ML19308C001

Decision Allowing TMI-2 CP to Be Continued.Authorizes Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation,Subj to Certain Technical Conditions, to Make Addl Findings on Contested Issues Necessary for OL Issuance

ML19308C001
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	12/19/1977
From:	Linenberger G, Luton E, Salo E Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
To:
Shared Package
ML19308B978	List: ML19308B977 ML19308B992 ML19308C001 ML19308C009 ML19308C013
References
TASK-TF, TASK-TMR LBP-77-70, NUDOCS 8001170742
Download: ML19308C001 (9)

Text

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in cur Order, PGE was once Cite as 6 NRC 1185 (1977)

LBP-77-70 eliminary work prior to our l

, even though the intervenors UNITED STATES OF AMERICA visited the spent fuel pool, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION to us nor factually asserted ites NEPA or has resulted in ATOMIC SAFETY AND' LICENSING BOARD ublic health and safety.

Edward Luton, Chairman prmance of this preparatory Ernest O. Salo t again, despite their visit to Gustavo A. Unenberger ive discovery, they hase not j

technical specifications have in the Matter of Docket No. 50-320 nied.

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY y 10 CFR {2.718(i), we deny JERSEY CENTRAL POWER &

6ue to the Appeal Board.

LIGHT COMPANY PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY l

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's Objections To Prehearing (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, r Certifications.

Unit No. 2)

December 19,1977 a sign the instant Memoran-Upon emironmental review pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix D, Section C, and upon request for operating license, the Licensing Board (1) l concludes that the construction permit for Three Mile Island, Unit 2, should be continued; and (2) subject to certain technical conditions, LTOMIC SAFETY AND authorizes the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to make such addi-ISING BOARD tional findings on uncontested issues as may be necessary for issuance of a full-term operating license.

ick J. Shon, Member TECIINICAL ISSUES DISCUSSED: Environmental impact of thermal releases; biological surveys; cooling tower design: safety standards; capacity n J. Wolfe, Esquire factor; aircraft crash risk; radioa'etivity monitoring program; flood protec-lan tion; emergency plans; gaseous rad waste treatment system; chlorin'e dis-charge; dose calcul.itions; effect of cooling towers; need for power; Table S-3 (Rn-222 releases); water pollution control; compliance with Federal and state provisions.

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INITIAL DECISION Appearances George W. Trowbridge, Esq., and Ernest L Blake Es4, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge,. for the Applicants l

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/Chauncey R. Kopford, for Joint Intervenors York i

Committee for a Safe Environment and Citizens for a-3 Safe Environment

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t Karin W. Carter, Esq., for the Commonwealth of Penn-sylvania

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Henry J. McGurren Esq., and Gregory H. Fess, Esq.',

pl for the NRC Regulatory Staff S

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I.-INTRODUCTION

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1. This is a proceeding on the applica: ion of Metropolitan Edison Com-y pany, the Jersey Central Power and Light Company, and the Pennsylvania y

Electric Company (" Applicants") for licenses to construct and operate the i

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2 ("TM1-2"). The plant is j

located adjacent to a similar unit (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit

j No.1) on Three Mile Island in~ the Susquehanna River in Londonderry f

Township, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania.

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2. Construction of TMI-2 was authorized on November 4,1969. By ap-J plication dated April 4,1974, Applicants rt uested auth'ofintion pursuant 4

to Section 104.b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to possess, use, and operate TM1-2, a pressurized water nuclear reactor, at a steady state power level of 2,772 megawatts thermal. On May 20,1974, the Commission 4

issued a notice which provided that any person whose interest might be af-7 fected by the proceeding could file a request for a public hearing in the form

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' of a petition to intervene in accordance with the Commission's regulations fg h contained at 10 CFR 62.714. Petitions to intervene were received from the

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w Citizens for a Safe Environment and the York Committee for a Safe En V h

vironment (as " joint petitioners"), and from M'rs. Barbara Pradel of i,' Greencastle, Pennsylvania. Additionally, the Commonwealth of Penn-C 1

sylvania requested leave to participate as an interested State pursuant to 10 f

CFR 92.715(c). On July 24,1974, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 9

designated to rule on intervention requests granted the joint petitioners' re-t quest to intervene, granted the Commonwealth's request to participate, and N

l denied the intervention petition of Mrs. Barbara Pradel.'

