specified that an applicant

.. = = =

.'. :.:":i:L.*

or an intervener could request a hearing or the Comtission, on its own

. _. = =

initiative, could direct the holding of a hearing prior to taking action

.. I 68 on an application.

Since it was unlikely that the Camtission or an

*

applicant muld request a hearing, the only real possibility would be a request from an intervener. Because such little data was available to a potential intervener upon which to petition for a hearing, the s.. :.=:.

=

z.==._

logical point in tine for such an intervention to take pla was after a construction permit was issued. The rules made it easier to do that.

0 bI5 5I They specified that the ABC wuld order a hearing if a valid petition p...; J 69 was remived within 30 days after the issuan of a license.

These rules must be kept in perspective. There was little public awareness of the AE limnsing process and equally little public

'.2 2

.=

knowledge about the nature of nuclear technology.

It would be several

].

years before intervention in licensing cases became anywhere near a

. = = = =

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conuen occurrence.

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Issuance of an operating license was the second and last step in 6.y.m the licensing system. There were several intervening years between the aanstruction pennit and the conversion to an operating license.

g.,.,

During that time, the licensee regularly sent supplementary infonration to the Division of Civilian Application to bring his application up to date. At last, he submitted a final hazard suTmary report that was

==

reviewed by the staff and the ACRS Fecomiendations were again for-warded through the General.'bnager to the Ccmnission, which if it decided favorably, authorized the issuance of ar operating license by Pri At the tine of the issuance of this license, the licensee also received authorization to possess the source, special nuclear or byproduct material used or produced during the operation of the 70 reactor.

So was established what appeared as a workable regulatory program that protected public health and safety while at the same tire allowed

~~"""""

the needed flexibility to develop the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

That it was not a perfect system would be shown in the immediate years

. ahead. Challenges and criticism would a:re from the Joint Catmittee,

- au =.

the industry, and from outside groups. The test would be how well the AT responded to those challenges.

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er.

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3 a _.

p._

7 p.

1.

Ibr the history of atanic energy developmnt through 1952, see Richard G. McWlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., A_ Historv of, the p_m United States Atanic Energy Ccmnission, Volume I_, 1939-1946:

The New World, (Chicago 1962) and Hewlett and Francis Duncan, p=- -

A_ _ History of _the United States Atomic Energy Ccmnission, Volure II, f

1947-1952: Atanic Shield (University Park, Pa.,1969). The 1954 act is docununted in legislative Historf of, the Atanic Energy Act of 1954 (Public Law 703, 83rd Congress), crmpiled by Madeleine W.

Iosee (3 vols., Washington,1955).

~ ~ ~ ~ ~_, _ _.

2.

AEC 615/8, Fhy 11,1953; AEC 615/9, May 21,1953; ABC 615/22,

=-

Oct. 14, 1953; Ccmnission Meeting (CM) 930, Oct. 21,1953, AEC/ DOE.

When the AEC was disbanded in 1975, the records of the agency were divided functionally between the Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission and the Energy Research and Developrent Agency that subsequently became a part of the Department of Energy. AEC reoards that are located in the NBC are designated AEC/NIC and thase located in the Deparbrent of Energy are designated AEC/ DOE.

-="-

3.

Richard G. Hewlett, draft mss., " Chapter 5, The Political Arena,"

Ibpartrent of Energy Historical Office; Cong. Rec., House, July 23, 1954, p. 11021; Corbin Allardice and Edward R. Trapnell, The z._=

Atanic Energy Ccmnission (New York,1974) p. 44; Harold P. Green

= _..

