ML19308C091
| ML19308C091 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 03/14/1979 |
| From: | Mazuzan G NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19308C087 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001210389 | |
| Download: ML19308C091 (21) | |
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Interview with Dr. Clifford Beck held in Washington, D.. C., March 14, 1979
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2;.-4m M.
hty don't we start with what you are doing with the sit'ingh
- u B.
Afrignt, there was a, request trade for finding' aAway of getting the m terial on the sity&of the earlier reactors and h w that wcs p+")
handled and as you may recall, Shippingport was theifirst one in tae connercial field and that's where it started - they wanted to begin a~-a at that point. Beginning at the cmmercial field and incid2nta]ly, I was brought up here on a leave of absence to help license that
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FO reactor because the people who were there then xes had not been'\\ ully f
incbetrinated in handling a real live nuclear reactor.
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O.K., can I interject here?
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B.
Yes.
M.
Do you recall the date that that happened whan you asked the 7
Ca:nnission - you were in N.C.?
".?T B.
Yes. And I had a reactor dwn there.
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Right.
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And because I had that they knew I knew something about it.
So I cam up and helped license that reactor.
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M.
Now, would that have been 1950...?
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B.
56.
I cam in 1956 in June and as soon as that reactor was licensed and going,which took scrre time, 2:Jmoam they irmediately wanted me to cb another one and it continued and I never went back.
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You see, after a while I just threw in my - you kncw - and went
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this request came in for scxte nore informTtion on hcw these earlier f.T.7 things were handled-as they carte into being. Isnd you will also lureuber
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that - the - following Shippingport others canc xx vary quickly -
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right up the line, like buttons on a row.
It occurred to no that it
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would be interesting to take each reactor and look at the siting
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characteristics that were looked at that time and then go to the h.h next one and the next one and the next one up to CaNert Cliffs and Z
there you have the string of buttons on the chain and what the changes aw were from one to the next to the next to the next - that kind of thing.
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I've collected a good bit of the ma6rinla and have made a little start on the beginning but really haven'.t gotten into it yet. Now, what I hope to do is to take,beginning with the beginning reactor -
Shippingport and learn all I can about that and put that - and that spreads over several years, you se'e, in building it - the tine schedules -
and some of the overlap ea ther c
-,,,e you pick them out and go up that chain looking at this particular reactor first and finding out what we could get frcm that and then picking up the next one. And that would be with the information there in the records.
Also, I muld-at the sane tine I was wrking on these reactors as they m=
cane along;I was also writing a large nunber of speeches all over the T_.Z-world. Particularly to foreign nations and others who were eagerly, you know, wanting to see and hear about atmic energy in the early days.
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Now, is this in the 1950's when you were doing this or was this
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later on?
B.
Well it was all the way up - it was all the way up the chain.
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x Essentially, being alnest half tine in foreign travel or elsewhere
=y and at other times in here. In the ncan time, I wrote a large nunber
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of (bcunents on what - how these things ought to be done and just f-5_7 p
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put it out free wheel and by the tine I finished part way up I preceived I needed to readjust and put out new instructions 'and it kept rolling too, so I'm trying to find all the information cbwn the building line and also going back and picking up all my sp;a speeches crrning up with them.
So there are two stacks on my desk about this high and one is a speech line the other one is the cxxtbination line of
_...._ f building the reactors. And I don't know Irw it's going to turn out because I reall svery far up the laaMar.
M.
Sounds like a rather formidable project.
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B.
It would be
.if you took everything into it and -
k< helped you pick out the highlights - you know - I think it wuld be an interesting project to do that.
sw M.
Oh yes, I think E8 too.
B.
I have - it's easy to put.these speeches into line - you could I
just put t1rm one on top of the other and you can get scrne good material on low this reactor was different frcan the next one and'.
l~.E and the next one and.the next one.
1 Now in cbing that you weren't just <hlbg with AQ sitA, M. -
you were dealing with all of the problets?
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Right. Yes.
Developing,2 design and construction, M.
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M it came along - and as our infonnation expanded we would.
put out new instructions amh on how nuch and Irw many and so on..
M.