3. This Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (" Board" has conducted a l

public evidentiary hearing to consider (1) issuance or denial of a full-term operating license for TMI-2 or its appropriate conditioning to protect en-MY" a petition to in5r%\\C j

'On August 15. 1974, vene was filed by Gertrude and Frederick Hellrich. et al. Intervention was granted by the Board but thereafter, on August 20,1976,

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these intervenors withdrew f rom the proceeding.

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the Applicants and the Staff Contention 6 cf an accident caused by a i

liding with the facility (Tr.

The environmental radioactivity monitoring program of the Applicants 3

aten notion dated April 15, is inadequate to accurately measure the dose delivered to the public I

brd compel the Applicants to during normal and accident conditions. Only active, real-time detectors senied that motion orally at can determine what the actual dose rate is. Furtliermore, an array of 249). On August 8,1977, we offsite detectors could greatly aid in possib'e evacuation plans. No there took the position that operating license should be granted until the Applicants provide a net-

. Applicarts need not be con-work of active radiation monitors.

probable accident events (less s

icdhere to that view for the

51. The Board views this Contention as comprising two allegations:

(a) The actual radiation dose received by the public during normal and vy tircraft operations (Item accident conditions can be properly measured only if offsite, real-

'ts have established that for time detectors are deployed.

sr greater) aircraft used the (b) The implementation of evacuation plans could be greatly aided by

)t patterns that could poten-the deployment of such detectors.

) corresponds to one to two l

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$ to six per day at the time of

52. Based upon a review of Applicants' present capabilities to monitor l Staff concluded that about and assess radioactive releases from TMI-2, as well as upon the advantages l risks to the health and safety and disadvantages of employing active real-time detectors, the Applicants b require that the Applicants and the NRC Staff are in agreement that the current monitoring capabilities bize of craft using the field.

of Applicants are adequate. They also agree that installation of the type of

' would warrant the Sta'f's real-time detectors currently commercially available would provide no bestimony of J. B. J. Rod, meaningful improvement over the existing system; indeed, certain disad-fcerning the options that the vantages were noted. For normal releases, the Applicants sample and Cal Staff testimony to the ef-analyze the release at its source prior to discharge, monitor the release at the irmation projects a 50% to time of discharge, and variously take continuous composite samples and period 1975 to 1990; conser-grab samples of releases. Through a wide variety of types of samples, of lsistent with the Staff's judg-types of detectors, and of locations. including thermoluminescent

.y of operations is needed to dosimeters, sampling of surface water, drinking water and rain water, col-

of larger than design basis lection of particulates and iodines, and collection and analysis of vegeta-jans of airspace in the site tion, soil, and agricultural products in the TMl site emirons, radiation levels 1 potentially be undertaken; and radioactivity around the plant site are measured to assist the Applicants ed if the crash probability in assessing the impact of releases, and to provide confirmation of the ef-fluent monitoring results done at the points of release.

tken of the current and an-

53. With respect to off-normal conditions that might justify the evacua-here will be an adequate op-tion of members of the public within the low population zone, testimony

' craft traffic well in advance was offered to the effect that the environmental monitoring program is not able risk. We find that such intended for use in formulating nor in implementing evacuation plans. With hiless occur, acceptable cor-respect to the ability of active, real-time detectors to aid in evacuation s ccceptable.

plans, such detectors would again be of little or no value. Instrumentation 1201

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used to determine the severity of an accident, and the need for any offsite

