ML19308B992
| ML19308B992 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/19/1978 |
| From: | Johnson W, Rosenthal A, Sharfman J NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19308B978 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR ALAB-486, NUDOCS 8001170735 | |
| Download: ML19308B992 (17) | |
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Cite as 8 NRC 9 (1978)
ALAB-486 i
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND !.lCENSING APPEAL BOARD Alan S. Rosenthal. Chairman Dr.W. Reed Johnson Jerome E. Sharfman in the Matter of Docket No. 50-320 METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, et al.
(Three Mile island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2)
July 19,1978 Upon appeal from LBP-77-70,6 NRC 1185, which authorized the issu-ance of an operating license, the Appeal Board upholds the Licensing Board's decision on emergency planning but orders a further hearing (to be held before it) on the question of future aircraft crash probabilities. It declines to suspend the license pe, ding such hearing. The Appeal Board also declines to reopen the record on emergency planning and defers its decision on radon-222 pending the outcome of procedures outlined in ALAB-480,7 NRC 796.
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EMERGENCY PLAN: CONTENT Live tests and drills involving the general public are not essential to art adequate emergency plan. Drills for personal assigned responsibilities under the plan are required.
EMERGENCY PLAN: CONTENT The people responsible for implementing the emergency plan do not have to have expert knowledge of the effects of radioactivity in order for I
the emergency plan to be effective.
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I RULES OF PRACTICE: PETITION TO REOPEN TIIE RECORD d
The proponent of a motion to reopen the record bears a heavy burden.
3 Normally, the motion must be timely and addressed to a significant issue.
Kan.sas Gas & Electric Company (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit No.
1), ALAB-462, 7 NRC 320, 339 (1978). If an initial decision has been rendered on the issue, it must appear that reopening the record might materially alter the result. Where a motion to reopen the record is untimely 1,
without good cause, the movant must demonstrate not only that the issue is
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significant but also that the public interest demands that the issue be further 9
explored. Vermont YankeeNuclear Power Corp. (Vcrmont Yankee Nuclear j
Power Station), ALAB-138,6 AEC 520,523 (1973);id., ALAB-167,6 AEC g
1151-52 (1973).
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RULES OF PRACTICE: PETITION TO REOPEN Tile RECORD i,
Criteria for reopening the record govern each issue: the fortuitous cir-1 cumstance that a proceeding has been or will be reopened on other issues is 4
not significant. Georgia Power Company (Alvin W. Vogtle Nuclear Plant, i
Units I and 2), ALAB-291,2 NRC 4N,413-414 (1975).
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EMERGENCY PLAN: PROTECTION OF PERSONS OUTSIDE LPZ 3
j Commission regulations do not require consideration in a licensing
]i proceeding of the feasibility of devising an emergency plan for the protec-tion (in the event of an accident) of persons outside of the low population zone. New England Power Company (NEP, Units I and 2), et al., ALAB-v l
390,5 NRC 733,747 (1977).
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'l EMERGENCY PLAN: CONTENT s
aq The type of accident that might occur at a particular plant is irrelevant I
. to planning for emergency evacuation. The criteria for emergency planning 1
d are based on Part 100 which assumes radiation releases from a hypothetical major accident.
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i EMERGENCY PLAN: CONTENT i,
j The vesting of certain emergency plan responsibilities (particularly those related to monitoring) in an applicant does not contravene the Price-Ander-l son Act,42 U.S.C. 2210.
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5 lOPEN TIIE RECORD ATOSilC ENERGY ACT:SCOPEOFINFORS!ATION REQUIRED FOR LICENSING (AIRCRAFT CHASIIES) record bears a heavy burden.
ressed to a significant issue.
The concept of analyzing aircraft hazards in terms of probabilities has Generating Station, Unit No.
had longstanding acceptance within the Commission. Long /s/and Lighting i an initial decision has been Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-156,6 AEC 831,845-reopening the record might 46 (1973).
reopen the record is untimely
! strate not only that the issue is RULES OF PRACTICE: APPELLATE PROCEDURE ands that the issue be further
. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear A party may not raise issues on appeal which were not raised below.
31973);id., ALAB-167,6 AEC Tennessee Val /cy Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units I A,2A, IB, 2B), ALAB-463,7 NRC 341,351-52 (1978).
@ PEN TIIE RECORD ATOSilC ENERGY ACT: SCOPE OF INFORSfATION REQUIRED FOR LICENSING (AIRCRAFT CRASIIES) each issue; the fortuitous cir-be reopened on other issues is The consequences of a greater than design basis aircraft crash need not hin W. Vogtle Nuclear Plant, be explored, inasmuch as the proability of such a crash is so low that the P ant need not be designed to withstand it, notwithstanding what its con-l B4 (1975).
sequences might be.
ERSONS OUTSIDE LPZ OPERATING LICENSE: SUSPENSION consideration in a licensing Nuclear facilities may be allowed short-term operation if it is determined
'ergency plan for the protec-on the record that a still unresol'ved safety question has no application to tside of the low population such operation.
nits I and 2), et al., ALAB-TECIINICAL ISSUES DISCUSSED: emergency-plans; aircraft crash risk.
/'
essrs. George F. Trowbridge and Ernest L Blake, J
Washington, D. C., for the applicants, Metropoli-S y
{particular plant is irrelevant tan Edison. Company, Jersey Central Power and,ight p)eria for emergency planning Company, and Pehnsylvani.agtric CompanL/ '
releases from a hypothetical Mr. Chauncey R. Kepford, State College, Penn-sylvania, for the intervenors, Citizens for a Safe En-vironment and York Committee for a Safe Environ-ment.
Gsibilities (particularly those Ms. Karin W. Carter, Assistant Attorney General of c:ntr:vene the Price-Ander.
Pennsylvania, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, filed a brief for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
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Mr. Stuart A. Treby (Messrs. Henry J. McGurren,-
j Gregory H. Fess, and Lawrence J. Chandler on the }
brief) for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff.