Well, let's, can I go back to that beginning part? hhen you came up from N.C. - and see if we can put together scxte of than those facts in the early days. You cane up in 1956. But the Hazards Evaluatiori Branch
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which you headed was the initial evaluation agency or unit within the MZ' v.
AEC that...
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Yes, it turned out to be that after a little wh.ile.
E Were you the initial head of that branch?
B.
Yes.
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E There wasn't any predecesor before you? When did you start that?
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Ibw, I understand that originally it was directly under the General
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Manager before it was noved over to the Division of Civilian Application.
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B.
Yes, it cano - Harold Price was appointed and he imTediately wanted smebody because he knew very little - he was - he had indoctrination in sme wartine work in the earlier war and he knew a
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cpod bit of things about sme ways of handling piwaus and organizations.
He was good in that but he knew nothing about atmic energy.
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E Right. He was a lawyer.
B.
He was a lawyer, right., And he wanted sanoone and they cane dbwn to N.C. and asked if I'd cone'lon leave to help get this going.
E Was it Harold that asked you to cme up?
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B.
I can't lu ulxr exactly who broached it to ne in the first place.
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I (bn't luteiber it right now maybe we'll run across it scmewhere in j
the files..
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E Iet ne go back to the N.C. experience. That was the first research reactor that was licensed outside of the government program.
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B.
In the world. That's right. And the first graduates and formally h.2 trained nuclear engineering cane out of that program.
E Khen was that startod? When did that reactor go critical?
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Let me see.
1956. About 1954 - 53 or 54 - 53 or 54. I forget exactly - scxtewhere.
I may have it in this material I have here.
M.
And out of that,Fyou cane to Washington?.
r B.
Yes..
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M.
And out of that was organized the Hazards Evaluation B.
That's right.
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Originally it was not a part of Pricn's organization. According T~_?
to my records - it was - you were directly under the General Manager gg i
for just a short tine.
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Just a short time - a very short tine
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Then it was pulled over to his Division of Civilian ?pplication.
B.
Pulled over to him.
Right.
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M.
Did you have a staff? Or was that your responsibility?.
B.
Oh yes, I had a large staff for a while. For a long ta tine.
'e M.
Are those people still around?
B.
Ed Case. Numbers of them. Oh yes, yes, there are at least a cbzen of them around still. Ed Case and let's see - Bob - Bob -
it slips my notory. There are a goM w of thczn still around. _
I could think foc for a little while and nake up a list for you.
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M.
O.K.
That would rmily be helpful because scme of those people I would really like to talk to later on.
B.
Yes. - '
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When the Division of Civilian Application was first started under l
the 1954 act and Pri was brought in to organize it, he also had the j
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responsibility to wright the regulations for 3,e developrent of
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Bob Imnstein.
Bob Imnstep. That'c the one I was reaching for. Bob Icenstein did that.
IM was a very sharp guy and w rked very well with Harold Pri And Price knew the kind of thing he wanted and it was aga a gcod organization.
And Icenstein was right there working with him and helping write the initial tbgs - even scme of them before I was them - they had written same things and I chimd in as soon as I got there and began to help fill in some 7.f?!.~
information.
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The record indicates that while he was organizing the Division
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of civilian Application 'these things were also written and/ approved
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by the Ccmnissioners.
7"T B.
That's right.
M.
And they were sent out for hearings - for public hearings.
B.
Oh yes.
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For public hearings very early, say in - by mid of 1956 they
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several of those.
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Right. And several'5t6isanizations, except the one that I was in was stable all the w5y down alnest tc
- well, was stable until T-p the middle of Manning Muntzing. That was a line thatYnct get disturbed.
_7 It continued right on until after Harold Price had gone.
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M.
So that, now you're talking about the Hazards Evaluation Branch B.
Yes, the Hazards Evaluation Branch M.
But there wax were some adjustm2nts in organization?
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Oh, there were organization changes.
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Right.
B.
But I stayed into that up until Panning Muntzing's career. He wanted ne to go into another part.
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You originally cane up as a consultant, then headed the Hazards
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Evaluation Branch.
B.
Right.
M.
And eventmlly becane 53puty Director of Regulations.