. j emergency action, i located on site and is monitored from the reactor con - -

l trol room. This instrumentation momtors area conditions and process k

variables such as the reactor coolant temperature and pressure and any ab-T normal release of radioactivity. In the event that accident conditions arose for which evacuation would be an effective protective measure, necessary fil measurements and corrective actions to mitigate the consequences, in-cluding notification of offsite emergency personnel, would be performed C k.J quickly, within 10-15 minutes of the incident. It would, therefore, be f

unlikely that any offsite active detectors would register any abnormal reading since no release from the containment would as yet have occurred.

f Only after some period of time (to allow the release and transport of radia-tion emitters) would the detectors be of any u'se, and even then they would add nothing to the information that the previously dispatched offsite survey b

teams would not already have gathered.

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54. In summary of this matter, the Board finds that the radiological ef-fluent and environmental monitoring programs as proposed by the Ap-3 plicants and approved by the Staff are adequate to measure and evaluate p

normal radioactive effluent releases anil to measure radioactivity in the d

plant environs; and that active, real time detectors would add nothing to the

}j present capability. We further find that the response or effectiveness of1 F

both in-plant instrumentation and offsite personnel in the event of an acci-y dent would not be aided or improved by such detectors (testimony of M

Porter, following Tr.1011; testimony of Osloond and Stoddart, following f

Tr.1060; testimony of Van Niel, following Tr.1060; testimony of Wayne 1

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ti Contention 7 f1 The flood protection system for Unit 2 is inadequate. This is because k

the flood data presented and the floods designed against are based on

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historical data w hich do not include the intentional efforts of man to ef-

.g fect weather modification. Suc h efforts at weather modification render 1

the historical data of questionable value. No operating license should h

be granted until the effects cf human efforts at weather modification r

are understood.

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55. The Applicants' witress Hosler is an expert in the field of

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meteorology and weather riodification (see biographical sketch and publications of C. L. Hosier, following Tr. 284). His testimony establishes that no weather modification efforts of man can conceivably be expected to 3

increase the precipitation rate during a hurricane or heavy storm episode, 5

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d the need for any offsite Lred from the reactor con.

nor to increase the flood threat to the TMI site. "The water is either ther conditions and process coming into the region or it isn't and nothing man can do is going to change J pressure and any ab-this" (Hosler testimony, following Tr. 481).

ccident conditions arose

56. The Staff's witnesses concurred in the above conclusion. They fur-tive measure, necessary ther explained the various elements of conservatism not only used to the consequences, in-estimate the probable maximum precipitation that might initiate a llood, 1, would be performed but also used to estimate the probable maximum flood that could result t would, therefore, be therefrom. The estimation methodology, a portion of which had been register any abnormal previously developed for TMI-1, was tested during the 1972 hurricane Id as yet have occurred.

"Agnes" flood and was found to overpredict the river stages that actually and transport of radia-occurred. In addition to this conservatism, four feet of freeboard protection d even then they would has been provided at TMI-2 to eliminate wave effects produced during a l sispatched offsite survey probable maximum flood by up to 40 mph winds blowing from the least l

desirable direction. Examination by the Board established that the reason that the radiological ef-the TMI site was flooded during the occurrence of Hurricane Agnes was proposed by the Ap-because certain protective levees had not been completed (Tr. 509).

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, measure and evaluate

57. From a review of the available evidence, we find that weather

re radioactivity in the modification does not represent a material threat with respect to the ade-fould add nothing to the quacy of the flood protection design at the TMI-2 facility, which design we se or effectiveness of find to be acceptable and conservative (testimony of Hosier, following Tr.

in the event of an acci-481; testimony of Johnson and Divins, followiig Tr. 508).

'etectors (testimony of Contention 8 d Stoddart, following testimony of Wayne The warning and evacuation plans of the Applicants and the Common-wealth of Pennsylvania are inadequate and unworkable. The plans as-sume that all local and state officials involved are on 24-hour notic j'

and can be contacted immediately. They further assume that all people

0uate. This is because notified will promptly react and know how to respond and are trained in against are based on what to do. They also assume that the public which has been assured efforts of man to ef-that accidents are " highly unlikely".or." highly improbable," will re-at modification render spond and allow themselves to be evacuated. No operating and evacua-brating license should tion plans are shown to be workable through live tests.

