ML19308B937

Transcript of D Miller Interview by Util

ML19308B937
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	03/30/1979
From:	METROPOLITAN EDISON CO.
To:
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References
TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001170644
Download: ML19308B937 (6)

Text

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TMI STAFF INTERVIEW

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Don Miller 0100 Hrs. March 30, 1979 e

Conducted By:

R. Long and D. Reppert LONG:

This Bob Long talking. Don Reppert and I are going to interviev Don Miller. Don, would you gi,ve us your name and job function?

It is 0100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> on March 30, 1979.

MILLER:

My name is Don Miller, I'm an Auxiliary Operator-A at THI Unit II.

LONG:

Can you describe your location before and during the event, beginning about I hour before MILLER:

Beginning about I hour before the event, I was working on the condensate polishing system, transferring resins from Vessel #7 to the receiving tank to be regenerated. The resins were clogged in that line for approxi=2tely 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> and we were working on unclogging them.

It was a process of shooting it with air and water to try to push it through.

I was on that at least an hour before the trip. At the time of the trip, myself, my shift foreman, Fred Schiemann, and Harold Farst, another auxiliary operator-A were standing there discussing the problems we were having with this. The first thing...

l we heard something that sounded like a pu=p stop.

I'm sitting at a desk now.

Because the scenario report said that the condensate pump stopped and thinking back over it I can believe that is what I heard now.

We came down a ladder from where I was, and went around to look -

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at the condensate polishing panel and I lost all flow...all condensate flow through the polisher. Well, then they announced the turbine trip, and directly after that the reactor tripped.

So the first thing I did was go ahead and shutdown five of those polisher units.

Nor=al procedure is when we trip the turbine, or trip the reactor, we're coing to lose feed pu=ps and booster pu=ps.

So under nomal situatiens of coming right back up we only use two polishers, and that's the position I had to be into, and that's the position that I went to.

When I went to the panels, I noticed that my outlet valves.on the polisher vessels had failed shut.

So I just isolated the other five, left the two lines open, and was ready to go.

Then I decided to go up to C

the control room to see if there was anything else, and/or what was going to be coming on next. While making a last double-check, as I started to.

go between condensate 2A booster pump and the panel, the line there shook about two and one-half to three feet. Then I turna.d around and went back around beMnd the panel and up the steps to the control room.

When I got up to the control room, they said, "Is the polisher lined up and ready to go?" and I said, "It's lined up the way it should be in this situation." They said, "OK", and we stood there a few minutes. Then they sent me down to check, and double-check just to make sure everything was all right.

S'o I went back down and discovered a valve leaking, the suction valve to the '2A booster pump.

I called the control room and told them the situation, took the chain lock off; actually, I broke it off. Then, I started closing the suction valve and a few minutes later I got so=e help from two other operators to get it shut.

So we isolated that pu=p and they knew of that problem. We went back upstairs, and they said we still didn't have any condensate flow. And I said, " Bypass around the polishers because 8001170

1 that thing had failed shut." Nobody knew for sure.

So they hit the button, somebody up there said that they had hit the button, and it didn't go open.

Then they sent us down there to check it manually.

When we got down there, the handwheel was missing, but we did get it open =anually.

The hand wheel wasn't on but it was laying there and we were able to get it on and get it open.

Then after that sequence of events, I went back upstairs, and it was jus t a

=atter of running here and there for odd jobs.

I got sent to the primary side to check the precsurizer level.

The reading I got was 300 inches in the pressurizer which I read on the indication down in the makeup valve alley.

The rest of it was, I don't know how far into it, or how much time lag we're talking about or how much time was involved in this; I don't have any idea.

LONG:

Uh-huh.

MILLER:

And then, from then on, it was just double-check other things.

LONG:

Did you have any procedure, a checklist, or anything or do you just know these things that you should do?

MILLER:

Certain things, from operating the systems, you know have to be done. For an emergency situation like that, a checklist would be just in the road as far as you know.

It's great when you're finished.

Maybe you could look at it and say, "Well, I didn't get this", but I don't see where you have the'

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time, you know, to use it right at that time. And you wouldn't be able to carry it with you all the time.

LONG:

At the time you didn't assume you had an emergency.

Right?

MILLER:

Well, I knew we had an emergency, but not in the sense that we have the emergency problems that we do now.

I never dreamed of anything like that.

LONG:

You assu=ed you had a trip?

MILLER:

Right, and I just went back to normal situations when the turbine trips.

LONG:

In the past, have you been on shift when the turbine tripped?