1 N _ DECISION-4 i
j Unit No. 2 of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station (TMI-2), located j
adjacent to a similar unit on an island in the Susquehanna River about 12 j
miles from Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, received a construction permit in November 1969, prior to enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Therefore, no environmental review was performed in con-
.j nection with the application for that permit. Subsequently, after the appli-y cants (Metropolitan Edison Company, et al.) had sought an operating j
license, a Licensing Board undertook to consider both (1) those environ-mental and safety questions bearing upon the issuance of such a license; and 7
(2) whether, as a result of a complete environmental review, the previously h1 issued construction permit should be continued, modified, terminated, or appropriately conditioned to protect environmental values.'
. l On December 19,1977, the Licensing Board issued an initial decision in d
which it concluded that the construction permit should remain in effect and I
l authorized the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to make findings 2
requisite to issuance of a full-term operating license (subject to specified environmental conditions).2 Exceptions to that decision were filed by Citi-d{
zens for a Safe Environment and the York Committee for a Safe Environ-ment, joint intervenors below.' Those intervenors also moved us to stay the effectiveness of the initial decision. In ALAB.456,7 NRC 63 (January 27, i :
1978), we denied the motion.
( I The intervenors renewed their stay request before the Commission.'
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They stressed, as they had before us,5 their disagreement with the Licensing Board's rejection of their claim that the environmental review of the nuclear j
fuel cycle had not correctly dealt with the effects of radon (Rn-222) releases
- i generated by mill tailings produced in the course of the mining and milling j
of uranium. In ALAB-456, we had held that this claim was " barred as a
'See 10 CFR Part 50. Appendit D. Section C (1974 ed.).
]
LDP.77.70. 6 NRC 1185. An operating license (DPR.73) was issued on February 8.1978.
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Sec 43 Fed. Reg. 7073 (February 17,1978).
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An appeal was aho filed by a nonparty; w c dismissed it for that reason. ALAB-454,7 NRC 39 (January 23.1978).
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'On February 27.1978 they also sought a judicial stay of the operating license authoriza-
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tion, but the court of appeals denied their request. Kepford v. NRC, No. 781160 (D.C. Cir.,
7 March 8,1978).
8The issue was before us both through the intervenors' exceptions and as part of the stay request.
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matter of law for the reason that it constitutes an impermissible attack upon J. Ch;ndl;r on the a generic regulation of the Commission"-Table S-3 of 10 CFR 51.20(c).*
immissi:n staff.
The Commission, however, as was within its (but not out) authority, agreed with the intervenors that the radon release values in Table S-3 were incor-rect and accordingly set aside that portion of the table. CLI-78-3,7 NRC 307 (March 2,1978). Although it denied the requested stay, the Commission Icar Station (TMI 2), located directed us to review the issue "as though no Rn 222 release figure had been Susquehanna Riser about 12 determined by regulation in Table S-3." Id. at 310. With that in mind, and ved a construction permit in following discussion of the matter with the parties at oral argument, we Lti:nst Environmental Policy remanded the radon issue to the Licensing Board for further consideration.
' view was performed in con-ALAB465,7 NRC 37' (March 27,1978). But subsequently, in an order e
Subsequently, after the appli-encompassing all the cases before us involving the radon matter, we deter-II.) had sought an operating mined that one particular proceeding pending before a licensing board' isider both (1) those environ-should be treated as the " lead case," with supplementary material to be re-issuance of such a license; and ceived in other cases (including this one) where appropriate. Philadelphia
. mental review, the previously Elcetric Company (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), et ied, modified, terminated, or al., ALAB480, 7 NRC 796 (May 30,1978). As a result, we vacated the sental values.'
remand in ALAB465. The radon issue remains before us pending the pur-rd issued an initial decision in suit of the procedures outlined in ALAB480.8 lit should remain in effect and Now ripe for disposition are the remaining issues raised by the interd Regulation to make findings venors on appeal. Only two are sufficiently substantial to warrant discus-g license (subject to specified sion: the adequacy of the applicants' emergency plan and the probability of at decision were filed by Citi-a crash ofiheavy aircraft intithe plant. With respect to the former ques-I' ommittee for a Safe Environ-tion, the intervenors have moved to reopen the evidentary record. We have hrs also moved us to stay the reviewed their claims and have found insufficient cause either to reopen the 6456,7 NRC 63 (January 27, record on the emergency plan or to disturb the result reached by the Li-censing Board on that question. As for aircraft crashes, our review has led est before the Commission.*
to a different result. The record does enable us to find reasonable assurance fagreement with the Licensing of safety given present levels of aircraft traffic in the vicinity of the plant.
pnmental review of the nuclear But it contains sufficient inconsistencies and ambiguities relative to aircraft Lets cf radon (Rn-222) releases 7 NRC at 65. T! e Licensing Board had applied the Table S-3 values; the intersenors' rse of the mining and milling 6
t this claim was " barred as a position was that those salues were erroneous. But that Board also admitted into esidence (and permitted crosdesammation ont testimony proffered by the intervenors (and responsise 8 I-testimony offered by the staf0 on the health effects of radon releases and the effect of such M3) was issued on February 8.1978.
releases on the comparative nuclear-coal cost-benefit balances. Without determming whether such testimony constituted an impermissible challenge to Table S 3, and granting arguendo q for that reason. ALAB-434,7 NRC the correctness of the intersenors' analysis, the Board determined the radon impact "to be of negligible materiahty" and msufficient to alter the comparison between the nuclear and wal I
fy of the operttms license authoriza-alternatives. 6 NRC at 1224.
wo e. MC. No. 78-Il60 (D.C. Cir,
'DuAt Power Company (Perkins Nuclear Station Units I,2, and 3), Docket Nos. STN 50438, STN $0-489. STN 50-490.
f eteeptions and as part of the stay son July 14.1978 the Perkvis Licensing Board rendered its partialinitial decision on the redon matter. LBP-78-25,8 NRC 87.
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crash probabilities over the life of the plant that we must order a further hearing on that question. There is, however, no need to suspend the opera.
l, ting license pending the outcome of that hearing.'
