ML19308C060

NRC Incident Response, Draft 2

ML19308C060
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	07/23/1976
From:	NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
To:
References
TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001200036
Download: ML19308C060 (42)

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7 TABLE OF CONTENTS

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1 I.

Introduction........................

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II.

Major Considerations A.

Goals of Incident Response Capabilities.......

1 1.

Infor=ation Gathering 2.

Evaluation 3

Assistance 4.

Direction fE A.

Timing of Response...................

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6 C.

Type of Incident.

III.

Basis for Resource Requirements A.

Consideration of Scenarios...............

7 B.

Recc== ended Resources for the IMC........

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1.

Discussion

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2.

Rescurces a.

Physical IMC facility and organization b.

Pre-collected information c.

Real time information d.

Evaluation resources

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Action resources 55?:?:

E IV.

I=ple=entation Reccc=endations...........

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APPENDICES 5b..

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A.

Incident Scenaries En?

B.

Current NRC Division Responsibilities L.'

C.

Current NRC Personnel assigned to Incident F

Response functions En.uw h5IN D.

Present Incident Management Center (IMC)

D:

O E.

Present Agency Authorities for Incident Planning and Preparedness F.

Current Information Exchange Agencies

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Current Support Agencies Responsibilities r:

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Draft NRC Headquarters Contingency Plan Outline O

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ei NRC INCIDENT RESPONSE

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I.

Introduction

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The purpose of this paper is to consider how the existing incident UE::

response capabilities of the NRC might be improved. Present NRC ac t ions taken in response to a serious incident are directed and accomplished from an Incident Management Center (IMC). The scope and cap' abilities of the present IMC are described in Appendix D T-to this paper.

To implement an emergency response plan, it is necessary that the

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IMC be equipped with appropriate ccumunications services, informa-

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tion handling and evaluation aids, pre-approved action guidelines,

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and technical and management' personnel resources. The present IMC, S

which is manned during the course of an incident by a team of NRC

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management and technical staff, has all of these in sete degree.

This paper addresses whether practical and useful short term and long term improvements can be made. The approach in the following qg:-

sec tions is to discuss the practicality and need for various IMC resources as a function of the goals of the NRC response capability and the time sequences of a spectrum of incident scenarios judged L

typical of those that are at least theoretically possible.

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5 II.

Major Considerations A.

Coals of Incident Resoonse Capabilities By an incident, in this paper, is meant those events which present an actual or imminent threat to the public health and O

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.h 11 safety or the ec==on defense anc security; specifically (1) an event which has had actual significant radiological consequences M

a or involved a confir=ed diversion of protected =aterial or (2) an d

event which has the potential fo* i==ediate significant radio-logical consequences or the potettial for i==ediate diversion of protected =aterial. For exa=ple, an event such as the Browns Ferry fire would, at least for the first few hours, be classed as an incident requiring activation of the IMC, but an operational

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proble= such as channel box wear or pipe cracks would be handled

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through nor=al organi::ational channels as they would not require an i==ediate response to protect the public health and safety.

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(I= prove =ents in the efficiency of handling icnger ter= proble=s are not addressed in this paper.)

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i 59 Although a final judg=ent has not been =ade on the precise role U

that the NRC should seek to play in the event of a serious inci-dent, the following overall goal has been assu=ed for the purpose of this discussion paper as reflecting current staff cpinion and k

providing a broad fra=ework for discussion of varicus alternatives:

The coal of NRC incident resoonse is to obtain and evalu-i ate infer ation in order to have the cacabilitv to =ake y.]

3 indecendant iude-ents with raesrd to the inoaet of licensee

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Ed and other aranev setiens en tha cublic health and safetv and the ec-non defense and security and to h?ve tha esra-bility to assist the licansaa and other atencias where

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Y P The practicality of achieving this goal is of course dependent on 5 g:

the time available to respond in a given incident and the level of life resources cc=mitted to achieving this goal. These aspects are dis-cussed later in Section II of this paper.

The overall objective of NRC incident response can be subdivided into several activities which would be pursued by the IMC incident response team. These are listed below in the order in which the activities would be initiated. Once initiated, these activities L

would ' continue in sc=e fors until the incident response team was i.

disbanded.

C Yi-l.

Informatien Gatherine -

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Obtain early, factual infor=ation in as cc=plete a form as practical to determine and initiate the physical and per-sonnel resources likely to be required by NRC and to

.=y inform responsible authorities within and outside NRC in accordance with pre-planned action guidelines.

b.

Menitor and record the course of the incident and the response actions taken by licensees, NRC and other in-k volved agencies.

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2.

Evaluation a.

Evaluate the information obtained with respect to the likely future ecurse cf events within the facility and i

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• _s likely offsite consequences and determine whether the actions taken up to that point by the licensee and other

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agencies will assure that effects on the public health and safety and the cc==on defense and security are =ini=ized.

b.

Deter =ine the alternative courses of future action avail-able to the licensee, NRC and other agencies and the consequences of these actions on the public health and a: ;;u;;

safety and co==on defense and security to for= a basis for interaction and discussion with the licensee and other agencies as deter =ined to be desirable.

t c.

Determine the additional resources required to provide assistance or directien.

3.

Assistane*

On the basis of evaluation of infor=ation obtained, determine what assistance to the licensee and other agencies is feasible and useful and initiate that assistance. The assistance =ay r,

be in the fer: of discussions in which opinions are exchanged or advice given or in the for= of =aking technical (including security) expertise available re=otely or at the site.