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, weather modification

58. The Applicants' prepared testimony described the pla'ns and pro-cedures which govern their actions in accident situations; described the pert in the field ol' equipment relied upon both for accident detection and evaluation and for praphical sketch and assured communications with qffsite authorities; and described pertinent

} testimony establishes portions of'their training program, including emergency drills (testimony of i

eivably be expected to J. G. Herbein, G. P. Miller, and R. W. Dubiel, following Tr. 757; heavy storm episode, testimony of Thomas Potter, following Tr.1556). The Joint Intervenors presented no prefiled testimony, but conducted extensive cross-I 1203 I

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Q examination and submitted proposed findings on this contention. This was l

<J the only contention for which the Commonwealth presented prepared L

testimony and submitted proposed findings, adopting as its own the Ap i plicants' proposed findings numbered 43 through 56.

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$9. The witnesses for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania were from the state and local civil defense organization. Their testimony described the civil R

defense organizational structure; the action plans that would be followed in the event of an emergency, including a nuclear power incident; and de-y scribed their experience in evacuation involving nonnuclear events 1

(testimony of K. J. Molloy and C. A. Williamson, following Tr. 801).

60. The Staff's testimony described the results of its review of the Ap f f

plicants' emergency response plans, including the ability to provide early warning to the public, to arrange for public evacuation, and to interface ap-sj propriately with the state (testimony of Q R_. Van N:el, following Tr.1701;

,,l testimony of Charles Gallina and Phil Stohr).

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61. We see no need to recite here-as do the proposed findings of the

%j Applicants, the Commonwealth, and the Staff-those uncontradicted, descriptive characteristics of tne Applicants' state of preparedness, nor that tj of the cooperating state and local agencies upon whom the success of the

4 cmergency plans depend. We find these to be adequate. We do address

?x those assumptions deemed by the latervenors to be necessary for the success of the emergency plans, and hence challenged by this contention, namely, ?

(a) that appropriate state and local officials are available to be contacted I

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any time they are needed;

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• a (b)that such personnel, upon being notified, will know the right thing (

.;,1 to do and will do it promptly because they have been so trained; and

.,b (c) that any members of the public that should be evacuated will respond t

appropriately and will permit themselves to.be evacuated despite d

there having been no live drills or tests of the public response.

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{4 Underlying all of those is the need for the existence of dependable, prompt, and intelligible modes of communication amongst the emergency plan par-I ticipants and with the public. The referenced testimony is replete with

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p evidence confirming this. Examination by the Intervenors.and the Board

'g cast no doubt upon the adequacy of the communications equipment and the

.g various modes of communication. The Board finds these matters to be y

satisfactory.

62. We turn now to Item (a) above. In the event of an accident, TMI-2 personnel initially contact the State,Gouncil of Civil Defense Duty Officer and the Dauphin County Civil Defense Headquarters. Calls also would be i

made by Applicants directly to Pennsylvania State Police, Hershey Medical Center, and the Brookhaven Assistance Group, as necessary. The State's 4

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, this contention. This was Civil Defense (CD) Duty Officer is available twenty-four hours a day, seven Ith presented prepared days a week; the County Civil Defense Headquarters, which serves as the i

pt ng as its own the Ap-constant communications center for all emergencies in the county, is always

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manned. Similarly, Pennsylvania's Bureau of Radiological Health (BRH),

nnsylvania were from the which is the Commonwealth's expert radiological advisor and whose per-primony described the civ 1 sonnel are notified immediately by the state civil defense duty officer, main-

)that would be followed in tains a number of contact points where BRH representatives can be reached r power incident; and de-by the CD duty officer. Upon receipt of the call from the CD duty officer, the BRH representative then contacts TMI on one of its multiple phone jlvmg nonnuclear events pn, following Tr. 801).

lines to confirm the validity of the initial notice to CD and to receive details

,ts cfits review of the Am of the event. In the event that BRH cannot be contacted (considered remote he ability to provide early in view of BRH's multiple contact points and successful drills in the past),

f ation, and to mterface ap-civil defense could proceed based on Applicants' expen recommendations n Niel, following Tr.1701; as to the need for protective action.