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'l I. EMERGENCY PLANNING A. The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for every operating license application must include "[p]!ans for coping with emergencies." 10 CFR 50.34(b)(6)(v). While it need not include the " details of these plans and the details of their implementation," the FSAR must at least describe certain defined elements "to an extent sufficient to demonstrate that the plans
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provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can and will be 1
i taken in the event of an emergency to protect public health and safety and prevent damage to property." 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Part 111 t
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(emphasis supplied).'o i
The emergency plan for this reactor appears in Section 13.3 of the f
FSAR, as supplemented by Appendix 13A. Additional descriptive material j
q l relating to the plan was presented by a panel of the applicants' witnesses i
(1lerbein, et al., prepared testimony, fol. Tr. 757) and by two witnesses 9 i sponsored by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (fol. Tr. 801). The staff both reviewed the plan in its Safety Evaluation Report (SER, {l3.3) and q ;
j l presented testimony on it (Van Niel, prepared testimony, fol. Tr.1701).
in general, the plan anticipates that "the statiort will be self-sufficient
- j in handling emergency conditions" but that "outside agencies will be called j
upon as needed" (FSAR,613.3.1). The applicants are to be responsible for I
initially detecting the occurrence of an accident or event giving rise to an i l emergency situation; taking corrective action (where possible); assessing
'This Board's sua sponte review of the remainder of the record has disclosed no other error 1
warranting correcti.e action.
d Insofar as intervenors' request for financial assistance is concerned. the Commission has j
held that no such assistance is to be granted in a proceeding of this type. Nuclear Reeulatory
'g Commission (Financial Assistance to Participants in Commission Proceedings). CLI.76 23,4 y
NRC 494 (19M). We and the licensing boards are, of course. bound by that ruling. Detrost j
Edison Company (Greenwood Energy Center. Units 2 and 3). ALAB 376. 5 NRC 426,428
.I (1977).
4 Whe elements of an emergency plan which are identified in the regulations pertain to.
later alia, the organizational structure relied upon for coping with emergencies; communica.
f tions systems to be used to keep sarious insolsed organizations informed of matters bearing upon their responsibilities. the means for determining the magnitude of radioactive releases; d
identification of first aid. decontamination, and treatment facilities; training of and drills for i
j persons charged with emergency plannmg responsibilities; and critena for determming the j
appropriateness of reentry into the facility and resumption of operations.10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E. Part IV.
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t we must order a further potential offsite and onsite effects; and timely notifying local, State, and need to suspend the opera-Federal authorities (llerbein, et al., pp.1,4). Among the authorities that might assist in responding to art emergency are the State and local (Dauphin County) civil defense organizations, the Pennsylvania Bureau of Radio-ING logical llealth (BRil), the State Police, local fire departments, and the NRC Brookhaven Assistance Group (id., pp. 3-4,10). The record includes agree-f:r every operating license ments between the applicants and various outside organizations spelling out
.ith emergencies." 10 CFR the responsibilities the organizations would assume, t:ils cf these plans and the Stated in an extremely simplified way, the sequence of activities follow.
ist tt least describe certain ing an accident or incident, or other cause of radioactive release, would be lemonstrate that the plans as follows. The occurrence of the event would be detected, and its severity measures can and will be assessed, by means of instruments located onsite and monitored in the ublic health and safety and control room (and confirmed and augmented by portable equipment)(see 50, Appendix E. Part til Herbein, et al., p. 5; also, LBP 77-70,6 NRC at 1201-02). Thereupon, the applicants would notify first the State Council of Civil Defense duty officer ars in Section 13.3 of the (who is available at all times) and then (as necessary) the State Police, a I
litional descriptive material nearby medical centst, and NRC (Herbein, et al., p.10; Tr. 792). In the event of the most serious type of incident, the occurrence would become
>f the applicants' witnesses i
557) rnd by two witnesses known in seconds, and the duty officer would be notified within < rhes nia (fol. Tr. 801). The staff
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(FIT 606). 't hat officer in turn would notify the county civil detense orga-n Report (SER, sl3.3) and nization (ibid.), which is also manned without interruption (Molloy, pre.
3estimony, fol. Tr.1701).
pared testimony, fol. Tr. 801, p. 3), and the BRH duty officer. BRil would lation will be self sufficient confirm the notification by recontacting the applicants (Tr. 1611, 1745, tside agencies will be called 1827A).
nts tre to be responsible for l
The information provided by the applicants to the State and local orga-h cr event gising rise to an nizations would vary depending upon the nature of the event in question
@here possible); assessing (Tr. 767-68); in all instances, however, it would include such data as might be available to assist in determining whether (and in what area) evacuation was called for. The applicants would also make a recommendation as to resord has disclosed no other error evacuation (Tr. 1606-07), but the State would make the final determina-tion, based upon the advice of BRH (Herbein, et al., pp. 3-4; Tr.1363-64, is concerned. the Commission has ks c f ihn type. Nuc/ car Rerulatory 148182,1625,1654-57). The Dauphin County Civil Defense organization, hmon Proceeding 4. CLI-76-23. 4 acting through local fire and police deoartments and local civil defense per-Frse, bound by that ruling. Detrost sonnel, would carry out the evacuation.
f 31. At.AB 376. 5 NRC 426. 428 The Environmental Protection Agency has' promulgated guidelines which would call for protective action to avoid doses to individuals in excess ried sa the resutaiions pertain io.
of 5 rem whole body of 25 rem to the thyroid." The applicants' evidence rce oiih emergencies communica-anonmrormed of maners bear.n8 indicated that, assuming the occurrence of the maximum hypothetical acci-dent postulated under 10 CFR Part 100, nondispersive atmospheric condi-magniiude er radioactne releases:
oIdete tions, and the transport of radioactive material in the direction of the c:
n :t of operrtions'.10 CFR Part So.
HHerbein, et al., p. 9.
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l greatest number of people near the site (i.e., north, toward 51iddletown,
- J Pennsylvania), those dose lev
- Is would not be exceeded (1) within 45 min-1 i utes of the time of the event at a distance of I mile from the site; (2) within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> at a distance of 2 miles from the site (on the fringe of the more densely populated areas of hiiddletown); (3) within 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> in the center j
of hiiddletown; and (4) at any time beyond 4.8 miles from the site (Herbein, i
et al., pp. 8,9). The Director of the Dauphin County civil defense organi-l zation (Kevin J. 51olloy) testified that, in these circumstances, no more than
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15,000-18,000 persons would have to be evacuated (hfolloy, supra, p. 7; j
Tr.1409,1447-48,1452). He concluded that "we could effect and complete j
an evacuation of this type within the period allotted us"-l.c. less than 1 j
hour for persons located closest to the island,1:ss than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> for those on 4
the edge of the more densely populated areas of hiiddletown, less than 5 1
hours for those in the center of hiiddletown, and "a couple more hours" 1
out to 5 miles (N1olloy, pp.10,6; Tr.1411). The staff determined that the Y
organization and procedures proposed were adequate and that the appli-j cants' plan satisfied applicable requirements (Van Niel, pp. 4-5). The Licen-a I
sing Board agreed, finding the emergency and evacuation plans to be "both i
adequate and workable." 6 NRC at 1206.