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4 Direction

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On the basis of evaluation of infor ation obtained, determine

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whether the actions or lack of actions taken by the licensee L

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warrant formal intervention by the NRC'and initiate this Lq;jg hh[E L

action. This direction could take the form of oral and written directives by a responsible officer of the NRC or, in the extre=e, could theoretically involve on-site direction

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B.

Ti=in:t of the Reseense The ti=ing of the NRC response to an incident is a significant

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consideration in deter =ining the resources required for incident respen'se and the practicality of accc=plishing the above stated goals of the response activities. The physical resources which

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=ust be held in readiness.for response increase dramatically as g.

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g the desired response ti=e is shortened. For exa=ple, the NRC can presently place an inspector on-site in fro: one to six hours.

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To significantly shorten this ti=e would require additional re-sources such as arrange =ents for helicopter use or on-site inspectors.

(This is not to say that alternative cc==unication

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=eans with the site could not supply a substantial amour:t of the information that could be obtained by an on-site inspector.)

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Another exa=ple of the relationship between ti=ing and resources is the activation at the IMC. The present reaction ti=e for IMC activation is about I hour following notification of an inci-

{.;.y, dent. The li=1 ting consideration in this activation time is O

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location of the appropriate technical and canage=ent personnel and siii their travel ti=e to the IMC. To significantly shorten this 55=='

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activation time would require the continuous presence of qualified Ei::;,,

staff at the IMC or quicker notification and travel =ethods (e.g.,

pagers and helicopters).

The incident scenarios discussed in Section III of this paper w

12 illustrate the types of incidents and the timing of decision points.

O It is clear that for many important scenarios, a response ti=e of

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an hour to a few hours is adequate if adequate factual infor ation 73 is available to the 1MC in the same time fra es.

So e scenarios, on the other hand, have i=portant decision points early in the i.,

lllh event sequences. To be reasonably sure that a response is the correct response in a short time fra e, however, carries the i=-

plication of the availability of a very large a=ount of plant

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specific information and the large conco::itant physical resources associated with obtaining this information (for example, readout

=fb of plant process information in the ".MC via ec=puter hookup with the reactor).

C.

Tvee of Incident f.==

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Whether an incident is internally or externally caused has a 55E~

direct bearing en the role of the NRC in the incident. For Jb]

exa=ple, for plant related accidents the NRC nas lead agency ji u

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responsibility, but for external threats, the FBI assu=es this 5

l role. While this paper contains discussions of events related EE to plant security, the pri=ary thrust of the paper is toward

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incidents caused by equipment failures, unusual natural phe-nomena or transportation accidents. Certain resources in addition to those identified as practical and useful in this

'll paper will be forthcoming in the near future. An outline of d

..E the considerations that lead to the determination of the re-

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sources required to respond to safeguards incidents is given in Appendix H.

On the basis of the lad.SS review of this paper U

te date, nothing has been identified that would causa a major 3

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revision to the resources proposed in this paper that were S

selected on the basis of incidents resulting in radiologica' consequences.

E III. Basis for Rascurce Peauiraments 5

A.

Consideration of scenarios To determine what resources would be practical and useful for the incident management center, a number of possible incident scenarios were postulated, developed and reviewed to deter =ine Whether cc==on characteristics could be identified which would

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lend weight to pre-collecting a particular set of plant or site inforation for use in the 'MC, obtaining certain standard incident status information fres plant and site, establishing O

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'" f standard evaluation resources, or specifying that certain per-

.,!ff : l; sonnel be consulted. The scenaries were also exasined to h::{;jk, determine which of the response activities previously discussed (infor=ation gathering, evaluation, advice and direction) would be feasible on the time scale available for influencing the course of the event. F.any of the scenarios were taken frem the

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WASH-1400 study and involve core-nelt sequences of very low proba-llll2E:

bility. Other scenaries are more credible and one, the large fire,

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has actually occurred. In cost cases faults in addition to the FJ t :.

initiating event were postulated to produce a scenario in which

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the potential offsite consequences would be great enough to war-

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rant NRC action if the utility did not perfor= adequately. The postulated incidents for which detailed scenaries (which are pre-sented in Appendix A) were developed are as follcws:

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Radiological Consequences

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Large Loss of Coolant Accidents (15 scenarios)

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2.

Small LOCA's (5 acenarios)

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Reactor Plant Transients (4 scenarios)

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Refueling Accidents 5.

Gasecus and Liquid Waste Releases (2 scenarics)

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Lar > Fire (3rowns Ferry)

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Abandoned Control Room at a Nuclear Power Plant

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(2 scenarics) h{jj.:::l 8.

Crash of Spent Fuel Cask with Release of Radioactivity hh,,

(2 scenarics)

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Major Flooding or Other Natural Pheno =ena at a zixb:

Nuclear Power Plant (4 scenarios)

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10. East Coast Blackout

.l" y Radiological and Safeguards Consequences

11. Seizure of a Reactor with Threat of Sabotage Safeguards Consequences with Potential Radiological Consequences f:;

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Penetration of Physical Barrier at a Fuel Facility with Theft of SNM L:=:

It should be emphasized that the scenarios presented in Appendix A

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were selected as situations beyond the expected to illustrate the Eh+0 g.:

times by which an NRC response, if any, would be required. A design O

basis accident which followed its expected course would involve only infor:ation gathering and evaluation by the NRC to confirm that ade-EM quate actions were being taken by the licensee and other responsible zu

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agencies.