63. The Dauphin County CD unit claims to have responded effectively proposed findings of the to several disasters over the past several years involving evacuation of the

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[f-those uncontradicted, public and the handling of physical injuries. These claims were not

of preparedness, nor that disputed. The Board finds that a randomly required initiation of the ap-i whom the success of the propriate emergency response plans will not fail due to any inability to con-adequate. We do address tact state and local officials.

e necessary for the success

64. Regarding item (b) as noted above, prior successful disaster f this contention, namely, responses (albeit to nonradiological events) also support the conclusion that e cvrilable to be contacted state and local officials are knowledgeable about their jobs. Joint In-tervenors and the Board were particularly interested in the effect on the will know the right thing emergency response plans if the state's lead radiological assessment agency,

[tave been so trained; and

, the Bureau of Radiological Health, should suffer a reduced capability.

be evacuated will respond This possibhty was suggested by a press release from the Department of En-to be evacuated despite vir nmental Resources, withm wh:ch BRH operates, mdicatmg that the state 1he public response.

budget may reduce funds for radiological monitoring (Board Exhibit 1).

NRC Staff witnesses, when presenteJ with information in the press release,

e of dependable, prompt, generally observed that the NRC requiics an adequate emergency plan, and f

t the emergency plan par-that should that plan become insufficient for some reason, the Applicants "

testimony is replete with would be required to fill the gap (Tr. 1075-1090). In fulfilling the Board's itervenors,and the Board request to specifically address the question of responsibilities (Tr.

ations equipment and the 1097-1099), the Staff determined that it would, in fact, have several options

_nds these matters to be available to it, including having the Applicants fill the void, looking to other groups within the state, or perhaps filling the void at the Federallevel int of an accident, TMI-2 r.1745-1749). Furthermore, the Staff's witness observed that the Ap-ivil Defense Duty Officer pb. cants monhodng capaMity outs

• th W wouM h mon than a6 rters. Calls also would be quate until such time as subsequent or supplemental monitoring teams t Police, Hershey Medical y

be avaHa& to th Commonwead LMeed, th E yonal omce as necessary. The State's itself could provide up to 20 additional inspectors, in addition to other

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teams from Brookhaven Laboratory and radiological teams from western Pennsylvania (Tr. 1806-1809).

65. The testimony stresses the drills and training that various emergency j

response groups undergo. The Commonwealth's civil defense witnesses saw I

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I no compromise of their own effectiveness of response because of their not having technical knowledge and training concerning radiological matters.

I Staff witnesses testified that the Commonwealth's BRH possessed the req-i uisite radiological know-how needed to assist with protection of the public T

health and safety. The Board finds that the evidence adequately supports "f

the conclusion that the effectiveness of state and local officials is based f.

upon an adequate knowledge of their job. These officials will not be hampered by not having had technical training in radiological matters.

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66. Finally, we address item (c), regarding the necessity of the public's being subjected to live tests or drills in order to insure that it will respond 3

appropriately. All witnesses agreed that members of the public need not be drilled to assure their proper response to emergency evacuation instruc-5[.

tions. Witnesses for the Commonwealth's CD organization explicitly of-fered the opinion that such drills might be counter-productive, citing a Stan-

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ford Research Institute study to support this opinion, and pointed to the ac-4 tual behavior of the public during disasters in their own recent experience as being satisfactory and supportive of the lack of need for drills. The Staff similarly cited an EPA evacuation study. Examination by the Intervenors y

elicited the information that conclusions regarding the lack of need for

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public drills were without the benefit of experience with radiological events i

reouiring evacuation. Nevertheless, the Board's examination revealed that p

such a diversity of nonradiological events had been successfully dealt with to provide confidence that drills are not necessary. Furthermore, the Board

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l additionally determined that the civil defense emergency preparedness I

d literature that has been disseminated to the public is being revised to include radiological awareness and response information. The ability of the Coun-ty's CD organization to adequately cope with the management of public vehicular traffic during an evacuation was also examined by the Board (Tr.