]
B. With this background in mind, we turn to the particular criticisms 3 j leveled against the emergency plan by the intervenors. Both before the l' j Licensing Board and on appeal, the intersenors have asserted that the plan is " inadequate and unworkable" for several discrete reasons-vi::
3 The plans were based upon the unproven and questionable assumptions p
that all necessary officials will be available at all times, will know how to yl respond and will react promptly, and that members of the public will respond to a radiological emergency and allow themselves to be evac-J uated....
d )
Brief on appeal, p. 8. They additionally have advanced two legal claims:
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that the Board improperly limited the scope of their cross-examination, and J
that the plan is inconsistent with the Price-Anderson Act. We will treat I
, j these matters seriatim.
j
- 1. Central to the intervenors' challenge to the ade'quacy of the evacua-a tion pla 1 is their expressed belief that " live tests and drills" are essential.
J They reason that radiological emergencies are different from other emer-gencies and that the effectiveness of the plan can be ascertained on;y a
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through tests involving the potential evacuees.
The evidence, however, is to the contrary. Witnesses for the Common-1j wealth expressly discounted the need for or desirability of live drills. The Director of Civil Defense for Dauphin County questioned whether such j
drills would be meaningful and whether most people would participate; in-
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l erth, toward Middletown, deed, he suggested that they might prove counterproductive inasmuch as a h exceeded (1) within 45 min, real emergency was not likely to conform to a test situation and an ap-I mile from the site; (2) within propriate response to one might not be an appropriate response to the other (Molloy, p.13: Tr.1463). On the basis of a Stanford Research Institute te (on the fringe of the more I within 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> in the center study, substantiated by his personal knowledge of two events in Penn-B miles from the site (Herbein, sylvania, the Deputy Director of the State Council on Civil Defense ex-h County civil defense organi.
pressed a similar view (Williamson, prepared testimony, fol. Tr. 501, p.10).
' circumstances, no more than He specifically pointed to (1) a planned extensive public evacuation exercise e
in Erie, Pennsylvania, in which actual public participation had been icuated (Molloy, supra, p. 7;
" minimal" and (2) the successful evacuation within approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> i
we could effect and complete of more than 100,000 people from Wilkes-Barre in the wake of Hurricane allotted us"-i.e. less than 1 less than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> for those on Agnes (ibid.). To the same effect, see also Tr. 1463,1468-69 (Molloy); Tr.
j is cf Middletown, less than 5 1642-43 (applicants' witness); Tr. 1829-32,1938-42 (staff witness); but ef.
, cnd "a couple more hours" Tr.1835 (recognizing "some diversity of opinion" in this area). According-Rhe staff determined that the ly, the Licensing Board's rejection of the intervenors' thesis regarding live tdequate and that the appli, drills (6 NRC at 1206) is well-founded in the record.'2 Vtn Niel, pp. 4-5). The Licen-Closely tied to the intervenors' claim regarding the need for live drills is I evtcuation plans to be "both their assertion below that a predicate to a successful emergency plan is knowledge on the part of those who would be evacuated of the nature and rn to the particular criticisms consequences of radiological events.35 As in the case of live drills, however, intervenors. Both before the the record firmly establishes that such knowledge is not tvecesory Indeed, a
>rs have asserted that the plan staff witness who had participated in the review of the emergenty plan testi-iscrete reasons-vi::
fled, on the basis of his more than 5 years' experience in emergency plan-and questionable assumptions ning, that "the general population reacts more readily, fears more readily 1 at all times, will know how to things which it knows nothing about" (Tr.1852); and that, when con-it members of the public will fronted with such an event, a person " generally responds to people who tell tilow themselves to be evac.
him what to do to protect his health.... It is the fear of the unkown that makes [ people] act"(ibid.).
- 2. Although discounting the need fer live drills involving the public, the
'e advanced two legal claims:
witnesses for the Commonwealth, the applicants, and the staff all ac-f their cross-examination, and knowledged the desirability of drills for personnel assigned responsibilities Anderson Act. We will treat under the emergency plan." The plan provides for such drills by applicants'
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> the adequacy of the evacua-82We note that about a year ago the Commission denied a rulemaking request which sought letts and drills" are essential, a general requirement for licensees to conduct an " actual evacuation drill" as a precondition
'e different from other emer-for obtaining a license. 42 Fed. Reg. 36326 (July 14.1977).
8 The assertion does not appear to hase been directly adsanced on the intervenors' appeal.
'Ian Can be ascertained only "An emergency plan must include, inter alia. "IpJrovisions for tesi.4. by periodic drills, of radiation emergency plans to assure that employees of the licensee are familiar with their speci-
. %,itnesses for the Common-fic duties, and provisions for participation in the drills by other persons w hose assistance may desirability of live drilh. The be needed in the event of a radiation emergency." 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix E. Part IV.I.
- ty questioned whether such signiricantly, the appendix lacks any requirement or suggestion that live drills involving the peopic would participate; in-Public be included in an emergency plan.
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l personnel and others charged with responsibilities under the plan. See i
FSAR, App.13A, $13A.10; Herbein, et al., pp. Il-12; hiolloy, p.12, and Tr.1457; Williamson, pp. 9 10; Van Niel, p. 4 and Tr.1829-30.
i The intervenors' only challenge to these provisions (aside from the I
failure to involve the general public, as discussed above) appears to rest on j ':
their assumption that the drills are announced in advance and hence are not
" random." This assumption is not justified. It is founded wholly on the
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acknowledgement by an applicants' witness that some drills are scheduled 2
and the participants so advised (Tr. 786-88, 793). But the same witness l
indicated that such notice is given for only one-third to one-half of the drills j
(Tr. 793)(see also Tr.1079).