MILLER:

Yes.

LONG:

And you followed the same steps basically?

MILLER:

Yes.

I haven't always been at the polisher, but that's one of the systems that I supposedly know a little more about than a lot of other people because I spent a lot of time there when they were getting it squared away in the first place. But anytime we core back up or go down we always take those polishers off in order, and they aldays need 2 on unless your going to shutdown co=)1etely because you still need the two on until youk com-pletely down.

The vacuums broken, so I just left two of them lined up nor= ally.

LONG:

Don, frem the control room standpoint, did you feel like the instructions you were getting there were making sense?

J

I

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' MILLER:

Knowing the situation, what they were going through up there and the infor-r.ation they were asking for, I think definitely the questions they were asking made sense. The other thing was we ran around and checked that pressurizer level.

For some reason they didn't think the one they had was right and we double checked it with the local indi cator. Actually, I believe everything they did was valid, as far as you know, what they sent us out to check.

.LONG:

Uh-huh.

MILLER:

The thing is I was involved mostly on the secondary side of the plant.

And what was going on in the primary side of the plant, I really had no idea.

!LONG:

Who were you getting the instructions from?

MILLER:

The trip to the pri=ary side to check that level came from the shift super-visor, and most of my other stuff came from the two control room operators.

!LONG:

You don't have anybody under you, I guess.

' HILLER:

No.

lLONG:

None that your responsible for? One of the questions that Dick (Wilson) suggested is, "Was there hardware needed, but not available?" One piece of hardware needed was the wheel that you found.

I.IIR:

The handwheel was laying over there. Yea, it shouldn't have been off.

It's an, electrically operated valve.

It wouldn't open anyway. You know some-times we would run into a problem with that type of valve.

If you don't have an equalizing pressure across the valve you have to break it off the seat before the. electrical operator would take over.

I don't know if there is any way of correcting that problem.

LONG:

How long did you stay on? Did you stay over that morning?

MILLER:

Yes, I was on the island, I would say, at least 'til 11 o' clock, LONG:

Were you working, or did you just go to a holding area?

MELLER:

I'd say we actually worked 'til 9 o' clock. When the site emergency was declared, it was actually 7 o' clock. We went to our normal ECS area. And then they'd just take an operator as they needed. For the first couple hours we were used pretty much because we had a good idea of where we were.

.LONG:

Uh-huh.

MILLERt Then after that, you know, they just kcpt assigning jobs. Then they just started taking the people that were just ccming in and giving the guys that were there all night the benefit of the break.

i LnNG:

So after the emergency procedure, and I'm not too familiar with it, you were sent to the control point?

!.'CLIER:

Righ t.

1

&CNG:

And then from there you were assigned tasks until' about 9 o' clock.

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MILLER:

Uh-huh.

_s.hG:

And then you started the process of checking out from the Island?

MILLER:

No, until 9 o' clock we were used basically from ECS all the time.

They were always taking operators. But the last two hours I was still there available, but I just wasn't us'ed for anything from say 9 o' clock 'til 11 o' clock.

LONG:

Uh-huh.

MILLER:

And then from 11:00 (a.m.) till 1:30 (p.m.) was the time I actually started getting processed. They made radiation checks, they monitored the cars over at the 500 kV substation, and everything, and until we were finally cleared to go home, it was 1:30.

LONG:

OK, then when did you come back on?

MILLER:

11:00 that night.

LONG:

At what point did you personally become aware that there might be radiation hazards?

MILLER:

When they gave the site emergency. When they announced the site emergency was the first indication I had of anything like that.

• ]iG:

What time was that?

([bLLER:I thf ak it was 6:40, somewhere around 7:00, give or take 15-20 minutes s eme.wh ere.

LONG:

Did you get any infor=ation at that point? Other than the alarm did any-body...?

MILLER:

Well, they gave the alarm.

LONG:

Did they give you some explanation about what...?

MILLER:

Well, this is the first site emergency that I have,been involved in except tests.

The thing I got out of it right away was that they declared a site emergency; the alarm was sounded and they said evacuate the auxiliary building.

So right away I figured there was some type of airborne radiation in the aux building, cause that's usually why and the only reason why.

LONG:

And you were in the turbine building at that time?

MILLER:

I was in the turbine building.

LoliG:

OK.

You didn't get an explanation of the situation, at least at that point?

MTLLIR:

Not at that point.

LONG:

Fres you knowledge of the polishers did you =ake any rece==endations to anybody about things they ought to try to do or were you pretty much...?