1731-1735; Tr.1840-1841; Tr. 2528-2541).

67. The Board thus finds that item (c) states an assumption ~ supported

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by a preponderance of the evidence. More broadly, we find that the record

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supports the conclusion that Contention 8, in its entirety, is without merit.

and that the Staff has properly assessed the adequacy and workability of the emergency response. We also find the emergency and evacuation plans to b

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f both adequate and workable.

Contention 9 I

The releases of gaseous radioactivity exceed the "as low as practicable 4

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l p,c. accibed a'nd evaluated, changes recommended by the Staff in the FSFES at paragraph 6.6.1, pages

,,. ius the operation of the 6-9, which changes the Board hereby adopts.

..e ine terrestrial and aquatic 116. In response to a Board question (Tr.145), both the Staff and the ul effects will be small. Fur-Applicants discussed FSFES Q11.1.6.2 dealing with the monitoring of mtute a minimal impact on radioactive releases entering the river. The Board has determined that the ses that the site is sufficiently operational radiciogical environmental monitoring program for Unit 2 will o hmited to relatively small include a composite water sampler capable of collecting hourly aliquot samples from the Susquehanna River one mile downstream of the plant discharge. Composited water samples will be analyzed monthly for gamma I

isotopic content and analyzed for Sr-89, Sr-90, and tritium, all on a quarter-JI monitoring programs have ly basis (testimeny of Joseph Osloond, following Tr.1062; Applicants' En-d's resolution of Conten-wr nmental Responses). The Board finds that the Staff and the Applicants W a hydrological monitoring ave sufGeiendy claMed the meaning of FSFES Q11.1.6.2, and that the sampIm, g program provides a means for confirming that concentrations of

{ includes measurements of rada, ctivity between the plant release point and the sampling location are m, turbidity, color, odor, and low.

I program was begun in May 117. The Board finds that the various preoperational and operational

• n ng programs performed or proposed by the Applicants, when 1strumented mast to measure 150-foot high meteorological rens% to mc% th Boads mohadons ad aMons, are adequate to

'ind speed and direction, am-f

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ical temperature differences, impacts which may result from the operation of TMI 2.

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d. Environmental Effects of Postulated Accidents

. Meteorological data collec-118..The environmental effects of postulated accidents have been as-that the Applicants submit a sessed by the Applicants (ER s7). The Staff has reviewed the Applicants' confirm its radiological im-assessment, has made independent calculations, and has concluded that the a collection will continue environmental risks are extremely small(FES QVI; FSFES Chapter 7). The in (FSFES {6.3.2).

radiological effects of accidents on the environment have been assessed i

) ting programs have been using the standard accident assumptions and guidance issued as a proposed

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ris of radiation and radioac-annex to Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 50 on December 1,1971 (36 FR j

FSFES Table 6.1). Monitor-22851). The annual potential radiation exposure of the population from all er operation of in-plant con.

postulated radiological accidents is assessed to be a very small fraction of

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!ctive r.iaterials and to assure the exposure from natural background. The Board thus finds that the en-in the environment (FSFES vironmental impact due to postulated radiological accidents is acceptably for the measurement of small.

L i the anticipated important ased by the Applicants has

e. Need for Power dnerally acceptable (FSFES additions to improve the ef-119. TMI-2 is to be a base loaded plant, which will contribute to meeting

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• the energy demand placed on the General Public Utilities (GPU) System.

1is acceptable, subject to the The General Public Utilities Corporation, with its subsidiaries, the Metropolitan Edison Company, the Pennsylvania Electric Company, and l

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