55 It should also be noted that the need for active NRC involve =ent in an incident is predicated en the failure of preplanned utility and State actions either because an event different than planned for has k;j c:

occurred or because of a breakdown in the execution of the preplanned

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actions. E=ergency plans and procedures developed by each utility 9. :.:

are exa=ined during the course of licensing reviews and are required to be based on the assumption of no NRC intervention.

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Several observations with regard to the timing of operator action to prevent core =elting can be =ade on the basis of these scenarios.

~.=c For example, in 11 of the 16 large LOCA scenarios cera =elt was calculated to be initiated in 20 =inutes or less and a =ajor fissien product release within about one hour was calculated for these The proportion of the large LOCA sequences that would re-cases.

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c sult in a relatively quick fission product release is not i=portant,

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but the fact that a large nu=ber of scenarios would require essen-tially instantaneous response to affect the outec=e of the incident i

and prevent core =elting is i=portant. After consideration of the

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type and ti=ing of infor=ation and action plans that would have to 5

be available to a continuously staffed IMC, we have concluded that NRC action to change the coerse of in-plant or off-site events in a time fra=e of less than an hour is neither feasible nor desirable.

..=a All action within such a short time fra=e =ust be taken by those with

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the best infor ation, the best knowledge of the facility, and the best chance to influence the outco=e of a sequence of events--the on-site plant operating staff. Even if it were possible to arrive at specific action plans for response to a large nu=ber of accident scenarios which would theoretically allow re=ote direction of an in-

ggg cident, the best use of these action plans would be to make the:

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available to all operating plants for incorporation into their

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e=ergency procedures.

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. nu=ber of the scenarios considered (including some large and h5kf

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s=all LOCA's, sc=e plant transients, the large fire, and so=e hydro-E!!?5iin.

logical events) require reaction ti=es in the order of a few hours after event initiation. For this type of event, NRC inter-action with the licensee would be feasible but =ay not be desirable because of the need for action by operational personnel with access

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to the best available plant and incident knowledge.

Despite the i= practicality of obtaining and adequately evaluating plant'and site infornation i==ediately after initiation of an

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W incident, there are a nui=ber of scenarios where actions taken =any

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hb hours after initiation of an incident are of high significance.

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lllll This is particularly true in plant transients initiated by =ecnani-cal or electrical eqiup=ent failure, fires, loss of offsite power, i;E.

reactor seinure, abandened control roc =, and =ajor ficed event.

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Even in these cases, however, an inti=ste knowledge of the facility

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by the operating staff would have to be co=bined with any additional

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-il5iiif evaluative resources that the IMC =ay be able to bring to beer to

... 7 i=ple=ent actions within the facility. The IMC plant-related activi-h ties are therefore expected to be at =ost advisory in nature.

It would be an extremely unusual situation where directives would need

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to be issued with regard to specific plant actions in response to y

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incidents. A sc=ewhat better case can be =ade for IMC direction of

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off-site actions, =ainly because of the additional time available l

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'2 during which the radioactivity is being transported to the population

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and the fewer nu=ber of physical parameters required for decisions regarding off-site actions. Even for off-site actions, however, the IMC role would be =uch care likely to be adisory than directive.

On the basis of the above discussion, we conclude that the =ain

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focus of the resource require =ents for the IMC should be on those information gathering, evaluation, and ce==unicttien capabilities which will allow the IMC to function effectively in an advisory capacity in the time period starting at least a few hours after an

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incident. We also conclude, however, tt.at it is prudent to provide the legal and cc==unication rescurces to assure the cacability to llh direct a licensee should the need ever becc=e evident during the

:.; '.T course of an incident.

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3.

Recc== ended Pescurces fer the IMC DE 55..;

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Discussion g5 gE=

As discussed above, we recc==end that the resources for the LMC be those that allow efficient collection and evaluation of information to assure that the IMC can function in an adviscry

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capacity within a few hours after an incident is initiated.

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The administrative and co==unication resources should be such F'5E=

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that should the unlikely situation arise where the NRC needed r~

to direct a licensee, the capability to do so would exist.

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The approach of this section is to set forth the reco== ended

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IMC resources in five categories:

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Physical IMC facility and IMC organization--physical,

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b co==unications and personnel requirements for the IMC; y

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Precollected infor=ation--infor=ation on the plant and p

site that would be available to the IMC staff at the U.

start of an incident and with which it would be generally j.:.=...

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fa=iliar; c.

Real time infor=ation--lists of plant and site parameters

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and interactions with other agencies likely to be required

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Evaluation resources--personnel, cc=puter and other tools

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needed to evaluate infor=ation obtained.

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Action resources--cc==unication and transportation capa-e.

bilities and =anage= ant tools needed to assure that any i.r.

necessary advice or direction reaches the site in a timely =anner.

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These recc==endec retources are then discussed in section IV with h= g respect to whether they should be i=ple=ented on a short-or long-

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ter: basis. In many cases, the content of a particular list of

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specialists in the particular area. Such cases have usually I,hf.[ib been designated for long-ters development.

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Resources

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Physical IMC facility and Oreanizacion The present arran5ecents depicting authorities and responsi-J~~. il bilities and the existing layout and arrange ent for NRC F....?

incident response are described in Appendices B, C and D.

y:l These existing arrange =ents have been reviewed jointly by 5? 1 P

H NRR end IE.

A proposal to =eet i!RC's needs to accomplish I

its mission for incident response is given below:

ll (1) Oresnization for Incident Feseense

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~'Ei On the basis of a review of the existing organization L.........

for incident response, we have concluded that some

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changes are necessary for the proper functioning of r.n the IMC. One apparent deficiency is that a senior ad-

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visory group to the IRACT does not for= ally exist.