- )
It bears noting that the provision for drills for Unit 2 parallels the
.1 requirement in effect under the emergency plan for Unit 1 (Tr.1655). A j ;
staff witness testified, witho.it contradiction, that he had observed two full-scale drills at Unit I and "in my opinion the drills [were] probably some of 4
the best drills that I have seen conducted, wider in scope than I have seen in 3) other areas, and the emergency planning as a whole has proven to me, or 5
has been shown to me as being much more than adequate" (Tr.1856).
j i
- 3. The intervenors challenge the adequacy of the training program for l {
persons who will carry out an emergency plan." Specifically, they claim that
- t the plan can be effective only if those persons have expert knowledge of the j
effects of radioactivity. But they point to no evidentiary foundation for that l
proposition.86 Indeed, all the testimony on this subject contradicts the inter-1 f venors' conclusion. Str. hiolloy emphasi.:ed that he is able to fulfill his 5
evacuation responsibilities effectively without specialized knowledge of radiation. He maintained that his evacuation personnel are adequately 7
- j assistance available to assist them-primarily from BRH and the applicants trained to carry out their responsibilities and, additionally, have expert f
1: l (hlolloy, p. 5). Further, one of his staff members is a radiological defense
{
officer (Tr. 1356-58,1361) and several hundred persons in Dauphin County a
have been trained in radiological monitoring and are available to assist in
..]
an emergency, in most instances as volunteer firefighters (Tr. 1359-60). Ap-q proximately 50 percent of those who might aid in an evacuation have either j
I' H
]
An emergency plan must include "lpirovisions for training of employees of the licensee 5
who are assigned specific authority and responsibility in the event of an emergency and of 1
other persons w hose assistance may be needed in the event of a radiation emergency." 10 CFR Part 50. Appendit E. Part IV.ll.
f
In support of the proposition, they rely solely upon Str. Stolloy's admissions that his only lj special knowledge of radiation (or of the consequences of radiation) is derived from a week.
long seminar on emergency planning for nuclear facilities (Tr. 1355 56. 813-14. 837; see also j
(
Tr.1567). Plainly, that evidence provides no basis whatsoever for the point intervenors are attempting to make.
1
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taken Pennsylvania's radiological monitoring course (as Mr. Molloy did)
(bilities under the plan. See or had other radiological training (Tr. 1449-50).
fcn.11 12; Molloy, p.12, and p
d Tr.1829-30.
Even more important, Mr. Molloy insisted that those responsible for an provisions (aside from the evacuation would not need " detailed knowledge" of the event compe!!ing sed above) appears to rest on that action (Molloy, p. 6). Rather, useful knowledge would be strictly in advance and hence are not limited and of a different genre:
' It is founded wholly on the What we need to know is generally the nature of the problem, secondly
[htt some drills are scheduled what segment of the public will be or could be affected, and what ac-
[ 793). But the same witness tion on our part is recommended. With this information, our organiza-L-third to one-half of the drills tional structuie and communications capabilities allow us to respond very quickly, calling upon and coordinating whatever groups or agencies tills for Unit 2 parallels t:
the situation dictates.
plan for Unit I (Tr.1655). A that he had observed two full-Ibid.; see also Tr.1363. To the same effect, see Tr. 1686-87 (applicants'
' rills [were] probably some of witness). Mr. Molloy expressed confidence that his organization had (or d
ler in scope than I have seen in would have available to it) adequate knowledge of this sort (Molloy, pp.
L whole has proven to me, or 5-6,10-11; Tr.1370-73,1722-24).
h tdequate"(Tr.1856).
On this score, the staff testimony went even further. It pointed to an q
y cf the training program for Environmental Protection Agency study (EPA-520/6-74-002, June 1974)
" Specifically, they claim that analyzing some 500 events-including floods, fires, hurricanes, explosions,
,have expert knowledge of the and release of toxic substances-that had prompted evacuation. The study videntiary foundation for that had found no statistically significant difference in the effectiveness of 3 subject contradicts the inter-evaucation with an emergency plan and without such a plan. A staff witness I that he is able to fuifill his opined that the study was relevant "because it talks about the movement of
,6 put specialized knowledge of people. The reason for the movement, I think, is of secondary importance" ior personnel are adequately (Tr.1828). He added that the staff nonetheless believes it prudent that there nd, additionally, have expert be " proper training and planning on the part of the officials responsible for from BRil and the applicants evacuation" (Tr.1833). Another staff witness attributed the emer:,ency nbers is a radiological defense plan requirement to the Commission's concept of " defense in d pth" Tr.
ed persons in Dauphin County 1834).
I and are avaitaale to assist in Finally, Mr. Molloy pointed to the wide variety of emergency situa-firefighters (Tr. 1359-60). Ap-tions in which his orgapization had successfully carried out evacuations id in an evacuation have either (Molloy, p. I1). He specifically mentioned Goods, a plane crash, a passen-ger bus accident, a train derailment (ibid.), and natural gas seepage (Tr.
1361-62). And he unequivocally stated that his actions did not depend on training of employees of the licensee m ihe esent or an emergency and or detailed knowledge of these matters (Tr.1362).
i ct a rraiation emergeney." 10 CF R Given this evidentiary record, the Licensing Board's conclusion that the 3r. MoHoy's admissions that his only techm. cal trammg in radiolog.ical matters (6 NRC at 1206).is mamfestly
- t radiaiioni n deri,ed from a week-correct.
.es (Tr.1355 56. 81314. 837; see also
~
alweser for the pomt int rvenore are Usee n.16. supra.