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That's right.
M.
And that carries it up to Muntzing!s period.-
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That's right.
M.
So you were the nunber tm person under Price - in the later years?
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That's right.
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hhen did you nove frun the Hazards Branch up to Deputy Director?
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I can't renenber that.
I 'nean it was pretty early.
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It was in the 50s?
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Yes.
It was pretty early but I don't really know.
I don't.
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In the writing of those regulations. Icwenstein - is that the EoiirV?
B.
Yes. Icenstein was the primary one with Harold right on his back. I nean he wa: - they were wrking together, actm11y.
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Did they them, or did they have a lot of help frun'other l
pecple?
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I really don't know how much help or how they got it before I i
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got there. But I cane in with a large amount of information that they y=--
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did not have - and then we worked all together. And I helped to write
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sone of those regulations - as they - well they continued to evolve 25 all the tine.
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Right.
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And that's when nry speeches began because, you know, even the people in industry who were nibbling at the bait and wndering if
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they would ever find this of any use to thcm - that kind of thing.
!"tr Iots of them were eager to kncw smething about it and as these people
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cane in,the easiest thing to dc would be to talk with them.
So I
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wrote speech after speech after speech as soon as anybody got involved, you see.
And these speeches uld go out and people muld gain same knowledge of what they could do and what they couldn't cb and the
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way to go about it.
M.
I'm interested in the process that was used to license a-reactor.
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The records indicate,that the people fran the Fmrds Branch, well; pccple fran various branches within the Division of Civilian Application
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talked to utility and industry people even before a fonral application was made.
B.
Right. Oh, yes. And the Conmisssioners even did too. And one of the things that would be interesting to back and read would be hae intermeshed the Ccmnissioners were and even into the Senate and the Joint Camnittee were also talking to people.
I rarember several of them
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sme of
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going with/the Ocmnission, I nean scxre of the people on the Joint
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Ommittee - and going with them because they did not kncw very much p.=.==
about atomic energy - same of them-and I went with them to talk wf ch
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people in industry.
I mean it wasn't a hands off business. They were
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probiig - they were pushing.
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Ncw, they were prmoting of course tM nuclear power c--
w B.
Right.
t-E Ucw does that tie in with the concern over safety and health?
7Z B.
Well, they were giving full due to any safety precautions we wanted to put in there. They never did a one injustice. I nean they were anxious to make it safe but they wre also anxious to sell 7==;
atomic energy and of course that was a thing thatvreally didn't give
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a promise of very good capability in the industry until Oyster Creek.
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Oyster Creek was the turining point. And frcm that point on it took off. But up to that, up to Oyster Creek, it had not had real promise that was clearly visible.
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E Ncw was that because the technology was not far enough advanced to nuke it coonamically feasible?
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Yes. That's right. It was just going along c:t working - working
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@ through until it finally cane to a point where there was the prcmise of a real breakthrough.
E I was reading an excerpt frca Edward Teller's book and he
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was talking about the early reactor safeguards acmnittee and how
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in heading that thing up his colleagues in the prmossional end power
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Anahu hidw were calling it the Mmak camittee because they put the bseaks on
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a lot of the developtrent that took place. Was that sort of an
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inplication level that you people in the Hazards Branch - during the 50s?
l B.
Well, When I came up, when I started to build the reactor'at N.C. State, I had to get a license of sme kin @, and I went up to the
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Conmission and told them what I wanted to do and 'Ib11er was the E2.==
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l Chairman and he wanted to know hcw large it was and I told him and m.,.
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he qmstioned ne quite a while - I nean I was tMre, nearly all day.
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s and they wanted to know if I knew what I was cbing. Well, they
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satisfied themselves on that.
But they didn't quite know - he said, "How much" - let's see what did he say? He said: "We have a fornula.
Do you know it?" And I said '"No, I don't know it." He said:"
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I have a fornula and if your project will neet this formula, you can have it - have your license or authorization to go ahead." I guess is what he said. And what did he say - he said its-
[C he had a fourula there - something - I've forgotten that - I'll 7==
have to go back and read that one. But it had scnething to do with
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the size of the reactor and he wanted to know the dimensions of mine.