Such a team would function in a =anner similar to the EACT (E=ergency Action & Coordination Team) created

,.[h by ERDA as a =anagement advisory team. It is clear

E" that the IRACT should be the response ar= of NRC but EF ;

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those dealing with an incident need i==ediate access F2 7N to and guidance by senior level anagement.

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exist to sc=e extent without a for=al designated

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structure, but we reco==end that the co= position

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m of the advisory Ercup be clearly delineated at l.(

this time.

It is also clear that the IRACT itself needs the

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capability to obtain operational assistance i==e-Ed' diately from the line offices in order to better function because at least sc=e of the technical re-x;=

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sources of NRR and NMSS will probably be needed for

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serious incidents. The concept of the existing IE "~

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glg charter described in NRC Manual Chapter 0502 for the IRACT need not be changed to acco=plish this

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objective, only the tea: =akeup.

f9E We, therefore, recc==end the following me=bers be

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Team (MAT) and the Incident Response Action Coordina-

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tion Team (IRACT).

(Because the Line Office Directors

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[NMSS, NRR, IE] are na=ed to the Manage =ent Advisory IF~

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Team, the leader for IRACT is designated as a senior IE operations me=ber.)

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MA!!AGEMENT ADVISCRY TEAM

=c; Director, IE (Team Leader)

Director, NRR-Director, NMSS g

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mi:FF; bbb INCIDENT RESPONSE ACTION COORDINATION TEAM Director, Division of Field Operations, IE Director Director, Division of Materials Inspection Programs,IE Me=ber Director, Division of Reactor Inspection Progra=s,IE Member Director, Division of Operating Reactors, NRR Member (Reactor Incidents)

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Director, Division of Safeguards, G

NMSS Member (Safeguards Yncidents)

Director, Division of Fuel Cycle and Materials Safety Me=ber (Materials Incidents)

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The newly assigned =e=bers; i.e.,

those not in IE, would ii =

serve only when incidents occur in their area of licensing

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E jurisdiction unless otherwise requested by the IRAC.

2Ei Director. The proposed incident response organization is shown schematically in Figure 1.

The specific charter for each of the tea =s will need to

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be specified as well as the line responsibilities for issuance of orders or authorization of other actions by the NRC. As presently conceived, the IRACT would be charged with conducting all response activities up to and including advisory interaction with the licensees.

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==79 Should the issuance of an order to a licensee be required,

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this would be done by the directors of ONRR or CNMSS or their designees who would be present as part of the MAT.

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- _E1 In addition to the changes proposed above, the NRC Ih;;

incident response program should utilize the capa-

_2E bilities of the newly created Infor=ation Assess-l.i s

=ent Team (IAI) for responding to incidents in

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which it has offered advice to the line Office g

Directors. This team consists of three =e:bers, E

one each from NMSS (team leader), NRR and IE.

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Their charter will include the routine cellection of intelligence data, assess =ent of such data, and t::...

(gr reco= endations to the line Office Directors. This (j};.

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team should be physically present at the IMC during Y Le ll response to security or safeguards incidents tv ad-

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vise the IRACT tea: and assist it in obtaining in-i n""

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for=ation and contacting appropriate authorities.

.y Once the IRACT has been activated, the Infor:ation E==

Assess =ent Team should report to IRt.CT Director but F3 E

also be available to interact with the MAT.

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(2) IMC Physical Arrancerent The broadened scope of the incident response mission IEF recc== ended in this paper and the physical facilities il.;

==: ;

necessary to accc==cdate this =ission require a dedi-E.7 92 cated facility to =eet these neads. Accc= odations 1

are needed for the IRACT, suppcrt staff, and, wnen 3: :.

+

P

-sm-_

=.;;..

,e-7;3

. =' "yg necessary, the IAT. This room should be unocca-pied for other purposes and should contain com-

[-'

muinications equipment and briefing files. Exist-ing rooms in the EN Towers building could serve this purpose.

(Relocation plans for the IMC are now under active develop =ent.)

Adjt.:ent to this group, a special facility is needed to acco=modate

^'

the MAT. This recm cust be able to accom=odate up 9::

to six =anage=ent personnel and should include telephones, interec=s and speakers connected to g

the IMC operation room and television. There cust

a.

n=.E also be a co'nvenience room to acccc odate the Cet=issioners and EDO and at least one assistant

a for each. This roc = too cust have an interco=,

g.;:

arrang=ent with the MAT room, and a television

.;;g ;;.;_

set should be provided. Visual conitcring of the Eis?

IMC status boards via closed circuit television

.}.;;,.; ~

to the MAT and Co==ission roc =s should be evalu-ated. Some of the scenarios described in this paper indicate that the technical support staff needed cight be rather large. Certainly the IRACT gg will need certain key technical persennel in its 5

center; however others shculd be nearby and per-forming "What if" studies as the incident pro-

~ !:E gresses. A roce is needed for them to functicn.

O

1

==

ll &;;;;;;;;

=:

In addition to these needs,. a place =ust be avail-able for protracted incidents where parts of the 55" staff can rest and obtain food. This facility too should be nearby the IMC roc =.

The needs are, therefore, a specific dedicated space for per=anent installation of ec==unications and n

display equip =ent and a dedicated roo= (=ay be oc-cupied during reut

'perations) for each of the hi following: MAT, Co==issioners and EDO, Technical

!5 Es" Support Staff, and for sleeping and eating.