FULLER:

You mean at the time or over the past couple days?

==

LONG,*

Over tha pact couplo days.

"I,LLER:

Not in the last couple days or months even. A lot of things seemed to be squared away. The only thing I found out was that I was definitely mis-infor=ed on the outlet valves of the vessels themselves. There's an over-ride on them that should leave them in the open position and I thought this would prevent them from closing. Well, it will prevent them from closing electrically, but not with a loss of air.

FFIDERICK:

Want ce to standby?

LONG:

Yes, just for a few minutes. We'll be with you in just a noment.

MILLER:

So, I don't have enough engineering knowledge to know exactly what should be done - if they should be made failed open, or faf. led as is, or whatever.

Just thinking abouc it myself, I could see that I'd like to see those valves fail as is. in the future that way, with the loss of a pu=p or even the situation where I believe they got - that's so=ething I missed.

Sone-where in tin course of the night, in all that havoc, or running around doing diffeccat jobs, I met a guy at the instrument air compressor and the receiving tanks. We drained water out of one of the tanks, in particular about 7 minutes.

So so=ehow or another there was water in the air systems, too.

That's what caused those valves to fail shut.

But I'm pretty sure that happened after the trip, just going from the co=puter reports and thinking back now at what I actually heard.

If those valves had failed as is, I don't think we vould have got in quite the problem we did. The one that was shut, because it was not in service, would have stayea that way and the other seven would have stayed in service the way they were and we

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still would have gotten water flow through with the one condensate pump and the two booster pu=ps that were still running.

1.ONG:

What have you been doing in the last two nights? This is the...

.i MILLER:

Well, lasti night.

I REPPERT:

The second night, I guess.

I MILLER:

That was all right. That was the night it happened, and last night, it i

vould have been - Wednesday morning is when it happened.

Thursday morning was last night, this is Friday morning, I do know where I'm at.

Last night when we came in, we came in the north gate. We didn't know what to expect-anyway.

So they sent us to the Observation Center an! there we got on coveralls and got an idea. Well, they just got us together and got us j

clearance to get on the Island to our respective control rooms.

Up there we i

were told that we would wear respirators everywhere but in the control l

building and in the control room.. We just_ did little odd jobs here _and there. Andfwe picked 7up all the Scott air packs. laying around that.were contaminated or not and brought them out to vhere they could all get new:

air bottles-on themL

~~

And then one ofsthe Aux operators, Terry Daugherty, went in the pri=ary side.

For approxi=ately 15 minutes he was in and out.

In there we were vcaring double rubber suits and Scott air packs and everything. With three Aux-A operators, we had to =ake four trips.

I was the fortunate one, I went l

the last two times.

For some reason or another the radiation levels really

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fell off from the time the guy in the middle went in until the time I

. went in.. The guy that went in first, well they claim his dosimetry read

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350 to 400 mrem for the fifteen minutes he was in there. The second guys read about 500 mrem.

In the two trips I made I got 90 mrem.

So radiation levels considerably fell off. But basically that's what we did all last night.

LONG:

^Whes.yous$y youNat _ int'o the primary side, was thatin to the Aux ;

building?

MILLER:

Yea, ' the - Auxiliary building..

FIPPERT:

That would be a good thing to clarify.

MILLER:

So, they don't think we were in there (contain=ent).

LONG:

When we get this transcribed, you can look at it and see if there is any-thing that you want to change.

Can you think of anything else, Don (Reppert)?

FIPPERT:

You mentioned earlier, when you started to describe what happened that you noticed a pipe move two or three feet.

Do you have any idea why?

MILLER:

The only thing I can see is -

REPPERT:

Is it like a water ha=mer or -

ifILLER:

That's what I thoroughly believe.

LONG:

What size pipe are you talking about?

MILLER:

24-inch diameter. That's why I politely turned around and walked behind it.

It's a condensate suction line.

I've seen it move a little bit before, you known in startup it expands and contracts, but nothing like that.

LONG:

And this was a sudden move?

MILLER:

Uh-huh. All of it was going at one time.

But I wasn't going to stay around to watch either.

LONG:

That might be important. We'll try to put it together, the fact that you saw that could be important.

MILLER:

I would guess that it was within the first 5 to 10 minutes of the trip that that actually happened.

LONG:

OK good, that helps too to have it placed in time.

MILLER:

Cause I hadn't gotten away from the panel yet. You know, I was still checking the ' stuff there.

VIPPERT:

If you don't think of anything else?

l v/)

END OF IhTERVIEW WITH DON MILLER.

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