19 s
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4
- 4. The intervenors' remaining factual challenge to the Licensing Board's evacuation determination is somewhat vague and diffuse; we understand 1
i it, however, tr question the " availability at all times" of " officials" charged with evacuation responsibilities. Although their brief on appeal does not specifically identify the " officials" intervenors have in mind, it seems probable that the intended reference was either to State (or local) i civil defense or to radiological health personnel,
- a. No evidence of record casts doubt upon the testimony that the
]
State civil defense duty officer is available continuously and that Dauphin County civil defense headquarters is likewise always staffed (Herbein, et al., p.10; hiolloy, p. 3; Van Niel, p. 2). Aloreover, in every test of the 9
communications system, whether announced or random, the State or 1 I county official sought to be reached was available (Tr. 792-94).
i l
- b. Insofar as BRH personnel are concerned, we have seen that those i j individuals serve as radiological advisers to State and local civil defense
', j personnel and, under the evacuation plan, would advise as to the appro-l priateness of evacuation in a given situation (see pp.15,18, supra). BRH j
also engages in offsite monitoring following an accident (Tr. 1075-76, 1668-J !
69). Further, both 51r. Herbein (the applicants' witness) (Tr. 1607, 1625)
)
and h1r. N;olloy (Tr. 1363-64) indicated that the receipt of advice from a 1
knowledgeable source (such as BRH) was perhaps the most significant j
clement in determining whether evacuation should occur (as well as the area l !
involved).
j f At the hearing below, the intervenors questioned whether budgetary 1
curtailments would make BRH unavailable for or incapable of performing
{
its assigned functions. Their inquiry was founded on a public announce-ment of the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (BRH's parent organization), dated Ntay 13,1977. *a the effect that a budget cut J
for the 1977-78 fiscal year approud '.,y the Pennsylvania Seante would l
result in a drastic curtailment of that department's services, including, inter i
all.2, a reduction in the " radiologic health environmental monitoring pro-g gram and emergency response capability" (Bd. Exh.1, Tr.1081-82).
But the record contains mcre than enough to support the conclusion 1
that others could fulfill BRH's responsibilities under the emergency plan.
The applicants indicated that, if necessary, they would notify NRC and
'1 make specific recommendations to achieve a substitution for BRH's capa-bilities (Tr. 1570-71). And there are clear indications that State and local 4
civil defense officials are willing to rely upon advice provided by the appli-q cants or NRC, either in conjunction with that of BRH or indepdent of it 4
(Tr. 1363 -64, 1368, 1499-1500, 1541, 1720-21, 2467, 2529-32). Beyond that, J
the staff stated that it would require resort to one or more of a number of available means to fill the " void in the overall emergency preparedness" f
1 I
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Ilenge; to the Licensing Board's created by any inability of BRil to provide expected services (Tr. 1780-82; e znd diffuse; we understand 174f,-49). Still further, the staf f pointed out that it will keep track of the et all times" of " officials" Commonwealth's continuing ability to fulfill its assigned responsibilities Ithough their brief on appeal (Tr.1078-79,1087,1746). Notwithstanding the intervenors' claim to the intervenors have in mind, it contrary, the record amply supports the conclusion that others could take 3
cas eithrr to State (or local) over the functions assigned BRil in the emergency plan withcut the public safety being compromised.
gj, It upon the testimony that the
- c. In their appellate brief, the intervenors attempted to augment their hntinuously and that Dauphin Position on BRil's potentiallack of capability by referring to a statement 6ise always staffed (lierbein, made by the BRil Director at an EPA workshop (November 30-December lloreover, in every test of the I,1976). The statement analyzed the BRil experience in monitoring radio-
- cd or random, the State or active fallout from Chinese nuclear tests conducted in October 1976; and lable (Tr. 792-94).
although indicating that BRil generally reacted satisfactorily to demands rned, we have seen that those made upon it in the " fallout crisis," expressed serious doubt that it "would /
State and local civil defense have been able to have responded as well" had there been a nuclear reactor accident.
would advise as to the appro-i (see pp.15,18, supra). BRi{
That statement appeared in a draft EPA report which was not in the cn accident (Tr. 1075-76, 1668 record before the Licensing Board. At oral argument, therefore, we advised ants' witness) (Tr. 1607, 1625) the intervenors' representative that we could consider it only if he moved to it the receipt of adsice from a reopen the record to include it. Somew hat belatedly, he did so." In ALAB-perhaps the most significant 474,7 NRC 746,748 (Niay 5,1978), we decided to hold the motion in hould occur (as well as the area abeyance pending our review of the record on emergency planning and then to determine it on the merits (despite its tardiness) because it addressed an questioned whether budcetary important safety question.
for cr incapab!c of performing We recently have had occasion to reiterate the standards for reopening a
)unded on a public announce.
record. Kansas Gas & Electric Company (Wolf Creek Generating Station, sironmental Resources (BRil's Unit No.1), ALAB-462, 7 NRC 320, 339 (March 7,1978). As we there to the effect that a budget cut stressed, the proponent of a motion to reopen bears a heavy burden. The se Pennsylvania Seante would motion normally aust be timely presented and addressed to a significant is-nent's services, including, inter sue. Moreover, if an initial decision has already been rendered on the issue,
- nsironmental monitoring pro.
it must appear that reopening the proceeding might alter the result in some
'd. Exh.1 Tr.1081-82).
material respect. In the case of a motion which is untimely without good ugh to support the conclusion cause, the movant has an even greater burden; he must demonstrate not ties under the emergency plan.
merely that the issue is significant but, as well, that the matter is of such they would notify NRC and gravity that the public interest demands its further exploration. See a substitution for BRil's capa-ndications that State and local n adsice provided by the appli.
"These means include the expansion of the applicants' capabiliti s. replacement of BRH by ancther State agency, developmc.:' of an " interagency cadre" t a handle the BRH func-hat cf BRil or indepdent of it 1, 2467, 2529 32). Bcyond that, fon $,
tacne or more of a number of "At our request, the applicants, by letter dated Narch 24,19'8, supplied us with a copy crall emergency preparedness" of thedraft report.
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Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power I
Station), ALAB-138,6 AEC 520,523 (1973); id., ALAB-167,6 AEC 1151-l 52 (1973). These criteria govern each issue to be reopened; the fortuitous g
circumstance that a proceeding has been or will be reopened on other issues has no significance. See Georeia Power Company (Alvin W. Vogtle Nuclear i)
Plant, Units I and 2), ALAB-291,2 NRC 404,413-14 (1975).