{

F==

r We also recc==end that the IMC Operations Roo:

gllg}

be equipped with e=ergency lighting to allow continued operation in blackouts. A syste= of co=-

=unications wnich does not rely on the telephone

=;

network is also reco== ended. The feasibility of

=2

'5 :=::..

providing a power scurce for the backup ce==unica-w tions equip =ent should be deter =ined.

Teletype facilities, including a secure teletype for safeguards incidents should be provided.

d.jE b.

Tra-cellected inferratien (1)

?lant infer-stien (a)

FWR, BWR and Gas Cocied briefing packages should be available including visual aid =aterial to

~

50

'x.;5 ~......

-75h -

?:

enable briefing of the IRACT, MAT, EDO and

. ;;; gg Commission as required en the basic physical E::

context in which the incident is taking place.

.((;[.....

This briefing package should include single ine drawings of the major equipment and plant

~

E layouts inside and outsice the contain=ent.

This information should be available in the

_ j@.h

.=

IMC for the use of the IRACT and its support

=-

staff. As complete a set of typical detailed EE, system and component drawings as possible should

=

be indexed and available for reference for

- 29?

=::

each plant type and vender.

(Such drawings g,

()

are now available in the IE training facilities

$hhg5;#

but =ay require augmentation.)

fh (b) Up-to-date technical specifications, FSAR,

j; Environmental Report, staff Safety Evaluations, E~

Environ = ental State =ents, and E=ergency Plans in ---

should be accessible at all ti=es by IRACT E

support staff members but need not be in the

=3:

IMC itself. Consideration should be given to EEGi?

obtaining and updating a set of detailed plant

_:35;;.....

E=ergency Procedures for each facility.

=.

(c) A detailed plant infor:ation package on each

~

unit should be available. This package should

(~~/l define tajor de;a.'tures from the detailed s.-

p3 hi

~ :.;:;

. =%

p.7.=

' ' )..:'5. 5.

N:...

Ns b I) drawings available for each plant type and

.;;j v

contain photographs of plant equipment,

....:=....

containment and control areas. This package l;.:l. Tll. '

35.=

should contain schematics of at least the systems i:dEUi::5, essential for plant shutdown and plant layout drawings from the FSAR.

(Essential systems are

.:q those listed in SRP 3.5.1.4)

This information V.:

should be available in the IMC.

jy{

A. :::::

(d) For each facility, lists of manufacturers of pi : ~

L;.

major cosponents and systems, architect-engineers tk f.-

r::

and constructors and contact points in each of

[!.

iii.....

these organizations should be co= piled to enable b 'iii :.

E:::.

more detailed plant information to be obtained

,,j quickly. A list of key plant and utility person-i]y[:f:~

nel and plant and utility organization charts g

should be retained for each facility. This information should be in the E!C.

..=-- : -.

.=

Y."Ll::-

(2) Site Infor-ation E

(a) A briefing package should be available on each site containing aerial photographs of the plant fiE bExi:

in relation to its surroundings, USGS maps or p.::;

equivalent of the immediate site areas, popula-tion distribution to a distance of at least 20

=

miles, and selected figures frc: the FSAR'and Enviren= ental Report. Infor:aticn on the location

Es=

N

' u:.

r.

.... tr:-

.7 "

.. =...: : :

L:. ::-32:-i_}:f;

==:

9;= ;... -

I

u.a,

."~

'r=

55'

[

c.;= ::::

' U:=:E=

==.

= -

==

of institutions such as schools and hospitals siagg 55'~~

near the site and water intakes near the site 55; g=

s should be provided on maps or listings. This y

information should be available in the IMC.

(b) Up-to-date environ = ental technical specifications,

=~ =.

U- -

Emergency Plans, FSAR, Environmental Reports,

==

Safety Evaluations and Environnental Statements t,]

should be accessible at all times by the IRACT E.1..

u.==

support staff members but need not be in the IMC E5.

hz;i...

itself. Consideration should be given to

.:.-gE...y

{}

obtaining and updating de tailed site emergency procedures for each facility, h..

"l=

EE. ::

(c) Summaries of i=portant site " ology" information

~~

should be available, with emphasis on seasonal meteorological summaries of expected and worst hfh=

case stability, vind speed and wind direction.

A description of the plant meteorological instru-E=:

~

mentation and alternate local sources of data g,

should be included. Other brief su=maries should

[==

=

be included on hydrology, geology and s aismology.

~::::::"

E-This information should be available it the IMC.

g7;.;..

(d) For each facility lists of contact points for local and state authorities should be cespiled in addition ij:.

lng j

i 1

%, s

• l

j

=l

.. =

=..

J

m(d.g:5 to the list of agency contacts which would be Ihh r' ::;::.

applicable to all f acilities. This information

~

should be available in the IMC.

(3) Interagency Contacts The authorities and responsibilities of various agencies are addressed in Appendices E, F and G of this report.

[..

Lists of contacts are now available for use in the IMC.

p:

c.

Incident Status Information

)[--

(1) A detailed list of plant parameters to be obtained at g'%

w.:1...

the time of the incident will need to be developed as i$l

()

a function of the scenario type. As an example, an i

incident initiated by a plant transient or piping or I"

[;l..c=.; _

component failure might require collection of the

~

==

following information:

=c Primarv indicators ll:k:3.

5552:

Reactor coolant pressure

iA?:

Reactor coolant tempe ratur e Reactor vessel or pressurizer level

[.;;

Power z.:.:. :

Steam generator pressure (PWR)

[..,,

???:'

l Steam generator level (PWR)

?