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And I told hime that the total volume of my nuclear reactor was
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about one gallon. And he said "then your production of energy is f
i about one-fourth or one-half of the diameter of-c.
your container. And he said :
"There's nobody going to get hurt 3_7.-..=-
with that. So you may have your license." It was rmily a small 7.'.
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one and I intended it to be small but we did a lot of interesting experinents with it. But ??Iaher and Parvin Pann, that was one of n=2===
the fellows - and he just resigned
-just last week, I guess it was.
He was a roving person going around the circuit anywhere there were
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nmime reactors-he was the person to check up and see if they were i=
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cbing alright.
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M.
He was the early inspection team?
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He was the early inspection team. And he cane down to visit
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Iq place and gave me a full credit and no problems whatever so it g===-
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went well. Snd I guess he's the one that kind of told Harold Pri
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he ought to get me up there to help license the first one. I think r
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X that's the way it went.
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Ncw when you cane up and Ivwbd the Evaluation Branch, of course you had wrtain regulations to use as guidelines,th, c you could spell
.g out for the people who were going to build the reactors - how did you
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go about evaluating their plans? I've crnn across the Hazards Sumary Peport on many occasions and that was seemingly the critical cbcment that was put in on any application.
[2 B.
That was it.
They had to put right in writing --vth:3 everything r
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about it. They had to make clear and explicit records of what they E.m.=
were planning to cb and how they wanted to do it. And in fact, this
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often was discussed back and forth.
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M.
You nean in the formal meetings?
B.
In formal nectings between them...
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The utilities and the manufacturerst and the agency.
..em B.
Right.
Right. Until they got it-where they thought we.
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had it about right and then when we would get - when we were also~
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satisfied and they got their writing down then and formally submitted it to us. And by that time they may have been in the Senate or
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everywherdplse trying to get noney or trying to do everything else
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but we had the say of whether they could go or not.
It had to meet
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.w..e..e them had to change them later because we learned sme things ourselves.-
all cbwn the line. But it was a leap frog operation.
1960
M.
Now there were in the regulations and in the act'itself certain I
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clauses that allowed a conditional permit to be granted. 16cc f"
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Yes.
M.
Wem those the usual types of permits?
B.
I cbn't mu;.:uiver the nuTbers on those. Just which ones-I could p
look up scun of them, I'm sure, but particularly after Oyster Creek
~ j then there began to be nom of a separation and hands off with bdustry.
The industry began at that tindi:o get on its voc own feet and plcw its O
own roads and and then ocne and increasingly sophistification and so on
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and people outside got as skillful as w were. Good peopl's.
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M.
Cnc of the problems that I see in loc that early period was h'
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the various reactor designs - the light water reactor wasn't the basic I.[
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standard at that time.
B.
Right. No. Not at all.
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There were different kinds'of then being developed.
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All kinds of them.
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And so this would - I would think-nuke it very difficult i.7===
for you people in Evaluation to have any kind of standards to piace '
against all of them. How did yo.4 evaluate a reactor - did you do it r
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individin11y? Each reactor was'dgm cbne on an individual basis?~-
[2 B.
. Yes.
Because each one was different. And I think the Ocmnission in a iarge way intended that because they were probing
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what is the best. And we didn't kncw the best. Because this was a sury infant industry.
say
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There was no indication /in 1955, Sier 56, 57 that the light. water
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reactor muld be the mainstay of the industry?
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You couldn't tell it.at that tine.
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At that time.
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At that tinu, you couldn't.
And scrm of these people offered
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.. n same sort of exotic cbsigns hoping to cash in on scnuthing that they thought they had. Ex Maybed it didn't work,maybe it did. So it was a learning process with us as'well as with the industry.
C M.
Later on the Atomic Energy Ccmnission gets criticized because
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it has a lack of standards to apply-generic standards to apply
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against everything.
Do you think that's warranted? In other words,
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did the agency nove fast enough to develop the set of standards that they had or could they have noved faster?
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That's difficult to say. It was cartainly carried fcIward with
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a lot of caution. There's no question about that. And nobody 4
qu2stioned it.