?" ~

and Alan Rosenthal, Government of the Atan (New York,1963),

pp. 124-125.

~~~ ~~

4.

Cong. Rec.,Ibuse, July 23, 1954, p. 11021.

(.....

5.

Hewlett, "The Political Arena." Cole later ccmrented: "The joint Ocmnittee.

. spent 5 weeks, I believe, going through that bill t

paragraph, by paragraph, line by line and item by item." Cong.

Rec., House, July 23, 1954, p. 11021.

~ ~~~ '

6.

See Hewlett, "The Political Arena," for an in-depth treatnrnt of these issues.

f";::

7.

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Chap.10, sec.103.

8.

AEC to JCAE, November 18, 1955, printed in Joint Cannittee Print, Background bhterial for the Report of _the Panel of the' Impact of the Peaceful Uses of Atanic Energy,74th Cong., Ed Sess., vol. II, r=2.

pp. 645-646; U.S. Sngress, Joint Ccmnittee on Atanic Energy,

!=2="

Hearings on Develognent, Growth and State of the Atanic Energy F""=-

Industry, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1956, p. 3F4. The first ocmmrcial license under Section 103 was not issued until 1963.

9.

Atanic Energy Act of 1954, Chap.10, sec.104.

c..

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10.

Ibid.

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L l-11.

Ibid.

12. Harold P. Green, "The Ltra of Pcactor Safety," Vanderbilt Law bt Review,12 (Dec.1958) p.122.

b==.=.

13. See the statements of Walker L. Cisler, President, Detroit Edison,,

p. 77; Francis K. McCune, General Electric Conpany, pp. 322-336, U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings on S. 3323 and H_.R_. 8862, T_o Anund the Atomic Energy Act of 1946,

=t

~

83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1954.

~~

14. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Chap.14, sec.161.

15. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, pp. 186-187; Edward Teller and Allen Brwn, The legacy of Hiroshima (Westport, Conn.19~75),

===m

p. 102.

= = = "

16. AEC Press Release No. 491, Aug. 9, 1953.

" ~ " "

.===.

17.

U.S. Congress, Joint Conmittee on Atomic Energy, Hearings on "as Developnent, Grmth, and State of the Atomic Energy Industry,

="

84th Cong., 1st. Sess., 1955, p 759.

.[.' 2

18. AFE Press Palease No. 575, Oct. 22,1954.

19. ABC Press Release No. 615, Mar. 30,1955.

Interview with Clifford K. Beck, Washington, D.C., Mar. 14, 1979.

20. ABC Press Release No. 656, June 29, 1955. Activities of the Licensing Controls Branch in the Division of Constrwtan and

~~TZ, Supply were noved to the Division of Civilian Applications along

==

with certain functions of the abolished Industrial Liaison Branch in the Division of Reactor Developnent.

..=.==.:.

21. ABC Announcenent No. PSFD-3, Nov. 2,1956, Organization of the

.

Division of Civilian Application, printed in Joint Conmittee c=--=--

Print, A Study of Air Procedures and Organization in the Licensing of_ Reactor Facilities, 85th Cong.,1st Sle s., pp.176-77.

""j.,

22. Air Press Release No. 717, Oct. 20,1955; Beck interview, Far.14,

=-

1979; ABC Press Release No. D-247, Sept. 25,1961.

=3

23. ABC Announcennnt No. PShD-3, in JCAE Print, A Study of ABC Pro-cedures, pp. 176-77.

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24. JCAE, Hearings on D2velopTent, Growth,1956; Beck incerview, Mar. 14, 19797 -

-~~

+. = =. =. =

25. AEC Press Ibleases No. 622, April 12.1955; No. 641, May 23,1955;

'"E _....

No. 654, June 27,1955; tb. 660, July 11,1955; No. 670, Aug.1, 1955; JCAE, Hearings on_ Develognent, Growth,1956, p. 7.

26.

10 CFR 50.1.110; Harold L. Price, "The Civilian Application

~~~~

Program" in Proceedings of a, Fbeting of the Atcmic Industrial Forum on Carmercial and International Develognants in Atcmic Energy'~ Sept. 27-29, 1955; AEC Press Release No. 764 Jan. 18,

~

1956; JCAE, Hearinas on_ Develogrent, Growth,1956, p.100.

=._ m

=..;.=_

27.

10 CFR 50.33.

= = -

28. JCAE, Hearings on_ Develognant, Growth,1956, p.108; Green, "The Iaw of Reactor Safety," p.124, note 37.

29.

10 CFR 50.34.

30.

10 CFR 50.40.

C.C.~.. '

' ~ ~ ~ ~

31.

10 CFR 50.41.42.

'~i!"i5;=* ?

32.

10 CFR 70.3.

. = _

33.

10 CFR 70.31.

]

34.

10 CFR 70.31.

r...