Feedvater flow

- ~ - -

Safety injection flow l~)

\\

%)

=

4

. :7=.:

AU Residual heat removal system flow Control rod position indicators Baron concentration Makeup flow Main steam line flow rate Radiation level in main steamline (3WR)

Containment Indicators

, =::

Containment pressure Containment temperature Radiation level in containment Containment sump or torus level

=~

r...

• e rz l

Hydrogen concentration in centainment

{

r Engineered Safety Feature Indicators h.

r:

Containment spray flow

=~

Containment fan cooling flov Water level in emergency cooling water and

)?

Es 55 chemical tanks

• :11;;.

Emergency filter train operation I

Energency ventilation syste=s operation 3:

Containment isolation valve positions (c{g.;;. -

'=:

Status of power supplies

"" :., r il Temperature in vicinity of vital equipcent

+

a O

l. :

IL:

L*::: :::.::::.

"T'.

. g._

• 4*

.t r-rrv..-r m

' ::".7. .:...

== ()

",.

u f,i,

I:-

Pump speeds se:

System valve positions Standby liquid poison control system operation (BWR)

Radioactivity Release Indicators Activity release rate from principal plant vents (including filter trains)

Radiation level at air ejector Area radiation levels in secondary containments ff; and auxiliary buildings.

[

[;;;;==i.

e;;

=

)

The above listing of information is typical of that

}."

=

being reviewed for ttsefulness by the Iask Force on Instrumentati. c to Follow the Course of an Accident.

E: -

. = -

z=u, Any listings cc= piled for the IMC will need to be t..'..".........

== ::----

consistent with the findings of that task force.

In

~".::....

== -

addition the order in which the information cust be

.=.

obtained and the time scale on which it cust be ob-

~ ' ' "

tained will need to be decided for each scenario ffE type. The listings developed should be available in il-i!!"~

the IMC.

5l.

E.r (2) Site parameters which =ust be collected at the time

"=

I of the incident will need to be listed as a function AU) t

. =p. '

%p

.)

X4'.i of the scenario type, For example, these could include some of the following:

Site Indicators p.;,,

Wind speed Wind direction Meteorological stability class River flow

.gzz...

Water level Radiation levels outside buildings

!ii-Offsite information

~~.:'l Offsite radiation surveys l~"

(,)

Status of protective actions

[I,7 Local, s tate and federal contacts by the utility Media contacts.

...=::

.hhbbbNbb The listings developed should be available in the IMC.

s :f1 l

i d.