Plainly, intervenors' motion does not satisfy the above criteria for re-i opening.2* Review of the statement and analysis of the issue demonstrate j
2 !
that the BRH Director raised only one matter relevant here: whether the
) !
b'ireau could fulfill its responsibilities for postaccident monitoring under j
the emergency plan. The statement does appear to question BRH's existing C
ability to conduct widespread environmental sampling and long-term
} l laboratory analyses of such samples-activities incident to, but not directly involved with, emergency evacuation procedures. As we have seen, how-2 I ever, the question of BRH capability to respond to an emergency has al-j l ready been fully litigated, in the context of the budgetary constraints which I
f
! l BRH might face. And we have also determined on this record that BRH participation is not essential to a successful emergency evacuation, since t
] :
the applicants and NRC could fulfill the responsibilities assigned under the$
J plan to BRH. That bemg so, teopening the record could not change the i
]
result previously reached and hence is not warranted.:'
I r !
- 5. The intervenors claim that the Licensing Board improperly limited r
d ;
Mhere is some question whether the intersenors' failure to raise the issue sugge ted to them f ;
- j by the December 1976 statement earlier than January 1978, when they filed the brief which i
first mentioned it, should preclude them from raising it now. The draft report is undated and Y)I it is unclear precisely when it was issued. An affidasit of the BRH Director states that he l
received it "carly in 1977" (Gerusky, af fidavit dated April 26,1978, par. 3). Interevenors claim 3 I they were not aw are of i; until January 1978. But that, esen if true, does not settle the matter.
k l Pennsylvania w as participating in this proceeding as an "interes:ed State"(see 10 CFR 2.715 4 l (c)). During the hearmg below in April 1977, intersenors requested that a BRH witness appear 6
and testify as to that organization's capabilities (Tr. 888). After the Commonwealth interposed an objection to that request. the intersenors withdrew it (Tr. 891). Even if the intervenors wcre j
not aware at that time of the December I,1976, statement of the BRH Director, had they per-1 sisted in their attempt to examine a BRH witness on BRH's capabih ies and had their request to
/j do so been granted, any present or projected weaknesses in those capabilities could have been brought to light by thorough questioning.
2tThere appears to be no esidentiary support whatsoever for other assertions made by the intervenors in their motion to reopen, to the effect that the Director of BRH had suggested in an otherwise unidentified public statement that he and members of his staff would not be on t
24-hour call to respond to an emergency, and that the Director had stated in another unidenti-d fied statement that BRH had sutfered a ma power loss "since the date of the EPA docu.
I merit." The Director by affidavit has explicitly denied making any such statements and has confirmed that BRH is in fact on 24-hour call. Geruskyl affidavit dated April 26,1978, pars. 4, 4
5.
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l their cross-examination with respect to the size of the area to be considered i
pont Yankee Nuclear Power for evacuation in the emergency plan. They insist that they should have M, ALAB-167,6 AEC 1151-been allowed to explore the feasibility of evacuation of areas beyond 5 miles be reopened; the fortuitous from the reactor, I be reopened on other issues Intervenors' position is directly contrary to New England Power sny (Alvin W. Vogtle Nuclear Company (NEP, Units I and 2), et al., ALAB-390,5 NRC 733 (1977). We i413-14 (1975).
there determined that existing Commission regulations do not require con-r;sfy the above criteria for re-sideration in a licensing proceeding of "the feasibility of devising an emer-gsis of the issue demonstrate gency plan for the protection (in the event of an accident) of persons s relevant here: whether the located outside of the low population zone." 5 NRC at 747. The LPZ for
%staccident monitoring under this facility extends 2 miles out from the reactor (SER, $2.1.3). It is true Lar to question BRil's existing that, for reasons which need not be discussed here, the applicants and the ital sampling and long-term staff nevertheless looked into the possible need for protective measures les incident to, but not directly within a 5-mile radius of the reactor-and the int:rvenors were permitted to dures. As we have seen, how-cross-examine on the evidence presented in this regard. It scarcely follows from this fact, however, that the question of emergency planning at still lpond to an emergency has al-l he budgetary constraints which
{
greater distances from the LPZ boundary had to be explored at the Inter-ined on ibis record that BRi{ -
f vernors' instance, 1 cmergency evacuation, since Intervenors further argue: "The prejudice to the public interest by this ponsibilities assigned under the restriction of inquiry to evacuation of the areas in the immediate vicinity of
' record could not change the TMi-2 is compounded because the record had already shown that a Class 9 e
3 ranted.:'
accident at TMI-2 could occur by the crashing of a large aircraft into the sing Board improperly limited TMI-2 plant." The likelihood of such a crash is discussed in Part 11 of this opinion and in Mr. Sharfman's dissent. It suffices for our purposes here to 11re to raise the inue suggested to them recall that the rquirements for evacuation planning are rooted m 10 CFR 1978, when they filed the brief which Part 100,:2 and that Part 100 assumes releases of radiation based upon a lt now. The draft report is u idated and hypothetical major accident "that would result in potential hazards not ex-mit cf the BRH Director states that he ceeded by those from any accident considered credible."n Thus, what acci-rril 26.1978. par. 3). Interes enors claim dents might conceivably occur at the particular plant in question is irrele-rsen if true. does not settle the matter.
vant to planning for emergency evacuation; that is based solety on the Part 100 hypothetical accident and the assumed releases of radioactivity resulting t
e that R wi n ss ap e r 4). After the Commonwealth mterposed therefrom.
b IT r. 891). Even if the intersenors mere
- 6. Intervenors' claim that the emergency plan somehow runs afoul of the merits little discussion." Jt appears to rest on the nent cf the BRH Director, had they per.
price-Anderson Act:
4 Ul's capabihties and had their request to acs in those ctpabihties could hase been 22NEP, supra.
Footnote I to 10 CFR 100.ll(a).
23 mer for other auertions made by the The pravisions of the Price-Anderson Act are contained in Section 17o of the Atom 24 at the Director of BRH had suggested in Energy Ar, as amended,42 U.S.C. 22io. Their constitutionality recently was upheld by the id members of his statI would not be on Sup..me Court. Duke Power Company v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, D' stor had stated in another unidenti-46 U.S.LW. 445 (June 26,1978),
m since the date of the EPA docu-y at 2sThe applicants correctly point out that the Price-Anderson question was not explici rd making any such statements and has encompassed by the intervenors' contentions. The staff goes on to assert that the que (Contmued on next page.)