I thougid'very fcd people in the early days questioned
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any real valid ways in which to Irake it nore safe. We were always looking for that. And a number of the reactors had to be altered
.1 after they were built to conform to scue other standards which would
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inpose a penalty on them - several wece.
M.
Khich is the nature of the evolving technology.
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Yes. Just the nature of the evolving techrology.
M.
Required that m mr thnix sort of thing.
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B.
'It required that kind of thing.
M.
One of the cases that I want to get into is the Fermi case
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which you were involved with. Of course there is a lot of spinoffs 1Z on that too.
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Sure.
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On the technical feasibility of that project chere wdquestion i=.=="-
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on both the part of the staff and the advisory camittee as to whether
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Yes. That was a difficult one.
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Ib you ruTudcr that controversy?
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Ib. I don't remsber the" details of it.I would have to go back now and look at that.
Because I do luiuiLer Fermi particularly because
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we had to spend a great deal of tine on it. And we had to - I think t.._=f._
we brought in, we may have brought in sme extra people in that case to talk with us - and I reallysan can't tutuiber in that detail at the
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Well, perhaps at sme future tine after you've had icoc a chance "t "= "
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to look at the records we could get back and sit down and talk about
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B.
Well, that was one that had a great deal of controversy because of
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Icwis Strauss.
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Was it Lewis Strauss?
I thought it was - well also M.
Murray. Murray and Strauss. Murray was a Cmmissioner at the tine and he was the one who leaked the ACRS report to Anderson.
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Yes. And the other person in the controversy was the.-
owner of the reactor.
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Don you know - what's his name?
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Detroit Edison.
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Yes. Detroit Edison.
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I can't think of his name citinr.
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Iw'htaroundtheworldwithhimonetime. He was a powerful k _f..
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I'll think of it shortly. But anyway he was trying to unke scxte very
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large steps in atomic energy.
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Sisler. Exactly, exactly. That's right. Sisler. And he and the
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Chaimun there of the 6,4rm,n hvn nf the - we just said his nane comxmunoc a nament ago.
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Strauss.
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No, the other one.
M.
Anderson.
B.
Anderson-Anderson was the one who ron11y put the - put in the
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1cgislation and made the ACRS statutory.
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Right. Part of the Price-Anderson Act, 57.
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That's right. And that was because he had that rift with M.
O.K., we're talking about the rift.
B.
Right. And that unde the ACRS nundatory - to put it in public what their reconmendations were., It was.a good step.
M.
Ncw, prior to that tine though the ACRS did evaluate every reactor.
B.
Yes. Yes they.did. Right frtan the start.
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But the question that cane was Inn 11y a procedural one as to
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whether or not those reports should be nude public.
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Yes.
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And to get around that Anderson nude the cmmittee statutory and required that all the reports be nude public.
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That's right.
M.
When you first cane up to Washington where ware your offices
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Were you cksn on Constitution Avenue?
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H Street. No. Down en Constitution Avenm.
M.
You were part of the headquarters group there?
B.
That's right.
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When did you cxxne tp to this building? Weren't you in this building for a while-on H Street.
B.
I came here for a long tine. We were here a long is tinn.
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Was all of the regulatory division - they were all in thin building?
B.
Yes. All here. Ebr a long tine. And then we noved out to
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'Ib Germantown.
B.
And then back to Dethesda.
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But initially you were on Constitution' Avenue and then to hare and then when Germantown was finished - that building was finished -
you noved out there.
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Right.
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And of course you went to Bethesda once the separation was
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B.
'That's right. That's right. And then over to Willste.
I'gt officially there now but I'm actually wrking at Bethesda now
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although - wbon Saul Ievine's outfit.
I haven't been back downtown
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You seem rather confident that it's all going to nove downtown.
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Well, I cbn't know.
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Well, if we go back to the developnent of your staff, were you l---"
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the recruiter for the Hazards Branch?
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Nothing escaped.
He knew how to handle people and how to let thcnn 7--.-.
go ah2ad if they were doing the right thing and so on.And we seldcm if ever had any cross words of any kind. He gave ne full reih on the technical side. And-he would question things all dcun the line.