35.

10 CFR 70.42.

= =.

36.

10 CFR 70.51.53; JCAE, Hearings on Developrent, Growth,1956, pp. 114-15.

=; "-

37. ABC Press Release No. 589, Jan. 10, 1955.

"*[

38.

Frank G. Dawson, Nuclear Power, Develognent and Panagement of a Technology (Seattle,1976), pp.76-101; Robert Perry, Developint

-~

and Comrercialization o_f the Light Water Ibactor, 1946-1977 (Santa bbnica,1977), pp.10-24; Irv2n C. Bupp and Jean-Claude

s.;,__

Derian, Light Water: How the Nuclear Dream Dissolved (New York, g--[=[

1978), pp. 33-36.

39.

10 CFR 50.35.

= = = -

==.:.-

40.

U.S. Congress, Joint Ccmnittee on Atomic Energy, Hearings on Governnunt Indemnity for Private Licensees and AT Contractors Acainst Reactor Hazards, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess.,1956, p. 64.

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41.

Ibid., p. 63.

I~"

42. 'Deller and Brown, The Ingacy of Hiroshirn, p.104.

=U

43. Ibid.

t--

t- -

44.

C. Ibgers bbCullough, "Peactor Safety," Nucleonics (Sept.1957),

p. 135.

45. Ibid.; McCullough, " Experience in the United States With Reactor

-=d Operation and SaftW," Proceedings of the Second United Nations International Conference of the Peaceful Uses of Atcmic Eneroy (1958); JCAE, Hearings g Governmnt Indemnity, pp. 46 50;

. = _.

ABC Press Release No. 849, June 29, 1956.

=--

a3.-(-

46. JCAE, Hearings on Governnent Indemity, p. 50.

47. JCAE Print, A, Study of ABC Procedures, p.106.

48. McCullough, " Reactor Safety," p.136.

$T.['((3 e....:.=.

49.

U.S. Congress, Joint Cbmittee on Atomic Energy, Hearinos on d

Governmnt Indemnity and Pcactor Safety, 85th Cong.,1st Sess.,

Zlll,__

1957, p. 54.

~~"~~~

50.

Ibid.

51. 10 CPR Part 20.

52. AEC Press Pelease No. 660, July 11,1955; William H. Benmn and Ice M. Hydeman, The Atomic Energy Ccmnission and Regulating Nuclear Facilities (Ann Arbor,1961), p. 56; bhrril Eisenbud, Envuonment, 'Ibchnology and Health: Humn Ecology in Historical Perspective (New York,1978), pp. 313-14.

~

==.a

53. JCAE, Hearings on Government Indemity and Reactor Safety,1957, pp. 47-53.

.. = _,.

54. JCAE, Print, A_ Study of AEC Procedures, pp. 9-10.

55.

Ibid., pp. 106-107.

..l

56. Ibid., p. 107; Beck interview,bhr. 14, 1979.

57. Beck interview, Mar. 14, 1979.

bI

58. 10 CFR Part 2.

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i

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~~~

l

~

4 A.:.

59.

" Procedures and Considerations Governing the Paview of and Actions Taken on Applications for Class 104 Licenses Relating to Pomr

=-.==;.

Reactors," in JCAE Print, A_ Study of, AEC Procedures, pp. 101-102.

lf; 60.

Ibid., pp. 102-103.

61. " Division of Civilian Application Responsibilities and Objectives with Respect to Pcactor Hazards," in ibid., p. 107.

62. JCAE, Hearings on Governnent Indemnity and Ibactor Safety,1957, N-2

~~

p. 53.

63.

" Division of Civilian Application Responsibilities," pp. 107-108.

. =..

64.

" Procedures and Considerations," pp. 103-104.

((

f._.;=.;

65.

10 CFR 50.35.

t

66. AEC Press Release No. 762, Feb. 6, 1956.

j((.

67. Green, " Law of Reactor Safety," p.130.

E 68.

10 CFR 2.102.

69.

Ibid.

~

70.

" Conversion of the Construction Pennit to a License Authorizing

""* "l" Operation of the Facility," in JCAE Prh, A Study of AEC Pro-

'"~~

~

~~

cedures, pp. 104-105.

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