Evaluation resources Eqj t

_E (1) Computer facility requirements for the IMC support

.d

. \\

....... :: j staff should be developed. A portable terminal

~~~!

=ai (suitcase type) should be readily available at all

\\

~

times for use by t.he EMC support staf f in addition to the permanent terminal in the E/W Towers building.

b oJ

..;=.:.--

e n

~,

.i?

h,-

.~u

.h:. -

b

- -(.;ff A list of useful computer coles and experts in hfiE-their use should be compiled and these codes put g:j%s_

fi

E=

on computers (e.g., NIH) which can be accessed J"="~

on a 24-hour basis.

Some of the parameters listed above for collection during an incident may be obtainable from plant process computers at the present time. Serious

?(rg consideration should be given to requiring that this type of information be available at one lo-cation in the facility so that an on-site inspector, as well as,the plant staf f, 'can quickly determine

(

the status of most of the key parameters. One pos-

=.:

sibility for transmittal of the infornation to the

'}.l.;.jij=

IMC would be through a direct hookup from an DiC computer to all plant computers. The feasibility

. = ' -

.==-

of this type of hookup should be evaluated.

How-ig ever, an immediate problem of equipment compata-bility arises and this method of data collection may not be feasible for plant infomation. Site b

9:-i

~~

meteorological information may be more amenable to

='E =

direct computer readout in the IMC.

Several com-g mercial systems are now being developed for sale to

== 2r.I utilities for the purpose of opti= icing releases d

n v

a^.'.

27

'i e.

12.

r O.z._....

v hI5h and recording data within the constraints of Appen-dix I.

These same computer syste=s are progra==ed my to calculate off-site exposures.

Interaction with 1 ::

the suppliers of this equipment at this ti=e might result in adequate compatability with an IMC termi-nal to take direct collection of ceteorological data feasible. Current regional weather data can also be obtained through a facsi=ile hookup.

Data such as current information en the status of

==

=aterials accountability at licensed facilities gl W.=::

(to enable evaluation of threat credibility) may be

m-

\\_)

a= enable to stcrage and updating in a format retriev-

~ "=~

able by computer.

Alternatively, updated lists of

=aterials

• status should be i=cediately available to the IMC.

~;a An industry-wide inventory of spare part equipment at g

nuclear power plants by geographical area should be considered as a possible joint effort with the nuclear ZEi!

industry. This would facilitate the location of com-ponents required for e:ergency repairs.

Because it

.994

- =EE:

would be a =ajor effort to ec= pile and continually up-

..1..7:

date such a list, this is probably only feasible if F.x the inventcry list could serve se:e cther purpose llf v

...;~

L

i l

l.

=.

/'

el ;..

'!:5li.

h!21 useful to ther utilities involved. A possible ap-preach would be for the NRC to encourage the AIF to

l==

institute a clearinghouse for such equipment to E

facilitate sales between utilities. Of course, if this approach worked ef ficiently, it would reduce the

[

I:.7..

inventory of spare parts that would be available,

[

==

although the location of parts available would 'ee

[

.y be tter known. An alternative approach would be to f

r i

maintain a list of key contacts in various organi-

]t)}

zations, as suggested in an earlier section of this g

paper, who could quickly ascertain the availability 6

(

of desired equipment at their 'f acility.

.r..

55iiE (2) A list of analytical tools needed for data reduction Y5[

should be compiled and those not already available should be developed. This is particularly important

..=-.

in the areas of radiological exposure and decay heat /

~ Fi--

boiloff calculations.

R 3l (3) A list of specific technical personnel resources I..,.. '.'.

=

available should be developed for immediate use and EEE:*

for standby notification. For example, at least one i5Efi

?=..i.:' :!

of the DOR Operational Technology (OT) branch chiefs E %

should normally be requested to report to the IMC to

" =..

serve as supervisor for the technical support staff

i

E; O

h

.. W ;,

~:; :

5

. $.h i

qip"

.J

..J

(~~) ~

v'

....:;1;Z: :

r;;;r.

===r

.. =. =

m and the other OT branen chiefs and selected NRR ZZZZ' 5$Eb$

reviewers put on standby. Any projects personnel EfEE:7 with special knowledge of the particular plant should also be put on standby. Technical re-6 sources in other agencies and NRC consultants should also be listed by subject. The feasi-FE=

9.U;.

bility of prearrange =ents for e=ergency use of consultants not nor= ally used for potential con-

=

flict of interest or other reasons should be ex-

!e plored with the administrative office.

h=:S (4) A list of key creolanned actiens for each facility L--

that can be used to assess whether these actions i

have been initiated in a ti=ely =anner by the 1_-

E

e

censee and whether the instituted actions are jg;;

having the desired effect.

2EE

iEEEF" e.

Action resources (1) Cereunications (as discussed earlier) and tr?.nseortatien as Q

are the two key resources requiired to i=ple=ent ac-

[!: lf tien deter =ined appropriate en the basis of the IRACT FEE [

incident evaluation. In addition to the ability to E?

deter =ine and ec==unicate the qtates of a licensee's action, which will usually be done by Regien inspec-

"F:::

tors, a capability to place technical ;ersennel at

.=

- =

f3

\\_,)

s.

.m....

l.. _

(D LJ 7E the disposal of the licensee, either remotely E" :.c::

or by transport to the site is required. If it EE is judged important to place an expert at a site in a particular instance, another expert should d~

maintain contact with the site during the " dead L;:

time" that will result during travel to the site, l?;-

n";:

Prearrangements for ef ficient travel to all sites should be established. Minimum and nor=al travel y;r times and pr,oposed transport modes to all sites should be established and reviewed by headquarters b

[.g.5F=

to assure the shortest feasible transport time

" ~4)

.E without incurring extraordinary costs.

[.1 lii' Special ecomunications equipment should be avail-

=.

able for personnel dispatched to a site to assure

=

timely reporting of significant information to headquarters and to maximize the availability of

~ ~ ' -

these personnel to the Region or headquarters staf f.

For example, two-way radios with a repeater s tation g

ru ca l

and a base station may be needed. All equipment E

EE must be amenable to light plane and car transport.

~

l

. =...

I

~ ::=.

(2) Legal authority and the continuous availability of C:

acoropriate management levels to the IRAC are re-H

'~

~

E?

quired to assure that should an order to a licensee o

/

-+p e.

a m

a e.

w; 9

1

,.. 5... )..

5

/7

(.) ![

..]

aa to take a pat *,ieular action be necessary, it o

could be issued in a timely fashion.