- 4. afGdaut dated April 26.1978, pars. 4,
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l thesis that the applicants will be the sole source of radiologicalinformation in the event of an accident; that, as a result of Section 190 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2240, such information "cannot be used as evidence against the applicant in court"; and, hence, that the vesting of emergency plan responsibilities in the applicants (particularly those related to monitoring) " denies victims of a nuc! car accident the op-portunity to introduce in court the only evidence likely to establish a claim i
under the Price Anderson Act." This line of reasoning is, however, defec.
l tive in several respects.
- j In the first place, intervenors' factual premise that applicants are the j
sole source of radiological information is plainly incorrect. Postaccident
-jj monitoring is the responsibility not only of the applicants but also of State
[ j agencies (primarily BRH), the Department of Energy, the NRC, and others
/
~,1l (Tr. 1093-94, 1578-81, 1613-14, 1668-70, 1678, 1742-43, 1767, 1805-06).
Even if BRH shodd be unable to fulfillits monitoring responsibilities, other 4
agencies (both Federal and State)would take up the slack. See p. 20 21, I,
supra.
l More important, the intervenors' legal premise is far wide of the mark.
.l Section 190 of the Atomic Energy Act provides that
.i No report by any licensee of any incident arising out of or in connection l
with a licensed activity made pursuant to any requirement of the Com-d !
mission shall be admitted as evidence in any suit or action for damages
} l growing out of any m tter mentioned in such report.
i j The " action for damages" which intervenors have in mind is one arising
- q q under the provisions of Price-Anderson (i.e., Section 170 of the Act (see fn.
z j 24, supra.)) Under those provisions, the licensees waive, inter alia, "any issue or defense as to conduct of the claimant or fault of persons indem-N i nified" Bection 170n. (1) (c) (i), 42 U.S.C. 2210 (n) (1) (c) (i); 10 CFR 140.2(c)). With limited exceptions not relevant here, a claimant would have
- }
to prove only causation and the severity of any injury in order to recover
/
damages. The availability of the licensees' monitoring reports would be of
[
little consequence because the Commission itself is required to make a l
a public report on the incident (presumably to be based in part on informa-tion supplied by the licensees)(Section 170i,42 U.S.C. 2210(i).
d (Continu.dfrom previous page.)
"was nr a raised otherwise below" and asks that we dismiss the exception on this issue for that l
in making this argument. which we reject. the staff has apparently overlooked the reason
/
inters :nors' unsuccessful attempt to include the Price-Anderson matter in their cross-examina.
1 tion in evacuation (Tr. 1782-83,2$0512) and their filing of a proposed " finding" (par. 65) j and
- conclusion"(par. 94) on the subject (Intervenors' Proposed Findings of Fact and Con.
clu?.ons of Law, dated August 15,1977).
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Further, the use limitations in Section 190 are strictly limited to partic-rce of radiologicalinformation ular reports submitted to the Commission and (as the applicants concede)
- ef Section 190 of the Atomic would restrict neither (1) an individual's rights informally to request or such information "cannot be formally to discover information and data possessed by the applicants (as court"; and, hence, that the licensecs) concerning the offsite consequences of an accident; nor (2) his y
On the applicants (particularly use of that information and data. In other words, while the use of the re-t s cf a nuclear accident the op-hence likely to establish a claim port itself may be circumscribed by Section 190, the use of the information J re;soning is, however, detec-and data undergirding the report is not.
v.
l premise that applicants are the 31 inly,mcorrect. Postaccident ahe applicants but also of State As a result of the facility's relative proximity to Harrisburg Interna-of Energy, the NRC, and others tional Airport (formerly Olmstead Air Force Base), a significant issue E678,1742 43,1767,1805-06).
throughout this licensing proceeding (as well as that for Unit 1) has been monitoring responsibilities, other whether the public is adequately protected against the hazards of a crash of ke up the slack. See p. 20-21, an airplane into the facility. The reactor's vital structures, power supplies, and cooling water sources (" safety structures") have been designed to premise is far wide of the mark.
withstand the aircraft impact and fire effects from the crash of a des that 200,000-pound plane traveling at 200 knots, the " design basis crash."2' The it erising out of or m. connection crash of an airplane heavier than 200,000 pounds into TMI-2 has been l o any requirement of the Com-calculated by the applicants and staff to have such a low probability that it t
s any suit or action for damages does not present a hazard to the public, and therefore the plant need not be such report.
designed to withstand its effects. Because the probability of an airplane crash is proportional to the level of aircraft traffic, the determination that ers have in mind is one arising the crash probability for heavy aircraft is acceptably low reflected both the r., Section 170 of the Act (see fn.
current level of heavy aircraft traffic at the airport and the projected licensees waive, inter alia, "any magnitude of such traffic in the future.
nant or fault of persons indem-The L, censing Board accepted this analysis (6 NRC et 1197-1200),
i
.C. 2210 (n) (1) (c) (i); 10 CFR despite the mtervenors' challenges to the crash probability assessments of vant here, a claimant would have the appheants and the staff. The intervenors appeal from the Board's deter-
>f rny injury in order to recover nunation.
' monitoring reports would be of A. To give proper perspective to the claims of the parties on this matter.
it is useful to look first at the Commission's methodology for determining
.on itself is required to make a to be based.n part on informa-whether there is reasonable assurance that the public will not be exposed to i,42 U.S.C. 2210(i).
undue hazard as a result of an airplane crash into a nuclear facility. Most facilities are not required to be specially designed to withstand such crashes, i
lbsmiss the exception on this issue for that 26SER, Three Mile Island, Unit I, dated July 11,1973, at pp. 3 4, 3 5; incorporated by
, the stirf has apparently oserlooked the reference into SER for Unit 2. at p. 2-8. " Design basis" is defined in 10 CFR 50.2(u) as"that e Anderson matter in their cross-examina-Information which identifies the specific functions to be performed by a structure. system. or
' Ihs cf a proposed " finding" (par. 65) component of a facility, and the specific values or ranges of values chosen for controlling Ws* Propowd Findings of Fact and Con-parameters as reference bounds for design."
25
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