12 I nean, we were all questioning ea ther in that group and it was i.
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Another name cues into the picture at about that time -/56 Ibger*FbCullough who w2.s chairman of the ACRS and then he became Deputy Director for Hazards Evaluation for a while.
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Yes.
M.
Did that put him between you and Harold? Ibw was that arrangenunt
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Well, it didn't go well at all with Harold - because McCullough -
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was still chairman - but when thy came over to the camissian - to
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tine when bicullough dropped out and went/- where did he go now-
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he went to california and Ibger McCullough becane chairrran.
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Teller had been chairman the entire tire before and McCullough came in t
and becane first chairman after him and he went on into office for the b
necond year.
In the second year Ibger began to go around Harold's back
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Under Harold. But because he was in that position he was going behind Harold's back on sme of the issms. ~~i M. He really wore two hats. He was chairm,n of )dt the ACRS and he. was Deputy DirectDr of the Civilian Applications - Hazards Evaluation Branch.
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B. Right. And Harold said: "I'll be damned if I'm going to let lum do that on me." So he and I went up to the chainran.
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M. Was that Strauss? B. No. That was - I think that was - let's see - cbwn there at ~~' m H St. M. Ict's see. B. When did that take place? I thought Seaborg had just cme on 2 at that tine. Maybe I'm wrong. =- N M. Seaborg doesn't cxre en until 61. B. Yes. That's right. M.- Was it that late? B. Well, I'm not quite certain. But it was at that time when we j had just noved into this building, I think - well I dsAixdpar.bn't have it. M. And strauss was chainran frcm 53 until 58. . _... l.. _. B. Till 58? That's Strauss. Well, it was after that. M. So McCullough was Deputy Director during that whole period of time? p._. B.. I cbn't think he had been that long. Teller stayed on for sm e in =_==T tone - becai:se -- p.. $A5me ~ "]1'" i l - =- r ~ li
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==+ B. 53. .== 1 M. Right. And than in 1956 he was still ACRS chairman.
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.= = ~=J B. O.K. So he M. But he also became deputy director under Price, ] _.\\ B. Yes. --..a M. But I don't know when he 2 eft that position. M en did Price get fed up with his round the horn business ~ " = " ' B. Yes. . AW?& i =. =. M. But you said it was after Strauss had left the chainranship? B. Yes. I'm alnost certain. Yes, definately. Yes, I don't think = ,5 Strauss - M. Now Fc Comb was chainran frun 58 until,61. John Mcccrnb - he replaced Strauss. Yes. $ " w [ f-B. M. He repla d Strauss. B. Yes. That's right. Was it under McCorch,do you recall, when you and Harold went up M. to straighten out the situation with M11mugh? .1 B. It could have been as late as - un. I think I could find it in
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~= ~ m could find that. M. Did you have a lot of cloalings with the General Fanagers? ~ F B. I had free access to them when I wanted to and I always kept Harold very carefully informed of eve- +hing going on - it was all open =" t....... . N
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Ha uld Malt directly with the general nanagers. t_t m. B. Yes. a -rEE = M. Do you zuetbar noch about the personalities of tha people = r-
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Now let's see, the other one with his own job. I nuan he was a z you nentioned? --=
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=
M. I had some qtnstions to ask you - oh, the relationship bebeen =. m_ e Strauss and Ccmnissioner Murray was a rather ranc orous one - frtan EE . _ = what I can gather frun the records. [ &~2 B. Yes. It was s t. =.
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e we r t.== / r g 1 2.2.. p..u... ,b...~. pm g....m._ M. Do you tutuii.er any of the reasons? g[ ,=u = B. I tuieiber that that was so and I can't zuteiber now why. }.. M. Where I caught wind of it was in the Fermi ca e as Murray m.==. was the dissenting vote agairist the issuanm of the initial ca.struction .Z. pcImit on that case. 77 ~ ~~ B. Yes. M. Well, perhaps B. Maybe I'll wllect scnnthing on that. I don't zuieiber ncw. Y M. Ict's jurp to a related subject and that's the general philosophy that the Hazards Branch used to evaluate reactors. Was ".l. there any philosophy
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