'I IV.

Implementation Recoc:mendations Q

This section presents the recommended time schedule for implementation of l

the resource recommendations of section III of this paper. The implemen-tation of the various recommendations is divided into short term and long term categories. By short ters is mean implementation within three months and by long term is meant withie six months to one year.

I t ^:.

l The following table is organized in the same order in which the recommen-dations are presented in section III.B.2.

The timing reco== ended is s:;E.

n determined mainly by the feasibility of obtaining the resource quickly.

As

=

0 C

se E

.:L'::

I; _.=::

.m, e

k p

j

f );.. ?,= jj IMPU'MntrATION R$ COMMENDATIONS _

(m i

x_./

2 Reotre Sectica Short Term Lone Term

~l:

.?.l.

Stetion III.B.7.

'.. 7 l

'S.1

c. Physical IMC and Organization n.(1)

Add a Manage =ent Advisory Team j1 (MAT) to the incident response s

1:*

• organization.

g, Change the composition of the

, h IRACT to include a = ember frcs

{

the line offices.

Delineate the specific charter kjh" of the IRACT and MAT including the line responsibilities for

.. i advisory response acticus and orders.

i i

O Maka the Infor=ation Assessnent g.

Teas part of the incident respeare p :.g-organization reporting to IRACT -

bi -

When an incident involving safe-

$=

guards is in progress.

{..].....

=

a.(2)

Arrange for specific dedicated Obtain emergency lighting for the [i space for per=anent installatien, incident response areas to allcw

[jk.

of IMC cc - 4caticus and dis-functioning during power blackou:

play equip =ent and additional dedicated space (which =ay be Establish a system of cec =unica-normally occupied) for other tion which does not rely on incident response personnel.

telephone networks.

==

Examine the feasibility of self-povered cw_anication equipment.

Teletype equip =ent, including hl:q a secure teletype should be k

cbtained.

f\\

i

'%d l

=u i

, i.

, p)

IMPLEMENIATION RECOMMENDATIONS (Cont'd) u,

=::

~

sm+::

Short Term Long Term Rep rt Section

amm, Siction III.B.2 Continued b.

Precollected Information

b. (1)(a)

Develop briefing package on Indem set of typical detailed PWR, BWR, Gas Cooled reactors system and component drawings

. =.

b. (1)(b)

Confirm that plant licensing materials such as FSAR's and Safety Evaluations are readily available to IRACT support staff E-"-~

..... = =

)

b. (1)(c)

Prepare plant infor=ation pack-

[

age on each unit. (Requires p) site visits for photographs.)

(_

b. (1)(d)

Confirm that lises of key plant Compile lists of =anufacturers g:ll!N and utility personnel and organi-by co=ponent, A/E's and construc-zational charts are available in tors and contact points for each

" r the IMC for each facility unit.

~-

55:

b. (2)(a)

Prepare briefing package on eac!;

Co:. ission aeri;J. photographs site from available materials if not availaHe.

b. (2) (b)

Confirm that site licensing ca-terials such as FSAR's and En-

773..

viron= ental Reports are readily available to the IRACT support

- = =

staff.

=pl{:I,gj b. (2) (c)

Prepara s e ries of " ology" infor=ation wi:h emphasis on meteorology.

i Ns/

e

,,..s nu:e!

A IMPLEMENTATION RECCMMENDATIONS (Cont 'd)

L)

=

Report Section Short Ter:n Long Ter=

[

S etion III.B.2 Continued

b. (2) (d)

Confir= that lists of contact points for local and state H

authorities are available for each site in the IMC.

fj: = =

b. (3)

Review the authorities and I=ple=ent recc== ended changes in 2

responsibilities and reco==end in interagency agree =ents.

i:

changes in interagency agree-

[.

ments or write these if they

[.i......

do not exisc.

E}."

1' c.

Incident Status k.I:

uj Infor=ation 5

i

)

I

.: i c.(1)

Co= pile a list of plant parama-Assure that lists are co=patible h:. 4:l ters as a function of scenario with work of task force on In-is m il type which should be collected stru=entation to Follow the

..d during the incident and prepare Course of n Accident.

Es) instructions to IRACT opera-Ti tional staff for the order in E id which information is to be collected.

gr c.(2)

Cc= pile a list of site para =a-ters to be collected during an

[

incident.

• 2..=.

=

d.

Evaluation

~

==:,

Resources

=...

kisi d.(1)

Establish.orocedures for kSg

s portable ec=puter ter=.inal l

i==adiately available to 13ACT l

support staff.

q i Ol

=..

7 G

l

==

^_.:::..

l.

!..g'

- as -

p IMPLZ M ATION RECOMMENDATIONS (Cont'd)

C/

Sherr Term Long Term Emp^rt Section l

S ction III.B.2

~

m m

Continued

d. (1) - continued Conpile a list of useful com-i puter codes and experts in their

M use.

Establish feasibility of direct Request all facilities to main-hookup to a permanent IMC tain updated knowledge of key terminal to 'obtain plant and plant para =eters in one location; site paramaters.

preferably through the plant process co=puter.

Obtain updated lists or computer storage capability en the status of materials accountability a-licensed facilities.

O Arrange for receipt of regional i

V weather service information in the IMC Establish feasibility of =aintain ing an industry-wide spare parts inventory.

d.(2)

Establish need for specific Write and docu=ent any needed additional analytical tools computer codes.

such as computer codes.

d. 0)

Compile a list of tech feni

~

~

personne.1 resources by subject (inside and outside NRC).

i l

[..)i I.I..

Resources I,

e.(1)

Establish prearrangements for i

travel to all sites.

1 Establish the com=unicacices Furchase c:==unications equip =en-p equipment needed for personnel such as two-way radios, repeater N.,/

dispatched to a site.

stations, base stations.

,:7

~~

6 L

s

r o

,.h

[r

~

~

T.

7.

IMPLEMENTATION RECOMMENDATIONS (Cont'd)

'E h=

c;.

i??$

Raport Section Short Term Long Ter:n

$.12.

r-Ssetion III.B.2

........ ~..

====

Continued o.(2)

Confirm that the appropriate Change regulations as necessary f

legal and nanagement resources to assure that timely issuance

!?.

are available for issuance of of orders during an incident

orders, is possible.

p_....

~ 5....

. i=

g rb:

-h..

=

i=#

?

• a=

t=u...

::=

ll2:.

E:??E EE.i.n..:.

E s

r

-1

[

1

1 l

1 I

l 6

l -

E.: 1

'EEE 1

1 E5Eni!I 1

..i i::=.

j t

r_C i

.=: =:+

j

" ;= g j

i 1

O a

w.

I e

)

FIGURE 1 P

PROPOSED IllCIDENT RESPO!!SE ORGAllIZATION 4

Commissioners I

I N

I I

I p

I IRACT s

i I

(Incident Hanagement 5

g l

N Action Coordination, Team) s

i!!

N g

HAT N

(Hanagement Advisory Team)

IHC, Operations Technical Support

/

Staff Supervisor

/

8

/,

/

Public Congressionni

/ /

Affairs Officer I,1aison

/

/

/

p

/

j

/

/

Regional Office Technical Support

/

/

y Response Teams Staff

/

j (Incident Investigation Review Committee) **

j

\\1

/

l l

/

Information 3

• Tlie IAT reports to the line Office Assessment Directors when the IRACT is not Teun (T W

• functioning.

• • The IIRC is a post-incident evaluative team.

pi, l}l i

! II

,